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The INF Treaty of 1987

A Reappraisal



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Edited by

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Philipp Gassert/Tim Geiger/Hermann Wentker

Preface

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed on December 8, 1987 in Washington by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, was a milestone in nuclear disarmament and a decisive step towards ending the Cold War. To mark the thirtieth anniversary of this monumental event, the Berlin Center of Cold War Studies, the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History, and the Department of History of the University of Mannheim got together to hold a conference at the European Academy in Berlin. This took place between November 30 and December 2, 2017, under the title, “The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal.” The present volume contains the revised proceedings.

It was a memorable conference. The organizers were the three editors of this book along with Bernd Greiner. Many others contributed to the conference’s success. First, we would like to thank the German Foundation for Peace Research, the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation, and the Humboldt University Berlin for the generous financial support that made the conference possible. Secondly, we would like to thank those who chaired the various panels: Dr. Bernd Rother, Dr. Arvid Schors, Prof. Dr. H el ene Miard-Delacroix, and Dr. Agnes Bresselau von Bressendorf. We are also very much indebted to Dr. Bettina Greiner and Sophie Lange for the excellent organization of the conference, which included a public panel discussion, chaired by Bernd Greiner, in the Humboldt University Berlin. On the panel were: Susanne Baumann, Dr. Oliver Meier, Otfried Nassauer, and Prof. Dr. Andreas Wirsching.

Prof. Dr. Leopoldo Nuti and William Alberque, who gave papers at the conference, had to drop out of the published proceedings, but we thank them for the helpful contributions they made to our discussions in Berlin. Two essays in this book are by authors only approached later. We are very grateful to Wolfgang Richter for agreeing to take on the complicated task of summarizing the intrusive INF verification system, and our special thanks go too to Prof. Dr. Ulrich K uhn, who discusses the present problems and prospects of the INF Treaty. Finally, we would like to thank Cedric Bierganns, Richard Rohrmoser, and Philipp Scherzer for issuing two conference reports.

Our last words of thanks go to those who helped us prepare the text of this volume, especially our English copy-editor, Jon Ashby, who turned the submitted papers into highly readable English essays, and our student assistants, Leila Esh and Philipp Scherzer.

Philipp Gassert/Tim Geiger/Hermann Wentker

“The Reward of a Thing Well Done Is to Have Done It”: The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019

An Introduction

On December 8, 1987 U.S. President Ronald Reagan welcomed his Soviet counterpart General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the East Room of the White House for the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).¹ As they were preparing to sit down at the massive oak table, once used by Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet at the time of the American Civil War, Reagan joked that the idea behind the INF Treaty had been “disarmingly simple.” Unlike previous treaties, “it didn’t simply codify the status quo.” As the President made clear: “For the first time in history, the language of ‘arms control’ was replaced by ‘arms reduction’—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.” Quoting Russian proverbs, Reagan took credit for having invented the “zero option” six years earlier. He also expressed his hope that the INF Treaty would not remain “an end in itself,” but be “the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us.”²

Gorbachev joined Reagan in stressing the historic significance of the moment, claiming that their mutual venture had “a universal significance for mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism.” He exhorted his American partners, to “take full advantage of that chance and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children and grandchildren and for their children and grandchildren the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction.” Yet, he seemed a bit less triumphant, a bit more somber, a bit more skeptical than Reagan when it came “to bestow laurels upon each other.” For Gorbachev that was still “too early.” Smiling at Reagan, he quoted the famous nineteenth-century American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: “The reward of a thing well done is to have done it.” It would be up to future

1 “Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and Vow to Work for Greater Reductions,” in: *The New York Times*, December 9, 1987, p. A1.

2 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, “Remarks on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” December 8, 1987, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/120887c> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

generations to “hand down their verdict on the importance of the event which we are about to witness.”³

Now, thirty years later, a generation has passed. With the benefit of hindsight and access to new primary sources, we can take up Gorbachev’s challenge. What historical “verdict” do we pass on the 1987 Reagan–Gorbachev agreement today? On the surface, things look far from good: the world is in a dismal state with regard to nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s crowning achievement—for which the two could jointly have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—is now obsolete.⁴ As early as 2014, the Obama Administration started publicly to complain that Russia was in violation of the Treaty: Moscow was developing a new class of medium-range missiles.⁵ Then, on October 20, 2018, two years into his Presidency, President Donald J. Trump announced that the U. S. would withdraw from the INF Treaty “in response to Russia’s longstanding violation of its obligations.”⁶ On February 1, 2019, U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, gave a formal six-month notice of America’s intention to withdraw if Russia would not return “to full and verifiable compliance.” Otherwise, he said, “the Treaty will end.”⁷ Accordingly, on August 2, 2019, Pompeo declared that the INF Treaty had ceased to exist. Shortly thereafter the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that it was “formally dead.”⁸

Thus, after 32 years, the INF Treaty has been relegated to Leon Trotsky’s famous “dustbin of history.” Reagan, Gorbachev, and their advisors, along with the representatives of their respective allies, may have done their “thing well” during the second half of the 1980s, as many of the contributions in this volume demonstrate, yet, their more hyperbolic expectations and historic predictions have not come true. Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s children and grandchildren are not living in a nuclear-free world. To the contrary. While few contemporaries of 1987 expected that *all* nuclear weapons could be abolished, they certainly thought that a “new thinking” had taken hold in international rela-

3 Ibid.

4 In 1990, Gorbachev alone was granted the Nobel Prize for his policy of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* and “for his leading role in the peace process which today characterizes important parts of the international community.” See <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1990/gorbachev/facts/> (last accessed March 10, 2020).

5 Amy F. Wolf (Congressional Research Service), “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated August 2, 2019, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

6 “Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure,” October 20, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-air-force-one-departure-4/> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

7 “U. S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty,” Press Statement by Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo, February 2, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-intent-to-withdraw-from-the-inf-treaty-february-2-2019/> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

8 “INF Nuclear Treaty: U. S. Pulls Out of Cold-War Era Pact With Russia,” BBC News, August 2, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

tions.⁹ Yet, the opposite seems to be happening in recent years. Both, Russia and the United States are developing new and more sophisticated weapons, partly in response to a rising People's Republic of China.¹⁰ In this perspective, future historians may see the ending of the INF Treaty as collateral damage arising from the failure of Russian and American containment efforts vis-à-vis Beijing. Whatever the reasons, the revocation of the INF Treaty taken together with an increasingly hostile U.S.–Russian relationship further undermines an already fragile post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. At the same time, Europeans, Americans, and Russians are at loggerheads over the best strategy for preventing Iran from becoming the tenth nuclear power.¹¹

To the public eye, this all seems to be quite a turnaround from the situation even a decade ago when, in 2009, U. S. President Barack Obama delivered a famous speech in Prague to the thundering applause of his Czech audience, in which he envisioned “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a *world without nuclear weapons*.”¹² A few days later, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the “New START Treaty,” which further limited the strategic arsenals of the U. S. and Russia. Moreover, Obama promised new domestic political efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of September 10, 1996 and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1, 1968, pointing to North Korea and Iran as imminent threats, but also to the need to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, in this same speech, Obama thanked both the Czech and the Polish governments for their courage in hosting a new American missile defense system. While ostensibly this was meant to protect Europe from an Iranian attack, it gave Russia an excuse to allege that the U. S. was not keeping to its side of the grand bargain struck in the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹³ Therefore, despite all the extraordinary

9 To invoke Gorbachev’s iconic phrase, see Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Europe, 1985–1989, in: Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (eds.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War. A Reappraisal*, London/New York 2008, pp. 23–25; Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev and the “New Political Thinking”, in: Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler, and Arnold Suppan (eds.), *The Revolutions of 1989. A Handbook*, Vienna 2015, pp. 33–46.

10 Both Russia and the U.S. saw themselves hemmed in by the INF Treaty with regard to the options available to them to respond to the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons by China and by North Korea; see the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume.

11 See the speech by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, *After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy*, May 21, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/after-the-deal-a-new-iran-strategy/>; Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, January 14, 2020, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2292574> (last accessed March 22, 2020).

12 Remarks by Barack Obama in Prague, April 5, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered> (last accessed January 30, 2020), emphasis ours.

13 See the contributions by Ulrich Kühn and Oliver Bange in this volume as well as David Parker, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia in the Post-Cold War Era. Ideational Legacies and Institutionalized Conflict and Co-Operation*, London/New York 2019, pp. 198–204.

attention that the Trump Administration's recent actions are receiving, we should not forget that Russian–American relations were turning sour even during the Obama years. This became most clearly visible with the Russian occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. But nuclear disarmament had already become a contentious issue in 2010. Future historians may find more continuity than change when it comes to the foreign policies of the Obama and Trump Administrations.¹⁴

Though the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty produced a short-lived outcry, surprisingly few people seem to be losing their sleep over a new “nuclear threat” in Europe today. Almost all the public attention of Europeans goes to global warming, the wars in the Near and Middle East, the questions brought up by refugees and illegal migration, and now by new pandemic diseases. When it comes to nuclear weapons, those who comment are mostly talking about Iran and North Korea, all but ignoring the new nuclear buildup in their immediate neighborhood. Although European NATO members formally backed the American allegations, they did not do so wholeheartedly. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg cautiously stated that the “allies agree that the *most plausible* assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty.”¹⁵ In October 2018, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said he regretted the American decision. He criticized Russia for failing to clarify the “serious allegations that it has violated the INF Treaty.”¹⁶ Moreover, Maas lamented the end of the Treaty because “a piece of Europe’s security has been lost.”¹⁷ Yet, the German Federal Government, while it officially continues to pursue the increasingly elusive goal of a Reaganesque INF “global zero,” does not seem to give a possible new arms race in Europe much urgent consideration because of other, more pressing issues. France, after Brexit the last nuclear power within the European Union, seems to be slightly more concerned. French President Emmanuel Macron has criticized the apparent lack of awareness of most Europeans with regard to a new Russian nuclear missile threat, now that the INF Treaty has become obsolete.¹⁸

14 On continuity vs. change in U.S. Foreign Relations see Timothy J. Lynch, *In the Shadow of the Cold War. American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump*, Cambridge 2020.

15 Amy F. Wolf (CRS), “U.S. Withdrawal from INF Treaty: What is Next?”, Updated January 2, 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF11051.pdf> (last accessed January 30, 2020), emphasis ours.

16 “Foreign Minister Maas on the U.S. announcement that it is withdrawing from the INF Treaty”, October 21, 2018, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-inf-treaty/2151874> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

17 “Foreign Minister Maas on the end of the INF Treaty”, August 2, 2019, <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/maas-inf-treaty-end/2237298> (last accessed January 30, 2020).

18 Speech of French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy delivered on February 7, 2020, <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy>.

1. What Was the INF Treaty? And What Can We Learn from It?

German Foreign Minister Maas's August 2, 2019 statement correctly points to an apparently forgotten fact: that the 1987 INF Treaty was about a new security architecture for Europe. Its structure was put in place in the years between 1987 and 1994—during the last years of the Cold War and the first decade after its end. The INF Treaty became the first milestone of this new architecture of “relaxing tensions”, which was clearly characterized by a massive reduction of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas the INF Treaty had only reduced a very small number of the overall nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991 (expired in 2009) led to deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. Moreover, the so-called “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives” of 1991/92 melted away the bulk of U.S. and Soviet short-range tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons.¹⁹ With the peaceful revolutions and the end of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, a new era of democracy, international cooperation, harmony and trust seemed to emerge. The “Charter of Paris for a new Europe,” signed by 34 heads of states and governments on November 21, 1990, is the best known manifesto of this burgeoning optimistic belief in a “New World Order.” Moreover, the so-called “Helsinki process” was made permanent by the transformation of the noncommittal “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” (CSCE) into a more ambitious “Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” (OSCE) in 1994.²⁰

The INF Treaty of 1987 was the landmark starting point of this epochal development. Most importantly, it abolished a whole class of nuclear weapons that would have carried their “payloads” (nuclear warheads) to a European theater of war and to the two Germanies in particular.

At the end of the day, the INF Treaty may have helped to increase *Europe's* security, but we should keep in mind that, of course, neither of the superpowers acted for primarily altruistic reasons or just to please their European allies. Quite the opposite. For the Soviet Union, the deployment of the fast-flying American Euromissiles was a devastating move against its security. The ballistic Pershing II missiles could reach their Soviet destinations within less than 15 minutes, reducing the time to reflect and react nearly to nil.²¹ Worse, the USSR had

19 See the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume.

20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Our History”, <https://www.osce.org/whatisosce> (last accessed February 6, 2020); on the Helsinki process see Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah Snyder (eds.), *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies, and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, New York/Oxford 2019.

21 The Soviet Union, as well as Western peace movements, postulated that the flight-time of a Pershing II from launch to impact would add up to 5 to 8 minutes whereas NATO's military experts calculated about 15 to 20 minutes. This difference was due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact's flight reconnaissance had a lower performance than NATO's. It thus could verify Pershing II launches only after about 10 minutes as West German diplomats realized quite

no antidotes whatsoever against this lethal threat. In his memoirs, Gorbachev leaves no doubt that the INF Treaty massively improved the security of the Soviet Union: “By signing the INF Treaty we had literally removed a pistol held to our head.”²² The United States mainland, of course, was never directly threatened by Soviet intermediate-range missiles (except for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands). Nevertheless, Washington felt relieved by the “decoupling” effect of the Treaty. Henceforward, the U. S. regained its free hand in choosing how to react to a case of Soviet aggression in Europe, without automatically being drawn into a nuclear exchange with its Cold War adversary right from the very beginning of any ensuing military conflict.

In his manifesto *Perestroika*, published in late 1987, Gorbachev proclaimed: “The INF Treaty represented the first well-prepared step on our way out of the Cold War, the first harbinger of the new times.”²³ Some contemporaries went even further, claiming that this ground-breaking agreement had ended the Cold War altogether. Political Scientist Francis Fukuyama famously talked about the end of the Cold War epoch in a piece published during the summer of 1989, months before the final crisis of Communism; and historian John Lewis Gaddis, then the doyen of American Cold War Studies, wrote in his 1987 study *The Long Peace* as if he were looking back to a bygone period.²⁴ With superpower conflict gone, and the nuclear arms race over, the Cold War had seemingly ceased to exist. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that this assumption was rather premature. Regional “East–West” conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Angola were far from being over in 1987. Moreover, the collapse of the Socialist states in Eastern Europe and of the USSR itself was still two or three years away. Nevertheless, while historians have engaged in a long-standing argument over the extent to which ideological or geopolitical conflicts drove the Cold War, the “nuclear arms race” was certainly one of its defining features. Today, the “new

late in spring 1983. See Memorandum of Political Director in the FRG’s Foreign Office, Pfeffer, January 28, 1983, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik (henceforward: AAPD) 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Doc. 20, p. 103, Footnote 8.

22 Mikhail Gorbatschow, *Memoirs*, New York 1996, p. 444. Gorbachev had already used the metaphor of the Pershing II as “a gun pressed to our temple” in a preparatory meeting for the Reykjavik summit on October 4, 1986; see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), *The Last Superpower Summits*, Budapest/New York 2016, p. 163.

23 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York/London 1988, p. 443.

24 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, in: *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, Oxford 1987; see also Nicholas Guyatt, *The End of the Cold War*, in: Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, Oxford 2013, pp. 605–622; Jonathan Hunt and David Reynolds, *Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, 1985–1988*, in: Kristina Spohr and David Reynolds (eds.), *Transcending the Cold War. Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990*, Oxford 2016, pp. 153–174.

missile crisis,” which in 2019 led to the end of the INF Treaty, may bring us “back to the future” of the 1980s.²⁵

So, what was the now defunct INF Treaty?

First, the INF Treaty abolished all American and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures. These were to be scrapped within three years from when the Treaty entered into force.²⁶ This so-called “double zero option” referred to the removal of both long-range INF (LRINF 1,000–5,000 km) as well as shorter-range INF (SRINF 500–1,000 km) missiles from Europe.

This means, *second*, that air- or sea-launched missiles were not covered, nor were the atomic warheads necessarily destroyed.²⁷ The INF Treaty talks addressed only a certain type of missiles and their support structures—a point which is often overlooked. This does not diminish the overall diplomatic importance of the Treaty, but it does put the achievement of Reagan and Gorbachev into perspective.

Third, the INF Treaty eradicated a whole category of nuclear weapons. By May 31, 1991, at the end of the three-year destruction period that had started with the exchange of the instruments of ratification by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on June 1, 1988, exactly 1,846 Soviet and 846 American INF missiles were to be eliminated.²⁸ These 2,692 missiles amounted to just 3 to 4 per cent of the existing nuclear arsenals.²⁹ This fact—that

25 Which is one of the scenarios that Ulrich Kühn lays out in his contribution.

26 Which meant after ratification. In the American case, this gained Senate approval on May 27, 1988. Ratification happened on June 1, 1988; on ratification see Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991*, London 2015, p. 296; Maynard W. Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, New York/Basingstoke 2006, pp. 223–233.

27 In one of the annexes to the INF Treaty, in the “Protocol on Procedures governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems”, Article II, No. 3 it was laid down: “Prior to a missile’s arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.” See <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf4.htm>. As the “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” reported in autumn 1990, the nuclear warhead of the dismantled Pershing II (W85) was on the verge of returning to Europe as a recycled and converted new nuclear bomb, also based on the original warhead ground-model B61 Mod. See Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, *Beating Swords into Swords*, in: *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46/9 (1990), pp. 14–17. See also “Aus alt mach neu”, in: *Stern* No. 45, October 31, 1990.

28 Up to May 1991, the United States eliminated 234 Pershing II and 443 BGM-109 Cruise Missiles, as well as 169 Pershing IA SRINF missiles, while the Soviet Union eliminated 654 SS-20, 149 SS-4, 6 SS-5, and 80 SSC-X-4 INF missiles, as well as 239 SS-23 and 718 SS-12 SRINF missiles. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology*, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm> (last accessed March 11, 2020). On treaty implementation see the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

29 See Telegram No. 2448 of German Ambassador Hellbeck, Beijing, on conversation between Bavarian Premier Minister Franz Josef Strauß and Chinese Premier minister Zhao Ziyang, October 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 288, p. 1469. On the Soviet side, the percentage of eliminated nuclear weapons from the global stockpile was estimated at 4 per cent, Eduard

the INF Treaty left about 97 per cent of the then nuclear stockpiles completely untouched—was vociferously pointed out by critics of the agreement at the time, but it seems to be forgotten by most historians or political observers nowadays.

Fourth, the British and French had “independent deterrents”, and these were not included in the nuclear disarmament talks of the two superpowers. This was the result of long and protracted diplomatic wrestling which had gone on ever since the superpowers started the Geneva INF negotiations after NATO’s Dual-Track Decision in 1979. Although initially, during his visit to Moscow on July 1, 1980, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) had been told by the Soviet leadership that the French and British “third countries systems” were not supposed to be part of future INF Talks between the superpowers,³⁰ the USSR soon pressed for their inclusion in the Geneva talks. Though sections of Western Europe’s political elites and societies were inclined to accept this Soviet demand, it did not become NATO policy. Keeping the British and French nuclear weapons out of an INF deal remained a precondition for the Alliance. It was Gorbachev who, in 1986, finally accepted that an INF Treaty would solely deal with American and Soviet systems. In this way he helped to overcome one major obstacle that had hitherto caused stalemate in the negotiations.³¹

Fifth, the INF Treaty bound only the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and accordingly its successor state Russia). As a bilateral agreement it could not take care of any future INF proliferation. That China might at some stage become a potential threat was not yet regarded as a matter of great urgency back in 1987. However, already at the time of the negotiations, members of the Soviet military had misgivings about leaving East Asia out. Western experts were aware of this, too, but given the situation in the 1980s, East–West issues took priority over anything else.³²

Sixth, one can therefore argue that the INF Treaty was a product of the Cold War world order, in which the superpower (or East–West) conflict was dominant. While the INF Treaty helped the powers overcome this conflict and contributed to the fall of Communism in Europe, its value was much diminished in a post-Cold War world marked by the rise of new nuclear powers such as China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Why should Russia or the United States, so the reasoning goes, have continued to bind themselves by a pact that was tying their hands in their strategic rivalry with China?³³

Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, London 1991, p. 92; Aleksandr G. Savel’ev and Nikolaj N. Detinov, *The Big Five. Arms Control and Decision Making in the Soviet Union*, Westport, Conn. 1995, p. 137.

30 Memorandum of Conversation, in: AAPD 1980, Munich 2011, Doc. 193, p. 1038.

31 See the contributions by Oliver Barton and Christian Wenkel to this volume.

32 For the Asian aspects of the INF Talks see Glitman, *Last Battle of the Cold War*, pp. 145–156.

33 See the chapter by Ulrich Kühn in this volume; also see Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes (eds.), *North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century. Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World*, Cham 2018.

Even though the INF Treaty is dead, what lessons does it hold for us today?

First of all, many historians, along with international relations and security experts, agree that, despite being a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States only, the INF Treaty was a core piece, central to the formation of a new and multilateral post-Cold War security architecture for Europe.

Second, it helped to end the Cold War and to create an international environment conducive to the post-Communist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.

Third, given that the post-Cold War order was already coming to an end in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the “war on terror” helped to push America in new directions, it is actually surprising that the INF Treaty managed to survive for more than 30 years, making it one of the longest-lasting international disarmament treaties ever.

Fourth, while its demise was perhaps overdue, its emergence was a bit of a surprise. It took only four years, after a new heightening of tensions during the early 1980s and the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe as part of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision in late 1983, before the INF Treaty was signed.³⁴ It was a policy reversal that made contemporaries gasp.

Fifth, a key element was “trust”. The 1983–87 reversal would not have been possible, if Reagan and Gorbachev had not learned to trust each other and if their advisors as well as their societies had not gone along.³⁵

Thus, the history of the INF Treaty may hold a tentatively optimistic message for the future, despite its recent demise. If the conditions are right, trust can be built step by step and lead to astounding results. It is often said, that trust is something that needs work,³⁶ and in general terms this is certainly true. But it

34 The Dual-Track (or sometimes Double-Track) Decision has been treated extensively in the literature, see the previous volume by the editors, Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011, as well as Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D.C./Stanford, Cal. 2015; Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990*, New York/Oxford 2012; Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016.

35 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, *Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty*, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), *Trust, But Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, Washington, D.C. 2016, pp. 121–139.

36 George H. W. Bush wrote in hindsight: “You can’t develop or earn this mutual trust and respect unless you deliberately work at it.” Quoted in J. Simon Rofe, *Trust between Adversaries and Allies. President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War*, in: Klimke, Kreis, Ostermann (eds.), *Trust*, pp. 63–81, here p. 63; on trust see the contribution by Bernd Greiner to this volume.

seems that the work of building personal trust between political leaders does *not* need years and years of previous cooperation—as Reagan and Gorbachev realized quite rapidly in 1986–87.³⁷ Nevertheless, since it was definitely in the *interest* of both sides to *trust* each other, one can say that without this interest a trust-based relationship would not have emerged.³⁸ Though the INF Treaty may now be history, its genesis as well as its legacies may offer us valuable insights and lessons. It is these that this volume will address. The five thematic sections of our book will look at the superpower negotiations (I), then move on to the reactions of Western (II) and Eastern Allies (III), before surveying the socio-political contexts in selected countries (IV). The final chapters will examine the legacy of the INF Treaty and attempt a look into the future (V).

2. It Takes Two to Tango: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Superpowers

A history of the INF Treaty needs to start with Ronald Reagan—as the contributions in the first section of this volume demonstrate. But then we need to move swiftly on to Gorbachev, though he did not enter the scene until 1985. So, Reagan happens to be first, since he was the first to come up publicly with what would later be called the “zero option,” which became the core principle of the INF Treaty. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 1981, he proposed the cancellation of American “deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over

37 Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), *The Last Superpower Summits. Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War*, New York 2016; Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991*, London 2015.

38 That old habits die hard is shown by the fact that the visit of Secretary Shultz to the USSR in April 1987, which brought Gorbachev’s offer of the double zero solution was in instant danger of cancellation because of allegations that the KGB had bugged the construction area of the new American Embassy in Moscow; see George Pratt Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, pp. 889–891; for the Soviet side Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter*, University Park 1997, pp. 65f. Another telling episode was witnessed by Colin Powell, in winter 1987, as Reagan’s National Security Advisor. He remembers that the National Security Agency, the CIA and other intelligence agencies heavily tapped the White House before the signing ceremony of the INF Treaty in order to get information about the Soviet “nuclear football” that of course permanently accompanied the General Secretary just as did the nuclear emergency satchel of the President on the American side: “Anybody walking across the White House lawn wearing a pacemaker during the summit would be lucky not to be microwaved.” See Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, New York 1995, p. 358.

the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind.”³⁹

Reagan’s speech caused consternation among some of his advisors as well as among his adversaries. It also left some of the NATO Allies puzzled.⁴⁰ But it fits well with his overall, relatively consistent approach to nuclear weapons as both *Beth Fischer* and *Ronald Granieri* argue in their contributions to this volume. Not hesitating to compare the “zero option” to the “race to the moon,” which epitomized the high point of superpower Cold War rivalry, Reagan also linked his proposal to earlier efforts of détente. It is worthwhile re-reading Reagan’s speech, because Reagan places himself in the context of the Nixon–Kissinger approach to the Soviet Union, which has often been contrasted with an allegedly more “hawkish” Reaganesque or “neo-conservative” approach.⁴¹ Quoting from a letter he had written to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev earlier that year, Reagan reminded the General Secretary that he had been first introduced to Brezhnev by Nixon, when in June 1973 the two leaders had met at Nixon’s western home in San Clemente.⁴² At that time Reagan was serving as Governor of California:

Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.⁴³

Few took Reagan’s reference to détente at face value. The way he reminded his audience of a tradition of mutual interaction and negotiation was probably seen as a clever PR trick disguising a more sinister agenda. After all, Reagan had been elected as a staunch anti-Communist and a “crusader for freedom,” who believed in “peace through strength.”⁴⁴ And, though historians continue to argue about Reagan’s intentions and debate the extent to which the labels of “hawk” or “dove” can be applied to him with much explanatory value, the emerging historiographic

39 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/111881a> (last accessed February 3, 2020).

40 The British side knew in advance, see the contribution by Oliver Barton in this volume; West Germany all along had pushed for the “zero option”, see Tim Geiger’s contribution in this volume.

41 See Justin Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism. The Biography of a Movement*, Cambridge 2010.

42 Tiffany Thompson, *Summitry and President Nixon’s Legacy*, in: Richard Nixon Foundation Website (January 12, 2017) <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/01/summitry-president-nixons-legacy/> (last accessed February 7, 2020).

43 Reagan, Remarks, November 18, 1981, *ibid.*

44 James Graham Wilson, *Ronald Reagan’s Engagement and the Cold War*, in: Bradley Linn Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), *Reagan and the World. Leadership and National Security, 1981–1989*, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 11–29, here pp. 14f.

picture is that of a man who stuck to his guns and consistently followed a nuclear abolitionist agenda.⁴⁵

Beth Fischer, in her chapter on “Nuclear Abolitionism, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty,” lends support to the idea of Reagan, “the consistent,” qualifying her own earlier argument of a “Reagan Reversal” in 1983/84.⁴⁶ As Fischer argues, Reagan’s announcement of a massive military buildup, after entering office in January 1981, his “zero proposal” of November of that same year, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which he made public in a seminal speech on March, 23 1983, should not be seen as being in conflict with each other.⁴⁷ Reagan had unconventional views about security, but basically, as Fischer affirms, he “abhorred nuclear weapons and sought to eliminate them.” The President did not believe in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) nor did he buy into flexible response.⁴⁸ He thus undercut the core principle that NATO had upheld in its strategy since 1968.⁴⁹ By building up the American military arsenal, he wanted to force the Soviets to the negotiating table so as to make massive cuts in the nuclear deterrents possible and to end the Cold War. SDI, too, served the goal of making nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” as the President famously framed it.⁵⁰

Part of the trouble Reagan faced was that neither the governments of the Western Allies nor many of his own advisors bought into his enthusiasm for abolishing nuclear weapons. As Ronald Granieri shows in his contribution “The American Road to INF, 1986–1987,” contemporaries as well as historians have had difficulties reconciling themselves to the idea “that armament and disarmament always went together.” To some extent the future fortieth President contributed to this confusion, because in 1976, as well as in 1980, he had run as a staunch critic of the disarmament process. The “zero option” idea, while rejected by some (more “dovish”) members of his Administration, was shared by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the hardliners within the Pentagon.⁵¹ The same

45 Ryan Carpenter, *Researching Reagan. A Guide for Scholars of National Security Policy during the Ronald Reagan Presidency*, in: Coleman and Longley (eds.), *Reagan and the World*, pp. 293–306; Jeffrey L. Chidster and Paul Kengor (eds.), *Reagan’s Legacy in a World Transformed*, Cambridge, Mass. 2015.

46 Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, Columbia 1997.

47 On SDI, most recently, Ralph Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks, 1981–1988*, Lanham 2019.

48 See also Beth Fischer, *A Question of Morality: Ronald Reagan and Nuclear Weapons*, in: Coleman and Longley (eds.), *Reagan and the World*, pp. 31–49.

49 See Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. A Crisis of Credibility 1966–1967*, Oxford 2005.

50 Ronald Reagan, *Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security*, March 23, 1983, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/32383d> (last accessed February 3, 2020).

51 See also Ronald J. Granieri, *Beyond Cap the Foil. Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense Buildup*, in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), *The Enduring Legacy. Leadership and National Security Affairs during the Reagan Presidency*, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 51–80.

group was also most enthusiastic about SDI. Yet, if it had not been for Reagan's consistent commitment to the abolition of the nuclear arsenal, the INF Treaty might never have come about. After all, many members of the national security establishment could not imagine that abolishing a whole class of nuclear weapons would be feasible.⁵²

Granieri also reminds us of the very mundane, domestic political context that helped pave the way to the INF Treaty. Part of the winding road to the INF Treaty was the "near-death experience" of the Iran-Contra affair, during which Reagan's team, in direct violation of Congressional orders, sold arms to Iran and used the proceeds to support the anti-Sandinista "Contra" rebels in Nicaragua.⁵³ The scandal left Reagan exposed to accusations of criminality or incompetence, because he claimed not to know what his underlings had done. A severely wounded Reagan urgently needed a success. As the historian Sean Wilentz has written, Reagan "found, in his work with Gorbachev, an escape route out of his political morass."⁵⁴ As Gorbachev gave him a helping hand, Reagan managed to accomplish what he had set out to do from the beginning. As *Granieri* writes, "an understanding of the winding path should temper the enthusiasm of [Reagan's] hagiographers." The INF Treaty was not the result of chance, but of a "combination of principles and the political realities of the moment."

This brings us to the second father of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev, who introduced his own landmark proposal to abolish nuclear weapons in January 1986. As *Svetlana Savranskaya* and *Thomas Blanton* argue in their chapter "The Nuclear Abolition Package of 1986 and the Soviet Road to INF," Soviet nuclear thinking had started to change even before Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. As early as the mid-1970s, Soviet military planners had come to realize that the nuclearization of European war scenarios "would negate the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's advantages in conventional forces over NATO." However, the NATO Dual-Track Decision as well as the increasingly hostile Soviet-American relationship limited the space for "new thinking" among Soviet military planners. Thus, Gorbachev's election to General Secretary helped the military reformers gain the upper hand in the Soviet political machine at the end of 1986, and finally prevail in 1987.⁵⁵

According to *Savranskaya* and *Blanton*, Gorbachev was not initially the radical reformer we think of today; but he "was committed to stopping the arms race which he saw as both dangerous for humankind and devastating for the Soviet economy." Even though the INF Treaty cut deeper into the Soviet nuclear arsenal than the American one, Gorbachev and his supporters came to see it as being in

52 See Wilson, *Ronald Reagan's Engagement*, pp. 11–29.

53 See James F. Siekmeier, *The Iran-Contra Affair*, in: Andrew L. Johns (ed.), *A Companion to Ronald Reagan*, Malden/Oxford 2015, pp. 321–338.

54 Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan. A History, 1974–2008*, New York 2009, p. 244.

55 See also Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Chapel Hill 2007, pp. 294–296; Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War. From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall*, New Haven/London 2011, pp. 354–363.

the interest of Soviet security. Early into his tenure Gorbachev was exposed to the thinking of leading military figures not normally seen as part of his reform team, such as the Chief of General Staff, Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, and these men promoted their own Soviet version of the “zero solution.” Though they did not expect the Americans to accept “zero,” if they were actually to do so, the Soviets would be able to get by on their conventional superiority. When Gorbachev revealed this plan in the spring of 1986, the American side was not yet ready. While U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz seems to have seen the beauty in it—in part because the Reagan Administration was plunging into the Iran-Contra abyss—negotiations did not lead to any results in 1986.⁵⁶

It was the failed Summit at Reykjavik in October 1986 that opened the road to the INF Treaty, as *Savranskaya* and *Blanton* show. At this point, the Soviet military was stalling, because SDI was going ahead and the American side refused to compromise on it. In 1983, when Reagan first introduced SDI, the Soviets still believed that it could be workable. By early 1987, however, Gorbachev and his associates had come to understand from their own experts that SDI was technologically not feasible, at least not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, and “perhaps even more important,” *Savranskaya* and *Blanton* propose, “the perception of threat from the United States was giving way to the new sense of trust and productive cooperation that emerged from the experience of the two previous Summits” and this “promised important payoffs in the future.” Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze therefore sidestepped the Defense Ministry and forced the Soviet military to make concessions. The Soviets were even willing to go beyond American expectations when it came to the all-important verification regime, which became “remarkably extensive and intrusive.” This turned out to be the most potent symbol yet of trust between the superpowers.⁵⁷

3. Europe: Left Out in the Cold? The Uneasy Reaction of the Western Allies

Any history of the INF Treaty also needs to bring the 1979 NATO Dual-Track Decision in at the start. After all, the negotiations between Soviets and Americans about intermediate-range nuclear forces hoped to put a perceived military imbalance in *Europe* right.⁵⁸ In 1979 NATO had been addressing a growing European

56 See Granieri’s contribution in this volume.

57 Accordingly, the demise of further INF verification after 2001 was part of the growing tensions between the Russians and Americans; see the contribution by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

58 While it had serious ramifications for the situation in East Asia, which contributed to the recent demise of the INF Treaty, concerns about China were tabled in 1987. The genesis of the NATO Dual-Track Decision is covered by the contributions of Oliver Barton and Tim Geiger in this volume; see also Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*; Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*; as well as Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*.

security problem, when it answered the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles with a threat to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 land-based Cruise Missiles if negotiations over the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear arsenals failed to yield success. From NATO's point of view, it was the Soviet challenge that had been the catalyst for a Western arms upgrade, for, as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl put it in hindsight, since the mid-1970s the Warsaw Pact had taken advantage of détente and "acquired substantial military predominance in Europe."⁵⁹ This was creating a problem for NATO because its doctrine of *flexible response*, adopted in 1967, required a commensurate reaction to military aggression. Since NATO had no weapon equivalent to the SS-20, if there were a case of nuclear aggression the U.S. could only stand by its Allies by threatening to use its own strategic arsenal, and this might well provoke a retaliatory Soviet intercontinental strike on the American homeland.⁶⁰

While the logic of NATO's nuclear doctrine has always been contested, it is important to realize that the 1979 Dual-Track Decision was at least as much about the credibility of the Alliance and the strength of West European–American ties as it was about the Soviet threat. Therefore, to see the Dual-Track Decision as a direct response to a unilateral nuclear arms buildup by the Eastern bloc is only half the story. As is clear from today's vantage point, it was to some extent an unintended consequence of the relaxation of Cold War tensions during the 1960s and 1970s. As the "father of the Dual-Track Decision," West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argued in a speech delivered in October 1977 to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the SALT negotiations on intercontinental ballistic missiles between the superpowers had "forgotten" the intermediate-range missiles.⁶¹ The SS-20 fell into a "grey area" because of its target range of under 5,000 km, which only threatened Europe and the East Asian allies of the U.S., but not the American mainland. Since the SS-20 was not considered to be an intercontinental weapon, the European theater of war could potentially be isolated, if the American President decided not to use intercontinental weapons in response to an SS-20 attack on Western Europe. The SS-20 therefore created a problem for NATO because the doctrine of *flexible*

59 Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, Munich 2005, p. 140.

60 The concept of "flexible response" harks back to the late 1950s. It became NATO's official policy in December 1967 through MC 14/3, see Report of the Military Committee of NATO, January 16, 1968, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf>.

61 Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, in: *Survival* 20/1 (1978), pp. 2–10; on Schmidt's geopolitical nightmares see Philipp Gassert, *Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation*, in: Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, New York 2013, pp. 154–176, here pp. 161 f.; Tim Geiger, *Die Regierung Schmidt-Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, pp. 95–122, here pp. 97–100; Kristina Spohr, *The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order*, Oxford 2016, pp. 85–101.

response it had adopted in 1967/68 required an appropriately nuanced reaction to military aggression. Since NATO had no equivalent weapon to match the SS-20, this inequality in the escalation continuum allegedly destabilized the nuclear balance of power.

Obviously, there would not have been the need for an INF Treaty if NATO had not come up with its 1979 Dual-Track Decision. Since the INF Treaty addressed the military balance of power in Europe, America's European allies observed what was going on between the superpowers with great apprehension. The huge strides made by Reagan and Gorbachev towards an INF Treaty took care of the threatening SS-20s. But these negotiations did nothing to address the still very considerable military superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe. West European leaders like Kohl and Thatcher had been wedded to pushing the NATO Dual-Track Decision through their reluctant parliaments and publics. Grudgingly, they had to go along with Reagan and Gorbachev and the public mood in the West, which reacted enthusiastically to an impending INF Treaty because it was sold as a first step towards even bigger disarmament.⁶² After all, the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced (conventional) Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe had been dragging on without success for more than a decade—since 1973. No one in 1987 expected these negotiations to yield any meaningful results anymore, so first thoughts were ventilated about a new forum for conventional arms reductions.⁶³ On paper, the Soviets still held a huge military advantage with respect to conventional, short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and chemical weapons in Europe. Accordingly, some feared that after an INF Treaty, NATO would not be able to deter the Soviets adequately—at least not within the framework of its still binding nuclear doctrine.

Early on, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, voiced her misgivings about “Ronnie’s” nuclear abolitionist agenda, as *Oliver Barton* shows in his contribution “‘The Most Staunch and Dependable of the Allies’? Britain and the Zero Option.” Thatcher admitted in her memoirs that she always had “mixed feelings” about the INF talks, because they enshrined the “zero option” and thus brought back the very thing that Schmidt had been concerned about: a possible decoupling of European NATO partners from the American nuclear security guarantee and the creation of a “gap” in NATO’s deterrence continuum.⁶⁴ So when, in November 1981, Reagan came up with the “zero option” as a political goal for the opening Geneva negotiations, the “Iron Lady” publicly welcomed it, but in reality she and her defense officials had “deep misgivings about Reagan’s declared negotiating objective.” Moreover, the British security establishment

62 On public opinion see the contributions by Barton, Gassert, Kemper, and Juntunen in this volume.

63 Only in 1989 were the MBFR negotiations replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations (also in Vienna), which would then lead to huge cuts in conventional armaments; see the contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume.

64 Margaret Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, London 1993, p. 771.

harbored similar misgivings about Schmidt's idea, that just by securing the removal of the SS-20, all would be well and dandy: "Britain's overriding strategic interest was in INF modernization; arms control was the price, not the prize." This was quite the opposite of what Reagan and Schmidt seemed to be thinking.

Because of the political affinity between Reagan and Thatcher, as well as the peculiar nature of their "special" security (and in particular their nuclear "sharing" partnership), the British were in a unique position to try to influence the American side. But, as *Barton* tells us, the ways in which Reagan's call for the "zero option" on November 18, 1981 had come about, "were a galling reminder of the limitations to Britain's insight and influence in Washington, at least when it came to arms control." The British (together with the French, who from 1966 were outside NATO military integration anyway) were successful in keeping their own nuclear capabilities outside the INF disarmament talks, but they were now finding themselves less successful in keeping the Americans from embracing "zero." Nevertheless, with the negotiations in Geneva heading nowhere and the Soviets politically stalled during the final Brezhnev years, the Thatcher Administration achieved its main goal of having the Dual-Track Decision implemented, and this created the hoped-for "seamless robe of deterrence" as well as a position of strength that the British thought was essential to stunt any Soviet efforts at the "decoupling" of Western Europe.⁶⁵

Margaret Thatcher always took pride in having been the first of the major Western European leaders to have met Gorbachev. This was even before he became General Secretary, when he visited London in 1984 and she famously proclaimed that he was "a man we can do business with."⁶⁶ This did not prevent her from pursuing a strong anti-Communist agenda and from having a vision of Communism coming to an end in Eastern Europe.⁶⁷ Thatcher, like Kohl, was very outspoken about Soviet military strength. She drove the point home during her seminal visit to Moscow in March 1987: "You have superior intermediate-range weapons and strategic offensive weapons, if we count warheads, as well as chemical and conventional arms. You are very powerful, not weak."⁶⁸ Now, this perceived military strength of the Soviet Union presented conservative Western

65 Kristan Stoddart, "Creating the 'Seamless Robe of Deterrence': Great Britain's Role in NATO's INF Debate," in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 176–195, here p. 191; Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddart, *Großbritannien zwischen Doppelbeschluss und Anti-Kernwaffen-Protestbewegungen*, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, pp. 305–324.

66 *The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations*, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 422, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/>.

67 Ilaria Poggiolini, "Thatcher's Double-Track Road to the End of the Cold War. The Irreconcilability of Liberalization and Preservation," in: Bozo et al. (eds.), *Visions*, pp. 266–279.

68 *Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher, March 30, 1987, Moscow*, in: *Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations*, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/docs/Doc%201%201987-03-30%20Gorbachev-Thatcher%20memcon.pdf>.

leaders like Thatcher and Kohl with a problem: the INF Treaty would not only interrupt the Western nuclear deterrence continuum, but would also resurrect the old problem that had already haunted NATO in the 1950s and had led to the setting up of nuclear deterrence in the Eisenhower period. The problem was that in sheer numbers the Warsaw Pact was always stronger than NATO. This explains the unenthusiastic reaction of the Thatcher government to the doomed idea of total denuclearization put forward at the Reagan–Gorbachev Reykjavik Summit in the fall of 1986. To the prospect of a real breakthrough for an INF zero option in spring 1987, the British reacted in a similar fashion. In February 1987, British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe bluntly told his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher that he had reservations about the zero option. While NATO’s Dual-Track Decision lasted, however, there could be no rejection of it.⁶⁹ A month later, Thatcher confided to French President François Mitterrand that she feared that, through an additional offer to include shorter range nuclear missiles, “Gorbachev wanted to tempt Europe down a path towards de-nuclearisation, including getting rid of the British and French deterrents. This must be resisted firmly.”⁷⁰

Despite Thatcher’s dislike of the final “double zero option”—the abolition of both the LRINF as well as the SRINF—she followed her supreme principle that the United Kingdom must always stay firmly and steadily at the side of the United States. In June, general elections were scheduled in Britain. Because there was no doubt that the Reagan Administration favored “double zero,” the “Iron Lady” made a complete U-turn. From May 1987 she publicly supported Reagan’s approach, willy-nilly and very much to the dismay of Chancellor Kohl of West Germany.⁷¹ At the end of the day, the most important aspects for Britain were *first* that its own nuclear deterrent was sure to remain unaffected by the superpowers’ disarmament agreement, and *second* that there would be a “firebreak” in the anticipated stampede to disarmament. This pause was considered necessary in order to thwart any Soviet conspiracy to bring about a complete denuclearization of Western Europe. In view of this, right up to 1990, London stubbornly insisted on a rapid modernization of NATO’s arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons (with ranges under 500 km) even though this was total anathema to West

69 Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between Howe and Genscher in Bonn, February 25, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Munich 2018, Doc. 54, p. 254. Thatcher repeated this argument in her Bonn talk with Chancellor Kohl on March 23, 1987, *ibid.*, Doc. 79, p. 254.

70 Memcon between Thatcher and Mitterrand in Normandy on March 23, 1987, The National Archives Kew, PREM19/2182f67, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/205881> (accessed March 8, 2020).

71 On May 11, 1987 Mitterrand told German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker that he had received a letter in which the British Prime Minister supported double zero; see diary of Weizsäcker’s Press Secretary Friedhelm Pflüger, Richard von Weizsäcker. Ein Porträt aus der Nähe, Stuttgart 1990, p. 225. In mid-May, another letter from Thatcher to Kohl in support of the double zero option was leaked in West Germany, see “Nichts gelernt”, in: Der Spiegel No. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.

Germany for self-evident reasons. One of the consequences of the INF Treaty was therefore to bring serious strain in Anglo–German relations.⁷²

On a personal level, Thatcher and Kohl did not get along very well, right from the beginning, despite their political consensus as staunch pro-American, anti-Communist political leaders. The West German Chancellor, who had replaced Schmidt in 1982, had even less enthusiasm for the INF Treaty than his British counterpart. As *Tim Geiger* explains in his contribution “Controversies Over the Double Zero Option: The Kohl–Genscher Government and the INF Treaty,” the prospect of an INF Treaty almost ripped the Kohl government apart and was not at all seen as something that would help the cause of German reunification. Kohl had gotten off to a bad start with Gorbachev as well:⁷³ his publicly comparing the Russian leader to Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels did not help.⁷⁴ Although Foreign Minister Genscher was a frequent visitor to Moscow, Kohl and those on the conservative wing in his government, were suspicious of what the Soviet General Secretary was up to. They were also uneasy about Reagan’s apparent willingness to make huge concessions to the Soviets, leaving the Europeans (as it were) out in the rain. As *Geiger* indicates, it was the coalition partner of Kohl’s Christian Democrats, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) under Genscher’s leadership, that benefitted from the renewed détente.

Again according to *Geiger*, the Soviet–American rapprochement, starting with the Reykjavik meeting, “disclosed the fundamental inconsistencies and paradoxes of Bonn’s security policy. Until then, the Germans had been worried by the arms race and the nuclear buildup, and because the superpowers had not talked enough or effectively with each other. However, now with Soviet–U.S. rapprochement and a looming chance of real disarmament, the Germans were no less concerned.” In a strange reversal of the usual order of things, the erstwhile staunch “Atlanticist” Kohl was at odds with the Reagan Administration, while Genscher, and to some extent the Social Democratic opposition, were in sync with their “American friends.” The debate was further complicated by the looming discussion about NATO’s “short-range” deterrent (SNF, up to 500 km), which of course would have devastated the two German states (as well as adjacent countries such as Czechoslovakia). In this context, there seemed to be a return of the “German Question.”⁷⁵ In the end, West Germany’s isolated Christian

72 See Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests. Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*, London 1999, pp. 80–85. See also the essay by Tim Geiger in this volume.

73 During their first meeting at Chernenko’s funeral, Kohl felt insulted by Gorbachev, who accused him of “standing at attention” on orders from Washington. See Ambassador Kastl to Auswärtiges Amt, March 15, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Munich 2016, Doc. 68.

74 Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie*, Munich 2012, p. 456 calls this a “disaster in communication” (“*Kommunikationsdesaster*”). See also Hermann Wentker, *Vom Gegner zum Partner: Gorbatschow und seine Politik im Urteil Helmut Kohls*, in: *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 22 (2015), pp. 1–34, here pp. 7–10.

75 See also the contribution by Hermann Wentker in this volume.

Democrats had to accept that neither the German public nor their main ally, the mighty U.S., would support any of the demands being made by Kohl and the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats.⁷⁶ Cunningly, the Soviets seized their moment and urgently pressed that the 72 Pershing IA weapons of the West German *Bundeswehr* should be included in the Western share of INFs to be destroyed following an INF treaty—despite the fact that the Geneva Talks had always been exclusively about Soviet and American missiles. Here again, a divided Kohl government was forced, grudgingly, to give in and bend to international pressure and to overwhelmingly anti-nuclear opinion amongst the public at home. However, in the longer run this apparent defeat turned out to be a decisive step for improving Soviet–West German relations.

The French, like the British, disliked a “zero solution”, as *Christian Wenkel* highlights in his chapter on “Resuming European Détente and European Integration. France and the INF Treaty.” Moreover, like the British, they were skeptical when it came to superpower deals, partly for the same reasons, and partly because of their own specific interests. President Mitterrand had been elected in 1981. Despite adhering to the Socialist Party and not being one of the “founding fathers” of the NATO Double-Track Decision, he staunchly supported the deployment of the Euromissiles, thus helping the Christian Democrat Kohl against his Social Democratic domestic adversaries.⁷⁷ This was the case even though France had not been a member of NATO military integration since 1966 and did not participate in the INF buildup of 1983. Moreover, *Wenkel* argues, the French, like the British, were “far from convinced by the West German conception of the strategic imbalance in Europe.” Nevertheless, Mitterrand supported Kohl, whom he expected in turn to take a stance against inclusion of the French nuclear deterrent in the Geneva negotiations.⁷⁸

In addition to keeping the *Force de Frappe* out of an INF deal at all costs, Mitterrand (like Thatcher) wanted to gain political capital from his position as a bridge-builder between East and West. While he encouraged Reagan to talk to

76 In addition to Geiger, see also the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume.

77 Most famously in a speech in the German Bundestag on January 20, 1983: for Mitterrand’s speech see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographischer Bericht*, 9th Legislation Period, 143rd Session, pp. 8978–8992; on Mitterrand’s role during the Euromissiles crisis see Georges-Henri Soutou, *Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, pp. 363–376.

78 As the Kohl-Genscher government dutifully did. The West German government regularly reiterated NATO’s political position: that INF negotiations were exclusively about the nuclear systems of both superpowers, see for example letter from Genscher to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, August 24, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc. 241, p. 1231, fn. 24; Defense Minister Wörner at NATO’s Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting on July 1/2, 1983, *ibid.*, Doc. 166, p. 872. In contrast, the SPD opposition supported the renewed Soviet demands to include both Western European nuclear arsenals in the Geneva INF talks, see for example letter from Willy Brandt to General Secretary Andropov, September 22, 1983, in: Willy Brandt, *Berliner Ausgabe*, Vol. 10: *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehungen und deutsche Frage 1982–1992*, Bonn 1992, Doc. 8, p. 155.

his Soviet counterparts, in his conversations he comes across as an even more ardent hawk than the supposedly arch-anti-Communist Reagan. *Wenkel* quotes Mitterrand, who gave Reagan the following advice:

With regard to the USSR, it is necessary: 1) not to give up anything, 2) not to concede anything, 3) to place yourself in a good psychological situation for the day when the Soviets want to discuss.

Domestically, however, Mitterrand was dealing with the French public, and, like the publics of Britain, West Germany, and to some extent the United States, people were truly smitten by Gorbachev. Moreover, it was not only those on the leftist spectrum who were hugely in favor of an INF Treaty. Here, for once, France was not so different from the rest of Europe. But its policies diverged from Britain with regard to the process of European integration. For Mitterrand the INF Treaty made it necessary to push forward with plans for deeper European integration, not just in the field of defense. It did not escape his notice, nor that of British observers, that the INF Treaty was bringing the “German question” to the fore (though most Germans did not realize this at the time). Like *Geiger*, *Wenkel* therefore sees the INF Treaty as a dynamic factor in the process leading toward the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, as well as to closer Franco–German military cooperation during the 1990s.

4. Looking Forward to the Easing of Cold War Tensions: The Reactions of the Eastern Allies

Unlike their Western counterparts, who had many qualms about Reagan’s “zero option” plans and the impending INF Treaty, the Eastern allies of the Soviet Union welcomed the prospect of the removal of intermediate nuclear forces from all of Europe. The reasons were manifold and not the same in all Warsaw Pact countries: *First* of all, Eastern bloc leaders like Erich Honecker and Wojciech Jaruzelski were genuinely worried about the short and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which could devastate their territories far more than those of the Soviet Union.⁷⁹ *Second*, in narrow military “balance of power” terms, the undoing of NATO’s Double-Track Decision with the scrapping of the American INFs might have reassured Warsaw Pact countries that they would have the advantage in numeric conventional superiority. However, that was not the most common perception in the capitals of the Eastern alliance. Quite to the contrary, military and political leaders there were particularly concerned about the growing conventional strength they saw in NATO, thanks to an ongoing “revolution in military affairs.”⁸⁰ That was the reason why in May 1987, at the Warsaw Pact

79 See the contributions by Hermann Wentker and Wanda Jarzabek in this volume.

80 See Oliver Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-West Relations, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 70–86.

Summit in East Berlin, a new military doctrine was announced which replaced the war planning that had hitherto relied on offensive tactics with a new one, appropriately based on the primacy of defense. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact also agreed to a new Vienna Forum for Conventional Armed Forces Reductions in Europe (CFE) to replace the ailing MBFR talks. *Third*, most East Europeans hoped for the “peace dividend” of a new *détente*. The crippling arms race demanded many resources, which could not be used for consumer goods that might help to buy acquiescence amongst the people of the Socialist countries. *Fourth*, they also hoped to gain economically from increased East–West trade. Countries like Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Romania were dependent on Western loans and trade relations with the capitalist “class enemy.”⁸¹ And *finally*, there seems to have been a tactical element. Some *Perestroika*-critical Communist leaders like Honecker and the Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu could lend support to Moscow on an INF Treaty while being critical of Gorbachev’s agenda for reforming the Communist system.⁸² So, we must understand, the Eastern allies were not just paying lip service to the peace moves of their “big brother.”

The generally welcoming stance of the Eastern allies with regard to an INF Treaty should also be seen in the context of their longstanding criticism of the Kremlin’s handling of the Euromissiles issue (normally not publicly voiced). The implementation of the NATO Dual-Track Decision turned out to be a disaster for the Warsaw Pact, while simultaneously both “imperial overstretch” in Afghanistan and the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s were hitting COMECON members hard.⁸³ The Polish crisis of 1980/81 was a clear sign of the bloc’s inability to cope with the fallout of the oil price hike. Despite all the public displays of “unity,” the Euromissiles crisis had “had a bruising impact on Warsaw Pact members.”⁸⁴ And this was just one constituent of a much broader malaise in the Eastern bloc; it “highlighted a number of institutional and systemic weaknesses that for years had been eroding the Warsaw Pact and the political-

81 See Stephen Kotkin, *The Kiss of Death. The East Bloc Goes Borrowing*, in: Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 2010, pp. 80–93.

82 For the different attitudes to *Perestroika* among Communist party leaders in Eastern Europe see Francesco Di Palma (ed.), *Perestroika and the Party. National and Transnational Perspectives on European Communist Parties in the Era of Soviet Reform*, New York/Oxford 2019, especially Tamás Péter Baranyi, *Perestroika Made in Hungary? The HSWP’s Approach to the Soviet Reform of the Late 1980s*, pp. 88–104; Wanda Jarzabek, *The Polish United Workers’ Party and Perestroika*, pp. 118–131; Hermann Wentker, *SED and Perestroika: Perceptions and Reactions*, pp. 132–152; Stefano Bottoni, *Between External Constraint and Internal Crackdown: Romania’s Non-reaction to Soviet Perestroika*, pp. 153–175.

83 On the economic situation see Chris Miller, *The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy. Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR*, Chapel Hill, N.C. 2016; on “imperial overstretch” and Afghanistan see Zubok, *Failed Empire*, pp. 227–264.

84 Malcolm Byrne, *The Warsaw Pact and the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983*, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 104–120, here p. 104.

economic-ideological order that underpinned it.”⁸⁵ Moscow had underestimated NATO’s ability to pull itself together. During the final years of the Brezhnev era and the devastating Andropov and Chernenko interim, the Kremlin had an increasingly gerontocratic leadership, and lacked the resources either for an energetic, coordinated response to the immediate international relations issue in the Geneva negotiations, or for overcoming the economic, cultural, and social crisis of Communism.⁸⁶

The ascent of Gorbachev to the Chairmanship of the CPSU thus made a huge difference to the international relations of the Eastern allies. Erich Honecker, Chief of the East German Communist Party (SED) and GDR Head of State, came into the equation, too. As *Hermann Wentker* writes in his contribution “The German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty,” Honecker “was not a friend of nuclear weapons in Europe,” and very much favored a “double zero” solution in Europe. As he argued in a speech delivered to the SED Central Committee in November 1986, shortly after the Reagan–Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik: “If the INF question is solved, it will no longer be necessary to have tactical missiles [...] in the GDR.”⁸⁷ While, in domestic policy, the East German leadership eyed Gorbachev’s reform Communist agenda very warily, it welcomed the new line in international affairs. In that area, the East German–Soviet relationship improved after 1985. In 1983, after NATO had gone ahead with the deployment of Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles, the GDR leader had cautiously distanced himself from Moscow’s plans to increase the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on the territory of its East European allies.⁸⁸ Now things looked set to change.

As *Wentker* shows, Honecker did not follow up on Soviet demands that he should make it clear “to the FRG how much the situation had changed after the deployment of the missiles.” Surprisingly, he was able to get away (for a while) with his veiled critique of Soviet counter-deployments after the NATO Dual-Track Decision. At that time the gerontocratic Soviet leadership was weak and confused about how to react to Western rearmament, and Honecker had to engage in damage control because of the GDR’s economic dependency on West German loans and trade. Moreover, a “peacenik” East German population seemed to welcome Honecker’s “peace power” stances, even though the GDR government did not command much respect with regard to its economic and social policies—it still had to rely on frequent crackdowns on dissent. For Honecker, this

85 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

86 Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, New York 2009, pp. 481–618.

87 “Mit Initiative, Schöpferium und Tatkraft verwirklichen wir die Beschlüsse unseres XI. Parteitages. Aus dem Schlußwort auf der 3. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED”, November 21, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze*, Vol. 12, Berlin (East) 1988, p. 203.

88 “In kampferfüllter Zeit setzen wir den bewährten Kurs des Parteitages für Frieden und Sozialismus erfolgreich fort. Aus der Diskussionsrede von Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der SED”, in: *Neues Deutschland*, November 26/27, 1983, p. 3.

made it even more imperative to avoid going back to the heightened East-West tensions that had characterized the early 1980s. Kohl's constructive approach vis-à-vis Honecker's "peace" moves pushed the East Germans still further into the disarmament camp. When Honecker coined the term "coalition of reason," Kohl gladly took up the formula of his East German counterpart.⁸⁹

So, when Gorbachev came to power, Honecker could happily demonstrate that, at least in international affairs, he was in line with the new Soviet team. This gradually increased in importance, as Gorbachev was moving ahead with domestic reforms that the GDR leadership remained adamantly opposed to. Honecker also needed to stress détente as a means to keep the East–West German relationship going. Constantly in search of legitimacy, he was eager to realize his long-term goal of making a visit to the Federal Republic. He also wanted to prove to Moscow that the GDR was pushing Bonn towards an agreement, thereby exaggerating his role "enormously," as *Wentker* comments. Furthermore, for the East Berlin government, the INF Treaty was in the interest of its own security, as it would contribute to the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from East German soil. To further this, the relationship with Bonn was critical, because it was one way to influence the process on the Eastern side. It also helped in securing the all-important trade and financial relationship with the FRG. Furthermore, according to *Wentker*, it was good domestic politics as well, since the East German population was hugely in favor of détente, even though Honecker's "popularity seems not to have benefitted from this identity of views."

When discussing the winding road to the INF Treaty, we therefore have to take Eastern bloc public opinion into account, even though there was no such thing in the strict sense of the term. As *Wentker* demonstrates in his analysis of reports in the East German secret police files, the GDR population gave Gorbachev most of the credit, while holding Reagan in low regard. In that at least, the Communist "anti-Imperialist" propaganda fell on fertile ground.⁹⁰ The East Germans hoped for a "peace dividend" and saw the easing of international tensions as the prologue to domestic reform, which was decidedly not Honecker's idea of the INF agreement. In Poland, too, "fear of war" and "love of peace" worked toward an overall positive perception of the INF talks and in favor of Gorbachev's international role in particular. As *Wanda Jarzabek* shows in her contribution, the Poles seem to have expected an easing of the economic burden of defense, even though the Polish contribution to Warsaw Pact armaments was on the conventional side,

89 Letter from Honecker to Kohl, October 5, 1983; letter from Kohl to Honecker, October 24, 1983, in: *Innerdeutsche Beziehungen. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1980–1986. Eine Dokumentation*, ed. by Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Bonn 1986, pp. 154 f., pp. 158 f.

90 On Anti-Americanism in Eastern Europe see Jan C. Behrends, Árpád von Klimó, and Patrice G. Poutrus (eds.), *Anti Amerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa*, Bonn 2005.

and at best only indirectly affected by an INF deal. Moreover, she finds, the Poles, unlike the East Germans, perceived the impact of the INF Treaty as not equal for all sides. While everyone's security was supposed to be growing, that of the Soviet Union was likely to be growing to a greater degree than that of Poland. For Poland, as for West Germany, it was therefore important to complement the INF arrangement with a resumption of new Vienna talks about conventional armaments.

Poland, like the GDR and all other Warsaw Pact members, was not directly involved in the INF Treaty negotiations and was kept at arm's length by the Soviet leadership. Given the salience of the "German question" and earlier Polish "peace initiatives," such as the 1957 Rapacki Plan, however, the proposed INF Treaty fitted well into long-standing Polish (and other Eastern bloc) efforts to make the 1945 Potsdam Conference post-war settlement permanent.⁹¹ What the Poles seemed to anticipate was an issue that the East German government apparently failed to see: that a relaxation of East–West tensions could lead to a situation in which the "German question" would come up with force. While the Jaruzelski government wanted to intensify the dialogue with both German states and hoped that the GDR and FRG would present "some elements of the Polish initiative as their own," he certainly did not want German unification. Moreover, given their geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, the Poles were very keen on having the INF Treaty implemented once it had been signed and ratified. Today, Poland's current government, despite being a staunch supporter of NATO and the Trump White House, believes there could be much to lose from the recent turn in Russian–American relations, with new missiles being introduced in the Russian military enclave of Kaliningrad.

Though it has not been possible to supply further essays covering other Eastern allies of the Soviet Union, similar stories can probably be told about Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Within the Eastern Pact organization, the ČSSR was among the staunchest supporters of Moscow, once the country had stabilized after the 1968 crackdown. As Malcolm Byrne has shown, in the case of Prague, it took a lot of cajoling and "convincing" on the part of the Soviet leadership to get the government to accept the deployment of new SS-12 and SS-23 missiles as part of the Warsaw Pact countermeasures against the deployment of Western Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in 1983.⁹² In this, the Czechs were reacting like the East Germans.

Although the East European populations were in general supportive of the thaw and welcomed the easing of tensions that came after 1985, they did not

91 Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, 1945. The "Bitter Victory". Poland and its "Liberation", in: Jürgen Luh (ed.), Potsdam Conference 1945. Shaping the World, Dresden 2020, pp. 114–125.

92 Byrne, Warsaw Pact, pp.111–116; see also Ivo Pejčoch, Kernwaffenträger in der tschechoslowakischen Armee, in: Oliver Bange (ed.), Zwischen Bündnistreue und staatlichen Eigeninteressen. Die Streitkräfte der DDR und der ČSSR 1968 bis 1990, Potsdam 2016, pp. 151–163.

really trust the Western peace movements. Given Poland's historically well founded suspicion of the Soviet Union, "peace" was the wrong term. The Polish government suppressed *Solidarność* while at the same time propagating its own work towards "peace." It is fair to say that the West European peace movements were viewed with suspicion by Polish and other Eastern European dissidents.⁹³

5. Mobilizing for Peace *and* Security: Public Opinion and Protest Movements

Peace movements have a long history in North America and Europe, going back to the decades before World War I.⁹⁴ Yet the nuclear buildup of the 1980s gave the various societal actors organizing protest demonstrations for peace a new urgency and a common goal. During the 1980s, Western Europe as well as the United States saw one of the largest protest mobilizations in post-war history. During the Euromissile debate, millions took to the streets to voice their opposition to NATO's Dual-Track Decision. While the general story of the 1980s peace movement is well known, historians have long debated its impact on the end of the Cold War. Scholars like Lawrence S. Wittner have highlighted the impact of the peace movement on the Kremlin as well as on the Western side.⁹⁵ Recently, the historian Angela Santese has credited the U. S. peace movement with pushing Ronald Reagan towards disarmament and "Freeze."⁹⁶ In his contribution to this volume, *Tapio Juntunen*, even sees "widespread agreement among Cold War historians" that the anti-nuclear campaign had a decisive impact on NATO's decisions within the Euromissiles crisis. Other historians, are more guarded in their judgement, and propose a multi-causal model to explain the end of the Cold War.⁹⁷

As *Claudia Kemper* argues in her contribution "More than a FREEZE. Political Mobilization and the Peace Movement in 1980s U. S. Society," perennial debates

93 Idesbald Goddeeris and Małgorzata Świder, Peace or Solidarity? Poland, the Euromissile Crisis, and the 1980s Peace Movement, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 291–308, here p. 303.

94 Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Introduction, in: Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, Essen 2008, pp. 11–38; David Cortright, *Peace. A History of Movements and Ideas*, Cambridge 2008; Holger Nehring, Peace Movements, in: Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), *The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey*, London 2017, pp. 485–513.

95 Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present*, Stanford 2003, pp. 395–401.

96 Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s, in: *The International History Review* 39 (2017), pp. 496–520.

97 See for example Florian Pressler, A Triumph of Disarmament? The 1980s and the International Political System, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 348–351.

over “who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their political success” may not lead us very far. As always in history, success has many parents, while failure is an orphan. What was popular, however, were superpower deals that cut nuclear arsenals, while unilateral disarmament never went down very well with the American audiences who “vacillated between long-term uneasiness about nuclear weapons” and “distrust of the Soviet Union.” Like their President, Americans supported more military spending while favoring a nuclear “zero” at the same time.⁹⁸ Though the U. S. peace movement was successful in mobilizing millions for peace, its impact on the actual political decision process leading to the NATO Dual-Track Decision, was negligible, even though the FREEZE motion passed Congress. Afterwards, nothing happened until Reagan and Gorbachev started their negotiations, beginning in 1985.⁹⁹

FREEZE was a very peculiar American umbrella campaign, involving traditional peace movement activists—Quaker Organizations like the American Friends Service Committee, anti-imperial groups like the War Resisters League and professional organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Federation of Atomic Scientists. But it also included politicians, such as Senator Edward Kennedy, “critical” experts and scientists like Carl Sagan, and some celebrities like the actor Meryl Streep. To some extent, *Kemper* argues, FREEZE also focused a general critique of society, providing an outlet “to express general dissatisfaction with public policy and with political decision makers,” and voiced a general cultural-critical perspective. Thus, against the backdrop of the re-election of Ronald Reagan in 1984, the American peace movement became disillusioned and saw a general decline. Now the future of the peace movement has moved into the hands of professional organizations, such as ICAN, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was founded in 2007. These new-model peace movements have built on the experiences of 1980s movements like FREEZE, and, as *Kemper* explains, have developed into more focused and “extremely professional” networks, striving for a UN nuclear weapons ban treaty. Though ICAN was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, it was unable to prevent the recent round of rearmament, especially on the Russian side.¹⁰⁰

98 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III., Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear Freeze, in: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569.

99 Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedensbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, p. 302; on the ability of the U. S. peace movement to mobilize hundreds of thousands of street demonstrations see Kyle Harvy, *American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace*, New York 2014.

100 ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2017 “for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its groundbreaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons.” See <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/summary/>.

Up to the mid-1980s, the supporters of the U.S. peace movement could not put a stop to the deployment of new nuclear weapons. Yet like their European counterparts, they created a framework for peace, which in turn helped to support the societal momentum and positive climate of public opinion in the Western countries where the INF Talks were taking place. As *Philipp Gassert* argues in his contribution “West German Politics, the INF Treaty, and the Popular Dynamics of Peace,” a “dovish” political context forced West German Chancellor Kohl’s hand. Grudgingly he had to comply with the “double zero option” and he was then obliged to make even more concessions with regard to West Germany’s outdated Pershing IA missiles. Initially reluctant, Kohl sided with his liberal coalition partner against the conservative wing of his own party. He was also acting against the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, whose chairman, the baroque Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauß, thought this to be a “totally irresponsible” act, endangering West Germany’s future security and making the country susceptible to Soviet pressure.¹⁰¹ But Kohl, a shrewd and expedient politician, knew exactly where the West German public stood, thus, *Gassert* writes, “giving in to the prevailing sentiment of the German population as well as a majority of deputies in the Federal Parliament.”

One of the deep ironies of the second half of the 1980s is the slow death of the peace movement, against the backdrop of a final round of détente that would contribute to the demise of the complete Cold War order. As *Gassert* argues, years of talk about “peace,” “disarmament,” and “making peace with ever fewer weapons” (a slogan that had been pioneered by the CDU) “had moved the emphasis of West German political culture into the direction of the peace movement’s core positions.” Kohl, who had risen to the Federal Chancellery’s office in 1982/83 in part by steadfastly supporting the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles following the NATO Dual-Track Decision, now chose to shed the mantle of the “Cold War hawk” and realign himself with his dovish public and coalition partner. He knew very well that West Germany could not go through another “hot autumn” of protests like the one in 1983. With Gorbachev at the top of the Kremlin’s hierarchy, old enemy images were crumbling. Germans were seized by Gorbimania, maybe taking it even further than was shown in similarly enthusiastic receptions in Britain, France, and Italy where, in 1989, Gorbachev was greeted throughout his visits by cheering crowds.¹⁰²

There is a second irony here. Not only did the West German peace movement fall apart after 1983, but West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost power in 1982, in part because a significant portion of its membership and parliamentary representatives felt they must break with Chancellor Schmidt over

101 Franz Josef Strauß, *Die Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1989, p. 552.

102 Hermann Wentker, *Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow. Der Gorbatschow-Diskurs im doppelten Deutschland 1985–1991*, Berlin 2020; William Taubman, *Gorbachev. His Life and Times*, New York/London 2016, pp. 475–478 and p. 495; on Gorbimania in the U.S. see Kristina Spohr, *Post Wall, Post Square. Rebuilding the World after 1989*, London 2019, p. 11.

the deployment of the Euromissiles at that time.¹⁰³ After 1987, Kohl reaped the benefits of détente. Having been re-elected in March 1987 (with some losses), he now sided with the “peace camp,” or at least the informal coalition of parliamentarians across both wings of the German Bundestag, whether of his own party or not. The INF Treaty, while it created difficulties and fractures within Kohl’s Christian Democrat-led coalition government, was very much in sync with the majority of West Germans, or at any rate of those who responded to public opinion surveys. This, *Gassert* argues, concluded the “move toward peace” and the acceptance of the “Potsdam” status quo in Europe that had begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

It fell to the Danes to bring the new term “footnote policy” into the vocabulary of NATO and the Cold War. As *Tapio Juntunen* remarks in his contribution to our volume, the Danish government’s tendency to add “several reservations on its participation in NATO’s operations and procedures” was one of the “most evident examples of the effect of public opinion and transnational peace movements” on the 1980s foreign policy practiced by the NATO countries. For a long time, the governments of the NATO states Denmark and Norway, and also of neutral Finland, had been confronted with strong anti-nuclear sentiment from their citizens. Increasingly they warmed to the idea of a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone (NNEFZ), which went back to 1963 when it had first been introduced by the Finnish government. Even though Denmark and Norway, the NATO members, took a skeptical stance toward the NNEFZ initially, by the late 1970s and early 1980s such proposals had “matured into a shared practical connection between anti-nuclear movements and certain parts of the Nordic political elite.”

Juntunen also shows some results of disarmament and the INF Treaty that were unwelcome or paradoxical for the Nordic countries. While the Danes, Norwegians and Finns were very much in favor of nuclear disarmament, they were afraid of an impending nuclearization of the Northern seas. They anticipated that the removal of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would lead to more sea-based nuclear weapons on submarines, which, of course, were not covered by the INF Treaty. Thus, the Nordics feared that the denuclearization of Central Europe would lead to a sea-borne nuclearization of the North of Europe and the Arctic. So, while the countries of this area welcomed the INF Treaty “as a historically and symbolically significant political achievement,” they highlighted the fact that one superpower treaty would not solve all strategic uncertainties, especially in the North. The Danish parliament even passed a resolution that reminded the world that warships visiting Danish harbors were not allowed to

103 Even though it remains difficult to measure the exact impact of the peace movement on the establishment; see Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, Did Protest Matter? The Influence of the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 1977–1983, in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s*, Cambridge 2017, p. 309; Jan Hansen, *Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungstreit (1977–1987)*, Munich 2016.

carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, on the sub-regional level, the INF Treaty created new problems of a nuclear as well as non-nuclear balance of power. This was not really taken into serious consideration within the superpower negotiations.

6. Back to the Future: The World After the INF Treaty

While in hindsight, the INF Treaty has looked like an opening gambit in the overcoming of the East–West division of Europe, blazing a trail towards the fall of the Wall, such a perspective is more of a “post-Cold War” one and was not a very widely held view among contemporary observers, at least in Germany.¹⁰⁴ When he spoke in Berlin on June 12, 1987, the challenge Ronald Reagan made to Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” seemed too much like a public relations stunt that willfully neglected the political basics in Europe. From a West German point of view, the speech appeared to be mostly for domestic U.S. consumption and, in the eyes of many, an almost comic return to an outdated Cold War rhetoric. The words did not square easily with the same President’s ground-breaking work towards achieving disarmament in Geneva. The INF Treaty thus seemed like just one more effort to ratify and ultimately consolidate the European order established by the victorious powers with the 1945 Potsdam Agreements.

Today, it is obvious that the INF Treaty was indeed an important step in overcoming the Cold War order. It was part and parcel of the momentous “conversations” held between Reagan, Gorbachev, Bush Sr., and the foreign ministers and advisors who contrived to “end the Cold War.”¹⁰⁵ On September 11, 1990, less than a year after the Berlin Wall had fallen, President George H. W. Bush (Sr.) addressed both houses of Congress in a famous speech, in which he saw the dawn of new era:

stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.¹⁰⁶

104 See the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume.

105 To use Blanton’s and Savranskaya’s inspired phrase.

106 George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217> (last accessed February 27, 2020); see also George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, New York 1999.

Bush's 1990 vision of a new multipolar order that would emerge from the Cold War did not materialize. Due to the decomposition of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 1990s and early 2000s have been described as a "unipolar" moment, especially by conservative American pundits.¹⁰⁷ During the first two post-Cold War decades the United States tried to assert a power that amounted to "global hegemony." This could not be sustained after 2008/09, and is now being dismantled by the U.S. itself. This dismantling process started with President Obama, and is now in full swing under the leadership of President Trump.

For 30 years, however, the INF Treaty worked surprisingly well. This was because of its verification system. In his conversations with Gorbachev and in his public speeches, Reagan himself had repeatedly quoted the Russian proverb: "Trust but verify." Following this precept, the INF Treaty established a detailed system of rules for defining, counting, and verifying all relevant armaments and accompanying equipment, and then for monitoring their final destruction within the three years of its coming into force (on June 1, 1988). Through additional protocols and Memoranda of Understanding, it laid down a complicated system of intrusive mutual control and observation. The rigor of verification was unprecedented: nothing before it had been so comprehensive and reliable—or so necessary. This central aspect of the INF Treaty is usually skipped over by historians and journalists—perhaps because following the detail has seemed to be too complicated or too technical, or even too "boring". In the present volume, *Wolfgang Richter*, an expert who has worked in the German *Bundeswehr* Verification Center, is able to offer the reader insights into the provisions and actual practice of verification—right up to the year 2001, when the verification system expired according to the Treaty's terms.

As *Oliver Bange* outlines in his essay, the INF Treaty, along with the other extraordinary disarmament measures negotiated between 1985 and the early 2000s, did indeed make Europe a more secure place, at least in the perceptions of the public in the various European countries, and of the majority of their politicians. The recent demise of the Treaty thus raises fears that we might "return to the future"—to the uneasy state of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when nuclear weapons seemed to destabilize what only in hindsight looks like a stable, post-World War II order.

This perception of stability, however, is a Eurocentric one. People in the "Global South," which had become the main battleground of the "Global Cold War" from the 1960s on, have never been able to share this point of view.¹⁰⁸ And even in the so-called "First World" (the West) and "Second World" (the East), it would be wrong to take too rosy a view of the tense situation when two

107 See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in: *Foreign Affairs* 70/1 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23–33. See also Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order*, Ithaca 2016.

108 See first and foremost Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Cambridge 2005.

ideologically, politically, economically, and militarily antagonistic alliances faced each other with “over-kill” capacities of nuclear weapons, with—in the worst case scenario—the possibility of nuclear Armageddon unleashed in less than one hour.¹⁰⁹

As *Ulrich Kühn* reminds us in his contribution, the INF Treaty was not just a “landmark arms control and disarmament treaty.” Despite its global ambition, it was first and foremost about the security of the European–Western Hemisphere, of which the Soviet Union was a part. While the symbolism of the signing ceremony in Washington carried meaning way beyond Europe, the Treaty had serious flaws because it had a purely European perspective. This laid it open to its demise in the post-Cold War order. As *Bange* shows, the INF Treaty did not address the East-Asian nuclear balance of power. China has risen in global importance, and both Russia and the U.S. feel that they need to contain its growing power. By the 2010s the INF Treaty was increasingly being seen as an impediment to global security. Moreover, in present-day Russia the INF Treaty has become a symbol of an unequal post-Cold War order that has kept Russia in check and rendered it geopolitically more vulnerable than need be, while the U.S. has remained unconstrained, especially after 9/11.¹¹⁰

Since the turn of the millennium, we have had to witness the decline of the security architecture that was so successfully built in the last decade of the Cold War and the following years. The INF Treaty was a center-piece in this structure. Its termination in 2019 is the result of a long chain of events, starting in December 2001 with George W. Bush (Jr.)’s decision to renounce the ABM Treaty of 1972, which had been the foundation block of all later Soviet–U.S. disarmament agreements. Subsequent key events have ranged from Russia’s withdrawal from the 1990 CSE Treaty in 2007 to the failed attempts to renew the seriously outdated “Vienna Document” on Confidence and Security Building Measures which had its last overhaul in 2011. Worse, after ending the INF Treaty, the Trump Administration is threatening to cancel the Open Skies Treaty (another pillar for verification measures). As at present (spring 2020), there are no convincing signs that there will be a suitable replacement for the new START Treaty of 2010, which, if nothing is done, is due to expire in February 2021. Should this happen, for the very first time since 1972 (SALT I) there will be no treaty or other legal instrument between Washington and Moscow that restrains nuclear armament.

Consequently, while the INF Treaty in 1987 signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the end of the INF Treaty in 2019 may thus signal the beginning of the *post-post Cold War* world, for which we do not yet have a name.

109 See Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon, Introduction: Between Accidental Armageddons and Winnable Wars: Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Fears in the 1980s, in: Conze, Klimke, and Varon (eds.), *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear*, pp. 1–23.

110 See Parker, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia*, pp. 7–10.

**I. Breakthrough to Disarmament:
The Superpowers from Reykjavik
to Washington 1986–1987**

Beth A. Fischer

Nuclear Abolitionism, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty

How is it that the President who launched the largest peacetime military buildup in U.S. history and who introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was also the leader who proposed and signed the only treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons? To many, the Reagan Administration's military buildup and SDI seem inexplicably at odds with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. On the one hand, the President introduced massive increases in defense capabilities but, on the other, he called for nuclear disarmament. However, from President Reagan's perspective these policies were perfectly consistent. This chapter examines Reagan's unorthodox views about security, his policy goals, and the intellectual connection between SDI and the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It also considers SDI's role in the conclusion of the landmark INF Treaty.

When President Reagan entered office in January 1981, he announced a massive increase in defense spending. The Administration claimed that the Soviet Union had been engaging in a military buildup during the 1970s and was poised to overtake the U.S. in the arms race. A U.S. buildup was necessary so as to counter increased Soviet strength and global aspirations. Although Reagan was slashing expenditures in most sectors, defense spending would increase by seven per cent per year between 1981 and 1985 and constitute more than 30 per cent of the federal budget. Military expenditures would cost \$1.5 trillion over the next four years, and these resources would be used to strengthen forces, improve combat readiness, and enhance force mobility.¹

In March 1983 Reagan also introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI was a research program that sought to develop a space-based system of lasers that would destroy Soviet nuclear missiles should they ever be launched in an attack. SDI generated a storm of controversy, not only in the USSR and Western Europe, but in the U.S. as well. Although Reagan portrayed SDI as a defensive system that would protect civilians from a nuclear attack, critics feared it would

1 Reagan's predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had significantly increased defense expenditures before leaving office, rendering Reagan's buildup all the more noteworthy. Richard Halloran, Weinberger Begins Drive for Big Rise in Military Budget, in: *New York Times*, March 5, 1981; Richard Halloran, Reagan to Request \$38B Increase in Military Outlays, in: *New York Times*, March 5, 1981; and Hedrick Smith, US Priorities: Basic Reversal, in: *New York Times*, March 5, 1981.

prompt an arms race in space. Others believed it to be an exorbitant pipe dream, pointing out that the technology for such a system did not exist. Arms control experts claimed that SDI would undermine nuclear security, as enshrined in the doctrine of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD. The central idea of MAD was that both superpowers would be deterred from launching a nuclear attack on the other by the fact that neither side had defenses. If one side were to attack, the other would retaliate and both would be obliterated. A first strike would prove suicidal, thus deterring a would-be aggressor. Arms control experts insisted that this ever-present prospect of nuclear annihilation had deterred the Soviets from waging war. It was this logic that led the superpowers to sign the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in which they pledged to forego nuclear defenses. Building a defensive system would upend this delicate system of mutual vulnerability.

The military buildup and SDI seemed at odds with the Administration’s “Zero Proposal,” which it introduced in November 1981.² This proposal called for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and later became the basis for the 1987 INF Treaty. At the time it was introduced, however, the Soviets were the only ones with such forces in Europe. The Soviets had deployed SS-20s since 1976 and in response NATO had pledged to deploy similar forces. American Pershing II and Cruise Missiles were scheduled to arrive in Western Europe in late 1983.

To many, the Zero Proposal appeared to be both inequitable and disingenuous. The Reagan Administration was asking the Soviets to dismantle a deployed arsenal while the Americans would simply forego a deployment which was years in the future and which faced increasingly strong resistance from citizens in Western countries.³ Some suspected the Zero Proposal was nothing more than a public relations campaign intended to make the Soviets appear to be the ones opposing arms control. Thus, it came as no surprise when the Kremlin immediately rejected the offer, calling it a “propaganda ploy.”⁴

1. Reagan’s Unconventional Views about Security

In order to appreciate the connection between the military buildup, SDI, and the INF Treaty it is important to understand President Reagan’s views about security, which were unconventional for the time. Simply put, Ronald Reagan abhorred nuclear weapons and sought to eliminate them. He believed nuclear

2 Ronald Reagan, Speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 1981, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/111881a>.

3 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, New York 1984, pp. 229, 355 f. See also Kenneth Adelman, Interview for the Miller Center of Public Affairs Presidential Oral History Project (2003). Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/oralhistory/kenneth-adelman>.

4 Reagan’s Arms Proposal Assailed, November 20, 1981, in: *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 33:47, 7.

weapons to be morally repugnant, owing to the fact that they targeted civilians and threatened to destroy civilization. A nuclear war was also unwinnable, Reagan reasoned, owing to the destructive capacity of the weapons. Moreover, the vast stockpiles that had been accumulated during the Cold War raised the probability of a catastrophic accident. “No *one* could win a nuclear war,” Reagan observed in his memoirs. “Yet as long as nuclear weapons were in existence, there would always be risks they would be used, and once the first nuclear weapons was unleashed, who knew where it would end? My dream, then, became a world free of nuclear weapons [... F]or the eight years I was president I never let my dream of a nuclear-free world fade from my mind.”⁵ Martin Anderson, Reagan’s long-time friend and advisor, recalled that “the concern about nuclear war and the challenge to diminish that war was always foremost in [Reagan’s] mind. It was not something he talked about a lot in public. But he had strong feelings and strong convictions about what could and should be done.”⁶

Reagan also rejected the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Foregoing defenses defied reason, he believed, and left American citizens vulnerable to nuclear annihilation. Such a policy was unconscionable. “MAD [was] madness,” the President maintained. “It was the craziest thing I ever heard of.” It rendered the world “a button push away from oblivion.”⁷ MAD depended upon the superpowers threatening each other’s survival forever, with no mistakes, no miscommunications, and no technical failures.⁸ Reagan thought such expectations were unreasonably high, and the stakes even higher.

President Reagan rejected traditional approaches to arms control, which sought to limit the rate at which arsenals could continue to grow. Instead, he called for the reduction and eventual elimination of these weapons. During his first press conference in 1981, the President told reporters, “We should start negotiating [with the Soviets] on the basis of trying to effect an actual reduction in the number of nuclear arms. That would then be *real* strategic arms limitation.”⁹ Reagan repeatedly called for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and for him, the Zero Proposal was a first step toward this larger goal.¹⁰ Eliminating INF weapons from Europe would be a positive step in the right direction. “I believe there can only be one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age: a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,” the President explained in November 1983. “I know I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the

5 Ronald Reagan, *An American Life*, New York 1990, p. 550, see also p. 265.

6 Martin Anderson, *Revolution*, New York 1987, p. 72.

7 Reagan, *An American Life*, pp. 13, 547, 550.

8 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 14, 1988. Text of speech is accessible at The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35547#axzz1nhyn0pZ8>.

9 Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference, January 29, 1981, in: *Public Papers of the Presidency*, 1981, pp. 55–62.

10 Ronald Reagan, *An American Life*, pp. 293–297.

earth.”¹¹ By the time he left office Reagan had called for the elimination of nuclear arsenals approximately 150 times.¹²

2. Reagan’s Military Buildup

Reagan’s military buildup was part of his plan to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Administration officials called this policy “peace through strength” and it had three objectives.¹³ The most immediate goal of the buildup was to match Soviet military capabilities. Reagan officials believed that the USSR had been engaged in a military buildup and was about to overtake the United States in the arms race.¹⁴

The second objective was to deter Soviet expansionism. The Administration assumed that the USSR had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 because Moscow believed the United States was too weak to challenge them. Reagan

11 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Japanese Diet, November 11, 1983; Lou Cannon, President Hails Japan as Partner, in: Washington Post, November 11, 1983.

12 Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, *Reagan’s Secret War: The Untold Story of his Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster*, New York 2009, pp. 93 f.

13 See Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction and Deterrence, November 22, 1982, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 18, p. 1519; Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1983, pp. 442–448; Ronald Reagan, The US–Soviet Relationship, January 16, 1984, in: Department of State Bulletin (February 1984), pp. 2–4; Ronald Reagan, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 1984, in: American Foreign Policy Current Documents, Washington, D. C. 1984, pp. 220–227.

14 There were disagreements within the Administration as to whether the U.S. was in the process of falling behind the USSR in the arms race, or already in second place. More importantly, both arguments were wrong. They were based on U.S. intelligence assessments which indicated that the Soviets had been acquiring weapons at an increasingly faster pace during the 1970s. By 1982 the CIA had revised this assessment. New information indicated that Moscow had not been acquiring new weapons at an increasingly faster pace during the 1970s as previously believed. In fact, the growth rate in Soviet military expenditures had peaked in the mid-1970s, and was unlikely to increase in the near future. Nonetheless, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey continued to suggest that the Soviets had been engaged in a threatening buildup. For example, see *Soviet Defense Spending: Recent Trends and Future Prospects* (written in 1982 but published in July 1983), and CIA, Office of Soviet Analysis, Joint Economic Committee Briefing Paper, September 14, 1983, pp. 8–11, 18. For a discussion about the process of reassessment and its aftermath, see Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950–1990*, Texas 1998, pp. 75–97; James Noren, CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Economy, in: Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Legget, *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union*, Washington, D. C. 2003. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article02.html>; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, Washington, D. C. 1994, pp. 41 f.

officials reasoned that a stronger U.S. would prevent the Soviets from seeking to further expand their sphere of influence.¹⁵

President Reagan's ultimate objective, however, was to persuade the Kremlin to reduce its arsenal. Administration officials assumed that Moscow would only make concessions if confronted by a strong and determined adversary. The U.S. needed to compel the Soviets to agree to arms reductions, these advisors reasoned. Thus, their strategy was to increase U.S. military capabilities so as to convince the Kremlin to enter into arms reductions talks.¹⁶ The buildup was meant to bring about a decrease in superpower arsenals.

President Reagan explained his reasoning in 1982. "Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace," he acknowledged. "[A] secure force keeps others from threatening us, and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that's what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons, but unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they're so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat the point because it goes to the heart of our policies. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate."¹⁷ Although it seemed paradoxical, Reagan hoped the buildup would ultimately lead to arms reductions.

3. SDI and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

SDI was another critical component of Reagan's quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. The President reasoned that even if nuclear arsenals were reduced by 90 per cent the world would not be truly secure. "Peace" would still be achieved through the on-going threat of nuclear annihilation. Defenses were necessary to protect citizens from both accidental and intentional attacks. "Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it," he observed. "[Wasn't] it possible in this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerged from their silos?"¹⁸

15 This assumption was incorrect. The Kremlin decision to send armed forces to Afghanistan was based on a perceived need to support an ideological ally. Members of the Politburo were somewhat reluctant about the mission and within a month were looking for a face-saving way out.

16 These assumptions were incorrect. For a variety of military, strategic, and financial reasons, the Kremlin favored an end to the arms race.

17 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction and Deterrence, November 22, 1982, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 18, p. 1519.

18 Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 547.

When Reagan unveiled SDI in March 1983 he explained, “I’ve become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? [...] What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies. [...]”¹⁹

Moreover, Reagan believed that an effective defensive system could pave the way for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If the United States could defend itself from a nuclear attack, Soviet nuclear arsenals would be rendered useless, he reasoned. And if both the U.S. and the USSR had effective defenses, the weapons would become obsolete. Thus, they could be abolished. Consequently, the President repeatedly offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets. If both superpowers could defend themselves against a nuclear attack, Reagan explained to General Secretary Gorbachev, retaining such arsenals would be pointless. Thus, from the outset the President offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets.²⁰ During the Geneva Summit and the Reyjavik meeting, as well as in letters to Soviet leaders, the President repeatedly offered to share SDI technology so as to pave the way for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In short, from President Reagan’s perspective the U.S. military buildup, SDI, and the INF Treaty were all part and parcel of the same quest to abolish nuclear weapons. The U.S. buildup would persuade the Soviets to agree to arms reductions, SDI would render nuclear weapons impotent, and the Treaty would be the first step toward abolishing superpower arsenals. In Reagan’s mind there were no contradictions whatsoever.

4. Rifts Between the President and His Advisors

For the most part, Reagan’s advisors did not share his unorthodox views about security. For one thing, they opposed the abolition of nuclear weapons. The experts believed that nuclear weapons had successfully deterred the Soviet Union from initiating a war with the West and expanding its empire. If the weapons were removed Moscow would embark on a series of military adventures intended to fulfill its territorial ambitions.

19 Ronald Reagan, Address, March 23, 1983, in: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Washington, D. C. 1984, pp. 442 f.

20 For example, see Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, March 29, 1983, in: *Public Papers of the President, 1983*, pp. 463–470; and the transcripts from NSC meetings in: Jason Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), *The Reagan Files: The Untold Story of Reagan’s Top-Secret Efforts to Win the Cold War*, Pacific Palisades, CA 2010, pp. 349–422.

Reagan's advisors also supported MAD, claiming that this arrangement had kept the peace since the end of World War Two. Secretary of State Alexander Haig wrestled with the President over this issue in 1981. As Haig tells it, during a visit to Camp David, Reagan had drafted a personal letter to the Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, which expressed his hope for "meaningful dialogue" and ultimately, the abolition of nuclear weapons. "[When I read it] I found myself astonished at his attitude when I measured it against the backdrop of what he was saying publicly and what was attributed to him as a classic cold warrior," Haig told Reagan biographer, Lou Cannon. The letter "talked about a world without nuclear weapons, it talked about disarmament. [...] It reflected a demeanor that if only those two men could sit down as rational human beings, the problems of the world would be behind us." Haig considered the letter "naïve," so he strongly advised against sending it. Reagan ultimately agreed not to send the letter, but he did not change his views about MAD or the need to abolish nuclear weapons.²¹

Haig's successor, George Shultz, found himself waging the same ideological battle. Shultz, who was normally quite deferential, repeatedly tried to persuade Reagan to support MAD. In late 1983 he prepared a paper for the President outlining the reasons to stick with the doctrine. "But I made little real impact on the president," he conceded. "He stuck with his own deeply held view of where we should be heading."²²

Most of Reagan's advisors also opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI had been the President's pet project. The development of the initial concept, along with the speech unveiling the program, had been conducted in secret. Reagan had wanted to ensure that his idea did not fall victim to bureaucratic battles or naysayers. Thus, neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense was part of the venture. The normally placid Shultz was incensed when he learned of the program—two days before it was publicly unveiled. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt was "flabbergasted."²³ Both men, along with National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, vehemently argued against the project. The program would be perceived as destabilizing and undermine Western security, they argued. The technology did not exist, the costs would prove exorbitant, and the program would cause serious rifts with Allies.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was the only senior advisor who backed SDI enthusiastically. Like Reagan, he believed the mutual vulnerability enshrined in MAD was nonsensical and thought defenses against Soviet nuclear missiles would be a positive step forward. The \$26 billion flooding into his department was also a plus.²⁴

21 Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime*, New York 1991, p. 301.

22 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, pp. 466, 509.

23 For more on the Reagan Administration officials' reactions to SDI and the ensuing internal battles see *ibid.*, pp. 246–264; Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, New York 1990, pp. 291–329; and Martin Anderson, *Revolution*, pp. 80–99.

24 Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, pp. 291–329.

After repeatedly trying to talk the President out of the SDI program, Reagan's advisors grudgingly came to accept it. Reagan was so enamored of the idea that they had little choice but to go along. Moreover, McFarlane and others came to believe that it could be a useful bargaining chip for extracting arms control concessions out of the Soviet Union. SDI could be traded away in exchange for a Soviet pledge to reduce its nuclear arsenals, these advisors reasoned.²⁵

But Reagan's advisors emphatically opposed his idea of sharing SDI technology with the Soviets. They repeatedly beseeched the President to stop making such offers. The plan was not only untenable, they argued: sharing SDI would constitute the largest transfer of Western technology during the Cold War. Washington would be giving away its most valuable advantage over the Soviets. As Weinberger advised Reagan in February 1987, the idea of sharing SDI "scared the pants off" some of his officials, including the Defense Secretary himself.²⁶ "President Reagan was not only a true believer in SDI, he was definitely a true believer in sharing," Jack Matlock, the Soviet expert on the National Security Council at the time explained in 1993. "[T]his was something that most of the bureaucracy, virtually the entire bureaucracy [...] said we can't do."²⁷ Frank Carlucci, who served as both Reagan's National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense recalls, "[The President] did, as best I could tell, sincerely believe that he could give [SDI] to the Russians and everything would be fine. And I and others tried to explain to him that technically that just was not feasible. And the only thing that finally convinced him, I remember [was] one day I said to him, 'Mr. President, you have just got to stop saying that because Gorbachev, among others, doesn't believe you.' And he said, 'Well, I guess you are right. He really doesn't believe me.' [...] But it took a number of years to get him to that realization."²⁸

25 Robert McFarlane, *Consider What Star Wars Accomplished*, in: *New York Times*, August 24, 1993; McFarlane's remarks, in: Nina Tannenwald (ed.), *Understanding the End of the Cold War 1980–1987*, oral history conference at Brown University 7–10 May 1998 (provisional transcript 1999), pp. 47 f., henceforth 'Brown Conference'. See also the memo from Thomas Thorne, INR to Secretary Shultz, July 26, 1985, in: Tannenwald (ed.), *Brown Conference*. On the views Reagan's officials held on SDI see Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*, New York 2005, especially pp. 145–170. Reagan never saw SDI as a bargaining chip, however, and was adamant that it should not be treated as such.

26 NSC Meeting, February 10, 1987, transcript in: Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files*, p. 370.

27 Jack Matlock's remarks, in: *A Retrospective on the End of the Cold War*, oral history conference sponsored by The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, February 26–7, 1993, Session II, pp. 81 f., henceforth "Princeton Conference".

28 Carlucci's remarks, in: *Princeton Conference*, Session II, p. 54.

5. SDI and the INF Treaty

From President Reagan's perspective SDI and the INF Treaty were perfectly consistent. SDI would protect civilians from an intentional or accidental nuclear attack while the superpowers began the process of reducing their arsenals. And if both the U. S. and the USSR could build effective defenses, nuclear weapons would become useless, thus enabling them to be abolished. SDI and the INF Treaty would both facilitate the abolition of nuclear arsenals.

But, as Reagan's advisors anticipated, others had a different view. The Soviets found the two programs to be at odds. Reagan repeatedly called for the elimination of nuclear weapons yet he launched a military buildup and introduced what they called "space weapons." From Moscow's perspective SDI threatened to extend the arms race to space. If effective, it would enable the U.S. to attack the USSR without fear of a reprisal, thus upending the fragile peace between the superpowers. At the very least SDI contravened the 1972 ABM Treaty.

While the Soviets were initially troubled about SDI these concerns dissipated as military scientists studied the matter.²⁹ In the late 1970s the Soviets had considered launching a similar research program of their own and were consequently deeply familiar with the technical challenges of building a space-based defensive system.³⁰ This expertise enabled them to conclude that it was unlikely SDI would come to fruition any time soon. Experts advised the Kremlin that the Soviet Union should not invest resources trying to match SDI. If the system was ever built and deployed—and this was a big "if"—the Soviet Union could build inexpensive countermeasures that would overwhelm it.³¹ By the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 Soviet officials had begun to suspect that SDI was a ruse intended to lure the Soviets into wasting their resources on a comparable project, or perhaps a bargaining chip that Reagan would offer to trade away in exchange for Soviet pledges to reduce their arsenal.³²

29 Vladimir Slipchenko, in: Tannenwald (ed.), *Brown Conference*, pp. 51–54; Aleksander Bessmertnykh, in: *Princeton Conference*, 1993, pp. 22–24. Yuri Andropov interview in: *Pravda*, March 26, 1983.

30 In 1978 Soviet military scientist Vladimir Chelomei had proposed the construction of small space shuttles that would carry anti-satellite weapons into space. Like SDI, Chelomei's proposal envisioned a space-based system of lasers capable of destroying incoming missiles. A key difference, however, was that President Reagan envisioned a purely defensive system, whereas the Soviet proposal included the ability to attack enemy satellites. See Steven J. Zagola, *Red Star Wars*, in: *Jane's Intelligence Review* 9/5 (May 1, 1997), pp. 205–208; David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy*, New York 2009, pp. 215–218; Roald Z. Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist*, New York 1994, especially pp. 96, 99, 123–124, and 202–211; and Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, Ithaca, NY 1999, pp. 233–248.

31 Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, p. 239.

32 Alexander Yakovlev, as cited in Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue*, New York 2000, p. 411. Oleg Grinevsky relates that Marshall Akhromeev called SDI "a chimera." See

Like Reagan, Gorbachev abhorred nuclear weapons, and for a variety of strategic, military, and financial reasons, the Politburo sought to end the arms race. But SDI made it more difficult to do so. Soviet conservatives claimed that Reagan was launching a new arms race in space and therefore resisted arms reductions. The more belligerent Reagan seemed, the more these Soviet hard-liners resisted Gorbachev's reforms.

Gorbachev therefore sought to counter SDI in the most cost-effective manner possible: through diplomatic pressure. The Soviet leader tried to persuade Reagan to abandon SDI, or at the very least, to restrict it to the laboratory. Gorbachev reasoned that if he could get such assurances from the President, he could proceed with his main task, which was to end the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev's strategy was to link SDI with arms reductions. The Soviets would agree to reduce their nuclear arms, he explained, if the President would forego SDI. In letter after letter and meeting after meeting Gorbachev tried to sell Reagan this "package."

But Reagan refused to budge. SDI was not a bargaining chip, he insisted. It was a means to protect civilians from nuclear Armageddon. The President thought it would be unconscionable to trade such protection away.

Thus, the Strategic Defense Initiative stymied progress on the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The stand-off over SDI slowed progress on the conclusion of the INF Treaty. Both leaders bear the blame for this situation. Reagan's initially belligerent rhetoric, combined with the military buildup and SDI, undermined his quest to abolish nuclear weapons. From Moscow's perspective, launching a new weapons system while calling for the elimination of nuclear arms seemed contradictory. The Soviet camp questioned Reagan's sincerity about both nuclear abolition and the objectives of SDI. The President also undermined progress on arms reductions by refusing to agree to restrict SDI to the laboratory, as Gorbachev requested. Realistically, the research program would have remained a laboratory experiment for two decades. As Secretary Shultz later remarked,

Tannenwald (ed.), *Brown Conference*, p. 41. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985*, London 1991, pp. 112, 114, 106–115. Soviet suspicions were not entirely misplaced. In 1993, after an internal investigation, the then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, confirmed that the United States did indeed have a program aimed at deceiving the Kremlin about SDI. The internal investigation determined that during the 1980s the Pentagon developed a deception program designed "to feed the Kremlin half-truths and lies about the project" and to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining accurate information about SDI research. See Tim Weiner, *Lies and Rigged 'Star Wars' Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress*, in: *The New York Times*, August 18, 1993, p. A6; Tim Weiner, *General Details Altered 'Star Wars' Test*, in: *The New York Times*, August 27, 1993; Eric Schmitt, *Aspin Disputes Report of 'Star Wars' Rigging*, in: *The New York Times*, September 10, 1993; and U.S. General Accounting Office, *Ballistic Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results*, GAO NSIAD-94-219 (July 1994).

agreeing to such a restriction would have been like “giving [Gorbachev] the sleeves from our vest.”³³

But Gorbachev made the tactical error of linking SDI and nuclear arms reduction. Consequently, no progress could be made on reducing nuclear weapons until Reagan conceded on SDI. Linking the issues enabled SDI to become a roadblock.

By 1987 Gorbachev’s advisors were urging him to de-link SDI and nuclear arms reductions. “The package” had backfired. There had been no progress on the main goal—arms reductions—because the process had been held hostage to SDI. The advisors urged him to deal with each issue separately. On February 28, 1987, Gorbachev “untied the package,” announcing that the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss the reduction of nuclear missiles separately from the Strategic Defense Initiative. This led to a major breakthrough and was pivotal in ending the Cold War. Alleviated of the need to find common ground on SDI, the two sides quickly reached an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range forces in Europe. Ten months later Gorbachev and Reagan signed the historic INF Treaty.

6. Conclusion

President Reagan had unconventional views about security which led to policies that could appear to be contradictory. The President’s repeated calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons seemed inconsistent with his military buildup and SDI. Such seeming inconsistencies proved frustratingly perplexing to both Reagan’s advisors and the Soviet leaders. But for Reagan the ultimate goal was the abolition of nuclear weapons. The buildup, SDI, the Zero Proposal, and the INF Treaty were all part of the President’s quest for a more stable system of global security. President Reagan sought to replace mutual assured destruction with mutual assured survival.³⁴ The INF Treaty was meant to be a major step on this journey.

33 George Shultz, Oral History at Miller Center, December 18, 2002, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2002_1218_shultz.pdf.

34 Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 550.

Ronald J. Granieri

It's Only Easy in Retrospect: The American Road to INF, 1986–1987

We should not allow the emerging consensus on the INF Treaty's historical significance to obscure the complexity of its origins. As with so many historical events, things that appear inevitable in retrospect were predicted by few in advance. Both then and now, informed observers have struggled to explain the circuitous, decade-long path that wound from Helmut Schmidt's stern warnings about Soviet missile deployments to NATO's Double-Track Decision, and then, via a deployment that contributed to the collapse of *détente*, to that final Washington signing ceremony. It's a story set to the background music of an increasingly shrill and apocalyptic rhetoric of anti-missile protest marches, which ended at a summit between a reformist Soviet leader and an American President who had once called the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world."¹

This fascinating story has only gained in appeal in the last few years. The present essay was originally written for a conference to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Washington Treaty, but now appears in print after a subsequent U. S. President has withdrawn from the agreement in response to alleged Russian violations. It remains to be seen whether any new negotiations will result in a more satisfactory agreement, as negotiators on both sides have suggested. The future remains as hidden from us as it always has been, but, as we experience the politics surrounding the Treaty's death, it is appropriate that we consider the developments and decisions that brought it to life in the first place.

The American road to the INF Treaty was the product of both long- and short-term elements, all of which were important; neither the long-term factors nor the short would have been sufficient on their own. The long-term element was the particular vision of Ronald Reagan, who rose to the leadership of the Republican party as an avatar of hardline anti-Communist conservatism but who also pursued a nuclear abolition agenda that was out of line with that held by many of his supporters. In the short term, the American political developments of 1986 and 1987 that weakened the Reagan Administration, along with the domestic and international pressures that moved Gorbachev to reach a compromise, created an opportunity for the President to close this nuclear deal and end his term of office

1 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983. Text at <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/30883b> (accessed March 14, 2020). See also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan, Washington D. C. 1983, p. 364.

on a historically positive note. This brief essay will attempt to sketch these two sides of the story, to help us understand both how a historical agreement can be the product of such disparate forces, and how similar forces can work against such deals in the future. It aims to contribute to an understanding of the late Cold War era that is post-revisionist (for want of a better term) and which highlights the surprising interplay of long-held beliefs and political opportunities that led to a success many had dreamt of, but few had predicted.

1. Ronald Reagan, “Secret Dove?”

Our understanding of the American position on the INF issue has to begin with a recognition that INF was a natural culmination of the Reagan defense buildup. This aspect is underappreciated, even by some of the most recent scholarship, which continues to frame the Reagan Administration’s embrace of disarmament as a “reversal.”² Beth Fischer and the scholars who have learned from her path-breaking work are correct in noting the apparent change of course in Reagan’s arms control policy. This, they say, began in late 1983, when Reagan moved away from the position taken during his first term—at that time, stressing the need to close an alleged “window of vulnerability” through substantial increases in the American defense budget—and moved toward an openness to arms control.³ According to that long dominant narrative, Soviet overreaction to NATO’s Able Archer exercise, which an increasingly nervous Soviet leadership thought was preparation for an actual attack, combined with concerns about the approaching 1984 Presidential elections to make Reagan rethink his rhetorical approach to the Soviets.⁴ That rethinking coincided with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, who had his own reasons for offering Reagan the opportunity to strike the historic deal in Washington.⁵

That visible break, however, should not obscure the basic continuity in Reagan’s own thinking about nuclear weapons. Even now that Reagan’s historical image has been “rehabilitated” by scholars like Fischer, there is still a tendency amongst commentators to imagine those moves as the product of external forces influencing the President rather than to credit them to his agency. Reagan’s critics were so wedded to his image as a trigger-happy cowboy that, unsurprisingly, his

2 Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, Columbia 1997.

3 Fischer has now significantly revised her original position, see Beth A. Fischer, *Building Up and Seeking Peace: President Reagan’s Cold War Legacy*, in: Jeffrey L. Chidster and Paul Kengor (eds.), *Reagan’s Legacy in a World Transformed*, Cambridge/Mass. 2015, pp. 165–177; as well as her contribution to this volume.

4 Nate Jones (ed.), *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War*, New York 2016; Marc Ambinder, *The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983*, New York 2018.

5 See the contribution by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton in this volume.

embrace of arms control caused cognitive dissonance; and this has lasted from his own time to subsequent historical interpretations.⁶ Even scholars who consider themselves even-handed with Reagan have struggled to accept the possibility that rearmament and disarmament always went together.

Reagan himself asserted a continuity in his policy vision that neither critics nor admirers have completely understood or consistently applied in their analyses. One-time critics who now have kind words for Reagan tend to shift responsibility for his previous sins onto his more conservative advisors, while praising the sensible moderate advisors who guided him onto wiser paths.⁷ Among the latter, they particularly single out Secretary of State George Shultz. But conservative activists, then and now, tend to do the opposite, blaming alleged moderates like Shultz and the Chief of General Staff, James Baker, for betraying the Reagan Revolution, as they criticize some of the Reagan policies. So, in their search for the “Real Reagan,” scholars have often only found the Reagan they wanted to find in the first place. As speechwriter Aram Bakshian noted, when people said “Let Reagan be Reagan,” they usually meant, “Let me be Reagan.”⁸

This is unfortunate, because it not only misses the complexity of Reagan as a character, but also the complexity of his team and the role they played in producing the Washington Treaty. I say this not to claim any of the mystical qualities attributed to Reagan that dot the hagiographic literature on the man,⁹ but rather in a plea for scholars to apply the same serious *Verstehen* to the relationship between Reagan’s intentions and results that scholars apply to the protesters who denounced the President’s policies.¹⁰ Whether or not those protesters were correct in their assumptions about the President and in their predictions of imminent nuclear disaster, scholars do understand the value of treating them on their own terms. Like many a peace marcher, however, many Reagan researchers have not fully appreciated that the President was actually serious in his belief that the point of the arms buildup—the buildup he called “peace through strength”—might actually have been to make the U. S. strong enough to negotiate when the time was right; and he certainly assembled a team of advisors who made

6 Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History. Reagan in the White House*, New York 1984 (paperback ed.) is a perfect example of the conventional wisdom during the Reagan Era. Among the well known post-Reagan works, France FitzGerald, *Way out There in the Blue*, New York 2000, also emphasized Reagan’s irresponsible rhetoric on missile defense, treating the INF Treaty as largely Gorbachev’s accomplishment.

7 James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation. Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement and the End of the Cold War*, Ithaca 2014.

8 Interview with Aram Bakshian, in: Miller Center, Ronald Reagan Oral History [MCOH], January 14, 2002, pp. 31, 42, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/aram-bakshian-jr-oral-history-director-speechwriting>.

9 Peter Schweizer, *Victory. The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the End of the Cold War*, New York 1994; idem, *Reagan’s War. The Epic Story of his Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism*, New York 2003.

10 Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, and the Cold War of the 1980s*, New York 2017.

that possible. For all their occasionally intense disagreements on details, those advisors who worked with Reagan the longest, including the pair most often described as polar opposites, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, did so because they shared an overall strategy for advancing American interests. It was one in which a military buildup and an arms control strategy were intimately bound together.¹¹

A central element of that strategy was Reagan's deep aversion to nuclear weapons, which distinguished him from other conservatives, who advocated strength and distrusted arms control.¹² This is what led Reagan to embrace the "zero option," something he advocated for all nuclear weapons and which eventually found expression in the INF Treaty. More conventional arms control experts—of both parties—viewed the zero option as either a dangerous delusion or a clever dodge to avoid negotiations. Whether inside or outside the Reagan Administration, they were generally shocked when Reagan actually followed through on it as a practical policy. Reagan aide Annelise Anderson argues that Shultz and others in the arms control world initially thought Reagan's anti-nuclear positions were "nuts." But the pragmatic Shultz also warned his staff, "You better get used to it because that's what he thinks."¹³

Shultz found a way to channel Reagan's enthusiasm for arms reduction in the direction of opening talks with the Soviets. His success and his positive press image allowed many writers to imagine that he had somehow taken Reagan somewhere the President did not want to go, missing the point that, despite his advocacy of the largest defense buildup in peacetime American history, Reagan's goal was *always* zero. To acknowledge that, however, threatened to confuse those who already thought they had Reagan clearly categorized.

The confusion goes back to Reagan's first embrace of the zero option, in his November 18, 1981 speech to the National Press Club.¹⁴ Reagan gave that speech, shortly before American and Soviet negotiators were getting ready to meet in Geneva as part of the negotiation package of NATO's Double-Track Decision. NBC's Marvin Kalb struggled to make sense of Reagan's musings about a world without nuclear weapons, and asked Secretary Weinberger half-jokingly, "Have you always been secret doves?" Weinberger asserted that he did not "see any change from dove to hawk [...] or anything of that kind at all. I see a perfectly clear evolution of a policy which the President enunciated many times last year

11 Ronald J. Granieri, *Beyond Cap the Foil. Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense Buildup*, in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), *The Enduring Legacy. Leadership and National Security Affairs during the Reagan Presidency*, Lexington KY 2017, pp. 51–80.

12 Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*, New York 2006.

13 Annelise Anderson, MCOH, Interview (December 17, 2002), pp. 56 f., <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/annelise-anderson-oral-history-associate-director-office>.

14 Ronald Reagan, *Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons*, November 18, 1981, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/111881a>. (accessed March 14, 2020).

[...] to arm and regain the strength of the United States so that we can enter into effective negotiating discussions.”¹⁵

Getting from that idea to the actual Washington Treaty was, of course, not always so simple. One of the foremost historians of the Cold War, Melvyn Leffler, offers an example of how scholars can gain a better understanding of what was happening in a recent essay in which he emphasized the significance of Reagan’s “desires to abolish nuclear weapons, tamp down the strategic arms race, and avoid Armageddon.” Even though many of his advisors were more suspicious of Soviet intentions and reluctant to pursue radical change, Leffler writes, “Reagan’s sincerity, goodwill, strong desire for negotiations, and shared commitment to nuclear abolition (however abstract) reassured Gorbachev, helping to sustain a trajectory whose end results the Soviet leader did not foresee or contemplate. Paradoxically, then, Reagan nurtured the dynamics that won the Cold War by focusing on ways to end it.”¹⁶

As much as Reagan disliked nuclear weapons personally, however, his rise to power depended in no small part on the coalescence of a conservative critique of arms control. Both his 1976 and 1980 campaigns built on his suspicion of the arms control process. Along the way, Reagan gathered a diverse collection of arms control critics, giving them coherence and a common home, enabling them to become an authentic conservative counterculture. That counterculture had helped alter the direction of the arms control narrative with the emergence of the Second Cold War after 1979. Historians generally agree that the success of conservative opinion leaders like William F. Buckley Jr. in marginalizing fringe elements and bringing together the main strands of conservatism in the 1960s created a movement with which Ronald Reagan could ride to victory in 1980. But arms control, too, provided a particularly useful issue to attract disparate groups to Reagan’s banner.¹⁷

Too much work on the historical development of the foreign- and security-policy views of the American Right tends to collapse definitions rather than refine them. Thanks especially to the bruising political debates inspired by the Bush (43rd) Administration’s foreign policy, terms such as “neo-conservative” and “hard-liner” have been tossed around so much that they have lost their specific meanings. Even good books tend to ignore very real differences in detail that separated, and continue to separate, them.¹⁸ While not advocating splitting

15 Weinberger and Kalb on *Meet the Press*, November 22, 1981, in: Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 1981, Vol 5, Washington 1981, p. 3427.

16 Melvyn P. Leffler, Ronald Reagan and the Cold War. What Mattered Most, in: Texas National Security Review, 1/3 (May 2018), <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65636> (accessed July 15, 2018).

17 On the development of the Reagan coalition and the Conservative movement in general, see Rick Perlstein, *The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan*, New York, 2015. See also George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*, 30th Anniversary Edition, Wilmington DE 2006.

18 Len Colodny and Tom Schachtman, *The Forty Years War. The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama*, New York 2009.

for its own sake, I think it is important that we don't lose all sense of the trees when describing the forest. Understanding differences in origin and goals can help us understand both how political coalitions emerge and also how and why they break up.

A line of simply opposing arms control was neither unique nor a sufficient description of Reagan's positions. A segment of the American policy elite had been arguing in this way throughout the Cold War, but simple rejectionism had been defeated in the 1970s, when the emergence of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process altered the political debate.¹⁹ Conservatives needed to regroup if they hoped to shape any future debate, and this forced them to refine both the nature of their critique and their vision for the future.

The most important distinction between groupings in the Reagan team was that between the anti-nuclear hawks and the hard bargainers. The first group got its name from a term used by one of the men Reagan appointed to direct the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman. It was how he described his boss's basic outlook. According to Adelman, Reagan wanted a strong national defense but "couldn't stand nuclear weapons; he wanted to get rid of nuclear weapons."²⁰ Secretary of Defense Weinberger also admitted in a private conversation that "Ronald Reagan detests [nuclear weapons] more than anyone I've ever dealt with."²¹ That attitude was not immediately apparent to all those who supported Reagan nor to those who feared him. Many Reagan supporters, hardened by the arms control debates of the 1970s, assumed that conservatism required an attachment to nuclear weapons and a rejection of all deals. Adelman himself admitted "All of us who were conservative thought that when [Jimmy] Carter said, 'I want to eliminate nuclear weapons,' that was the stupidest thing we'd ever heard. We all made fun of it, and then we have our hero who says things really more extreme than Carter ever does, and he's unstoppable on doing it."²² As we have pointed out, subsequent literature has emphasized the nuclear abolitionism that ran consistently through Reagan's policies. He opposed conventional arms control because it did not aim at reductions, and believed that an arms buildup was the best way to respond to the Soviet threat until reductions became possible. Reagan's critique of SALT II was twofold. Essentially, he attacked the treaty from both the left and the right. He believed it wrong merely to limit future growth of stockpiles, preferring to negotiate on reducing existing forces.

19 Matthew J. Ambrose, *The Control Agenda. A History of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks*, Ithaca 2017.

20 Kenneth Adelman, MCOH, Interview (September 30, 2003), p. 38, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/kenneth-adelman-oral-history-director-arms-control-and>.

21 Weinberger comment in conversation with Clare Booth Luce, quoted in: William F. Buckley, Jr., *The Reagan I Knew*, New York 2008, p. 190.

22 Adelman, MCOH, Interview (September 30, 2003), p. 38, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/kenneth-adelman-oral-history-director-arms-control-and>.

On the other hand, he was convinced that the Soviets “cheated” or “fudged” on the limitations.²³

Thus, when in office, he rejected the traditional arms control path and instead embraced the “zero option” idea presented by Weinberger and the Pentagon (an idea they themselves had borrowed from the Europeans). As early as October 1981, Weinberger had argued that the administration “might need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion,” and advocated zero.²⁴ He stood by that position even as political pressure built to abandon it, both for larger strategic reasons and for political purposes. As a Defense Department paper argued in 1983, “European opponents of deployments now have a stake in the negotiations because they might lead to a zero outcome; abandon ‘zero’ and their interest will diminish sharply.”²⁵ The zero option rejected intermediate steps, accepting short- and medium-term increases in arms in return for the long-term vision of abolition. This vision was certainly paradoxical, but that does not necessarily mean it was dishonest, and we cannot understand the Reagan record on arms control without appreciating how sincerely held, yet contradictory, his convictions were.

Reagan’s attitude found its most profound expression in his advocacy of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which in its ideal form was intended to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”²⁶ The anti-nuclear hawk vision added an important long-term idealism to what could otherwise sound and look like simple rejectionism. And it had important political consequences, since it made Reagan’s significant and (for many) shocking flirtation with nuclear abolition at Reykjavik possible in October 1986, which ultimately led to the INF Treaty in Washington a year later.

The second group, the hard bargainers, included those security professionals who did not reject arms control per se, but who felt that previous administrations had negotiated bad agreements. Reagan sometimes spoke in this vein, but the more consistent advocates of this position were veterans of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane. The hard bargainers did not reject the arms control process. They argued, rather, that they could manage that process better than their Democratic predecessors. They claimed to be realists, not idealists, somewhat to the right but clearly within a generalized arms control consensus.

23 Douglas Brinkley (ed.), *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 297, 332 (January 29; June 3 and 4, 1985).

24 Meeting of the National Security Council on October 13, 1981, in: FRUS 1981–1988, Vol. 3 (Soviet Union 1981–1983), ed. by James Graham Wilson, Washington 2016, Doc. 92, pp. 309–315, especially p. 313.

25 Defense Paper, cited in: Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan, January 1983, in: *ibid.*, p. 852; Reagan Diaries, p. 125 (January 13, 1983).

26 Reagan’s televised speech, March 23, 1983, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/32383d>.

Haig, for example, prided himself on being tough with the Soviets, famously revoking Ambassador Dobrynin's privileged access to the State Department parking garage once he took over at Foggy Bottom.²⁷ An important link between Reagan and the security policy establishment, Haig believed that the arms control process should continue. He was therefore appalled by the zero option, arguing that it was a bad idea to take a position that could not, he felt, be the basis for negotiations.²⁸ Convinced that it was his job to be the voice of reason, speaking for the entire American foreign policy community, Haig never quite grasped the differences between his position and Reagan's. In an NSC meeting on the eve of Reagan's announcement of the zero option, he argued against making zero the official administration line. Seeking a basis for negotiations, he suggested instead that American policy should seek "the lowest possible number" of nuclear weapons. When Reagan and Weinberger pushed back, Haig responded that he agreed zero was the ultimate goal, only to have Weinberger reply: "then we should say so."²⁹ Reagan concurred.

McFarlane, who took over as National Security Advisor in 1983, after serving as Counselor to Haig in the State Department as well as Deputy National Security Advisor, echoed Haig's sentiment and was often frustrated by Reagan's attitude. For example, after Congress rejected plans for the MX missile, a new ICBM that was originally intended to modernize the American land-based deterrent, McFarlane endorsed using SDI as a possible bargaining chip in getting the Soviets to reduce their own ICBM force. He was genuinely shocked when Reagan made it clear that he did not intend to negotiate SDI away, no matter what the Soviets might be willing to give up in return.³⁰ These were the positions that Shultz called "nuts."

Reagan was willing to wait a long time for the right deal, and to walk away from half-measures. Thus when the Soviets showed little interest in the zero option, and when the 1983 deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles led them to break off the Geneva talks, Reagan took a less tragic view than some of his advisors—and certainly less than the Democratic opposition in Congress or the media. "Some on our side want us to come up with an additional proposal" to keep the Soviets from walking away, Reagan confided in his diary. "That is lousy negotiating strategy [...] We can't keep changing our proposals every time they say *nyet*."³¹ ACDA director Adelman followed Reagan's position closely. "My objective was to get a good treaty if we could do it, and if we didn't have a treaty at the end of four years, then we didn't. I didn't need a treaty; the United States

27 Alexander M. Haig, *Caveat. Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, New York 1984, pp.100 f.

28 Ambrose, *Control Agenda*, pp. 183–185.

29 Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meeting, November 12, 1981, p. 4, in: box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Meeting Files, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

30 Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, pp. 107 f.

31 Reagan Diaries, p. 186 (October 12, 1983).

didn't need a treaty. Maybe the President's political guys needed a treaty, but if they did, they'd need someone else to get them a treaty."³²

Variety within the conservative coalition was essential for Reagan's success, but also contributed to the apparent incoherence of the Administration's policies, not to mention the eventual crisis the Republican Party faces today. In arms control the differences were not immediately problematic, as the generalized critique of the Carter Administration's approach worked well in blurring differences among conservatives, and the alternately threatening and sclerotic Soviet leadership of the early 1980s did not offer a terribly appealing negotiating partner for any arms control breakthroughs. But the coalition suffered significant strains during Reagan's second term, as its abolitionist President moved towards negotiations. When the concrete opportunity for talks appeared, once Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in Moscow in 1985, Reagan moved cautiously but determinedly to seize it. Nevertheless, domestic politics as well as the changing international climate influenced the shape those talks eventually took.

2. The Politics of Diplomacy and the Diplomacy of Politics

Even with a clearer understanding of Reagan's motivations, we still need to appreciate the political context that made the Washington Treaty possible. It was a success for Reagan and Gorbachev, but it was not the success that either had initially hoped to reach. The specific form of the agreement reflected the politics of the late Reagan Administration, and although Reagan would defend the agreement by emphasizing its connection to his larger vision, our historical perspective reveals the interplay between long-term strategy and immediate political tactics.

The path to INF wound through two summits and the Administration's near-death experience in the Iran-Contra scandal, all of which, along with the increasing global popularity of Gorbachev's reform agenda, prepared the ground for the Treaty. Despite his career of anti-Communist rhetoric, Reagan had been eager to meet with Soviet leaders ever since he came into office. Even from his hospital bed, as he recovered from a spring 1981 assassination attempt, Reagan composed a long letter to Leonid Brezhnev, concluding with his hope for a "meaningful and constructive dialogue which will assist us in our joint obligation to find lasting peace."³³ Such a meeting did not become a real possibility, however, until Gorbachev's arrival on the scene. Many conservatives—those who had denounced previous Soviet leaders for being Communist true believers—were

32 Adelman MCOH, 36–7. Adelman recounts with some resentment that Colin Powell, at that time one of Reagan's military assistants, joked that Adelman was head of ACDA and opposed arms control. He claims he retorted, "Yes, you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and you didn't like war."

33 Quoted in Barrett, *Gambling with History*, pp. 31–33. See also Reagan Diaries, pp. 13–15 (April 18, 22, and 23, 1981).

not mollified by Gorbachev's calls for *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*. Indeed, they saw him as even more dangerous than his predecessors, as his popularity in the West might undermine Western solidarity. Reagan himself was not unaware of these dangers, but, encouraged by Shultz, he was committed to pursuing dialogue.

The course of true *détente* never did run smooth. After a first meeting in Geneva in 1985, the two sides began a wary dialogue. Significant differences remained on fundamental issues, such as the relationship between strategic and intermediate-range forces and the role of SDI. For all his commitment to nuclear abolition, Reagan's attachment to "Star Wars" threatened the progress of arms control. He may have sincerely believed that SDI could be a force for peace by removing the danger of nuclear attack, but he failed to appreciate what the project must look like from Moscow's perspective. For the Russians, as for Reagan's critics, SDI appeared to be either a colossal boondoggle or a roundabout way of preparing the United States to launch a devastating first strike.³⁴

At the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev and Reagan flirted with the idea of massive cuts in their strategic nuclear forces, and the occasion has taken on mythic proportions in the Reagan literature, including a recent memoir by Kenneth Adelman.³⁵ But it is worth remembering that, at the time, skeptical observers thought Reagan's rash entertainment of the abolition of all nuclear weapons and his ultimate refusal to sacrifice SDI for the purpose at the "slapdash summit" were equally irresponsible stances. They concluded that "the casual way in which Reagan played at gambling away the West's nuclear deterrent is beyond question and without match." For critics writing in the immediate aftermath, the success of Reagan's team in their bid to spin the summit into "Reagan's finest hour" was both inexplicable and infuriating.³⁶

Observers back home viewed Reykjavik within the context of a much bigger story arising at the same time: the Iran-Contra scandal.³⁷ Instead of hailing theoretical developments in arms control, the American press and public saw a President who had become so detached from the details of government, or blinded by his own ideological prejudices, that he had allowed rogue elements of his own government not only to sell arms secretly to enemies of the United States in Teheran, but to use the proceeds from those sales to finance the anti-Communist Contras in Nicaragua—all of which was in direct contravention of Congressional

34 FitzGerald, *Way out There in the Blue*, pp. 248–254; Ralph Dietl, *The strategic defense initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the nuclear and space talks, 1981–1988*, Lanham/New York/London 2019.

35 Kenneth Adelman, *Reagan at Reykjavik. Forty-Eight Hours that Ended the Cold War*, New York 2014. See also Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, pp. 111–130.

36 Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, *Landslide. The Unmaking of the President, 1984–1988*, Boston 1988, pp. 282–284. A more even-handed assessment of Reykjavik can be found in Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan. A History, 1974–2008*, New York 2008, especially pp. 254–259.

37 For discussions of Iran-Contra generally, here and below see Wilentz, *Age of Reagan*, pp. 209–244. An indispensable source remains Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *The Iran–Contra Scandal. The Declassified History*. New York 1993.

resolutions and perhaps of the Constitution. From the fall of 1986 through the summer of 1987, President Reagan and his supporters struggled, and largely failed, to explain what had happened in any way that could satisfy the American public. Reagan's own closest advisors Weinberger and Shultz had advised against the Iran deal, but Reagan, moved by the plight of Western hostages in Lebanon, had allowed secret contacts to go forward. Even if he denied knowledge of the financial machinations, the scandal rocked his Administration. National Security Advisor McFarlane had especially encouraged the policy. He had hoped a successful secret opening to Iran would provide a breakthrough in the Middle East—something equivalent to Henry Kissinger's work to open relations with China. Instead, he exposed his President to the same sort of constitutional danger that brought down Kissinger's boss. Televised congressional hearings were just the most obvious connection between this scandal and the Watergate scandal that had driven Richard Nixon from office barely a decade earlier.³⁸

Reagan survived the scandal, but his popularity and his reputation suffered a sharp and immediate blow. In early December 1986, for example, he noted with dismay: "71 % of the people like & think I'm a nice fellow. But 60 % don't think I'm telling the truth."³⁹ Eventually, primary responsibility for both the arms sales and the diversions to the Contras fell on McFarlane (who had resigned his position earlier) and on his successor John Poindexter, but especially on NSC staffer Lt. Col. Oliver North, who had done most of the ground-level work on both the arms sales and the diversion. Each took their turn before the Congressional investigating committee and the television cameras during the summer of 1987, forced to confess their guilt. More importantly for the President, they also absolved Reagan of criminal culpability, claiming that they had acted without his direct knowledge of the details. Reagan's escape, however, came at a steep personal price. Some critics may have believed he was more or less innocent, having already concluded that he was either too old, too incurious, or too incompetent to mastermind a conspiracy against the Constitution. Even his defenders, however, hastened to blame enthusiastic underlings who had acted without the President's notice. Only recently have scholars been able to piece together the degree to which Reagan was not only aware, but also strongly supportive, of many aspects of the scandal.⁴⁰

38 Ibid. For a history of the hearings written by two Senators who participated, see William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell, *Men of Zeal. A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings*, New York 1988. See also *The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 210, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm>.

39 Reagan Diaries, p. 455 (December 1, 1986).

40 Malcolm Byrne, *Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power*, Lawrence KS 2017. See also *The Iran-Contra Affair 30 Years Later: A Milestone in Post-Truth Politics*, National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 567, edited by Malcolm Byrne, 2016.

By early 1987, a weakened President needed a policy success to restore his standing and get his Administration going again for its final act. At this moment, Gorbachev rode to the rescue. As Sean Wilentz argues, Reagan “found, in his work with Gorbachev, an escape route out of his political morass.” For reasons of his own, Gorbachev offered Reagan “a helping hand to lift him out of the riptide of the Iran–Contra Affair.” Facing criticism at home for failing to deliver the promised international breakthroughs in arms control that would allow further reforms, Gorbachev helped break the Reykjavik deadlock. In February 1987, he offered to decouple the INF issue from broader discussions of SDI and strategic weapons, making a significant INF deal possible. Reagan had also managed to regain some of his ideological élan with a speech made in Berlin that June, in which he called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”⁴¹ The speech, though not as important as some later analysts have tried to claim by linking it to the actual collapse of the Berlin Wall more than two years later, did serve an important purpose. By calling for the elimination of the wall as something that could be accomplished through appeals to Gorbachev, the President declared, at the same time, both his commitment to Cold War ideals and his willingness to negotiate with the Soviet leader.⁴²

From that point, things moved quite rapidly. Negotiations for the INF Treaty on the basis of “double zero” progressed to their conclusion, and Gorbachev’s visit to Washington for the signing was a public relations triumph for him.⁴³ Reagan built on the success of the Treaty in his own visit to Moscow the following May. There, Reagan and Gorbachev walked through Red Square, and Reagan had his chance to greet excited Russians. When asked how he could relate this reception to his previous statements about the “evil empire,” he responded: “I was talking about another time and another era.”⁴⁴

The INF Treaty has emerged as one of Reagan’s signal triumphs, and contributed to the upswing in personal popularity that not only carried him through the rest of his term but also helped guarantee the election of his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, as his successor in November 1988. Even that success, however, had to be filtered through the lens of American politics. Reagan’s critics focused on his previous image as a cold warrior and on his failures in the Iran–Contra scandal; they were slow to accept the INF Treaty as a success. One of the bestselling analyses of Reagan’s presidency, *Landslide* by veteran Washington reporters Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, which was published during his final year in office, offered a narrative of Reagan’s second term as a series of calamities. Denouncing the Reykjavik meeting as a “slapdash summit,” these authors displayed even less enthusiasm for the INF Treaty, which barely merited a paragraph

41 Reagan’s remarks at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, June 12, 1987; <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/061287d>.

42 Wilentz, *Age of Reagan*, pp. 244, 259–261.

43 Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, pp. 132–137.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

in a 400-page book. Contrasting the Treaty with Reagan's alleged failure to make progress in "other, more critical aspects of arms control" (never specified), Mayer and McManus dismissed the INF Treaty and the follow-up in Moscow as the end of a process in which "a Presidency once known for its ideological fervor now seemed to be devolving into a series of pleasing photo opportunities."⁴⁵

Hard-core Reagan critics who found reasons to dislike him both when he showed too much "ideological fervor" and when he showed too little could never have been satisfied. As the Washington Treaty made the zero option a reality, however, Reagan did not meet serious opposition from the Joint Chiefs, the press, or even the Democratic majorities in Congress. The strongest opposition came from within his conservative camp, opposition from ideological firebrands and hard bargainers who could never believe that zero was realistic, and who distrusted any possible agreement with the Soviets. Echoing the criticisms made by his protégé Haig, Henry Kissinger, for example, lobbied Reagan against pursuing the zero option one last time in May 1987. Reflecting the concerns of many other traditional conservative arms control hard-liners, Kissinger worried not only about the feasibility of reliable inspections to guarantee Soviet compliance but also feared that an effectively denuclearized Central Europe would be at the mercy of Soviet conventional superiority.⁴⁶

Kissinger's doubts were only to be expected, as arms control veterans were never able to make much sense of the zero option. More notable, however, was the reaction of various conservative activists who had been Reagan's most reliable supporters. Many rose up in vociferous opposition to the Treaty. One denounced Reagan as "a useful idiot for Kremlin propaganda," while scholarly conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer accused Reagan of being "dizzy over Gorbachev." The conservative daily *Washington Times* compared Reagan to Neville Chamberlain at Munich, selling out Western interests in the name of an illusory peace.⁴⁷ Even William F. Buckley Jr.'s *National Review*, a magazine that had strongly supported Reagan's rise, positioned itself against its once-favorite President. In anticipation of the Treaty being signed that fall, the cover of its May 22, 1987 issue blasted "Reagan's Suicide Pact." It included essays by many conservative luminaries, including one jointly written by Kissinger and Richard Nixon, who were anxious about the strategic folly of pursuing nuclear abolition without conventional force reductions. Buckley himself was so concerned about the

45 Mayer and McManus, *Landslide*, p. 388.

46 Reagan Diaries, pp. 482–483 (March 12 and 13, 1987). Kissinger had raised similar concerns in Moscow. See Record of Conversation of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeev, and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones, February 4, 1987 at the National Security Archive online: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/russian/Final1987-02-04Akhromeev-Americans.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2018). For the ratification fight in Congress see also Maynard W. Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, New York/Basingstoke 2006, pp. 223–232.

47 Wilentz, *Age of Reagan*, p. 261.

implications of taking a strong position against Reagan that he sent an advance copy to the President, assuring him of his personal friendship despite this intense disagreement. Therewith, Buckley justified his concerns about concessions to the Soviets and was at pains to argue that opposition to the Treaty extended beyond the “knee-jerk Right” to include Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig, among others.⁴⁸

It’s in a crisis that one’s real friends emerge. Reagan discovered the truth of this in the upshot. As conservatives lined up against the Treaty, the alleged “hard-liner” Caspar Weinberger stayed loyal to the President’s vision of nuclear abolition. Although he was openly skeptical about the “new stage” in Soviet-American relations and rejected the universal enthusiasm for Gorbachev which was sweeping Washington after the summit, he embraced the Treaty as “very good” and endorsed its ratification.⁴⁹ Press reports tried to link Weinberger’s retirement from the Pentagon in November 1987 to a perceived opposition to the Treaty, leading him to comment that such a view was “ironic, because I had proposed the treaty in the first place.” A long-term advocate of the zero option, Weinberger saw the INF Treaty as proof of how one could negotiate from strength.⁵⁰ Reagan made the same arguments in his own friendly response to Buckley.⁵¹

When the Treaty came up for the vote, the efforts of a few right-wing critics were unable to stop it. The Senate voted 93–5 to ratify the Washington Treaty in May 1988.⁵² Reagan’s reputation was on the upswing as well. By the time he left office in January 1989, he was enjoying the highest approval rating of any President at the end of his term since the Second World War: some 71 per cent of those surveyed particularly approving of his handling of foreign policy and relations with the Soviets.⁵³ It had not been as easy as it might appear in retrospect, but Reagan had not only survived the last crisis of his Presidency, he emerged triumphant. He concluded his televised Farewell Address with the words: “All in all, not bad, not bad at all.”⁵⁴

48 William F. Buckley, Jr. to Reagan, 29 April and 18 October 1987. Summarized in: Kiron Skinner, Martin Anderson, and Annaliese Anderson (eds.), *Reagan. A Life in Letters*, New York 2003, p. 418. Reprinted in: Buckley, *The Reagan I Knew*, pp. 204–207. See also Hedrick Smith, *The Right Against Reagan*, in: *New York Times Magazine*, 17 January 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/17/magazine/the-right-against-reagan.html?pagewanted=1> (accessed November 24, 2017).

49 Maureen Dowd, *Summit’s aftermath*, in: *New York Times*, December 12, 1987. <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/12/us/summit-aftermath-washington-summit-song-is-off-key-for-weinberger.html> (accessed November 24, 2017).

50 Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace. Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, New York 1990, pp. 331–352, especially p. 347.

51 Reagan to Buckley, May 5, 1987, in: *Reagan, A Life in Letters*, pp. 418 f.

52 Wilentz, *Age of Reagan*, p. 262.

53 Steven V. Roberts, *Reagan’s Final Rating Is Best Of Any President Since 40’s*, in: *New York Times*, January 18, 1989. <https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/18/us/washington-transition-reagan-s-final-1988-best-any-president-since-40-s.html> (accessed November 20, 2018).

54 Ronald Reagan Farewell Address to the American People, January 11, 1989, <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/farewell-address-to-the-nation-2/> (accessed November 20, 2018).

3. Conclusion: It's Only Easy in Retrospect

The American path to the INF Treaty cannot be understood without appreciating the role of Ronald Reagan and his consistent commitment to the goal of nuclear abolition. That commitment distinguished him from being merely a “hard-liner,” and explains both his resistance to the arms control movements of the 1970s and his ultimate enthusiasm for the zero option that led to the INF Treaty. Over the course of 1987, through a combination of determination and good luck, Reagan managed both to save his Presidency and to accomplish his long-held goal of eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. Those are significant achievements, but they are not merely the product of a single elderly politician’s will. The political environment has to be considered as well.

Just as a recognition of his accomplishments should encourage former Reagan critics to reconsider their estimations of the man, an understanding of the winding path should temper the enthusiasm of hagiographers. The INF Treaty did not spring fully formed from Reagan’s principles, even if his attachment to those principles shaped the course he chose. Politics determined the limits of the possible. That does not mean the ultimate result was merely the product of chance. It means that only a combination of principles and the political realities of the moment made the INF Treaty. (It would be the same with any treaty.)

The INF Treaty has come to occupy a central place in the current Reagan revisionism, in which scholars are coming to appreciate that the old conservative was actually, in his way, a rebel against a stagnant status quo.⁵⁵ That is all to the good, if we want to have the full picture of the man, and makes sense as we try to understand the end of the Cold War in historical perspective. But for such an understanding, we should take care to avoid replacing one set of truisms for another. “Reagan the cowboy” did not simply or suddenly become “Reagan the apostle of peace.” Closer examination shows that he was both of these things, and neither. To appreciate such paradoxes, we need most of all a sense of historical irony. In this case, the most ironic thing is that so many people were surprised by how things turned out, when one of the men at the center had been telling them all along that he wanted to do exactly what he did. Although it’s certainly true that no one at the time would have been able to predict the ultimate result of his Administration’s arms control policies (except perhaps Reagan himself), historians should avoid the Columbus fallacy: just because we stumble across something we did not expect to find does not mean we are discovering something brand new. After all, somebody may already be there.

As we enter an era in which the agreements and alliance structures of the Cold War era face extreme challenges, and transformations in both the principles of American leaders and the realities of international politics have undermined the

55 James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, New York 2009.

INF Treaty itself, we would do well to remember both the accomplishments of a previous generation of statesmen and the fragility of even the most inspired agreement. The nuclear nightmares of the 1980s, thankfully, did not become reality. But avoiding them took wisdom and foresight and luck. Whether we will be as fortunate in the face of a new century's dilemmas is far from certain.

Svetlana Savranskaya/Thomas Blanton

The Nuclear Abolition Package of 1986 and the Soviet Road to INF

1. Introduction

The Soviet road to the INF Treaty started many years before the historic Reagan–Gorbachev meeting in Washington, at the exact date and time determined by Nancy Reagan’s astrologer. To understand how this ground-breaking treaty became possible, we need to look back to the mid-1970s’ thinking about nuclear war in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and also to the story of SS-20 deployment, to subsequent Soviet attempts to negotiate mutual reductions in the late 1970s, and to the negotiating stalemate starting in 1983 and lasting till Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. The story of INF is the story of nuclear learning and the building of trust. Thirty years after the signing of the INF Treaty, it looks as though both learning and trust have been lost in U. S.–Russian relations.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal for global nuclear abolition, made in January 1986, ranks as a landmark in the process that led to the historic 1987 Treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).¹ At the most obvious level, the first stage of the proposal included eliminating INF in Europe along with 50 per cent of both sides’ strategic forces. At a deeper level, the abolition package represented the first public airing of a sea-change in Soviet military thinking about fighting a nuclear war—a major shift that would give Gorbachev the necessary foundation for his radical arms control proposals to go forward.

Remarkably, the authors of the proposal were not Gorbachev’s “new thinkers.” Rather, the abolition package originated with the Soviet General Staff, specifically Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, working with a small group of General Staff experts including General Nikolai Chervov, and with input from senior diplomat Georgy Kornienko.² Yet Gorbachev would ultimately go much further than Akhromeyev ever intended, both on conventional arms cuts and on sacrificing some of the Soviet military’s most advanced systems, especially the Oka missile

1 For an overview and key primary sources from the time, see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, *Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986 and the Road to Reykjavik*, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 563, October 12, 2016, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault-russia-programs/2016-10-12/gorbachevs-nuclear-initiative-january-1986>.

2 See the joint memoir by Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev and Georgy M. Kornienko, *Glazamy marshala y diplomata*, Moscow 1992, Chapter 3.

(SS-23). INF was all that the Soviets were able to salvage from the nuclear abolition proposal after they had failed to receive any positive response from the Reagan Administration on the abolition package. New evidence suggests that President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz did in fact take it seriously but encountered staunch resistance from the U.S. government and its NATO Allies.³

For the Soviets, the INF Treaty was a big leap. They were entering into a hugely unequal agreement that was nevertheless seen as being in the Soviet national interest. This Treaty—which shook Soviet traditional military thinking, negotiating style, and several deep concepts of how international relations worked—was a logical result of the “new thinking” that had originated even before Gorbachev announced it publicly.

2. Changes in Soviet Military Thinking About War in Europe

Soviet nuclear thinking, at least among the senior military, had already changed dramatically before Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. We now know this from Soviet military journals and internal doctrinal studies;⁴ from declassified Warsaw Pact files from across Central Europe;⁵ from extensive interviews with high-level Soviet military planners by U.S. defense contractors (the BDM firm) working for the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon at the end of the Cold War;⁶ from the series of “critical oral history” conferences looking at the collapse of détente during the Carter-Brezhnev period, which included senior Soviet veterans;⁷ and from a remarkable oral history roundtable in 2006 focused on military planning.⁸ Still missing, of course, is any access to the Soviet General Staff archives, a major gap for which the relatively full openness of Warsaw Pact files in former member countries only partially compensates.

3 See the Reagan Presidential Library documents published in: Savranskaya and Blanton, *Gorbachev's Nuclear Initiative of January 1986*.

4 See Joan Bird and John Bird (eds.), *CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting*, Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections Division, Langley, VA 2012.

5 Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, Budapest/New York 2005.

6 See William Burr and Svetlana Savranskaya, *Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades*, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 285, September 11, 2009, analyzing and publishing the BDM study, *Soviet Intentions 1965–1985*, Volumes 1 and 2, 1995, declassified in 2009, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/index.htm>.

7 For the documents and transcript from each of these seminal conferences, see the National Security Archive, *Carter-Brezhnev Project* page, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/>.

8 Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay (eds.), *Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War: An Oral History Roundtable*, Stockholm, April 24–25, 2006, Zurich 2007.

Yet the main outlines of the story are clear, illuminating several key themes on the road to the INF Treaty. First, of course, was the interactivity between Soviet planning and U.S. and NATO planning, so that the Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20s, for example, occurred during extensive Western discussions about the necessity of modernizing nuclear forces, including the prospect of bringing in the neutron bomb.⁹ Next was the power of the military-industrial complex in driving decisions without real consideration of the political consequences. The Deputy Head of the Military-Industrial Sector of the Central Committee apparatus, Vitaly Kataev (who would certainly know from his lengthy tenure in the Soviet Central Committee's Defense Industry Department), told the BDM interviewers that the SS-20 decision was made not at the political level, but by a troika of Central Committee Secretaries for Defense and the military-industrial complex with the Defense Minister alone. There was no expert input, but lots of push from the missile design bureaus and factories.¹⁰ During this period, which started in 1976, the Soviet Defense Minister was not a combat commander, but a military industry manager. This was Dmitry Ustinov. On promotion to Minister he was quickly given the rank of General in April 1976, and was a Marshal by July, ultimately achieving the all-time record for Orders of Lenin—eleven of them. The Deputy Head of the General Staff, General Makhmut Gareev, commented, that that was when the armed forces had “been taken over by the enemy.”¹¹

Yet as early as the mid-1970s, Soviet General Staff war planners had come to the realization that a nuclear war in Europe would negate the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's advantages in conventional forces over NATO, and indeed make impossible any conventional war fighting along the lines of long-standing Pact plans, such as Czechoslovak forces reaching Dijon, France, in nine days.¹²

According to Colonel Vitaly Tsygichko,¹³ key studies by the General Staff think-tank in 1968 and 1972 identified what David Rosenberg would later term the “smoking radiating ruin” problem—the absolutely inhospitable environment for conventional advance or counterattack in the context of an already radioactive battlefield in central Europe.¹⁴ Conventional Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine had insisted on advances of 150 kilometers per day, but the studies showed that

9 Kristina Spohr, *Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979*, in: *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 21 (2010), pp. 259–285.

10 Kataev interview, BDM study, *Soviet Intentions 1965–1985*, Vol. 2, p. 98.

11 Gareev interview, BDM study, *Soviet Intentions 1965–1985*, Vol. 2, p. 75.

12 On the impact of the NATO Double-Track Decision on Warsaw Pact Strategic planning, see Oliver Bange, *SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-West Relations*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausebach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 70–86.

13 Tsygichko, quoted in: Hoffenaar and Findlay (eds.), *Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict*, pp. 65–68.

14 See David Alan Rosenberg, ‘A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–1955, *International Security* 6/3 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 3–38.

in a nuclear battlefield, not even 50 kilometers was possible, and even then most of the soldiers would have died from radiation poisoning.¹⁵

Simultaneously, Soviet planners re-thought their requirements for tactical air support, basing this on analysis of Israeli operations in 1967 and 1973, and U.S. movements in Vietnam. They reached the conclusion that the conventional balance in Europe was maybe not so much in their favor, considering NATO's tactical air resources and likely use of tactical nuclear weapons. One CIA compilation based on clandestine reporting (including some from key Warsaw Pact assets like Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in Poland who passed top secret Warsaw Pact documents to the U.S. throughout the 1970s) describes "intellectual ferment" in the 1970s and, even among the Soviet air operations planners, there was "a certain sense of desperation" despite major investments by 1980–81 in tactical air weaponry.¹⁶

As the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact officials participating in the 2006 Stockholm discussion on military planning described it, this new military understanding of the impossibility of winning a nuclear war was not allowed to surface as stated Soviet policy, given the primacy of Communist Party doctrine about winning any conflict with imperialism/capitalism. Formal military scenarios were therefore required to posit "victory" rather than state the more likely reality. The new military realizations did, however, develop in parallel with initiatives like Leonid Brezhnev's famous Tula speech in January 1977, which was intended as an olive branch for incoming U.S. President Jimmy Carter, but was largely ignored by a U.S. foreign policy elite preoccupied by internal debates ("Team B versus Team A") over Soviet intentions.¹⁷ As Raymond Garthoff later commented, the U.S. was in real need of a Team C that might entertain the possibility of future Soviet collapse.¹⁸

The collapse of détente under Carter in 1979 and the rising sense of U.S.–Soviet crisis through to the end of 1983 restricted the new Soviet military analysis against nuclear war fighting to the confines of the General Staff planners, until

15 See the comments on the war plans as "science fiction" by Tadeusz Pioro, formerly of the Polish General Staff, in: Hoffenaar and Findlay (eds.), *Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict*, pp. 77 f. and 91 f., referring to a Polish plan of 1970 and the Czechoslovak plan of 1964; and the agreement by former Soviet general Aleksandr Liakhovskii, who served in the Main Operational Department of the General Staff, pp. 93 f.

16 Bird and Bird (eds.), *CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces*, p. 35.

17 See the discussion of the Tula speech, in: Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya (eds.), *Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1977*, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 594, May 25, 2017, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-05-25/anatoly-s-chernyaev-diary-1977>. Team B, a group of conservatives appointed by CIA director George H. W. Bush in 1976 to question CIA assumptions, argued that the standard CIA analysis (Team A) of rough strategic parity between the U.S. and the USSR was wrong, and that the Soviets sought and were achieving nuclear superiority.

18 See the discussion in Raymond Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence*, Washington, D. C. 2001, pp. 325–337, the Team C reference is on p. 333.

the coming of Gorbachev in March 1985. Up to that point, the extraordinary incapacity of Soviet leadership, in a highly centralized system, from the decrepit Brezhnev to the sick Andropov to the dying Chernenko, meant only increased paranoia and inertia.

Again, interaction with U.S. planning had a significant impact. For example, in August 1980, there was front page U.S. coverage of leaks of a new Presidential Directive (PD-59) exposing Carter's White House planning for flexible nuclear war options, in place of what National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski derogatorily called "the spasm plan" of the SIOF (the Single Integrated Operational Plan).¹⁹ Brzezinski persuaded Carter that having only a spasm plan actually increased the risk of nuclear war—in stark contrast, say, to President Eisenhower in the 1950s, who concluded the opposite, that having limited strike options encouraged their use and risked escalation.²⁰

The front pages certainly caught Soviet attention. The long-time General Staff war planner Colonel General Adrian Danilevich, for example, told the BDM interviewers in 1992 that "you confused us terribly" with the discussion of limited nuclear strike options which would have "asymmetrical consequences," since the theater would obviously be limited to Europe or the European territory of the Soviet Union.²¹ Also confused was the U.S. Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, who found out about PD-59 from the newspapers. His top aide on Soviet matters, Marshall Shulman, warned that the reported emphasis on leadership and C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) targets could "only increase Soviet perceptions of vulnerability" and introduce "further instability in the strategic balance."²²

The Pentagon official who commissioned the BDM interviews, Andy Marshall, had a different view. The Director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment—nicknamed "Yoda" after the wise and often inscrutable movie character in *Star Wars*—believed that PD-59 was a justified reaction to the Defense Intelligence Agency findings that the Soviets had built so many bunkers for leadership that they must be planning nuclear war fighting. So "the objective was to clarify and personalize somewhat the danger of warfare and nuclear use to Soviet decision makers."²³

19 See Michael Getler, Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War, in: Washington Post, August 6, 1980, p. A1.

20 See William Burr, Jimmy Carter's Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 390, September 14, 2012, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/>.

21 Danilevich interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, pp. 37, 40.

22 See Document 17, Shulman to Muskie, September 2, 1980, in: William Burr, Jimmy Carter's Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/>.

23 Marshall interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, pp. 118f.

3. Gorbachev and Nuclear Learning

A new stage in U.S.–Soviet arms control negotiations started with Gorbachev’s selection as General Secretary in Moscow. Though not a radical reformer from the start, Gorbachev was committed to stopping the arms race, which he saw as both dangerous for humankind and devastating for the Soviet economy. Although this view was widely shared within the more progressive military and political leadership, the traditional Soviet thinking and negotiating style focused on numerical equality in armaments, especially where reductions were concerned. The Reagan Administration did not help either. As the longtime Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, pointed out in his memoirs, “Reagan’s belligerence backfired:” it was producing results that were “just the opposite of the one intended by Washington.”²⁴ Rather than come up with any new proposals, the Soviet side had dug in for a long confrontation, and denounced U.S. militarism. In this situation, Gorbachev needed a breakthrough to get out of the vicious cycle.

His own background and his open-minded approach to entrenched problems and learning helped Gorbachev leap from total stalemate in arms control negotiations, symbolized by the Soviet walkout from the Geneva talks in the fall of 1983, to his eventual agreement to a Treaty with highly asymmetrical cuts. Gorbachev and his supporters came to see the INF Treaty as being in the interest of the Soviet Union and as a first step toward universal nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev had very little prior experience with arms control but, as Janice Gross Stein showed in her early research, he “learned in part from those in the Soviet Union who had been thinking about security for a long time, in part from the meetings with senior officials abroad, and in part through the trial-and-error experimentation that he and his colleagues initiated. [...] Over time, learning from others and from behavior became self-reinforcing and self-amplifying.”²⁵ The Soviet leader elevated his close allies like Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Anatoly Chernyaev to key positions in the Soviet Party apparatus. Essentially, he used the power of the office of General Secretary to enable their ideas to come to the fore and to change policy.²⁶

Gorbachev also learned by interacting with foreign leaders, whom he eventually came to perceive as his main interlocutors on arms control and most foreign policy issues. Importantly, starting from the meeting in Geneva, he also came to understand, that Reagan did not merely represent the interests of the

24 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence. Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)*, New York 1995, p. 545.

25 Janice Gross Stein, *Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner*, in: *International Organization* 42/2 (Spring 1994), p. 180.

26 See the discussion on the power of appointments and the power of ideas in the groundbreaking early book by British political scientist Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford 1996, and in Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, New York 2000.

military-industrial complex, but that he represented his electorate and the real interests of U.S. citizens—and that he was also constrained by them. The most important understanding, however, was the meeting of two minds, each believing that nuclear weapons could be completely eliminated, which took place between the two leaders in Geneva and then, especially, Reykjavik

4. Gorbachev's Nuclear Initiative of January 1986

According to first-hand accounts by the top officials who developed the proposal, the history of the Soviet abolition program dates back to the spring of 1985. Soon after Gorbachev came to power in March of that year, the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, first revealed to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kornienko that he and the head of the Legal and Treaty Department of General Staff, General Nikolai Chervov, along with military experts from the General Staff, were secretly preparing a detailed program of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Kornienko supported the idea, and Akhromeyev ordered selected military experts to study the issues and prepare a draft. This was basically ready by mid-summer 1985. Very few people knew about the program until the end of that year, however. Although the program was ready, its authors were looking for an occasion to present it to the top leadership when it would have most chance of being accepted by the Soviet leaders, and might be received favorably by the United States. Soviet arms control expert General Viktor Starodubov writes in his memoir that the planners felt the time was right to present it to Gorbachev after his meeting with Reagan in Geneva.²⁷

Akhromeyev first reported the plan to Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov at the end of December 1985, and Kornienko took the draft to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.²⁸ General Chervov was instructed to take the program to Gorbachev, who was vacationing in Crimea. The military's hunch proved right. After discovering that Reagan was an abolitionist in Geneva, Gorbachev was enthusiastic about making a bold proposal, and the fact that the program was ready made it all the more practical. He approved it and presented it to the Politburo in early January 1986. Not everybody was enthusiastic about the program. Interestingly, the "new thinkers" around Gorbachev, including Chernyaev, later came to distrust it, because it originated from the General Staff and was embraced by "old thinkers" like Kornienko. But at the time, Chernyaev was very impressed with Gorbachev's public statement. On January 18, 1986, he wrote in his diary: "Gorbachev's statement. It seems he [has] really decided to end the arms race at all costs. He is going for that very 'risk,' in which he has boldly recognized the absence of risk,

27 Viktor Starodubov, *Ot razoruzheniya k kapitulyatsii* (From Disarmament to Capitulation), Moscow 2007, pp. 261 f. See also Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazamy marshala y diplomata*, Chapter 3.

28 *Ibid.*

because no one will attack us even if we disarm totally. And in order to revive the country and set it on a steady track, it is necessary to free it from the burden of the arms race, which is depleting more than just economics.”²⁹ But later, in his memoirs, Chernyaev was skeptical about the proposal and thought it was mainly propaganda by the military. So was it just propaganda, or was it the first serious step toward universal disarmament?

Rather transparently, the Akhromeyev proposal meant to retain Soviet conventional superiority and get rid of the West’s European nuclear weapons—particularly the Pershing II deployed in late 1983, which, to the Soviets, looked like the ultimate decapitation weapon. American specialists, including Ambassador Jack Matlock and CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin, deprecated this possibility, basing their calculations on lower assessments of range and accuracy, but they were never believed by the Soviets, including Gorbachev, who, in one Summit preparatory session, described the Pershing IIs as “a gun pressed to our temple.”³⁰ Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin remarked in his memoirs that “it would not be honest to deny that Gorbachev’s proclamation carried elements of propaganda.” Nevertheless, the strategic thinking was exactly what Gorbachev had in mind: bringing the Cold War to an end.³¹

According to Gorbachev’s spokesman and biographer, Andrei Grachev, the drafters of the program envisioned it in terms somewhat similar to those of the U.S. drafters of Reagan’s “zero option” INF solution of 1981. They thought that the chances of the U.S. side accepting abolition were close to zero, but that making the proposal would provide strong negotiating grounds as well as propaganda points for their own side. General Starodubov later claimed that Akhromeyev’s reasoning was that “if by any chance the Americans accepted the idea, the Soviet side would be able to make full use of its advantage in conventional weapons.”³² Gorbachev, however, saw the program differently. For him, it was an opportunity to advance the U.S.–Soviet arms control discussion that had stalled after Geneva with a bold, radical stroke. He thought it would be acceptable to Reagan because of his strongly expressed belief in a nuclear-free world. Also, according to Grachev, by accepting an initiative drafted by Akhromeyev and Kornienko, Gorbachev, was able to “trap” his own military into supporting very deep cuts in armaments across the board.³³

29 The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1986. National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 220, May 25, 2007, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB220/Chernyaev_1986.pdf, pp. 6f.

30 See Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), *The Last Superpower Summits. Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War*, Budapest/New York 2016, p. 163.

31 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 597.

32 Starodubov, *Ot razoruzheniya k kapitulyatsii*, pp. 261–262. See also Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazamy marshala y diplomata*, Chapter 3.

33 Andrei Grachev, *Gorbachev’s Gamble. Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, Cambridge 2008, p. 69.

The program envisioned three stages. The first stage was a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (to be achieved over 5 to 8 years) and an agreement to eliminate all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the second stage, starting in 1990, Britain, France and China would join the process by freezing their arsenals, and all nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical weapons and ban nuclear testing. In the third stage, “starting in 1995, liquidation of all still remaining nuclear weapons [would be] completed.”³⁴ Other important elements of the Soviet program were a ban on space weapons, strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, and a comprehensive nuclear testing ban.

Because of the lack of immediate response, Gorbachev always believed that his program was never taken seriously in the West, and had simply been dismissed as propaganda. For example, on April 4, 1986, he complained to a visiting delegation of U.S. congressmen that “the United States decided to hide behind the opinions of its Allies—West European countries and Japan, otherwise, it would be hard for them to justify their negative position [...]. We are often accused of making propaganda proposals. Well, if it is propaganda, then why not catch Gorbachev at his word, why not test his intentions by accepting our proposal?”³⁵

However, the highest level declassified U.S. documents show that Reagan took the abolition proposal very seriously (as few others in the U.S. government did) and that he forced through an extensive policy process including multiple consultations with Allies (who, except for Helmut Kohl, almost unanimously opposed any such abolition). On January 15, 1986, after a long meeting with Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, Reagan wrote in his diary: “we’d be hard put to explain how we could turn it down.” On February 3, after a senior National Security Planning Group meeting, Reagan wrote, “Some wanted to tag it as publicity stunt. I said no. Let’s say we share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt it will be revealed by them.”³⁶

Shultz told the State Department’s senior group for arms control on January 17, 1986:

I know that many of you and others around here oppose the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. You have tried your ideas out in front of the president from the outset, and I have pointed out the dangers too. The president of the United States doesn’t agree with you, and he has said so on several very public occasions both before and since the last election. He thinks it’s a hell of a good idea. And it’s a political hot button. We need to work on what a world without nuclear weapons would mean to us and what additional steps would have to accompany such a dramatic change. The president has wanted all along to get rid of nuclear weapons. The British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and all of you

34 Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, January 14, 1986, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=3131897-Document-01-General-Secretary-Mikhail-Gorbachev>.

35 See Savranskaya and Blanton, Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986, Doc. 22.

36 Douglas Brinkley (ed.), *The Reagan Diaries*, Vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, New York 2009, pp. 562, 568.

in the Washington arms control community are trying to talk him out of it. The idea can potentially be a plus for us: the Soviet Union is a superpower only because it is a nuclear and ballistic missile superpower.³⁷

In the end, the Reagan Administration did not dismiss the abolition proposal as propaganda, but did come to the conclusion that it was not ready for a program of such a scope. The opposition of the Allies and what senior negotiator Paul Nitze called the “free-for-all” battle between Shultz’s State Department and Caspar Weinberger’s Pentagon ultimately deterred Reagan from expressing his fulsome support, and left Gorbachev fuming that Washington had dissed him. Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev of February 22, 1986 engaged only with the INF issue and left the rest out.³⁸ That became a pattern. At least as of spring 1986, the two ships had passed in the night, even though, at the highest level, both actually shared a commitment to getting rid of nuclear weapons. The astute Congressman Dante Fascell, long-time Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, provided a coda for this dynamic when he met with Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1986, before the Iran–Contra scandal plunged the Reagan Administration into total dysfunction that fall. Fascell said of the nuclear abolition proposal: “The reality is such that the United States is not ready, for some reason—either political or military, I don’t know—they are not capable to make the big leap, which you are calling for, at this time.”³⁹

Although the Soviet side was dissatisfied with the U.S. response, frequent meetings and interactions pushed both sides to work harder on negotiating positions and think about deep disarmament for the next Summit. In fact, active Soviet diplomacy and the American effort to use the opportunities offered by Gorbachev resulted in a comprehensive review of the entirety of the U.S. arms control policy and long-term nuclear strategy in preparation, a process which continued throughout the spring and summer of 1986. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration actively engaged the Soviets in all negotiating formats. As a result, the Soviets accepted the U.S. “zero option” on INF, agreed to radical verification measures, and started internal discussions on dramatic reductions in conventional weapons. Gorbachev’s January 1986 initiative and the U.S. response laid the first paver on the road to the most dramatic summit in U.S.–Soviet history, the one at Reykjavik in October 1986, which, despite its failure, prepared the ground for the INF Treaty signed in 1987.

37 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York 1993, p. 701. See also M. Charles Hill Papers, Ronald Reagan Library, RAC Box 3, Spiral Notebook (01/06/86–01/23/86).

38 For Reagan’s letter see Savranskaya and Blanton, *Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986*, Doc. 18.

39 See *ibid.*, Doc. 22.

5. De-linking as a Political Initiative

At Reykjavik, the Soviet side agreed to leave the British and French nuclear weapons out of the equation, and accepted the idea of cuts or even a complete elimination of medium-range ballistic missiles in the Asian portion of the USSR. This significant and unanticipated change in their position in effect meant a complete acceptance of the original U.S. proposal for a “zero option.” However, the Ministry of Defense—represented by Akhromeyev—had agreed to that solution at Reykjavik only as part of a compromise that firmly linked the intermediate-range weapons with strategic and space issues, including adherence to the ABM Treaty and limits on SDI, all to be negotiated as one package.⁴⁰ The U.S. side rejected such linkage, and argued for negotiating INF as a separate agreement. Therefore, to make progress towards their top priority—a comprehensive START treaty that would cut strategic arms in half across the strategic triad while Reagan was still President—Gorbachev and his aides realized they would have to revisit the package deal and focus on just those parts, such as INF, where agreement was more likely.

Aiding this realization, by early 1987 there was a significant change in the perception of SDI on the part of Gorbachev and his close associates. Fear of SDI as a potential first strike weapon from space, which Gorbachev had tried to explain to Reagan over and over again at Geneva and Reykjavik, had by now faded. Part of this change was due to the influence of progressive Soviet scientists, like the academicians Evgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev, who did not believe in the technological feasibility of the SDI concept. Perhaps even more important was that the perception of threat from the United States was giving way to a new sense of trust and productive cooperation, emerging from the experience of the two previous Summits. This new understanding promised important payoffs in the future.

In January 1987, Gorbachev pushed on two fronts at once to advance *Perestroika*. Domestically, the January Central Committee Plenum concentrated on political reform and democratization and scheduled a CPSU conference to address those issues for the summer of 1988. In foreign policy, to preserve and strengthen the momentum of Reykjavik, Gorbachev convened an international forum which had the title “For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity.” This forum focused on the threat of nuclear weapons and the need for deep reductions as a step towards their complete elimination. Academician Andrei Sakharov, recently released from exile, was permitted to speak at the forum.

40 Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya vstrecha na vysshem urovne, Reikjavik, 11–12 Oktyabrya 1986 goda (Transcript of the Soviet-American Summit, Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986. Meeting of the working group of experts on military issues), Information about the position of the Defense Ministry provided by Colonel-General Chervov in an interview, Moscow, June 15, 1996.

Along with many other participants, he called for swift progress on arms control, even if this meant negotiating on INF separately.⁴¹ Sakharov also met privately with two U.S. scientists and talked about the need to untie the strategic arms control package and to stop allowing SDI to be the major stumbling block in the negotiations. Gorbachev had called on his Politburo members to “stop being afraid of SDI” as early as March 1986, but it took him almost a year to follow his own advice. Untying the arms control package was a very sensitive political issue, since it amounted to a unilateral concession, and it took a great deal of internal discussion and an impassioned memorandum from Yakovlev, on February 25, 1987, for Gorbachev to make the decision.⁴²

Ironically, the argument that persuaded Gorbachev alluded mainly to the U.S. domestic political agenda. Yakovlev argued that considering the strength of the right wing in the Republican Party and the upcoming Presidential elections, if Gorbachev was counting on signing a major strategic arms control treaty while Reagan was still in power, he had to sign a separate INF accord as soon as possible. On February 26, 1987, the Politburo ratified the decision to untie the package as a means to jumpstart negotiations, and to invite George Shultz to Moscow in April. Gorbachev made the formal announcement on February 28.⁴³ It was received with concern among the Soviet military, who viewed it as caving in to Reagan’s demands, but nobody, at first, wanted to openly oppose the General Secretary.⁴⁴

At this point, preparations for a successful INF Summit became the foreign policy priority of the Soviet leadership. Just as in the period before Reykjavik, Gorbachev understood that he had to take serious steps to accommodate U.S. interests, perhaps even invoking the hated word “concessions.” The test of seriousness would come during the visit by Shultz in April 1987. In preparation, in late March the Soviets announced new radical proposals on verification, basically introducing the principle of “anytime anywhere,” which went well beyond what the U.S. side was proposing or willing to accept at the time. April brought with it even more rethinking Shultz’s trip were Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Moscow and Gorbachev’s visit to Prague. During Thatcher’s stay, the British Prime Minister accused the Soviet leader of exporting Communism to third world countries and explained to him how the Soviet military posture in Europe, combined with

41 Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There In the Blue*. Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War, New York 2000, p. 409–411, goes so far as to credit Sakharov’s speech at the forum with “breaking the spell” of the tied package, but the internal Gorbachev documents point to other key players in the ultimate decision.

42 Alexander Yakovlev memorandum to Gorbachev, February 25, 1987 in: Savranskaya and Blanton (eds.), *Last Superpower Summits*, pp. 269–277.

43 For this decision see Elizabeth C. Charles, *Gorbachev and the Decision to Decouple the Arms Control Package: How the Breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit Led to the Elimination of the Euromissiles*, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D.C./Stanford, CA 2015, pp. 66–84.

44 Savranskaya Interview with General-Colonel Anatoly Gribkov, Moscow, November 13, 1996.

memories of 1956 and 1968, conveyed a sense of threat to Europeans.⁴⁵ Gorbachev was moved by her explanation and mentioned it repeatedly in Politburo discussions of Soviet and the Warsaw Pact military doctrine. The Prague visit in April 10, 1987 helped Gorbachev realize that soon he would have to confront major changes in Eastern Europe and the issue of Soviet troops stationed there. In a way these two visits helped him approach negotiations with Shultz in a more decisive and even radical mode.

6. Concessions and the Soviet Military

The most controversial development in the entire INF negotiations was the Soviet decision to consider the SS-23/Oka tactical missile with a tested range of 400 km (well under the 500 km stipulated by the INF Treaty) as an item that should nonetheless be covered by the Treaty. The inclusion of Oka stirred up a major controversy between Gorbachev and Shevardnadze on one side and the Soviet military on the other, and by the fall of 1987 had led to the first real break between the political and the military leadership. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze acted against the strong opposition of the military, including that of Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov and of Akhromeyev, who was Gorbachev's major supporter in the military and the author of many disarmament initiatives himself.

During his talk with Shultz on April 13, Shevardnadze agreed in principle on the inclusion of the shorter-range missiles in the systems counted under the INF Treaty. This Soviet concession was confirmed by Gorbachev during his meeting with the Secretary of State the following day. Gorbachev was under pressure from Shultz, who insisted that if the Soviet Union did not count the SS-23 as having a range of more than 500 kilometers, then the United States would have to deploy similar systems in Europe.⁴⁶ Throughout the meeting Gorbachev repeatedly accused the American side of forcing the Soviet side to make more concessions and not treating the Soviet Union as a great power, to which Shultz made his famous response: "I'm weeping for you."⁴⁷

It was only possible to make the concession on Oka by sidestepping the military and by isolating them from the decision-making. According to Akhromeyev and Kornienko, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze intentionally did not invite the Marshal, who would normally be present at all the meetings at which INF issues were discussed, as a top Soviet arms control negotiator. He was invited to the

45 Gorbachev-Thatcher Memorandum of Conversation, March 30, 1987, in: Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton (eds.), *The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations*, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 422, April 12, 2013, Doc. 1, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/docs/Doc%201%201987-03-30%20Gorbachev-Thatcher%20memcon.pdf>.

46 Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and G. Shultz, April 14, 1987, in: Savranskaya and Blanton, (eds.), *Last Superpower Summits*, pp. 278–284.

47 Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 894.

meeting immediately *after* the concession was made, and the talk turned to the unresolved issues of START. The Marshal was not informed of the Oka decision, but in the next day's press coverage it appeared as if he was present during the entire meeting and therefore must have approved the inclusion of the SS-23.⁴⁸

This, in fact, is exactly the impression Shevardnadze later gave in his memoirs, responding to criticism of his "concessionary position" on INF, and on the Oka missile in particular:

Why don't the deputies from the Soyuz Group for example, ask not just me, as they are so zealously doing, but Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, a man I respect, about the reasons for dismantling the Oka Missile Compound? He sat next to the General Secretary during the negotiations about this class of weapons. Surely a Marshal would know much better than I, who gave their consent to this and why, as he would also know that without the consent of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff such a decision would not have been made.⁴⁹

Transcripts of the meetings of Shevardnadze with Shultz on April 13, and of Gorbachev with Shultz on April 14, show that Akhromeyev did not participate in, or even attend the discussion about shorter-range missiles. Only Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Dobrynin were present at the first part of the meeting. After Akhromeyev arrived at the Kremlin to participate in the meeting on April 14, not a single word was said about the shorter-range systems, and the discussion moved on to strategic offensive weapons. In fact, the final position agreed to by the political leadership was not coordinated with either the Defense Minister or the Chief of General Staff, precisely because they were on record as strongly opposing it.

As time went on, opposition to including Oka in the Treaty grew stronger, and the idea of making such a concession to the United States was regarded by some as treason. It was a highly technological new weapon, which had only recently been deployed and was both a source of pride to the military and could be a strong bargaining chip for diplomats. Marshal Sokolov openly criticized the decision in the Central Committee building, calling it a "state crime" and comparing it to Khrushchev's "destruction of the navy and the aviation."⁵⁰ At that point, events intervened in a bizarre way, when a West German amateur pilot named Mathias Rust flew a single-engine Cessna across hundreds of miles of Soviet airspace, landing in the middle of downtown Moscow (close enough to taxi over to Red Square). This inexplicable breach of Soviet air defenses gave Gorbachev an opening to remove members of the top military brass who opposed new thinking and were especially against the new INF Treaty. Sokolov was replaced by the more loyal and less ambitious Dmitry Yazov at the end of May 1987.

48 Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami Marshala i Diplomata*, pp. 131–133. More detailed information on the inner politics of the SS-23 concession was given to Savranskaya by Georgy Kornienko, Interviews, Moscow, June 13, and June 28, 1996.

49 Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, New York 1991, pp. 96 f.

50 Quoted in Grachev, *Gorbachev's Gamble*, p. 96.

Even though he made the decision to include shorter-range weapons in April, Gorbachev announced it to the Politburo only on July 9, after the decision by Kohl that the German Pershing IA missiles would be eliminated. In his statement Gorbachev presented it as a major step toward “clearing Europe from nuclear weapons” and called for adding a “third zero”—eliminating *all* tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.⁵¹ The Soviet Union issued a formal announcement of a global double zero platform—going beyond the initial Reagan initiative of 1981. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles would be eliminated both in Europe and in Asia. Thereby, a whole class of nuclear weapons would be destroyed for the first time in nuclear history—and under conditions of the strictest verification.

According to Akhromeyev, Shevardnadze’s disregard of the position of the Defense Ministry on Oka resulted in the “first serious crack” between the Defense Ministry and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. All attempts by the military to return to the issue of shorter-range missiles in the summer and fall 1987 were sidelined by threats of party disciplinary measures. This is how Akhromeyev describes it his memoirs:

Efforts by the military to return to the issue of Oka before the treaty was signed were immediately thwarted using all means, including threats of applying party disciplinary measures to servicemen who participated in the negotiations and who criticized this misstep at party meetings. It finally ended by the military simply having to retreat literally a week before the Washington summit, where the INF Treaty was going to be signed, and only then our internal decision about including the missile SS-23 in that Treaty.⁵²

According to advisers close to Akhromeyev, the political leadership eventually forced the military leadership to accept the position that Gorbachev had agreed to with Shultz. They did so only after six months of pressure, and some never signed the agreement.⁵³ The Soviet Union would now have to destroy 239 SS-23/Oka missiles completely—a blow against the military’s prestige. On top of this, Oka was expensive to destroy.

Although the story of Oka is quite often told in Russian military and political memoirs, documents that have become available recently put the narrative in a somewhat different light. Oka was tested only for the range of 400 km, but the developers of the system and a small circle of top military knew very well that it could fly farther than that. On October 16, 1987, on the eve of Shultz’s trip to Moscow to finalize the draft Treaty and to set the dates for the Summit, the Five—the Soviet main decision-making body on military–industrial and arms control issues—gathered for its regular meeting, chaired by Lev Zaikov. The entire agenda was devoted to INF issues. Item 2 on the agenda read, “About

51 Notes of a CC CPSU Politburo Session, July 9, 1987, translated and published in Savranskaya and Blanton (eds.), *Last Superpower Summits*, p. 289.

52 Grachev, *Gorbachev’s Gamble*, p. 133.

53 Savranskaya Interview with Georgy Kornienko, May 18, 1996.

expediency of presenting the American side with factual [information about the range of the Oka missile,” and item 3 read, “About providing the delegation data on our INF and shorter-range missiles (RMD [*rakety men’shey dal’nosti*]) for inclusion in the Memorandum.” The presenter of both items was Akhromeyev. The reference information attached to the agenda (which is in the Vitaly Kataev papers collection at the Hoover Institution) shows that the “factual” capability of Oka was up to 600 km, with modification Oka-U. The drafters suggested that the Soviet side should not inform the U.S. side about the actual range, and insisted that Oka be classified as having a 400 km range (as tested). Since the concession had already been made, the Soviet side should propose to expand the parameters of the treaty to include all systems with the range 400–1,000 in the shorter-range category.⁵⁴ If the U.S. side agreed to it, the new range would cover the Lance-2 missile and would remove the issue of upgrades to those missiles, which indeed became a problem for the Soviets in the spring of 1989.

Reverberations about the way the INF Treaty was negotiated and the lack of consultation between the military and the political leadership continued throughout the fall and even after the signing of the Treaty. On December 29, the Party organization of the Legal and Treaty Department of the General Staff held a meeting, which allowed participants to air their hurt feelings and concerns about the process of negotiation and the concessions made in the INF Treaty. Although the report, signed by Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov and Dobrynin, is overall positive in tone, it mentions problems of communication between ministries, significant concessions given by the Soviet side, and the fact that Akhromeyev talked with members of the Legal and Treaty Department about the issues raised at the meeting.⁵⁵

7. Conclusion—The Most Important Treaty

Gorbachev and Reagan never achieved their dream of universal nuclear disarmament. They were unable to sign the START Treaty while Reagan was in office. Though many of their dreams did not materialize, the INF Treaty stands as a towering achievement—a breakthrough in scope and an agreement bringing in an unprecedented model of verification.

Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, while the U.S. destroyed 677 and 169 respectively. From the point of view of Gorbachev’s supporters in the military, those the U.S. agreed to scrap were the missiles with a very short flight time to targets in the Soviet Union, which made them the most dangerous in starting off

54 Plan rassmotreniya voprosov na soveschaniy u tov. Zaikova L.N. October 16, 1987, Kataev Papers Collection, Hoover Institution, Box 13, Folder 29.

55 Memorandum to Gorbachev, M.S. from Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov and Dobrynin, February 17, 1988, Kataev Papers Collection, Box 13, folder 28.

possible escalation to a general nuclear war. These weapons were perceived as the most threatening, and that was why the Soviet military supported the Treaty, even though there was significant opposition among them to the inclusion of shorter-range weapons.

The Treaty included remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspection and monitoring arrangements, based on the “any time and place” proposal of March 1987, which, to the Americans’ surprise, was accepted by the Soviets; and the documents show that the Soviets were willing to go even beyond the American position in the depth of the verification regime. The new Soviet position on verification not only removed the hurdle that seemed insurmountable, but according to the then U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock, it became a symbol of the new trust developing in U.S.–Soviet relations, which made the Treaty and further progress on arms control possible.

To understand why the Soviet leadership agreed to such unequal cuts and such uncharacteristic transparency, we have to be aware of what the Soviets saw in this Treaty—a first step on the road to a nuclear-free world and also a first step to a Soviet-American partnership to end the Cold War and fundamentally change the international system itself.

II. Reactions of the Western Allies

Oliver Barton

“The Most Staunch and Dependable of the Allies”?

Britain and the Zero Option

President Reagan regarded the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty¹ as one of the crowning achievements of his Presidency: a critical step towards ending the Cold War, and achieving his vision of a world without nuclear weapons.² Although Margaret Thatcher played an important role in facilitating this outcome, as a committed believer in nuclear deterrence the British Prime Minister had reservations about the INF Treaty and the “zero option” that it codified: the total elimination of all U. S. and Soviet intermediate-range, land-based systems. In her memoirs, Thatcher professed to have “always had mixed feelings about the INF ‘zero option’ [...] First, it threatened precisely what Helmut Schmidt had wanted to avoid when he originally urged NATO to deploy them: namely the decoupling of Europe from NATO [...] Second, the INF ‘zero option’ also cast doubt on—though as I always argued it did not in fact undermine—the NATO strategy of ‘flexible response.’” Finally, the “removal of the intermediate-range missiles might be argued to create a gap” in NATO’s deterrence posture.³

A comprehensive archival-based study of the British reaction to the INF Treaty awaits the release of the outstanding relevant government files from 1986 to 1988.⁴ However, a close examination of Britain’s role during the first phase of the INF negotiations from 1981 to 1983 can help to shed valuable light on the origins and substance of Thatcher’s “mixed feelings” about the zero option. It can also help us to understand why Britain not only acquiesced, but gave active sup-

1 Thanks go to Dr Roham Alvandi, Prof Nigel Ashton, Dr Alistair Feltham, Prof David Holloway, Prof Matthew Jones, Dr Adam Lyons, Sir Richard Mottram, Prof Leopoldo Nuti, Prof David Yost, the editors of this volume, and others unnamed for their comments on this chapter. Any errors that remain are my own.

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2 Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography*, New York 1990, pp. 699 f.

3 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London 1993, p. 771.

4 Britain’s role in implementing the Dual-Track decision will be covered in detail by the author’s forthcoming PhD thesis in International History at the London School of Economics, provisionally entitled “Dual Track Diplomacy: Britain, Intermediate Nuclear Forces, and Transatlantic Relations, 1977–87”.

port, to an Allied negotiating position about which it held such deep misgivings from its earliest inception. As a NATO nuclear power and a prospective basing nation for American ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), Britain was at the heart of Allied debates in 1981 over when to resume the INF negotiations, and what negotiating position to adopt. President Reagan's decision in November 1981 to seek the elimination of all U. S. and Soviet land-based, intermediate-range missiles defined the scope and the objectives of the INF negotiations. This chapter helps to explain the uneasiness Thatcher felt about the zero option by considering to what extent and why Britain lived up to its self-appointed role as "the most staunch and dependable of the allies" when it came to INF.⁵ In so doing, it sheds light on transatlantic relations and the inner workings of the Anglo-American "special relationship" during the Thatcher–Reagan years.

In October 1980, the Carter Administration held inconclusive, exploratory INF talks with the Soviets in Geneva.⁶ When President Reagan took office in January 1981, he faced calls from the European Allies for an early resumption of these negotiations.⁷ Britain stood in the middle between a new American administration that was determined to pursue "peace through strength" and the European Allies, who remained committed to détente and were far less skeptical about arms control.⁸ In a bid to resume U.S.–Soviet talks, Britain helped to foster mutual understanding and to cultivate unity amongst the Allies. Thatcher was quick to welcome the talks, although she and her officials harbored deep misgivings about Reagan's declared negotiating objective, the zero option, whereby the U. S. offered to forego deployment of its land-based, intermediate-range missiles in return for the Soviets eliminating all of theirs.⁹

One episode, in particular, illustrates the ambivalence of Britain's views about the zero option from the very outset. On October 20, 1982, faced with growing public unease about the forthcoming deployment in the UK of GLCMs and stalemate in the INF negotiations, John Nott, the British Defence Secretary, wrote to Thatcher, calling for a "more positive tone" on arms control. Nott called, in particular, for consideration of a "British initiative" on arms control so that Her

5 The National Archives (TNA), PREM19/979, Pym to Thatcher, October 25, 1982.

6 Maynard W. Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, Basingstoke 2006, p. 48.

7 Ralph Dietl, *Beyond Parity. Europe and the SALT Process in the Carter Era, 1977–1981*, Stuttgart 2016, p. 258.

8 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago, August 18, 1980, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85202> (accessed February 20, 2018); Kristina Spohr, *The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order*, Oxford 2016, pp. 111–120. See also Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011.

9 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43264> (accessed February 20, 2018). See the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri to this volume.

Majesty’s Government (HMG) would “no longer [...] look—as the public sees it—to be the creature of the Americans.”¹⁰ In a brief note five days later, the Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, cautioned against taking any precipitous action that risked undermining the modernization of NATO’s INF and, by extension, the special relationship:

So far we have been the most staunch and dependable of the allies in our support for the modernisation programme. Any hint at this stage that we were having second thoughts about the 1979 decision [...] could put at risk the whole enterprise. The impact of this, in particular on the Americans, would be extremely serious.¹¹

On similar grounds, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the lead government department for arms control, was resisting calls from European Allies for a shift in NATO’s negotiating position that would show greater flexibility than the Americans’ strict focus on complete elimination allowed.¹² Nonetheless, behind closed doors, the FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) harbored reservations about both the achievability and desirability of the zero option, and had, since the summer, been busy investigating so-called “fallback positions”.¹³

What explains this apparent contradiction? Why did Pym and the FCO deem it so important to maintain “staunch and dependable” support for a negotiating position about which HMG held deep misgivings, for which it was paying an increasing political price, and to which it was privately exploring alternatives?

Although British officials eschewed unilateral diplomatic initiatives regarding INF, Britain played a prominent role behind the scenes, ensuring that transatlantic ties were not strained to breaking point and that progress was made on both the arms control and deployment tracks. At times, Britain acted as a “transatlantic bridge” fostering mutual understanding and mediating differences that threatened NATO unity. On other occasions, Britain acted more like an enforcer, reminding Allies on both sides of the Atlantic of their obligations and the consequences for transatlantic and East–West relations should they renege. Two assumptions that were held across Whitehall were firstly that Britain’s credibility to perform the roles of mediator and enforcer stemmed from its dependability as an Ally, and secondly that Britain’s dependability was the bedrock to its jealously guarded special relationship with the Americans. Following the suspension of all high-level engagement with the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan, any influence Britain exerted over the INF negotiations would have to come via the Americans. This put an additional premium on the special relationship and Britain’s dependability as an Ally, particularly since HMG was dependent upon the Americans for protecting its most vital interest in the INF negotiations:

10 TNA, PREM19/979, FCO46/3101, Nuclear Issues, Nott to Thatcher, October 20, 1982.

11 TNA, PREM19/979, Pym to Thatcher, October 25, 1982.

12 TNA, FCO46/3136, Record of Discussion with Herr Egon Bahr (SPD) on Arms Control matters, FCO, 16 February 1982, March 2, 1982.

13 TNA, FCO46/3098, INF Negotiations—Future Work, Price to Gozney, September 20, 1982.

ensuring that the sacrosanct British independent deterrent remained outside the arms control framework. The price of American protection was Britain's support of a negotiating position that it hoped privately would never come to pass: the elimination of all INF under a zero option. Nonetheless, the Thatcher Government never fully reconciled itself to the zero option and hoped to exploit the political capital it had earned by supporting the Americans at a difficult time to wrest a change in the negotiating position when the time was right. However, Anglo-American relations were both more vexed and complex than the public bonhomie between Thatcher and Reagan would suggest.

1. The Significance of INF for Britain

In 1977, the Soviets had begun fielding SS-20s, giving them a capability to strike significant military and political targets across Western Europe with little warning. NATO had fielded no equivalent land-based system since President John F. Kennedy's decision to remove Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe after the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹⁴ Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor, feared that the SS-20 would undermine regional stability by creating an imbalance at the theater-level. Without a Western response, Soviet superiority at the "Eurostrategic" level would undermine the credibility of American security guarantees by raising the prospect of "decoupling" European security from U.S. central strategic systems.¹⁵ Only by securing negotiated reductions in Soviet systems or by responding symmetrically and deploying their own INF could NATO Allies shore up the "Eurostrategic balance" and re-establish the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.¹⁶

Over the next two years an Alliance consensus formed around pursuing arms control and INF modernization in parallel, the so-called Dual-Track Decision. However, views varied amongst the prospective basing nations as to the rationale and imperative behind INF modernization.¹⁷ Understanding the different strategic assessments that underlay each Ally's support for deployment helps to explain the different emphasis that they placed on arms control and the different reactions that they later had towards the zero option. Michael Quinlan, the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Programmes at the MOD and the doyen of British deterrence thinking, disagreed with Schmidt's reasoning, if not the

14 Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars. Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam*, Oxford 2000, p. 222.

15 Ivo H. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967*, New York 1991, pp. 16,9f.

16 Spohr, *Global Chancellor*, pp. 59, 93; Tim Geiger, *The NATO Double-Track Decision: Genesis and Implementation*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 53f.

17 Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, pp. 182–190.

imperative, for modernizing NATO’s INF. Quinlan believed it was Schmidt’s talk of separate regional balances that risked decoupling, by drawing an artificial, conceptual distinction between American and European security. Instead, it was the lack of credible NATO response options between tactical nuclear use and the resort to strategic nuclear weapons that risked decoupling and gave rise to the requirement for modernizing NATO’s INF.

According to the November 1978 Duff-Mason Report—commissioned by Thatcher’s predecessor, Jim Callaghan, to prepare the ground for a potential successor to the Polaris strategic delivery system—in a period of parity, “[s]trategic nuclear forces [...] cannot in themselves directly deter Warsaw Pact aggression at substantially lower levels” than general nuclear war.¹⁸ NATO’s policy of flexible response required the Allies to possess a range of scalable response options that could be employed in a graduated manner to manage the escalation of a nuclear crisis with the USSR. In part to offset the Warsaw Pact’s conventional superiority, NATO had a significant preponderance in tactical nuclear weapons. In order to meet NATO’s strategic requirement, the UK and U.S. assigned Polaris and Poseidon submarines respectively to NATO. In between, at the theater-level, NATO’s nuclear forces consisted of aging Vulcan and F-111 medium-range bombers, whose ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses was increasingly in doubt.¹⁹ The nature and characteristics of British and French nuclear systems meant they could not meet this sub-strategic role, leaving a gap in NATO’s deterrence posture.²⁰ This structural deficiency risked the “sanctuarization” of Moscow, and that the European Allies would conclude that the U.S. might not be prepared to make the leap from tactical to strategic nuclear employment for fear of escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange.²¹ This deterrence gap could lead to decoupling and the erosion of the Allies’ confidence in American extended deterrence, and risk ceding escalation dominance to the Soviet Union, and potentially “victory” in any hot war in Central Europe that might occur. In order both to deter the Soviets and to reassure the Allies, NATO needed a sub-strategic capability for a deep strike to ensure a “visible ladder of escalation with no rungs missing.”²² The consequence of “the rapid growth in Soviet long-range nuclear capability” and the “increasing age and vulnerability” of “the Alliance’s own equivalent forces” meant that INF modernization was “essential if we are to avoid a dangerous gap emerging in NATO’s theatre nuclear capability. Such a gap would weaken the

18 Duff-Mason Report, quoted in: Kristan Stoddart, *Creating the “Seamless Robe of Deterrence”: Great Britain’s Role in NATO’s INF Debate*, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D. C./Stanford, CA 2015, p. 185.

19 Tanya Ogilvie-White, *On Nuclear Deterrence. The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan*, London 2011, p. 179.

20 TNA, FCO46/2703, *Legge to Gozney, Exclusion of UK Strategic Deterrent from LRTNF Negotiations*, August 20, 1981.

21 Daalder, *Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, p. 152.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 179–180.

Alliance's strategy of flexible response and so cast doubt on the credibility of our deterrent."²³

Schmidt's focus on addressing a perceived theater nuclear imbalance gave him a greater interest in arms control than the emphasis on correcting structural deficiencies in NATO's nuclear posture gave Quinlan. Taken to its extreme, Schmidt's position implied that if the Soviets withdrew all of their INF, there would be no imbalance; the Allies could therefore forego deploying any intermediate-range missiles of their own. By contrast, Quinlan believed that the deficiencies in NATO's force structure existed irrespective of the SS-20. Flexible response required a spectrum of capabilities regardless of whether the Soviets fielded intermediate-range systems of their own; arms control could reduce, but not eliminate, the requirement for INF modernization. In short, Schmidt's strategic analysis allowed for a zero option; Quinlan's did not.

Quinlan's analysis was widely shared by British officials and ministers alike. Ultimately, Britain's overriding strategic interest was in INF modernization; arms control was the price, not the prize, for maintaining Allied consensus. As the basing nation with the largest share of INF and the only Ally to host Pershing II missiles, West Germany was the key to Dual-Track. By January 1981, the growth in anti-nuclear sentiment across Western Europe led the FCO to conclude that the resumption of the INF negotiations had become "a political *sine qua non* for [INF] modernisation particularly in FRG".²⁴ Progress was necessary on both tracks if the fragile Allied consensus on Dual-Track was to hold. With preparations for deployment already underway, the priority in January 1981 was to begin substantive negotiations.

2. Beginning Substantive Negotiations

Despite occasional flurries of ministerial activity, day-to-day responsibility for implementing Dual-Track and engaging Allies rested with officials. The Defence Department in the Foreign Office was responsible for INF arms control and for staffing NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) whereas Defence Secretariat 17 (DS17) in the MOD was responsible for INF deployment and for staffing NATO's High Level Group (HLG). Despite the creative tensions inherent to Dual-Track, there was a large degree of consensus between the FCO and the MOD concerning how it should be implemented. Forced to choose, both diplomats and defense officials would have prioritized deployment over arms control. However, both would have rejected the choice as a false dichotomy. The same underlying analysis guided both departments: Alliance cohesion rested on preserving the

23 Pym in: Hansard, December 13, 1979, Vol. 975, cc. 1540–1556.

24 TNA, FCO46/2700, Prime Minister's Visit to the United States, 25–28 February 1981, East/West Relations, February 19, 1981.

uneasy compromise at the heart of Dual-Track by implementing both tracks in parallel and beginning the negotiations promptly.

The British government, unlike its Dutch and German counterparts, actively avoided projecting a distinctive, national voice on INF. In April 1982, Sir Curtis Keeble, Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Moscow, proposed a dialogue between British and Soviet experts to discuss the INF balance. London rejected the proposal because of the risk that comparing figures with the Soviets:

may be seen as pre-empting a US role. It would come at a time when the Europeans, including the UK, are trying to impress upon a reluctant American Administration the need to speed up steps towards the resumption of talks. Even if we kept the US fully informed of what we were doing, the risk that they would misunderstand our motive and suspect that we were applying pressure by the back door is great [...] It might also lead to UK involvement in negotiations which, because of our concern to exclude UK systems, it is strongly in our interest should remain a US/USSR bilateral matter.²⁵

Any differences in the Allies’ approach or objectives would provide the Soviet Union with opportunities to drive wedges between the Allies, and between European governments and their publics. As a political test of Alliance unity, it was imperative that all Allies abided by Alliance policy on INF and did not promote their own national policy. As a NATO nuclear power and a prospective basing nation for GLCMs, Britain felt that it had a particular duty to act as a role model in this respect. This was one reason why Britain was determined to be the “most staunch and dependable of the allies” when it came to INF. The other was to maximize British insight and influence in Washington, and thus to ensure American protection of the UK’s independent deterrent.

Britain’s direct, early engagement with the Reagan Administration helped to temper perceived excesses, to bridge transatlantic differences, and ultimately to begin the INF negotiations. The depth of the UK–U.S. nuclear relationship and the political affinity between their respective governments helped British officials to have the insight, influence, and rapport with their American counterparts necessary to conduct their first bit of mediation and enforcement of 1981.²⁶ Reagan’s anti-Communism and the skepticism towards arms control shown by Administration hard-liners like Richard Perle, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Department of Defense (DoD) lead for INF, jarred with many Europeans’ continued interest in détente and dialogue with the East. References by Caspar Weinberger, the new Secretary of Defense, to the possible manufacture and deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) and by Reagan to the preparedness of the Soviet leadership to “commit any

25 TNA, FCO46/2728, Proposal for a UK/Soviet Discussion on TNF Figures, Gillmore to Moberly, undated.

26 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography. Volume 1: Not for Turning, London 2014, p. 565.

crime, to lie, and to cheat” only exacerbated European doubts that Dual-Track would survive the change in administration.²⁷

The “Iron Lady” shared many of Reagan’s views about East–West relations, including his desire for a more robust approach to arms control. Thatcher was certainly not prepared for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent to be included in arms control negotiations. To her, the SS-20 was just the latest evidence that the “threat of the Soviet Union is ever present. It is growing continually.”²⁸ Leonid Brezhnev’s offer on February 23, 1981 of a moratorium on SS-20 deployments in return for NATO abandoning modernization provided scant evidence that an equal, verifiable INF arms control agreement was possible, at least in the short-term.²⁹ The process of reaching the Dual-Track Decision in December 1979, however, had alerted Thatcher to the strength of European concerns and the risk posed to transatlantic relations should the new Administration be seen to renege on the arms control track.³⁰

Early efforts by the Foreign Office to persuade the Reagan Administration to announce a start date for the INF talks revealed that the Americans were not willing “to be rushed on arms control negotiations”.³¹ In January 1981, the Administration launched a comprehensive review of U.S. arms control policy. Consequently, the start date for negotiations and the Allied negotiating position became ensnared in a vicious interagency debate that pitched critics of SALT like Perle against SALT-era holdovers like the new chair of the SCG, Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.³² The Assistant Under Secretary of State for Defence and International Security at the FCO, Patrick Moberly, described the American policy review as “understandable, indeed commendable”; however, he cautioned that until it reported INF “will be awkward for us and our European Allies”, especially “if the Americans take matters as slowly as they may prefer.”³³ Reports from Bonn of the increasing frictions over INF within Schmidt’s own party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), only confirmed Moberly’s suspicion.³⁴ In May 1981, Schmidt threatened to resign should the SPD reverse its support for INF modernization. The fate of the Schmidt government hung on the resumption of negotiations.

27 TNA, FCO46/2771, Washington TELNO 1203, Bonn to FCO TELNO 273, April 16, 1981; The President’s News Conference, January 29, 1981.

28 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: Vol 1, p. 559.

29 R.W. Apple Jr., Brezhnev Proposes Talks with Reagan to Mend Relations, in: *The New York Times*, February 24, 1981, p. A1, A5, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/24/world/brezhnev-proposes-talks-with-reagan-to-mend-relations.html> (accessed February 26, 2020); Leonid I. Breschnew, *Auf dem Wege Lenins. Reden und Aufsätze*. April 1979–März 1981, Bd. 8, Berlin (East) 1982, p. 756.

30 Moore, Margaret Thatcher, p. 568.

31 TNA, FCO46/2700, TNF Arms Control, Moberly to Private Secretary to Secretary of State (PS/SoS) for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, February 20, 1981.

32 TNA, FCO46/2704, Eagleburger and Perle, Renwick to Weston, September 22, 1981.

33 TNA, FCO46/2700, TNF Arms Control, Moberly to PS/SoS, February 20, 1981.

34 TNA, FCO46/2715, State of the Coalition, Bonn to FCO TELNO 069, January 30, 1981.

Like many European Allies when it came to arms control, Britain enjoyed closer relations with the State Department than the DoD. Eagleburger was concerned that the Europeans were not being more vocal, and encouraged them to “make their views known to others in Washington beside the State Department.”³⁵ Deputy Under Secretary of State Julian Bullard cautioned against Britain “becoming involved in Washington wrangles” but appreciated that “it would be unfortunate to say the least if opponents of arms control in Washington, particularly in the DoD, were allowed to get the wrong impression simply because we and other Europeans failed to speak up.”³⁶ On February 27, 1981, Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, met Weinberger in Washington. They stressed the realities of European politics and tried to dispel Weinberger’s misconception that some Europeans were trying to “escape” from the Dual-Track Decision. The tone of Weinberger’s public remarks improved, but he remained reluctant to commit to a start date until the Administration had concluded studies on the interrelationship between arms control and the planned rearmament program.

Alexander Haig, the U.S. Secretary of State and former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, proved more sympathetic to European concerns, although even his views demanded some gentle correction. Carrington persuaded Haig that a lack of Allied consultation, not a lack of American leadership, was the biggest short-term risk to Allied cohesion and that an early SCG meeting was essential.³⁷ As a dependable Ally, Carrington could afford to be blunt. At a later meeting in July, Carrington told Haig that “full consultations would help to dispel the suspicions of the ill-natured that the Americans were simply indulging in a charade.”³⁸ Carrington also corrected Haig’s misapprehension that the European Allies were in the grip of radicals. “In Britain, for example, very many middle of the road people were worried about the increasing lethality of nuclear weapons and wished to see a reduction on numbers. But these people were not neutralists.”³⁹

Carrington had left an impression. At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on April 30, 1981, Haig cited Carrington and Thatcher’s testimony that “European leaders cannot maintain domestic consensus behind [INF] modernization without a specific date for the start of [INF] negotiations.”⁴⁰ Britain’s influence over the DoD, however, remained limited. Weinberger’s deputy, Frank

35 TNA, FCO46/2701, NAC Meeting, Rome 4/5 May: TNF Arms Control, Bullard to Quinlan, May 7, 1981.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 TNA, FCO46/2703, Record of a Meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the United States Secretary of State: State Department, Washington, Friday 17 July 1981, undated.

39 Ibid.

40 Minutes of NSC Meeting 8: Theater Nuclear Forces, April 30, 1981, <http://insidethecoldwar.org/part-3/chapter-11> (accessed January 31, 2018).

Carlucci, refused to be rushed by Allies whom he regarded as “really not interested in theater nuclear deployments or survivability. They regard [INF] simply as a tripwire which would lead to use of US strategic systems.”⁴¹ By contrast, Haig’s reference to a dependable Ally like Britain, who saw a vital role for INF in strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture, carried weight with Reagan. The President would not commit himself to a specific date, but did agree that Haig could announce that negotiations would resume by the end of 1981.⁴²

British pressure, sensitively applied, helped to cajole the Reagan Administration into making small, but decisive steps towards the resumption of negotiations. The fragility of Schmidt’s political position and the centrality of West Germany to NATO’s modernization program gave the Federal Government considerable leverage over the Americans. Britain’s dependability and discretion, however, gave it a standing in American eyes that less reliable Allies lacked. Nonetheless, there were limits to Britain’s insight and influence over American decision-making and consequently to Britain’s ability to reassure the Europeans. Ultimately, Britain could not defuse the explosive interagency debates that delayed the conclusion of the American policy review. If anything, the strength of the relationship British diplomats enjoyed with their State Department counterparts undermined their influence when it came to the Pentagon.⁴³ The heavy reliance upon the U. S. Department of State for insights into Beltway politics narrowed, if not distorted, the insight the Foreign Office had into the American policy review.⁴⁴ Britain’s relationship with the State Department had helped secure a start to the negotiations, but would stymie Britain’s attempts to influence the debate in Washington about the INF negotiating position.

3. The Zero Option

Although, at the Rome North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 1981, Haig committed the U. S. to resuming the INF talks by the end of the year, the Reagan Administration remained deeply divided about the objectives of these negotiations. When announcing the Dual-Track Decision, the Allies were deliberately vague

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 British diplomats would not have improved their stock had the Pentagon realized the number of barbed anecdotes that London and the British Embassy Washington exchanged via the diplomatic bag about Perle and other so-called hard-liners in the Administration. See e.g. TNA, FCO46/2703, Richard Perle, Weston to Renwick, July 28, 1981.

44 The majority of MOD files on INF arms control remain classified, therefore it is not possible to reach definitive conclusions about the extent of MOD–DoD contacts, and the insight that this provided. However, the FCO files contain many MOD documents, including MOD reports from NATO and bilateral meetings with the Americans. The majority concern INF modernization and the deliberations of the HLG, which Perle chaired.

about the scale of reductions to NATO’s INF deployments that they envisaged as a result of any arms control agreement.⁴⁵ The Dutch were keen to signal that all NATO deployments could be cancelled as a result of an arms control agreement; the UK and U.S. rejected this out of hand, believing that it would detract from the rationale and resolve to modernize INF.⁴⁶ The final language of the NATO communiqué papered over these differences, stating simply that “limitations should take the form of *de jure* equality both in ceilings and in rights.”⁴⁷ The (still) classified Integrated Decision Document that accompanied the communiqué was more specific in describing NATO’s objective as the negotiation of equal ceilings at the “lowest possible level,” whilst noting that the complete elimination of all INF was “highly unlikely” given the current Soviet monopoly.⁴⁸ At least privately, therefore, the Alliance had not ruled out the possibility of a zero option: the cancellation of NATO’s INF modernization program in exchange for the elimination of all equivalent Soviet systems.

When, in early 1981, Britain lobbied the Reagan Administration to make an explicit commitment to the Dual-Track Decision, this included a restatement of the American commitment to the objective of equal ceilings at the lowest possible level. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office continued to consider the adoption of a strict zero-only option as NATO’s public position “divisive”.⁴⁹ Firstly, it would allow Brezhnev to ask disingenuously “what the West wanted in return” for zero, if not the moratorium he had already offered. Secondly, “in the highly unlikely situation that the Russians agreed” to withdraw all their INF, “the strategic requirement for [...] modernisation would remain.”⁵⁰ Finally, the FCO worried that the sheer unnegotiability of the zero option could lead to pressure to widen the scope of the INF negotiations when they inevitably stalled, and thus put the British strategic deterrent at risk of inclusion.

The Foreign Office was very glad to learn in July 1981 that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the *Auswärtiges Amt*, shared its misgivings about the zero option. Adolf von Wagner, one of the leading German officials for INF arms control, confided to British diplomats that the zero option offered “endless scope for ‘twisting’ by the Soviet Union, particularly if the emphasis were placed on ‘zero’ NATO missiles as the starting-point,” as prominent left-wingers in the

45 Communiqué of the Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, December 12, 1979, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm (accessed February 20, 2020).

46 Dietl, *Beyond Parity*, p. 213.

47 Communiqué of the Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, December 12, 1979, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm (accessed February 20, 2020).

48 TNA, FCO46/2703, FRG Non-paper Preparation of LRTNF negotiations, August 26, 1981.

49 TNA, FCO46/2729, The TNF Balance: The Secretary of State’s Talks with Gromyko and Brandt’s Visit to Moscow, July 1981.

50 *Ibid.*

SPD stressed, “and not on the need to reduce SS-20s.”⁵¹ However, in the space of a month the Federal Government concluded, under growing domestic pressure, that a reference to the zero option in the Allies’ public negotiating position was unavoidable.⁵² Nonetheless, the Germans preferred that NATO adopt what became known as the “zero plus option” to a strict zero-only option.⁵³ NATO should announce that although elimination was the ultimate objective of the INF negotiations, the Allies were prepared to consider (and by implication thought more realistic) a verifiable agreement that established equality in INF somewhere above zero.

Concerned as they were about the fragility of the German Government, British officials were even more worried about the suggestion made by some Allies that there were grounds for some flexibility about the exclusion of British and French nuclear systems from the INF negotiations. Ultimately, the only thing more important to Britain than preserving Allied cohesion and strengthening NATO’s seamless web of deterrence was keeping the sacrosanct British independent deterrent out of the negotiations. For all that, British officials were conscious of the fragility of their arguments about Polaris being strategic in nature, if intermediate in range. As Quinlan put it, “our interest in ensuring exclusion is perhaps rather stronger than our logical case for it.”⁵⁴ Consequently, Britain was reluctant to countenance as dramatic a shift in the Allies’ public position as the zero option lest it undermine the rationale for INF modernization and mark the start of a slippery slope towards expanding the scope of the negotiations, and thus jeopardize the exclusion of the British strategic deterrent.

From its previous interactions with the DoD, the Foreign Office fully expected that Perle and the hard-liners would oppose both the zero and zero plus options. Although Perle was highly critical of what he regarded as the Europeans’ fickle attitude towards deployment, he was himself at best ambivalent about INF modernization.⁵⁵ For all his zealous attachment to deterrence, Perle did not find Quinlan’s argument compelling that INF modernization was essential to maintain a seamless web of deterrence, or to prevent decoupling. The weapons were too few in number, and the political costs involved in deploying them too great. Perle did not therefore share Britain’s concern about the consequences should the Soviets accept the zero option. Instead, Perle embraced the political opportunities presented by zero to call the Soviets’ bluff, and to entrap Allies into

51 TNA, FCO46/2729, Theatre Nuclear Forces, Bailes to Gozney, July 9, 1981. For the Auswärtige Amt’s judgement of Brezhnev’s proposal see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1981, ed. by Daniela Taschler, Matthias Peter, and Judith Michel, Munich 2012, Doc. 51.

52 TNA, FCO46/2703, FRG Non-paper Preparation of LRTNF negotiations, August 26, 1981.

53 Ibid.

54 TNA, FCO46/2730, Quinlan to Gillmore, July 21, 1981.

55 Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits. The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*, New York 1984, pp. 43–45.

pursuing deployment when the negotiations inevitably failed. At the October 13, 1981 NSC Meeting, Weinberger spoke to Perle’s brief, describing the zero option as a win-win. We:

need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion. If refused by the Soviets, they would take the blame for its rejection. If the Soviets agree, we would achieve the balance that we’ve lost. Such a plan would be to propose a ‘zero option’ [...] If we adopt the ‘zero option’ approach and the Soviets reject it after we have given it a good try; this will leave the Europeans in a position where they would really have no alternative to modernization.⁵⁶

The Pentagon’s surprise embrace of the zero option caught the FCO off-guard. Contacts at the State Department reassured British diplomats that the Administration would never adopt a strict zero-only option.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Gillmore did not keep quiet about his misgivings. In an uncharacteristically direct intervention at the September SCG meeting, Gillmore expressed three reservations about the zero option:

First, it must not form the main plank of the approach to negotiations. If it did NATO would have to breach its own aim in late 1983. Secondly, there was a risk of building up false expectations of what arms control could do. Thirdly, there was a danger of putting the cart before the horse. Public presentation had to be kept in perspective to avoid a situation where the public posture began to dictate the negotiating position.⁵⁸

Gillmore’s MOD counterparts shared his misgivings, but were less vexed since they were confident that the Soviets would not accept zero, and that in the unlikely event of the Soviets doing so, they believed that the elimination of the SS-20s would outweigh all other considerations, including “the strategic rationale for [INF] modernisation.”⁵⁹

Gradually the ground began to shift under the British position as an Allied consensus formed around zero plus. On October 13, Gillmore hosted a meeting of the SCG Inner Group at Chevening.⁶⁰ Gillmore discovered that the Germans remained “strongly attached” to a reference to the zero option in Allied public statements: “we may have to make some concession on the zero option which is assuming considerable importance in the public debate in the Federal Republic.”⁶¹ Gillmore was prepared to recommend acquiescence to zero plus

56 Minutes of NSC Meeting 22: Theater Nuclear Forces, Egypt, October 13, 1981, <http://inside.thecoldwar.org/part-3/chapter-11> (accessed January 31, 2018).

57 TNA, FCO46/2703, TNF, Renwick to Logan, August 28, 1981.

58 TNA, FCO46/2704, UK Summary Record of the Special Consultative Group Meeting in Brussels, 16 September 1981, September 24, 1981.

59 TNA, FCO46/2706, The Zero Option, Legge to Gillmore, October 28, 1981.

60 TNA, FCO46/2705, TNF Arms Control: Meeting at Chevening, 13 October of the Inner Group, Gillmore to PS/SoS, October 13, 1981.

61 Ibid.

and to support the new NATO consensus only after Eagleburger gave him an unambiguous assurance “that the United States Government was firmly wedded to the principle that neither British nor French nuclear systems should be included in the negotiations, nor should ‘compensation’ be offered to the Russians for these systems.”⁶² At the September SCG, Eagleburger gave such an assurance, stressing that this was “a matter of deep principle and the Allies could not expect any change in the future.”⁶³

With Britain’s vital interest secured and Allied consensus reached on zero plus, the British regarded American endorsement of the negotiating position largely as a formality. Certainly, British officials felt that a decision in favor of the strict, zero-only option “would make nonsense of the processes of consultation so far conducted in the SCG.”⁶⁴ Five days after the NSC meeting, Gillmore was confident that Haig and zero plus had won the day.⁶⁵ Only on November 18, 1981, the day of the speech during which Reagan would announce the negotiating position, did the Foreign Office learn that Reagan had opted for the strict zero-only option.⁶⁶ Haig’s lackluster performance in successive NSC meetings, the smug disregard that the hard-liners showed towards European concerns, and Reagan’s own enthusiasm for the simplicity and abolitionist potential of the zero option had tipped the balance in the Pentagon’s favor.

The episode was a galling reminder of the limitations to Britain’s insight and influence in Washington, at least when it came to arms control. Despite repeated reassurances from Haig over the summer that the Reagan Administration “would not play the Carter game of presenting its allies with *faits accomplis* on vital issues,” Britain had no warning and was given no choice but to accept the zero option.⁶⁷ Officials had held back from playing Britain’s trump card—Thatcher’s relationship with Reagan—out of the mistaken belief that the Americans would endorse the Allied consensus already reached on zero plus. With little leverage over the Pentagon, the Foreign Office was dependent upon the State Department to make the running. Consequently, Britain was subject to, and ultimately found itself the victim of, interagency dynamics beyond its control.

Only the day before Reagan’s speech, at a briefing ahead of the Anglo-German Summit, Thatcher had:

62 TNA, FCO46/2704, French Nuclear Forces, Gillmore to PS/SoS, September 18, 1981.

63 TNA, FCO46/2704, UK Summary Record of the Special Consultative Group Meeting in Brussels, 16 September 1981, October 24, 1981.

64 TNA, FCO46/2706, TNF, Washington to FCO TELNO 3366, November 10, 1981.

65 TNA, FCO46/2707, Prime Minister’s Briefing Meeting for Bonn Summit: TNF, Gillmore to PS/PUS, November 17, 1981.

66 TNA, FCO46/2707, Press Conference in Bonn: President Reagan on TNF, FCO to Bonn TELNO 508, November 18, 1981.

67 TNA, FCO46/2703, Record of a Meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the United States Secretary of State: State Department, Washington, Friday 17 July 1981.

expressed some misgivings about the zero option which she thought might be defined by some of our allies as meaning a good deal more than zero for the Russians. She thought, in particular, that it would be a mistake to create public expectations which would lead to widespread disappointment when they were unfulfilled.⁶⁸

Nonetheless, Thatcher did not just acquiesce to the zero option; she championed European support for a negotiating position that she hoped would never come to pass.⁶⁹ At a joint press conference with Schmidt only a few hours after Reagan’s speech, the Prime Minister welcomed the zero option as “a most important initiative” offering the prospect of “massive reductions” in nuclear arms.⁷⁰ Why the apparent contradiction?

As she attests in her memoirs, Thatcher’s approach to the Anglo–American special relations was heavily shaped by the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Britain and France failed ignominiously to recapture the Suez Canal from the Egyptians, in large part thanks to American opposition. She drew the lesson from Suez that it was vitally important that Britain should never be at odds with the Americans over an issue at which Britain’s vital interests were at stake.⁷¹ Britain’s influence in Washington stemmed ultimately from its loyalty and reliability. “We in Britain stand with you,” Thatcher declared during her first visit to see Reagan as President. “Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends we will be there.”⁷² As important as INF modernization and the adoption of a credible negotiating position were to Britain, Britain’s preeminent national interest was the exclusion of its strategic deterrent from the negotiations. Britain had pursued its objections to the zero option with tact and discretion, but in the end the British had lost the argument. The Americans had committed to protecting Britain’s deterrent in the full knowledge that this would complicate negotiations, and that not all Allies would agree. Britain’s duty in return, Thatcher felt, was to accept the outcome with loyalty and good grace, to welcome the zero option, and to continue the role of “staunch and dependable” ally, presenting a common front with the United States, and resolving any outstanding disagreements privately.

68 TNA, FCO46/2707, SCG Meeting on 20 November: The Zero Option, Gillmore to PS/SoS, November 18, 1981.

69 Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 771.

70 TNA, FCO46/2707, Reagan’s Speech on Disarmament, November 18, 1981.

71 “I drew four lessons from this sad episode. First, we should not get into a military operation unless we were determined and able to finish it. Second, we should never again find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in a major international crisis affecting British interests. Third, we should ensure that our actions were in accord with international law. And finally, he who hesitates is lost.” Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power*, London 1995, p. 88.

72 Robin Renwick, *A Journey with Margaret Thatcher. Foreign Policy under the Iron Lady*, London 2013, pp. 127 f.

4. The Interim Option

When the chief U.S. negotiator, Paul Nitze, formally tabled the zero option at the start of the negotiations on November 30, 1981 his negotiating instructions contained no fall-back options.⁷³ Privately, Nitze, the State Department, and the Foreign Office doubted the long-term viability of the zero option.⁷⁴ Gillmore recognized that with such a sharp disparity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of the number of deployed INF systems, the U.S. would need to pursue equal levels above zero—a so-called “interim option”—if any INF agreement was to be reached. The question was when, not if, to make a move in the Allies’ negotiating position. Until NATO convinced the Soviets that deployment would proceed as planned, the Soviets would not negotiate seriously and would only pocket any premature concessions that the Allies made. Assuming that the “Russians were to sit on their hands for the rest of 1982 [...] any changes in the NATO position had to be produced very sparingly.”⁷⁵ The Allies should retain the zero option for the foreseeable future; the Americans agreed.

Although sticking with the zero option made sense diplomatically, it also meant that the Allies ceded the initiative to the Soviets, putting NATO at a disadvantage when it came to the battle for hearts and minds in Western Europe. The Soviets proved adept at making frequent presentational changes to their negotiating position, which gave the appearance of activism and accommodation without making their proposals any more attractive to the Allies.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, European public opinion began to turn against the zero option; opponents viewed the all-or-nothing approach as evidence that the Americans were not taking the negotiations seriously.⁷⁷ By mid-1982, with the two sides little closer after six months of negotiation, pressure began to build within the Alliance for the Americans to show greater “flexibility” in its negotiating position. British and French nuclear systems continued to be a focus of Soviet propaganda and were at the core of the Soviet negotiating position.⁷⁸ The Soviets continued to stress that a balance already existed in Europe, and that NATO’s superiority in European-based systems, including the British and French strategic deterrents, legitimized deployments of the SS-20. In Brussels, Britain circulated paper after

73 Glitman, *Last Battle*, p. 61.

74 Glitman, *Last Battle*, p. 74.

75 TNA, FCO46/3094, Call on Mr Hurd by Ambassador Paul Nitze: 5.30 PM, 17 March 1982, March 19, 1982.

76 Glitman, *Last Battle*, p. 83.

77 TNA, FCO46/3136, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: The State of the Debate in the FRG, Mallaby to Gillmore, September 15, 1982.

78 TNA, FCO46/3085, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, Moscow to FCO TELNO 117, March 5, 1982.

paper challenging Soviet claims.⁷⁹ These efforts did not prevent critics, including the architects of *Ostpolitik*, Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, from echoing Soviet calls for compensation for British and French forces and the cancellation of NATO deployments in return for marginal reductions in Soviet systems. In September 1982, the British Minister in Bonn, Christopher Mallaby, reported that the popular interpretation of “flexibility” and zero plus in SPD circles was for NATO to allow the Soviets to keep some SS-20s as compensation for the British and French deterrents.⁸⁰

In June 1982, Schmidt concluded that an interim option was required to head off the opposition from within his own party to INF modernization, which threatened to topple his fragile coalition. The FCO deemed the call for an interim option ill-timed, if not ill-judged. “It would be profoundly damaging,” Gillmore believed, “if the Alliance was to work itself now into a state of jitters [...] It is probably right that the zero/zero outcome is not negotiable.”⁸¹ However, the timing of any move “will be of the essence [...] There must be no question of considering alternatives to zero until [the Soviets] have displayed a greater readiness to approach the INF negotiations with a real intent to negotiate for a sensible result.”⁸² The Americans agreed with Gillmore’s analysis and rejected Schmidt’s proposed interim option.

Nonetheless, the FCO found the growing frequency of U.S.–German interactions disquieting. In September 1982, Gillmore’s deputy, John Weston, learned that Nitze would be:

having a private exchange of views with the leader of the Soviet delegation [...] before going on to ‘brief the Germans over the weekend’ [...] It is perhaps perfectly natural that Nitze should be making a point of keeping the Germans closely informed at this very fluid juncture in the German political scene. But we shall presumably wish to ensure that US/German bilateral contacts on INF do not assume the proportions of a ‘special relationship.’⁸³

Signs that Nitze was “finding it more difficult to deal conceptually with the problem of the exclusion of allied systems in INF” only made the FCO more nervous about where a U.S.–German special relationship could lead, and the other concessions Schmidt might feel forced to make to shore up his governing coalition.⁸⁴ In order to safeguard its independent deterrent, Britain needed to strengthen its own special relationship with the Americans, and to make

79 TNA, FCO46/2729, Analysis of Soviet Claims on the Balance of Nuclear Forces in Europe, June 30, 1981.

80 TNA, FCO46/3136, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: The State of the Debate in the FRG, Mallaby to Gillmore, September 15, 1982.

81 TNA, FCO46/3097, INF, Gillmore to Mallaby, October 4, 1982.

82 Ibid.

83 TNA, FCO46/3097, US/German Relations, Weston to Gillmore, September 28, 1982.

84 TNA, FCO46/3101, INF Et al, Renwick to Gillmore, October 22, 1982.

preparations for a positive shift in the negotiating position. In September 1982, Gillmore broached the subject of Anglo–American collaboration on preparing fall-back options with Richard Burt, Eagleburger’s successor as Chair of the SCG.⁸⁵ Gillmore stressed the “great difficulty” they would have in discussing possible alternatives to the zero option:

since, as soon as any whiff of it leaked out, the present position would be untenable. If some forward thinking were not done, however, we could find ourselves in real difficulty next year; and could come under sudden and intense pressure from the Germans to make some move which might not be well considered or make much sense in terms of arms control.⁸⁶

Burt had been one of the leading proponents of zero plus, and remained sore about losing the interagency debate to Perle the previous November. Burt welcomed the opportunity to work with Britain, believing that cooperation, if handled carefully, could help strengthen the State Department’s hand within the interagency process.⁸⁷ Perle and the hard-liners were already in a weaker position than they had been in November 1981. The Administration faced not just growing pressure from the Europeans but calls from Congress to accept a “nuclear freeze.”⁸⁸ According to one FCO desk officer, the European Allies could be forgiven if they found themselves “unable, privately at least, to resist a feeling of relief that the American Administration is now having a first-hand taste of the sort of public pressure which the European Governments have faced for several years.”⁸⁹

Nitze shared Burt’s frustration with the stalemate in Geneva. In early October 1982, the FCO learned that in July Nitze had established on his own authority a private back-channel to sound out the Soviets about a possible interim option, the so-called “Walk in the Woods.”⁹⁰ Although the White House rejected Nitze’s proposal (thanks in part to Perle) the new U. S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, supported Nitze’s efforts to find a compromise.⁹¹ Burt hoped that with British help he could get Shultz to approve the development of fall-back options for use in 1983. Having sounded out Perle and learned that even he “acknowledged that an Allied move was likely to be necessary” at some point, the FCO felt confident to press the matter with Shultz.⁹² Indeed, the FCO regarded Pym’s meeting with Shultz on December 17, 1982 as of “critical importance” in helping the Department of State “break the log-jam in Washington [...] [N]o voice is likely to weigh

85 TNA, FCO46/3097, INF and START, Renwick to Gillmore, September 3, 1982.

86 *Ibid.*

87 *Ibid.*

88 On Freeze in the U. S. see Claudia Kemper’s essay in this volume.

89 TNA, FCO46/3143, Congressional Proposal for a Nuclear Freeze, Gozney to Pakenham, April 2, 1982.

90 TNA, FCO46/3101, INF, Renwick to Gillmore, October 7, 1982.

91 *Ibid.*

92 TNA, FCO46/3101, INF, Renwick to Gillmore, December 11, 1982.

more persuasively in the matter than that of the United Kingdom.”⁹³ Although Shultz was not prepared to countenance a shift in NATO’s public position in the immediate future, since the Soviets had made no meaningful concessions of their own, he recognized that it would be “irresponsible for the Americans not to think about other positions behind closed doors.”⁹⁴ Burt was ecstatic and thanked Gillmore profusely for Britain’s help in winning over Shultz.⁹⁵

It was against this background of delicate engagement with the U.S. about possible fall-back options that the Defence Secretary, John Nott, wrote his letter to Thatcher calling for a “British initiative” on arms control.⁹⁶ The idea Nott had in mind was a move to reduce the number and salience of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO’s posture, not a move on INF. Nonetheless, the FCO remained cautious about any effort that could be perceived as placing “semi-public pressure on the Americans to move” lest this detract from Britain’s role as the “most staunch and dependable of the allies”, and thus undermine British influence in Washington.⁹⁷ The irony was that the FCO rejected calls from MOD for an early move on arms control precisely because the FCO wished to persuade the Americans to be ready to make a move on INF in early 1983. The FCO’s analysis of the zero option had never changed. The interim option had always been a question of when, not if.

By January 1983, the British had concluded that the time for a move in the negotiating position was fast approaching. This was not because they felt that the Allies had succeeded in demonstrating to the Soviets their resolve to see through the deployments. Rather it was because public support for deployment was looking increasingly vulnerable. In particular, a new, more credible negotiating position could help to head off calls from the likes of Bahr for a one-year postponement in deployment in order to allow additional time for negotiation.⁹⁸ The British feared that postponement, even for a year, would undermine the momentum then building behind deployment, perhaps fatally. Indeed, the Soviets were quick to capitalize on the growing opposition throughout Western Europe to deployment by announcing a new negotiating position of their own. On December 21, 1982, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, gave a speech in which he labeled the zero option a “mockery.”⁹⁹ In its place, he offered his own interim option, whereby the Soviet Union would retain in Europe only as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France already possessed “and not a single one more”. By making this new

93 TNA, FCO46/3101, Shultz Visit: Separate Brief on INF, Weston to PS/SoS, December 14, 1982.

94 TNA, FCO46/3101, Visit of Mr Shultz: INF, Fall to Gillmore, December 17, 1982.

95 TNA, FCO46/3101, INF: Discussions with Shultz on 17 December, FCO to Washington TELNO 2178, December 17, 1982.

96 TNA, PREM19/979, FCO46/3101, Nuclear Issues, Nott to Thatcher, October 20, 1982.

97 TNA, FCO46/3101, INF, Renwick to Gillmore, December 11, 1982.

98 TNA, FCO46/3519, Your TELNO 627 to Washington: CBS Television Debate: Egon Bahr, Bonn to FCO TELNO 373, April 15, 1983.

99 Ibid.

offer, Andropov had attempted to portray the issue of British and French nuclear forces as the main obstacle to progress in the negotiations. This alone gave Britain every reason to want the U.S. to announce their own interim option.

By February 1983, Britain, along with the majority of the other European Allies, had concluded that the time had arrived for the U.S. to offer an interim option. However, FCO officials cautioned against putting collective pressure on the Administration to change track. The Reagan Administration already had a strong tendency to view defense issues through a domestic political lens; the challenge posed by the FREEZE Movement only exacerbated this. Gillmore argued that “if it was believed that the Europeans were ‘ganging up’ on the Administration in order to encourage a new initiative in the negotiations, this would merely serve the arguments of those who oppose any shift from the zero option, even on an interim base.”¹⁰⁰ It was for this reason that, on January 24, Pym declined an invitation from Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, to meet with their Italian counterpart to discuss INF. Later Pym persuaded Genscher not to lobby the Americans for an early NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting to discuss INF for the same reason.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, in making the case to the Americans for an interim option, German support would be key. The new German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, favored an interim option, but wished to delay any move until after the Federal Elections.¹⁰² “[F]ighting for his political life”, the FDP leader, Genscher, did not want the Americans to wait any longer.¹⁰³

Their determination to avoid ganging up on the Americans did not preclude the British from lobbying the Administration bilaterally or continuing to collaborate on the development of fall-back options. On February 18, Thatcher wrote to Reagan, warning that the recent public revelations about the Walk in the Woods, had “aroused public expectations that we are now considering the possibility of an intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome.”¹⁰⁴ Reagan himself needed little convincing. On January 27, the British Embassy in Washington reported that the “President’s own inclination was towards some flexibility.”¹⁰⁵ However, Reagan was “reluctant to force the issue with Weinberger”, and “Shultz did not want to bring the matter to a head until he was convinced that there was no alternative”.¹⁰⁶ By the time Vice-President Bush visited London on February 9,

100 TNA, FCO46/3470, INF: Mr Pym’s Contacts with Mr Genscher and Sr Colombo in the Margins of the European Council: 24/25 January, Gillmore to PS/SoS, undated.

101 TNA, FCO46/3470, INF: Mr Pym’s Contacts with Mr Genscher and Sr Colombo in the Margins of the European Council: 24/25 January, Gillmore to PS/SoS, undated; TNA, FCO 46/3470, INF, FCO to Bonn TELNO 36, January 25, 1983.

102 TNA, FCO46/3518, MIPT: INF: Nitze’s Talks in Bonn on 24 January, Bonn to FCO TELNO 076, January 25, 1983.

103 TNA, FCO46/3518, Your TELNO 46: Visit of Chancellor Kohl (and Herr Genscher) to Chequers, 4 February, Bonn to FCO TELNO 112, February 2, 1983.

104 TNA, PREM 19/979, Thatcher to Reagan, February 18, 1983.

105 TNA, FCO46/3471, INF, Renwick to British Minister, Washington, January 27, 1983.

106 Ibid.

opinion in Washington had begun to shift; “some of the staunchest opponents to any move from the zero option within the Administration now appear to accept that a new initiative [...] may now be inescapable.”¹⁰⁷ Even amongst the NSC Staff, there were those who recognized that the United States would have to “work very hard to combat the prevailing view here and abroad that R[onald]R[eagan] is not serious about arms control, won’t compromise, that the policy is in disarray with major splits in the Administration.”¹⁰⁸

Against this background, Pym seized the opportunity presented by the Vice-President’s visit to tell Bush that “[i]n the UK view, the moment to move from the zero option might be very close, although [...] it might be best to leave it until after the FRG elections.”¹⁰⁹ In his report to Shultz, Burt recounted the conversation somewhat differently: “Pym was brutal in asserting that zero/zero is unobtainable and has outrun its political usefulness.”¹¹⁰ Despite Weinberger’s continued opposition to any move away from zero, Burt reassured British officials that the President had given Shultz the authority to conduct a prompt review of the U. S. negotiating position.¹¹¹

Although welcome, talk of a prompt review brought back bad memories of when Allied consultation had broken down shortly before Reagan had first announced the zero option.¹¹² Gillmore was determined to avoid a repeat: “It is of course important not to nag the Americans unnecessarily. But under the pressure of time, proper consultations could become a casualty.”¹¹³ Gillmore received additional justification for his concerns when, on March 23, President Reagan announced “his desire to move from a US strategy based on the deterrent effect of a retaliatory capability to one based on adequate anti-ballistic missile defences by pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative.”¹¹⁴ The President’s speech “came as a complete and unwelcome surprise” to many in his own Administration, let alone to his NATO Allies.¹¹⁵

The same day Reagan informed Thatcher of the results of Shultz’s review: “the United States is prepared to negotiate an interim agreement”.¹¹⁶ Having lost the argument in Washington, Perle was furious with what he regarded as British interference. On the margins of the Nuclear Planning Group on March 23,

107 TNA, PREM 19/973, INF: The Zero Option, Bone to Coles, February 9, 1983.

108 RRPL, NSC Subject File, Arms Control (1 Jan 83–20 Jan 83), Arms Control Public Affairs, Allin to Clark and McFarlane, January 13, 1983.

109 TNA, PREM 19/973, Secretary of State’s discussion with Vice-President Bush: 9 February: Defence Issues, Bone to Coles, February 9, 1983.

110 National Security Archive, Washington, An Overview of the Vice President’s Talks in Europe on INF, U.S. Embassy London to U.S. Secretary of State, February 10, 1983.

111 Ibid.

112 TNA, PREM 19/979, Reagan to Thatcher, March 14, 1983.

113 TNA, FCO46/3472, UKDel NATO Telegram Number 83: INF, FCO to Washington TELNO 469, March 21, 1983.

114 TNA, FCO46/3472, SITREP 14–25 March, Weston to Wright, March 24, 1983.

115 Ibid.

116 TNA, PREM 19/979, Reagan to Thatcher, March 23, 1983.

Perle opened a meeting with his MOD counterpart “with a heated denunciation of what the British were up to in, as he saw it, mobilizing European opinion to apply pressure on the US Administration to make a move in the INF arms control negotiations.”¹¹⁷ Gillmore put Perle’s outburst down to him being “aggrieved at having lost the battle in Washington in spite of having spilt a good deal of blood on a large number of carpets. But then we are all getting used to that.”¹¹⁸

Did Perle overstate Britain’s influence? Certainly, there is little evidence to suggest that the British perfidiously masterminded a conspiracy by the European Allies to lobby the Reagan Administration to pursue an interim option. Indeed, the British had actively discouraged attempts by Genscher and others to mount such a coordinated lobbying campaign.¹¹⁹ However, Perle had stronger grounds to allege that the Foreign Office had been “ganging up with the State Department in some way” even if this fell short of the “unfair pressure” Perle claimed that the British had placed on the interagency decision-making process.¹²⁰ Behind the scenes, FCO officials had been working hard with Burt and his team for nearly six months, exploring alternative interim options. In so doing, the British were able to inject their thinking at the very earliest stage of the American policy development process. In parallel, at the political level, Pym engaged with Secretary Shultz, and Thatcher kept up a regular correspondence with President Reagan. In short, the British had learnt the lesson from the zero option debacle “that dealing with the State Department is no substitute for more widespread exchanges; and that views delivered early carry twice the weight of those that come later.”¹²¹

Some in the Reagan Administration, like Perle, grated at “the role the British cherish: to straddle the differences between the U. S. and Europe.”¹²² However, the MOD was confident that HMG had pursued the “right” approach:

[T]he most productive way of seeking to influence US thinking has been to feed in the UK view through intensive contact between senior US officials and our Chargé [d’Affairs] in Washington [...] [W]e have been consequently taken into the confidence of State Department officials as their thinking develops and I doubt whether this would have happened if Mr Shultz or the President had been responding [only] to high level messages from us. There is no doubt that our views are respected and carefully listened to.¹²³

117 TNA, FCO46/3472, Belloch to Gillmore, March 25, 1983.

118 TNA, FCO46/3072, INF: Richard Perle, Gillmore to Belloch, March 29, 1983.

119 TNA, FCO46/3470, INF: Mr Pym’s Contacts with Mr Genscher and Sr Colombo in the Margins of the European Council: 24/25 January, Gillmore to PS/SoS, undated.

120 TNA, FCO46/3472, Belloch to Gillmore, March 25, 1983.

121 TNA, PREM 19/1690, European Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons, Howe to Thatcher, December 9, 1983.

122 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL), NSC European and Security Affairs Directorate, RAC Box 6, United Kingdom 1983 (06-03-83-06-15-83), Your June 16 Meeting with David Gillmore, Sommer to McFarlane, June 15, 1983.

123 TNA, DEFE 24/2998, INF Negotiations—Development of the US Negotiating Position, Stewart to Assistant PS to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, August 31, 1983.

Were the British any more influential in Washington than their European Allies because they adopted this approach? Like any success, the interim option had many parents. The Italians were quick to claim their share of responsibility for the move.¹²⁴ However, Kohl’s views about the timing of any move were unquestionably the single biggest factor weighing upon American decision-making once the President had accepted the need for greater flexibility in the U.S. negotiating position. Nonetheless, Burt believed that when it came to INF both “the FRG and Britain are the crucial countries”; indeed, Burt argued that the U.S. “should put special weight on what was heard in London.”¹²⁵ While other Allies “are reluctant to offer us advice on sensitive nuclear matters”, the British “rely on the ‘special relationship’ and are always more candid. They view themselves as ‘explaining Europe to the Americans and vice versa’”.¹²⁶ British intervention may not have influenced the timing of Reagan’s announcement. However, FCO officials kept up their quiet, but consistent engagement with their counterparts in the State Department, conveying the message, echoed by Pym and Thatcher, that a move of some sort, early in 1983, would be essential if the U.S. were to maintain Allied support for deployment. It was, in no small part, thanks to this that President Reagan reluctantly took on the hard-liners within his Administration, and decided to pursue an interim option.

5. The Zero Option Redux

As NATO’s self-imposed deadline of December 31, 1983 either to reach an arms control agreement or to begin NATO deployment fast approached, the interim option underwent several further revisions. These modifications of NATO’s negotiating position pushed the zero option further into the distance, although it remained ostensibly the Allies’ ultimate objective in the negotiations. When the first NATO deployments began in November 1983 and the Soviets subsequently walked out of the negotiations in Geneva, the zero option was effectively dead. Coming on the back of the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Airlines Flight 007, and the concern provoked in the Kremlin by the NATO command exercise, ABLE ARCHER 83, East–West relations reached a new nadir.¹²⁷

When the INF negotiations finally resumed in Geneva on March 12, 1985, under the umbrella of the expanded Nuclear-Space Talks, the prospect of an

124 *Negoziato FNI di Genevri*, prepared for a meeting between Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Chancellor Kohl on September 23, 1983. Quoted in Leopoldo Nuti, *Italy and the Battle of the Euromissiles: The Deployment of the US BGM-109 G ‘Gryphon’ 1979–83*, in: Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War. From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation*, London 2004, p. 292.

125 National Security Archive, *An Overview of the Vice President’s Talks in Europe on INF*, U.S. Embassy London to U.S. Secretary of State, February 10, 1983.

126 *Ibid.*

127 Taylor Downing, 1983. *The World at the Brink*, London 2018.

INF agreement, let alone the zero option, appeared little closer. Indeed, the linkage established between the arms control negotiations in Geneva had tied the fate of the INF negotiations to that of START and the outer space tasks. The British had long argued against the merger of INF and START for fear that it would undermine their argument that, as strategic systems “by definition”, the British and French strategic deterrents “had no place in the INF negotiations.”¹²⁸ However, in February 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the new Foreign Secretary, wrote to Thatcher, saying that for the sake of East–West relations “if a genuine opportunity presents itself for the resumption of nuclear arms control [...] the West should be in a position to respond positively without pre-conditions.”¹²⁹ The U.S. ended up accepting the merger of INF, START, and the outer space talks as the price of resuming negotiations with the Soviets. However, Maynard Glitman, Nitze’s successor as the chief U.S. negotiator for INF, believed that linkage had presented the Soviets with only greater opportunity to present “Alliance-splitting proposals”, and to sabotage SDI. Only by unravelling this grand package, Glitman argued, could progress in the INF negotiations be made.¹³⁰ Thatcher’s advisor for foreign affairs, Sir Percy Craddock, agreed.¹³¹

Rather than the threat that linkage posed to SDI, Thatcher was more concerned about the threat that SDI posed to the progress of nuclear arms control. Thatcher agreed with her private secretary, Charles Powell, that “the key is [...] not to allow” the Americans to make “any irrevocable decisions affecting deployment of an SDI which would sabotage the short-term possibilities of limiting and reducing nuclear arms.”¹³² To that end, on December 22, 1984 at Camp David, Thatcher secured President Reagan’s commitment that while research into ballistic missile defence could proceed unconstrained, any deployment of SDI-type capabilities would be subject to negotiations.¹³³ Shultz regarded the joint statement that Powell drafted and that Reagan and Thatcher issued after the meeting as “excellent” since it neatly “bypassed” opposition from Weinberger and the Pentagon to any aspect of the SDI program being subject to negotiation.¹³⁴

Linkage and SDI were not the only potential obstacles to progress in the INF negotiations. The U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions remained far apart, with

128 TNA, PREM 19/1443, Implications of a Merger of INF/START Negotiations, January 7, 1985.

129 TNA, PREM 19/1184, INF/START Merger, Howe to Thatcher, February 10, 1984.

130 Glitman, *Last Battle*, p. 108.

131 TNA, PREM 19/1443, Prime Minister’s Meeting with Mr McFarlane: US/Soviet Talks on Arms Control, Powell to Ricketts, January 9, 1985.

132 TNA, PREM 19/1443, Arms Control: Briefing Meeting, Chequers, 2 February, Powell to Thatcher, handwritten annex, January 31, 1985.

133 RRPL, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records (File Folder: Thatcher Visit—Dec 1984 [1] Box 90902), Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, December 28, 1984, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109185> (accessed on March 12, 2020).

134 George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, p. 509.

little obvious way of bridging them.¹³⁵ Despite NATO’s ongoing modernization program, the Soviets continued to possess a significant superiority in the number of deployed INF systems and understandably remained deeply opposed to making the disproportionate reductions that parity in intermediate-range missiles would have entailed. Finally, and most troubling for the British, the Soviets continued to claim that third-party systems must be taken into account in the negotiations.¹³⁶ Although Reagan reassured Thatcher that the U.S. would continue to reject any such proposals, this did not preclude the new General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposing that Britain and the Soviet Union engage in a “direct dialogue” to discuss the “nuclear balance in Europe”.¹³⁷ Nor did it stop Nitze, now Reagan’s special advisor for arms control, suggesting that Britain and France would participate in multilateral talks once the superpowers had made 50 % reductions in their strategic arsenals, a prospect that both Britain and France strenuously opposed.¹³⁸

Only when Gorbachev made successive unilateral concessions were the obstacles to progress in the INF negotiations removed. When he met Reagan for the first time at Geneva, Gorbachev indicated that a separate agreement on INF might be possible.¹³⁹ On January 14, 1986, Gorbachev wrote to Thatcher, in parallel to other Allied leaders, setting out a dramatic proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons within 15 years.¹⁴⁰ Dismissing much of it as propaganda, the British Embassy in Moscow commented that “[t]he most striking feature of Gorbachev’s programme is the apparent acceptance [...] of the original US ‘zero option’ on INF”, albeit only in Europe, not in Asia.¹⁴¹ By making disarmament conditional upon the U.S. renouncing space weapons, the main target of Gorbachev’s dramatic initiative was clearly SDI. However, his proposal also came with the condition that the U.S. would agree not to transfer strategic or medium-range systems to other countries, which “would seem at least to catch the Trident programme”.¹⁴² More positively, Gorbachev appeared to have dropped “demands for compensation for third country systems”, and to have accepted the principle of superpower, rather than bloc, parity.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, in order to maintain a common front against the inclusion of their systems in the negotiations, the

135 TNA, PREM 19/1443, Background Note: INF, undated.

136 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Gorbachev to Reagan, September 12, 1985.

137 TNA, PREM 19/1443, Outcome of Geneva Talks: Soviet View, Budd to Powell, January 16, 1985; TNA, PREM 19/1443, Reagan to Thatcher, January 5, 1985; TNA, PREM 19/1693, Gorbachev to Thatcher, October 12, 1985.

138 TNA, PREM 19/1695, Arms Control: Prime Minister’s Discussion with Ambassador Nitze, Powell to Culshaw, July 23, 1986.

139 Glitman, *The Last Battle*, p. 117.

140 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Gorbachev to Thatcher, January 14, 1986.

141 TNA, PREM 19/1693, My TELNO 057: Gorbachev’s Statement on Arms Control, Moscow to FCO, TELNO 066, January 16, 1986.

142 *Ibid.*

143 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Your TELNO 83, Gorbachev Proposals on Arms Control, Washington to FCO, TELNO 153, January 22, 1986.

British stepped up cooperation with the French, who were, if anything, even more hostile towards Reagan and Gorbachev's shared dream of a world without nuclear weapons than Thatcher was.¹⁴⁴

At the same time, the British continued to work hard to maintain their influence upon American thinking. With the zero option having resurfaced as a serious prospect following Gorbachev's January 1986 disarmament initiative, Thatcher told Nitze that she continued to have "misgivings" about the elimination of INF since "it would call into question the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles as an essential part of the Alliance's spectrum of nuclear deterrents [sic]."¹⁴⁵ Ultimately, Thatcher was reluctant to give up systems that she believed plugged an important gap in NATO's nuclear posture, and that she had expended considerable political capital to deploy. On February 11, 1986, Thatcher wrote to Reagan to share her views on Gorbachev's proposals, and to reiterate her "anxieties about your ideas on INF", namely the President's apparent interest in accepting Gorbachev's proposal for a zero option in Europe as a stepping-stone towards his wider goal of nuclear abolition. She hoped "that our experts can stay closely in touch on this as well as on wider issues."¹⁴⁶ To this end, Howe sent Shultz a 15-page paper that set out the Prime Minister's "own detailed ideas" on how to handle SDI and the negotiations in Geneva.¹⁴⁷ In parallel, Howe wrote to Shultz, expressing his hope that the Americans would "bear in mind our continued preference for an agreement which would take account of the military rationale for the Alliance decision to deploy" INF, i.e. the interim option.¹⁴⁸

Whilst the FRG was "unconditionally in favour" of pursuing the zero option, if need be only in Europe, the other basing nations, France, and Japan shared Thatcher's misgivings.¹⁴⁹ "[T]he strength of Allied and Japanese objections" prompted an intense interagency debate about how best to respond to Gorbachev's proposals for INF.¹⁵⁰ Eventually, the President retreated from his initial decision to accept Gorbachev's proposal of a zero option only in Europe, not in Asia.¹⁵¹ Instead, Reagan reaffirmed his original position that any zero option pursued would need to be on a global basis; failing that, only an interim agreement that preserved some INF in Europe would be possible.¹⁵²

144 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Bilateral Talks on Nuclear Matters, Paris to FCO, TELNO 91, January 24, 1986.

145 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Prime Minister's Meeting with Ambassador Nitze, Powell to Appleyard, February 5, 1986.

146 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Thatcher to Reagan, February 11, 1986.

147 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Howe to Shultz, draft, February 10, 1986.

148 Ibid.

149 TNA, PREM 19/1693, SCG Quint Meeting, 12 February, UKDel NATO to FCO, TELNO 48, February 12, 1986.

150 Ibid.

151 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Reagan to Thatcher, February 22, 1986.

152 Ibid.

Thatcher was reassured by, if not entirely satisfied with, the President’s reversal, the product of what Sir Oliver Wright, the British Ambassador to Washington, described as “[f]or once [...] a genuine consultation exercise.”¹⁵³ However, this episode turned out to be the high watermark of British and Allied influence upon American policy towards the INF negotiations. In a prescient statement a year before, Wright had warned: “[w]hile we can reasonably expect to be kept in close touch with the strategy and tactics and the course of the negotiations as they proceed, we cannot expect that the hand will be necessarily played our way.”¹⁵⁴ Betraying his growing exasperation with the Americans’ handling of the chemical weapons negotiations and their decision no longer to respect the SALT II constraints, in May 1986, Howe advocated taking a more distinctive British approach to arms control, including strengthening cooperation with Britain’s European Allies, and trumpeting the efforts that the British made behind the scenes. Although this approach might not increase British influence over the arms control process, Howe believed that it would help to ensure that Britain received greater credit publicly for the contributions it made, and to make it less vulnerable to the charge of slavishly supporting American policy.¹⁵⁵ Powell and the Prime Minister, however, were quick to dismiss Howe’s suggestion, claiming that “[t]here is nothing to gain from swapping discreet but real influence over the US for hortatory European statements”, particularly when it was the Americans, not the Europeans, who were participating in the arms control negotiations.¹⁵⁶ “The best way to maintain our record”, Powell believed, “is to continue to come forward with practical proposals, even if relatively modest ones, which will nudge arms control negotiations steadily forward.”¹⁵⁷ Although this approach had proven successful to date—none more so than with the interim option—the British government soon experienced its limitations. As the pace of the INF negotiations increased, so the opportunities diminished for the British to inject their thinking privately at an early stage of deliberations in Washington. Likewise, the risk grew that the British might be rudely surprised.

Looking ahead to Reykjavik, Thatcher told Reagan on February 22, 1986 that she believed that Gorbachev would “come to your next Summit without any serious expectation of reaching definitive agreements on the main arms control issues”. Rather, Gorbachev’s purpose might “be to spin out negotiations in the hope of being able to rely on a steadily mounting volume of pressure from

153 TNA, PREM 19/1693, My TELNO 270: Arms Control: US Response to Gorbachev’s 15 January Proposals, Washington to FCO, TELNO 383, February 14, 1986.

154 TNA, PREM 19/1443, My TELNO 24: Shultz/Gromyko Meeting, Washington to FCO, January 7, 1985.

155 TNA, PREM 19/1694, Arms Control and the UK Contribution, Howe to Thatcher, May 16, 1986.

156 TNA, PREM 19/1694, Arms Control, Powell to Thatcher, May 16, 1986.

157 TNA, PREM 19/1694, Arms Control and the UK Contribution, Powell to Galsworthy, May 18, 1986.

Western public opinion to remove the ‘blockage’ represented by the SDI.¹⁵⁸ Instead, Gorbachev arrived in Reykjavik with an even more ambitious set of proposals than his January 1986 disarmament initiative. To Thatcher’s horror, President Reagan came close to agreeing to eliminate all ballistic missiles by the year 2000, and possibly all nuclear weapons within ten years, both of which would have put at risk the future of the British strategic deterrent.¹⁵⁹ Powell declared that the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years would be “devastating militarily and politically. One is tempted to say thank God for the Russians for having turned the proposal down.”¹⁶⁰ The priority, in Powell’s views, was to ensure that “the arms control process slow down, to give time to get the American proposal modified or knocked off the table”. Nonetheless, it was important that the British not “be seen publicly to be blocking or slowing down progress”.¹⁶¹ When Reagan called to discuss the outcome of the Summit, Thatcher told him that he “had performed marvellously”. However:

the President’s proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years caused her considerable concern. Given the great imbalance in conventional forces in Europe in the Soviet Union’s favour, nuclear weapons would remain essential to our defence.¹⁶²

Inadvertently underscoring the different strategic calculations that underlay their thinking, Reagan replied that he did “not believe the conventional balance is so imbalanced.” On a more positive note, Reagan reported that Gorbachev had appeared to accept that British and French nuclear forces could not be included in the INF negotiations, and that “it looked like we had the framework of an INF agreement”.¹⁶³ However, the framework that Reagan described was very similar to the Europe-only zero option that Gorbachev had offered in January, which the British and other Allies had lobbied the Americans so strenuously to reject.

Days before the Reykjavik Summit, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries had been “concerned at the possibility of being placed in the position of being seen to be blocking [...] agreement on low numbers for INF in Europe. This would be

158 TNA, PREM 19/1693, Thatcher to Reagan, February 11, 1986.

159 RRPL, Matlock MSS (Box 92140), Memorandum of Conversation, October 12, 1986, 3:25–6 PM, Hofdi House, Reykjavik, October 14, 1986, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109180> (accessed on March 14, 2020).

160 TNA, PREM 19/1695, Arms Control, Powell to Thatcher, October 14, 1986.

161 *Ibid.*

162 TNA, PREM 19/1759, Prime Minister’s Talk with President Reagan, Powell to Budd, October 13, 1986. The White House record of the conversation (RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File, 8607413, President’s Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher, October 13, 1986) described the elimination of all ballistic missiles as Reagan’s proposals, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons as Gorbachev’s; U.S. accounts of the Summit tell a different story.

163 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File, 8607413, President’s Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher, October 13, 1986.

especially damaging when we originally supported the zero-zero solution, and have supported the US search for equal ceilings at any level.”¹⁶⁴ After Reykjavik, the dilemma facing the British was even starker. “[N]ow that proposals for zero-zero INF in Europe have been tabled publicly and apparently accepted in principle by the US and the Soviet Union,” Powell noted, “it may well be that this is the only INF agreement on offer.”¹⁶⁵ However, Ministers and officials quickly adjusted to the new reality, treating the pursuit of a separate INF agreement—if needs be, eliminating systems only in Europe—as a means of avoiding something much worse. On October 21, George Younger, Heseltine’s successor as Defence Secretary, told Weinberger on the margins of the NPG at Gleneagles: “we could accept the zero solution for INF, but strategic weapons were another matter for us.”¹⁶⁶ The British preference remained for an interim agreement that would preserve “some residual US LRINF deployment in Europe”, especially “if the Russians were to insist on higher Asian SS-20 numbers”.¹⁶⁷ However, Thatcher recognized that “a zero outcome for Europe [...] must in the light of previous public statements be accepted by us if the Russians themselves are ready to accept it.”¹⁶⁸

Despite giving Shultz “unshirted hell” when she visited Washington on November 15, once Thatcher had secured renewed public assurances from Reagan at Camp David about the supply of Trident, and a restatement of the importance he attributed to nuclear deterrence, she reluctantly, if pragmatically, gave her assent to the elimination of all INF in Europe.¹⁶⁹ However, talk of a so-called “double zero” and the elimination of short-range INF as part of a broader agreement threatened to reinvigorate her concerns. On the one hand, a double zero would address the problem of potential Soviet circumvention. On the other, Thatcher feared that a double zero could yet become a triple zero, if the U.S. heeded calls from Chancellor Kohl and other European Allies to make large-scale reductions in NATO’s arsenal of short-range, battlefield nuclear weapons. Having set out to plug a gap in NATO’s “seamless web of deterrence”, Thatcher feared that an INF Treaty could yet result in widening the gap in NATO’s nuclear posture. However, having long publicly endorsed the zero option, the Prime Minister realized that she was not in a position to disavow it, nor to oppose a double zero. Instead, she sought to contain the risks that the two zeros presented. On the one hand, she accepted as a *fait accompli* an INF Treaty that codified a global double zero; on the other, she sought a commitment from President Reagan that NATO

164 TNA, PREM 19/1759, US–Soviet Meeting in Reykjavik: Message to President Reagan, Budd to Powell, October 3, 1986.

165 TNA, PREM 19/1695, Arms Control, Powell to Budd, October 16, 1986.

166 TNA, PREM 19/1759, Secretary of State’s Meeting with Mr Weinberger in the Margin of the NPG at Gleneagles, 21st October: Note for the Record, October 21, 1986.

167 TNA, PREM 19/1759, Your TELNO 1822: Post-Reykjavik Arms Control Discussions, Washington to FCO TELNO 2703, October 23, 1986.

168 TNA, PREM 19/1759, Arms Control: UK/US Exchanges, Powell to Budd, October 23, 1986.

169 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography. Volume Two: Everything She Wants, London 2015, pp. 605–609.

would modernize its remaining theater nuclear forces, and that there would be a renewed focus on conventional arms control. Events came to a head at the Venice G7 Summit on June 8, 1987, when Thatcher and Kohl clashed over dinner about the future of NATO's short-range nuclear forces. Reagan agreed with Kohl that disarmament should not stop with a double zero; however, greater progress was required first in controlling chemical weapons and conventional arms before a third zero could be entertained.¹⁷⁰ With that the path to an INF agreement lay open.

Shortly before the Washington Summit, at which Reagan and Gorbachev were to sign the INF Treaty, Powell wrote to Thatcher worried that Gorbachev's "willingness to stay longer in Washington if there were good prospects of reaching agreement on strategic nuclear weapons" risked "a replay of Reykjavik."¹⁷¹ Ultimately, British concerns about the direction of U.S.–Soviet arms control proved overblown. Although it was undoubtedly a singular achievement that unlocked progress in other areas of East-West relations, in terms of nuclear arms control the INF Treaty proved something of a swansong for the Reagan Administration. As Reagan entered his final year in office, the impetus behind the arms control process began to slow, much to Thatcher's relief.

6. Conclusion

The Germans were right to observe that, as a nuclear power, Britain had "special interests" when it came to INF,¹⁷² none more special than Britain's interest in preserving an independent strategic deterrent. Britain's approach towards the zero option was guided by its three overarching objectives for Dual-Track: to maintain Allied cohesion; to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture; and, above all, to ensure that the UK's nuclear capabilities remained outside any arms control negotiations. Britain played a leading role in encouraging the Reagan Administration to begin negotiations, in order to shore up European support for deployment. British officials tried to persuade the Americans to adopt zero plus, leaving open the possibility that some NATO INF would be preserved by an interim agreement. However, the British were caught out by the Pentagon's surprise embrace of the strict zero-only option, and Haig's clumsy politicking. In order to hold together a fraying Alliance and to repay American support for the exclusion of the British deterrent, Britain portrayed itself publicly as a resolute supporter of an Allied negotiating position about which it privately held deep

170 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher. *The Authorized Biography. Volume Three: Herself Alone*, London 2019, pp. 162–164.

171 TNA, PREM 19/2172, United States/Soviet Summit, Powell to Thatcher, November 27, 1987.

172 Pfeffer, German Veto of Nuclear Use from Federal German Territory, February 2, 1983, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1983*, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Munich 2014, Doc. 31, p. 156.

reservations, and which Thatcher hoped that “the Soviets would never accept”.¹⁷³ Outwardly, Britain displayed instinctive Atlanticism, placing Allied consensus first, burying its private misgivings, and professing loyal support. However, the British were also motivated by self-interest. Supporting the zero option would help to preserve British influence in Washington, and thus protect Britain’s preeminent national interest in the INF negotiations: the continued exclusion from the arms control process of Britain’s independent strategic deterrent.

Despite growing pressure from the European Allies, the peace movement, and the U.S. Congress, American and British officials initially resisted calls for an interim option in the absence of compelling evidence that the Soviets were prepared to make meaningful concessions of their own. Nonetheless, Britain continued to regard the zero option as fundamentally un-negotiable, and feared that events might force NATO into an ill-considered move unless preparations were made first. To that end, the British proposed collaborating with the Americans on contingency plans for the inevitable shift in NATO’s negotiating position towards an interim option.

Apart from a handful of routine exchanges at a ministerial level, in 1981–82 British engagement with the Americans on INF was conducted by officials. Although she had her misgivings, Thatcher did not confront Reagan about the zero option until much later. She was not above confrontation, as the Soviet gas pipeline episode showed; however, she learned of Reagan’s decision to adopt the zero option too late for her to effect a reversal. British officials had not raised the matter with the Prime Minister sooner, in the mistaken belief that Reagan had decided in favor of zero plus. Nevertheless, had British officials learned of Reagan’s decision in time, it is doubtful that they would have encouraged Thatcher to intervene. Given the limited prospects of the INF negotiations, the question of the U.S. negotiating position was simply not important enough to risk jeopardizing Allied unity, expending political capital, or squandering Britain’s reputation for reliability. Ultimately, the probability that the Soviets would accept the zero option seemed remote in 1981–82, and the UK had already secured its key objective: American support for the exclusion of the British deterrent from the negotiations.

From 1983 onwards, Thatcher played a much more active role in the INF negotiations. First, in March 1983, she lobbied Reagan to pursue an interim option. Later, after Reykjavik, she urged the President to back away from his proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, and to focus instead upon achieving an INF agreement. In both cases, whilst the majority of Anglo-American engagement continued to be conducted by officials, the balance of interests had shifted towards prompt and direct Prime Ministerial intervention. In early 1983, Thatcher judged that it was essential for the U.S. to make a swift move in its negotiating position lest European public support for deployment be lost. Only by having adopted an interim option would the European public blame

173 Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 472.

the Soviets, and not the exclusion of British and French nuclear forces, for the continuing stalemate in the negotiations.

When in early 1986 the zero option returned as a serious prospect, Thatcher continued to have serious misgivings about this outcome. However, these paled by comparison with her concerns about President Reagan's proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, which put at risk the future of the UK's strategic deterrent. With such fundamental interests at stake, Thatcher concluded that only her swift personal intervention with Reagan could avert catastrophe. Not even (or perhaps especially not) her Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, could be trusted with such a delicate mission. Ultimately, while she continued to harbor concerns about the impact it would have on NATO's deterrence posture, Thatcher viewed the zero option as the lesser evil, especially when compared to nuclear abolition. That she was successful in persuading Reagan to focus his attention on pursuing an INF agreement, and to park loftier ambitions only reinforced Thatcher's belief that her intervention had been critical.¹⁷⁴

Nonetheless, the INF Treaty, and the Allied consultations that contributed to it, illustrate the limits as much as the extent of British influence upon American arms control policy. Ultimately, the British could live with the INF Treaty in the very different political climate presented by renewed East/West détente. However, the elimination of INF was at odds with Britain's primary objective at the time of the Dual-Track Decision, namely the strengthening of NATO's deterrence posture. Furthermore, the negotiating process had highlighted Britain's critical dependency upon the U.S. for the continued viability of its independent deterrent. Nonetheless, by refraining from airing their concerns publicly, and instead working with the Americans behind closed doors, the British had remained a staunch Ally, providing loyal, but not uncritical support to the Americans. Indeed, according to Chris Patten, then a junior Conservative minister, staunch was Thatcher's "favourite word", and the quality that she most prized in herself and others.¹⁷⁵ Despite narrowly avoiding catastrophe at Reykjavik, and ultimately having to acquiesce to the zero option, the British approach paid off. With the signing of the INF Treaty, Thatcher and her government had succeeded in protecting their most vital national interest—the exclusion of British nuclear forces from the arms control process—whilst helping to hold together the fragile North Atlantic Alliance, and to bring the Euromissile Crisis to a close.

174 *Ibid.*, p. 473.

175 Moore, Thatcher, Vol 3, p. 767.

Tim Geiger

Controversies Over the Double Zero Option

The Kohl–Genscher Government and the INF Treaty

With the benefit of hindsight, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) claimed that NATO's "Dual-Track Decision was the most important decision [made] on the way to German unification." Kohl counted its implementation, against the protests of the peace movement and all the diplomatic pressure from the East, amongst his greatest political successes.¹

One might assume that the prospect of the destruction and removal of hundreds of deadly nuclear weapons by a superpower agreement like the INF Treaty of December 6, 1987 would cause enthusiasm in a divided country that had the highest proportion of weapons of mass destruction worldwide on its soil. However, the opposite happened. The looming of an INF Treaty caused a serious rift in West Germany's government and threatened to tear its Christian-Liberal coalition apart. This chapter tries to explain this paradox. It also shows that some patterns and practices in the struggle for the INF Treaty were repeated in 1989/90 during the course of German unification.

The article starts with a policy analysis, looking at the attitudes of the various West German parties towards nuclear rearmament (*Nachrüstung*) up to 1986, and how they regarded the zero option. In a second step, it scrutinizes the controversy about the double zero option of spring 1987. The third part deals with the debate that followed in the summer of 1987 concerning the proposed inclusion of the 72 German Pershing IA missiles in an INF agreement.

1. West German Parties, the Zero Option and Rearmament, 1977–1986

The Kohl-Genscher government (1982–1992) owed its life to controversy about the implementation of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, though it was Chancellor Helmut Kohl's predecessor, Helmut Schmidt from the rival SPD, who had been one of the driving forces for that decision in the first place.² As early as 1977, in his

1 Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1930–1982*, Munich 2004, p. 557; Helmut Kohl, Mauerfall und Wiedervereinigung, in: *Die Politische Meinung* 54/479 (2009), pp. 5–12, here p. 9.

2 Tim Geiger, *Die Regierung Schmidt–Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011, pp. 95–122; Tim Geiger, *The NATO Double-Track Decision: Genesis and*

famous speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Schmidt had warned that, with an imminent SALT II agreement coming up, NATO's spiral of escalation was at risk, due to a strong Soviet arms buildup with intermediate nuclear weapons. The infamous SS-20 missiles were a particular menace, as they threatened most Western European countries, but not NATO's leading member, the United States. Doubts about the reliability of the United States' extended deterrence were therefore growing and also strong awareness of the danger of a "decoupling" of the American nuclear umbrella for its European allies.

NATO's Dual-Track Decision of December 12, 1979 announced that this danger could be countered by the deployment of 108 American Pershing II missiles (replacing the same number of the older Pershing IAs) and 464 ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in Western Europe at the end of 1983, should disarmament talks between the U.S. and the USSR fail.

In West Germany (where all the Pershing IIs and a share of 64 GLCMs were to be deployed), the CDU and CSU opposition parties wholeheartedly supported this modernization of NATO's nuclear arsenal. These parties believed, even more strongly than the SPD/FDP government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that the Pershing II especially—a ballistic missile with a range of 1,800 km and a short flight-time of only 15 to 20 minutes—would improve deterrence. For the first time ever, the Soviet Union itself was directly threatened by these nuclear missiles, which would be fired from West German territory in case of a Warsaw Pact attack. Thus, in a future war the USSR would no longer remain a "sanctuary" but would become a nuclear battlefield right from the beginning—just as Germany was. According to the logics of deterrence it was this abhorrent danger that reduced the risk of any war and kept the fragile peace alive.

Within the SPD/FDP coalition government, NATO's Dual-Track Decision was much more controversial. Especially in the SPD there was resentment against Schmidt's course, because *détente* had been central to the party's identity ever since Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Many Social Democrats feared a new Cold War and a deadly arms race.³ The struggle over implementing NATO's Dual-Track

Implementation, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*. New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 52–69; Klaus Wiegrefe, *Das Zerwürfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen*, Berlin 2005; Kristina Spohr, *NATO's Nuclear Politics and the Schmidt-Carter Rift*, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Stanford 2015, pp. 139–157.

3 Jan Hansen, *Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977–1987)*, Munich 2016; Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, *Did Protest Matter? The Influence of the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 1977–1983*, in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, and the Cold War of the 1980s*, Cambridge 2017, pp. 290–315; Anton Notz, *Die SPD und der NATO-Doppelbeschuß. Abkehr von einer Sicherheitspolitik der Vernunft*, Baden-Baden 1990.

Decision eroded the domestic base of the Schmidt–Genscher government. The peace movement became a mass phenomenon in West Germany from late 1980. Its adherents tried hard to prevent the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe by mass demonstrations and spectacular actions of civil disobedience. It was a movement that reached far into the ranks of both the SPD and the FDP. Schmidt and Genscher tried to counter this challenge with a carrot-and-stick policy. On the one hand, they hoped to exercise discipline over their parties by threatening to resign; on the other, they tried to take the wind out of the peace protesters' sails by pushing for a "zero option" as the Western negotiation target in the superpowers' INF disarmament talks, scheduled for autumn 1981 in Geneva. By the terms of such a "zero option," if the USSR would remove all of its (existing and future) SS-20s and other ground-launched INF forces, NATO, in return, would refrain from deploying any new Pershing IIs or GLCMs.⁴

The Schmidt-Genscher government lobbied for this approach right through 1981. It lobbied the new Reagan Administration,⁵ its rather hesitant European NATO partners,⁶ and the Soviet leadership as well. During Leonid Brezhnev's last visit to Bonn in November 1981, just a week before the opening of the Geneva talks on November 30, it urged the Soviet side to take the zero option seriously, especially as, on November 18, President Ronald Reagan had publicly endorsed it as the official American negotiating position.⁷ To the public, the Schmidt–Genscher government presented itself as one of the driving forces of this proposal.⁸

However, Moscow resolutely rejected the zero option. It would not only mean an end to further SS-20 deployment but also the radical elimination of the vast Soviet nuclear superiority in the medium-range scale—and all this merely in exchange for the elimination of far fewer American INF missiles. These proposed missiles did indeed worry the USSR a lot, but they had not even been deployed in Western Europe yet, and Moscow hoped that the ever-rising resistance from peace movements all across Western Europe would prevent them from ever arriving.

4 Marilena Gala, *The Euromissile Crisis and the Centrality of the 'Zero Option'*, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 158–175.

5 Conversation Genscher with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, September 14, 1981, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1981*, ed. by Daniela Taschler, Matthias Peter, and Judith Michel, Munich 2011, Doc. 356, p. 1368.

6 Conversation between Genscher and his British and French colleagues Lord Carrington and Cheysson in Chevening, July 5, 1981, in: *AAPD 1981*, Doc. 205, p. 1111; conversation Genscher with Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, July 17, 1981, in: *ibid.*, Doc. 211, p. 1149. For the British skeptical approach see the essay by Oliver Barton in this volume.

7 For the conversations of Schmidt-Brezhnev and Genscher-Gromyko on November 23/24, 1981 see *AAPD 1981*, Docs. 334–341; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1995, p. 424.

8 In German Television's Late Night News on November 17, 1981, Schmidt claimed that the zero option was "a chance for negotiations that the Americans adopted after long talks with us." See Memorandum Paschke, February 11, 1983, in: Political Archive of the Foreign Office (*Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts: PA/AA*), Berlin, B 9/178493.

Within the German peace movement, many people also rejected a zero solution.⁹ They judged that it would be absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and therefore feared that such an approach would immediately cause a deadlock in the Geneva disarmament talks. Proponents of arms control within the State Department had the same worries, too. By contrast, the anti-Soviet “hawks” of the Reagan Administration, gathered around Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, *supported* a zero option for exactly the same reason.¹⁰ In the end, in 1981, it was a weird coalition of the social-liberal Federal Government and arms control opponents in the Reagan Administration that helped to enforce the zero option as the significant formula that became central to the INF Treaty of 1987.

Initially, the German opposition parties—the CDU and the CSU—were clearly against the zero option. Manfred Wörner, the defense expert in the CDU/CSU parliamentary grouping, and Franz Josef Strauß, Chairman of the CSU and Minister President of Bavaria (who as Defense Minister from 1956 to 1961 had pushed for nuclear armament of the *Bundeswehr* and who had been the Union’s Chancellor-candidate in the Federal elections of 1980) attacked the zero option as a chimera. They regarded it as the wishful thinking of those in the SPD/FDP government who were trying to duck away from the necessity of modernizing the West’s nuclear arsenal (which NATO had been urging since the mid-1970s, irrespectively of the Soviet SS-20 threat). However, once Reagan had endorsed the zero option, the CDU/CSU soon changed their tune. Following the American lead, Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU and of the CDU/CSU grouping in the Bundestag, officially embraced the zero option and argued for the party’s slogan “Make peace with fewer weapons.”¹¹

In autumn 1982 the social-liberal government broke down—in part because an ever-growing number of people within the SPD were resisting Schmidt’s allegiance to the Dual-Track Decision and opted to support the peace movement. Unshaken by all public protests, the newly-formed Christian-Liberal coalition under Kohl’s Chancellorship promised to stick to West Germany’s obligation to accept NATO’s Dual-Track. Kohl left no doubt whatsoever that he would give the highest priority to solidarity within the Western Alliance, and that he was determined to act in close collaboration with the United States. On his first visit to Washington as Chancellor, Kohl even overturned one of the key planks of Bonn’s foreign policy—the axiom of German “non-singularization” concerning re-armament.¹² In his talks with Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Kohl reaffirmed that his government would stick to the promised deployment

9 Memorandum of Ambassador Ruth about meeting with Erhard Eppler, the exponent of the peace movement within the SPD, August 18, 1981, in: AAPD 1981, Doc. 235, p. 1240.

10 See the essay by Ronald Granieri in this volume.

11 Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung. Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970–1987*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1988, pp. 103 f.

12 Geiger, *Regierung Schmidt-Genscher*, pp. 102, 112.

of American INFs even in a worst-case scenario in which all other Europeans “would quit.”¹³ That concession took even long-experienced staff members of the Federal Chancellery by surprise.¹⁴

Neglecting all strong anti-nuclear protests, Kohl stood firm to his NATO allegiance and took responsibility for the deployment of the Euromissiles in 1983. This earned him an impeccable reputation as a trustworthy ally whom Washington could unconditionally rely on—a reputation that remained for years to come.¹⁵

A central episode that helped build this rapport was one that took place in June 1983, at the climax of anti-nuclear peace protests in West Germany. In that month, Kohl and U.S. Vice President George H. W. Bush met in Krefeld to celebrate the tercentenary of “the first German immigrants in the U. S. A.,” who had come from this town in the lower Rhineland. Krefeld was also the place where, three years previously on November 15/16, 1980, the *Krefelder Appell* had been adopted. This manifesto demanded that the Federal Government should withdraw its pledge to deploy American INF missiles and henceforward should pursue a policy that no longer risked paving the way to a nuclear arms race—which would endanger Europeans first and foremost. Although the manifesto somewhat lopsidedly blamed the West and was obviously inspired by communists, it was (initially) endorsed by prominent figures like Petra Kelly and the former *Bundeswehr* General Gert Bastian, two prominent figures in the burgeoning Green Party. By 1983, more than four million Germans had signed the *Krefelder Appell*, which thus became one of the most influential *pronunciamentos* of the peace movement.¹⁶

Not surprisingly, peace activists took a meeting of two such staunch proponents of rearmament in this very town as a provocation. On June 25, 1983, the occasion at the Krefeld venue was massively disrupted. During the ceremonial act, the lights went off when protesters cut off the electricity; afterwards Bush and Kohl were trapped for several minutes in an underground garage; and in the

13 Telegram No. 4933 of Ambassador Hermes, Washington, November 15, 1982, in: AAPD 1982, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski, and Judith Michel, Munich 2013, Doc. 306, p. 1599; Telegram No. 3061 of Political Director Pfeffer November 16, 1982 in: *ibid.*, Doc. 309, p. 1611.

14 Ulrich Weisser, *Strategie als Berufung. Gedanken und Erinnerungen zwischen Militär und Politik*, Bonn 2011, p. 85. Weisser was head of the Bureau for Security Policy in the Federal Chancellery under Schmidt and Kohl.

15 Andreas Rödder, *Bündnissolidarität und Rüstungskontrollpolitik. Die Regierung Kohl-Genscher, der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Innenseite der Außenpolitik*, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.): *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, pp. 123–136.

16 Erklärung des Krefelder Forums vom 15./16. November 1980, in: 100(0) Schlüsseldokumente zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0023_kre&object=translation&l=de; Rudolf van Hüllen, *Der ‘Krefelder Appell’*, in: Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke (eds.), *Raketenspoker um Europa. Das sowjetische SS 20-Abenteuer und die Friedensbewegung*, Munich 2011, pp. 216–253; Becker-Schaum et. al (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, p. 19 f., 190 f.

streets their motorcade was violently attacked. Bush played it cool and quipped, "It's like in Chicago. Some cheer us, some throw stones—here and there." But Kohl was upset about the Public Relations disaster and blamed the SPD government of North Rhine-Westphalia who had been in charge of the police, accusing them of mishandling the affair.¹⁷

In the long run, however, the Krefeld incident proved to be a milestone in building trust between Bush and Kohl. Their close relationship turned out to be of enormous importance—especially in 1989/90. Despite massive international reservations about German unification, Bush and his Administration trusted Kohl and his pledge to keep a united Germany firmly within the West. In the short run, Krefeld underpinned the American perception that the German Chancellor was absolutely loyal, but domestically bitterly embattled. As Bush signaled to Reagan: "While keeping absolutely firm on our schedule, we must be sympathetic to Kohl's problems and do all we can to ease his way through them."¹⁸

Part of that strategy emerged at the Geneva talks. There, in March, September, and November 1983, the U.S. offered different kinds of "interim solutions". This move ensured that the zero option was not killed off, but signaled to the global public that Washington was ready to compromise. In order to achieve some success in pursuing disarmament, it would not stick to a take-it-or-leave-it position. This was of enormous importance to West European governments, who were fighting for their publics' hearts and minds against the persuasions of the peace protesters. For exactly this reason the Kohl-Genscher government had been lobbying in Washington for just such an interim solution.¹⁹

On November 22, 1983 there was a heated 23-hour debate in the Bundestag. With its parliamentary majority the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition reaffirmed the need to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. These new American missiles were required, it was claimed, because the Geneva disarmament talks had not delivered any viable results. Only a few hours later, the first Pershing IIs were brought in; and the next day the Soviets left the Geneva talks.²⁰ After that, the bitter domestic debate about rearmament gradually ebbed away, although the actual deployment went on for at least two further years.²¹

17 Wie in Chicago, in: *Der Spiegel* Nr. 27, July 4, 1983, p. 32; conversation of Kohl with Bush in Krefeld, June 25, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Munich 2014, Doc. 189, pp. 983–987; Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 192–194.

18 Letter Bush to Reagan, June 27, 1983, in: George H. W. Bush, *All the Best*, George Bush. My Life in Letters and other Writings, New York 2013, p. 328.

19 Conversation Genscher with Bush, January 31, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc. 27; Telegram No. 1729 of Ambassador Ruth to Genscher, March 23, in: *ibid.*, Doc. 75; Letters of Kohl to Reagan, September 15, November 3; AAPD 1983, Doc. 267 and 326, pp. 1338–1340 and 1623f.

20 Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition. American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, Washington D. C. 1994, p. 566.

21 At the end of 1984, there were still 54 out of 108 Pershing IIs deployed in West Germany. After an incident with a Pershing II in Heilbronn in January 1985, deployment was disrupted for some months, Memorandum of Political Director Pfeffer, May, 6, 1985, in: AAPD 1985,

By that time significant changes within the Christian-Liberal coalition had taken place. Up to 1982, within the (former) coalition with the détente orientated SPD the tiny Liberal Party had made its name by advocating close transatlantic relations and the strengthening of NATO. But that approach became much more difficult to uphold after 1982, because of the ostentatious closeness of Chancellor Kohl to the U.S. Administration and the almost unconditional pro-American bias of the CDU/CSU generally. Hence, with its front-runner Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FDP started to distinguish itself in the coalition by demonstratively upholding *Ostpolitik* and détente, and by paying special deference to the USSR and its satellites. So Genscher (who was personally not at all close to the new American Secretary of State George Shultz and had to make a great effort to achieve a working relationship with him)²² remained very skeptical towards Reagan's SDI project. The German Foreign Minister did not believe that any Strategic Defense Initiative was realistic, but did believe that the project could endanger the fragile balance of power between East and West.²³ To the American Ambassador in Bonn, Richard Burt, and to many others in Washington "tricky Genscher" (who always had a loophole at hand) was primarily a "slippery man" whom one couldn't rely on: "Genscherism" became a pejorative term in Washington.²⁴

Nevertheless, the political situation in West Germany seemed quite stable up to the mid-1980s. In many ways, the party lines resembled those of the 1950s. As in the past, the CDU and CSU presented themselves as staunch defenders of close ties with the West and as close friends with the U.S.A. They got on well with France, too, because in January 1983, just weeks before the snap elections in the FRG, President François Mitterrand, a Socialist, had ardently endorsed the deployment of Euromissiles in the Bundestag—thus backing Kohl against the SPD.²⁵ And, as before, the Union attacked the opposition parties—the SPD

ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, Berlin 2016, Doc. 116, pp. 583 f. In the fall of 1986 the deployment of all Pershing IIs was completed, the finalization of GLCMs' deployment in Wüschheim was scheduled for December, Memo of VLR Bertram, September 19, 1986, in: PA/AA, B 150/651.

22 Dietrich von Kyaw, *Auf der Suche nach Deutschland. Erlebnisse und Begegnungen eines deutschen Diplomaten und Europäers*, Berlin 2012, p. 213. In November 1984, Genscher sent Shultz a personal note to protest against the German Foreign Office being too often sidelined by the Reagan Administration, Telegram No. 4879 of Ambassador van Well, in: AAPD 1984, ed. by Tim Szatkowski and Daniela Taschler, Munich 2015, Doc. 303, p. 1412.

23 Andreas Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1982–1990*, Munich 2006, pp. 501 f.; Stefan Fröhlich, "Auf den Kanzler kommt es an": Helmut Kohl und die deutsche Außenpolitik. Persönliches Regiment und Regierungshandeln vom Amtsantritt bis zur Wiedervereinigung, Paderborn/Munich/Vienna 2001, pp. 151–153.

24 When Burt's "slippery man" quote was published (SDI: Beinbruch mit Kukident, in: Spiegel Nr. 3, January 13, 1986), the Ambassador disclaimed it in a letter to Genscher, January 14, 1986, PA/AA, B 1/178925.

25 Georges-Henri Soutou, *Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.): *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, pp. 373 f. See also Christian Wenkel's essay in this volume.

and even more the new Green Party—for being soft on Communism and naïvely leaning towards neutralism.

The situation became blurred when the Geneva talks between the superpowers were resumed in March 1985. The delegates were now discussing three interconnected but segregated tables: on strategic weapons (START), on INF, and on Defense and Space Weapons. Moreover, the new strong man of the USSR, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, had started flooding the West with disarmament proposals.

Soon, one of the crucial points became the question of how profound and serious the change in Soviet policy really was. For the German Federal Government, that question was especially tricky because, even under Gorbachev, Moscow was still pursuing its course of “punishment” against Bonn. After the deployment of Pershing IIs, the USSR ostentatiously sidelined West Germany and courted other powers in Western Europe, especially Mitterrand’s France and Thatcher’s Great Britain. Bonn was ignored.²⁶ This did not stop Moscow having contacts with the SPD opposition, however. Its Chairman, Brandt, was received in the Kremlin only two months after Gorbachev had seized power.²⁷ And the stand-off only affected the Liberal Foreign Minister to a degree: Genscher kept on meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko. Both men were the longest-serving Foreign Ministers around, and they had become used to each other.²⁸ Later on, Genscher also met with Eduard Shevardnadze, and, on July 21, 1986, he was received by Gorbachev himself.²⁹ Meanwhile, Chancellor Kohl was constantly vilified as Reagan’s poodle—just as he had been at his first, very confrontative meeting with Gorbachev on March 14, 1985 at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko in Moscow.³⁰ The Soviet leadership demonstratively ignored Kohl and snubbed his repeated invitations to them to visit West Germany.³¹

26 Memo of Political Director von Braunmühl, March 6, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Doc. 55; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, pp. 451–457.

27 Conversation of Gorbachev with Brandt, May 27, 1985, in: Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe, Vol. 10: Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehungen und die deutsche Frage 1982–1992, Bonn 2009, Doc. 20, pp. 219–229. SPD Foreign and Security expert Egon Bahr also kept on meeting with his Soviet partners.

28 Gromyko had been in office since 1963, Genscher since 1974. In a last-minute bid for a breakthrough in the ailing Geneva disarmament talks, just five weeks before the arrival of new American INF in Europe, Genscher and Gromyko had met on October 15/16, 1983 in Vienna for talks that lasted over 11 hours. AAPD 1983, Docs. 303–306, 310, Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 431–433.

29 Telegram No. 3 of von Braunmühl from Moscow, July 22, 1986 concerning conversation between Gorbachev and Genscher on July 21, in: AAPD 1986, ed. by Matthias Peter and Daniela Taschler, Berlin 2017, Doc. 209; Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 490–508; Julij A. Kwizinskiy, Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten, Berlin 1993, pp. 408–412.

30 Telegram No. 813 of Ambassador Kastl, Moscow, to AA, March 15, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Doc. 68. Staatssekretär Meyer-Landrut characterized the meeting as “unusually sharp” and “no fun”, *ibid.*, Fn. 24, p. 381. See also Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, Berlin 1992, p. 702.

31 Letter Kohl to Gorbachev, August 30, 1985, in: AAPD 1985. Neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze were ready to receive this letter that had to be handed over to the Deputy Foreign

Kohl's frustration may have played a role when, only two weeks after the spectacular summit of Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik on October 11/12, 1986, with its near breakthrough to total nuclear disarmament,³² the Chancellor gave his infamous *Newsweek* interview. Asked how he would judge Gorbachev and his intentions, Kohl replied: "I'm not a fool: I don't consider him to be a liberal. He is a modern communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels, one of those responsible for the crimes of the Hitler era, was an expert in public relations, too."³³ This clumsy comparison of the Soviet leader with the Nazi Minister of Propaganda brought bilateral relations to a freeze. For most of the West German media, the blunder was perfectly in line with the image they almost uniformly projected onto Kohl already—the "bumpkin" politician.

It was Foreign Minister Genscher and his Liberal party that profited. In the Federal elections in January 1987, the Christian-Liberal coalition was re-elected, but the FDP gained in strength while the CDU and CSU lost votes. Genscher made the best use of the momentum. In a bold speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, he passionately asked the West "to take Gorbachev at his word." According to Genscher, it was obvious that real change was taking place within the USSR. The West should no longer sit and wait wondering what this might mean for East–West relations. Rather, it should cooperate, and thereby force Gorbachev to prove that he meant business with his new cooperative style.³⁴ With this appeal, the Foreign Minister was striking out on a notably different line from the Chancellor and his coalition partner;³⁵ indeed, he was going further than any other Western politician. International reception of Genscher's trail-blazing speech was quite mixed: in Moscow, it augmented his credibility; in the West, it stirred further reservations about "Genscherism."³⁶

Minister, *ibid.*, Doc. 246. Gorbachev's reply in October completely ignored the invitation, *ibid.*, Doc. 300. Thus, Kohl repeated it in his next letter of January 30, 1986, AAPD 1986, Doc. 27.

32 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 203, The Reykjavik File. Previously Secret Documents from U.S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, <https://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm>.

33 Kohl to Reagan: 'Ron, Be Patient', in: *Newsweek* No. 43, October 27, 1986, p. 20.

34 Genscher's speech of February 1, 1987, in: *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, ed. by the Presse- und Informationsamt, Bonn 1987, pp. 93–97.

35 A week after Genscher's Davos speech, CSU Chairman Strauß reiterated doubts about Gorbachev's trustworthiness in an article for the CSU's Party paper. A real litmus test for Soviet sincerity would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan. See Franz Josef Strauß, *Auftrag für die Zukunft. Beiträge zur deutschen und internationalen Politik 1985–1987*, Munich 1987, pp. 489–496.

36 Telegram No. 1793 of Ambassador Günter van Well, Washington, April 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, ed. by Tim Szatkowski, Tim Geiger, and Jens Jost Hofmann, Berlin 2018, Doc. 114, p. 572. Konrad Seitz, head of the AA's planning department and ghost-writer of the Davos speech, recalls that in NATO's "Atlantic Policy Advisory Group", Genscher was criticized for going too far; see Matthias Peter, *Geplante Außenpolitik? Der Planungsstab des Auswärtigen Amtes*, in: Elke Seefried and Dierk Hoffmann (eds.), *Plan und Planung. Deutsch-deutsche Vorgriffe auf die Zukunft*, Berlin/Boston 2018, p. 176. Conservative French Foreign Minister

2. The Controversy Over the Double Zero Solution, November 1986–June 1987

When a real prospect of an INF Treaty being agreed emerged in spring 1987, there was bound to be trouble within West Germany's government. On February 28, Gorbachev announced that Moscow would finally accept a decoupling of the INF talks from the still controversial START and SDI issues in Geneva.³⁷

Since Reykjavik, the main features of such an INF agreement that the superpowers consented to were that all (ground-launched) long-range INF (LRINF) in Europe with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km should be completely abolished, but that both superpowers could keep an equal maximum of 100 nuclear warheads in their own territory. In practice, then, the USSR could keep 33 SS-20s (with three warheads on one carrier) in its Asian part east of the Urals, and the U.S. 100 GLCMs (with one nuclear warhead per carrier) in Alaska.³⁸ So this was not yet a real global LRINF zero solution but a purely *European* zero; and it meant that West Germany (like most of Western Europe) was still within reach of the remaining, very mobile Soviet LRINF missiles,³⁹ even though these might be principally intended as weapons against China. It is worth keeping in mind that it was not until July 21, 1987 that Gorbachev changed tack by completely abolishing this remaining stock of 100 permitted warheads. It was at this moment that he agreed to a real *global* zero.

The debate that flared up in West Germany revealed the fundamental inconsistencies and paradoxes of Bonn's security policy. Up to this time, the Germans had been worried because of the arms race: they feared the nuclear buildup and thought that the superpowers had not talked enough or been sufficiently effective in dealings with each other. But now, with a Soviet–U.S. rapprochement and the looming chance of real disarmament, the Germans were no less concerned. After some serious trouble within the coalition and contingency meetings with Genscher, Kohl announced the government's position on November 6, 1986 in the Bundestag. The government, he said, would support any LRINF zero option (preferably a global one, but a European one could be accepted); it would also support compulsory concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF (SRINF), with ranges between 500 und 1,000 km, which should in time be cut down to a lower equal level on both sides, but not to zero.⁴⁰ This announcement did not pacify the situation.

Jean-Bernard Raimond claimed France would check Gorbachev's policy with "double alertness": on the one hand, thoroughly registering any improvements, on the other, not giving concessions for mere non-committal promises. See conversation of Genscher and Raimond in Paris, February 6, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 25, p. 118.

37 Telegram No. 625 of Gesandter Arnot, Moskow, March 1, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 60.

38 Memo of Ambassador Ruth, October 14, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 284.

39 Memo of Political Director von Richthofen, May 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 142.

40 Wirsching, Abschied, p. 567.

It was largely the prospect of the Soviet proposal thought likely to follow—a demand for a second zero option for SRINF—that stoked the debate to red heat. And this was well before Moscow proposed exactly that to Secretary Shultz during his visit on April 13–15, 1987. As the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington, detected during a visit to Bonn, a double zero option was an absolute dogma for Foreign Minister Genscher, while Chancellor Kohl showed sympathy for a solution leaving a remnant of SRINF but with a lowered ceiling, as was also favored by the influential U.S. Senator Sam Nunn.⁴¹ If we remember the differing involvements both German politicians had had with the genesis of the zero idea in 1981, that fact is hardly surprising. For the Christian-Liberal coalition government, however, it created an explosive situation because, just like the opposition parties, Genscher and the FDP demanded a double zero solution. They pointed out that the Soviets had a vast superiority in the SRINF area and therefore would have to destroy many more nukes than NATO. Moreover, even though NATO had only demanded a *LRINF zero* and concurrent constraints for SRINF missiles,⁴² they argued that an unrestricted zero option was what the West had been demanding for years; so it seemed a mere matter of trustworthiness to remove as many nukes as possible in the present (a sentiment that was popular amongst the public, too). Last but not least, a double zero option was clearly the approach that the Reagan Administration favored.

At the debriefing of his Moscow talks at NATO's Ministerial Council, Shultz made it clear that the only alternative to the rejection of a global SRINF zero solution would be a modernization of NATO's SRINF arsenal.⁴³ It remained unclear how this could happen militarily. The most likely option was to convert the Pershing II into a new "Pershing IB" missile by eliminating the second propulsion stage and thus transforming it from an LRINF into a SRINF system. But that would be highly problematic politically: it would not really remove the controversial Pershing II from German soil but leave it in place, merely downgraded technically. Moreover, such a conversion would completely contradict all former promises of the Federal Government. In the past, both the Eastern bloc and the peace movement had attacked the fast-flying Pershing IIs as dangerous "decapitation weapons" against the Soviet leadership, and the Federal Government had always repudiated this allegation by pointing to their limited range of just 1,800 to 2,000 km: they could never reach the Soviet capital.⁴⁴ If it

41 Conversation of Kohl with Lord Carrington in Bonn, March 26, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 83, p. 400.

42 Memo of AA's Head of Disarmament Unit, Holik, March 31, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 90; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 559–563.

43 Telegram No. 521–523 of Ambassador Hansen, NATO, April 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 115.

44 That was constantly repeated in all official information booklets, e.g. *Auswärtiges Amt* (ed.), *Es geht um unsere Sicherheit. Bündnis, Verteidigung, Rüstungskontrolle*, Bonn 1980; *Aspekte der Friedenspolitik: Argumente zum Doppelbeschluss des Nordatlantischen Bündnisses*, ed. by the Federal Government, Bonn 1981.

was now declared possible to simply downgrade the missiles' range, that would confirm the argument of the other side that an upgrade could be done just as easily. The Federal Government therefore rejected, point-blank, any plans for a Pershing II conversion.⁴⁵ By pointing to the alternative prospect of an inevitable SRINF modernization, Shultz greatly increased the pressure on Europeans, and especially Bonn, to accept an INF double zero solution.

In a strange reversal of the previous political frontlines, it was now the CDU and CSU who were in disagreement with the United States. Attacking Genscher's embrace of the double zero solution, Alfred Dregger, Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, complained that the Foreign Minister should be pursuing German, not American, interests.⁴⁶ Dregger belonged to the so-called "steel helmet faction" within the Union—a small, but rather vociferous group of right-wing traditionalist politicians like Strauß, Dregger and the CDU defense expert Jürgen Todenhöfer, staunch anti-Communists who often criticized the continuity of the Kohl-Genscher government's *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik* with its social-liberal predecessor. But it was not just this group who rejected the double zero solution. Opposition from within the Union also came from well known centrists and convinced "Atlanticists" like Defense Minister Manfred Wörner (who at the end of 1987 was elected to be the next Secretary General of NATO) and the CDU foreign policy spokesman Volker Rühle.⁴⁷ Of course, the rejection of a double zero option by the Union soon created an uncomfortable political situation. The vast majority of Germany's population, the media and all the other parties in the Bundestag favored a radical reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe to be made as soon as possible,⁴⁸ and the hesitant CDU and CSU looked like reactionary warmongers addicted to nukes. No one seemed to listen any more to their solid argument (valid for the last decade) that for the "escalation continuum" of NATO's "flexible response" the Alliance needed at least some INF that could reach directly into the USSR. Mysteriously, with the prospect of the evaporation of a whole category of nuclear weapons, the danger of "decoupling" seemed to vanish into thin air. In a conversation with Belgian Prime Minister Winfried Martens, Chancellor Kohl bitterly lamented that the U. S. was now repeating the same old argument as the peace movement, claiming that America's strategic forces alone would be enough to counter any Soviet threat.⁴⁹

45 Conversation Ruth with Nitze in Bonn, February 8, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 33. Kohl underscored this in a letter to Reagan, February 14, 1986, *ibid.*, Fn. 22, p. 204.

46 Nichts gelernt, *Der Spiegel* Nr. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.

47 Tim Matthias Weber, *Zwischen Nachrüstung und Abrüstung. Die Nuklearwaffenpolitik der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zwischen 1977 und 1989*, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 306–317.

48 See the contribution of Philipp Gassert in this volume.

49 See conversation of Kohl with Martens, May 6, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 125, p. 634. Shultz had claimed just that at a press conference on April, 23 in order to disperse critics of U. S. conservatives like Nixon or Kissinger and of Europeans allies.

In a meeting held on March 31, Kohl, Defense Minister Wörner, and Foreign Minister Genscher officially reconfirmed the compromise of the fall of 1986 that the Christian-Liberal coalition would support any LRINF zero and a reduction of SRINF to a reduced and equally balanced level (but not to zero).⁵⁰ Despite this, the agile press department of Genscher's Ministry pushed for more—in an underhand way, as Wörner complained in a “strictly personal” letter to the Chancellor. Summing up the arguments against a second zero option, the Defense Minister warned that an INF double zero solution could endanger American commitment to European defense. It could also exacerbate the military balance, because the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact would gain even more weight. In case of a double zero, NATO's military experts like SACEUR Bernard Rogers⁵¹ or the Military Committee would doubt if a “flexible response” could be viable in the future. By eliminating systems that could reach Soviet territory deterrence would crumble. Worse, only the short-range nuclear weapons (SNF, with ranges below 500 km) would be kept in place. These SNF would destroy only German territory (both east and west of the Iron Curtain). Some Allies, like Margaret Thatcher, would already argue for SNF modernization (and buildup) in order to have a “firebreak” against a “third zero option,” which, it was thought, would probably be the next Soviet gambit in its sinister conspiracy to denuclearize Western Europe. Such an SNF modernization would trigger off a new “rearmament” debate which would be worse than the one over the Dual-Track Decision because, this time, Germany, as the only country concerned, would stand all alone.⁵²

With the catch-phrase “*je kürzer die Reichweiten, desto toter die Deutschen*” (“the shorter the nukes' range, the deadlier for the Germans”), the foreign and defense experts of the Union fought acrimoniously against this trend; they warned that such a development would necessarily endanger close ties with the West and feed into a dangerous trend towards nationalism and “neutrality” in Germany.

That argument was something that hit a nerve abroad. In the context of the Euromissiles debate of the 1980s, the “German problem”—the question of German unity—had returned to the international agenda. Faced with Allied troops and nukes on German ground, proponents of the peace movement were raising questions about the limits of the country's autonomy of decision, and of its sovereignty.⁵³ The Allies were puzzled by the German peace movement, with its claims of equidistance from both superpowers, and calls for demilitarized

50 This compromise proposal exactly was transmitted in a letter from Kohl to Reagan, April 7, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 100.

51 For Rogers' critique of a double zero solution, ‘What's wrong with Zero.’ NATO's boss speaks out, in: Newsweek, April 27, 1987, pp. 9f.

52 Letter from Wörner to Kohl, April 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 116, pp. 581–584.

53 Philipp Gassert, Viel Lärm um Nichts? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss als Katalysator gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung in der Bundesrepublik, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, p. 194f.

zones in Central Europe,⁵⁴ and even of quitting NATO.⁵⁵ Its demands fanned fears about the stability of the FRG and its anchorage in the West; also about a new German national neutralism.⁵⁶ Old fears in the West about a new kind of German–Soviet “Rapallo Deal” came to the fore. These fears were exacerbated by rampant debates among intellectuals in Germany and in the Middle-Eastern European states about a possible re-emergence of *Mitteleuropa* after the mid-1980s.⁵⁷ Already in 1984, the Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, had warned of “Pan-Germanism” and had publicly commended the fact that there were two separate German states.⁵⁸ Only some months before, a French socialist had allegedly proclaimed that the deployment of Pershing IIs was excellent at least in one way: it would prevent German unification for at least another 20 years.⁵⁹ So what would become of the “*incertitudes allemandes*” when the missiles were dismantled?

Since the Reykjavik Summit, some maverick CDU back-benchers like Bernhard Friedmann had been urging the government to insist on a package deal between disarmament and progress toward German unification. This was a fallback to positions of the 1950s, and so completely out of touch with reality that no one took the idea seriously, although it was reiterated before President Richard von Weizsäcker met with Gorbachev in Moscow in July 1987.⁶⁰

In June 1987, an unexpected incident in the GDR underscored the subcutaneous presence of the “German question.” As part of the festivities celebrating the 750th anniversary of Berlin, a big rock concert took place in West Berlin in front of the Reichstag, which was just next to the Wall. In East Berlin, young people trying to listen to the rock music were driven off by the police, and this led to the biggest unauthorized demonstration in the GDR for years. The stand-off

54 In 1985 and 1987, together with the ČSSR, the GDR proposed initiatives for a zone free of chemical weapons and nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The idea of a chemical weapons free zone was based on a joint paper that the West German SPD and the GDR’s State Party, the SED, had adopted some months earlier, Memorandum of Ruth, July 26, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Doc. 205.

55 Oskar Lafontaine, Minister President of Saarland since 1985, had demanded this in 1983, see Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium*, p. 88.

56 In regard to the INF Treaty, French Defense Minister Giraud complained about a German “growing irrational pacifism (fired by the Greens), the ‘Fata Morgana’ (*le mirage*) of reunification and the German desire for close economic relations with the East”. Telegram No. 2331 of Military Attaché Fraidel, Paris, October 15, 1987, PA/AA, B 14/143334.

57 Memorandum head of planning department, Seitz, April 3, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 95, pp. 480–488.

58 Telegram Head of Italian Bureau, Kuhna, to Rome embassy, September 14, 1986, and Memorandum of MDg Hans Schauer, September 28, 1986, in: AAPD 1984, Docs. 236 and 255.

59 *Wo ist der Deutschen Vaterland?*, in: *Der Spiegel* Nr. 48, November 28, 1983, p. 21; Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1997 (paperback edition), p. 321; Egon Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit*, Munich 1998, p. 512.

60 Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989*, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 309–311; AAPD 1987, Doc. 212, Fn. 19–21.

escalated, and the protesters began to chant both “We want Gorbachev” and “*Die Mauer muss weg*” (“The Wall must go”).⁶¹ A couple of days later, in front of the Brandenburg Gate, this request was memorably repeated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan as he demanded that General Secretary Gorbachev should “tear down this Wall.”⁶²

In the run-up to von Weizsäcker’s visit to Moscow rumors spread that Gorbachev might try to tease the Germans with a new kind of “Stalin Note.”⁶³ In 1952, the USSR had proposed a model of a reunified, but neutral Germany that would not be part of NATO. Gorbachev did not do anything of that kind. When Weizsäcker—more for the record than through real conviction—brought up the wish of the German people for reunification, Gorbachev repeated the Soviet argument that two Germanies were the verdict of history that had to be accepted. However, he also said that no one could know what things would be like in a hundred years’ time.⁶⁴ That a Soviet General Secretary should indicate that there might be change in Germany’s divided condition (albeit in a faraway future) was indeed a new development and impressed his visitors.

In a nutshell: due to the INF debate, the “German problem” had returned to international politics. It is striking that this development was better perceived abroad than it was within Germany. This does not mean, however, that there was a teleological path up to German unification, which came three years later. Most contemporaries felt quite the contrary. In September 1987, the leader of the GDR, SED General Secretary Erich Honecker, made an official visit to the Federal Republic. This was rightly perceived, all over the world, as the final recognition of the GDR as a second German state by its long-term rival. Indeed, Honecker’s visit was the climax of *Zweistaatlichkeit* (the two-state solution).⁶⁵

In April 1987, both German unification and an end to the Cold War seemed highly unlikely. For delegates of the Union, the USSR was still a dangerous adversary and definitively not to be trusted. If taken in the narrow perspective of the German national interest and from a purely military point of view, some of the CDU/CSU arguments against the second zero solution even made sense.

61 DDR-Sicherheitskräfte behindern westdeutsche Journalisten, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), June 10, 1987, pp. 1 f.

62 For Reagan’s speech on June 12, 1987, see Public Papers, Reagan 1987, p. 635. Confidentially, at the margins of a Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin on May 28/29, 1987, Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Minister had indeed proposed exactly that to Honecker who rejected any removal of the Wall. See Vladislav Zubok, *With his back against the Wall: Gorbachev, Soviet demise, and German reunification*, in: *Cold War History* 14/4 (2014), pp. 621 f. In the official records of the meeting, however, there are no hints of this episode.

63 Memorandum of Political Director, von Richthofen, July 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 212, p. 1059.

64 Conversation Gorbachev with Weizsäcker, July 7, 1987, German Memcon in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 206; Soviet Memcon in: Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernajew (eds.), *Michail Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage. Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991*, Munich 2011, Doc. 16.

65 See the contribution by Hermann Wentker to this volume.

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group had passed new "General Political Guidelines (GPG) for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in Defense of NATO" at its Ministerial meeting in Gleneagles on October 21/22, 1986 (only a week after the Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik). For West Germany, the crucial merit of these GPG was that they finally shifted the Alliance's strategy away from the military–operational use of tactical nuclear weapons to appreciating the political function of a nuclear strike. The latter was defined as the ultimate signal to the enemy to stop its aggression at once—and such nuclear strikes were to be made directly and immediately against Soviet territory itself. Almost since it first entered the Alliance in 1955, West Germany had hoped that this calculus would become NATO's strategic approach. If a double zero solution for INF were adopted, it seemed that the tools to implement this philosophy would immediately be put at risk: With the remaining U.S. strategic nuclear weapons (as well as those of France and Britain) the old problem of "decoupling" arose again: would the Allies really go nuclear for the FRG and thus risk the destruction of their own countries? Moreover, with the (outdated and outnumbered) SNF that remained, there was no threat to the territory of a Soviet aggressor (nor, indeed, to any Anglo-Saxon Ally): all the destruction would be wreaked on German territory alone!

This complex military calculus was the reason why CDU/CSU politicians clung to retaining at least some SRINF. Additionally, they demanded that any nuclear agreement of the superpowers should be accompanied by a total ban on chemical weapons and by a swift beginning to disarmament talks in Vienna between NATO and the Warsaw Pact about conventional forces in Europe (CFE). Chemical weapons and conventional forces were less in the focus of public interest (even though the East had an enormous quantitative superiority) but were also a lethal threat to the West, and especially to its front-line state, West Germany.

However, the proponents of the CDU/CSU philosophy were faced with a phalanx of overpowering adversaries. Firstly, public opinion in Germany was predominantly anti-nuclear.⁶⁶ A majority of West Germans had grudgingly accepted Euromissiles as an unwanted but necessary reaction to a dangerous Soviet armaments buildup; and when the Soviets said they wanted to get rid of as many nukes as possible, most people euphorically agreed. They did not bother to go into the complicated logic of nuclear deterrence. On a psychological level, the peace movement had prevailed: disarmament had become an end in itself. It was in vain that Chancellor Kohl reiterated that disarmament was only sensible when it led to more, not less security.

Secondly, the Union was totally isolated in West Germany's political system. Its Liberal coalition partner insisted on a double zero solution just as firmly as the opposition parties, the SPD and the Greens. The split within government was brutally exposed in the Bundestag on May 7,⁶⁷ but already, on April 27, Genscher

66 See the contribution by Philipp Gassert to this volume.

67 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation Period, 10th Session, pp. 524–565; <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf>.

had been saying that the government was in the “most difficult situation since the coalition’s formation in 1982”⁶⁸—thus premonitorily recalling that the FDP had swapped its coalition partner in a controversy over INF missiles once before.

Thirdly, the United States, which had been the CDU/CSU’s mightiest international ally in the past, was now taking a stand on the opposite side. During a visit to Washington on May 11, Genscher had talks in the State Department, the Pentagon and the NSC. He was also briefly received by President Reagan—a demonstrative protocolic signal to Bonn.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, CDU/CSU politicians hoped to find support against the double zero solution from European Allies. It almost looked like a flashback to the 1960s with a return to a kind of German “Gaullism” within the two parties. Just as they had some decades ago, politicians like Strauß, Dregger, and Todenhöfer expressed fears that the United States would be prepared to sacrifice the national interests of Germany and Europe in favor of an agreement between the superpowers alone. In their view, this was just what the U. S. had done at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. Out of distrust towards America, these politicians dreamed of creating a “European Security Union,” especially by closing ranks with France, which was a nuclear power.⁷⁰ However, just as in the 1960s, France had absolutely no intention of sharing its *Force de Frappe* with Germany. Nor did CDU centrists like Kohl and Rühle have interest or illusions about the scheme.

To complicate things, for the first time ever in the Fifth Republic, France had a *cohabitation* government (1986–1988). The Socialist President, Mitterrand, was having to make do with a Conservative government. Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, and Defense Minister André Giraud made no secret of their resentment at the prospect of a double zero option.⁷¹ Mitterrand, by contrast, indicated to Kohl, early on, that he would not be averse to it.⁷² In public, Mitterrand kept silent for a long time in order to save Kohl’s domestic position. This silence fostered illusions. On May 13/14, the Bundestag leader Alfred Dregger visited Paris hoping to forge a continental

68 Genscher spricht von der schwierigsten Situation der Regierung seit 1982, in: FAZ, April 28, 1987, p. 1.

69 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, p. 567; Nichts gelernt, in: *Der Spiegel* Nr. 21, May, 18, 1987, p. 19; conversation Genscher with Weinberger, May 11, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 128.

70 Dregger für eine Neuorientierung der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik, in: FAZ, June 19, 1987, p. 2. For German Gaullism in the 1960s see Tim Geiger, *Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten. Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innenpolitischer Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958–1969*, Munich 2008.

71 Telegram No. 970 Ambassador Schoeller, Paris, April 30, 1987 on Conversation of Chirac with Thatcher in Chequers, in: PA/AA, B 43/130134; Memo von Ploetz, May 8, 1987, about Kohl’s Strasbourg meeting with Chirac on May 3, see PA/AA, B 150/666.

72 Conversation of Kohl with Mitterrand at Chambord Castle, March 28, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 89; Jacques Attali, *Verbatim*, Tom 2: *Chronique des années 1986–1988*, Paris 1995, pp. 287–291; Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 584 f.; see also the essay by Christian Wenkel in this volume.

alliance of resistance against the U.S.—and against Bonn’s Foreign Office—with the conservative French government.

CDU foreign policy expert Rühle tried the same in Britain.⁷³ Thatcher, too, was highly critical of any zero option.⁷⁴ However, at the ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Stavanger, British Defence Minister George Younger made it public that Britain would endorse a double zero option for LRINF and SRINF if NATO’s deterrence could be kept viable by other nuclear systems and if the disarmament of chemical and conventional weapons proceeded. This left the FRG standing all alone as the main obstacle preventing a common NATO view on banning SRINF being reached.⁷⁵ Thatcher’s surprising U-turn was primarily due to the fact that she faced general elections in June. An even worse stab in the back for Kohl and his fellow party members, however, was the massive pressure the British were exerting for a “firebreak” in further disarmament talks—employing a term (*Brandschneise*) that even linguistically went down badly with Germans. Through a “firebreak”, the “Iron Lady” wanted to stop the headlong rush to disarmament.⁷⁶ Instead of cutting down, or even abolishing, the short-range nuclear forces (SNF) which would “only” do damage in the immediate theater of war (obviously Germany), she insisted on a modernization and buildup of these SNF. This was because, in that category of weapons, just 88 Lance systems deployed by NATO faced a sixteen-fold numeric superiority of systems from the Warsaw Pact. From the German perspective, that meant ending up in the worst of all nuclear worlds.

In a conversation with a high-ranking politician from Hungary on May 15, Kohl protested that, of course, he was interested in real disarmament. On the other hand, he could not let Germany be sold down the river—either by the Soviets or by his American friends.⁷⁷ Under pressure from all sides, both domestically and internationally, Kohl made a desperate dart forward, that same

73 Telegram No. 867 of Ambassador von Wechmar, London, May 15, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 43/144772.

74 See Oliver Barton’s essay in this volume. On March 23, 1987 in Bonn, Thatcher told Kohl that Britain would support a LRINF zero, whatever the cost, because the West had to stick by its word; but she would not accept a SRINF zero. See Memo of Political Director von Richthofen, March 24, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 79.

75 Wörner fand kaum Verbündete, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, May, 15, 1987, p. 1; Nichts gelernt, Der Spiegel Nr. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.

76 Telegram No. 1020 from Gesandter von Stein, London, June 5, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/668. At the G7 summit in Venice on June 8, Thatcher vehemently attacked Kohl, whom she suspected to be angling for a third (SNF) zero. Her behavior shocked even Mitterrand, and Reagan tried to calm her down, The National Archives, Kew, PREM19/2090 f135, Charles Powell’s record of conversation of G7 leaders at dinner, (online <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/211271>); Margaret Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, London 1993, p. 587; The Reagan Diaries, ed. by Douglas Brinkley, New York 2007, p. 505; conversation of Kohl with Mitterrand in Venice, June 9, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 166.

77 Conversation of Kohl with Hungarian member of Politbureau Havasi, May 15, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/667.

day. Without any consultation with Genscher's Foreign Office or with the Allies, the Federal Chancellery put out a declaration, announced by the government's spokesman, that a SRINF zero solution would ignore the very weapons that were the most dangerous to the Federal Republic, and that therefore, weapons of *all* ranges between 0 and 1,000 km should be included in the Geneva talks. The declaration added that attention also had to be paid to the clear conventional and chemical superiority of the Warsaw Pact.⁷⁸

Kohl's initiative exacerbated an already chaotic situation by puzzling everyone. This became obvious the next day when contradictory headlines appeared in the papers. Some papers ran the headline "Kohl against zero option"; others ran "Kohl in favor of total zero."⁷⁹ The Disarmament Unit of the Foreign Office took stock in an extremely negative way, since Kohl's amateurish initiative did not differentiate between nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, the latter two never part of the Geneva talks. Even if the Chancellor's unfortunate choice of words were taken to mean nuclear weapons only, his proposal could bring back dual-capable artillery or air-launched nukes, when, for years, the West had fought hard (and successfully) to reduce the Geneva talks to ground-launched missiles alone.⁸⁰

Most observers judged Kohl's attempt to jump ahead as primarily a domestic maneuver, because two days later there were to be elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and in Hamburg.⁸¹ If so, that calculation failed: in Mainz, the CDU lost its absolute majority, and in Hamburg, the SPD retained the majority it already had. It is generally agreed that the Union's quarrels over disarmament had a decisive share in this election outcome.⁸²

In the CDU executive committee, the next day, Kohl admitted this; but he defiantly insisted that without the politics of the Union there would never have been any disarmament agreement at all. He recalled that the implementation of NATO's Dual-Track Decision had been the precondition for any zero option—and without the Union the tiny FDP could never have secured its implementation. Kohl accordingly demanded that the unfair "worksharing" within the coalition, where some profited themselves as (the only) friends of disarmament at the expense of the others, should henceforth come to an end.⁸³ Germany's biggest tabloid, *Bild*, had already made the Chancellor's thoughts public in a well-informed article which also addressed the deep and enduring rift the debate over

78 Bulletin der Bundesregierung 1987, pp. 413 f.

79 Archiv der Gegenwart 57 (1987), p. 31071. Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of the Federal Chancellery, had to explain Kohl's initiative to American Ambassador Burt, May 18, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 138.

80 Memo of Referat 220, in: PA/AA, B 43/130126.

81 Telegram No. 2228 of Ambassador van Well, Washington, May 18, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 141.

82 Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, p. 527.

83 Helmut Kohl, *Berichte zur Lage 1982–1989. Der Kanzler und Parteivorsitzende im Bundesvorstand der CDU Deutschlands*, Düsseldorf 2014, pp. 533–536 (May 18, 1987).

the zero option had caused in the once close personal relationship between Kohl and Genscher.⁸⁴

In the whole controversy, Kohl cut an unfortunate figure. He had been away from Bonn at a health spa when the controversy within the coalition escalated in April, stayed there too long, and appeared indecisive and weak in leadership when he returned. It was not so much Party Chairman Kohl who now brought his estranged coalition government together, but the CDU's ambitious Secretary General Heiner Geißler. As a skilled strategic thinker, Geißler ruthlessly overrode intra-party resistance to the double zero option by insisting that the Christian Democrats must not longer appear to the public as Cold Warmongers addicted to nukes and hostile to détente and disarmament.⁸⁵ In this way, Geißler, who preened himself on being "Executive Party Chairman," overcame the political deadlock and saved the government. However, applauded by the liberal-progressive press, he became overambitious. Thus began an internal rivalry with Kohl, which finally ended in Geißler's failed revolt against the Chancellor in summer 1989.

In spring 1987, Geißler was successful because, within days, it became evident that any hope of finding European Allies against a double zero option had gone altogether. Once the British government had endorsed the double zero option, Italy followed suit.⁸⁶ At the Franco-German summit in Paris on May 21/22, Mitterrand made it crystal clear that he, as President, not the Conservative government, was in charge of Foreign Affairs, and that France would not oppose double zero.⁸⁷

In fact, contrary to the lofty hopes of some CDU/CSU politicians, Bonn and Paris were at odds over many defense issues, not just the double zero option. Talks in the (UN-based) Conference on Disarmament (CD), also in Geneva, had been concentrating particularly on chemical weapons and had reached a stalemate because the French insisted on keeping a "security stock" of these. The French had also blocked a proposed mandate for new talks in Vienna over "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" (CFE)—which it was hoped would replace the ailing "Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions" (MBFR) discussions as from spring

84 Raketen: So leidet die Freundschaft Kohl/Genscher, in: Bild am Sonntag, May 17, 1987. Genscher reacted the same day with a handwritten letter that reaffirmed his allegiance to Kohl, AAPD 1987, Doc. 139.

85 Strauß: 'Geißlers Politik führt zur Katastrophe', in: Der Spiegel Nr. 22, May 25, 1987, pp. 17–19.

86 Although, on April 27, 1987, the Italian representative in NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) made a case for a SRINF base level solution (Telegram No. 553 of Holik, Brussels, April 28, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 119), Foreign Minister Andreotti indicated in a telephone conversation with Genscher, on May 14, 1987, that there would be Italian support for double zero, PA/AA, B 1/178903. Andreotti made this public on May 19. Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani confirmed it the following day in talks with Kohl in Bonn, Archiv der Gegenwart 57 (1987), p. 31071.

87 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, p. 585; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 568, conversation of Kohl, Mitterrand and Chirac in Paris, May 22, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 147.

1989. France wanted to include the neutral and non-aligned countries, but the U.S. would not accept this. Germany, however, was desperate that the talks should go ahead.

Despite this friction, the uncertainties caused by the INF Treaty within the Western Alliance did lead to an intensification of Franco-German security cooperation. After Reykjavik and in the wake of the INF Treaty, Kohl and Mitterrand activated parts of the Elysée Treaty of 1963 that covered defense and that had not yet been implemented.⁸⁸ In November 1987, a month before the signing of the INF Treaty and two months after a spectacular first joint Franco-German army maneuver (“*Kecker Spatz/Moineau hardi*”), a Franco-German summit was held in Karlsruhe. Here the highly symbolic decision was made to set up a joint Franco-German Brigade and a common Council of Foreign and Defense Ministers as well as a common Council of Economic and Financial Ministers.⁸⁹ As a quid pro quo for intensified military collaboration, Paris demanded closer economic and monetary cooperation from Bonn. The French wanted to get control over West Germany’s dominant economy and its currency, the D-Mark, which Mitterrand’s Diplomatic Advisor, Jacques Attali, went as far as calling “the German Nuclear bomb.”⁹⁰ This started to pave the way for the new European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which took shape in 1988 with the “Delors package” and the European Council of Hannover.⁹¹ So, in a way, even some of the origins of the Euro go back to the debate surrounding the INF Treaty.

On June 1, 1987, West Germany’s Christian-Liberal government finally settled for an acceptance of the double zero solution.⁹² Genscher’s line had prevailed. In the CDU/CSU parliamentary group this caused outrage; but that did not change anything.⁹³ On June 4, Chancellor Kohl presented the government’s decision in the Bundestag. He did so in a rather complicated way, emphasizing that Germany could only agree to a zero option for SRINF if this were accompanied by a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. This should include a 50 per cent cut of American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons, and real progress in the disarmament of conventional

88 Urs Leimbacher, *Die unverzichtbare Allianz. Deutsch-französische sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit 1982–1989*, Baden-Baden 1992, pp. 133–192; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 423–433.

89 Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 126/1987, pp. 170 f.; Christoph Lind, *Die deutsch-französischen Gipfeltreffen der Ära Kohl—Mitterrand 1982–1994*, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 133–142.

90 Cf. conversation of Teltchik with Attali in Paris, August 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 239, p. 1209. Mitterrand repeated that aphorism in 1988 in the French Ministerial Council, Jacques Attali, *Verbatim III: 1988–1991*, Paris 1995, p. 47 (August 17, 1988).

91 Wirsching, *Abschied*, pp. 531–544; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 431–439.

92 The compromise was forged into a resolution proposal that was brought to the Bundestag by the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary group on June 3, 1987, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Drucksache No. 11/405, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/004/1100405.pdf>.

93 *Stürmische Debatte der Unionsfraktion über die doppelte Null-Lösung*, in: FAZ, June 3, 1987, p. 1.

and SNF forces. The 72 German Pershing IA missiles were mentioned as being explicitly no part of the deal.⁹⁴

In Geneva, the Soviets were still waiting for the official American response to their SRINF zero proposal, because the Reagan Administration had told them that it had to consult with its NATO Allies first, and the Alliance was waiting for the Europeans—and especially the West Germans—to sort themselves out. At the G7 Summit in Venice, Reagan promised Kohl that the U.S. would accept the German demand for a comprehensive NATO disarmament plan that would include negotiations on SNF systems with a range below 500km.⁹⁵ Finally, on June 11/12, NATO's next Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Reykjavik was able to give Washington the green light to go ahead in Geneva.

It underlines the crucial importance of West Germany in the whole INF matter that the NAC communiqué at Reykjavik repeated the wording of the German coalition paper almost exactly.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, even hours before the NAC's session, at the traditional preliminary quadripartite meeting of the American, British, French, and German Foreign Ministers, Genscher was having to fight hard to keep the plan afloat. Britain and France did not want any commitment to follow-on negotiations on SNF, so as not to endanger the "firebreak" they favored; both Howe and Cheysson made strong attempts to water down the relevant passage.⁹⁷ Although Genscher repeatedly emphasized that no one in the Federal Government wanted a third zero option, the Allies did not trust his assurance, because Genscher had assured just the same with regard to a SRINF zero only half a year ago.⁹⁸ This was just a foretaste of further controversies that would come within the Atlantic Alliance in the next years. Nor was the controversy over the INF Treaty yet over in West Germany itself.

94 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation Period, 16th Session, pp. 923–928.

95 Conversation of Kohl with Reagan, June 8, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 164.

96 Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik, June 11/12, 1987, <http://archives.nato.int/statement-on-ministerial-meeting-of-nac-at-reykjavik-on-11th-and-12th-june-1987>.

97 Conversation of Genscher, Howe, Raimond and Shultz, June 11, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 170.

98 Memo of AA's head of NATO unit, VLR I Dreher, June 15, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/668. For Genscher's former rejection of an SRINF zero, see his meeting with Howe, Raimond and Shultz at Chevening, December 9, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 353, p. 1826.

3. The Abandoning of the Pershing IA, Summer 1987

From late April 1987, the Soviet side complicated things further by demanding, as an ultimatum, that the 72 *Bundeswehr* Pershing IAs should be included in an INF Treaty⁹⁹—this, despite the fact that, ever since their beginnings in 1981, the Geneva talks had been confined to American and Soviet land-based nuclear systems (to be precise: to carriers, not the nuclear warheads themselves).

The Pershing IA (P IA) was a SRINF system with a range of approximately 750 km. In other words, it could hit the deployment area of the second echelon of the Warsaw Pact at the Vistula River in Poland. The P IA had been used by the *Luftwaffe* since 1963. It could be armed with nuclear warheads, though these were always under American control and custody.¹⁰⁰ Germany's share in NATO's nuclear weaponry (*Nuklearteilhabe*), crucial for a country at the front line of the Cold War, basically relied on these Pershing missiles and on the multi-role combat aircraft, the "Tornado". In 1987, it was first and foremost the political asset that remained of this arrangement; the military value of the evermore outdated Pershing IA had declined rapidly and the lifespan of the P IA system would come to an end in the early 1990s. Modernization had been debated within NATO since the mid-1980s,¹⁰¹ and the former 108 American Pershing IAs in Germany had already been replaced in 1983 with an improved successor model, the Pershing II, thanks to the Dual-Track Decision.

The official position of the Federal Government, of the U. S., and of NATO was that the Pershing IA, as an "established pattern of co-operation" system, could not be part of an American–Soviet INF agreement—just as was the case with the British and French nuclear arsenals. This position was reaffirmed again and again on various occasions throughout the summer of 1987. The State Department confirmed it in a press release of April 29;¹⁰² Defense Secretary Weinberger reconfirmed the non-inclusion of the P IA in an INF Treaty at NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in Brussels on May 26/27;¹⁰³ Secretary Shultz again

99 The Leader of the Soviet INF Delegation in Geneva, Obukhov, demanded this in his oral presentation of the Soviet draft for an INF Treaty on April 28 (whereas the written form did not mention it, nor even a SRINF zero solution). Obukhov's Press statement, in: Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit, Vol. XXIV, 1987/88, p. 150; Telegram No. 553 of Ambassador Holik, Brussels, April 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 119. In NAC on April, 16, Secretary Shultz informed that at his Moscow visit no Soviet had asked him about the German Pershing IA, Telegram No. 521 of Ambassador Hansen, NATO, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 115. This was confirmed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov who, on May 6, was telling Genscher that without the inclusion of these missiles there would be no real zero solution, AAPD 1987, Doc. 126.

100 Memo of Referat 201, January 26, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/659.

101 Memo of Staatssekretär Sudhoff and LR I Adamek, both May 20, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Docs. 144 and 145.

102 Archiv der Gegenwart 57 (1987), p. 31068.

103 Telegram No. 731 of Hansen, NATO, May 27, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 155.

affirmed it at the North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik on June 11;¹⁰⁴ and at the G7 Summit in Venice, President Reagan himself assured Kohl that “the question of the 72 P IA is now off the table.”¹⁰⁵ But the Soviets kept on pressing, and even indicated that the proposed INF Treaty could come to nothing just because of this issue.¹⁰⁶

Moscow’s threats had an immediate effect in West Germany. The opposition parties vociferously demanded that Bonn should comply, instead of blocking the prospect of real nuclear disarmament.¹⁰⁷ The FDP made yet another U-turn, abandoning the coalition’s consent, and joined in demands for the abolition of the Pershing IAs. For the Liberals, preserving these outdated systems (or modernizing them, which would be extremely controversial and might endanger East–West détente)¹⁰⁸ was simply not worth it, if Germany were to become the final obstacle to an INF Treaty. Although the coalition’s difficult compromise over the double zero option of June 1 had explicitly underlined the established position that Pershing IA missiles must be kept out of the Geneva talks, only the next day Genscher secretly indicated to an emissary of the GDR that he himself would not mind getting rid of them.¹⁰⁹ He could be sure that this intimation would be heard not only in East Berlin, but also in Moscow.

Thus, the Foreign Minister was hardly surprised when his Soviet colleague tried to grill the German delegation on the Pershing issue during President von Weizsäcker’s visit to Moscow in July. Shevardnadze complained that the Soviets felt they were being cheated because, whether they talked to Germans or Americans, the responsibility for the P IA was always passed from one side to the other: the Americans would declare that the systems were German (so they could not negotiate about them); the West Germans would claim that the nuclear warheads were solely American, and that Bonn was no party at all at the Geneva disarmament table. Moscow was now saying that the P IA had become

104 Ortez No. 36 of VLR Stöcker, June 16, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/669. See also Shultz in the preceding meeting with Genscher, Cheysson and Howe, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 170.

105 AAPD 1987, Doc. 164 (June 8, 1987). In the CDU executive committee, Kohl therefore showed confidence that the Pershing IA would be kept out of an INF Treaty: Kohl, *Berichte zur Lage 1982–1989*, p. 541 (June 18, 1987).

106 Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze labeled the refusal to include the German P IA in a double zero solution a “grave obstacle for disarmament”, *Europa-Archiv* 1990, Z 135 f.

107 E.g. the Defense spokesman of the SPD fraction, Erwin Horn, on his visit to the U. S. A., in: Telegram No. 3140 of Ambassador van Well, Washington, in: PA/AA, B 43/135403.

108 Ambassador van Well, Washington, reported on June 27 that Shultz had told him again that the Pershing IA could not be part of an American–Soviet INF deal. However, Shultz indicated at the same time that, for Washington, modernization of the P IA had no alternative, AAPD 1987, Doc. 214, Fn. 2.

109 Memo of the Rector of the Academy for Life Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, Otto Reinhold, for General Secretary Erich Honecker, June 5, 1987 about Reinhold’s conversation with Genscher in Bonn on June 2, in: Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch–deutschen Beziehungen auf höchster Ebene 1980–1987*, Berlin 1995, Doc. 52, p. 313.

“the main obstacle” standing in the way of an INF solution, and Shevardnadze asked what the USSR could do to facilitate West Germany “voluntarily” giving up these missiles. Would a real global LRINF zero help—an elimination of the 100 remaining LRINF nuclear warheads?¹¹⁰ A fortnight later, Gorbachev announced precisely this step.

In the meanwhile, controversies dragged on in the Bonn coalition. Whereas the FDP clearly favored the abandonment of the P IAs, the CDU/CSU “steel helmet” hardliners around Strauß and Dregger insisted that these SRINF missiles be kept at all costs: not only to retain at least a remnant of the direct threat West Germany could pose to the East (and thus keep deterrence alive), but also in order to kill off the already evolving intra-Western debate over a SNF modernization program, which would surely get going fully as soon as there were no SRINF left on NATO’s side.¹¹¹ Using the argument that the USSR would presumably demand a zero option for French and British nuclear forces as soon as the P IA was removed,¹¹² the CDU and CSU tried again to get backing from both key European Allies. But London and Paris were already harassing the FRG with regard to SNF modernization—just as Washington did. Even within the CDU, figures like Deputy Party Chairman and Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, publicly announced that the Pershing IA issue was only a bargaining chip to get the Warsaw Pact to disarmament talks over SNF.¹¹³ Such statements indirectly indicated a readiness to renounce P IA.

As Ambassador Günter van Well reported from Washington, the Reagan Administration was having increasing doubts about the firmness of Bonn’s commitment to keeping the Pershing IAs, in face of the mounting pressure from Moscow. Van Well did not rule out the possibility of Secretary Shultz disregarding German (and British) objections and ruthlessly sacrificing the German Pershing IAs, all contradicting promises notwithstanding. The American wanted to get an INF agreement and prove his disarmament approach was right.¹¹⁴ After talks with the U.S. delegation in Geneva, German diplomats came to the conclusion: “blatantly obvious, the wish was expressed that we solve this [Pershing IA] problem for the U.S.”¹¹⁵ Apprehension grew that Washington might lay all the blame on Bonn if an INF Treaty should fall apart because of the Pershing IA issue.¹¹⁶

110 Genscher–Shevardnadze delegation talks in Moscow, July 7, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 204.

111 Am Kleiderständer, in: Der Spiegel No. 24, June 8, 1987, p. 26.

112 Conversation of Kohl with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French *Assemblée Nationale*, June 3, 1987, in: PA/AA, B 150/668. Exactly for that reason, Thatcher, too, objected to an abandoning of the P IA, Thatcher, Downing Street, p. 771.

113 Interview with Späth, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 24, June 8, 1987, p. 24.

114 Telegram No. 3049 of van Well, July 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 214.

115 Memo of AA’s Deputy head of the Disarmament Division, Ambassador Hartmann, to Genscher, July 21, 1987, in: PA/AA B 150/671.

116 Handwritten comment of State Secretary Sudhoff on a memo by AA’s Head of the Disarmament Division, Holik, on August 17, 1987, which analyzed another letter of Secretary Shultz to Genscher confirming that the U.S. would steadily refuse to include the German Pershing IA in an INF agreement, PA/AA, B 150/673.

On August 18, Soviet ambassador Yuli A. Kvitsinsky urgently called on Genscher, who was on holiday in the south of France, relaying the alarming message that, due to the Pershing IA question, the INF Treaty really was at risk. Because of this Shevardnadze was confidentially suggesting that Bonn should take the appropriate initiative itself.¹¹⁷

It is worth noting that exactly this pattern would be repeated three years later in the process of German unification, this time concerning the controversial issue of the size of the *Bundeswehr*. In 1990, Shevardnadze again confidentially indicated that Germany should submit a proposal as its own initiative that would enable Soviet agreement.¹¹⁸ Kohl acted accordingly during his famous Caucasus meeting with Gorbachev.¹¹⁹ On a multilateral level, the result was confirmed by a declaration of Genscher at the Vienna CFE forum, which was finally incorporated in the Two plus Four Treaty.¹²⁰

In 1987, back home, Genscher held a for-your-eyes-only conversation with Chancellor Kohl. He had thoroughly prepared it by previously winning over the more compromise-orientated, left-wing CDU leaders like Employment Minister Norbert Blüm, Späth, and Geißler.¹²¹ He succeeded in convincing the Chancellor. Without any prior consultations with the NATO Allies or even with the CSU itself, Kohl then made a complete U-turn. On August 26, he declared that, in order to help the American quest for an INF Treaty, his government would autonomously agree to a unilateral dismantling of all German Pershing IA missiles if the INF Treaty were to become effective.¹²² Just as in the fall of 1989, when he presented his famous Ten-Point Plan, Kohl's unilateral move took Washington completely by surprise.¹²³ On both occasions, however, the American Presidents backed their proven and trusted German ally. In 1987, Kohl's declaration was accepted all the more readily, because it substantially facilitated the finalization of the INF Treaty.

117 Conversation of Genscher with Kvitsinsky in Théoule-sur-Mer, in: PA/AA, B 150/673; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 572–573.

118 Conversation of Genscher with Shevardnadze in Copenhagen, June 7, 1990, in: Andreas Hilger (ed.), *Diplomatie für die deutsche Einheit*, Munich 2011, Doc. 32, p. 167; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 817 f.; Tim Geiger and Heike Amos, *Das Auswärtige Amt und die Wiedervereinigung 1989/90*, in: Michael Gehler and Maximilian Graf (eds.), *Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen*, Göttingen 2017, p. 85.

119 Conversation of Kohl with Gorbachev in Archyz, July 16, 1990, in: *Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90*, ed. by Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann, Munich, 1998, Doc. 353, p. 1365.

120 For Genscher's declaration of August 30, 1990, *Bulletin der Bundesregierung 1990*, pp. 1129–1131, and *Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess*, ed. by Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, Göttingen 2016, doc. 147; for the 2+4-Treaty of September 12, 1990 (esp. Article 3), *ibid.*, Doc. 152.

121 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, p. 573; Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 550 f.

122 For Kohl's declaration *Bulletin 1987*, p. 682.

123 Telegram No. 3618 of Gesandten Paschke, Washington, August 26, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 235.

Within his government, Kohl's action did not go down so well. His declaration was widely seen as yet another capitulation a weak Chancellor was making to his strong deputy, Foreign Minister Genscher, and it caused a real crisis with the third coalition partner, the CSU. Strauß, who had never ceased from attacking his rival Kohl as a naïve "clunk," was caught off guard during a visit to Bulgaria. His outrage ended in a very aggressive declaration from the CSU executive committee, delivered on August 31, which charged the Chancellor with a breach of promise and accused him of destroying the basis for cooperation.¹²⁴ For some weeks, the Bavarian sister party even withdrew its Ministers from the cabinet, but in the end, they fell in line. It must be conceded that Strauß's criticism had a point: the INF Treaty did indeed eliminate only 3 per cent of the global nuclear arsenal¹²⁵—an aspect that was often glossed over by the Treaty's advocates (and that has been largely forgotten since). Nevertheless, at the end of 1987, Strauß flew to Moscow himself. After conversations with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze,¹²⁶ he underwent a "Damascus" conversion. From that moment, even Strauß acknowledged that serious changes were taking place in the USSR.

Similarly, relations between Bonn and Moscow improved steadily following the Federal Government's "voluntary" renunciation of the Pershing IA. At his annual meeting with Genscher during the UN General Assembly in New York, Shevardnadze praised the important contribution the Federal Government had made in the final round of negotiations for an INF Treaty: Gorbachev himself had referred to Kohl's declaration and Genscher's contribution to it. If an INF Treaty were to come about, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared, it would not only be due to the negotiating skills of the Americans and Soviets, but also to the responsible political leaders in Bonn.¹²⁷ Gorbachev repeated this praise personally in a letter to Kohl.¹²⁸ The "Ice Age" of German–Soviet relations had definitively come to an end. In October 1988, Chancellor Kohl paid an official visit to the USSR.¹²⁹ Some

124 10-point-statement of CSU-Parteivorstand, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 32 (1987), pp. 1373–1375; *Weisheit am Werk*, in: *Der Spiegel* Nr. 37, September 7, 1987, p. 23.

125 Telegram No. 2448 of Ambassador Hellbeck, Beijing, on conversation between Strauß and Chinese Premier Minister Zhao Ziyang, October 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 288. On the Soviet side, the percentage of eliminated nuclear weapons from the global stockpile was estimated at 4 per cent, Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, London 1991, p. 92; Aleksandr G. Savel'ev and Nikolaj N. Detinov, *The Big Five. Arms Control and Decision Making in the Soviet Union*, Westport/Connecticut 1995, p. 137.

126 Conversation of Strauß with Shevardnadze, December 28, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 381; Memcon with Gorbachev, December 29, 1987, in: *Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage*, Doc. 19; Wilfried Scharnagl (ed.), *Strauß in Moskau ... und im südlichen Afrika. Bericht, Bilanz, Bewertung*, Munich 1988, pp. 21–55.

127 Telegram No. 25 von Richthofen and Holik, New York, September 22, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 268.

128 AAPD 1987, Doc. 280, Fn. 4.

129 For Kohl and Genscher's visit of October 24–27, 1988 AAPD 1988, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Matthias Peter and Jens Jost Hofmann, Docs. 300, 301, 303, 304, 309; Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 755–772.

months later, in June 1989, Gorbachev was accorded a euphoric reception in West Germany, which led some observers to talk of “Gorbymania.”¹³⁰

In retrospect, it is obvious that 1987 was a turning point in Soviet–West German relations. This was especially true with respect to the personal and political relationship of the two leaders of both countries, who learned the hard way how they could trust each other. Without the success of the INF Treaty, Gorbachev would hardly have had any chance of being accepted in the West as a partner whose *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* really brought a profound change in East–West relations. On the other side, the acceptance of the double zero solution and the unilateral abandoning of the Pershing IAs proved to the Soviet leadership that the Kohl–Genscher government could be a reliable and a serious partner whom Moscow could trust. This was an indispensable basis that helped to open the door for a development that only three years later would wind its way to German unification and the real end of the Cold War.

4. Outlook and Summary

As stipulated in the INF agreement, all Treaty-limited equipment had to be dismantled within three years of the date when the Treaty entered into force: June 1, 1988. Destruction of the Western launchers (but not the nuclear warheads!) took place in the United States; so all the 108 Pershing IIs and the 64 GLCMs that had been deployed in the FRG since 1983 were withdrawn in the following months. On September 26, 1990—exactly a fortnight after the signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty in Moscow, which handed back sovereignty to a Germany that was to be formally reunited on October 3, 1990—the last eight American GLCMs left the Federal Republic.¹³¹ Simultaneously and independently, the West German P IA missiles were also transferred over the Atlantic to be destroyed. This started in April 1990 and was finished by the fall of 1991.¹³²

During that time the Federal Republic (like the other four European deployment countries) had to host numerous on-site inspection teams from the USSR and to meet the strict requirements of the detailed inspection regulations.¹³³

130 For Gorbachev’s visit to Germany, *Deutsche Einheit*, Docs. 2–4; Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage, Docs. 33–44; Wirsching, *Abschied*, p. 562; Hermann Wentker, *Gorbatschow in Bonn: Ein historischer Staatsbesuch aus westdeutscher und ostdeutscher Sicht*, in: Andreas Kötzing, Francesca Weil, Mike Schmeitzner, and Jan Erik Schulte (eds.), *Vergleich als Herausforderung. Festschrift für Günther Heydemann zum 65. Geburtstag*, Göttingen 2015, pp. 277–299.

131 *Deutsche Außenpolitik 1990/91. Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Friedensordnung. Eine Dokumentation*, ed. by Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn 1991, p. 39.

132 Bundeswehr beginnt mit dem Abbau der Pershing-Raketen; *Deutsche Pershing- und SS-23-Raketen zerstört*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 5, 1990 and November 15, 1991.

133 As Shultz announced in NAC on November 25, 1987 within the first three years (the destruction period) there would be 20 on-site inspections per annum, 15 in the next 5

Initially, these obligations could clash with some left-overs of the Allied powers' reservation rights over Germany. The Three Western Powers—France, Britain and the U.S.—were still in charge of controlling German air space, and therefore had to “permit” every Soviet military aircraft that brought the inspection teams to the Frankfurt air base serving as their “entry point.” Not surprisingly, this procedure caused trouble when the time between each Soviet announcement of an inspection and the arrival of its inspection team at the nuclear deployment site was so tight. Not very sensitively, the British representative tried to shrug that question off by bluntly (but accurately) saying to his German Ally: “You are not sovereign.”¹³⁴

However, this was just a minor concern in comparison with the trouble that Britain and other NATO Allies like the U.S. caused for the *Bundesregierung* during the next two years as they continually pressed for an immediate modernization of short-range nukes. The Germans did not want this: rather, they wanted further disarmament of SNF. Throughout 1988/89 there was fierce argument over the issue in NATO. For the FRG the nuclear controversy was far from over—even after the INF Treaty was signed.¹³⁵ This time, however, Germany's national interest (“the shorter the nukes' range, the deadlier for the Germans!”) won over Anglo-American pressure and even over the sanctified axiom of Alliance solidarity, which Bonn had hitherto prioritized. Kohl and Genscher jointly pointed to their government's historic record—their imperturbable implementation of the Dual-Track Decision against all opposition, their final agreement to double zero, most recently, their abdication of the P IA. In return, they now demanded understanding for their objections to any new SNF armament. At the NATO summit in May 1989, the controversy was by no means solved. Decisions were postponed to 1992. By then, the revolutions of 1989 and the rush to German unification (within NATO) had changed the international scene completely. On May 3, 1990, President Bush announced that the United States would not pursue the modernization of ground-launched SNF; and NATO endorsed this at the next NPG ministerial meeting.¹³⁶ From the German perspective, it was only this decision that ended the controversy over nuclear missiles.

For the Christian-Liberal coalition, the wrangling surrounding the INF Treaty that raged in 1987 was a watershed. Genscher's clever, but populist solo actions and U-turns, along with the public image they created, that the tiny FDP was the

years and 10 in the following 5 years, AAPD 1987, Doc. 340, p. 1737. For more details on verification measures, Telegram No. 5132 of Gesandter Paschke, December 1, 1987, in: *ibid.*, Doc. 349 as well as the Multilateral Basing Country Agreement (MBCA) between the U.S.A., Belgium, Britain, FRG, the Netherlands, and the UK of December 11, 1987, *ibid.*, Fn. 6. See also the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

134 Memo of AA's legal advisor Hillenberg, December 4, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 354, p. 1802.

135 For the SNF controversy Wirsching, *Abschied*, pp. 570f.; Fröhlich, *Kanzler*, pp. 176–186; Josef Holik, *Die Rüstungskontrolle. Rückblick auf eine kurze Ära*, Berlin 2008, pp. 61–66.

136 *Die Einheit*, Doc. 95, Fn. 19 and Doc. 93, Fn. 4.

tail that wagged the dog, left deep scars within the CDU and the CSU. Personally, Chancellor Kohl came out wounded too. The old personal friendship he had had with Genscher was badly harmed, and these two alpha males never again completely trusted one another. The enmity left its marks in significant trifles: from now on, neither politician would inform the other of conversations they had with foreign leaders. It was a sign of poor cooperation and surely not the best way to handle a stringent German foreign policy.

For many political observers, the events of 1987 confirmed the popular verdict that Kohl was a mediocre Chancellor who lacked real leadership skills. That soon proved wrong. However, it is hardly a coincidence that, only two years later, all those in the CDU who had early on favored Genscher's political line and who (like Geißler, Späth, and Blüm) had helped swing the Party round on the double zero and P IA issues, joined in spearheading the internal *fronde* that tried—unsuccessfully—to dethrone Kohl at the Bremen Party Convention in summer 1989.

From an American perspective, it was a mixed blessing that, due to the INF controversy in Bonn, the political impact of Foreign Minister Genscher grew and grew. Though Washington appreciated the effect of Genscher's crusade for double zero (and his influence on giving up the P IA), officials there continued to distrust his wheeler-dealing and the offers he made to Gorbachev—his "Genscherism." In Moscow, however, it was precisely this that unmistakably made Genscher an influential *persona gratissima*.

The Reagan Administration was well aware that its INF policy caused real problems for its staunch ally, Chancellor Kohl. However, coming to terms with the other superpower over nuclear disarmament was more important; and in the end, Washington could not help Kohl with his political dilemma. Nevertheless, the U.S. Administration could rely on the fact that this dyed-in-the-wool Atlanticist and realist would never seriously embark on Gaullist daydreams of a dubious European *fronde* against the superpowers, as did Strauß and Dregger. Washington tried to show Kohl appreciation. In mid-December 1987, Secretary Shultz praised the Chancellor publicly as an important leader who had had a decisive share in implementing NATO's Dual-Track Decision, thus laying a foundation for the developments bringing about the successful INF Treaty.¹³⁷ The Administration also pushed within the Alliance to secure German Defense Minister Wörner's appointment as next Secretary General of NATO, when Kohl announced Wörner's candidacy at the same press conference in which he said that the Pershing IA would be scrapped.¹³⁸ Last but not least, Washington showed its gratitude in 1989/90 by strongly supporting Kohl's rush to achieve German unification. The Bush Administration backed this historic move against all objections from the Allies and the Eastern powers, and vigorously helped Kohl's government through the process on the international stage.

137 Shultz bestätigt westliche Berlin-Initiative, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 16, 1987, p. 1, also conversation of Kohl with Shultz, December 15, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 371.

138 Letter Genscher to Shultz, November 2, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 304 and Doc. 371, Fn. 35.

The Soviet leadership, too, would hardly have agreed to German unification if trust in West Germany had not grown further between 1987 and 1990. The initial rather hesitant and grudging reaction of the Federal Government to the double zero solution was soon forgotten. What counted in the end was Bonn's far-reaching concession when it "voluntarily" gave up its Pershing IA missiles. Thus, this move not only helped the INF Treaty come into being—a major breakthrough in the cause of disarmament—but brought ample rewards to the German people, who for decades had been living in a divided country in the shadow of the Cold War.

Christian Wenkel

Resuming European Détente and European Integration

France and the INF Treaty

In 1987, the two superpowers signed the INF Treaty, thus officially ending the Euromissile crisis. Though neither the French President nor any other French representative sat at the negotiation table, France itself was present—for throughout the Euromissile crisis, French diplomacy had played a decisive role. Pursuing his own *Ostpolitik*, in which he always took a tough line with Moscow, President François Mitterrand had actively encouraged Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to resume the U.S.–Soviet dialogue on détente and disarmament, which had come to a standstill at the beginning of the 1980s. Mitterrand had held extensive conversations with both Reagan and Gorbachev in 1984/85 and had offered both of them advice on how to get back into meaningful negotiations.¹

This was important to Mitterrand's own policy aims. The return to confrontation between the superpowers at the end of the 1970s considerably reduced France's room for maneuver in the field of East–West cooperation. It also hindered progress towards European integration. So, from the French perspective, any improvement in the area of détente and disarmament between the two superpowers and any steps forward towards ending the Euromissile crises would make better conditions for cooperation within Europe—both between the East-

1 For French policies during the last years of the Cold War see Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification*, New York 2009; from the same author with a particular focus on the Euromissile Crisis, France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Stanford 2015, pp. 196–212; an excellent PhD thesis on this issue, completed in 2017 at Sorbonne Paris Cité University (USPC) under Frédéric Bozo's supervision, is Ilaria Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles, 1977–1987*, 627 pages; see also Parisi's article: *L'indépendance européenne en question. La France et la crise des euromissiles (1977–1987)*, in: *Relations Internationales* 178 (2019), pp. 57–71. Another approach to the topic can be found in Georges-Henri Soutou, *Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011, pp. 363–376; so far as the French archives are concerned, a large part is already accessible, in particular the holdings of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a part of the holdings of the Mitterrand archives can be consulted via special permits (e.g. talks with heads of government from the U.S., the Federal Republic of Germany, or the Soviet Union), but important papers on the INF endgame are still being kept closed for another twenty years.

ern and the Western parts of the continent and between the member-states of the European Economic Community (EEC).

The process of European integration had been linked to Cold War dynamics ever since the early 1950s.² French foreign policies were much involved with both of these crucial issues, in particular with regard to the German question.³ Thus, it seems quite productive to focus on France during the INF endgame. In fact, the French attitude towards the INF Treaty of 1987 helps us understand the impact the last major crises of the Cold War—including the Euromissile issue—had on the European integration process right up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and even beyond.⁴

The link between the profound crisis in East–West relations during the 1980s and the various steps towards European integration, such as the beginnings of Franco-German Defense cooperation, enlargements in the Mediterranean area,⁵ and the European Single Act of 1986, is of a quite different nature from what had been seen in earlier decades. Nevertheless, as in the 1950s, it is easy to assume a stimulating role played by the darkening on the horizon of international relations, which is what was experienced in the early 1980s. A very first result was closer policy coordination inside the EEC, especially between Paris, Bonn, and (to a lesser extent) London, concerning relations with Eastern Europe.⁶ In

- 2 For the interdependencies between the Cold War and European Integration see, above all, the works of Piers Ludlow, *European Integration and the Cold War*, in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II: Crises and Détente*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 179–194, and *The new Cold War and the Expansion of the European Community—a Nexus?*, in: Johnny Laursen (ed.), *The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community 1973–1983*, Baden-Baden 2014, pp. 131–149; see also Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, Cambridge 2013; Angela Romano, *Re-Designing Military Security in Europe. Cooperation and Competition between the European Community and NATO During the Early 1980s*, in: *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 24 (2018), pp. 445–471; for the 1950s see, for example, Klaus Schwabe, *The Cold War and European Integration 1947–1963*, in: *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12/4, (2011), pp. 18–34.
- 3 Frédéric Bozo and Christian Wenkel (eds.), *France and the German Question*, New York 2019.
- 4 The issue of this linkage between the last major Cold War crisis and the Maastricht process is the main focus of my current research on the relations between the United States and the European Community; for earlier treatments of this complex issue, see Silvio Pons and Frederico Romero, *Europe between the Superpowers, 1968–1981*, in: Antonio Varsorri and Guia Migani (eds.), *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. Entering a Different World*, Brussels 2006, pp. 85–97; Philipp Gassert, *Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation*, in: Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, New York 2013, pp. 154–176.
- 5 As shown, for example, in Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974–1979*, Basingstoke 2014.
- 6 Some reflections on this issue can be found in Christian Wenkel, *Overcoming the Crisis of Détente 1979–83. Coordinating Eastern Policies between Paris, Bonn, and London*, in: Oliver Bange and Poul Villaume (eds.), *The Long Détente. Changing Concepts of Security and Cooperation in Europe 1950s–1980s*, Budapest 2016, pp. 235–251; on the American impact

order to foster genuine European détente,⁷ Paris was now much more willing to make concessions on European integration issues, as can be seen in its attitude towards the Genscher–Colombo initiative. Above all, it urged a deepening of Franco–German cooperation. The crisis clearly helped the relaunch of the European integration process during the Fontainebleau EEC Summit in June 1984 and thus the signing of the European Single Act two years later.

The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 confirmed François Mitterrand's conception of European détente and European integration and provided a base from which he could resume both his *Ostpolitik* and his European policy as soon as he was re-elected in May 1988 and able to end his former *cohabitation* with Jacques Chirac. Against this background, the present essay will address the question of how the end of the Euromissile crisis and the signing of the INF Treaty can be linked to the various European policies of the French government. In a more general way, the discussion may also help us answer the broader question of what interdependencies there were between the Cold War crisis and European integration during the 1980s. To address these questions, the first section of the essay explores the beginnings of French policies with regard to the Euromissile crisis from the late 1970s on, and highlights the particular role Mitterrand played as a bridge-builder between East and West. A second section deals more specifically with varying French attitudes towards the INF Treaty in 1987 and towards Gorbachev, focusing on public opinion, on French diplomats and on the President himself. The last section discusses the consequences of the Treaty for French foreign policy concerned with East–West relations and integration within Europe.

1. France, the Euromissile Crisis, and the Disarmament Issue

From the beginnings of the Fifth Republic, and in particular after the 1966 decision to withdraw from NATO's military integration, France was known for its opposition to superpower disarmament deals. Despite a gradual reinterpretation of Gaullist doctrines under de Gaulle's successors, this was still the case during the 1980s. Charles de Gaulle had indeed been opposed to any arms control deal between Moscow and Washington, which he regarded as the symbol of a superpower condominium.⁸ The French position evolved considerably in 1978 under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who believed that disarmament was

on French policies, see also Laurent Césari, *Les effets des politiques américaines sur la France 1984–1988* (forthcoming article).

7 Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West shaped the Helsinki CSCE*, Brussels 2009.

8 Pascal Boniface, *Repenser la dissuasion nucléaire*, La Tour d'Aigues 1997; Pascal Boniface, *La dissuasion nucléaire dans la relation franco-allemande*, in: *Relations internationales et stratégiques* 10 (Summer 1993), pp. 19–25; Bertrand Goldschmidt, *La France et la non-prolifération*, in: *Relations internationales* 69 (Spring 1992), pp. 41–50.

a matter for all members of the international community—not just the United States and the Soviet Union. Giscard therefore asked for a commission on disarmament within the institutional framework of the United Nations. Following this change of course, French diplomats took part in the Geneva Conference on disarmament and also supported the SALT negotiations. However, France fiercely resisted any Soviet attempts to include French (or British) strategic nuclear weapons in the Geneva disarmament talks. Then, in the context of the Euromissile crisis, François Mitterrand redefined the conditions that would allow France to participate in the disarmament process at the United Nations' tribunal in 1983.⁹ For Mitterrand, it was not the weapons themselves that guaranteed effective protection but the political will to use them at the decisive moment. For him, the French *Force de frappe* was first and foremost a political weapon and he did not anticipate actually using it. The most crucial political issue for the various French governments was to maintain their independence in defense by keeping the French nuclear arsenal out of any disarmament negotiations. However, they were continually confronted by Soviet demands to include the nuclear forces of third countries in the arms control negotiations. Persistently, Paris insisted on rejecting this.

In a conversation with the new Soviet Ambassador to Paris, Yuli Vorontsov, Mitterrand explained the point of the French nuclear force: “Our *Force de frappe* plays a strategic role, not a tactical one. [...] So why should France use its nuclear weapons if this would lead to a devastating disaster? We are not crazy! This force is our ultimate means of honor and defence.”¹⁰ Considering the Soviet demands unfriendly, he complained bitterly about the unwillingness of the Soviets to understand the French position: “I have not understood anything in Russian analyses of French politics for quite a while. It is as if I spoke Assyrian. But I speak French!”¹¹

The usual Soviet demand for the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons was repeated by Gorbachev immediately after he took office in April 1985; with the same regularity it was rejected as foolish by François Mitterrand.¹² However, the *Force de frappe* was now coming under additional pressure from the other side—from Ronald Reagan and his idea of a Strategic Defense Initiative: “The real risk in terms of space is not that the United States may become

9 François Mitterrand, *La France et sa défense. Paroles publiques d'un président 1981–1995*, Paris 2015, pp. 103–114; see also the dossier prepared for this purpose in the Mitterrand Papers, in: Archives nationales de France (AnF), series 5AG4, vol. CD264/3.

10 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Yuli Vorontsov, June 24, 1983, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD76/2.

11 Ibid.

12 Telegram from the French embassy in Moscow, April 24, 1985, in: Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter AMAE), series Europe after 1944, vol. 5642; see also François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Introduction à 25 discours, 1981–1985*, Paris 1986, pp. 32–33.

invulnerable but that the USSR may become so in turn. This would render the French deterrent force obsolete and would have incalculable consequences for our country.”¹³ In preparation for a meeting he was to have with Ronald Reagan in 1985, Mitterrand’s advisors urged him to clarify the French position: “As long as there is no other credible security system, our deterrent capacity must be maintained militarily and this has to be explained to the public.”¹⁴

One of the major differences between Mitterrand’s stance in the Euromissile crisis and that of his predecessor, Giscard, was the unreserved support he gave to the NATO Double-Track Decision from the very beginning of his Presidency. His diplomatic advisor, Hubert Védrine, described it as the “founding act” of his foreign and security policy.¹⁵ In return for this support, the French diplomats expected the Federal Republic of Germany to take a clear stance against the inclusion of French nuclear weapons in the Geneva discussions.¹⁶

In this context, a new Franco–German cooperation on security and defense was established, nearly thirty years after the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 and nearly twenty years after the signing of the Elysée Treaty of 1963, which led to the failure of De Gaulle’s ideas concerning a common Franco–German foreign and defense policy. An expression of this close cooperation between Paris and Bonn in dealings with Moscow—if not an indication of a new common Franco–German *Ostpolitik*—was Mitterrand’s speech to the Bundestag on January 20, 1983.¹⁷ In contrast to Giscard and his Administration, Mitterrand considered the Federal Republic to be not the cause of the crisis but rather its victim.

During the early 1980s, the Euromissile crisis brought about a growing convergence of German and French views about Soviet policies, even if French diplomats were far from convinced by the West German conception of the strategic (im)-balance in Europe. As a reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to Washington’s stance on East–West issues, Paris had already intensified its political consultations with Bonn. Henceforth, the German–Soviet relationship was once again considered to be a crucial element even for French détente policy, and the Federal Republic was now regarded as an honest broker between the East and the West.¹⁸

13 Memo for the President, Hubert Védrine, January 4, 1985, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD257, quoted in: Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles*, p. 431.

14 Memo in preparation for the meeting with Ronald Reagan, Elisabeth Guigou, and Hubert Védrine, May 1, 1985, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 4863, quoted in: *ibid.*, p. 433.

15 Hubert Védrine, *Les mondes de François Mitterrand. À l’Élysée 1981–1985*, Paris 1996, p. 93.

16 Report of the Franco-German Working Group on the relations with Eastern Europe to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, pp. 14–20, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.

17 For Mitterrand’s speech see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte*, 9th Legislation Period, 143rd Session, pp. 8978–8992.

18 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Joëlle Timsit, December 8, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.

In the same period a common rejection of the Soviet demand to include British and French nuclear weapons in the nuclear balance calculation in Europe also created a rare moment of unity between Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand. In accord with his British counterpart, he stated: "Our loyalty to the Alliance must not make us the plaything of decisions made between Washington and Moscow. All the more reason to strengthen the Franco-British relations that will be useful in this domain."¹⁹ Together with the Franco-German relationship, which he had described as "the last bulwark against madness" in a conversation with Helmut Schmidt some days earlier, Mitterrand intended the strengthening of such bi- and multilateral relationships between European countries to send out a message to the superpowers.²⁰

The troubles caused by the Euromissile crisis, and in particular the deployment of the American Pershing II missiles, resulted in a deterioration in the Soviet-German relationship and, in consequence, lent growing importance to the Franco-Soviet one.²¹ Paris could once again assume a leading role in the field of East-West relations. In this context, 1984 marked a turning point which led to substantial changes in French relations with Moscow in particular, but also with Washington. This was symbolically manifested in state visits the French President made to both capitals. Looking back at the end of the century, Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev's diplomatic advisor from 1986 and a foreign policy expert in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1984, regarded Mitterrand's visit to Moscow as a major event.²²

Throughout the years 1984 and 1985, Mitterrand traveled and acted as a bridge-builder between East and West, explaining to his American and Soviet counterparts how they could deal with each other. While playing a crucial part in re-establishing the East-West dialogue and encouraging a resumption of détente at superpower level, he was convinced that he was conferring a leading role on France. As he confided to Henry Kissinger: "Beyond my own person, it must be said that France is currently the only country in Western Europe that can have a meaningful dialogue with the Russians."²³

In particular, he used his meetings with President Ronald Reagan and Vice-President George Bush to prepare them for a revival of the dialogue with Moscow. In February 1984, he called on Bush to resume talks with the Soviets after a certain period had elapsed: "What we need to do is to get the Russians used to

19 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, January 10, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD75/2; see also memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, October 20, 1983, in: *ibid.*

20 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Helmut Schmidt, January 7, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD72/2.

21 Memo of the head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1984, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4907.

22 Anatoly C. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, University Park 2000, pp. 75 f.

23 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Henry Kissinger, June 28, 1984, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.

dialogue again.”²⁴ Some months later, on March 22, 1984, in a conversation with Reagan he explained how he saw the French role in helping the Soviets overcome their bad trajectory: “It is with you that they want to negotiate on the substance. But it’s more convenient for them to start with France.”²⁵

According to the French version of the minutes of this conversation, Reagan seemed to be very curious, and appreciated being advised by the French President. The central piece of advice Mitterrand gave was a psychological one: “With regard to the USSR, it is necessary: 1) not to give up anything, 2) not to concede anything, 3) to place yourself in a good psychological situation for the day when the Soviets want to discuss.” Reagan, he said, should deal very carefully with the Soviets: “Dialogue must be as much about signs as it is about substance. Primarily, for reasons of dignity. Signs and sensitivity are decisive.”²⁶ In return, the American President praised France’s role in the INF affair just as much as Bush had complimented Mitterrand for his speech to the Bundestag.

In October 1985 in Paris, Mitterrand also gave advice to Mikhail Gorbachev, when the Soviet leader made his first visit to a Western capital, just before the Geneva Summit.²⁷ For the President’s advisor Hubert Védrine, it was clear from the very beginning, that France should help Gorbachev carry through his reform agenda.²⁸

However, in March 1986 Mitterrand lost his governmental majority. For more than two years he had to work with a right-wing government under Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. This somewhat limited the degree of initiative he was able to take in the domain of foreign policy. The chief foreign policy disagreement between the left-wing President and his right-wing Prime Minister centered round security issues, particularly those raised by the INF affair. It highlights how differently they perceived the Cold War and how this conflict should be brought to an end.²⁹

24 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and George Bush, February 15, 1984, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.

25 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan, March 22, 1984, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.

26 Ibid. Reagan noted in his diary how he had probed Mitterrand on the USSR: “His views were most informative & confirmed some thoughts I’ve been having.” See Douglas Brinkley (ed.), *The Reagan Diaries*, New York 2007, p. 227.

27 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 11, 1985, in: AnF, serie 5AG4, vol. CD413/1; see also Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbatchev et “la maison commune européenne”, une révolution mentale et politique?, in: *Revue russe* 38 (2012), pp. 101–110.

28 Hubert Védrine, *Les mondes de Mitterrand*, p. 381.

29 For Chirac’s position on INF see Jacques Chirac, *Mémoires*, Paris 2009, pp. 369f.; on the *cohabitation*, Jean Lacouture, Mitterrand. Une histoire de Français, Vol. 2, Paris 1998, pp. 271–300; on the INF issue during the *cohabitation*, Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles*, pp. 426–448.

2. French Attitudes Towards Gorbachev and the INF Treaty

Compared to those in other Western countries, French intellectuals were late in turning away from the Soviet Union and Communism. An important turning point came with the events in Prague in 1968 and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's testimony about Soviet Communism some years later. But it was at the beginning of the 1980s that the rejection of the Soviet Union reached its peak in French civil society. Despite Communist participation in the French government from 1981 to 1984, French skepticism with regard to Moscow was now widespread and deeply rooted. This attitude was made particularly clear by none other than François Mitterrand in the speech he made to the German Bundestag in 1983. In 1985, only five per cent of the French had a positive image of the Soviet Union. This changed fundamentally with the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev on the political stage—albeit with some delay. French opinion researchers therefore compared Gorbachev's impact, and especially his peace initiatives, with the perceptual shifts triggered by Stalin and Khrushchev in earlier decades.³⁰

By 1989, Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader towards whom the French showed more trust and sympathy than they did to his American counterpart. Surveys confirm that it was above all the dimension of peace that shaped the image of both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union most strongly at this moment. The decisive change in the perception of Gorbachev dates back to 1987 and can be linked to the negotiation and signing of the INF Treaty. While in April most French people were still against a double-zero solution, by June they had already come to favor it—a turn probably due to the silencing of the Gorbachev and INF critics in the ranks of the Chirac government. In 1988 Gorbachev was even proclaimed “Man of the Year” by the right-wing conservative newspaper *Le Figaro*.³¹

In the commentaries of French journalists who specialized in foreign and defense policy issues, three currents can be identified when Gorbachev and his reform policy were assessed. Between the outright skeptics at one extreme and the optimists at the opposite pole, the largest group cautiously appreciated that change, but focused on the narrow limits set. They were particularly impressed by the changes being made in foreign policy, which gave them an overall positive picture of Gorbachev.³²

As in other countries, the Washington Summit of December 1987 was well covered by TV stations and in the press. The French public was fascinated, and, according to surveys, was largely in favor of abolishing intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The country's press, however, was divided in its assessment of

30 Olivier Noc, *Le choc Gorbatchev*, in: *Société française d'enquêtes par sondages* (ed.), *L'état de l'opinion 1990*, Paris 1990, pp. 51–69.

31 *Le Figaro Magazine*, January 2, 1988.

32 Stéphane Verlhac, *La perestroïka gorbatchévienne vue par les politologues et observateurs français*, in: *Cahiers d'histoire immédiate* 10 (Autumn 1996), pp. 143–185.

the Summit and the INF Treaty. Left-wing newspapers and journals, and also those from Catholic circles, were clearly in favor of the Treaty. They thought it a spectacular achievement, especially because of the verification measures, and liked the way Reagan and Gorbachev were readjusting to peace. But those from the right-wing camp were very critical about the Treaty as well as about Reagan—and especially about Mitterrand. Typical headlines during the days of the Washington Summit ran: “75 hours are enough to undress Europe”, “The illusion of the zero-option”, and “A fool’s bargain”.³³ Articles under such titles reflected not only the official French position before the turn under Giscard in 1978 but also the attitude of the right-wing government in office in 1987. This government considered the Treaty pointless, and even dangerous, for French security. Gorbachev was portrayed as a clever winner, able to triumph over a weak old man in the U.S. who had become a victim of efficient Soviet propaganda.

The Summit also provided an occasion for French diplomats, former military officials and political opponents of Mitterrand to express their fears about his attitude towards the INF Treaty. They wanted to “wake up” the French public. François Fillon, right-wing President of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee of the French Parliament, for instance, suspected Mitterrand of envisaging the scrapping of French nuclear forces and criticized the way he had given his support to the Germans in 1983.³⁴ Others feared a potential new Yalta, in which the superpowers would decide on Europe’s future without Europeans themselves having any say on the issue.³⁵ What is much more remarkable, however, is that some of the critics suggested taking the bull by the horns and creating a European Defense Community and a European Political Union. This last argument proved quite useful to the French President in pursuing his European ambitions.³⁶

The outlook of the French Foreign Ministry was colored by a traditional anti-Sovietism. At the time of the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986, French diplomats were very disappointed with Washington and Moscow and the willingness to sign an INF Treaty as soon as possible that both sides seemed to show. A lot of memos, written during the weeks around the Summit, dealt with the risk of a possible denuclearization of Western Europe and the fear of the expected

33 Robert Lacontre, Washington. 75 heures pour déshabiller l’Europe?, in: *Le Figaro Magazine*, December 12, 1987; Jean Denipere, Les illusions de l’option zéro, in: *Rivarol*, January 29, 1988; Jacques Bonomo, Accord de désarmement ou marché de dupes?, in: *Le Figaro*, February 27, 1988; all the articles from the French press quoted in this chapter were found in the various press packs on the subject compiled by the Sciences Po Paris library.

34 François Fillon, Pas de salut sans un front commun, in: *Le quotidien de Paris*, December 4, 1987.

35 Alain Peyrefitte, Un parfum de Yalta, in: *Le Figaro*, December 9, 1987.

36 Jean Denipere, Les illusions de l’option zéro, in: *Rivarol*, January 29, 1988; Noël Darbroz, Pas d’Europe aux sommets, in: *La Croix*, December 8, 1987; Michel Drancourt, L’Europe au défi, in: *Le quotidien de Paris*, December 8, 1987; Jean-François Poncet, Une grande absente, in: *Le Figaro*, December 7, 1987.

weakness of France's position should this happen.³⁷ The various departments of the Quai d'Orsay remained skeptical or were as outright pessimistic as Jacques Chirac and Jean-Bernard Raimond, his Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Since World War Two, our security and that of our allies has been based on nuclear deterrence [...]. Again, the Reykjavik meeting gave the impression that the abolition of deterrence could be a matter for a US–Soviet consensus, which is a cause of serious concern for France."³⁸ The French Minister of Defense, André Giraud, even described Gorbachev's proposition for a double-zero option made on February 28, 1987 as a "European Munich" that would give the Soviets free rein to use all their other military levers to dominate Europe.³⁹

Prime Minister Chirac stood on the side of the British and the Germans when he emphasized his doubts about the double-zero solution. Only the German decisions of 1987 to approve the double-zero solution and to give up any plan to modernize the Pershing IA missiles—decisions in line with Mitterrand's position—brought the President's dispute with his Prime Minister to an end, at least formally.⁴⁰

French diplomats believed that strategic nuclear forces were the real danger to their country and therefore insisted on the necessity of nuclear deterrence in Europe and on maintaining the existing strategic link between Western Europe and the United States. The question now being asked in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was how the link between European and American security interests could be re-organized.⁴¹ Another issue much discussed at the Quai d'Orsay during the months and weeks before the signing of the INF Treaty concerned the verification measures and the question of whether these measures could endanger the West in subsequent disarmament negotiations.⁴²

Nevertheless, despite all these initial criticisms and fears, and although, in the end, France was only indirectly affected, the majority of French diplomats approved of the INF Treaty, believing that it fulfilled the Western objectives formulated in 1979. Clearly, they would have preferred it if Washington and Moscow had first settled the issue of their strategic nuclear forces (START) and

37 For example, a memo on the French position towards the INF affair of the Strategic Affairs Directorate, November 27, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6621.

38 Memo of the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 3, 1986, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6652.

39 Quoted in Pierre Favier and Michel Martin-Roland, *La décennie Mitterrand*, vol. 2: *Les épreuves 1984–1988*, Paris 1996, p. 650; see also Bozo, *France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War*, p. 206.

40 Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles*, p. 443. See also the essay by Tim Geiger in this volume.

41 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6621.

42 The question arises for the first time in a memo of the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 11, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6621.

the disarmament of short-range missiles. They were also a little worried—though not as much as their German counterparts—about the convergence of denuclearization ideas in Moscow and Washington. And finally, they wondered whether the Allies would now be able to clarify their objectives. They therefore suggested that, after the signing of the INF Treaty, nuclear disarmament in Europe should be slowed down until a clear common position on European security was found.

At the time, French Socialists, too, generally distrusted Gorbachev's disarmament rhetoric. Amongst them, as with others, a change in attitude can be observed from the year 1987 onwards. It may be explained by a variety of events, such as the release of Andrei Sakharov, eased emigration possibilities for Russian Jews, and a trip the General Secretary of the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), Lionel Jospin, made to Moscow; but the INF Treaty was also highly significant. At the end of the year, most French Socialists and, above all, the French President were vehement supporters of *Perestroika*.⁴³ Previously, Mitterrand had not been completely convinced of the honest intentions of the Soviet leader, but his attitude towards Gorbachev's reform policy evolved considerably after the Summit meeting in Moscow in July 1986.⁴⁴

When the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987, neither Mitterrand nor Chirac could react in any other way than positively; but the French President's reaction was especially enthusiastic. In contrast to many of his contemporaries (and not only in France), he believed in a possible end to the Cold War, and the Treaty confirmed this conviction.⁴⁵ He even expressed his support for the Treaty on German television.⁴⁶

Like his predecessor Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand considered the INF Treaty to be a historical milestone, putting a European position into practice, and serving as a starting point for a longer-term process of ensuring peace. At the same time, he agreed with his critics that a disengagement of the United States from Western Europe would pose a potential threat. However, he was confident that the Treaty would not fundamentally change the picture. What he feared much more than the chances of a nuclear attack was a military conflict fought with conventional arms along the length of the Iron Curtain.⁴⁷

At the NATO Summit in March 1988, he praised the Treaty again, describing it as a beginning, and now calling for a fifty per cent reduction in the strategic arms of the U.S. and the USSR, simultaneously urging that conventional forces be disarmed, a plea he had already made in 1986. To West European critics of the INF Treaty, he recommended attending more carefully to these disarmament

43 Marie-Pierre Rey, *La gauche française face à la perestroïka gorbatchévienne 1985–1991*, in: *Communisme* 76/77 (2003/2004), pp. 141–167.

44 See Bozo, *France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War*, p. 208.

45 Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles*, p. 444.

46 Interview with François Mitterrand on East German television, January 6, 1988, <https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-6732-fr.pdf> (accessed on May 6, 2020).

47 Interview with Yves Mourousi (TF1), in: Mitterrand, *La France et sa défense*, pp. 390–394.

issues and to the asymmetry of the conventional forces on either side of the Iron Curtain.⁴⁸

A few months later, in September 1988, he called on the United Nations tribune to organize a European conference on these issues within the framework of the CSCE.⁴⁹ Indeed, Mitterrand now considered that disarmament was one way—perhaps the most appropriate way—to change the Yalta order in Europe, especially if it meant disarming along the frontiers of the Iron Curtain. For him, the signing of the INF Treaty came at just the right moment in terms of domestic politics, a few months before the French Presidential elections. In the letter he wrote to the French people in the spring of 1988 during his campaign, Mitterrand could argue, with reference to the Treaty, that security and disarmament should be handled together and not separately.⁵⁰ His security policy stance thus gave him a domestic political advantage over Jacques Chirac.

3. The INF Treaty and French Policies towards European Integration

The Euromissile crisis was decisive in bringing about a relaunch of Franco-German cooperation, especially in the fields of security and defense. This was part of a renewed French effort to solve not only the German question but also the European one.

During the second half of the 1970s, French policies towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were characterized by vehement competition with West Germany's *Ostpolitik*. Just before the Euromissile crisis, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his diplomats were particularly worried about the expected end of the Brezhnev era and tried to make the Soviets accept the idea of a conference on disarmament in Europe. This proposal was unsuccessful, coinciding as it did with the dwindling of French political influence in Moscow. As Bonn now seemed to stand in a better position than Paris, French diplomats saw a growing necessity to foster a European framing of the Federal Republic, and in particular of its *Ostpolitik*.⁵¹

The election of François Mitterrand in 1981 gave French diplomacy the opportunity to make a fundamental change in terms of détente policy. Strategy had already begun to shift under Mitterrand's predecessor, but the transition at the

48 François Mitterrand, Declaration at the opening session of the NATO Summit, March 2, 1988, in: François Mitterrand, *La France et sa défense*, pp. 377–381. See also report of the German Ambassador to NATO, March 3, 1988, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1988*, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Matthias Peter, and Jens Jost Hofmann, Munich 2019, Doc. 75.

49 Mitterrand, *La France et sa défense*, pp. 395–400.

50 François Mitterrand, *Œuvres*, Vol. IV, Paris 2018, pp. 821–891.

51 Memo for the President, December 31, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.

Elysée Palace gave critics of the French détente policy a voice. The in-house think-tank of the Quai d'Orsay now concluded that France had never been a privileged partner of the Soviet Union but had merely been a useful plaything in the hands of Brezhnev. Even worse, the French détente policy was not only deemed ineffective but was seen as harmful for the Western allies because it favored a sort of "moral disarmament."

France's endorsement gave détente the seal of the legitimacy it needed. The diligence shown by French leaders in defending the 'achievements of détente', despite the incidents along the way, had made it possible to consolidate a concept that has been proven useful to Moscow in order to pursue a policy of military strengthening and of expansion in the Third World [...]. The deepening of the dialogue with France, and its preservation during periods of crisis (Afghanistan), has made it possible to give external credibility to the idea that the USSR is a power like any other belonging without any restriction to the community of nations. However, the quest of normality is one of the oldest objectives of the Soviet state since Rapallo. [...] France has favoured, if not the disarmament of its allies, at least some moral disarmament.⁵²

Following this new predominant perception of its own *Ostpolitik* and due to the Euromissile crisis, France reduced its relations with Moscow and other Eastern European capitals on the political level, while maintaining exchange and interpenetration economically and culturally.⁵³ This shift was largely of a symbolic nature and mainly affected the ways of communication and dealing with the Soviet leadership. During the 1970s a newly elected French President would have paid a visit to Moscow straight after coming into office. Mitterrand waited until the deployment of the Pershing II missiles on West German territory had happened. As late as 1984, he was able to revive an official French policy of détente that still seemed to have potential for widening the room for maneuver in French foreign policy.

Aiming to change the patterns of French *Ostpolitik*, Mitterrand traveled to Hungary in 1982, thereby supporting Hungarian concepts of détente and human rights. His visit to Budapest was regarded as a way of communicating to Moscow that there was a European community straddling the Iron Curtain, and also to show how the French were determined to overcome the order of Yalta:

Under these conditions, the visit of the President of the Republic will have a particular resonance: Towards the Soviet Union, it will demonstrate, at the time of the Warsaw coup, our persistent desire for dialogue with the Eastern European states, despite the pressure that Moscow is putting on them and the policy it is imposing on them. With regard to

52 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 14, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD392/4.

53 On the persistence of détente during the crisis of détente policies, see Poul Villaume and Oliver Bange (eds.), *The Long Détente. Changing Concepts of Security and Cooperation in Europe 1950s–1980s*, Budapest 2016.

the countries of Eastern Europe, it will underline our desire for openness and dialogue with the members of the European Community, which has its roots in the oldest history and whose future may not necessarily have been shattered by Yalta.⁵⁴

That some countries of the Eastern part of the continent themselves claimed membership in Europe at this very time, believing that European integration should not be limited to the West, was considered as a sign of success and change: “This concern alone constitutes recognition of the importance of the Community phenomenon and is the best encouragement on the path taken since 1957.”⁵⁵

The Euromissile crisis prompted France to reconsider its own attitudes and policies towards the East–West conflict as well as towards European integration and, linking both, the German question. This last appears to have been of particular importance to the Elysée, as Mitterrand expected a solution to it before the end of the twentieth century.⁵⁶ The political decisions taken in 1982 and 1983 due to these changes of perception remained valid for the following years—at least until the end of the Cold War.

Although Mitterrand had rejected Franco–German relations because of their exclusionary character during his Presidential election campaign, he came to rely on this bilateral relationship as a central pillar of his foreign policy only a few months after taking office. More than ever French diplomats saw this as a key guarantee of the Federal Republic’s ties to the West. This is why, at this time, they were prepared to make concessions to their German partner on the forthcoming institutional reforms of the European Community.⁵⁷ Fearing that German *Ostpolitik* might drift, with a general deterioration in German–Soviet relations in 1982 and 1983, the Quai d’Orsay expended much time and effort proposing a European vision of East–West relations to the Germans. It was a vision that would differ from the American approach and from the one that Bonn was used to conducting, which French diplomats found “non-strategic.”⁵⁸

To get the Germans to change their strategic approach, French diplomats worked at deepening Franco–German relations in the field of security policy. In the re-orientation of French defense policies which they considered necessary for this purpose, they even went as far as to call into question the Gaullist doctrine of an independent French deterrent force: they were prepared to place

54 Memo of Bertrand Dufourcq, Head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD274/4; see also a memo of the Working group on East–West Relations of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in: *ibid.*

55 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the attitude of the Soviet Union with regard to the European integration, September 13, 1983, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.

56 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, October 21, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD72/2.

57 Memo for the President, September 22, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.

58 See for example the memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 12, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.

it at the service of an emerging Europe. Their long-term objective was clearly the organization of a more European, and thus more independent, system of defense for Europe.⁵⁹ The joint Franco–German declaration on these issues made on February 25, 1982 was seen in Bonn as helpful support in the debate over the deployment of the Pershing II missiles, and in Paris as a base for a renewed *Ostpolitik* to be implemented in the future.⁶⁰

As in earlier decades, French wishes to contrive a common *Ostpolitik* with the Federal Republic were received with some reluctance in Bonn, however: “As I argued that a policy in the East should have as a necessary corollary a tenacious effort to strengthen European integration, develop common policies and consolidate existing ones, I was unanimously told that the differences in economic ideology between the partners did not allow us to be so ambitious.”⁶¹

The speech Mitterrand made to the Bundestag enabled him to clarify his own position, and to send a clear, strong signal that France wanted to enhance Franco–German solidarity. Mitterrand was quite worried by the pacifist movement in the Federal Republic and its potential impact on German policies—indeed, this was one of his main motivations for delivering the speech. One of the most important results that came from it was the very close and strategic relationship Mitterrand struck up with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It lasted at least until 1989/90 and the dispute over how to put German unity into practice.

Once the INF Treaty had been signed, making European détente possible once again, the German question came back on the agenda too. From the French point of view, the renewed European détente could facilitate European integration, and this was seen as particularly urgent as a renewed German *Ostpolitik* was becoming increasingly active:⁶² “There’s only European unification. If not, Germany will play between East and West.”⁶³

The decisions taken at the Franco–German Summit on November 12 and 13, 1987 (on the eve of the Washington Summit) marked the beginning of a new chapter in the bilateral partnership and prepared the ground for the deepening of the European integration process. The Summit saw the creation of the Franco–German Defense and Security Council, and the Coordination Group for Economic and Monetary Policy. In January 1988, just a couple of weeks after the INF Treaty was signed in Washington and directly connected with

59 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 12, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.

60 Memo of a meeting of the political directors of the French and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs, April 30, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.

61 Telegram of Bertrand Dufourcq, head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the meeting of the Franco–German working group on relations with Eastern Europe, October 1, 1982, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.

62 Bozo, France, the Euromissiles, and the end of the Cold War, p. 207; see also Bozo and Wenkel (eds.), France and the German Question.

63 Council of Ministers, February 11, 1987, in private papers, quoted in: Bozo, France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War, p. 209.

the issues raised by it, the French President and the West German Chancellor together signed an additional protocol to the Elysée Treaty on defense and security issues, establishing, for instance, the Franco–German brigade. However, the Franco–German Defense and Security Council, officially created on this very occasion, was not allowed any competence in the nuclear domain: France preferred to retain its conservative stance on the nuclear issue. This was one of the reasons for the rather poor results the new institutions had in developing a common Franco–German strategic vision for Europe in the Cold War context. Nevertheless, French diplomats continued their quest to open up a long-term perspective, pursuing this until the German question was resolved in 1990.⁶⁴

Following his re-election in October 1988, Mitterrand delivered an important speech at the *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale*, calling for a new French spirit of engagement in defense, though not without reaffirming that a European alternative to NATO would not work.⁶⁵ This speech of his shows how far France had moved on in its strategic thinking during the Euromissile crisis and had the approval of NATO representatives and German security specialists.⁶⁶

At a range of levels French policy took advantage of the momentum set going by the INF Treaty. This was apparent in the disarmament conference in Vienna, in the revival of French *Ostpolitik* immediately after Mitterrand's re-election, and in the European integration process leading to Maastricht. Mitterrand's re-election with a Socialist majority in May 1988 seems to have shown popular approval of his positive evaluation of East–West relations after Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in office, and his optimistic acceptance of the INF Treaty as an invitation to deepen the European Community at both political and defense levels. He could thus resume an *Ostpolitik* that corresponded to his own conception of détente. Throughout the years 1988 and 1989 he made numerous trips to Eastern European countries establishing new relationships with them on the pattern inaugurated during his trip to Hungary in 1982.⁶⁷

In Paris, the rapprochement of the two superpowers was seen as a precondition for a European response to the continent's security requirements. A new European defense policy was envisaged—to be created from 1993 onwards. The basis for it was the close Franco–German cooperation on defense issues that had been started in 1982 and was formalized in 1988. Energized by the INF Treaty, as a signal announcing the crumbling of the two Cold War blocs, European actors

64 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Franco–German relationship, April 30, 1989, in: Maurice Vaisse and Christian Wenkel (eds.), *La diplomatie française face à l'unification allemande. D'après des archives inédites*, Paris 2011, pp. 55–60.

65 Mitterrand, *La France et sa défense*, pp. 401–417.

66 Samuel F. Wells, *France and NATO under Mitterrand 1981–1989*, in: Maurice Vaisse, Pierre Melandri, and Frédéric Bozo (eds.), *France et l'OTAN*, Brussels 2012, pp. 559–631.

67 Memo for the President, Caroline de Margerie, January 23, 1992, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CDM33.

could expect greater room for their own maneuvering. France played a central role in pushing forward the Maastricht process that was about to begin and, in particular, in the integration of security and defense issues into the European Union project. When this process started in 1988, the plan to reinforce security in Europe meant first and foremost strengthening European integration so that the European countries could themselves be actors, rather than passive objects of the East–West conflict.⁶⁸ It can safely be assumed that in 1987/88 Mitterrand was already looking beyond the end of the Cold War order.

At the time, the real question was about how French defense capacities could be integrated into a European defense project—a tricky question, as the French defense doctrine did not correspond with that of NATO. However, the INF Treaty marked a turning point in the relations France had with this organization. In 1988—for the first time since 1966—France adopted a NATO resolution, and thus created a unanimity in the West that had been unknown for more than twenty years. Finally, the signing of the INF Treaty paved the way for the French government to sign its own first major disarmament treaty in Vienna in November 1990—the Treaty on Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE).

All these efforts—in the fields of *Ostpolitik*, of Franco–German relations, of European integration, and of disarmament—can be understood as expressions of the French will to solve the European question, to find ways to go beyond the still existing Yalta order in Europe and to end the East–West division of the European continent. In the course of the INF affair, the French changed their perception of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, and it seems that this led them to an altered view of Europe, so that they saw the overall European question differently as well. This had direct consequences on the policy the French adopted in 1989/90 to deal with that question. Largely unnoticed by American foreign policy, but still in its wake, the European Community had been evolving since the mid-1980s, not least under French political influence. From 1988 on, decisive moves were made towards the creation of new structures. These can be understood as a reaction to the experience of the Euromissile crisis, but, at the European level, they would last far beyond the end of the Cold War.⁶⁹

68 See also Parisi, *La France et la crise des euromissiles*, p. 409.

69 Samuel F. Wells, *From Euromissiles to Maastricht: The Policies of Reagan–Bush and Mitterrand*, in: Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo, and Samuel F. Wells (eds.), *The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe*, Washington 2006, pp. 287–307; Dieter Krüger, *Sicherheit durch Integration? NATO, EU und der lange Schatten des Kalten Krieges*, in: Bernd Greiner (ed.), *Das Erbe des Kalten Krieges*, Hamburg 2013, pp. 176–193.

III. Reactions of the Eastern Allies

Hermann Wentker

The German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty

Erich Honecker was not a friend of nuclear weapons in Europe. If war broke out, it was clear that the GDR would be part of the battlefield and would suffer devastating consequences. At the beginning of the 1980s, with the discussion about NATO's Double-Track Decision and the threatened deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in West Germany and other West European countries, Honecker's anxiety grew. It came to a peak when, after the deployment decision of the Bundestag in November 1983, the GDR had to accept the deployment of Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles on its own territory. In an interview with the West German weekly paper *Die Zeit* in January 1986 he clearly stated that these weapons would vanish from East German soil if the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on a zero option on INF weapons.¹ Several months later, on November 21, he became even more explicit in a speech delivered to the SED Central Committee: "If the INF-question is solved it will no longer be necessary to have tactical missiles (under the range of 1,000 km) in the GDR. Then it would be possible to remove this devil's stuff (*Teufelszeug*) from the territory of the GDR."² With this statement—which was printed in *Neues Deutschland*, the paper of the Socialist Unity Party (SED)—Honecker stated publicly that the GDR was adversely affected by the deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads on its own territory and that he wanted to see them removed. Shortly before this event, on October 11 and 12, U. S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had almost agreed to scrap all ground-launched INF at their meeting in Reykjavik.

But it was not only general concern about the effects of a nuclear war on the GDR and tactical support for the Soviet leader that induced Honecker to make

1 Wir sind für den Frieden auf der Erde und im Kosmos. Interview des Chefredakteurs der BRD-Wochenzeitung *Die Zeit*, Dr. Theo Sommer, January 24, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 11, Berlin (East) 1987, p. 239.

2 Mit Initiative, Schöpfertum und Tatkraft verwirklichen wir die Beschlüsse unseres XI. Parteitag. Aus dem Schlußwort auf der 3. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED, November 21, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 12, Berlin (East) 1988, p. 203. According to Oliver Bange, Honecker had spoken repeatedly about "nuclear suicide" since 1981, and had used the term "devil's stuff" to characterize Western and (from 1983 onwards) Eastern nuclear weapons, but he does not substantiate this with any sources, see Oliver Bange, Sicherheit und Staat. Die Bündnis- und Militärpolitik der DDR im internationalen Kontext 1969 bis 1990, Berlin 2017, p. 224.

this statement. For a deeper understanding of GDR politics with regard to INF and the INF Treaty, first it is necessary to look back briefly to 1983, when the Soviets decided to deploy SS-12 and SS-23 in East Germany. Secondly, East German politics with regard to the INF Treaty have to be seen in the context of Soviet–East German relations, on which Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985 had a decisive influence—and this means the relationship between the leaders in Moscow and East Berlin as well as that between Gorbachev and the East German people. As the GDR could not influence Soviet–U. S. negotiations directly, Honecker had to concentrate on supporting the Soviet position *indirectly*, through his contacts with West German politicians. Furthermore, he tried to impress Moscow with his power to influence West German politics. So the third part will be devoted to East German support of Gorbachev in the context of relations between Bonn and Moscow. As this essay will not restrict itself to high-level politics, the fourth and last part will be concerned with the important question of how the East German public responded to the negotiations and the INF Treaty in 1987.

1. A Brief Look Back: Soviet Reactions to the Bundestag’s Arms Upgrade Resolution and the GDR

On December 12, 1979, the NATO Foreign Ministers decided, on the one hand, to deploy new American nuclear weapons in Western Europe, in order to restore the balance in nuclear deterrence after the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the European parts of the Soviet Union from 1976. On the other hand, they made an offer that both superpowers should negotiate a restriction of their INF, thus opening the possibility of reducing Soviet SS-20 missiles and of deploying fewer Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) than stated in the first part of the Decision.³ Although Moscow at first declined to talk as long as NATO stuck to its Decision, it eventually agreed to negotiations in Geneva, which began on November 30, 1981. As it became clear in the course of 1983 that these talks would remain inconclusive, the probability increased that the Bundestag would pass a vote in favor of the deployment of Pershing II missiles and GLCM in West Germany.

Already on May 12, 1983 the Politburo of the CPSU decided that, in this case, more than the intended number of SS-20 would be deployed and that operational-tactical missiles would be transferred further to the west, especially to the GDR and the ČSSR. Without giving details, the Soviet government announced on May 28 that if U. S. weapons were deployed, it would take effective countermeasures.⁴

3 For the Dual-Track Decision, see the Communiqué of NATO’s special meeting, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm.

4 Cf. Gerhard Wettig, Die Sowjetunion in der Auseinandersetzung über den NATO-Doppelbeschluss 1979–1983, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ) 57 (2009), p. 252; Julij A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten, Berlin 1993, pp. 322, 325.

Honecker did not favor this increase of nuclear weapons in the GDR. This was mainly for economic and financial reasons. To a large extent, the GDR was dependent on the Soviet Union for the supply of cheap raw materials, especially crude oil. When, in the fall of 1981, Moscow let its East German ally know that it would cut the delivery of crude oil in the future by two million tons, from 19 to 17 million tons per year,⁵ it became clear to the East German leadership that economic support from the Soviet Union would in future decrease. This would make the GDR more and more dependent on economic cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany, even though its *raison d'état* called for delimitation from its West German rival. Since the normalization of relations between the two German states in the Basic Treaty of 1972, the GDR also profited from West German loans and payments, especially for the use of East German traffic routes. In order not to endanger favorable trading conditions and other financial advantages from the Federal Republic, Honecker had to maintain a policy of détente between both German states at almost any price.⁶ And last, but not least he dreaded the costs which would be incurred in the preparation of the deployment sites.⁷ Honecker also knew from a visit to Moscow made in early October 1983 by Herbert Häber, Head of the so called "West Department" in the Central Committee, that the Soviet leadership did not have any idea how to react politically if there was a West German decision in favor of deployment. Afterwards Häber visited the Federal Republic and, after talks with numerous government and opposition leaders, reported: "In all discussions one notices that the term 'damage limitation' was being used as a central theme."⁸ Although Honecker learned from this report that only the West German Social Democratic Party and the tiny Green Party would reject the deployment of missiles and that the Parties of the governing Christian-Liberal coalition would support the move, he became

5 For Soviet-East German communication on this matter between August, 27 and October, 21 1981 see Hans-Hermann Hertle, Die Diskussion der ökonomischen Krisen in der Führungsspitze der SED, in: Theo Pirker, M. Rainer Lepsius, Rainer Weinert, and Hans-Hermann Hertle (eds.), *Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. Gespräche und Analysen*, Opladen 1995, pp. 321 f.

6 Cf. Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989, Munich 2007, pp. 477–480, 500–506; on German–German relations during the controversies over the NATO Double-Track Decision see Hermann Wentker, NATO's Double-Track Decision and East–West German Relations, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 87–103.

7 Cf. Heiner Bröckermann, Landesverteidigung und Militarisierung. Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der DDR in der Ära Honecker 1971–1989, Berlin 2011, pp. 536 f.

8 Häber's report on his sojourn in the FRG from 9–16 October, 1983, in: Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), *Die Häber-Protokolle. Schlaglichter der SED-Westpolitik 1973–1985*, Berlin 1999, p. 148.

convinced that Bonn had an interest in maintaining *détente* in East-West German relations, just as he did.⁹

So, after the Bundestag's arms upgrade decision of November 22, Honecker believed he could develop his own strategy with impunity. Three days later, he announced the counter-deployment of Soviet operational-tactical missiles in the GDR (SS-12 and SS-23) at the meeting of the SED's Central Committee. But he added: "Of course, these measures which were indispensable to prevent the strategic military superiority of the U.S. are not producing cheering and jubilation throughout our country." He affirmed his set intention to prevent a nuclear world war, to end the arms race, and to continue the policy of *détente*. With respect to East-West German relations, he added that he was anxious to "control the damage as much as possible."¹⁰ Against the backdrop of what he had heard from Bonn, this was meant as a message to the West German leaders that they need not fear a deterioration in these relations. As became clear in a letter from the Central committee of the CPSU to the SED Politburo sent at the end of November, Moscow expected East Berlin to pursue a "walls up" policy towards Bonn.¹¹ But Honecker did not give in. Economic dependency on the West German rival was increasing, as can be seen from the negotiations about two loan pledges of over a billion DM each, the first of which was settled on July 1, 1983 and the second a year later on July 25, 1984.¹² Honecker simply could not afford to antagonize Bonn.

He was therefore very pleased when Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl applauded his statements to the Central Committee in a letter, and confirmed his own commitment to East-West German dialogue. Kohl concluded, "The two states in Germany find themselves, with respect to each other, in a unique association of responsibility towards Europe at large and the German people in particular." Honecker took up the term "association of responsibility" in his subsequent phone conversation with Kohl and emphasized that "realism and reason" should

- 9 Hermann Wentker, *Zwischen Unterstützung und Ablehnung der sowjetischen Linie: Die DDR, der Doppelbeschluss und die Nachrüstung*, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011, pp. 147 f.
- 10 *In kampferfüllter Zeit setzen wir den bewährten Kurs des Parteitages für Frieden und Sozialismus erfolgreich fort. Aus der Diskussionsrede von Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der SED*, in: *Neues Deutschland*, November 26/27, 1983, p. 3.
- 11 On November 28, 1983 three secret letters from the CC of the CPSU reached the SED Politburo. The second of these contained thinly veiled instructions that the GDR should make clear to the FRG how much the situation had changed after the deployment of the missiles, in "the persistent raising of political problems—the question of borders, of citizenship etc., by intensified controls of West German citizens when entering the GDR and more". Quoted after Michael Ploetz and Hans Peter Müller, *Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung. DDR und UdSSR im Kampf gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, Münster 2004, p. 179.
- 12 Stephan Kieninger, "Niemand will einen Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg". Franz Josef Strauß, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski und der Milliardenkredit für die DDR 1983, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG)* 65 (2017), pp. 352–371.

“truly gain the upper hand” in East–West relations, despite criticism of Western deployment of nuclear weapons.¹³ From the end of 1983 onwards, East–West German relations took an unexpected upward surge. Honecker kept his word to Bonn, and Moscow did not intervene. This not only secured the financial and economic support needed, it also provided the GDR—in contrast to the Soviet Union—with the profile of being a “peace-loving state.”¹⁴

Stasi sources and indirect West German opinion polls indicate that the East German public to some extent appreciated Honecker’s attitude and willingness to maintain relations with Bonn intact. But there was also widespread criticism against the quick deployment of Soviet missiles in the GDR, which for many in the population did not fit in with the protests being made against Western rearmament. In early 1984, the Stasi counted over 400 “pseudo-pacifist” and “neutralist” petitions—including over one hundred collections of signatures with about 4,000 participants—criticizing the Warsaw Pact’s reaction.¹⁵ Even if Honecker managed to maintain the image of the GDR as a “peace power” at an international level, he obviously failed to boost his popularity within his own country. According to Jens Gieseke, even in this time, “the lack of legitimacy of the East German regime was always present.”¹⁶

2. Soviet–East German Relations and Gorbachev’s Accession to Power

The estrangement between the Soviet Union and the GDR continued throughout the years 1983 and 1984. Although the Soviet leadership did not have the power to force the GDR to leave its course of conducting “business as usual” with the FRG, it was still strong enough to prevent Honecker from visiting Bonn in 1984. On August 17, 1984 the East German leadership had had to endure severe criticism of its “Westpolitik” by CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. Honecker, who had stressed that it was for the SED leadership to decide on his visit to Bonn, in the end gave in, so as to prevent an open breach between Moscow

13 Kohl to Honecker, December 14, 1983; Telephone conversation between Honecker and Kohl, December 19, 1983, in: Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen auf höchster Ebene 1980–1987*, Berlin 1995, pp. 155–159 (first quotation p. 155), pp. 159–170 (second quotation p. 165).

14 Wentker, *Zwischen Ablehnung und Unterstützung*, pp. 151–153.

15 Jens Gieseke, *Whom Did the East Germans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, Confrontation and Détente in the German Democratic Republic, 1968–1989*, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian Ostermann (eds.), *Trust, but Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, Washington, D.C./Stanford, Cal. 2016, pp. 158–160.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 159; on the East German peace movement see Rainer Eckert, *The Independent Peace Movement in East Germany*, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 207–221.

and East Berlin.¹⁷ The relative weakness of the Eastern superpower with respect to the GDR was mainly due to imperial overstretch:¹⁸ on the one hand its costly worldwide engagements increased, not only in Africa but also in Afghanistan; and on the other hand, the Soviet economy was weakening, especially with the fall in prices of crude oil after 1981. Another cause for this weakness was that, from the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union was led by ill and aged leaders: Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. This changed with the death of Chernenko, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary on March 11, 1985.

The effects on Soviet-East German relations have to be analyzed in three fields of action. First, because of Gorbachev's commitment to disarmament (which culminated in his resolve of January 15, 1986 to abolish all nuclear weapons until the year 2000),¹⁹ the GDR lost its special role as "peace power". But, by supporting such initiatives,²⁰ the GDR leadership showed it was once more in line with the Soviet Union. On the whole, this was a more comfortable position than what had prevailed before.

Second, with regard to Honecker's yearning for a visit to Bonn, nothing initially changed. In his first meeting with Kohl in Moscow on March 14, 1985, Gorbachev was anything but charming. He implicitly accused the Chancellor of "standing at attention" before the U.S. leadership.²¹ Gorbachev stuck to the Soviet line that the Federal Republic had to be punished for the deployment decision of 1983. Therefore, in 1985 and 1986, he pursued a strategy of circumventing the West German government in Western Europe.²² Moreover, he clearly demonstrated a preference for the oppositional SPD by receiving, as early as 1985, Party chairman Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia Johannes Rau (who was to challenge Kohl in the next national election). On a lower level, Moscow also courted the Green Party. After an invitation by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Greens sent a

17 Fred Oldenburg and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, Honecker kam nicht bis Bonn. Neue Quellen zum Konflikt zwischen Ost-Berlin und Moskau 1984, in: *Deutschland Archiv* 28 (1995), pp. 791–805.

18 Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews*, Baden-Baden 1998, especially pp. 133–190.

19 Erklärung des Generalsekretärs des ZK der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, January 15, 1986, in: Michail Gorbatschow, *Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze*, Vol. 3, Berlin (East) 1988, pp. 146–159.

20 E.g. UdSSR zeigt den Völkern Europas Perspektive des Friedens, in: *Neues Deutschland*, January 17, 1986, p. 1.

21 Ambassador Kastl, Moscow, to Auswärtiges Amt, March 15, 1985, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1985*, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, Munich 2016, Dok. 68, pp. 378–381.

22 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Stuttgart 2012, p. 454. See also Tim Geiger's essay in this volume.

delegation to Moscow and Leningrad in April 1986.²³ Gorbachev seems to have set his hopes on a victory of the West German Social Democrats in the federal elections on January 25, 1987. Only when these hopes were dashed by the victory of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition did he change his course. On February 2, 1987 Gorbachev instructed the Soviet foreign office to intensify contacts with the West German government, which should not be “left to Honecker”²⁴—for the SED General Secretary was also preparing his visit to Bonn, at first independently of Gorbachev. Because Gorbachev now wanted to intensify his relations with Bonn too, a certain rivalry ensued. But after Moscow’s change of course in its politics towards the Federal Republic it was, once more, in line with East Berlin, so that, after consultations between members of the SED and CPSU Party Executives in July, Honecker could visit the Federal Republic from September 7 to 11, 1987, with Gorbachev’s (grudging) consent.²⁵

Third, after having initially welcomed Gorbachev as a relatively young and dynamic leader, the East German leadership’s perception changed in the course of 1986 and 1987. As long as he only seemed intent on economic reforms, the SED (which claimed that the Soviet Union was merely catching up with the GDR) could live with the new Soviet course. The SED leadership could also feel fairly secure that the new Soviet leader would not interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR, because at a Party and State Leaders’ meeting of the COMECON states on November 10 and 11, 1986 in Moscow, Gorbachev had committed himself to the autonomy of each ruling Party.²⁶ At their meeting on October 3, 1986 Honecker had, for the first time, openly reproached Gorbachev for being too liberal with Soviet writers who had publicly denied the existence of a West and East German literature and had pronounced themselves in favor of German reunification.²⁷

23 For Gorbachev’s contacts to Brandt see e.g. Wilfried Loth, Willy Brandt, Michail Gorbatschow und das neue Europa, in: Andreas Wilkens (ed.), *Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg. Willy Brandt und die europäische Einigung*, Bonn 2010, pp. 413–432; Stefan Kreuzberger, Willy Brandt und Michail Gorbatschow. Bemühungen um eine zweite “Neue Ostpolitik”, 1985–1990, Berlin 2015; for the Soviet contacts with the Green Party see Hermann Wentker, *Die Grünen und Gorbatschow. Metamorphosen einer komplexen Beziehung 1985 bis 1990*, in: *VfZ* 62 (2014), pp. 481–514.

24 M. S. Gorbachev’s orders concerning the German question, February 2, 1987, in: Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernjajew (eds.), *Michail Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage. Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991*, Munich 2011, pp. 26 f.

25 For the preparation of Honecker’s visit see Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 515; Heike Amos, *Die SED-Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1989. Ziele, Aktivitäten und Konflikte*, Göttingen 2015, pp. 491–500.

26 Memcon of meeting of leading representatives of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries of COMECON on November 10 and 11, 1986, in Moscow, in: Daniel Küchenmeister and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, *Gorbatschows Entfernung von der Breshnew-Doktrin. Die Moskauer Beratung der Partei- und Staatschefs des Warschauer Vertrages vom 10./11. November 1986*, in: *ZfG* 42 (1994), pp. 719 f.

27 Memcon of meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev, October 3, 1986, in: Daniel Küchenmeister (ed.), *Honecker-Gorbatschow Vieraugengespräche*, Berlin 1993, pp. 160–165.

But, whereas he uttered this point of criticism behind closed doors, he felt compelled to go public after Gorbachev's speech to the CPSU Central Committee on January 28, 1987, which clearly aimed at a partial democratization of the party and the state. In a consultation with the SED *Kreissekretäre* (District Secretaries) on February 6, he implicitly distanced himself from Gorbachev with the words: "If the GDR's socialist democracy is involved, it is irreplaceable."²⁸ On April 9 the SED leadership took this distancing further with an interview given by the SED Secretary for Culture, Kurt Hager, in the West German magazine *Der Stern*. When asked if the GDR would follow the course of *Perestroika* in the Soviet Union he answered: "Would you, if your neighbor changes his wallpaper, feel obliged to change your wallpaper, too?"²⁹ This reaction was so sharp because Honecker and his entourage realized that, if transferred to the GDR, Gorbachev's reform policy would threaten not only their power but the very existence of the East German state. Though the leadership saw the risks of Gorbachev's reforms, this did not apply to the East German population. Indirect opinion polls from the West German polling agency *Infratest* and from Stasi reports show that most East Germans not only supported Gorbachev's disarmament policy, but also would welcome the transfer of Soviet reforms to the GDR. According to the *Infratest* report, Gorbachev stood "among the GDR population primarily for the hope of internal reforms."³⁰

GDR politics with regard to the INF negotiations have to be seen in the triple context of relations with the Soviet Union, of domestic policy and of the implementation of East German policy towards West Germany. East Berlin had to perform a difficult balancing act between supporting Soviet foreign policy while disapproving of its domestic politics. Because of his rejection of Soviet reforms, it became even more important for Honecker to support Gorbachev's peace moves. This was for domestic reasons, because he knew that the peace moves were popular among East Germans. His support could best be shown in the field of East–West German relations. Here Honecker continued talks with leading West German politicians, aiming to secure their support for the Soviet position. In this way, he hoped, first, to persuade Gorbachev of the value of his East German ally; second, to demonstrate to the public his intent to secure peace and get rid of the "devil's stuff" in the GDR; and, third, to maintain continuous good relations with the FRG on which the East German state depended economically.

28 Schlußwort auf dem Plenum des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, January 28, 1985, in: Gorbatschow, *Ausgewählte Reden*, Vol. 4, pp. 394–401; Erich Honecker vor 1. Kreissekretären (Auszüge), in: *Deutschland Archiv* 20 (1987), p. 442.

29 Kurt Hager beantwortet Fragen der Illustrierten *Stern* in: *Deutschland Archiv* 20 (1987), p. 656.

30 *Infratest*, *Deutschlandpolitik und innerdeutsche Situation. Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen von DDR-Besuchern und DDR-Bewohnern (I. und II. Welle)*, Zusammenfassender Berichtsband 1987, Vol. 4, p. 49, *Infratest-Archive*, Berlin.

3. East German Support of Soviet policy in the Context of Relations with Bonn and Moscow

On February 28, 1987, Gorbachev announced on Soviet television that the Soviet Union was no longer making the realization of the zero option on INF dependent on the abolition of SDI.³¹ By untying the package discussed at Reykjavik, he hoped to bring the chance of progress back to the stagnant INF negotiations. Honecker had been informed shortly before the announcement and had promised his support. Indeed, he was so quick in making a supporting declaration in *Neues Deutschland*³² that, on March 3, the SED Politburo was able to acknowledge Gorbachev's "great gratitude for the quick and prudent reaction of comrade E. Honecker and the GDR in support of the Soviet proposals."³³ In accordance with the Politburo's decision he went ahead and communicated with Helmut Kohl, writing a personal letter as well as informing him via the West German representative in East Berlin, Hans Otto Bräutigam, and via the East German representative in Bonn, Ewald Moldt. He told Kohl that the GDR would follow an INF Treaty with an agreement that the Soviet Union should withdraw its missiles from the GDR, and Bonn should also engage with its Allies to make the proposals happen. Honecker suggested that representatives of both states should meet to discuss how to support the Soviet initiative.³⁴

Kohl reacted positively with a verbal message on March 12, and promised to send Minister Wolfgang Schäuble to East Berlin.³⁵ Before this visit took place, the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow on March, 24

31 Erklärung des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, March 1, 1987, in: Gorbatschow, *Ausgewählte Reden*, vol. 4, pp. 492–494. This date is that of the publication in *Pravda* of Gorbachev's earlier announcement. For the background to this decision, see Elizabeth C. Charles, Gorbachev and the Decision to Decouple the Arms Control Package: How the Breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit Led to the Elimination of the Euromissiles, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D. C./Stanford, Cal. 2015, pp. 66–84.

32 Gemeinsame Stellungnahme des Politbüros des ZK der SED, des Staatsrates und des Ministerrates der DDR, March 1, 1987, in: *Neues Deutschland*, March 2, 1987, p. 1; see also *Diese große Chance muß genutzt werden*, *ibid.*, p. 1.

33 Minutes of the Politburo meeting, March 3, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2208, TOP 2. The draft minutes ("*Arbeitsprotokoll*") of the Politburo session contains a submission by Honecker, dated February 28, 1987, in which the measures to support Gorbachev's announcement are listed: SAPMO, DY 30 J IV, 2/2A/2985, fol. 15 f.

34 Honecker's letter to Kohl, March 1, 1987, in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock*, pp. 293 f.; Non-paper, in: Draft minutes of Politburo meeting, March 3, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30 J IV, 2/2A/2985, fol. 17 f.

35 This can be gathered from the report about the sojourn of the Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, in Berlin, March 26 and 27, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 78.

and 25, 1987, and agreed that their most important common task was to achieve a Treaty for the elimination of INF in Europe.³⁶ East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer was keen to present Honecker's policy towards Bonn as successful. So after praising Gorbachev for having shaken "the image of supposedly aggressive socialism, of the so-called evil Russian," he went on to commend Honecker's initiatives towards Kohl which had "compelled the FRG government to move" and to adopt the zero-option as well.³⁷ His aim was to underline the GDR's role as a prominent and successful supporter of Gorbachev's peace policy, especially vis à vis his Soviet colleague Shevardnadze.

Immediately after this meeting, the Minister from the Federal Chancellery, Schäuble, came as promised to East Berlin, where he met with Fischer on 26 and with Honecker on 27 March.³⁸ Fischer asked Schäuble to support the zero option "without fuss or quibble" (*"ohne Wenn und Aber"*). As the GDR leadership knew that the West German government had reservations with regard to the zero option, this addendum became a standard formula in all conversations with the West Germans on this topic. Fischer declared that, in accordance with Gorbachev's declaration, if the zero option were adopted, the missiles deployed in the GDR in 1983 would immediately be withdrawn.³⁹ He also handed a non-paper over to Schäuble containing thoughts about parallel steps both states could take in Europe. Among them was the suggestion that they should discuss "the idea of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe."⁴⁰ This was a theme on which the SED had negotiated and come to an agreement with the West German Social Democrats on October 21, 1986, when Egon Bahr (SPD) and Hermann Axen

36 Report on the 14th meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's member states on March 24 and 25, 1987, in Moscow, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2212, fol. 14–18. See also Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, Budapest/New York 2005, Doc. 121, pp. 554–556.

37 Speech by Comrade Minister Oskar Fischer during the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, March 24 and 25, 1987, in: SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 62–64.

38 The meetings are well documented: Conversations between Federal Minister Schäuble, Federal Chancellery, and Foreign Minister of the GDR, Fischer, and the General Secretary of the CC of the SED, Honecker, in East Berlin, March 26 and 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Dok. 86, pp. 416–422; Conversation Schäuble-Honecker, March 27, 1987, in: Heinrich Potthoff (ed.), *Die "Koalition der Vernunft". Deutschlandpolitik in den 80er Jahren*, Munich 1995, pp. 515–525; Report on the Sojourn of Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery in Berlin on March 26 and 27, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 78–83; Note about the conversation between Foreign Minister of the GDR, Oskar Fischer, and Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, on March 26, 1987 in Berlin, in: *ibid.*, fol. 98–105.

39 These words can be found in the East German note, but not in the West German record of conversation.

40 Non-Paper: Überlegungen für gemeinsame oder parallele Schritte der DDR und der BRD, um dazu beizutragen, die Chancen zu einem gesonderten Abkommen zur Beseitigung der Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa zu nutzen, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 115–117.

(SED) had presented their “Principles for a nuclear-free corridor” in Bonn.⁴¹ As this idea was rejected by the governing parties in Bonn, Schäuble did not mention the subject in his replies to Fischer and Honecker. He stated that, with respect to disarmament, both states should concentrate on feasible steps, including a treaty on the zero-option for INF. After that, negotiations should immediately shift to short-range nuclear forces (SNF), where the Federal Republic assumed there was a huge imbalance to the disadvantage of the West. Here, like the GDR, the Federal Republic was prepared to aim at a zero option too, but only if the imbalance of conventional weapons was redressed at the same time. Moreover, both sides should stand up for those aims in their respective alliances—a point on which they concurred. Schäuble thus avoided succumbing to demands which he knew were anathema to his government; but, with his consent to pursue the zero option with regard to INF, the East German leadership had achieved its main goal.

On March 10, in support of the Soviet initiative, the SED Politburo had decided to carry on politically and diplomatically with the struggle for Europe’s liberation from INF. This resolve played a major role in a planning paper drawn up by the East German Foreign Ministry for GDR–FRG relations on April 7 in preparation for Honecker’s visit to Bonn. This paper declared it a central aim to achieve a zero option for INF “without fuss or quibble.” Furthermore, the GDR stated its intention of counteracting any inclusion of the FRG in the confrontational situation the United States was provoking, appealing to the population’s desire for peace.⁴² In subsequent conversations between East and West German politicians at the top level, every GDR official tried to secure the consent of his dialogue partner to the zero-option, and always “without fuss or quibble.” When a West German politician used these magic words himself, as happened at the end of March, in Bonn, in a conversation between Genscher and Otto Reinhold, Director of the Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, this could be touted as evidence of East German success.⁴³ Such could not be claimed in the case of Günter Mittag’s conversation with Helmut Kohl on April 1, however. The SED Secretary for Economics not only stressed how important it would be for the GDR and the FRG to remove the INF missiles from Europe without fuss or quibble, but also repeated much of what had been said to Schäuble some two weeks before. The Chancellor did not take up the words, but only spoke in general

41 Negotiations had taken place in an SPD–SED working group between December 1985 and September 1986. See Frank Fischer, “Im deutschen Interesse”. *Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989*, Husum 2001, pp. 190–193.

42 Minutes of Politburo meeting on March 10, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2209, TOP 3; Planning paper by the Foreign Ministry on GDR–FRG relations, April 7, 1987, in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock*, pp. 307–310.

43 Information by Otto Reinhold to Erich Honecker about a meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, end of March 1987, in: *ibid.*, pp. 294–296.

terms about the favorable situation in world politics and the Federal government's "key position" in exerting influence in NATO.⁴⁴

The situation changed somewhat when, in a speech delivered in Prague on April 10, Gorbachev proposed beginning negotiations on the reduction of short-range INF—i. e. missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km.⁴⁵ This led to a split in the Federal government in Bonn, where Genscher was prepared to accept Gorbachev's offer but Defense Minister Manfred Wörner was not.⁴⁶ Honecker was well informed about the Soviet move, as became clear in his conversation with Parliamentary Group Chairman Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP) on the day of Gorbachev's speech in Prague. He not only stated once more "that it was a decisive question that the GDR and FRG should be in favor of eliminating INF in Europe without fuss or quibble," but, full of praise, he also referred to the proposal on short-range INF which Gorbachev was going to make in Prague the same day. Mischnick, who belonged to the same Party as Genscher, expressed West German interest in reaching an agreement on INF—the aim being a zero option—and suggested starting negotiations about the other missiles within six months, and discussing conventional weapons as well.⁴⁷

A few days later, on April 14, Gorbachev went even further with his proposals in a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow. Not wanting to give Washington a pretext for increasing American SRINF, he had suggested a zero option for these weapons too.⁴⁸ When Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh informed Honecker about Shultz's visit, six days later, he stated that the U. S. Foreign Secretary had not reacted to this new suggestion, but he had clearly said to Shevardnadze: "We absolutely want such a treaty." According to information available to the Soviets, Shultz had informed the NATO Allies accordingly. All this had led to a dispute between some West European states and the U. S. on how far the NATO doctrine of "flexible response" had to be changed under such new conditions. In his reply, Honecker supported the Soviet position and drew attention to the conversations he had had with West German politicians about the earlier Soviet initiatives—especially his conversation with Wolfgang Mischnick of the FDP. Honecker stressed the fact that Mischnick concurred with Genscher in his support of the zero option and, according to the

44 Memcon of conversation between Günter Mittag and Helmut Kohl, April 4, 1987, in: *ibid.*, pp. 297–303.

45 Rede auf der Kundgebung der tschechoslowakisch-sowjetischen Freundschaft, April 10, 1987, in: Gorbatschow, *Ausgewählte Reden*, Vol. 4, pp. 523–542.

46 Cf. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, Munich 1997, p. 564. See also the essays by Philipp Gassert and Tim Geiger in this volume.

47 Conversation Mischnick–Honecker, April 1, 1987, in: Potthoff (ed.), *Koalition der Vernunft*, pp. 526–533, the quotations pp. 527 f.

48 Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition. American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D. C. 1994, p. 312; George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, pp. 889–891.

information available to him, Genscher had then “played a constructive role at the Foreign Ministers’ conference in Brussels.” This was important for Honecker, who also referred to positions taken up in the CDU/CSU, especially that of Defense Minister Manfred Wörner, who rejected the double zero option. Honecker not only displayed detailed knowledge of West German politics, but also stressed the fact that the GDR had “taken an active influence on the FRG’s attitude, especially to the elimination of INF without fuss or quibble.” This, he believed, would not remain without influence on the other Western governments.⁴⁹

Although Honecker was exaggerating enormously when he ascribed Genscher’s and others’ support for the double zero option to the influence of the GDR, he was right in his analysis of the political scene in Bonn. While Genscher supported a double zero option, Wörner wanted the zero option to be restricted to missiles with a range between 1,000 and 5,000 km.⁵⁰ As Genscher later wrote in his memoirs, there were concerns in the CDU/CSU that, after a second zero option for SRINF, a third one would follow for short-range nuclear weapons (those with ranges under 500 km). This could leave Western Europe denuclearized and open to threat by the Warsaw Pact’s overwhelming conventional forces. Genscher stood out for the double zero option, however, and felt certain that Reagan and Shultz were determined to enforce this solution on the Western Alliance. He believed this because Shultz had reported back on his conversations in Moscow at a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting on April 16.⁵¹ The coalition in Bonn was heading for disagreement, which became visible in a Bundestag session on May 7, when the Greens, the SPD and the FDP declared themselves in favor of the double zero option, leaving the CDU/CSU isolated.⁵²

On May 15, Honecker congratulated the SPD Parliamentary Group Chairman, Hans-Jochen Vogel, for his speech in the Bundestag, and supported his remark that the CDU/CSU was beginning to take up an anti-American position. Clearly, Honecker wanted to exploit the split in the Federal government between the CDU/CSU and the FDP, and he encouraged Vogel to persevere in full-hearted support of the double zero option.⁵³ Against the backdrop of 80 to 83 per cent of West Germans favoring concrete disarmament steps, he was perhaps hoping for a change of government, which would enable the GDR to realize agreements that had been reached by the SED-SPD disarmament group. But on the whole

49 Memcon about a conversation between Erich Honecker and Alexander Bessmertnykh in Berlin, April 20, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30/2384, fol. 62–80, the quotations fols. 68, 77.

50 Federal Minister Wörner to Federal Chancellor Kohl, April 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Dok. 116, pp. 581–584.

51 Genscher Erinnerungen, pp. 565 f.; on the NATO Council of Ministers’ meeting see Ambassador Hansen, Brussels (NATO), to Auswärtiges Amt, April 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Dok. 115, pp. 575–581.

52 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht 11. Wahlperiode, 10. Sitzung, May 7, 1987, pp. 524–565.

53 Conversation H.-J. Vogel-Honecker, May 15, 1987, in: Potthoff (ed.), *Koalition der Vernunft*, pp. 535, 537 f., 549 f.

Honecker stuck with the government Parties; the opposition was only second in importance, and this flirtation was just an interlude. In the mid-1980s, the Green Party was also a partner of the SED leadership against the ruling coalition in Bonn, but that relationship was greatly reduced after 1986, and in April 1987 the SED Politburo decided that a precondition for a GDR visit by members of the Green Party was the recognition of GDR laws. The Greens no longer accepted these, as quite a number in their Party criticized the human rights situation in the GDR and had close ties with East German oppositional groups.⁵⁴

On June, 1, 1987 Genscher prevailed and the Federal Government decided to support the double zero option. The following day, Genscher told an SED official, Otto Reinhold, that this decision was a great success, paving the way for the West European countries' consenting to this solution in NATO. But, as the CDU and CSU were still in confusion, he declined to meet Honecker and Fischer during a forthcoming private visit to his birthplace, Halle in the south of the GDR.⁵⁵ And now a new problem was looming: Gorbachev was also demanding that the Federal Republic should get rid of 72 (older) Pershing IA missiles. As these were not U. S. missiles but were at the disposal of the *Bundeswehr*, they were not part of the INF deal. The demand provoked a new split within the Federal Government along the established lines: Genscher was prepared to abolish these missiles, but the CDU and CSU were not. Promptly, on June 24, Moscow accused Washington of wanting to exclude the Pershing IA missiles from the negotiations and the Treaty. During President Richard von Weizsäcker's state visit to the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze called these weapons "the obstacle No. 1" on the road to an INF Treaty.⁵⁶

The GDR again saw a chance to demonstrate its importance to the Soviet leadership. An opportunity arose when Klaus Wedemeier (SPD), the Mayor of Bremen, visited Honecker on July 1. After reiterating the fact that both German states had reached agreement on the elimination of INF in Europe "without fuss or quibble," Honecker pointed out that there was now a danger a Treaty could not be sealed because of the Pershing IA: "It would be bad," he said, "if the Federal Republic of Germany played a negative role in this context." His wording was very similar to Shevardnadze's, when he had described the refusal to include these missiles in the negotiations as the main obstacle to concluding a Treaty. Wedemeier agreed, following the well known position of his Party, thus provoking a protest from Hans Otto Bräutigam, who was accompanying him:

54 Regina Wick, *Die Mauer muss weg—Die DDR soll bleiben. Die Deutschlandpolitik der Grünen von 1979 bis 1990*, Stuttgart 2012, pp. 231 f.; Minutes of Politburo meeting, April 7, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30 J IV, 2/2/2213, TOP 4.

55 Information by Otto Reinhold to Erich Honecker about a meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher on June 2, 1987, in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock*, pp. 312 f.

56 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 567–570; the quotation in: Ministerialdirektor Freiherr von Richthofen, currently Moscow, to Secretaries of State Ruhfus and Sudhoff, July 9, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Dok. 204, p. 1021.

Bräutigam defended the Federal government's point of view.⁵⁷ Although this conversation had no effect on the West German government's position, Hermann Axen, the Secretary of International Affairs of the SED's Central Committee, who visited Moscow on July 27, relayed it to Alexander Dobrynin and Vadim Medvedev, who were Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, the former of its International Department, the latter of its Department for Relations with the Socialist Countries. The aim of Axen's journey was to obtain Moscow's consent for Honecker to visit the Federal Republic in September. Although he referred to West Germany's insistence on keeping the 72 Pershing IA missiles, thereby postponing the INF Treaty, Axen also stressed the fact that there was a shift of power in the Federal Republic because of East German efforts and pressure. In the Bundestag, the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP formed a majority, and the CDU and CSU had no alternative but to take this into account. Axen's self-congratulatory words culminated in the sentence: "Our pressure has forced the ruling circles in the FRG to accept the documents of Reykjavik and the unequivocal positive statement proposed by comrade Erich Honecker concerning the conclusion of a treaty about the elimination of the INF without fuss or quibble."⁵⁸ Once more the East German leadership was seeking to convince its Soviet counterparts of the GDR's value for achieving the INF Treaty. This seemed even more important at a time when Honecker was preparing his visit to Bonn, which Gorbachev had not regarded favorably.

Before this event could take place, the last stumbling block on the path to the Treaty was removed—but not because of any moves by the GDR. The main reason why Kohl had once more to line up with Genscher was that he knew he had no chance of going on if he pursued a policy that was neither in line with public opinion nor with the NATO Allies. The final initiative in this matter came from the Soviet side. Instructed by Shevardnadze, Yuliy Kvitsinky, the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, called on Genscher (who was on holiday in France) telling him that a treaty on the basis of the double zero option could be signed immediately if only Bonn would give up the Pershing IA. Returning to Bonn, Genscher managed to persuade Kohl, so that the Chancellor publicly declared the FRG's waiver of the 72 Pershing IA missiles on August 26.⁵⁹ The GDR's influence on this decision was non-existent. Nonetheless, the SED Politburo proudly declared that Kohl had been compelled to make his declaration on the Pershing IA even before Genscher's visit and continued: "The unanimity in supporting the global double

57 Permanent Representation to Auswärtiges Amt, July 1, 1987, PA AA, B2 (Ref. 014), Vol. 512962 (I thank Tim Geiger for providing me with this document.) The East German record of this meeting in: Potthoff, *Koalition der Vernunft*, pp. 559–563, is much less detailed on this point.

58 Memorandum of consultation between Hermann Axen and the Secretaries of the CC of the CPSU, Alexander Dobrynin and Vadim Medvedev on June 27, 1987 in Moscow, (extracts), in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), *Von Hubertusstock*, pp. 315–319, the quotation p. 317.

59 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 571–576.

zero option by both German states which has thus become possible is a decisive result of comrade Erich Honecker's visit to the FRG."⁶⁰

Although the GDR leadership publicly supported the Soviet position in the INF negotiations, there are indications that its military leaders were not so convinced. At the Warsaw Pact's meeting of the Defense Ministers' committee in Bucharest from November 24 to 26, Minister of Defense Heinz Keßler praised the agreement reached in the negotiations as "a great success of the peace policy of socialism over the most aggressive circles of NATO;" the Soviet Union's "persistent struggle for the conclusion of this Treaty" once more underlined "the defensive character of socialist military power." But nuclear disarmament, he went on, was only one side of the coin. So, looking at the military situation "soberly and without illusions," he pointed out "how intensely NATO is increasing and training the capability for aggression of its armed forces in big maneuvers."⁶¹ Here he was specifically referring to the autumn exercises of NATO, during which U. S. forces had carried out the biggest transport of troops to Europe since 1944, and to an exercise that had demonstrated the increasing military reintegration of French forces into NATO. Keßler's comment shows the anxiety the Eastern military felt on account of the conventional and nuclear "revolution in military affairs" in which NATO was ahead of the Warsaw Pact because of Western technological superiority. In this context the double zero option—among other factors—also contained new potential dangers.⁶²

Honecker was of a different opinion. On December 9, 1987, he hailed the INF Treaty as "a historical milestone on the road to a world without nuclear weapons," and he referred to his statement of November 1983 when he had said: "We have never made a secret of the fact that the deployment of additional nuclear weapons in East and West has for us never been a cause for rejoicing."⁶³ Moreover, on November 26, well before setting off for Washington, Gorbachev had made a phone call to Honecker suggesting a meeting of the General Secretaries of the ruling Communist Parties, after the Summit. It would be in East Berlin. Honecker was delighted with this proposal, and promised to arrange the meeting which was to take place on Gorbachev's journey back from Washington to Moscow.⁶⁴

60 Report about Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic, September 7 to 11, 1987, in: Potthoff (ed.), *Koalition der Vernunft*, pp. 564–575, the quotation p. 572.

61 Statement by the Minister of National Defense on the 20th meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense on the 1st item of the agenda, in: http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/21971/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/a622de25-3972-4d18-b6b4-c587f226abfd/de/871124_2_east_g_statement.pdf, fol. 70.

62 Cf. Bange, *Sicherheit und Staat*, especially p. 434. For the revolution in military affairs also see Oliver Bange, *SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-West Relations*, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 70–86.

63 Erklärung Honeckers: Historischer Meilenstein auf dem Wege zu einer kernwaffenfreien Welt, in: *Neues Deutschland*, December 9, 1987, p. 1.

64 Honecker to all members and candidates of the Politburo, November 26, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30/2385, fols. 122 f.

This was a great chance for Honecker to present himself once more as a—if not *the*—most important supporter of Gorbachev’s peace politics in the Eastern bloc.

The meeting of the Party leaders took place on December 11, 1987. The Foreign and Defense Ministers were also invited. Gorbachev gave a lengthy report of the Summit talks. Although he bestowed enough praise on himself, when speaking about grasping the initiative and following up on it, he also talked of changes he had perceived in Ronald Reagan: Reagan had come to the conclusion “that this Soviet government does not aim at world domination.” Honecker welcomed the INF Treaty as “the introduction to disarmament.”⁶⁵ After the meeting, a treaty was publicly signed between the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia about inspections to be made according to the INF Treaty’s terms. This treaty was needed because the withdrawal of Soviet missiles deployed in the GDR and ČSSR since 1983 also had to be monitored.⁶⁶ The meeting made an impression on the Swiss Ambassador to East Berlin, Franz Birrer. At the end of his report he wrote that “for the GDR and especially for Honecker [the conference had been] a very successful and prestigious matter.”⁶⁷ The meeting, the signing of the treaty, and surrounding events received extensive press coverage, especially by *Neues Deutschland*. The East German public was urged to realize that not only Gorbachev, but Honecker too, had had a significant share in the outcome of the negotiations.

The treaty between the Soviet Union, the GDR and the ČSSR reminded onlookers of the fact that SS-12 and SS-23 missiles were still deployed on six bases in the GDR—an appendix to the INF Treaty detailed a total 97 launchers.⁶⁸ In February and March 1988, well before the ratification of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union withdrew these weapons. In its information to the rank and file of the Party, the

65 For the preparation of the meeting, see Minutes of Politburo meeting, December 1, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2250, TOP 2; for a report of the meeting SAPMO, DY 30, J IV 2/2/2252, fols. 10–13; for protocol of internal meeting see Stenographic minutes of the meeting of leading representatives of states of the Warsaw Treaty on Friday, December 11, 1987, in Berlin, SAPMO, DY 30/2355, fols. 8–63, quotations fols. 14, 61.

66 Abkommen zwischen der DDR, der UdSSR und der ČSSR über Inspektionen im Zusammenhang mit dem Vertrag zwischen der UdSSR und den USA über die Beseitigung ihrer Raketen mittlerer und kürzerer Reichweite, December 11, 1987, in: Gipfeldiplomatie. Ausgewählte Dokumente und Chronik zu den sowjetisch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen und Gipfeltreffen Januar 1985-Juni 1988, Teil II: Dezember 1987-Juni 1988, Berlin (East) 1989, pp. 284–287.

67 Franz Birrer to Head of the Political Secretariat, December 17, 1987: Ostblock-Gipfel nach Washingtoner Gipfel, in: Bernd Haunfelder (ed.), Die DDR aus Sicht schweizerischer Diplomaten 1982–1990. Politische Berichte aus Ost-Berlin, Münster 2017, Dok. 51, pp. 204–206, the quotation p. 206.

68 Memorandum Of Understanding Regarding The Establishment Of The Data Base For The Treaty Between The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics And The United States Of America On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles, in: <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#mou>. Swiss ambassador Birrer in his report of December 17, 1987 spoke about 50 launchers and 171 missiles (including missiles for exercises): see Haunfelder (ed.), DDR aus Sicht, p. 205.

SED Central Committee once more emphasized the success of Honecker's flanking support for the Soviet Union during the negotiations.⁶⁹ However, this did not mean that now there were no missiles of this type on East German territory. As late as March 1990 a spokesman of the GDR Defense Ministry admitted to *Neues Deutschland* that the National People's Army still had 24 of its own SS-23 missiles, and four launchers at its disposal; however, these did not have nuclear warheads.⁷⁰ Being at the disposal of the East German army, these missiles were similar to the 72 Pershing IA weapons, about which the Soviet Union had made such a fuss in the summer of 1987.

4. The East German Public and the INF Treaty

In 1987 there was no longer any institution for conducting opinion polls in the GDR, but the Stasi collected information on people's opinions on a number of different topics. The so-called Central Analysis and Information Group in the Ministry for State Security (MfS) often aggregated single reports into one central report, which was sent to selected political leaders, Honecker and Stasi Minister Erich Mielke always among them.⁷¹ One of these reports surveys popular opinion on the INF Treaty. When looking at the central reports, we have to bear in mind that they were written for the political leadership; but as the following is based not only on the central report⁷² but also on a large number of single reports,⁷³ it seems possible to draw a fairly accurate picture of public opinion, even if this is based only on Stasi documents.

The main message contained in the broad Stasi coverage of how the East German population responded to the Washington Summit and the INF Treaty was that their consent and approval was unanimous. Besides this observation, the documents contain the following five key elements.

First, according to almost all the reports, people stated that it was Soviet peace policy that had made the Summit and the Treaty possible. The historical significance of the Treaty was acknowledged: a whole system of weapons would be destroyed, and this was the first time such a thing had happened. In the single

69 Bröckermann, *Landesverteidigung und Militarisierung*, pp. 708 f.

70 Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums: Kein Geheimnis um Raketen der NVA, in: *Neues Deutschland*, March 3, 1990. I thank Tim Geiger for this information.

71 Cf. Daniela Münkel, *Die DDR im Blick der Stasi. Die geheimen Berichte an die SED-Führung 1953 bis 1989. Vorwort*, in: *Die DDR im Blick der Stasi 1988. Die geheimen Berichte an die SED-Führung*, redacted by Frank Joestel, Göttingen 2010, pp. 7–11.

72 Information about the general public's first reactions to course and results of the Summit meeting between the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Comrade Gorbachev, and the President of the U. S. A., Reagan, from December 7 to 10, 1987, in *Washington*, BStU, MfS, ZAIG Nr. 4234 fols. 2–7.

73 All reports can be found in the archives of the BStU. If in the following a sentence or passage is quoted directly, a footnote will indicate the document out of which it is taken.

reports—but, interestingly, not in the general report—Gorbachev was personally credited for the meeting and its results: in one report he was called “man of the century” (*Jahrhundertmann*).⁷⁴ For the most part, Reagan came off badly: often he was called an actor who was simply putting on a show. But some reports quoted people saying that he wasn’t such a bad guy after all, and that you couldn’t just dismiss him as an actor. One single voice—that of an East German wanting to leave the GDR—even said that it was important for the East Germans that the U. S. President had addressed human rights in the Eastern bloc.⁷⁵

Second, there was widespread skepticism towards the U. S. Some people were uncertain whether Congress would ratify the INF Treaty, or whether the U. S. would adhere to its conditions, as Reagan had not given up on SDI. Despite the renewed détente in East–West relations, most people’s assessment of the character of the U. S. and of the “imperialist” states had not changed. Only one person was reported to be suspicious of the Soviet Union itself, thinking that it might not destroy its INF but hide them in some place within its vast territory.⁷⁶

Third, in spite of this continued skepticism towards the U. S., hopes were high that the INF Treaty would be just a first step and that further disarmament treaties on nuclear and conventional weapons would follow. The Christian churches even saw in the meeting of Gorbachev and Reagan a “hopeful beginning for a world characterized by Christian charity.”⁷⁷

Fourth, the East Germans projected many more wishes onto the results of the Summit. Some hoped that, with disarmament, enormous funds would become available to improve the social and economic situation—especially of people in the GDR. In the National People’s Army, conscripts hoped that the Summit would affect structure and length of service, and they hoped that fewer reservists would be called for military exercises. And, last but not least, others hoped that, with this improvement in the superpowers’ relations, the dialogue between the FRG and the GDR would improve as well. This would result in better traveling possibilities and enhanced economic and cultural relations with the Federal Republic.

Fifth, praise for Gorbachev as a champion of disarmament went hand in hand with praise for him as a reformer. The Stasi reported that discussions often began with the Washington Summit and the changes in Soviet foreign policy, but from there they went on to changes within the Soviet Union, and they ended with

74 Information about the atmospheric picture and opinions [in the National People’s Army and the border troops], December 11, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA I, Nr. 15162, fol. 341.

75 Report on mood and reaction of the general public, December 15, 1987, BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, Abt. XIX, Nr. 11219, fol. 221.

76 Information about reactions and expressions of opinion by employees of central departments of the transport and communications sector to the results of the Soviet–American summit and other political questions of the day, December 18, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA XIX, Nr. 4816, fol. 190.

77 Reactions by the general public of the district [Potsdam] to the meeting of the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU Comrade Gorbachev and U. S. President Reagan, December 8, 1987, BStU, MfS, BV Potsdam, AKG Nr. 914, fol. 66.

demands for a more open and critical approach to problems in the GDR. Other discussions dwelt on the statement Gorbachev made in East Berlin on December 11, asserting that changes in the international arena were connected with an improvement in cooperation among socialist countries and with “the perfection and the renewal of socialism.”⁷⁸ The obvious inference people drew was that more democratization, openness and honesty were needed in the GDR too.

All in all, the Stasi reports yield ambivalent results. On the one hand, we can see how popular Gorbachev was in the GDR as a harbinger of peace. The fact that the INF Treaty was primarily seen as a result of Gorbachev’s policy, and not as that of Reagan, and the widespread skepticism of the U. S. were not necessarily the result of GDR propaganda alone, or due to the fact that these reports were written for the SED leaders. These opinions may also be traced back to the influence of West German media. On the other hand, it is clear that Gorbachev functioned as a screen for the projection of the many wishes and hopes of large parts of East German society. People especially craved for inner reforms, and for improved East–West German relations and chances to travel. These latter concerns seem to have been at least as important to them as their esteem for Gorbachev’s peace politics.

5. Conclusion

1. Honecker supported Gorbachev’s disarmament politics with regard to INF because he himself wanted to remove Soviet missiles from the territory of the GDR, and also because he wanted to demonstrate to the world and to the East Germans that he concurred with Gorbachev in this field, even if he rejected Gorbachev’s politics of internal reform.

2. The only way in which he could effectively be of help in this process was by using his contacts with West German politicians. Here he tried to kill two birds with one stone. His first aim was to promote his politics of détente towards the Federal Republic so that he could visit Bonn and maintain good relations with the FRG for economic and financial reasons. His second aim was to convince Gorbachev that East German influence was needed to make the Federal Government support the double zero option “without fuss or quibble.”

3. In assessing Honecker’s success, we have to differentiate what he achieved with respect to West Germany, Gorbachev, and the East Germans. Honecker was at last able to visit the Federal Republic and there receive the maximum recognition for the GDR that it had enjoyed in the whole forty years of its existence. Whether he convinced Gorbachev of his indispensable qualities in making the

78 Information about reactions and expressions of opinion by employees of central departments of the transport and communications sector to the results of the Soviet–American summit and other political questions of the day, December 18, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA XIX, Nr. 4816, fols. 191 f.

Federal Government accept the double zero option and waive the 72 Pershing IA missiles we do not know. But at least Gorbachev let Honecker put himself in the limelight by calling the meeting of the General Secretaries in East Berlin, after the Summit. Although Honecker concurred with the majority of East Germans in his wish to eliminate INF missiles in East and West, his popularity seems not to have benefited from this identity of views. Popular opinion was definitely on Gorbachev's side. Praise was heaped on the new Soviet leader, not only for having achieved the INF Treaty but also for his politics of internal reform. Gorbachev was the person on whom the hopes of GDR citizens were pinned. In the end, this contributed greatly to the downfall of the East German state.

Wanda Jarzabek

The Polish People's Republic and the INF Talks

The question of armaments limitation and reduction attracted great interest in Polish society and within the government in Warsaw. This interest was rooted in Polish experiences, and especially memories of World War II. In the eyes of many Poles the war had left them not only with enormous material damage, but with hecatombs of dead Polish citizens, the annihilation of the intelligentsia, and the destruction of a huge amount of cultural heritage. It also brought the loss of Polish independence—even though from a formal point of view Poland had been restored as a sovereign country. A natural reaction to these experiences was a particularly strong fear of war. Not only this. The armaments race had an effect on education and propaganda activities, which used the war and social memory as a tool to lend legitimization to the leadership and as means of creating “enemy” images. A will to start up a new war was attributed to the West (i. e. NATO) while the East (i. e. the Warsaw Pact) was seen as striving for peace.

Awareness of the constant menace connected with the possibility of war was present in the East as well as in the West.¹ The main object of this chapter is to show the official Polish reaction to the disarmament talks that took place in the 1980s, especially to the talks on the reduction of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). This is examined in the context of the Polish domestic situation, Poland's place in international relations and the tradition of Communist Poland's diplomacy.

1. Poland in the 1980s

How much did Poland have room for maneuver? This question is crucial for an evaluation of the country's reaction to developments in East–West relations during the 1980s. The Communist Polish authorities certainly tried to realize their aims in their relations with the Soviet Union, with Soviet bloc countries, and with countries outside the bloc. In general, Soviet bloc countries had very limited space to themselves in the field of foreign policy. This was especially so with regard to superpower relations; and nuclear armament was a question reserved to the superpowers. During the 1980s, Polish room for maneuver was limited even further after martial law was introduced by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), General Wojciech Jaruzelski, on 13 December,

1 See Sven S. Holtmark, Vojtech Mastny, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and alliances in the Cold War. Threat perceptions in the East and West*, New York 2006, passim.

1981. Poland was politically isolated; the level of political interaction between Poland and the West was lowered even more; and in the case of the United States, even ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides. Polish leaders were not, therefore, invited to other countries, and for several years after 1981 no high ranking foreign leader visited Poland.² As, very slowly, the domestic situation started to become more stable, Polish activities focused on rebuilding political relations as a necessary precondition for the economic talks that were needed. First talks with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Italy took place in late 1984. In December 1985 General Wojciech Jaruzelski met French President François Mitterrand in Paris, but he was made to enter the Elysée Palace by a side door and not through the main entrance.

One of the Western preconditions for a return to more regular political contacts was the release of political prisoners. The amnesty announced by the Polish authorities in September 1986 opened up possibilities for more interaction with Western governments. The main priority in Poland's activity, however, was the question of the country's debt and its restructuring. The poor economic situation overshadowed all the activities of the government at that time. Its incapacity to manage the economy and to improve the standard of living was the main reason for the lack of legitimacy it had in the eyes of the people. Further reasons for popular mistrust were the leadership's dependence on Moscow and the crackdown on *Solidarność* it had made in 1981. Moreover, relations with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet bloc countries were proving difficult. The Polish crisis was perceived as one of the dilemmas the whole bloc was having to contend with, worsening the perception of it in the West and "demoralizing" the societies within it.

In the mid-1980s, the PUPW still constituted the core of the political system in Poland, although two other official political parties were allowed, at least formally. Nevertheless, the center of power shifted to other institutions such as the army and the special services controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The Party's First Secretary, Wojciech Jaruzelski, was successful in removing his strongest opponents from political life.³ Predominant political factors at that time were the need for a rearrangement of the Communist system, undermined by strikes and rejected by the majority of society, and also for economic reforms. This is why a restructuring of the Communist system started earlier in Poland than in other Eastern bloc countries.

The nature of the changes in Poland differed from those in the Soviet Union. First of all, the government was aware of its lack of legitimacy and was interested

2 Andrzej Skrzypek, *Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989*, Warsaw 2010, pp. 377 ff. See also Andrzej Paczkowski, *Dyplomacja czasów kryzysu (1980–1989)*, in: Wojciech Matercki and Waldemar Michowicz (eds.), *Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej*, vol. 6, Warsaw 2010, pp. 853 ff.

3 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Dowódca czy przywódca? Wojciech Jaruzelski w latach 1981–1989*, in: Konrad Rokicki and Robert Spałek (eds.), *Władza w PRL. Ludzie i mechanizmy*, Warsaw 2011, pp. 259–289.

in broadening the “social basis” it could rely on. From 1982 on, many consultative bodies were set up, often with the participation of established journalists and professors.⁴ The old Front of National Unity (*Front Jedności Narodu*), which had been active since 1957, was replaced in 1985 by the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (*Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego*). Several changes were introduced into the Polish constitution, including the establishment of the Tribunal of State (which was to become the Tribunal for high-ranking state officials) and the Constitutional Tribunal. This does not mean that those institutions had real power, especially in matters of vital importance for the Party and the government—but they were meant to show the “democratization” of the Communist system, especially to foreign observers.

The need to reform the economy and to provide people with everyday necessities was predominant.⁵ Economic matters were especially important for the younger generation who knew more about the West and, because of this, the authority of both the Party and the government was at a very low level among the youthful.⁶ After the termination of martial law in Poland on July 22, 1983 many attempts were made to attract people of non-Communist views, among them intellectuals and some of those affiliated with the Catholic church. It was hoped to draw them into the Party. But it was especially young people the leadership tried to woo. Communist youth organizations (and student organizations too) tried to entice young people with free (or nearly-free) holidays, opportunities to earn extra money, chances to participate in student exchanges with Western countries, and courses where they could learn languages. Some foreign foundations (including the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation) let the Polish authorities choose who should receive scholarships, while others, especially in the United States, denied them this right. The young people who were given such opportunities to boost their careers in exchange for loyalty to the PUPW were nicknamed “Jaruzelski’s janissaries” by people hostile to the government. Many of them continued their political careers successfully after 1989 and the transition that occurred in Poland.

The change of leadership in the Soviet Union in 1985 opened a new chapter in the history of the Eastern bloc.⁷ When the new Soviet leaders informed

4 For instance: Rada Społeczno Gospodarcza przy Sejmie (the Social-Economic Council to Parliament), Konsultacyjna Rada Gospodarcza przy Prezesie Rady Ministrów (the Consultative Economic Council by the Prime Minister), Rada Konsultacyjna (a Consultative Council to W. Jaruzelski as the head of the Council of State).

5 Wojciech Morawski, *Pełzająca katastrofa. Gospodarka polska w latach osiemdziesiątych*, in: *W przededniu wielkiej zmiany. Polska 1988 roku*, Gdańsk 2009, pp. 27–43.

6 Leszek Biernacki, *Nie można zdezerterować—młodzieżowy bunt w 1988 roku*, in: *W przededniu*, pp. 79–97. For public opinion polls see Barbara Badora, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, and Krzysztof Kosela (eds.), *Spółczesność i władza lat osiemdziesiątych w badaniach CBOS*, Warsaw 1994, pp. 267–268.

7 See for instance Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford 1996; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Chapel Hill 2007.

Warsaw Pact Party leaders about their aims, the Polish Communists adopted a “wait-and-see” approach. Then, as the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev strengthened his position and it became clear that change in the Soviet Union would continue, his policy of reform gained support in the PUWP. His international activities and his attempts to stop the arms race were especially welcomed. All efforts to lower the danger of war were strongly welcomed and received the people’s sympathy and support. In the Polish official press, Gorbachev’s policies were presented as ones aimed at relaxing East–West tensions rather than ones that might bring significant domestic reforms.⁸

2. Polish “Peace and Disarmament Initiatives”

Although the policies of the Soviet bloc countries were subject to what was called “coordination,” every country tried to promote its own goals. In the Polish case, the most obvious of these independent efforts were made in response to the “German question.” Bilateral Polish–West German issues included establishing diplomatic relations, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent border, and international matters such as possible German reunification and West German access to modern arms, especially nuclear weapons.⁹ After the changes following the Polish October of 1956, the new leadership’s attempts to conduct a more independent foreign policy were most visible in policy towards Moscow and Bonn.¹⁰

In 1957 Poland started to promote its first disarmament plan, which was named after Adam Rapacki, at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone, initially comprising four countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, the FRG, and the GDR. It has been much debated whether this was a Polish or a Soviet plan.¹¹ The origins are somewhat obscure,

8 Wojciech Multan, *Nowe radzieckie inicjatywy rozbrojeniowe*, in: *Nowe Drogi*, 1/452 (1987), pp. 10–16. *Nowe Drogi* (New Ways) were, according to information given in them, “a theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the PUWP”.

9 Wanda Jarząbek, *Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1966–1976. Wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy*, Warsaw 2011, pp. 16 ff.

10 Wanda Jarząbek, *W sprawach niemieckich nasz głos musi mieć swą wagę. Problem niemiecki w polskiej polityce zagranicznej od października 1956 r. do rozpoczęcia tzw. drugiego kryzysu berlińskiego w listopadzie 1958 r.*, in: *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 33/2 (2001), p. 104. Andrzej Korzon, *Kłopotliwy Satelita. Stosunki polsko-sowieckie 1947–1957*, in: Andrzej Korzon (ed.), *Rola i miejsce Polski w Europie 1914–1957*, Warsaw 1994, p. 161.

11 The Rapacki Plan has been studied by many historians. See e.g. Teresa Łoś–Nowak (ed.), *Plan Rapackiego a bezpieczeństwo europejskie*, Wrocław 1991, *passim*. As a Polish initiative, the plan has been discussed by Piotr Stefan Wandycz, Adam Rapacki, and the search for European Security; Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Lowenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats 1939–1979*, Princeton 1994, pp. 298–312. The Americans and British, as well as the FRG, were strongly critical of this idea e.g. in James R. Ozinga, *The Rapacki Plan. The 1957*

but Rapacki's plan was certainly compatible with trends in international politics, with some of the Soviet announcements that were being made, and with Polish political goals. It was a kind of "two-in-one" proposal—linking nicely both with the Polish government's German policy and with the disarmament initiatives presented by Western politicians and the Soviets during the first *détente* in the Cold War that followed Stalin's death and subsequent changes within the Soviet Union. It is also possible that, by making this proposal, the Polish leadership hoped to avoid the detection of nuclear weapons on Polish territory, which was starting to be a real problem. Poland was in danger of possible attacks that would aim to destroy the places where nuclear weapons were based. The Poles fretted over the political aspects; the military details were discussed in depth with the Soviets.

During the 1960s, a new version of the old Rapacki Plan was unveiled—now renamed after the first Secretary of the Communist Party, Władysław Gomułka. In the second half of the decade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked on plans for a pan-European conference, which eventually became the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the original Polish plans, the security questions to be raised included disarmament measures; but due to superpower priorities at that time these were excluded from the CSCE agenda.¹² Later, armament and disarmament questions were indeed discussed in the CSCE process. In the late 1970s, Poland started to be involved in talks to realize the idea of the disarmament conference, and in Madrid in 1981, it proposed a mandate for a Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures. During the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference on December 8, 1986, Poland proposed broadening the Vienna mandate to include CBMs and disarmament talks.¹³ During the Vienna meeting disarmament talks also took place between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and this was followed with much interest in Poland.¹⁴

Proposal to Denuclearize Central Europe and an Analysis of Its Rejection, London 1989. See also David Tal, *From the Open Skies Proposal of 1955 to the Norstad Plan of 1960. A Plan Too Far*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 10/4 (2008), pp. 80 f. Even in the Soviet block it was not fully supported, see Ernst Laboor, *Der Rapacki-Plan und die DDR. Die Entspannungsvision des polnischen Außenministers und die deutschlandpolitischen Ambitionen der SED-Führung in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren*, Berlin 2003. See also Milan Hronicek, *Reakcja Czechosłowacji na Plan Rapackiego w latach 1957–1958*, in: Petr Blažek, Paweł Jaworski, and Łukasz Kamiński (eds.), *Między przymusową przyjaźnią a solidarnością. Cześć-Polacy-Słowacy 1938/39–1945–1989*, Vol. 2, Warsaw 2009, pp. 185 f.

12 Wanda Jarząbek, *Hope and Reality. Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964–1989*, in: *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, Vol. 56, Washington 2008, pp. 16–27. See also Wanda Jarząbek, *Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie. Plany i rzeczywistość, 1966–1975*, Warsaw 2008, pp. 43–75.

13 Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs further AMSZ), *Notatka o polskich propozycjach zgłoszonych na spotkaniu wiedeńskim KBWE*, March 13, 1987, DSiP 26/93, w. 11.

14 AMSZ, *Notatka informacyjna*, April 4, 1987, DSiP 26/93, w. 11.

For internal propaganda purposes, the country's leadership also tried to organize events showing how involved they were in the disarmament talks. They wanted to project a picture of Polish leaders being active in the crucial processes of changing international relations. In 1986, a "Congress of Intellectuals for the Defense of the Peaceful Future of the World" was organized in Warsaw. This Congress was announced as an event inaugurating the UN International Year of Peace. Although many scholars and peace activists refused to come to Warsaw, and although it could not be compared with the 1948 Congress in Poland in terms of famous personalities attending, it was regarded as a success.¹⁵

Probably because of the common interest in disarmament and the will to be more active in international talks, Polish Communists began working on a new peace initiative, this time named the Jaruzelski Plan. It was announced in Poland on May 8, 1987 (the eve of "Victory Day" in the Communist bloc). The idea was also presented to the other Warsaw Pact members then working on their own disarmament concepts. Jaruzelski discussed his plan during the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Berlin on May, 28–29, 1987.¹⁶ After the formal announcement of the Jaruzelski Plan Polish and Soviet experts met to discuss details of the memorandum the Polish Foreign Office wanted to send to other countries.¹⁷ The Jaruzelski plan dealt with conventional and nuclear arms (launched from aircrafts, missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear mines). It also discussed the question of confidence-building measures and reviewed the steps needed for inspections to control the disarmament steps. The Soviets supported Poland's intention to introduce elements of the plan into the Vienna 23 talks—the preparatory talks of the sixteen NATO and seven Warsaw Pact countries which would propose a mandate for negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The plan was also officially presented during the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna on July 17, 1987.

15 Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej (Archive of the Institute for National Remembrance, further AIPN), Ocena przebiegu Kongresu Intelktualistów w Obronie Pokojowej Przyszłości Świata, January 16–19, 1986, BU 1589/1303. The World Congress of Intellectuals for the Defense of Peace took place from August, 25 to 28, 1948 in Wrocław. The propaganda aim of the Congress was to convince public opinion that Communist countries were supporters of peace, and the West, especially the U.S. as the only owners of atomic weapons at that time, a menace to peace. Numerous Western intellectuals, such as Pablo Picasso, Julian Huxley, Paul Éluard, Bertolt Brecht, and Graham Greene, took part in the Congress. The Organizing Committee included Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Le Corbusier. The organizers (mainly Poles and French) referred to the tradition of the International Congress of Writers in Defense of Culture, which took place in 1935 in Paris. Professor A. J. P. Taylor, a historian from Oxford, supported only by a few other intellectuals, protested against the accusations of fascism made against the U.S. and the West.

16 AIPN, Wystąpienie I Sekretarza KC PZPR, przewodniczącego Rady Państwa PRL, tow. W. Jaruzelskiego na naradzie Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego UW, May 28, 1987, BU 02958/563.

17 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o polsko-radzieckich konsultacjach nt. planu zmniejszenia zbrojeń i zwiększania zaufania w Europie, June 23, 1987, DIE 52/90, w.1.

In the second half of the 1980s, many publications were issued describing post-war Poland's activity in the field of disarmament, its search for denuclearization and its engagement in devising security-building measures.¹⁸ This was probably seen as one element of Polish policy that could gain support from Polish society and at the same time enable the leadership to keep up with ongoing change in East-West relations. Some initiatives—beginning with the Rapacki Plan—were always treated as a kind of Polish 'brand'. For Poland, it is also important to take the economic benefit of ending the armament race into consideration. Armaments were expensive, and due to the sharing of obligations of Soviet bloc members, every state had to participate in purchasing equipment from the Soviet Union and manufacturing whatever Warsaw Pact plans demanded. The export of products from the national military industry was not free. Warsaw had to ask Moscow what and to whom these items could be sold.

3. Polish Reactions to the INF Talks

In October 1980 the Preliminary Talks on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces began in Geneva. The formal talks between the U. S. and the Soviet Union started on November 30, 1981. The INF talks were observed by Polish diplomats, who often took their information from press releases. That Poles had this role does not mean that the Polish authorities were much involved. It should be stressed that disarmament talks about nuclear weapons were in the exclusive domain of the superpowers. As the Soviet Union was the undisputed leader of the Soviet bloc, it was obvious that other Warsaw Pact countries could never participate in the decision-making process. However, the countries were informed about the talks through multilateral and bilateral exchanges within the alliance. Information was often given at the last moment, shortly before the Soviet leaders gave a public statement. As bilateral contacts were also used to transmit information, the scope of information divulged differed among the Soviet satellite states.

When the talks started, the Polish Communists were confronted with domestic problems: the strikes of summer 1980. These ended with the legalization of *Solidarność*, the first independent, non-Communist trade union movement within the Warsaw Pact. Recognition of this force prevented more rapid developments, but it did not calm the situation. The conflict between the Party (in other words, the government) and *Solidarność* was sharpening. The introduction of martial law in December 1981 resulted in massive criticism of the Communist

18 See e.g. Teresa Łoś-Nowak, *Problem rozbrowienia w polskiej polityce zagranicznej*, Warsaw 1985. See also Wojciech Multan, *Porozumienia rozbrowieniowe po II wojnie światowej*, Warsaw 1985; Wojciech Multan, *Rozbrojenie w Polskiej polityce zagranicznej*, Warsaw 1987; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *New Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)*. A Polish view, Warsaw 1987; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *The CSCE and the European Security System*, Warsaw 1988. Many articles were published in "Spawy Międzynarodowe", a magazine issued by the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM).

government and contributed to its political isolation. However, many Western leaders were appeased by the fact that the Soviets did not intervene in Poland directly. During the first phase of the INF talks up to 1983, therefore, the attention of the Polish leadership was consumed by the domestic crisis.

When negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union restarted in March 1985, Poland was informed about the talks mostly through the familiar channels existing within the Warsaw Pact. I do not know of any cases in which the Soviets provided any deep or detailed information about the INF talks. It could be that minutes of conversation do not exist, given the habitual reluctance of Soviet Foreign Policy-makers to pass on information. Shortly after the talks were renewed, during the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers that took place on March 19–20, 1986 in Warsaw, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze informed the Warsaw Pact member-states of the difference in interests between the USSR and the U.S. in the agenda of the Geneva disarmament talks. He stated that the United States and the Western countries were not willing to engage in talks about the whole nuclear arsenal (all types of nuclear weapons), but wanted to limit negotiation to intermediate-range missiles. They refused to discuss other topics, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).¹⁹ According to Shevardnadze, Moscow was being very flexible in the Geneva talks, and any contrary opinions stated in the media should be regarded as Western propaganda. The final conclusion of Shevardnadze's statement was that a further U.S.–Soviet summit would only be possible if the U.S. changed its stance on to the agenda.

This information was a mix of true facts and false. It typified how situations were standardly presented during Warsaw Pact meetings. Usually the Soviet announcements were merely noted, and provoked no deep discussion or even opposition from the other leaders. During this particular meeting it was only Romania's Foreign Minister Ilie Văduva who advanced any ideas. In his view, the INF talks should not be limited to Europe and arms reductions and should also cover conventional weapons.²⁰

A few months later, during the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest (June 10–11, 1986) Gorbachev informed Warsaw Pact leaders that the U.S. was planning to revoke the implementation of the (never ratified) SALT II Treaty and that the Soviet Union was considering limiting talks to the types of weapons included in SALT II. He also disclosed that the USSR was interested

19 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o warszawskim posiedzeniu Komitetu Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego, March 23, 1986, D.ZSRR 33/89, w.1. For records of the meeting see also Anna Locher (ed.), Records of the Warsaw Pact Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1976–1990, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopicf105.html?lng=en&id=16543&navinfo=15699>.

20 For Văduva's speech (in Czech) see <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopicce6e.html?lng=en&id=20506&navinfo=15699>.

in establishing an international system of collaboration on atomic energy and space research. Referring to the SDI project, he asked his Eastern bloc allies to strengthen their activity against the "militarization of space."²¹ In East Berlin a group was established to study the possibilities of freezing (and in the longer run reducing) the military spending of the Warsaw Pact members. In future this group was to work on the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's forces.

At the end of 1986, the Polish government assessed the Geneva disarmament talks as an unsuccessful effort. In a summary of Polish foreign policy prepared for discussion at the PUWP Politburo meeting on January 6, 1987, the first point presented was an analysis of US–Soviet relations. The lack of progress in this area was presented as a consequence of American policy. Washington was accused of breaking the Reykjavik agreements. The White House's refusal to talk about all types of nuclear weapons and the continued deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe were criticized especially.²²

At the end of January 1987, a conference of the Secretaries for International Affairs and Ideology of the Communist parties took place in Warsaw. Disarmament became part of the discussion.²³ During a meeting with the delegates, Jaruzelski discussed both conventional armaments and the allegedly non-existent balance of power between East and West. Referring to his talks in Japan and Italy, he emphasized that Western governments presented a false picture of the situation and insisted that they gave false data on the quantities and military effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact's armed resources. He instanced tanks, where the Warsaw Pact countries had numerical dominance; yet, Jaruzelski argued, on this example, that NATO tanks were more advanced from a technological point of view.²⁴

During the INF talks, rumors began to circulate about a possible change in the Soviet stance.²⁵ They turned out to be true. Moscow's position with regard to SDI changed in February 1987.²⁶ Since the diplomatic talks proved that the Amer-

21 For records of the Budapest PCC meeting see Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Douglas Selvage (eds.), *Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, 1955–1990*, <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic1fe4.html?lng=en&id=17111&navinfo=14465>.

22 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Documents, henceforth AAN), *Bilans polityki zagranicznej PRL w 1986 r.*, December 1986, WZ 973/682.

23 AAN, KC PZPR, *Notatka dot. przebiegu narady sekretarzy KC bratnich partii krajów socjalistycznych ds. międzynarodowych i ideologicznych*, Warsaw January 22–23, 1987, WZ 973/416.

24 AAN, KC PZPR, *Informacja o spotkaniu I sekretarza KC PZPR W. Jaruzelskiego z sekretarzami KC uczestniczącymi w naradzie w Warszawie w dniach January 23–24, 1987*. WZ 973/416.

25 AAN, KC PZPR, *Notatka dot. przebiegu narady sekretarzy KC bratnich partii krajów socjalistycznych ds. międzynarodowych i ideologicznych*, Warsaw January 22–23, 1987, WZ 973/416.

26 See also the essay by Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya in this volume.

ican side was not prepared to sign a treaty covering a broader range of nuclear weapons, Moscow withdrew from the hard line it had taken during the three Geneva disarmament talks. About two weeks after Gorbachev's announcement on February 27, 1987 and shortly after the U. S. had placed a new proposal on the table (March 4), the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries were invited to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. There they met with Yuli Vorontsov and Vadim Loginov, the former Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the Soviet START delegation in Geneva.²⁷ They were updated on the state of the talks and informed about a phone conversation between Vorontsov and his American counterpart Max Kampelman. According to the information passed on by the Soviets, Kampelman had asked the Soviets what their attitude was to the "zero option" in Europe and Asia, and the Soviet answer had remained negative. Vorontsov had indicated that some aspects of the American proposal were not acceptable to the Soviet side, for instance an idea it included of allowing the mechanical/technical downgrading of the INF missiles to change their range. The Soviets had also said that the reduction of short-range missiles, which the Americans now wanted to include in the INF talks, should be discussed separately. Vorontsov had admitted that it would be difficult to include factories in the control mechanism, a point the Soviet side had studied. He and Kampelman had also discussed the lack of any Soviet draft for a treaty on the table, which meant that the American draft would have to be taken as the starting point for further negotiations in Geneva. According to Vorontsov this was because Moscow wanted to finish the talks quickly—in about four months. Vorontsov had also explained that U. S. Foreign Secretary Shultz was scheduling a visit to Moscow in April. The results of that visit would be passed on to Polish and other allied diplomats there, details concerning possible numbers of missiles to be liquidated.²⁸

The Polish side observed the reactions of Western countries to this new phase of the INF talks closely. They noticed that Gorbachev's proposal (especially the way it renounced coupling of INF and SDI) was regularly treated as a proof of his weakness as a Soviet leader and evidence of there being a difficult situation in the USSR.²⁹ According to Polish diplomats, in Great Britain opinions prevailed that INF, SNF and chemical weapon talks should be carried on simultaneously; this lay behind London's reservations regarding the U. S.–USSR negotiations.³⁰ The FRG attitude to armament and disarmament also attracted much interest in Warsaw. According to the reports from Polish diplomats, the SPD and the Greens were especially keen on the disarmament talks, and the Poles noticed how they criticized the Kohl government. In the German governmental coalition, the FDP was perceived as more interested in active FRG participation in disarmament

27 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, March 3, 1987, DIE 52/90, w. 1.

28 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, April 16, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

29 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, March 12, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

30 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, March 14, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.; see the contribution by Oliver Barton to this volume.

talks than were the CDU and CSU.³¹ Governmental policy was assessed as simple reaction to world trends rather than any systematic line arising from convictions or inner deliberations. When, on August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced a possible waiver of Pershing IA missiles, Polish observers therefore evaluated it as a purely tactical move. The announcement came just before elections in some West German federal states and was seen as a kind of "maneuver to avoid accusations of slackening US-USSR INF talks."³²

As previously mentioned, members of the Polish authorities had hardly any opportunity to lead high-level talks. But they did talk over questions of disarmament with foreign governments. The INF negotiations became a subject of discussion when Jaruzelski held talks with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Bernard Raimond, when he visited Poland in April 1987. Answering Jaruzelski's accusations that Paris was not interested in quick results and was slowing the INF talks down, Raimond stressed that France supported the idea of balanced, well-adjusted disarmament and stated that the liquidation of the intermediate-range missiles and the denuclearization of Europe should be accompanied by reductions in conventional arms and chemical weapons as well.³³

Topics connected with the international situation and disarmament talks were also discussed during Wojciech Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow in April 1987. However, the agenda of these bilateral meetings was dominated by Polish domestic issues, such as the complicated economic situation, the activities of the opposition in Poland, and the role there of the Catholic church.³⁴ Nevertheless, Jaruzelski did offer an update on the the development of his plan. This plan proposed a gradual reduction of nuclear weapons and was to finish with establishing a nuclear-free zone. It also included a gradual reduction of conventional weapons, so as to leave only defense weapons in Central Europe and effect a change in military doctrine, while putting security measures in place aimed at avoiding sudden attacks.³⁵ Gorbachev answered that the Soviet Union supported the Polish initiatives, and that details were to be worked out in bilateral talks between experts.

The INF talks took more time than Moscow anticipated. In May 1987, during the PCC meeting in East Berlin, Gorbachev reported that the U.S. and Soviet Union were close to an agreement, but that there were obstacles on the side of

31 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, information obtained from the Polish Embassy in Cologne, June 5, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16. For the West German response to an INF Treaty see the essays by Philipp Gassert and Tim Geiger in this volume.

32 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, August 29, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

33 AIPN, Notatka informacyjna z wizyty ministra SZ Francji J.B. Raimond'a w Polsce, April 10-11, 1987, BU 0449/1, t.2. For the French position see also the essay by Christian Wenkel in this volume.

34 AAN, KC PZPR, Tezy do rozmów W. Jaruzelskiego z M. Gorbaczowem, April 1987, WZ 973/447.

35 Zapis rozmowy sekretarza generalnego KC KPZR M. Gorbaczowa z I sekretarzem KC PZPR gen. W. Jaruzelskim, April 21, 1987, in: Antoni Dudek (ed.), *Zmierzch dyktatury*, Vol. 1, Warsaw 2009, p. 122.

France, the FRG, and Great Britain.³⁶ This difficulty also came up in Polish conversations with Western diplomats, especially French and British ones.³⁷ Poland was also deeply interested in the reduction of conventional armaments, which started to be a topic in new international talks within the CSCE framework that followed the successful Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) held in Stockholm from 1984 to 1986.³⁸ According to Polish observers, all the difficulties in speeding up preparatory talks on conventional armaments and the reluctant stance of some smaller NATO countries to these talks arose through fear of Soviet conventional supremacy. Western Europe was correctly perceived as fearing INF reductions because its countries would thereby lose the U.S. nuclear umbrella.³⁹ The Poles thought that Western countries found reductions of SRINF and SNF missiles more difficult to accept because they were afraid of the possibility of being powerless in case of local European conflicts.⁴⁰ Polish diplomats also took note of voices against limiting INF talks to Europe.⁴¹ They tried to gather information about Western public opinion and analyzed reactions in newspaper articles, media coverage, and scientific conferences.⁴² Poland was also interested in restarting the work of the United Nations Disarmament Committee.⁴³

Polish interest in a change in the military doctrine espoused by the Warsaw Pact military doctrine in addition to disarmament can also be attributed to a concern to limit military expenses. Among Warsaw Pact members, the Polish army was the second largest after the Soviet Union's. The cost of maintaining its manpower and equipment was a considerable burden on the Polish budget. According to the bloc's "share of duties," Poland was to develop tank production plus accompanying units and equipment suitable for amphibious landing operations. A change of the military doctrine to a defensive one would help to lighten this burden.

As the INF talks were coming to an end, the Polish side intensified its work on the details of the Jaruzelski plan, and tried to obtain support for its ideas from Moscow—and also from the West. In November 1987, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh informed the Poles that some points from the Jaruzelski plan could be attached to the European disarmament talks.⁴⁴ This

36 For the PCC meeting in East Berlin on May 28/29 see Mastny et al. (eds.), *Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee*, <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic01ce.html?lng=en&id=17112&navinfo=14465>.

37 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, June 20, 1987, July 1, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

38 AMSZ, *depesza z Moskwy*, June 19, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

39 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, July 8, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

40 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, March 14, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

41 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, May 26, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

42 AMSZ, *dispatches from different countries*, DIE 2/90, w. 1.

43 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, September 22, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

44 AMSZ, *depesza z Moskwy*, November 17, 1987, DIE 2/90, w. 1.

was what the Poles wanted. But they also expected that the Polish origin of these ideas should be noticed.

After the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington on December 8, 1987, the Soviet satellite countries were told how the Soviet leadership assessed its results. This happened on December 15–16, 1987 in Warsaw during a meeting of the Multilateral Group on Reciprocal Information—a new body created within the Warsaw Pact the previous year.⁴⁵ The narratives of the Soviet side aimed at underlining a success that was “bigger than expected,” since the agreement included new generations of weapons and created modern control and verification mechanisms. The Treaty was presented as the first step towards liquidating all nuclear arms. It was also presented as the result of a positive change in Soviet–American relations and as a starting point for further talks. According to the Soviets, INF should also have an impact on the behavior of European countries, especially the NATO countries, and the small European countries (Benelux, Denmark, Norway) would become more interested in conventional disarmament talks. But as to the reactions of the big European countries, the Soviets anticipated effects unfavorable for Moscow—the beginning of a new arms race in the field of marine or conventional armaments, and the speeding up of European integration as an answer to the Washington–Moscow dialogue.⁴⁶ The Soviets assumed that, because Washington would try to keep close relations with Western Europe, it might freeze the talks on chemical weapons reductions for a certain period of time in the Geneva UN Conference on disarmament.

The Poles tried to assess the impact of the INF Treaty on Poland's place in international relations. An evaluation of the results of the Washington Treaty was prepared in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is an interesting document. It attempted to calculate the global and regional effects of the agreement and its impact on Polish security. Several points were presented as positive results in the field of security. The first was a reduction of the danger of a nuclear attack on Polish territory through the liquidation of the part of NATO's nuclear arsenal that could have been used for this purpose. Another positive was a significant limitation in the possibility of sudden and precise nuclear attack by NATO. The remaining nuclear arsenal would leave more time for reaction in the case of a crisis. It was assessed that from a military point of view the missiles to be destroyed were highly accurate and demanded only a very short time to reach their targets: so, due to their liquidation, the stage of ultimate escalation of a conventional conflict in Europe into a nuclear one would be eliminated. A positive effect was also seen in the promise that the FRG would waive its Pershing IA missiles—a move said to serve the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.⁴⁷ It

45 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o piątym posiedzeniu grupy wzajemnej informacji bieżącej, December 19, 1987, D. ZSRR 17/91, w. 1.

46 Ibid.

47 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o implikacjach dla Polski Układu ZSRR-USA ws. likwidacji ich rakiet nuklearnych średniego i krótszego zasięgu, December 12, 1987, DIE 2/90, w. 1.

was also expected that the Treaty would contribute to improving the atmosphere in Europe, and that this could result in greater scope for small- and medium-sized countries to operate. For Poland it could mean enhanced possibilities of reaching a “negotiation stadium” for the Jaruzelski Plan, since this plan discussed areas of disarmament whose importance would grow after the INF Treaty. It was also noticed that NATO states were starting to discuss replacing the ground-launched INF missiles that would be abolished by the Treaty with weapons launched by other means, such as bombers or submarines.

The impact on Polish security was not perceived as unambiguously positive. Once intermediate-range missiles were liquidated it would be more difficult for both sides to attack the remoter targets in Europe. It was therefore assessed “that the security of the Soviet Union will grow to a greater extent than the security of Poland, as in the case of nuclear missiles stationed in Europe, Soviet territory would be difficult to reach.”⁴⁸ In the case of conventional or nuclear war, it might even come about that Polish territory could be the main theater of war. It was noted that putting Polish territory in the center of an eventual war made Poland’s situation dependent on planned changes in NATO strategy. NATO might indeed compensate for its lost intermediate-range missiles by deploying air- or sea-launched missiles or by introducing a new self-maneuvering missile, and this was treated as an option. However, the high cost of production made this rather improbable. A modernization of NATO’s conventional weapons was described as more likely especially as NATO members believed that the Warsaw Pact countries were superior in these types of weapon. One possible consequence of the INF Treaty envisaged was closer military integration of Western Europe independently of the U.S., on whose nuclear umbrella the European countries had hitherto relied.⁴⁹ It was also mentioned that NATO’s decisions at Montebello⁵⁰ made the development and modernization of conventional arms possible. This could mean that a new arms race in the field of modern conventional weapons would be forced on the Eastern bloc countries from outside.

All in all, however, the INF Treaty was described as beneficial to Poland. Further disarmament talks were welcomed, especially talks on the reduction of conventional arms, which were now seen as the most dangerous for Polish security. As for nuclear weapons, Poland should push for the inclusion of all types of armaments remaining in Europe (and its close neighborhood) in further

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group had decided at its meeting on October 27/28, 1983 to abandon 1,400 nuclear warheads within the next 5 or 6 years, but also to modernize the alliance’s aging weaponry (nuclear and conventional). For the communiqué see <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c831028a.htm>. For the meeting in the report of West Germany’s Foreign Ministry see *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD)* 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Munich 2014, Doc. 321, and *AAPD* 1985, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, Munich 2016, Doc. 126.

disarmament talks. In the new situation, the Jaruzelski Plan should concentrate on conventional weapons, methods of verifying and the question of preventing a sudden attack. It was also recommended that more efforts be made to promote a NATO–Warsaw Pact dialogue on military doctrines. Thus, together with West Germany, Poland became one of the driving forces for the seminars on military doctrines that were held in Vienna in January and February 1990. For the first time ever, these seminars gathered together the military leadership of both antagonistic military alliances.⁵¹

As one of the consequences of the INF Treaty, it was anticipated that there would be an increasing role for both German states in the issues. It was also expected that some elements of the Polish initiative would be developed by the German states and presented as their own, the Genscher initiative of June 1987 advocating a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament being cited as an example. Intensified dialogue with both German states on disarmament questions was advised. Such a dialogue did already exist, but was limited by the fact that the two Germanies belonged to different military alliances. During one of the talks, the plenipotentiary of the FRG government for disarmament questions, Josef Holik, had informed the Polish side, that after the signing of the INF Treaty, Western Europe would be careful to keep the process of reduction under control so as not to weaken Europe. He had also informed the Polish side that Genscher's concept concerning disarmament—of both nuclear and conventional weapons—was in some points similar to Jaruzelski's ideas.⁵² This could be treated as a good starting point for further contacts on European security.

4. Conclusion

Poland was not directly involved in the INF talks. As a country and a military power it was integrated into the Soviet bloc, and this meant, among other things, that it had little room for maneuver and limited possibilities of influencing Moscow's policy. Non-nuclear countries did not have much influence on nuclear armaments issues in the second half of the 1980s. Nuclear weapons were stationed in Soviet bases on Polish territory, but anything to do with them was totally outside Warsaw's remit of competence. Their employment, however, could have a tremendous and devastating effect on the country and on Polish citizens. The government at that time was very much under the influence of the military and had to be keenly aware of what might happen to Polish territory in a case of nuclear or conventional war. Accordingly, as this essay has demonstrated, the INF talks were of particular interest to the Polish authorities. Despite this, there

51 For the Vienna Seminar on military doctrines see the account of West German participant Dieter Wellershoff, *First successful step in CSBM negotiations—the military doctrine seminar*, in: *NATO Review*, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 10.

52 AMSZ, *depesza do Moskwy*, December 17, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.

is little evidence to show the exact way of thinking the government had at the time. The press also presented events in a routine way, without revealing different points of view.

In the birth of the INF Treaty itself, it would be difficult to speak of a Polish impact on the talks, or of any Polish input. Such discussions were kept out of the reach of Poland and the other Soviet satellite states. But we *can* say that the INF talks and a general common interest in disarmament resulted in governmental work on Polish proposals. These included the Jaruzelski Plan and propositions for talks on conventional arms reduction. The INF Treaty enhanced the détente process and diminished the direct danger of a war with the potential to destroy Poland—even if, proportionally, the scrapping NATO’s INF arsenal reduced the danger of such destruction more for the USSR than for Poland.

The significance of the INF Treaty, however, was not limited to the 1980s. Even after the transition that started in 1989 it remained important from the Polish perspective. The Poles became increasingly concerned when the INF Treaty regime started to break down, with new Russian medium- and short-range missiles like the Iskander missiles deployed close to the Polish border, in the Kaliningrad region. The relaxation of tensions in East–West relations served Polish interests as such, and not just the interests of the Communist government, which tried to rebuild contacts with Western countries and gain support for economic reforms. In periods of East–West relaxation, the level of domestic freedom usually improved too. The lowering level of East–West confrontation could be a good sign for Polish society as it looked to establish (or remove) ties to the West. The INF Treaty was the first step in real disarmament and can also be regarded as a milestone facilitating other talks about the political order in Europe—and indeed, the world. Changes in that order, especially the enlargement of NATO in 1999 and of the European Union in 2004, have brought many benefits to Poland and Polish society.

IV. Public Opinion and Protest Movements

Tapio Juntunen

“We Just Got to Keep Harping On About It”

Anti-Nuclearism and the Role of Sub-Regional Arms Control Initiatives in the Nordic Countries During the Second Cold War

1. Introduction

There is widespread agreement among Cold War historians that the mobilizing effect of the anti-nuclear campaigns in both Europe and the U.S. had an impact on the formulation and timing of decisions made by NATO in the context of the Euromissile crisis.¹ The same can be said about the effect of the transnational disarmament community and the non-aligned movement on the Soviet Union's turn towards disarmament activism during the Gorbachev era. This pivotal turn led to the signing of the INF and START treaties.² As in the rest of Europe, the heyday of anti-nuclear protest in the Nordic countries was between 1980 and 1983. A quite rapid revival of the peace movement, spearheaded by veteran activists, led to the establishment of non-hierarchical civil society movements like the “No to Nuclear Weapons” campaigns in Norway and Denmark in the early 1980s.³

One of the most evident examples of the effect of public opinion and the transnational peace movements on foreign policy during this era comes from Denmark, where the opposition parties, holding a majority in the Danish parliament, the *Folketinget*, pushed the center-right minority government to pursue its so-called “footnote policy” between 1982 and 1988. During this period Denmark added several reservations to NATO's operations and procedures. This was in line

1 See Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s, in: *The International History Review* 39/3 (2017), pp. 496–520; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Did “Peace Through Strength” End the Cold War? Lessons from INF, in: *International Security* 16/1 (1991), pp. 179–185. Maria Eleanora Guasconi, Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis, in: Leopold Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D.C. 2015, pp. 271–289; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford/CA 2009, pp. 129–136.

2 See Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, Ithaca 2002, pp. 269–338.

3 See Michael A. Krasner and Nikolaj Petersen, Peace and Politics: The Danish Peace Movement and Its Impact on National Security Policy, in: *Journal of Peace Research* 23/2 (1986), pp. 156–173.

with the Danish government's decision to reduce its support for the Double-Track Decision in 1979, followed by a partial withdrawal on the 1983 decision to deploy Pershing II and Tomahawk Cruise Missiles in Europe. The "footnote policy" started to lose its meaning only after the signing of the INF Treaty, when, in spring 1988, the government—led by the Conservative Party—decided to reframe the "footnote policy" as an issue affecting Denmark's commitment to full NATO membership by calling parliamentary elections.

The change in public opinion fell on especially fertile ground in Nordic countries with a strong liberal-egalitarian identity, such as Norway and Denmark. It was in many ways natural for their governments to emphasize the centrality of the arms control component in NATO's Double-Track Decision. Both Denmark and Norway had long decided not to allow the deployment or positioning of nuclear weapons on their territories during peacetime. This tradition of nuclear restraint had already made the two Nordic members of NATO react somewhat differently from other small NATO members like Holland and Belgium when it came to the reception of NATO's Double-Track Decision in 1979. "Nuclear realists," advocating the stabilizing effect of enhanced nuclear deterrence, were clearly in the defensive mode when it came to public opinion in Scandinavia.

Regarding the reception of the INF Treaty in Nordic countries, it is also important to note that its focus on land-based missile deployments in Central Europe left unsolved an emerging security dilemma in the northernmost part of the continent. The INF Treaty did not address the prospect of military buildup in and around the Northern sea areas, especially in the Kola Peninsula and its surroundings, and this omission was a major concern among the Nordic political elite and civil society movements even after the signing of the INF Treaty. Indeed, the prospect that the maintenance of deterrence through new flexible options and technologies would merely shift from Central European soil to the Northern sea areas was perceived as potentially worrisome. Thus, the perception shared by many in the Nordic countries was that, as important as the INF Treaty was on a political level, it was also a necessary but insufficient first step in a path towards more comprehensive arms control agreements that would take into account the role of sea-based nuclear deterrence in the maintenance of regional and strategic stability.

Built on these insights, the present essay will be based on two broad arguments. Firstly, the role of the Nordic countries has often been ignored in studies covering the Euromissile crisis and the INF Treaty. Understandably, this branch of research has mainly focused on Central Europe and intra-Alliance politics.⁴

4 See Nuti et al. (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D. C. 2015; Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011. There is also a flux of literature on neutrality and small state foreign policy, also with a historical approach, but the studies tend to focus either on comparative cases or on the characteristics of neutrality, neutralism and non-alignment as historically distinctive foreign policy postures. See Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina

I argue that, in order to portray a more precise picture of how the Euromissile crisis and the INF process unfolded, we need to complement the existing literature with studies that grasp the geopolitical and societal consequences of nuclear weapons politics and arms control processes in the Northern “flank” of Europe. Indeed, these dynamics should be studied from the perspective of the Nordic societies themselves by taking into account their egalitarian and peace-oriented state identities as well as the close ties at societal level within the sub-region, which consists of both militarily-allied and neutral states.⁵

Secondly, in order to understand the socio-political dynamics and the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the Nordic region, the *positive* arms control agenda within the sub-region needs to be taken into account. In particular, it is important to recognize how the initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone (NNFZ), originally suggested by the Finnish president Urho Kekkonen in 1963 and repeated in a more elaborate form in 1978,⁶ matured into a shared practical connection between the anti-nuclear movement and certain parts of the Nordic political elite during the 1980s. The NNFZ initiative can be seen as an attractive and connective issue among the Nordic states and societies during an era otherwise characterized by intra-Alliance tensions and the *negative* prospects of nuclear buildup.

Based on original research made in four archives in Finland, the latter part of this essay examines the impact the NNFZ initiative had on the Nordic debate over the Euromissile crisis and INF Treaty. I argue that the diplomatic process around the NNFZ initiative formed a counter-doxastic practice; it made visible the indirect negative consequences of the doxastic arms control practices that characterized the maintenance of the superpower-led bipolar order, especially its focus on Central Europe during the Euromissile crisis and the INF negotiations.

Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.), *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?*, New York 2015; Heinz Gärtner (ed.), *Engaged Neutrality. An Evolved Approach to the Cold War*, Lanham 2017; Andrew Cottey (ed.), *The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-Alignment, Partnership, Membership?*, London 2018; Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland*, New York 2014.

- 5 The Nordic sub-region has been described as a model security community by several scholars. See Håkan Wiberg, *The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future*, in: *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook* (2000), pp. 133–135; Ole Waever, *Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community*, in: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998, p. 72.
- 6 Urho Kekkonen, *Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka. Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkonen turvallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943–1979*, Helsinki 1982, pp. 89–92 and pp. 95–102. See also Osmo Apunen, *Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980s*, in: *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 11/1 (1980), pp. 16–32.

2. The “Nordic Syndrome” and the “Flanks Problem”

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Nordic NATO members—Denmark, Norway and Iceland—from the outset of their joining the Alliance in the precarious post-war security environment of the late 1940s, is their ambiguity in attitude stemming from a firm alignment with western democratic values but, on the other hand, their rather reserved attitude towards great power politics. This was evident in concerns they held that the Western Alliance and its small liberal member-states would become mere objects of the heavily militarized bipolar Cold War security logic. Alyson Bailes has aptly described this as the “Nordic syndrome”—the fundamental sentiment stemming from a combination of egalitarian liberal values and a tendency to perceive international politics through a rather cynical prism of small state realism.⁷

Bailes picks out two key examples that illustrate how the “Nordic syndrome” worked in practice during the Cold War. The first one, Denmark’s “footnote policy” in the 1980s, is probably the best known of these examples. The second, “Norwegian dallying with the nuclear-free zone idea” was something that characterized basically all Nordic countries during the 1980s, especially Finland, as I will elaborate in detail later on in this essay. Of these two examples Denmark’s policy of nuclear restraint (which Norway partially shared) has received considerably more attention in the canon of Cold War historiography than the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone initiative.

The Nordic syndrome was also based on geostrategic considerations. Key arms control agreements of the early 1970s reinforced a sense of strategic balance between the two superpowers. But a lack of attention to managing regional level security in Europe, together with the rise of ideological fundamentalism in superpower relations and intra-Alliance anxiety over the level of U.S. commitment to Europe, started off a vicious circle of misperceptions that eventually led to the emergence of what is now known as the Euromissile crisis.⁸ The spiral of mistrust made both sides assume the worst about the intentions of the other. The security dilemma was reinforced by the ambiguous symbolism of new weapons technologies, such as the Soviet intermediate SS-20 missiles, U.S. plans to deploy neutron bombs in Europe, and second-generation Cruise Missiles, together with certain developments in nuclear strategic thinking (such as the “countervailing”

7 Alyson Bailes, *The Nordic Countries from War to Cold War—and Today*, in: *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37/2 (2012), p. 158.

8 See Nuti et al. (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis*; James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, *When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.–Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12/2 (2010), pp. 29–74; Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, Houndmills 2008, pp. 120 f.

strategy that seemingly put an emphasis on one side's ability to dominate escalation at theater level).⁹

The prospect of the "Europeanization" of the threat of nuclear war had deep ramifications in Western European societies, the Nordic countries being no exception.¹⁰ From the Nordic perspective, then, the geopolitical predicament posed by the Euromissile crisis (and partly too by the solution brought by the INF Treaty) looked very different from how it did from the perspective of Central Europe. The maintenance of a bipolar security order through arms control agreements that focused on land-based weapon systems was always in danger of omitting the potential repercussions of the growing importance sea-based nuclear deterrence was taking on in the European "flanks." As Olav Riste points out, during the latter part of the Cold War, the strategic analyses within NATO "remained fixed on a scenario in which the massive strength of Warsaw Pact armies would break [through] the Fulda Gap and invest [sic!] most of the European continent. Any action on the flanks would be ancillary to the main battlefield."¹¹

3. Denmark and the Period of "Footnote Policy"

During the Euromissile crisis Denmark's foreign policy was characterized by a reserved attitude towards NATO's nuclear planning. Between 1982 and 1988 Denmark added several critical footnotes to NATO's official communiqués. The immediate cause of this "footnote policy" can be traced back to domestic political contingencies. The so-called "four-leaf clover" minority cabinet, formed in 1982 and led by the Conservative People's Party,¹² prioritized domestic political and economic reforms. This helped the Social Democrats call the tune in Denmark's foreign policy. As the biggest party in the opposition with a qualified majority in the *Folketinget*, the Social Democrats were able to mobilize an alternative majority against the cabinet. At this point, the Social Democrats had already revised their foreign policy line, especially their stand on NATO's nuclear politics, including the Double-Track Decision of 1979, and had moved towards a more

9 See Jonathan Haslam, *Moscow's Misjudgment in Deploying SS-20 Missiles*, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 33–37; Risse-Kappen, *Lessons from INF*, pp. 176–178; Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, pp. 118–123.

10 David Holloway, *The Dynamics of the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983*, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 19–22.

11 Olav Riste, *NATO's Northern Frontline in the 1980s*, in: Olav Njostald (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation*, Abingdon 2004, p. 301.

12 In addition to the Conservatives, the government also consisted of the Liberal Party (Venstre), Christian People's Party and the Center Democrats (a splinter group from the Social Democratic Party). Formation of minority governments was already at this point an established political practice in Denmark. See Rasmus Brun Pedersen, 'Footnote Policy' and the Social Democratic Party's Role in Shaping Danish EEC Positions, 1982–1986, in: *Scandinavian Journal of History* 38/5 (2013), p. 638.

critical orientation.¹³ This endangered the so-called Atlantic Consensus since politicians, especially the Social Democrats, were allowed to call reservations on Denmark's participation within NATO, so long as they did not put Alliance solidarity into question altogether.¹⁴

However, Denmark's policy of nuclear restraint had deeper roots in its pragmatic and peace-oriented small state *habitus*. As aptly explained by Cindy Vestergaard:

Denmark's approach to nuclear weapons has historically tried to reconcile its status as a country publicly opposed to nuclear weapons [...] on the one hand with its status as a member of a military nuclear alliance on the other [...] With a strong national desire for declared non-nuclear status juxtaposed with the same desire for maintaining NATO unity, the history of the Danish Kingdom is characterized by protest, politics and external pressures.¹⁵

Vestergaard's characterization indicates a tradition of diplomatic balancing between domestic sentiments and the demands deriving from belonging to an intergovernmental military alliance with a joint nuclear planning policy. The Danish policy of "willfull blindness"—a double nuclear policy—emerged gradually from the late 1950s onwards in relation to questions on whether to allow calls at ports by naval ships from nuclear weapon states and on the role of Greenland as a geographical and logistical area for NATO and the U.S.¹⁶

The Danish government, as well as its opposition, followed general Scandinavian sentiment in supporting disarmament, arms control and global détente. As one contemporary observer described the reception of the INF Treaty in Denmark: "The symbolic message carried by the treaty and the Washington declarations is appreciated all across the political spectrum [in Denmark]."¹⁷ The underlying tension between the recognized value of the extended nuclear deterrence offered by the U.S. and, opposing it, a strong pro-nuclear disarmament sentiment in civil society was also visible in Denmark's responses to sub-regional nuclear arms control initiatives such as the NNFZ.

13 Nikolaj Petersen, 'Footnoting' as a political instrument: Denmark's NATO policy in the 1980s, in: *Cold War History* 12/2 (2012), pp. 297–299.

14 See Fredrik Doerer, 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish 'Footnote Policy'', in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 46/2 (2011), pp. 222–241. During the "footnote" period the opposition parties (with majority seats in the *Folketing*) forced the Danish minority government to a total of 23 footnotes to NATO's communiqués on the Euromissile deployments, tactical nuclear weapons and Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

15 Cindy Vestergaard, 'Going non-nuclear in the nuclear alliance: the Danish experience in NATO', in: *European Security* 23/1 (2014), p. 106.

16 *Ibid.* Double nuclear policy had its foundations in the 1953 decision to ban the permanent stationing of Allied forces in Denmark's territory and on the 1957 ban on nuclear weapon deployments.

17 Ove Nathan, 'Danes look to détente for greater security', in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44/2 (1988), p. 32.

The effect of the Danish footnotes, opt-outs and annotations on NATO's policy was mostly performative. According to Anders Wivel they merely "expressed the Danish dissatisfaction with superpower relations in general and the nuclear policy of NATO in particular and were marketed as an explicit response to hardened U.S. rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and the intensification of the Cold War."¹⁸ In this sense, the period of Danish footnote diplomacy is a good example of how domestic politics can affect the direction and timing of small state foreign policy change. It was not until spring 1988 that the "footnote period" came to an end. This happened when the Conservative-led government fully confronted the opposition's foreign policy line by calling general elections. The immediate cause was a Social Democrat demand for more explicit nuclear restrictions in the Danish port call permission policy, a policy that was based on the "neither confirm nor deny" principle. Leading Social Democratic politicians saw the port call resolution as a prerequisite for the establishment of NNFZ, which was at this point being negotiated at preliminary level by an inter-governmental working group consisting of government officials from the five Nordic countries (see more below).¹⁹

After colorful events in the chambers of the *Folketing*,²⁰ the parliamentary deputies once again voted in favor of the resolution sponsored by the Social Democrats. This time, though, instead of settling for footnotes, Prime Minister Poul Schlüter framed the issue as a threat to Denmark's ability to continue as a full member in NATO. New general elections were arranged for May 1988, only a few months after the previous elections of 1987. Although Schlüter's coalition was not able to reach a majority position in the *Folketing*, a change of sides by the Danish Social Liberal Party (who had modified their stance towards NATO's nuclear policy as a reaction to changes in public opinion over the issue) along with continuing support from the Center Democrats and Christian People's Party, this time from an opposition position, guaranteed them a de facto majority. This, subsequently, effectively ended the footnote period.²¹

4. Norway and the Model of Sub-Regional Balancing

Although Norway witnessed minority cabinets during this era, too, the domestic political setting and parliamentary set-up was not as propitious to splinter party "foot-dragging" as was the case in Denmark.²² Like Denmark's, Norway's state identity and foreign policy culture was based on "a strong liberal/meliorist belief

18 Anders Wivel, Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Origins of Denmark's Pragmatic Activism, in: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (2014), p. 127; see also Pedaliu, "Footnotes".

19 See Doeser, Fall of Danish 'Footnote Policy', pp. 229 f.

20 See Petersen, 'Footnoting' as a political instrument, pp. 307–310.

21 See Doeser, Fall of Danish 'Footnote Policy', p. 234.

22 See David Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, second edition, Manchester 2008, p. 317.

that the world can become a better place” and a sense of active agency in achieving this.²³ Norway’s “peace exceptionalism” and tendency towards strategic isolationism from great power conflicts after the experiences of World War II left their mark on its NATO policy. According to Riste, “the two main features that set Norway apart from the mainstream of alliance policy were self-imposed restraints on allied military presence and activities on Norwegian soil, and its anti-nuclear stance in its various permutations.”²⁴

For the European North, despite its peace-oriented foreign policy posture, the final phase of the Cold War amounted to a major geostrategic challenge. The combination of NATO’s focus on Central Europe and major efforts by the Soviet Union to reinforce its submarine-based strategic nuclear deterrence (beginning in the early 1970s) made Norway’s long coastal areas more and more vulnerable.²⁵ The increasing operational activity of Soviet submarines in the Baltic Sea was met with speculation that the USSR might be preparing to isolate Norway and the Nordic region in a pincer movement from its bases in the Kola peninsula and in the Baltic, should a regional crisis erupt. These concerns became even more alarmist after several incursions of Soviet nuclear submarines into the territorial waters of both Norway and Sweden in the early 1980s.²⁶

Although the Norwegian Labor Government accepted NATO’s Double-Track Decision in 1979, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment displayed by the Norwegian public, shared by several left-wing members of the Labor Party, along with the positive sub-regional arms control agenda provided by the new impetus given to the NNFZ proposal, pushed the Norwegian government towards emphasizing the arms control track of NATO’s Double-Track Decision. Eventually, as Riste points out, “the wear and tear caused by the ‘dual-track decision’ and the parallel debate on a Nordic nuclear-free zone contributed to Labour’s fall from power in the autumn of 1981.”²⁷ The Labor-led government was succeeded by Kåre Willoch’s Conservative government, which, in the eyes of the newly elected U. S. President Ronald Reagan, restored Norway’s position as a reliable Ally.

To counter the strategic challenge posed by the USSR, Norway decided to increase its defense cooperation with the U. S. From as early as 1976 it had begun negotiations with the U. S. (and, to a lesser extent, with Britain and Canada) on

23 Halvard Leira, ‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace, in: *Swiss Political Science Review* 19/3 (2013), p. 338.

24 See Riste, *NATO’s Northern Frontline*, p. 306.

25 See Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd edition, Houndmills 2003, pp. 239–330.

26 Of these the most famous is perhaps the 1981 “whisky on the rocks” incident when a nuclear-capable Soviet Whisky-class submarine shipwrecked near a major Swedish naval base in Karlskrona, causing a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries and almost leading to a confrontation between Swedish coastal forces and approaching Soviet surface ships. See Milton Leitenberg, *The Stranded USSR Submarine in Sweden and the Question of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone*, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 17/1 (1982), pp. 17–28.

27 See Riste, *NATO’s Northern Frontline*, p. 305.

pre-positioning heavy equipment and supplies for ground forces in Norwegian bases. These were intended to be a preventive means of enhancing NATO's deterrence in the region and of avoiding the unnecessary escalation that such maneuvers could cause during potential conflict. Measures were introduced to increase interoperability and logistical support so that the U.S. Air Force could operate more easily from Norwegian bases. Negotiations on a Prestockage and Reinforcement Agreement on pre-positioning a U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade's equipment in northern Norway were finalized in 1981.²⁸ The United States also introduced a new, more aggressive forward-based maritime strategy in 1982 amid the heated vertex of the Euromissile crisis.²⁹

From the perspective of the Nordic countries the latter development—reinforcing deterrence in the European Northern flank without balancing arms control processes—was a double-edged sword. Indeed, the focus on strategic parity and on the Central European theater threatened to leave the Northern flank of Europe exposed to increasing military buildup and tensions. According to Nate Jones, the U.S. shift towards a more aggressive forward-based maritime strategy in the early 1980s was received with extreme suspicion by the already paranoid and aging Soviet leadership, thus providing one more factor in the series of misperceptions that gradually led the Euromissile crisis towards full war scare, supposedly culminating during NATO's Able Archer exercise in the fall 1983.³⁰

During the period of Willoch's Conservative government between 1981 and 1986, Norway restrained itself from criticizing NATO's approach both to the Euromissile crisis and to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It was only after the Labor party returned to power in 1986 that Norway briefly joined the chorus of "footnote countries" like Denmark, refusing to sign NATO's communiqué that supported U.S. policy on defense and space weapons. At this point, Norway also tightened its policy on port visits and decided to export submarine-related equipment to the Soviet Union, causing notable resentment from the hardliners in the U.S. government. As with the Danish case, this created a short period of discord in the bilateral relationship during the crucial period of negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev over an INF treaty.³¹

Of course, there was also an external dimension at work in Norway's dual approach of commitment and restraint. The decision made in 1960, and confirmed in 1961, of not accepting nuclear arms into Norwegian territory during

28 See Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, Oxford 1989, p. 224.

29 The key component in the 1982 strategy, should deterrence fail, was to have the ability to seize the initiative, that is, to establish "sea control in key maritime areas as far forward and as rapidly as possible [and] wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines," see Linton F. Brooks, *Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy*, in: *International Security* 11 (1986), p. 65.

30 See Nate Jones, *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War*, New York 2016, pp. 26 f.

31 Riste, *NATO's Northern Frontline*, p. 305.

peacetime was an integral part of the so-called Nordic balance model, developed by Norwegian foreign policy experts at the time.³² The basic idea behind the model was that Norway (and Denmark to a lesser extent) could use their policy of peacetime nuclear restraint and the absence of foreign military bases as a preventive leverage or deterrent against the Soviet Union should the latter not restrain itself vis-à-vis Finland and not respect its status of limited but active peacetime neutrality (though there remained the *option* of abandoning this line of policy should a regional crisis occur).³³ The declared and internationally recognized neutrality of Sweden and its strong defense posture acted as a metaphorical pointer balancing the two pans of the scale.

Finland did not endorse this kind of mechanical reading of the Nordic balance model, since it might give room for an interpretation that the Norwegian and Danish NATO policy could determine its standing in relation to the Soviet Union.³⁴ But this did not hinder the acceptability of the broader idea that “strategic balance” in the Nordics was based on a certain level of commitment to military disengagement on behalf of both of the superpowers. Thus, instead of speaking about balance in a strictly mechanical sense, Finnish foreign policy leadership advocated a looser conception of maintaining sub-regional *stability*. This was based on the recognition that the security doctrines of the Nordic countries were interdependent: political decisions in regard to security made by one Nordic country would necessarily affect the strategic position of the whole region.³⁵

Another aspect of the external dimension was the shared social identity among the Nordic countries, based on their tendency to advocate liberal egalitarian and meliorist values, which has already been mentioned.³⁶ This was also evident in the extensive support for a pro-disarmament agenda among those in civil society, expert groups, and parts of the political elite. The role of social democratic parties was also strong during the Cold War era.³⁷ Thus, although the dominant narrative of the research literature tends to emphasize the isolationist element—the tendency of countries such as Denmark and Norway to disengage themselves from the militarized logic of great power politics—we should also take into account the centripetal effect caused by the shared Nordic identity and the shared geopolitical understanding of being located in a sometimes neglected yet strategically important sub-region.

32 See Arne Olav Brundtland, *The Nordic Balance: Past and Present*, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 2 (1965), pp. 30–63; Erik Noreen, *The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice*, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 18/1 (1983), pp. 43–56.

33 Finland’s limited peacetime neutrality was based on its position within the Soviet Union’s sphere of interest through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1948.

34 See Osmo Apunen, *Linjamiehet. Paasikivi-seuran historia*, Helsinki 2005, pp. 132–135.

35 See Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, p. 325.

36 See Leira, *Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace*; Wivel, *Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines*.

37 See Arter, *Scandinavian Politics Today*.

5. Explaining the Nordic Paradox—the Paradigmatic Case of Denmark

Of the two Nordic NATO members' approaches, it is probably Denmark's footnote diplomacy that provides the paradigmatic example of how foreign policy decisions are affected by a complex set of internal and external factors, such as traditions of domestic politics, public opinion, intra-party debates, transnational diffusion of disarmament norms and ideas, and sub-regional geostrategic concerns.³⁸ In short, there are several reasons to believe that the domestic political situation (dominated by the effect of the economic crisis and parliamentary composition after general elections) cannot by itself explain Danish foreign policy activism during the 1980s.

Firstly, the role of public opinion needs to be taken into account. This is evident in the way Schlüter's cabinet framed the 1987 port visit resolution into a general debate over Denmark's NATO membership, steering the discussion into wider issues than nuclear weapons and arms control alone. It is important to note that support for NATO as such did not deteriorate in Denmark after the Double-Track Decision and the start of American missile deployments in neighboring Western European countries in 1983. Indeed, support of NATO membership was at its highest (69 per cent) in 1983, perhaps the most tense year of the period. It peaked again at 66 per cent in 1988 when the government decided to call elections on Denmark's foreign policy line.³⁹ Thus, public opinion was against the assertive nuclear weapons policy of NATO, not against the military alliance itself. The resurgence of the anti-nuclear movement during the period also corroborates this conclusion.⁴⁰

Secondly, continuity in the Danish strategic culture needs to be taken into account when explaining the country's foreign policy activism during the Euro-missile crisis. The Danish liberal-egalitarian state identity and the buildup of the Nordic welfare state model during the Cold War amalgamated with a more pragmatist and realistic reading of world politics dominated by the great powers, a worldview that stemmed from historical experiences.⁴¹ This liberal-egalitarian state identity can be seen as a driving factor behind the strong anti-nuclear sentiment within the Danish foreign policy establishment and in society in general. Wivel points, as well, towards the traditional small state mentality of power balancing and cooperative behavior to explain Denmark's dual approach to peace policy. It did not want to rely too heavily on protection provided by a

38 See Brun Pedersen, 'Footnote policy', pp. 639 f.

39 See Doeser, *Fall of Danish 'Footnote' Policy*, p. 233.

40 See Krasner and Petersen, *The Danish Peace Movement*, pp. 114, 119.

41 Anders Wivel, *Forerunner, follower, exceptionalist or bridge builder? Mapping Nordicness in Danish foreign policy*, in: *Global Affairs* 4/4–5 (2018), pp. 419–434.

single great power, so its positioning included forthright cooperation with other Nordic countries (both Allied and neutral ones), and a stance “locating Denmark firmly within the U.S.-based Cold War foreign policy posture.”⁴²

In a similar vein, Pedaliu traces the origins of the “footnote period” and Denmark’s intra-Alliance dissent to a “longer gestation period” of suspicion (from the 1950s onwards) over the willingness of the U.S. to protect the national interests of its smaller European allies. The abandonment of the doctrine of massive retaliation in the 1960s by the Kennedy administration and Washington’s grand strategy shift towards Asia and preoccupation with the Vietnam War were key formative experiences indicating the potential volatility of U.S. transatlantic policy.⁴³

Indeed, Denmark exercised a “double nuclear policy” from the late 1950s onwards. In 1957 Copenhagen declared an official policy of peacetime nuclear restraint, according to which Denmark would not allow the stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil or the flying of nuclear-armed aircraft in its airspace; and this included the vast area of Greenland. Nevertheless, behind the official policy of nuclear restraint, successive Danish governments turned a blind eye to U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Greenland between 1958 and 1965 and to the continual overflights of nuclear-armed aircraft as part of the U.S. airborne alert system, right up to the time of the 1968 “broken arrow” incident in Thule Air Base, Greenland.⁴⁴

Moreover, the era of superpower summits and the U.S. decision to proceed with plans for détente directly with the Soviet leadership increased suspicions as to whether the U.S. would take the interests of its smaller Allies in Europe into account. Following the Soviet Union’s military buildup in the Kola Peninsula from the 1960s onwards, these concerns were felt as even more daunting.

Finally, when explaining the strong anti-nuclear sentiment during the 1980s, we need to take into account both the role ties at societal level had among the Nordic countries and the effect of transnational movements. Amidst the increasing superpower tensions in 1983, peace protests and anti-nuclear demonstrations drew several hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of major Nordic cities. In Finland alone over 215,000 people—approximately 5 per cent of the

42 Wivel, *Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines*, p. 125.

43 See Pedaliu, “Footnotes”, pp. 242–245.

44 See Vestergaard, *The Danish experience in NATO*, pp. 106–117. The Danish and U.S. governments lied about why an American B-52 bomber had crashed in Thule Air Base, Greenland, in 1968 to avoid the fact—revealed after the end of the Cold War—that U.S. bombers with nuclear weapons on board flew continuously over Thule as part of the airborne alert system. In 1995 the Danish government revealed that the U.S. had also stored nuclear weapons in Greenland between 1958 and 1965. The U.S. government informed the Danish government amidst a heated domestic debate in Denmark over the issue, immediately after Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen had reassured the Danish public that there had never been any nuclear weapons on Danish soil.

total population—participated in the anti-nuclear protests of November 1983, the biggest demonstrations held in the Nordics for several decades.⁴⁵

Although NATO's Euromissiles were eventually deployed, it can fairly be said that the massive peace protests and demonstrations made some mark. Arguably, they had an effect on the foreign policy agenda in the Nordic countries, as seems evident in the dialogue and intergovernmental cooperation on NNFZ, especially from the early 1980s onwards.

I will now go on to examine the life cycle of the NNFZ initiative and the way the diplomatic activities around it permeated into a practical connection between the Nordic countries amid the Euromissile crisis and became a semi-permanent arrangement. The idea even outlived the signing of the INF Treaty.

6. Origins of Finnish Sub-Regional Arms Control Activism During the Cold War

By the end of the 1970s, the initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone (NNFZ) had matured into a discernible element in the Finnish foreign policy toolbox.⁴⁶ The process of maturing lasted some 15 years after President Urho Kekkonen first publicly presented his idea of establishing a sub-regional nuclear arms control arrangement in the Nordic region in May 1963. Kekkonen's original proposal was based on previous nuclear arms control initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union, by the Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers Adam Rapacki and Östen Undén, by the British Labour politician Hugh Gaitskill, and by Yugoslavia's Premier, Josip Broz Tito.⁴⁷ Moreover, the idea of nuclear-weapon-

45 It is important to recall at this point that there were also cases of friction within the Nordic peace movement, as was the case in Western Europe as a whole. Nonpartisan peace organizations, such as the Committee of 100, protested against both the Soviet and the Western nuclear weapons buildup. "Anti-imperialist" organizations, on the other hand, who swore allegiance to the Soviet Union, directed their protests against NATO's Double-Track Decision. That said, underneath the rather politicized surface, these massive peace protests were motivated more by a transnational anti-nuclear and pro-peace sentiment promoted by the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END) rather than specific "Great Power" political antagonisms. See Elli Kytömäki, Viisikymmentä vuotta toimintaa ydinaseriisunnan puolesta, in: Elli Kytömäki (ed.), *Ei ydinaseille: suomalaisen aktivismin historia*, Helsinki 2014, pp. 40–42. See also Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*, pp. 119 f.

46 This section is based on my previous archival research collected from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland (UMA), Archives of the Cabinet of the President of Finland (PKA), from President Kekkonen's archives (UKA) and President Mauno Koivisto's archives (MKA) held in the National Archives. See Tapio Juntunen, *Kaavoihin kangistumista vai käytännöllistä viisautta? Suomen alueellinen ydinasevalvontapolitiikka kylmän sodan aikana*, in: *Kosmopolis* 46/1 (2016), pp. 27–44. See also Apunen, *Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan*; Clive Archer, *Plans for Nordic Nuclear-weapon Free Zone*, in: *Kosmopolis* 34 (2004), pp. 201–207.

47 See Ingemar Lindahl, *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal*, London 1988, pp. 47–57. Max Jakobson, Kekkonen's political advisor at the time, has

free zones was given new impetus in the early 1960s, when discussion on nuclear disarmament intensified after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (among other incidents).

Kekkonen's original proposal was that each Nordic country should reaffirm its *de facto* non-nuclear status by making a series of unilateral, reciprocal, and binding commitments. As founding members, Norway and Denmark had been in NATO since 1949. Kekkonen reasoned that, since they had committed themselves to non-nuclear status during peacetime, the simple process of recognizing the present nuclear-free status of the region would not compromise the security commitments and foreign policy doctrines of the concerned countries.⁴⁸ However, the original NNFZ proposal was effectively a non-starter, since the actual substance of the initiative was of secondary importance compared to the implicit agenda. Kekkonen used the initiative both to appease Soviet concerns about Finland's foreign policy and to signal concern about the possible unintended geopolitical consequences in the Nordic region of U.S. plans to establish a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in Europe.

For some researchers, the main rationale behind the 1963 NNFZ initiative was to emphasize the Nordic region, in terms of security politics, as an undivided and somewhat interdependent whole.⁴⁹ For others, the original NNFZ initiative also aimed to redirect international discussion over Northern Europe towards the idea of reinforcing the balance between the Eastern and Western blocs—one of the fundamental tenets of the Finnish foreign policy posture during the Cold War.⁵⁰ In other words, Finland's initiative aimed for system maintenance by recognizing the leading role of the nuclear weapon states. (The initiative did not lay any demands on them.)

The lukewarm reception of the 1963 NNFZ initiative in other Nordic countries and in the West in general hardly came as a surprise to Helsinki's Foreign Policy establishment. Finland's plan was perceived to favor the Soviet Union, who would use the NNFZ as a tool to achieve the neutralization of the Nordic region. Denmark and especially Norway had no intention of abandoning their option of receiving all the military aid that was possible should there be a time of crisis—especially if there were no significant concessions on the Soviet side.⁵¹ During the remainder of the 1960s Finland shifted its focus on the emerging front of multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy, as is evident in its role as one of

said that Kekkonen's 1963 NNFZ initiative was prepared rather hastily in just two weeks by him and some of his closest advisors after the Finnish Premier had discussed the topic with Tito during a state visit to Yugoslavia. See Max Jakobson, *Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953–1965*, Helsinki 1980, pp. 317–319.

48 See Apunen, *Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan*, pp. 17 f.

49 See Kari Möttölä, *The Finnish Policy of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the Early 1970s*, in: *Cooperation and Conflict 17/4* (1982), pp. 287–313.

50 See Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, pp. 129–131.

51 See Osmo Apunen, *Silmän Poliitiikka. Ulkopoliittinen instituutti 1961–2006*, Helsinki 2012, pp. 110–112.

the facilitators in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the United Nations in 1968. (Together with Ireland, Finland was the co-sponsor and the first nation to sign the Treaty.)⁵²

7. The Agenda-Setting Function of the NNFZ Initiative

The NNFZ initiative was restored to the Finnish foreign policy agenda in the context of the discussions on Mutual and Balanced (conventional) Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe under the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN disarmament regime during the first half of the 1970s.⁵³ But it was during the Euromissile crisis and amid deteriorating superpower relations in the late 1970s that the NNFZ agenda started to resonate among the political elites of other Nordic countries too. A key change in this regard came in 1975 when Sweden added the idea of a “safety belt” to the NNFZ agenda. It suggested that any sub-regional arms control arrangement in the European Northern flank should also include restrictions and reductions to the Soviet Union’s intermediate-range missile deployments in its immediate vicinity.⁵⁴

At the same time, a new generation of diplomats in the Finnish Foreign Ministry continued to modify and redevelop the NNFZ initiative in case a situation came up in which Finland could make another formal proposal to start negotiations over the arrangement.⁵⁵ The time to carry through these plans came when the Finnish foreign and defense policy elite realized that the routes of the new American second-generation cruise missiles might fly over Finland’s airspace.⁵⁶ It was feared that this could give the Soviet Union the impetus to demand consultations over defense cooperation from Finland. They could do this by appealing to the obligations stated in the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, to unite in countering any threat posed by Germany or its allies.⁵⁷

52 See Max Jakobson, 38. kerros. Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965–71, Helsinki 1983, pp. 129–147.

53 See Apunen, *Silmän politiikkaa*, p. 114.

54 See Anders Thunborg, *Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries Today—A Swedish Commentary*, in: *Ulkopolitiikka 1* (1975), pp. 34–38.

55 UMA, NNFZ and procedures relating to it, March 4, 1976 [date added by handwriting], PYY-PAJ 1975–81 kc 15.

56 UKA, Personal letter/discussion memorandum to President Kekkonen by Jaakko Kalela, Discussions with professor Bykov, February 17, 1981, TOK, PM/JK, UKA, IV: 10; UMA, Klaus Törnudd, Seppo Pietinen, Juhani Suomi, Arto Mansala, Jaakko Laajava, and Pauli Järvenpää [signed by Undersecretary Klaus Törnudd], Report on key near-term developments affecting Finland’s security policy, Finnish-Soviet relations and Finland’s neutrality policy, pp. 11–15, December 8, 1983, Highly classified documents, 82–87kc 16.

57 These fears actualized in 1978 when Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov privately proposed joint military exercises between Finland and the Soviet Union whilst visiting Finland. Although the suggestion was averted in private talks between President Kekkonen and Ustinov, officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry connected it directly with the strategic

The independent status of Finnish defense forces was regarded as the sacred core of Finland's otherwise rather compromised status as a country of limited peacetime neutrality. The aging president Kekkonen reasoned that the NNFZ non-starter could be used once more as an agenda-setting instrument—that is, to pave the way for negotiations through which Finland could yet again share its concern over the possible unintended sub-regional consequences of nuclear weapons politics.

Kekkonen presented his revised NNFZ initiative in a speech held at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in May 1978, this time in the form of a comprehensive arms control regime coupled with negative security assurances from the nuclear weapon states, verification procedures, and other confidence-building measures. The proposal was followed by a round of bilateral talks between Finland and other Nordic countries as well as talks with the two superpowers separately. As was perhaps to be expected, Finland's shuttle diplomacy did not open new ground for the realization of the NNFZ. Norway, Denmark, and the U.S. remained critical, while the Soviet Union was, also predictably, pleased with Finland's efforts to promote sub-regional military disengagement in a way that pointed to Western weapons systems as the source of the international problem.⁵⁸

This time Sweden wanted to add the Baltic Sea to the discussions, most likely because of the increasing tensions created by Soviet submarine activities in the area. The most critical stance in the round of bilateral negotiations was presented by the U.S. Ambassador to Finland, Rozanne Ridgway, who stated that the Finnish proposal did not accord with the strategic thinking of the United States. Indeed, Ridgway went on to say that it would cause serious problems for the cohesion of NATO and thus impair U.S. security interests in Northern Europe, although U.S. diplomats were also from time to time signaling that they understood the political predicament that pushed Finland towards these kinds of activities. A summary made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry on the discussions with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the U.S., and the Soviet Union was very realistic in its conclusions: there was almost no room for any hope that NNFZ could be actually realized.⁵⁹

tensions in the Northern maritime area. UMA, Juhani Suomi and Arto Mansala, The visit of USSR's Defense Minister, Marshal D.F. Ustinov, in Finland, July 10–14, 1978; propositions over military cooperation, September 11, 1978, 18–0 1978–81.

58 Apunen, *Silmän politiikka*, p. 119.

59 UMA, Arto Mansala, Summary of the discussions on NNFZ, November 9, 1978, p. 5, PYV-PAJ 1975–81—erittäin salaiset kc 15; UMA, Arto Mansala, Summary on the discussions concerning the NNFZ thus far, November 13, 1978, p. 5, PYV-PAJ 1975–81—erittäin salaiset kc 15. Another key takeaway from the 1978 NNFZ discussions was that other Nordic countries, especially Norway, and the U.S. now seemed to have a better understanding of the legitimate security concerns that had pushed Finland to make the initiative in the first place.

8. Arms Control as the Connecting Factor: How the NNFZ Matured into a Shared Practical Agenda Between the Nordic Countries

But the tides in the Nordic countries were also changing. Great power politics and the practices of systems maintenance—including nuclear deterrence policies—were increasingly being regarded more as a liability than a solution. Among the Nordic public, this was evident in the rapid rise in popularity of anti-nuclear civil society movements during the early 1980s. This did not go unnoticed by the Finnish foreign policy elite. Finnish diplomats reported back to Helsinki that some influential figures in the Norwegian Labor Party—particularly former Minister Jens Evensen and, to a lesser extent, Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg and the future Defense Minister Johan Holst—were urging a continuation of the NNFZ discussions in their domestic debates.⁶⁰

Even if the task of getting all the interested parties, especially the U.S, to favor such a resumption seemed infeasible, the NNFZ agenda itself was becoming an institutionalized, or at least semi-permanent practicality between the Nordic countries. This became evident in 1981 when the Nordic Council of Ministers referred to the NNFZ in a joint statement for the first time: public discussion on NNFZ had gathered such momentum that it was no longer possible to avoid it when dealing with the nuclear issue, as the Danish Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen reportedly admitted during the meeting.⁶¹

The discussions over NNFZ were again given fresh impetus when, during an interview with the Finnish newspaper *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* in June 1981, Leonid Brezhnev proposed that the Soviet Union was ready to give negative security assurances to the states involved in NNFZ.⁶² Brezhnev also hinted that the USSR might be ready to make reciprocal arrangements in the Soviet territory near the Nordic region. Brezhnev's underpinnings were, of course, merely tactical in nature, as he certainly knew that American sentiments towards the NNFZ agenda remained highly critical. In Finland the conclusions drawn from the discussions following the 1978 proposal were mostly deemed disappointing: none of the countries involved in the discussions were ready for official negotiations over the substance of the comprehensive NNFZ agenda. Rather, the discussions were seen

60 UMA, Tapani Brotherus, Norway's NNFZ memorandum to NATO, February 3, 1981, PYV 89 H, file I; UMA, René Nyberg, Nuclear Weapons on Norwegian (and Danish) soil, October 15, 1981, PYV 89 H, files III–IV.

61 See UMA, Deputy Head of Department Pekka J. Korvenheimo, Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone in the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers, September 2–3, 1981, p. 1; September 14, 1981, PYV 89 H 1981 III–IV; UMA, Acting Deputy Head of Department Erkki Mäentakanen, Nuclear-weapon-free Nordics, September 16, 1981, p.3, PYV 89 H 1981 III–IV.

62 See Bengt Broms, Proposals to Establish a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, in: Michigan Journal of International Law 10/2 (1989), p. 352.

as a fruitful way to market the basic foreign and security political orientation of Finland as part of the Nordic whole.⁶³

Creating and maintaining practical spaces for a security political dialogue between the Nordic countries themselves formed the basic rationale for what could be labeled the fourth generation of NNFZ policies, which lasted from the early 1980s until the end of the Cold War. From the Finnish perspective the basic idea was to enhance the sense of fellowship and interdependence among the Nordic countries. NNFZ policies were redirected towards the level of everyday diplomatic encounters of diplomats and officials. President Mauno Koivisto, Kekkonen's successor as President of Finland in 1982, had a more reserved attitude towards Kekkonen's NNFZ aspirations, especially when it came to the rather intrusive style that Finland had exercised with its unilaterally formulated public initiatives.⁶⁴ Still, Koivisto, too, saw the instrumental value in the process of the NNFZ discussions itself, although he emphasized that there was no point in making proposals just for the sake of their performative effect. Koivisto also had a reserved stance towards new variants of the NNFZ initiative, including the idea of a mini-zone consisting of only Sweden and Finland, and alternatively a maximalist proposal with disengagement zones outside the Nordic region.⁶⁵

Discussions and practical encounters around the NNFZ issue were used to anchor Finland's international position more firmly to the Scandinavian bedrock. Despite this, there were concerns within the Finnish security political elite on whether the establishment of NNFZ would have positive strategic repercussions for sub-regional stability at all. This was evident in a secret memorandum drafted by the Operative Department of the General Staff Headquarters of Finnish Defense Forces in 1986. The memorandum reasoned that the establishment of NNFZ might also increase Western anxieties about Soviet influence in the region and, more alarmingly, create more favorable conditions for the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, thus potentially destabilizing the military balance in the Nordic sub-region. Inclusion of the Baltic Sea was mentioned as a particularly problematic issue, both in terms of international law and strategy.

63 UMA, NNFZ; report by the Political Department. Summary on the project's past, present and perspectives on Finnish actions [signed by Head of Department Seppo Pietinen], March 30, 1984, p.17, 14–4.

64 This attitude is evident in several of Koivisto's draft notes ahead of private discussions with foreign state leaders and diplomats between 1981 and 1983. See MKA, memorandum from the discussions with Norwegian Prime Minister Kåre Willoch during a state visit in Norway in March 1983, Koivisto's handwritten notes, March 10, 1983, Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, 1983 I; MKA, memorandum from the discussions with Vice President Bush, July 3, 1983, Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, 1983 II.

65 MKA, handwritten notes by President Koivisto ahead of the state visit of the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union N.A. Tihonov to Finland, December 10, 1982, Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, lokakuu 1981–1982.

From the perspective of the Finnish politics of peacetime neutrality and the Nordic balance/stability model, the most interesting claim in the memorandum was that the actualization of NNFZ would actually increase the risk of conventional military intervention within the region, through the waning of the nuclear deterrent effect there. So it is interesting to note the Defense establishment in Finland repeating the U.S. criticism of the NNFZ initiative almost word for word and sharing in its implicit optimism regarding the functioning of nuclear deterrence.⁶⁶

But the primary function of the NNFZ initiative, at this point, was to maintain the process of dialogue itself. As has been aptly described by Finnish diplomats such as Keijo Korhonen and René Nyberg, who both worked on arms control issues in the Finnish Foreign Ministry during the 1970s and 1980s, Finland's NNFZ policies were essentially an exercise in diplomatic shadowboxing. This is captured rather eloquently in a metaphor used by Korhonen: "So valuable a fish is the salmon, it makes sense to try fishing for one, even if there is no prospect of catching any."⁶⁷

The instrumental value of the NNFZ process was already recognized outside Finland. For example, during a private discussion in Stockholm in 1985, the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme encouraged Koivisto to keep on pushing the NNFZ agenda. Interestingly, it was Koivisto who was the more reluctant of the two statesmen in this regard. Palme insisted that "we just got to keep harping on about it [the NNFZ agenda]," and pointed out that public opinion in Denmark and Norway showed considerable responsiveness to the idea. Palme hinted that the governments of Norway and Denmark might benefit from Sweden and Finland maintaining the momentum on arms control initiatives that the political elites in Norway and Denmark could not actively support.⁶⁸

66 UMA, The effects of the NNFZ from the military perspective [signed by Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg and Lieutenant General Rolf Wilhelm], January 2, 1986, pp. 3–4, 14–4 PYV, Suomen toiminta ja kannanotot 1984–86.

67 "Lohi on niin kallis kala, että sitä kannattaa pyytää vaikkei saisikaan [...]" Translated by the author of this essay from Jukka Rislakki, *Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi*, Helsinki 2010, p. 169. René Nyberg in critical oral history sessions organized by the research project 'Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War' (FA268669) in Helsinki, September 23, 2014.

68 "Meidän täytyy vain jatkaa asian jauhamista." Translated by the author of this essay from the discussion memorandum written by Undersecretary Klaus Törnudd. PKA, Meeting between the President of the Republic and the Swedish Prime Minister in Stockholm, January 7, 1985, p. 9, January 18, 1985, Jad:2 1985–89.

9. Towards Conclusions: The INF Treaty and the Security Dilemma in the Northern Sea Areas

When, after several preparatory meetings between the heads of each MFA's Departments of Political Affairs during winter 1986/87, the Nordic countries eventually established a joint intra-governmental working group to deliberate the NNFZ agenda in 1987, the strategic focus in Europe was already shifting from Central Europe towards the "flanks." President Koivisto addressed these concerns in one of his key foreign policy speeches in 1986.⁶⁹ Koivisto's handwritten notes and exchange of letters with Vice President Bush indicate that the Finnish president had an increasingly pessimistic view of the INF negotiations in late 1985 and early 1986.⁷⁰ Koivisto reasoned that there was an urgent need to move forward in the confidence- and trust-building measures (CBM) in the Northern sea areas, following the basic guidelines of the CSCE process. Koivisto also referred to the psychological aspects of the nuclear arms race and went on to consider the most likely reason for war or even nuclear confrontation in the Nordic region: they would, he thought, be based on misperceptions. The NNFZ agenda, he maintained, was to be seen as an "ongoing process".⁷¹

It is also important to remember that the heated Danish debate over its policy vis-à-vis NATO continued after the signing of the INF Treaty. In 1988, in an interview conducted by a Danish journalist, Paul Warnke, the U.S. chief SALT II Negotiator in 1977–78, hinted that the U.S. had routinely violated the Danish policy of no port visits by ships bearing nuclear arms.⁷² A public debate followed, leading to the *Folketing* passing the abovementioned resolution requiring the Danish government to remind all visiting warships of the fact that they were not allowed to visit Danish ports if carrying nuclear weapons. This raised worries among Denmark's allies over the cohesion of NATO, and gave rise to major diplomatic pressure on Denmark from the U.S., French, and British governments. Most notably, it resulted in the resignation of the Danish right-wing minority government on April 19.⁷³

When it comes to the INF negotiations and the reception of the Treaty itself, it is important to realize that public opinion in Scandinavia maintained a strong pro-nuclear disarmament sentiment throughout the 1980s, and that this was so even for people in the NATO countries Norway and Denmark. Moreover, the anti-nuclear movements in the Nordic countries continued to develop their

69 See Mauno Koivisto, *Maantiede ja historiallinen kokemus. Ulkopoliittisia kannanottoja*, Helsinki 1992, pp. 54–58.

70 MKA, Koivisto's letter to Bush, December 16, 1985, pp. 1–2 *Ulkopoliittikka/selvityksiä* 1985; MKA, Koivisto's handwritten notes ahead of a state visit to Switzerland, March 24, 1986, pp. 5f., *Ulkopoliittikka/selvityksiä* 1986 tammikuu–kesäkuu.

71 Mauno Koivisto, *Historian tekijät. Kaksi kautta II*. Helsinki 1995, p. 43.

72 See Vestergaard, *The Danish experience in NATO*, p. 111.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 111f.

approach, incorporating issues such as SDI and demands for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) in their agenda.⁷⁴ The US–Soviet rapprochement and the INF negotiations between the superpowers were therefore received as positive news in the region. However, due to its focus on land-based nuclear weapons, the INF Treaty threatened to increase the geostrategic significance of the Northern sea areas. It can therefore be concluded that from the Nordic perspective (if there ever was such a unified stance), the INF Treaty was recognized as a historically and symbolically significant political achievement, but at the same time considered to be merely the first incremental step in a process that should lead to more comprehensive arms control arrangements.

Although there were major differences between the foreign policy postures of the Nordic countries, the last decade of the Cold War era brought their strategic concerns closer together. There were several reasons behind this: a sense of solidarity, shared identity and kinship and, to a lesser degree, a shared perception of the idiosyncratic nature of their sub-regional geopolitical environment in the Northern “flank” of the European theater. When it comes to the NNFZ initiative, Finland used it as a diplomatic non-starter and agenda-setting instrument to signal its security–political concerns to fellow Nordic countries, and to the U. S. and NATO. During the 1980s the NNFZ discussions matured into a semi-permanent practical connection among the Nordic countries themselves.

Indeed, it is rarely noticed in the existing literature that, at the turn of the 1980s, the informal negotiation *process* around the NNFZ and its maturation into a shared Nordic practice very clearly overlapped with the proceedings of the Euromissile crisis. The point here is not to claim that relations between the Nordic countries would have been without friction without it. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, arms control initiatives such as the NNFZ created tensions between the Nordic countries, and even the two neutral Nordic countries did not have identical geostrategic positions.

To sum up, the NNFZ agenda formed a practical policy process that was used to create conditions for a security–political dialogue between the Nordic countries themselves (with minimal interference from external parties). This helped to create a sense of interdependence. Moreover, it provided a positive agenda that tied together the interests of the Nordic arms control community, peace researchers, and activists as well as the political parties at the Center and Left of the political spectrum. Inter-parliamentary meetings and summits around the NNFZ question were also organized. This positive agenda had its roots in the egalitarian and peace-oriented state identity that was shared by all the Nordic countries, but it also reflected geostrategic concerns about the status of the European Northern flank during arms control processes that focused exclusively on land-based missile deployment in Central Europe. The NNFZ initiative, then, was first and foremost used as an instrument to highlight the need for sub-regional sensitivity in the broader play of the great power order and its management.

74 Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*, p. 193.

Claudia Kemper

More Than a FREEZE

Political Mobilization and the Peace Movement
in 1980s U. S. Society

By now it is no longer particularly original to use Google NGram graphs to introduce a complex topic. But tracking and visualizing the vocabulary in “a lot of English books” (as Google says) is nonetheless a useful way to generate both a first impression of how popular one term or another was and to bring up some first questions for study.

As Figure 1 shows, the trajectories for the occurrence of “peace” and “security” developed in different directions. Not surprisingly, the term “peace” peaked after World War I and after World War II, while the term “security” had a steadier career, rising slowly throughout the twentieth century. This happened parallel to the rise of the fields and subjects in which the term became the conceptual centerpiece: International Relations and Political Science. It is quite remarkable but unsurprising that the quantitative use of both terms—“peace” and “security”—intersected during the last third of the 1970s.

In the period from 1977 to 1979, the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached more or less the same levels.¹ But this was only the most visible aspect of a complex mixture of factors that made the international situation appear very threatening. After this period, tensions and anxieties accumulated in Western societies. This spurred both a broad mobilization of anti-nuclear peace movements in almost every Western country and increasing political debates and diplomatic activities regarding security issues. As international tensions grew, the question of how to maintain, or even improve, the Soviet–American nuclear status quo became an urgent topic, regardless of whatever position groups were taking on nuclear weapons.²

In a heated atmosphere in which political and emotional arguments were all too often inextricably entangled, the task of framing the language of political discourse and influencing public opinion to particular ends became more and

1 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, *Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 69/5 (2013), pp.75–81, here p.78, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340213501363>.

2 Various contemporary concepts in P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Marrison, *Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future*, New York/NY 1985. An overview in Lawrence Freedman/Jeffrey H. Michaels, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London 2019.




Fig. 1: Occurrence of the words “peace” (dark gray) and “security” (light gray).

more important. Terms like “peace” and “security” had been in use for a long time. Now, there was a need to endow them with new meanings and enhance their political efficacy. In the context of protests and grassroots debates, the peace concept served as an important synthesis of ideas, critique, and fear. It covered concerns that preoccupied a large majority of politically interested citizens.³ Basic security issues had already been raised in connection with the numerous sites that posed nuclear risks and which were identified by the anti-nuclear movement during the 1970s. These included “power plants, missile silos, army bases, research laboratories, radioactive waste dumps [and] assembly facilities,”⁴ and the issue caught the public’s attention in 1979 with the events surrounding the reactor accident in the Three Mile Island power plant.⁵

Security concepts had also been part of anti-nuclear debates within the peace movement due to the input of experts, scientists, political renegades, and institutional brokers like church communities, who raised basic ethical, technological, military, political, and strategic issues. This happened, for example, in the context of the civil defense debate when physicists and physicians fed the peace movements with professional data, graphs, and projections buttressing their

- 3 Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo, *A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century*, in: *Contemporary European History* 17/3 (2008), pp. 277–299.
- 4 Kyle Harvey, *American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace*, London 2014, pp. 8 f.; Susanne Schregel, *The Spaces and Places of the Peace Movement*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis: the Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 173–188.
- 5 Dario Fazzi, *The Nuclear Freeze Generation: The Early 1980s’ Anti-nuclear Movement between “Carter’s Vietnam” and “Euroshima”*, in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (eds.), *A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s*, Oxford/New York 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149. On the changes caused by the anti-nuclear protests in Europe in the late 1970s see Andrew S. Tompkins, *Better Active than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany*, Oxford 2016.

political argument against nuclear civil defense plans.⁶ While “peace” remained the overriding political issue in such debates, the peace movement referred to security concepts, just as the inventors and proponents of civil defense plans did, but they drew different conclusions.

In spite of these different levels of argumentation, public and political perceptions often reduced the peace movement’s political agenda to the pursuit of “peace”. However, this perspective only concealed the fact that the movement was heterogeneous and was trying to develop a minimal consensus in order to perform a common protest strategy; and this least common denominator was inevitably moderate.⁷ To reduce the peace movement to a rather naïve demand for peace would be superficial. Interpretations of this kind only serve to downplay its contributions to the rising questions of how a modern state could deal with existing nuclear weapons in the safest way, of how to avoid a nuclear war, and finally how to mobilize substantial opposition to the U.S. Presidential Administration of the period. The following essay does not focus on whether the peace movement succeeded or failed, however. Rather, it takes a closer look at different aspects of the U.S. peace movement and in particular at FREEZE, the most prominent campaign within it.⁸ The aim of this approach is to refute oversimplistic assessments of the peace movement and to show the extent to which it was a driving force—among others—which strengthened the anti-nuclear consensus in the country. This, in turn, helped lay an important basis for the success of the INF Treaty.⁹

6 See e.g. the series of articles “Programs for Surviving Nuclear War: A Critique” by Jennifer Leaning, Matthew Leighton, John Lamperti and Herbert A. Abrams in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 39/6 (1983), pp. 1–16. Another example: Howard Kornfeld, *Nuclear Weapons and Civil Defense. The Influence of the Medical Profession in 1955 and 1983*, in: *The Western Journal of Medicine* 138/2 (Feb 1983), pp. 207–212. See also Claudia Kemper, *Medizin gegen den Kalten Krieg. Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre*, Göttingen 2016; Claudia Kemper, “The Nuclear Arms Race is Psychological at its Roots.” *Physicians and their Therapies for the Cold War*, in: Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945–90*, Manchester 2016, pp. 213–237.

7 Harvey, *American Anti-Nuclear Activism*, p. 9.

8 The capitalized term FREEZE refers here to the nuclear freeze campaign or movement that included the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign as well as other groups but was not an acronym used at the time. It is used to differentiate the movement from the strategic concept of “freezing” the nuclear arms race.

9 This thesis is based on Müller’s considerations, according to which anti-nuclear activism worked on many levels, especially in cultural and media contexts, and had a far-reaching effect on political culture. See William M. Knoblauch, *Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War. The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond*, Amherst 2017, p. 8.

1. Becoming FREEZE

Figure 2, another Google NGram graph, shows the frequency of occurrence of the terms “freeze,” “disarmament,” and “arms control” during the twentieth century.

Despite its long tradition as an instrument for demilitarization, the term “arms control” only became popular after it had come into use in professional (political) contexts as an element of Cold War thinking.¹⁰ Even in times of détente, the prospects for negotiating any fundamental disarmament did not appear very promising, but arms control at least seemed to offer a diplomatic opportunity to stay in conversation with one another.¹¹ In their representation in Figure 2, we do not know the contexts in which the terms were used. But it is likely that “freeze” was increasingly used because, after years of growing tensions, the idea of simply freezing the nuclear arms race had become particularly popular. Previous ideas on arms control or segmented disarmament, which had been discussed at the diplomatic level for years, seemed less and less convincing as reliable and fail-safe security systems.¹² In the face of a growing loss of confidence in the state’s ability to cope with nuclear weapons the idea of freezing the arms race through a moratorium on nuclear warheads had been circulating widely since the second half of the 1970s.¹³ The popularity of the idea was strengthened by the fact that the Western alliance set contradictory priorities in its defense strategy, and international relations drifted into a series of crises.¹⁴ As early as 1978, two peace groups had appealed to stop uranium mining bilaterally, and in 1979 there was even a proposal from the Republican side to add a clause to the SALT II treaty corresponding to a FREEZE.¹⁵

Within this atmosphere various scientific and civil society groups developed concepts to solve the precarious situation from both a security and a peace policy perspective. On the one hand, when things took a turn for the worse between the superpowers, academic associations like the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) stepped forward with fresh ideas to keep arms

10 Peter N. Stearns, Introduction, in: Peter N. Stearns (ed.), *Demilitarization in the Contemporary World*, Urbana, IL 2013, pp. 1–16, here p. 11.

11 Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985*, London 2009; Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75*, London 2008.

12 See e.g. the chapter title *The Nuclear Freeze Movement: The Reagan Administration’s Greatest Threat*, in: Christian Peterson, *Ronald Reagan and Antinuclear Movements in the United States and Western Europe, 1981–1987*, Lewiston, NY 2003, p. 87.

13 Dario Fazzi, *The Nuclear Freeze. Transnational Pursuit of Positive Peace*, in: *The Routledge History of World Peace since 1750*, ed. by Christian Petersen, William M. Knoblauch, and Michael Lodenthal, New York 2018, pp. 229–237, 229.

14 Leopoldo Nuti, *The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision—A Survey*, in: Nuti (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente*, pp. 57–71.

15 Fazzi, *Nuclear Freeze*, p. 229.



Fig. 2: Occurrence of the terms “freeze” (black), “disarmament” (light gray), and “arms control” (dark gray).

control going; while others, like the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), even sought personal contacts with Soviet scientists in order to restart the negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).¹⁶ Test-ban activists recognized that new safeguards—such as guaranteed access to test sites—were needed to convince the U.S. government that mutual control was possible, at least on a technical level.¹⁷ On the other hand not only experts but also more and more groups and initiatives were incorporating general concerns about nuclear armament into their political demands in order to influence the government’s rhetoric, or even its strategy. This constellation is often portrayed as the actions of two different groups—here the advocates (or experts), and there the activists¹⁸—even though the activities and personnel of both groups overlapped in many ways. Within this heterogeneous landscape of anti-nuke experts and laypeople, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC), founded in 1980, quickly emerged as both an important focal point for mobilization and the “political manifestation of [nuclear] fear.”¹⁹

16 Kai-Henrik Barth, *Catalysts of Change. Scientists as Transnational Arms Control Advocates in the 1980s*, in: John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth (eds.), *Global Power Knowledge. Science and Technology in International Affairs*, Chicago 2006, pp. 182–206, here pp. 186–188.

17 See for a history of Verification Diplomacy Nancy W. Gallagher, *The Politics of Verification*, Baltimore/MD 1999. A general approach to the concept of Trust in International Politics is offered by Martin Klimke, Reinhold Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), *Trust, but Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, Washington, D. C. 2016.

18 Rebecca Johnson, *Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*, in: Ann M. Florini (ed.), *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Tokyo/Washington 2000, pp. 49–82.

19 Paul Boyer, *Fallout. A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons*, Columbus, OH 1998, p. xv.

Taking a last look at the second NGram graph, Figure 2, we can see that “freeze,” as a political and strategic concept, peaked in 1983, as the campaign gained momentum. The campaign was initially able to form numerous coalitions at local and state level and to pass resolutions there. The campaign’s collaboration with the Democrats was not the result of targeted cooperation. Rather it was due to there being some political and strategic overlap between the Democrats and FREEZE. The former wanted above all to oust the President from power, while the campaign called for an arms freeze, no matter who had the power. The campaign began to be successful at the time when Democrats in Congress were trying to obstruct the President’s policies. The campaign, in turn, needed party-political access to Congress in order to be able to bring about concrete decisions. In the Republican-led Senate, a FREEZE resolution failed in 1983, but in the same year the Democrats were successful with their resolution in Congress, where, after various attempts, a resolution tabled by Edward Kennedy based on the demands of FREEZE was approved. Among other things, this resolution called on the government to agree and implement an immediate halt to the arms race with the Soviet Union.

Although the INF Treaty, signed a few years later, represented an extraordinary diplomatic breakthrough, its emergence cannot be explained by diplomatic history alone. The process that led to making the reduction of medium-range weapons conceivable and negotiable included oppositional politics, the efforts of arms control talks, and the FREEZE campaign. So it makes little sense to attribute victory to either the peace movement or to diplomacy, and it is especially crass to assume that Reagan made the crucial shift from a nuclear hardliner to a disarmament-supporting diplomat overnight.²⁰ Rather, it can be assumed that many of the political changes that occurred during the 1980s also depended on the perceptions and interpretations of the political opposition. Such a perspective can help us understand the heterogeneous dynamics that made the INF Treaty possible.

The role of non-state actors like the peace movement in general and FREEZE in particular should be seen as an important part of these dynamics.²¹ In turn, the success of the campaign must not conceal the fact that the U.S. peace movement was quite diverse even before 1987 and certainly after the ratification of the INF Treaty. Indeed, the U.S. peace movement was both heterogeneous *and* focused on the freeze concept as an overarching idea. This was because a call to halt the nuclear arms race was both easily comprehensible and a way to connect the heterogeneous strands of national protest in the U.S., also linking them to global sentiment and protest. This is all the more interesting because the breadth

20 Cortright laments a bit too schematically the lack of a significant “role of the peace movement”: David Cortright, *Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History*, in: Mary Kaldor and Javor Rangelov (eds.), *The Handbook of Global Security Policy*, Chichester 2014, pp. 482–504, here p. 493 f.

21 Angela Santese, *Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s*, in: *The International History Review* 39/3 (2017), pp. 496–520, here p. 497.

of the term “freeze” made it possible for activists, supporters, and the public to read further implications into it, notably criticism of the political establishment in Washington.²²

In order to grasp these interrelationships, it is important to understand the concept of “framing,” a term readers will almost certainly know, but which has to be explained in its relation to protest movements. Every local or national political initiative or NGO needs global frames to ensure that the specific issues they focus on remain relevant for a longer time period and for more people than just the local or national peer group. A frame, as originally outlined by Erving Goffman, is a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives that organizes experiences and guides the actions of individuals, groups, or societies.²³ Such frames can explain how protest movements are able to connect the different issues that concern their individual members with global politics. Or, as David A. Snow explains:

Applied to all varieties of social phenomena, including civil disturbances, social movements, and politics in general, the idea of framing problematizes the meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings are typically contestable and negotiable, and thus open to debate and differential interpretation.²⁴

Such frames were created, for example, when protests referred to “nuclear fear” as a common factor for all people involved, regardless of their specific political preferences. In this usage the frame “fear” worked like a bracket making it possible to share an interpretation of reality.²⁵ The same applied to the word “freeze”—a simple term that denoted a distinct first step towards solving all the nuclear issues. And in a way it worked: “The genius (and limitation) of the nuclear weapons freeze was that it reduced a complex issue to a simple idea that was linked to a deliberate strategy for mobilization.”²⁶ But, as so often in the history of protest

22 See Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedensbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, Munich 2011, pp. 283–304.

23 Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, New York 1974.

24 David A. Snow, *Frames and Framing Processes*, in: Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke, and Joachim Scharloth (eds.), *Protest Cultures: A Companion*, New York 2016, pp. 124–129, here p. 125; see also Dieter Rucht, *Studying Social Movements: Some Conceptual Challenges*, in: Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), *The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey*, London 2017, pp. 39–62.

25 David A. Snow, *Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields*, in: David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Oxford 2004, pp. 380–405.

26 Sam Marullo, Ron Pagnucco, and Jackie Smith, *Frame Changes and Social Movement Contraction: US Peace Movement Framing after the Cold War*, in: *Sociological Inquiry* 66/1 (February 1996), pp. 1–28, here p. 4.

movements, the story was more complex, because although the terminology and idea united very different factions of arms critics, the cooperation was neither unambiguous nor conflict-free.

Utilizing the framing concept to explain the peace movement's strategies for mobilization is only one side of the coin. The other side concerns heterogeneous concepts and groups that facilitate our understanding of INF as an important milestone and a point of rupture for the peace movement. Yet, they also reveal how support for an INF Treaty was just a minor part of another overarching theme in terms of global peace and security. In other words, perceiving the peace movement only within the INF frame is far too narrow. It leaves out both the political dynamics and strategic debates of the early 1980s and the long-term peace discourses about societal and technological developments which, in addition to armaments, are perceived as threats to peace.

2. FREEZE

The core idea of the FREEZE campaign was to persuade the U.S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously to adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of any nuclear weapons and missiles as well as on new aircraft primarily designed to deliver nuclear weapons—in the American case, the MX and Pershing II missiles in particular.²⁷ The key figure in the FREEZE movement, Randall Forsberg, initiated the idea of a “mutual, verifiable” freeze. In 1979, in a first bid at introducing it, she addressed over 600 activists from already existing peace organizations at a convention, calling on them to collaborate on the nuclear FREEZE proposal. In the same year, she popularized her nuclear freeze idea in an influential pamphlet which she co-authored under the title “The Price of Defense.”²⁸ As a strategic analyst,²⁹ she had recognized the window of opportunity for mass mobilization. The necessary political resources were

27 M-X was short for LGM-118A Peacekeeper, this was a missile capable of carrying multiple warheads that could be deployed at short notice to multiple targets. The missile was thus considered a fast defensive weapon. Compared to MX, Pershing II was the modernized form of a classic medium-range ballistic missile.

28 Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense*, New York 1979. See also Fazzi, *Nuclear Freeze*, p. 230.

29 Randall Forsberg (1943–2007) studied at Barnard College, worked as a teacher in Pennsylvania, and moved with her Swedish husband to Stockholm where she got a job as a typist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). After her divorce she moved to Boston in 1974 and enrolled in a MIT PhD program studying defense policy and arms control. Utilizing her many contacts, she began disseminating the “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race” in 1979. In the same year she founded her own Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts and in the following years she became an important disarmament advisor. See Mitchell K. Hall (ed.), *Opposition to War. An Encyclopedia of US Peace and Antiwar Movements*, Santa Barbara/CA 2018, p. 266.

already available, but a vehicle for mobilizing and uniting the existing networks of groups and activists was lacking. Later she described the circumstances at that time and her motivation:

[...] Then in December [1979], the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan and in January of 1980, Carter withdrew the [SALT II] treaty and it never did come up before the Senate. Well, it was in that environment that the FREEZE movement was born. The way I saw it, and other people who were concerned with arms control and disarmament—the SALT II Treaty was not that strong. It was a relatively weak treaty which essentially codified the next generation of nuclear weapons on both sides.³⁰

Forsberg had wondered how such a “weak treaty” could arouse political debate and saw the opportunity of attracting the public’s attention:

And it started as a movement to create popular pressure to support those people in Washington and the Senate and the Congress who wanted to see good arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, support them over the opposition of the vested interests.

The recent experience of a perilous nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island reactor,³¹ together with growing tensions in international relations, no doubt contributed to promoting the foundation of FREEZE as well. In an interview, Forsberg suggested a further factor, referring to a general mood after the Vietnam War and in the years that followed:

So, in my view, between 1974 and 1979–80, we had the pendulum swing back completely in the other direction from what it had been during the Vietnam era. And I think that it was during that period when we had the SALT II Treaty—we had arms control negotiations, but we had this kind of against-criticism-of-the-military public sentiment. So, there wasn’t much support for the arms control process. [But at the end of the 70s] the period where no criticism of the military was acceptable in the national mood was ending.³²

Forsberg not only proposed a call for a nuclear FREEZE but also offered arguments for how it should be presented and its perspective. She suggested that the movement should:

couple public education about the danger of nuclear war and the arms race with a concrete proposal to take an initial first step that leads in a good direction; this would have the opposite effect of empowering people, giving them hope, giving them something

30 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, November 11, 1987 on Open Vault from WGBH Media Library and Archives, http://open.vault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_F6CC542AF94B434FBC7E1DBE45F07024; (31 August 2018).

31 Natasha Zaretsky, *Radiation Nation. Three Mile Island and the Political Transformation of the 1970s*, New York 2018.

32 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, November 11, 1987.

to work for. And it was that coupling of both, the sense of the negative, the terrible danger and fear, and also the sense of the positive step of something to work for that I thought would really turn the trick in creating a national movement.³³

From the start FREEZE offered a comprehensive outline of a secure peace process but, above all, it disseminated a "Call to Halt the Arms Race"³⁴ in moderate and clear language, a text that "was easily accessible and salable to the general public."³⁵ In this way, FREEZE propagated an arms control concept in which the option of disarmament was only the second step. This aspect was decisive for gaining broader support within the United States, but at the same time made its demands different from those of the European peace movements, which, as a rule, called for bilateral disarmament.³⁶

The Call was printed jointly and initially disseminated by Forsberg's Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It is noteworthy that religious denominations, especially Quakers and the Catholic Church, formed a strong backbone to the peace movement. (The AFSC, founded as an aid organization after the First World War, and the American Episcopal Conference have been involved in many anti-nuclear protests since 1979.)³⁷ Consequently, these groups supported the FREEZE Call, which was designed to address both peace activists and the American public.³⁸ Forsberg and other supporters of the campaign calculated that, to convince politicians, they needed not only factual arguments but, above all, strong public support. Accordingly, the first objective of FREEZE was to build coalitions and to raise public awareness and support.³⁹ The organizers developed a strategy for popularizing their claims and encouraged the public to contact their senators and representatives in Congress.

It is difficult to say to what extent FREEZE influenced public opinion in this way but, strikingly, the campaign resonated with existing anxiety over the nuclear threat in general. Although, with the "zero option," Reagan offered his own proposal to break the impasse, peace activists were swayed more by his

33 Ibid.

34 The Call was published in various journals and pamphlets, see e.g. Jane O. Sharp, Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, in: *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 12/4 (1981), pp. 417–421.

35 David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent. The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics*, New York 1990, p. 157.

36 Kyle Harvey, *The Promise of Internationalism. US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European Challenge*, in: Jan Hansen, Christian Helm, and Frank Reichherzer (eds.), *Making Sense of the Americas. How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond*, Frankfurt a. M. 2015, pp. 225–243.

37 Mausbach, *Vereint marschieren*, p. 288; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. The Struggle against the Bomb*, Vol. 3, Stanford 2003, pp. 172–177.

38 Santese, *Ronald Reagan*, p. 498.

39 Ibid., p. 499.

threatening rhetoric, which did not alleviate any of the prevalent fears of “the enemy” and its nuclear potential.⁴⁰

Although FREEZE spread very quickly and gained in popularity, neither the media nor the Reagan Administration took the campaign as seriously as they did the European peace movements. Moreover, activists had to acknowledge considerable “criticism from European anti-nuclear campaigns [which] alleged that the FREEZE did not consider opposition to Euromissiles deployment as a particularly high priority.”⁴¹ The campaign moved beyond this defensive position in the course of 1982, as it experienced growing success at the local and state level. A petition campaign in California to put the FREEZE proposal on the ballot at an upcoming state election was overwhelmingly successful because “local organizers collected more than 700,000 valid signatures in just a few months, twice the number needed to qualify for the ballot.”⁴² Politicians from the Democratic Party like House members Edward Markey and Mark Hatfield, along with Senator Edward Kennedy, noted the growing public awareness and introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives and the Senate.⁴³ From that point on, the campaign’s agenda had to be recognized as a serious political demand and its organizers “still saw the potential for the FREEZE campaign to move beyond its domestic work [on a transatlantic and international level] if the freeze proposal were ratified by Congress.”⁴⁴

The first reactions of the Reagan Administration had been cautious and defensive, rejecting FREEZE as a crude mixed bag of unprofessional suggestions.⁴⁵ The Administration’s alternative, the “zero option,” was proposed not only as a diplomatic coup (as peace activists liked to describe it), but also as “a way of co-opting peace movement demands.”⁴⁶ It was not until another resolution was introduced to the Senate at the end of March 1982 that Reagan showed the first signs of adopting a different position. In a public speech, he expressed his “concern for the effects of nuclear war,” though he made no explicit mention of the campaign.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the campaigners were able to use this statement to their advantage. Forsberg and the NWFC had correctly assessed their window of opportunity, and in view of the upcoming mid-term Congressional elections, politicians in almost every federal state had to recognize and respond to an increasingly nuclear-sensitive public opinion.

40 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 500. See also the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume.

41 Harvey, *Promise of Internationalism*, p. 235.

42 David Cortright, *Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History*, in: Mary Kaldor and Javor Rangelov (eds.), *The Handbook of Global Security Policy*, Chichester, UK 2014, pp. 482–504, here p. 491.

43 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 502.

44 Harvey, *Promise of Internationalism*, p. 235.

45 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 504.

46 Cortright, *Protest and Politics*, p. 493.

47 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 503.

3. Further Issues

The public adopted the FREEZE concept and its rhetoric not so much as an expression of an unequivocal anti-nuclear stance but because of its oppositional and connectable political language. Since FREEZE and its appeal to the political establishment were mostly discussed and protested at the local level, it provided an opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with public policy and with the political decision-makers in Washington D.C.⁴⁸ As the FREEZE resolution presented itself as a manifesto of “We the people,” it was fueled by “the people’s” dissatisfaction and feelings of uncertainty towards U.S. government politics that clashed with majority attitudes and moral perspectives.⁴⁹ So, although this rhetoric no doubt boosted broader mobilization of support, the extended interpretation was also a handicap for the campaign. FREEZE ran the risk of abandoning its core mission, which was its focus on strategic doctrines and arms policy. Increasingly it became an instrument of domestic opposition.

This effect can be seen, for example, in the significance of opinion polls. As mentioned above, there were noteworthy changes in public opinion that ran parallel to the campaign’s success. In 1980, polls showed that support for a ratification of SALT II decreased dramatically, while at the same time more and more Americans supported higher military spending.⁵⁰ This indicated that there “was significant public support for a more hawkish posture and greater fears of war” occurring at the same time.⁵¹ The majority feared a nuclear war and simultaneously supported defense concepts, no matter how they were to be implemented. However, in order to assess the success of FREEZE correctly—or indeed the policies of the U.S. government of the period—it must be noted that,

48 Fazzi argues in a generational perspective that young protesters in both the European and U.S. movements “aimed to challenge capitalism, support different models of economic development, promote anti-militarism and non-violence or redefine urban and social spaces.” Dario Fazzi, *The Nuclear Freeze Generation. The Early 1980s Anti-nuclear Movement between “Carter’s Vietnam” and “Euroshima”*, in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (eds.), *A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s*, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149.

49 “All forms of communication involve creating audiences and making certain assumptions. The ‘people’ are constituted in the process, and their existence is confirmed through the artifice of public opinion polls and market research [...]. Individual answers to pollsters’ questions are aggregated into ‘public opinion’ [...] The creation of these phenomena allows them to become tools for legitimizing partisan opinion or media agendas.” John Street, *Mass Media, Politics, and Democracy*, Basingstoke 2011, p. 71. Snowball provides a study of the communication and rhetoric of the Christian and conservative organization “The Moral Majority” and its success during the early 1980s. His perspective on structures and strategies of influencing public opinion is remarkable for many public related movements. David Snowball, *Continuity and Change in the Rhetoric of the Moral Majority*, New York 1991.

50 Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent*, p. 85.

51 *Ibid.*

even though opinions on the nuclear issue had become more ambivalent between 1980 and 1984, in general “Americans’ opinions on nuclear weapons and war” scarcely changed between World War II and the end of the 1980s.⁵²

In a nutshell: most Americans vacillated between long-term uneasiness about nuclear weapons, “a fear of nuclear war [...], and a distrust of the Soviet Union.”⁵³ This led to quite uneven and, from today’s vantage point, seemingly inconsistent opinions. Over 80 per cent of the U.S. population believed both “that the Soviet Union was hostile and couldn’t be trusted (85 % in 1984) and that nuclear weapons were dangerous.”⁵⁴ Over 80 per cent wanted “the superpowers to agree to stop making nuclear weapons,” while another 82 % per cent opposed unilateral U.S. disarmament.

Obviously, any peace initiative had to engage with this highly ambivalent set of opinions, which remained much the same throughout the 1980s. These strong popular opinions about war and weapons and about the Soviet Union help to explain why FREEZE “achieved massive popular support” so quickly, as David S. Meyer highlights in his study *A Winter of Discontent*.⁵⁵ The FREEZE campaign did not grow out of a general change in attitudes toward nuclear weapons; instead, it was successful because it was able to crystallize diverse fears by focusing on common ground and transforming them into a single political demand. However, a detailed look at the opinion polls reveals significant limitations to the support for FREEZE:

First, the public supported only a bilateral freeze or a freeze among all nuclear nations. [...] Second, very high levels of support for the freeze depended in considerable measure on confidence that such an agreement could be verified. [...] Finally, public support for the freeze was conditional upon belief in the equivalency of the two superpowers’ arsenals.⁵⁶

Such restrained and heterogeneous opinions revealed that support for FREEZE was not only an expression of an all-embracing anti-nuclear conviction but was also motivated by a desire to voice a general and pressing dissatisfaction with U.S. security policy and its efficacy, and to express active concern about it.

Political rhetoric indicates too that the campaign was used for further concerns in its criticism of the political establishment. As mentioned above, FREEZE was spearheaded by an extremely visible contingent of academic experts and scientists who played “a critical role in focusing public attention on the dangerous capabilities of nuclear weapons.”⁵⁷ The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

52 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III, Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear Freeze, in: *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569, here p. 537.

53 Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 86.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 87. Meyer refers to The Public Agenda Foundation, *Voter Options on Nuclear Policy* Providence, RI, May 1984.

55 *Ibid.*

56 Hogan and Smith III, *Polling on the Issues*, p. 541 f.

57 Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 97.

and the FAS, in particular, provided knowledge and infrastructure for the peace movement. With this backdrop, FREEZE united a number of nuclear scientists and strategic experts like Robert Alridge, Daniel Ellsberg, George Kistiakosky, Jerome Wiesner, Hans Bethe, Harrison Brown, Karl Menninger, George Wald, Bernard Feld, Carl Sagan, and Jonas Salk, who were all highly visible in the media as they attacked the Reagan administration's nuclear policies.⁵⁸ But, since Forsberg and the early activists intended to gain support from the mass media and spark a mass movement, they needed support from more than just scientists.

Politicians like Edward Kennedy were a key factor in providing this; but so were celebrities like the actress Patti Davis (Ronald and Nancy Reagan's daughter), Paul Newman, and associations of clergymen.⁵⁹ Another substantial but less visible group of players in the FREEZE context were business people who had not wholeheartedly supported Reagan's candidacy, some of them because of his military or ideological policies, others because of their dependence on trade with the Soviet Union, or because of the growing federal deficit. Many of these business people were supporters of the Democratic Party, and were interested in arms control for economic reasons. They supported foundations conducting research on arms control (institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the MacArthur Foundation).⁶⁰

This type of support for FREEZE could have considerable impact, as the case of California highlights. The Californian FREEZE campaign was initiated in 1981 and was soon joined by Harold Willens, "a millionaire who had long been an arms control advocate within the Democratic Party establishment. [His] participation in the freeze campaign was welcomed as it meant an infusion of money, media attention, and mainstream legitimacy."⁶¹ But there was also unrest within the campaign because of Willens's intervention into its grassroots style and, on top of this, his attempts to influence the resolution. He aimed especially to reduce any links to other issues or overarching questions, such as demands to transfer the funds used in the arms race to the civil sector in order to strengthen development policies, which was one of Forsberg's long-term goals.

In the course of the California political campaign, the resolution was watered down to the point where it became an inoffensive request and ultimately a tame appeal for a nuclear armament freeze lacking broader societal perspectives on accompanying issues such as the technological arms race, nuclear weapon production, and extended deterrence. To be sure, the campaign had become highly visible and successful by the end of 1982, when "12 state legislatures,

58 *Ibid.*, p. 98 f.

59 On the context of social mobilization, popular music, musicians, and campaign shows like "Artists United against Apartheid" and others see Christian Lahusen, *The Rhetoric of Moral Protest: Public Campaigns, Celebrity Endorsement and Political Engagement*, Berlin 1996.

60 Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 109 f.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

275 city governments, and 446 New England town meetings had passed freeze resolutions, and voters had approved freeze referenda in eight states, the District of Columbia, and over two dozen cities."⁶² But in 1981 California had already shown that popular victories were ambivalent, all the more so when FREEZE was becoming a synonym for general opposition to the government and for anti-establishment rhetoric.

Typically, the FREEZE rhetoric heard at rallies or in statements by local politicians was marked by a combination of classic anti-elitism and the speakers' desire to set themselves apart from a supposed elitist political establishment and demonstrate empathy with the common people.⁶³ As Senator Tom Harkin (an early Congressional supporter) stressed: "US citizens would no longer 'allow their lives to be held in constant peril by the decisions of an elite group of generals, politicians and scientists'" and another Democratic representative asserted that "The issue of nuclear war and nuclear arms control belongs to the people."⁶⁴ On the one hand, backing for the nuclear FREEZE was more a response to the perceived excesses of the Reagan Administration than primarily support for an anti-nuclear security concept. On the other hand, these features, plus the essential moderateness of its key idea created the image of the campaign as a massive grassroots movement that had to be recognized and taken seriously in Washington D.C. The FREEZE campaign itself was essentially robbed of its international political context. "The alliance between freeze organizers and national politicians put the freeze on the front page and on the floor of Congress, but in a stripped-down version without the meaning the early supporters intended."⁶⁵ However, for a brief moment FREEZE attracted huge interest and a high level of media coverage.

On first sight, FREEZE succeeded when Edward Kennedy and Jonathan Bingham announced their introduction of the nuclear freeze resolution into Congress in March 1982. But Kennedy used vague language, merely calling upon the President to "decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze." This watered down the resolution to a mere request for a schedule and nothing more. Forsberg and other FREEZE leaders were disappointed, because the original resolution had called for an "immediate freeze." It took another year and another vote in Congress for the movement to make a real breakthrough.⁶⁶ After a delaying tactic by the government, Resolution 13 came up for a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives in March 1983. The debate took more than 40 hours and involved several amendments. When 278 Representatives finally approved

62 Hogan and Smith III, *Polling on the Issues*, p. 535.

63 As a communication and language scientist, Dan F. Hahn calls these mechanisms simplifications, generalizations, and "the art of saying nothing." See *Political Communication. Rhetoric, Government, and Citizens*, State College, PA 1998, pp. 96-109.

64 Quoted after Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 161 (unfortunately without dates).

65 Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 113.

66 Santese, *Ronald Reagan*, p. 511.

the FREEZE resolution, it was the first time that any bill asked the President “to propose to Moscow a mutual and bilateral nuclear weapons freeze.”⁶⁷

Yet, the limitations of this success were evident in the small print, or rather in the amendments that were added, weakening the text and downgrading the resolution from the mandatory to the advisory level.⁶⁸ The inconsistent politics of the House of Representatives probably led to even more disappointment among activists: only two months later, in May 1983, a majority approved “the release of \$625 million for the testing and deploying of 100 MXs,”⁶⁹ The resolution had previously failed in the Senate, where the decisive foreign policy decisions could have been made. Obviously, a majority of the representatives were pursuing a dual strategy, on the one hand taking into account domestic politics and the mood of their voters to support the FREEZE resolution, and on the other, sustaining a nuclear-based national security policy.

Circumstances had changed by the time the Presidential election campaign was underway in 1984 and FREEZE again tried to build up pressure on the Reagan Administration. First, Reagan’s most important project, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), had begun to take shape, a defense system that was not covered by the FREEZE concept and was difficult to integrate into any populist rhetoric. And second, FREEZE’s position during the Presidential campaign was complicated by the campaign’s support for the Democratic Party candidate, Walter Mondale. The Democrats’ politics concerning armaments were very ambiguous, including advocating a freeze at the same time as backing the construction of new intercontinental ballistic missiles like Midgetman, and the sea-launched Trident II as well as supporting the deployment of Euromissiles.⁷⁰

When, on November 6, 1984, Reagan won his second term in office, FREEZE could only emphasize that the movement’s demands had been a major issue in the election campaign and claim that the President’s now moderate tone and talk of arms control was partly a result of FREEZE. This change was no doubt real, so that a rapprochement between the Administration and the campaign seemed visible. But this was hardly a relevant response to the original FREEZE demands and FREEZE’s previous impact as a pressure group was weakening. Moreover, Reagan and his Administration were able to present their shift in strategy as a move deriving from their own policy-making insights.

67 Ibid., p. 512.

68 Ibid. In a meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning group, U.S. Minister of Defense Caspar Weinberger therefore denied any importance for this non-binding resolution. (See AAPD 1983, Doc. 77, p. 397).

69 Ibid.

70 Meyer, *Winter of Discontent*, p. 250. The special characteristic of these missile types was their high mobility: Midgetman was a mobile intercontinental nuclear missile which could be moved rapidly from one firing location to another. Trident missiles were launched from submarines.

4. Diversification as a Feature of the U. S. Peace Movement

By the end of 1984 FREEZE had literally exhausted all its resources, money, and volunteers in mobilizing support during the election campaign, and after Reagan's re-election it proved very difficult to regain political momentum.⁷¹ Certainly, activists and "political organizations continued their work, now including virtually all the types of political action that characterized the movement in earlier years: civil disobedience and direct action, symbolic demonstration and educational events."⁷² But the numerous activities now lacked a unifying campaign and a slogan that everyone could work with. The FREEZE campaign lost much of the public's attention, creating the impression that the peace movement as a whole had collapsed after Reagan's election victory. In fact, the process of diversification continued. To understand this process in the second half of the 1980s, it is worth taking a look at basic ideas that were relevant in the whole U.S. peace movement.

In 1986, after peak public attention for the peace movement as a whole had long since subsided, some 500 "significant" U.S. peace organizations (meaning those with a budget in excess of \$30,000) were active, between them covering a broad spectrum of issues.⁷³ As a rough breakdown: one portion of the movement concentrated on lobbying for FREEZE and arms control; another important set of groups dealt with anti-interventionism, an issue made relevant by U.S. policy towards Central America during the 1980s; and a third portion can be categorized as the nonviolent current within the movement. Differences between these strands of peace activism were not based solely on political distinctions or preferences in strategy; rather, all three portions of the movement can be traced back to strong peace traditions and ideas, stemming from the nineteenth century, that were connected with certain concepts of world order.⁷⁴

What the FREEZERS, the anti-interventionists, and the nonviolence groups had in common was their concern over the question of how to end wars, or how to avoid them altogether. The point where they diverged, however, was in their analysis of the causes of war. Like other schools of political analysis, the underlying assumptions of their peace concepts can be distinguished according to whether they were inclined to interpret the mechanisms of the international system as a result of interaction between the great powers, or as an essentially anarchical world order, or as the outcome of human relationships on a large scale.⁷⁵ First, the *great power* analysis "attributes the causes of war and peace

71 Ibid., p. 253.

72 Ibid., p. 254.

73 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), *Frame Changes*, p. 11.

74 About the many different peace groups that supported FREEZE see Lawrence Stephen Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb. A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford 2009, pp. 152–158.

75 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), *Frame Changes*, p. 6.

to the policies and behaviors of a small number of great nations.”⁷⁶ This is the basis of most bilateral security concepts, like the one that was favored by FREEZE. Secondly, the *world order* analysis “views the cause of war as the result of the anarchy of the international system,”⁷⁷ and this raises the issue of promoting multilateral institutions and more coordinated policy-making processes. This conception of international conflicts was favored by anti-interventionist groups who interpreted U.S. foreign policy as part of the problem of global inequality and human rights violations. Finally, the *nonviolence* analysis “sees the cultural acceptance and use of violence in the range of human relationships as the core obstacle to peace.”⁷⁸ If international relations are interpreted from this third perspective, then conversely, appropriate frames for peace must be developed that offer plausible strategies for preventing the system from pursuing acts of violence, armament, or war.⁷⁹

All of these three peace frameworks have had a presence throughout the history of peace movements in the U.S., alternatively favoring the establishment of international organizations or a preference for bilateral agreements. A focus on the advancement of civilized human behavior in order to establish a non-violent culture⁸⁰ partially underlies many educational programs and is an explicit aim of peace education.⁸¹ While in the first half of the twentieth century many peace organizations followed world order analysis and supported the League of Nations and other international institutions, from the 1970s on, more and more organizations and activists focused on “more great power-oriented unilateralist and bilateralist approaches,” especially when they were critical of the U.S. nuclear strategy.⁸²

Against this backdrop, we should keep in mind that “peace” and “security” are always interconnected, but which one of the two terms is preferred at any time depends on the political context and its framing. This “rule” applied to the peace movement of the 1980s. The U.S. case illustrates perfectly how peace movements can raise public awareness (and how they need the public’s attention), but it also shows the costs. The complex meaning of the activists’ topic (security and peace) and their political intentions were not fully perceived and recognized. This

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 These three concepts are quite static and should only outline the horizon of peace ideas at this point. But it is important to note that these interpretations are based on the same fundamental assumptions as those of international relations theorists. See e.g. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*, New York 1959.

80 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), *Frame Changes*, p. 7.

81 Till Kössler and Alexander Schwitanski (eds.), *Frieden lernen. Friedenserziehung und Gesellschaftsreform im 20. Jahrhundert*, Essen 2013.

82 Charles Chatfield with Robert Kleidman, *The American Peace Movement. Ideals and Activism*, New York 1992; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, *One World Or None: a History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953*, Stanford 1993.

was partly due to the close interdependence of protest and the media—the media being necessary because the latter “create public attention for their [protesters’] concerns and help them gain influence on the thematic agenda of the political system.”⁸³ Since the logic they follow is based on newsworthiness, the mass media create content based on a simple distinction between information or non-information, which immediately affects the medial perception and representation of any event or phenomenon.⁸⁴ This mechanism fostered a reduction of the demands spelled out in the “Call to Halt the Arms Race” to the simple “FREEZE” formula. Eventually, the idiosyncratic public sphere, which is closely linked to the logic of the media system and its modes of communication, adopted and interpreted the FREEZE concept and campaign. But the closer the diplomatic success of a treaty between the U. S. and the Soviet Union became, the less news value FREEZE could offer and the less attention the campaign received.

After the re-election of Ronald Reagan not only FREEZE but members of the whole peace movement questioned their strategies and goals. The reactions ranged from downright romantic gestures to strategies of professionalization. For example, a part of the movement relied on completely new forms of protest to attract public attention and to satisfy the need for concrete action. This included the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, which David Mixner, a prominent gay rights activist and political campaign strategist, was instrumental in bringing to life. In 1986 it brought some hundreds of peace activists from Los Angeles to Washington D.C.⁸⁵ In turn a large number of FREEZE supporters were in favor of organizational consolidation, which is why the campaign merged with another huge organization, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which had been going since 1957. The advantages of a merger were obvious, as SANE was a well known organization originally founded by prominent Americans “to stimulate debate on the hazards of nuclear testing”,⁸⁶ and had been involved in nuclear risk education for many years. Moreover, the campaigns that had previously focused on diverse issues decided to consolidate their resources and, in 1993, created Peace Action. In their own eyes, they had succeeded in implementing the anti-nuclear consensus of those opposing the

83 Benjamin Ziemann, *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA since 1945: Introduction*, in: *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen* 32 (2004), pp. 5–19, 17.

84 A general approach in Bart Cammaerts, Alice Mattoni, and Patrick McCurdy (eds.), *Mediation and Protest Movements*, Bristol 2013. See for the German case Kathrin Fahlenbrach and Laura Stapano, *Visual and Media Strategies of the Peace Movement*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, Oxford/New York 2016, pp. 222–241.

85 Harvey, *American Anti-Nuclear Activism*, pp. 143–167.

86 The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, <https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/national-committee-sane-nuclear-policy-sane> (last accessed on March 17, 2020).

Reagan Administration, nudging the latter finally to move away from the zero option and aspire to achieving the INF Treaty. In reality, their influence may have been more indirect. Their successes at the beginning of the 1980s reflected the mood of large parts of the population, which the government had to acknowledge.

5. INF and FREEZE in the Long Run

The question of who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their political success remains to be discussed on different levels.⁸⁷ This question—of who succeeded—fails to address other decisive issues, such as the possibilities and strategies opposition politics had in the 1980s; and they were by no means limited to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, a look at the peace movement shows that the processing of international goals such as the INF Treaty was strongly linked to domestic political and social debates.

For the peace movement, the political debate of the 1980s became a lesson in the pitfalls of mass mobilization and cooperation with political elites, paradigmatically highlighted in the relation between the movement and the President. On the one hand, in the perception of the peace activists, Reagan's rhetoric and statements on limited nuclear war underwent significant changes within a year of his 1981 inauguration. This was strongly demonstrated in his radio address of May 1982, when he stressed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."⁸⁸ Whatever motives had influenced the President and had led to this statement—inner conviction, a desire to contain the popularity of FREEZE, or concerns about public opinion—he eventually abandoned his earlier, strictly hawkish stance and stressed opportunities for diplomatic solutions to the arms race. On the other hand, the President continued to be suspicious of the movement, and he openly insinuated that it was influenced and manipulated by the Soviet Union.⁸⁹

All in all, we can assume that FREEZE, together with many other smaller initiatives, was an important factor that shaped the oppositional climate, and thus also the reactions of the government. But international opposition exercised a lot of influence too, when the Reagan Administration found it had to take heed of the European peace movements and when public opposition to the NATO Double-Track Decision reached new heights. The campaign, however, interpreted the policy change as a consequence of its own educational work in influencing

87 Lawrence Wittner gives the peace movement "the bulk of the credit" for the breakthrough toward the INF Treaty, see Lawrence Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, p. 403.

88 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 506 quoting Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget and the Western Alliance, May 29, 1982, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/52982a>. On Reagan's stance on nuclear weapons see the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume.

89 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 510.

public knowledge and the public's mood; they saw 1983 as "a turning point in shaping the premises for a change in Reagan's foreign policy."⁹⁰

In the long run, U.S. peace activists have learned their lessons and have taken into account the interdependence of external and internal conditions for their protest and the need to develop multi-layered concepts of peace and security. As an arms control lobbyist and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists said in 1994:

Trying to use the old strategies of the 1980s to cut military spending down does not work as well. It's just not as relevant. [...] We are [now] getting into nonproliferation, peacekeeping, and cleaning up the weapons complex. But we are not just lobbying against things, but lobbying for things that we want to see us doing: multilateral responses to regional conflicts, developing new mechanisms and full funding for peacekeeping, full U.S. participation in the UN, repair the damage of the Cold War, economic conversion, and deciding what our security priorities should be after the Cold War. It is a whole cultural change for us.⁹¹

Indeed, since the mid-1980s, peace movement mobilization has seen a general decline and a substantial loss of public support, especially among arms control and FREEZE groups. But, at the same time, surviving peace groups and organizations have reasserted their demands and agenda and have shifted towards a more structural or radical critique of the system of international relations.⁹² The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)—an extremely professional network and coalition of different NGOs supporting the implementation of the UN nuclear weapons ban treaty—is the best evidence of this shift.⁹³ Anyone who asks where the peace movement stands today must be aware that peace activism has changed. For example, it no longer employs concepts that tend to have a catch-all character, in the hope that this will advance its primary objective of gaining substantial influence. FREEZE was an extraordinarily popular campaign in the 1980s, but it is far from being the only manifestation of protest and campaigning among U.S. or international peace activists.

90 Ibid., p. 514.

91 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, *Frame Changes*, p. 19. They are referring to Jenny Week from UCS.

92 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, *Frame Changes*, pp. 20–23.

93 See The Nobel Peace Prize 2017, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/ican/facts/> and <http://www.icanw.org/>.

Philipp Gassert

West German Politics, the INF Treaty, and the Popular Dynamics of Peace

The revolutionary turn in international affairs leading up to the INF Treaty, had a tremendous impact on West German foreign politics. On August 26, 1987, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl publicly abandoned long-standing and deeply held principles with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in keeping the peace in Europe.¹ In a sensational press briefing, he publicly agreed to the dismantling of West Germany's very own, but rather aged Pershing IA missiles. These weapons systems had been deployed way back during the 1960s. In the mid-1980s, they were rapidly losing their readiness and military utility. Yet they continued to be of political and symbolic value, by making the military of non-nuclear West Germany an integral part of NATO's nuclear deterrent.² Moreover, the Pershing IA, as well as other intermediate nuclear weapons such as the Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise Missiles that had been stationed in the wake of NATO's 1979 Double-Track Decision, had long been seen as a means to ensure that nuclear war (or warfare in general) would not be limited to the territory of the two German states.

The promise of an INF Treaty, which proposed to disband all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, thus once again raised a specter that had haunted West German politicians for more than two decades: at all costs they must avoid a scenario in which West Germany could be "decoupled" from the American security guarantee by potentially limiting a nuclear war (or war in general) to central Europe. As conservative critics of Kohl's move were pointing out, a situation might once again emerge, in which the two German states would be devastated by a military conflict that was geographically limited to Europe, while the two superpowers would shield their own territories from the ravages of war. After all, that fear of a "singularization" of West Germany had driven Kohl's

- 1 That always precarious "consensus" is best described by the strategy of "flexible response," which, since the late 1960s, linked conventional military upgrades with an American willingness to threaten the use of substrategic nuclear weapons. It was established in response to the NATO crisis of the late 1960s, see Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility 1966–67*, Oxford 1996, pp. 389–402; Kori N. Schake, *NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship*, in: Detlef Junker, Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris (eds.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook*, Vol. 1, 1945–1968, Cambridge 2004, pp. 233–239.
- 2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung. Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970–1987*, Frankfurt a. M. 1988, p. 19.

predecessor Helmut Schmidt toward what would become the NATO Double-Track Decision. From both Schmidt's point of view and Kohl's, this had become necessary, because Soviet medium-range missiles (such as the SS-20) had been left out of the U.S.–Soviet SALT negotiations, which only covered systems with a range above 5,000 kilometers.³

While it looked as though the Federal Republic was succumbing to international pressures when Kohl grudgingly accepted the retirement of the Pershing IA, the Chancellor was in fact bowing to domestic public opinion as well as to pressure from within his own government, as I will argue in this essay. At home, Kohl faced a potential parliamentary majority that favored radical steps toward disarmament and which was quite in harmony with the majoritarian attitudes of the West German population. The rise of Gorbachev had contributed to an evaporation of the strong anti-Communist sentiments and mostly negative perceptions of the Soviet Union that had long been a hallmark of West German politics.⁴ Only a few years earlier, distrust of Moscow had prevailed among a majority of West Germans. In 1982/83 the country had heatedly discussed the question of whether the NATO Double-Track Decision should be implemented or not. Despite considerable opposition from the Left, the argument put forward by Kohl and the conservative side had carried the day: they claimed that, by introducing the SS-20, the Soviets had clandestinely acquired military predominance in Europe and put West Germany in a difficult strategic spot. As the proponents of *Nachrüstung* had relentlessly argued, the Soviets were out to weaken the trust between Germany and her Western Allies by undermining NATO's doctrine of "flexible response."⁵ While the huge peace movement of the early 1980s had

- 3 See Tim Geiger, *The NATO Double-Track Decision: Genesis and Implementation*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zapp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York 2016, pp. 52–69, here p. 56; and Oliver Bange, *SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East–West Relations*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 70–86, here p. 71.
- 4 See Hermann Wentker, *Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow 1987 bis 1989. West- und ostdeutsche Perzeptionen zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel*, in: Hanns Jürgen Küsters (ed.), *Der Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums und Deutschlands Wiedervereinigung*, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2016, pp. 119–149; Tim Matthias Weber, *Zwischen Nachrüstung und Abrüstung. Die Nuklearwaffenpolitik der Christlich–Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zwischen 1977 und 1989*, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 271–275.
- 5 Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zapp, *Introduction: The Nuclear Crisis, NATO's Double-Track Decision, and the Peace Movement of the 1980s*, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 1–36, here p. 3; the German wording is important in this context. While *Nachrüstung* refers to technical "retrofitting", the defenders of the NATO Double-Track Decision used this term to highlight the fact that Western "rearmament" had only come "after" (*nach*) the Soviets had started to deploy the SS-20; the peace movement disputed this temporal order and preferred the term "*Aufrüstung*" (armament).

clearly lost the battle over “Euromissiles”, it had been successful in turning the German public further toward “peace.”⁶

In addition, a dramatic normalization of East–West German–German relations contributed to those rather unprecedented political steps. In 1987, the Cold War between the two German states was finally laid to rest. In the summer of 1987, the impending first visit of the East German State and Party Chief, Erich Honecker, to the West German capital city of Bonn was looming large in German politics.⁷ To complete this highly popular course of German–German détente, Kohl needed to make concessions with regard to disarmament, even though the INF Treaty seemingly violated the very strategic and intellectual base that had formed the core of the West German and transatlantic “security consensus” since the 1960s. Its resurrection had been central to Kohl’s argument during the 1979–1983 *Nachrüstungsdebatte* (“Euromissiles debate”). But as the West German government knew full well, the Soviet Union would not have consented to Honecker’s trip to West Germany if Kohl had held out on the Pershing IA.⁸ Thus Kohl’s dramatic reversal over nuclear weapons on August 26, 1987 not only removed an important obstacle with regard to the conclusion of the INF negotiations in Geneva, but opened the path toward a Honecker visit to Bonn as well.⁹ That visit was popular in West Germany, even though Honecker himself was not. During his discussions with Honecker, Kohl drew attention to the sacrifice of the Pershing IA missiles as an important gesture of West German good will. As Kohl and Honecker agreed, the two German states needed to work together to secure peace in Europe.¹⁰

Even though his more “dovish” stance on nuclear weapons would bring Kohl into conflict with the conservative “steel helmet” faction within his own political camp and the few remaining Cold War “hawks” in West Germany, it endeared him to the liberal wing of his government. Faced with a possible parliamentary majority in favor of a “double zero” option that included the Pershing IA, Kohl sided with the “doves.” Ultimately, however, the “Kohl reversal” was made possible by a “peacenik” public that was more in harmony with the positions of the early 1980s peace movement than with the old Cold War consensus that had still

6 Philipp Gassert, *Arbeit am Konsens im Streit um den Frieden: Die Nuklearkrise der 1980er Jahre als Medium gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 52 (2012), pp. 491–516.

7 Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie*, Munich 2012, pp. 468 f.; as Schwarz argues, even though Kohl himself remained skeptical with regard to the ultimate outcomes of German–German détente, the strong liberal wing of the CDU was very much in favor of a Honecker visit and a continued rapprochement between the two German states.

8 See the contribution by Hermann Wentker in this volume.

9 See the conversation between Genscher and GDR Foreign Minister Fischer, September 8, 1987, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1987*, ed. by Tim Szatkowski, Tim Geiger, and Jens Hofmann, Berlin 2018, Doc. 247, pp. 1244–1251, here p. 1245.

10 Conversations between Kohl and Honecker, September 7, 1987, in: *AAPD 1987*, Doc. 244 and 245, pp. 1223–1243, here p. 1224.

prevailed five years earlier during the heated debates on the NATO Double-Track Decision. In the end, Kohl's departure from Cold War orthodoxy made sense not only with regard to West Germany's relations to its Allies and to the Soviet bloc but, most importantly, made sense from a domestic political point of view. Like attitudes in most of Western Europe, West German public opinion had seen a decisive turn toward peace since 1985.¹¹ Whether that was due to the "Gorbachev factor," as some scholars like Jeffrey Herf have argued,¹² or was the outcome of a belated "victory" of the peace movement, as for example Lawrence Wittner has proposed, will remain a topic for many future discussions.¹³

1. The Kohl Reversal: The Chancellor's About-Face on Nuclear Weapons in the Summer of 1987

German Chancellors are normally quite reluctant publicly to invoke their constitutional right to set binding policy guidelines on members of their own cabinet (*Richtlinienkompetenz*).¹⁴ On August 26, 1987, Kohl, who only in January of that same year had been re-elected for a second time, and who seemed quite securely enthroned in the Chancellor's office, felt that he needed to do exactly that. Among members of his center-right Christian Union/Liberal Democratic coalition government, the discussion had been spiraling out of control as to whether, under an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, West Germany would be allowed to keep its remaining 72 Pershing IA ballistic missiles. The Federal Republic had acquired these weapons during the 1960s. Should there be a war, they could potentially deliver U.S. nuclear warheads to areas controlled by the Warsaw Pact Organization. While the Federal Republic had solemnly renounced the right to own nuclear weapons and had signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Pershing IA missiles were an integral and highly symbolic part of NATO's nuclear escalation continuum. They were meant to forestall a "singularization" of non-nuclear Germany within NATO and vis-à-vis

11 Maria Eleonora Guasconi, Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Stanford 2015, pp. 271–289, here p. 286.

12 Jeffrey Herf, *War By Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles*, New York 1991, pp. 224–233.

13 Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1971 to the Present*, Stanford 2003, pp. 403–404.

14 Everhard Holtmann, Die Richtlinienkompetenz des Bundeskanzlers—kein Phantom?, in: Erhard Hoffmann and Werner J. Patzelt (eds.), *Führen Regierungen tatsächlich? Zur Praxis gouvernementalen Handelns*, Wiesbaden 2008, pp. 73–84; from a historical point of view Philipp Gassert, *Bildung und Management von Koalitionen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in historischer Perspektive*, in: Philipp Gassert and Hans Jörg Hennecke (eds.), *Koalitionen in der Bundesrepublik. Bildung, Management und Krisen von Adenauer bis Merkel*, Paderborn 2017, pp. 11–28, here p. 23.

the Soviet Union, as well as prevent a “decoupling” of Germany from the U.S. nuclear guarantee.¹⁵

In his August 26 press conference, the Chancellor announced, in a somewhat circumventive and technical way, that West Germany would take its Pershing IA down, *if* a deal by the Soviet Union and the United States would meet certain criteria. First, the two superpowers had to agree on, and ratify, an INF Treaty that abolished all medium-range nuclear missiles worldwide. Second, they needed to agree on a “satisfactory” verification regime. Thirdly, they needed to stay within their agreed timetable.¹⁶ Kohl’s strong conditional wording displayed a lingering distrust of the superpowers in general and the Soviet Union in particular. That was why he was linking his offer to the ratification and successful implementation of an INF Treaty—a line which he could not hold either. Yet in essence, he had very publicly “turned” on nuclear deterrence. As Kohl’s Christian Socialist Union (CSU) coalition partner and arch-rival within the Christian-Conservative camp, the baroque Bavarian Premier and CSU Party Chief, Franz Josef Strauß, later railed in his memoirs, the Chancellor’s step was “totally irresponsible” and “totally unjustified.”¹⁷

Strauß was right that Kohl’s public statement amounted to a 180-degree turn-around. It had been only three months since Kohl, speaking for the same West German government, had very confidently announced in the Bundestag that the Federal Government was in accord with its Western Allies that the German Pershing IA missiles had “never been part” of the Geneva INF negotiations and that they could therefore not be included in a Soviet–American “zero solution.”¹⁸ Moreover, as Defense Minister Manfred Wörner had argued in early June, the Pershing IA would remain the only land-based NATO nuclear system that would not strike on German soil alone and could be used as a “negotiating chip” for

15 On the fear of “decoupling” as the perennial nightmare of West German politicians, which had also motivated Helmut Schmidt, when he called for a NATO reaction to the SS-20, see William Burr, *A Question of Confidence: Theater Nuclear Forces, US Policy toward Germany, and the Origins of the Euromissile Crisis, 1975–1976*, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), *Euromissile Crisis*, pp. 123–138.

16 Chancen für die Menschen in Deutschland und für Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, Erklärungen des Bundeskanzlers, Bulletin der Bundesregierung 80/1987, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/1987/80-87_Kohl_2.html.

17 Franz Josef Strauß, *Die Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1989, p. 552; for further detail see Tim Geiger’s contribution to this volume.

18 See Kohl’s speech in the Bundestag on June 4, 1987 in: *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte*, 11th Legislative Period, 16th Session, p. 926. See also his second inaugural speech March 18, 1987, after the new government had been formed. Here, Kohl affirmed that there was “no alternative to the strategy of flexible response”, *ibid.*, 4. Sitzung, p. 67; for a detailed, step-by-step treatment of Kohl’s reversal see Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, pp. 150–170; Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989*, Stuttgart 1998, p. 328, and the contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume.

future negotiations on short-range missiles striking below 500 kilometers.¹⁹ That expectation had soon turned out to be quite erroneous. In early August 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze very pointedly asked how it could be that the Federal Republic was interloping in Soviet–American negotiations, thereby threatening the successful conclusion of a historic disarmament treaty. If the superpowers agreed to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons—those striking within the 500 to 5,000 km range—the Pershing IA, with a range of 720 km, would have to go to as well.²⁰

Thus, on the surface, it looked as though Kohl was mostly giving in to international pressures, along with the more dovish members within his own Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as well as the Free Democrat (FDP) “Liberals,” led by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The Pershing IA missiles were increasingly outdated and needed modernization.²¹ While military experts were quite clear on that point, officials in Kohl’s government, including several high-ranking members of his Party, were prevaricating. Many were not as much concerned about international resistance to Germany’s modernization plans as about German public opinion. Indeed, during the summer of 1987, the Reagan Administration had even pressured West Germany to go ahead with modernization, as had been decided on by NATO way back in 1983.²² Even France, which was not usually too keen on a nuclear Germany, shared some of the concerns of the West German government that the INF Treaty would leave the Federal Republic in a vulnerable position.²³

Yet, though internationally there seems initially to have been some room for maneuver, Kohl had West German public opinion against his position; and that was more important. While ostensibly he was bowing “to international pressures,” he was in fact giving in to the prevailing sentiment of the German population as well as of a majority of deputies in the Federal Parliament. In early May 1987, Kohl’s Liberal coalition partner had been very publicly sliding in the direction of the Social Democrats and the Green Party by opposing plans to modernize the Pershing IA. Ever since Helmut Schmidt had “discovered” the “missile gap” in 1977, the debate had been complicated by the confusing way in which the various categories of nuclear weapons were defined. This structured not only the Geneva negotiations between the superpowers, but also the nuclear weapons debate in

19 Herausforderungen der Zukunft: Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung auf der Kommandeurstagung der Bundeswehr in Oldenburg, Bulletin der Bundesregierung No. 55 (June 6, 1987), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/1987/55-87_Woerner.html.

20 Die Sowjets unter Risiko halten, *Der Spiegel*, No. 33 (August 10, 1987), pp. 19–21, here p. 20.

21 Memo by Adamek, May 20, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 145, pp. 726–728.

22 Telegram by Ambassador van Well, Washington, July 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 214, p. 1071–1077.

23 Consultations of the German and French Foreign and Defense Secretaries, May 21, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 146, pp. 728–735, here p. 734; see the contribution by Christian Wenkel to this volume.

Germany. While experts talked about “long-range intermediate nuclear forces” (LRINF) with a 1,000 to 5,000-kilometer range and “short-range intermediate nuclear forces” (SRINF) with a 150 to 1,000-kilometer range, the “double zero” and the Geneva negotiations addressed those above 500 kilometers, which would include the Pershing IA.

Therefore, Kohl’s about-face on the Pershing IA was the domestically expedient thing to do. Always the pragmatic centrist politician, Kohl knew that he was in a comfortable position to override the conservative “Cold Warrior” wing of his Party and his government. These included Strauß and the CSU, as well as Defense Minister and future NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner and the so-called “steel helmet” group within the CDU, led by the powerful chief whip of the Christian Democratic *Bundestag* group, Alfred Dregger. Of course, the Pershing IA had been stationed way back in the 1960s and thus long predated the 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision, to which Kohl had once tied his political future and which would now be voided by the 1987 INF Treaty. Yet Kohl realized that West Germany could not win a fight over a nuclear delivery system whose warheads it did not even own, and whose limited range made it even less popular among West Germans. After all, these outdated weapons would hit only targets either within Germany or in its immediate neighborhood.

2. A Dovish Domestic Context, West German Public Opinion and the “Gorbachev Factor”

While at first glance Kohl’s willingness to give up the Pershing IA looks surprising, it made a lot of sense from a domestic point of view. In 1982/83 he had first formed a new government (replacing the “father” of the NATO Double-Track Decision, Helmut Schmidt, as Chancellor) and then, in early 1983, he had secured an electoral victory by promising not to give in to the “pressures of the street” but loyally to implement the NATO Double-Track Decision.²⁴ Even though the world had moved toward détente since Reagan’s much-discussed 1984 “reversal”²⁵ and Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985, the military fundamentals with regard to the Soviet side were still the same as four years earlier. As has been explained above, by now accepting that the Pershing IA would be covered by the “double zero solution” of the INF Treaty, Kohl was violating one of the basic premises of West German security policy, held since the 1960s: that a situation must at all costs be avoided in which Germany could potentially be isolated and singularized behind a “nuclear firewall.” Even though Gorbachev sounded very different in comparison to his successors, in 1987 no one could safely predict that East–West tensions would not return. After all, it had twice happened during earlier phases

24 Geiger, NATO Double-Track Decision, p. 65.

25 See the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume.

of the Cold War and no one in his or her right mind imagined the collapse of the Soviet Empire within four years.²⁶

Members of the conservative faction within Kohl's government were time and again pointing this out. Within the logic of deterrence, West Germany and her Western European Allies would still face a conventionally superior Soviet Union if they accepted an INF Treaty with no further guarantees and a successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe (MBFR). The latter had been dragging on without success since 1973, and no one in 1987 expected them to lead to any meaningful result.²⁷ At least on paper, the Soviets still held a huge conventional (and chemical) military advantage in Europe. NATO could not deter it adequately, at least not within the prevailing doctrine of "flexible response" that had been invented in 1967 to steer NATO strategy away from immediate all-out nuclear war. After an INF Treaty, West Germany would be much more dependent on a U.S. nuclear guarantee that rested on strategic weapons stationed at sea or in the United States and not on weapons stationed in Western Europe. Thus, within the logic of a gradual response to a military threat from the East, West Germany would face a return to the uncertain times of the 1970s before the NATO Double-Track Decision.

A compounding problem for the conservative "hawks" was that the strategic debate had all the trappings of an "expert discourse" that went against common sense. The intricacies of NATO nuclear strategy were lost on most parts of the general public, who either did not appreciate or did not understand the reasoning behind "flexible response." The 1967 core NATO idea of "flexible response" had always been a hard sell, and not just because it had introduced a European level of nuclear escalation instead of intercontinental nuclear exchanges. Even though it was supposed to strengthen NATO's deterrence capabilities, ultimately, as the Potsdam military historian Oliver Bange has argued, it replaced "a strategy for preventing war [...] by one for waging it."²⁸ Of course, that change of strategy, which had come with the 1967 Harmel Report, was supposed to make NATO's willingness to deter an enemy more credible by giving the American President more options. While "flexible response" may have made deterrence more credible as the Soviet Union saw it, from the peace movement's point of view that strategic reasoning was a load of nonsense. According to those in the peace movement, war would become more likely, because the threshold for using nuclear weapons would be lowered. This last perspective was now carrying the day in West Germany.

26 After the 1955 "Cold War Respite," East-West tensions had returned with a vengeance during the Berlin and Cuban Crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the 1970s, détente had turned out to be short-lived, as was very vividly present in the minds of the decision-makers of 1987.

27 In 1989 they were replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, which would then lead to huge cuts in conventional armaments, see the contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume.

28 Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II, p. 71.

Spurred on by popular culture, people had always imagined what would happen “if deterrence fail[ed].”²⁹ Most did not conceive of nuclear weapons as political weapons that had kept the peace in Europe since the late 1940s. But they did understand, and full well, that any systems that were meant to strike within 1,000 kilometers, would devastate Central Europe including all of Germany—East and West. The popular saying “*Je kürzer die Raketen, desto toter die Deutschen* (literally, “the shorter the missiles, the deader the Germans”) made it difficult to overcome resistance to any idea of nuclear modernization within a context in which the superpowers were moving toward détente. Only four years earlier, people had overwhelmingly accepted the stationing of new nuclear systems in the wake of the NATO Double-Track Decision. That decision, however, had been pushed through against the backdrop of renewed East–West tension and because the perception had taken hold among a majority of West Germans that the Soviets had been using foul play in accelerating their armaments programs in the 1970s. By 1987, those fears were gone. Since the first 1985 Geneva meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan and the astounding 1986 Reykjavik Summit, superpower relations had taken a revolutionary turn for the better. Thus, world politics seemed to be on a new trajectory toward peace.³⁰

That new spirit of détente swiftly caught on with the West German public.³¹ It undercut any efforts Kohl and the conservative “Cold Warriors” tried to make to hang on to the Pershing IA as a nuclear insurance of last resort. Even before a single nuclear warhead had been removed, Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals and “charming” initiatives had had a marked impact on West German public opinion. Many Germans, not just those on the Left, were enchanted by the new CPSU General Secretary, who held out a carrot for overcoming Cold War enmity once and for all.³² In his 1987 book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Gorbachev explained not only how he saw the future of Russia, but how he thought that the “new thinking” was appropriate for Europe and the world, too. His line that “Europe is our common home” was well received in Germany. It evoked images of a common European heritage in a continent that has had its “fair share of wars and tears.”³³ Despite the brutal German invasion

29 See for example Jerome F. Shapiro, *Atomic Bomb Cinema. The Apocalyptic Imagination on Film*, London 2002; Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), *Angst im Kalten Krieg*, Hamburg 2009; Philipp Gassert, *Popularität der Apokalypse. Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Nuklearangst seit 1945*, in: Johannes Piepenbrink (ed.), *Das Ende des Atomzeitalters*, Bonn 2012, pp. 126–141.

30 For a classic contemporary treatment, see the still superb volume by Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, D.C. 1994, pp. 300–325.

31 See Herf, *War by other Means*, pp. 218 f.

32 Wentker, *Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow*, pp. 120–124.

33 “Der Kontinent hat an Kriegen und Tränen mehr als genug gehabt.” I am quoting from the second German edition, Michail Gorbatschow, *Perestroika. Die zweite russische Revolution. Eine neue Politik für Europa und die Welt*, Munich 1989, p. 253.

of the Soviet Union during World War II, Gorbachev seemed to stretch out a hand to Germans as well as others. Moreover, he implicitly admitted Soviet guilt for the past, when he pointedly explained his concept in a speech in Prague.³⁴

Even though Gorbachev did not mention the United States and Canada as partners in that new “European home” and thus, in the conservatives’ view, was employing the old Soviet trick of dividing the West, the left-liberal German press urged Germany’s politicians to take Gorbachev at his word.³⁵ The Social Democrats welcomed Gorbachev’s initiatives very warmly. In 1988, the main intellectual architect of the Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* of the 1970s, Willy Brandt’s erstwhile foreign policy advisor Egon Bahr, called for a “common security” in Europe, even if that left the Americans out in the cold. Shortly after the signing of the INF Treaty, he envisioned a new European order, in which Soviet and American forces would be withdrawn from Central Europe.³⁶ What is interesting, though, especially in the light of more recent developments, is that some conservative circles outside the traditional Christian Democrat “Cold Warrior” orbit wistfully hoped for a day in which Russia would “move back into a European home” too. As the conservative CDU member of the European Parliament, Otmar Franz put it in 1987: the “European Home” included Russia, to which, six years later, he added the thought that, after the end of the Cold War, a Europe that included Russia would be competing in a triadic economic world order, in which North America and East Asia would form the antagonists of Europe.³⁷

Those skeptical of Gorbachev’s political initiatives were increasingly on the defense in West Germany. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was one of the early converts. The Liberals had gained votes in the January 1987 Federal elections, whereas the Christian Democratic Parties had suffered considerable losses. While the two partners were still negotiating the outlines of a new coalition government, the Foreign Minister gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on February 1, 1987, in which he laid out his program for the coming years. He urged Germany’s European Allies, and by implication his future coalition partners as well, to take Gorbachev seriously: “If there is a chance today that, after forty years of confrontation, relations between East and West might have reached a turning point, it would be a mistake of historic proportions if the West were to pass on this chance, merely because it could not get over a mindset that always assumed the worst with regard to the Soviet Union.” And Genscher added: “We are prepared to take the promise of the common European home up and build this home together with the Soviet Union.” He concluded

34 Ibid.

35 Wentker, *Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow*, p. 123.

36 Egon Bahr, *Zum Europäischen Frieden: Eine Antwort an Gorbatschow*, Berlin 1988, p. 91; see Andreas Vogtmeier, *Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung*, Bonn 1996.

37 Ottmar Franz, *Europa und Russland—Das europäische Haus*, in: Ottmar Franz (ed.), *Europa und Russland. Das europäische Haus?* Göttingen 1993, pp. 1–8, here p. 7.

quite emphatically: "Our motto can only be: Let's take Gorbachev seriously, let's take him at his word."³⁸

Within the government, the dividing line was thus not between the Liberals and the two Christian Union Parties, but rather between members of the conservative wing of the CDU with its Bavarian sister Party the CSU on the one side, and the more moderate Christian Democrats and Liberals on the other. As Genscher gleefully pointed out in his memoirs, his speech received mixed responses among Christian Democrats. At the same time, however, his call "to take Gorbachev at his word" led to positive responses from the German public and from leading left-center journalists like the influential editor of the Hamburg newsweekly *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein.³⁹ As moderate members of the CDU/CSU group, such as the foreign expert Volker Rühle, pointed out time and again, the Christian Democrats had lost votes to the Liberals, because Strauß's Cold Warmongering had sown doubts among the population as to whether the Bonn government was really on a trajectory toward disarmament and détente in Europe. That Genscher was seen as the one major politician who was constantly "talking about peace, while the Union parties are portrayed as warmongers" was not a winning strategy—as Kohl's foreign policy advisor Horst Teltschik highlighted.⁴⁰

In retrospect, it is hard to understand why the Union parties were so divided about this point. Giving away the outdated 72 Pershing IA missiles, which anyway would have needed urgent modernization or replacement to stay fit for service beyond 1992, looked like a rather small price to pay. But the conservatives were not yet willing to pay this price, even though the German public was smitten by the very idea that Cold War enmity could be overcome in Europe. "German Angst" was gone; Gorbymania reigned supreme. This was shown in opinion surveys. Whereas in September 1983, 53 per cent of those polled expressed fear and felt anxious because of "threats from the East," in September 1987, 63 per cent of the respondents did not think that Germany was facing such a threat at all. In May 1987, only 18 per cent of those polled thought that nuclear weapons were still necessary to deter the Soviets, while 57 per cent thought that conventional weapons could easily do the trick and have the same effect of keeping the Soviets and their allies at bay.⁴¹

While Strauß continued to play the Cold Warrior, most German politicians seemed happy to go with the flow of public opinion and enjoy the new mood. In the run-up to the Federal elections of January 1987, many, including Chancellor Kohl, had campaigned on promises to take more initiatives toward disarmament, with 60 per cent of the population now being in favor of totally abolishing

38 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Nehmen wir Gorbatschow ernst, nehmen wir ihn beim Wort*, in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit. Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, Berlin 1991, pp. 137–150, here p. 146 f., 150.

39 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1995, pp. 527–530.

40 Ganz Wunderbar, in: *Der Spiegel* 7/1987, February 9, 1987, pp. 23 f.

41 See the various public opinion surveys quoted in Weber, *Nachrüstung und Abrüstung*, p. 272–274.

intermediate-range nuclear weapons—a very dramatic shift from how opinion stood in the fall of 1983. Even among supporters of the CDU/CSU, 47 per cent were in favor of a “zero option.”⁴² Yet while the Christian Democrats were in favor of a “zero option”, holding out against a “double zero solution” that would cover all SRINF including the Pershing IA carried increasingly higher political costs. The issue became one of the major points in the following state elections in Kohl’s home state of Rhineland-Palatinate, as well as in Hamburg, where the Christian Democrats were once again suffering major losses.⁴³ With electoral results coming out in April and May, Kohl was finally convinced that he needed to move on the armament question.⁴⁴

Given the prevailing sentiments of the German population and a growing enthusiasm for disarmament and détente in Europe, those who were critical of a “double zero option” were at a loss to get their point across. Since the two superpowers were moving in the direction of abolishing all intermediate-range nuclear missiles with a scope beyond 500 kilometers, the argument that was put forward by Strauß, Wörner, Dregger and the other remaining Cold War hawks, that a removal of a whole class of nuclear weapons would leave Germany in a dangerous strategic spot, sounded less and less convincing. Strauß had lost the battle for the office of Foreign Minister in Kohl’s new government. Now, he saw himself increasingly sidelined and out of sync with public opinion. In his memoirs, he reflects upon the public mood in Germany, which he thought was inimical to a “sober and realistic weapons and disarmament discussion.” Strauß was enraged by the fact that, among many intellectuals as well as large chunks of the public, the “superstition” could not be overcome that “disarmament alone can secure the peace.” As was common practice at the time, he invoked the negative example of pre-World War II “appeasement,” pointing out that British and French efforts to contain Hitler by accepting some of his demands had opened a path not “toward the heaven of peace, but toward the hell of war.”⁴⁵

How quickly the West German discourse on nuclear weapons had shifted toward the “peace camp,” became abundantly clear during a Bundestag debate in early May 1987. Now the “dovish” side counted a majority of the Bundestag deputies and even included several representatives from the Christian Democrat camp.⁴⁶ While Kohl reiterated the position that NATO did not consider the Pershing IA to be part of the Geneva negotiations, the Chief of the Free Democratic group, Wolfgang Mischnik, welcomed a “double zero solution” for his Party. He indicated that such a step might also include the Pershing IA, if the Western Alliance clarified its position and if the Americans made it clear that NATO’s defense

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., p. 275. See also the contribution of Tim Geiger in this volume.

45 Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, p. 514.

46 See *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte*, 11th Legislative Period, 10th Session, May 7, 1987, p. 558, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf>.

strategy would not be undermined by such a move.⁴⁷ There may have been a lot of “ifs,” but the direction in which the Liberals were heading was obvious. As the Green Party deputy, “peace researcher” and retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Federal Army, Alfred Mechttersheimer, pointedly noted during that same Bundestag debate, the conservative “hawks” were now facing a majority of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals in favor of a “double zero solution”, without any “Pershing IA reservation.” At no other time than in 1983 would a nuclear modernization platform have gained a parliamentary majority.⁴⁸

The straw that finally broke the camel’s back was the increasing unwillingness of the Western Allies to accept what they thought was an inconsequential position being held by the Federal Government, along with the subsequent question of modernizing the Pershing IA.⁴⁹ That modernization was impending, if the Germans were holding on to the missiles. In the beginning, France and Britain had supported the German position on the Pershing IA, because they did not want their own independent nuclear deterrents to be part of a deal between the superpowers. But in the summer of 1987, perspectives within NATO were shifting, since it had emerged that a deal with the Soviets could come to nothing if NATO held on to Germany’s Pershing IA. As the nuclear warheads of the Pershing IA were in the sole control of the United States, it was inconceivable, in the eyes of the public, that they should be left out from a Soviet–American deal—whereas British and French nuclear weapons were not owned or controlled by the U.S., even though the British also depended on U.S. launch systems. The West German government had no choice other than to accept that it would not press for a modernization of the Pershing IA missiles if an INF Treaty could be signed. It also accepted that they would be removed.⁵⁰ Even though the U.S. government had long supported the West German position on the Pershing IA, the American side was relieved to learn that Kohl had given up this “artificial impediment.” The renunciation would force the Soviets to move beyond rhetoric and “bring substance” to an INF Treaty.⁵¹

3. A Late Triumph for the Dying Peace Movement?

One of the ironies of the second half of the 1980s is the slow death of the peace movement. This came during a period in which the political spectrum in Germany was itself moving toward “peace.” Years of talk about “peace,” “disarmament,” and “making peace with ever fewer weapons,” a slogan that had been pioneered by the CDU, had moved the emphasis of West German political culture in the

47 Ibid., p. 545 f.

48 Ibid., p. 558.

49 See Risse-Kappen, *Nulllösung*, pp. 162 f.; Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium*, pp. 568 f.

50 Kohl’s press conference of August 26, 1987; see Tim Geiger’s contribution in this volume.

51 Gesandter Paschke, Washington, to Foreign Office, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 235, pp. 1191 f.

direction of the peace movement's core positions. The geopolitical shifts coming with Gorbachev's ascent to power and Reagan's "zero option" stances, as well as the "political springs" in most of Eastern Europe, rapidly narrowed the discursive space for hawkish positions. The conservative "Cold War" camp was therefore rapidly losing its erstwhile hegemony in the nuclear weapons debate. They could not rely on anti-Communist fears as they had successfully done during the early 1980s, even though the peace movement itself was now going through a period of prolonged weakness. An indicator of the peace movement's falling attraction was the dwindling number of people attending the annual Easter marches. In 1987, the march drew far fewer participants than marches four or five years earlier.⁵²

In the summer of 1987, it briefly looked as if the peace movement could stage a comeback. As members of the two Christian Union parties were heatedly debating whether they should resist the tendency toward a "double zero" option that included the Pershing IA, movement activists once again felt invigorated. Plans were being discussed for the fall of 1987 to organize marches and large blockades of the Pershing IA depots in Geilenkirchen (North Rhine-Westphalia) and Landsberg am Lech (Bavaria).⁵³ If Kohl, Strauß, and the "Cold Warriors" dug in their heels, preventing a successful conclusion to the Geneva INF talks, activists expected to draw huge crowds for large-scale protest demonstrations once again. As a circular letter among peace movement members put it in early August 1987: "It would be totally intolerable, if the historic chance of a first step toward disarmament were to be jeopardized by the German government. The failure of the Geneva negotiations would be a fiasco."⁵⁴

The clash did not come. Kohl did not do the peace movement the favor they were expecting. When he abandoned his resistance to a "double zero" solution that included the Pershing IA, he pulled the rug from underneath the peace movement activists. While it is impossible to attribute dramatic policy shifts to a single cause, and even more difficult to measure the impact of protest movements on decision-making, the very idea that West Germany would go through another "hot autumn" made Kohl and many members of his political party think twice. Moreover, Kohl did not want to risk damaging the relationship with Genscher and the Free Democrats. As Kohl summarized in his memoirs: "By moving over to Hans-Dietrich Genscher's foreign policy line, I possibly avoided a serious row within the coalition. In turn, I accepted a grave quarrel within the Union parties." Kohl could pay that price, because he knew full well that public opinion was on

52 Rüdiger Schmitt, Was bewegt die Friedensbewegung? Zum sicherheitspolitischen Protest der achtziger Jahre, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 18/1 (1987), pp. 110–136.

53 Cf. Wolfgang Hölscher and Paul Kraatz (eds.), Die Grünen im Bundestag, Sitzungsprotokolle und Anlagen 1987–1990, Vol. 1, Düsseldorf 2015, Doc. 21, p. 113, and Doc. 22, p. 118.

54 Circular letter: Für einen sofortigen, ersatzlosen und endgültigen Abzug aller Pershing-Raketen. Aufruf zur täglichen gewaltfreien Blockade der Stationierungsorte der Pershing IA- Atomraketen, S. 2, in: Archiv Aktiv, Bestand GMA KZU 10, quoted in the dissertation by Richard Rohrmoser, Sicherheitspolitik von unten. Gewaltfreie Proteste gegen nukleare Mittelstreckenraketen in Mutlangen 1983–1987, Mannheim 2019.

his and Genscher's side and that he would be rewarded by a Honecker visit. He also thought that his willingness to move on the Pershing IA had impressed Gorbachev, who up until that point had tended to show Kohl the cold shoulder.⁵⁵

It is not too far-fetched, then, to argue that the early 1980s peace movement had had a marked impact on the political culture of West Germany. While it had failed to prevent the German government from going ahead with the Double-Track Decision in 1983, with Kohl relentlessly campaigning for the stationing of Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles, the population seems to have opened up to the peace movement's original goals and ideas as East-West tensions began to abate during the second half of the 1980s. This created a larger discursive space for the "peace camp." If public opinion surveys are any guide at all, most people in West Germany still thought that the Green Party was too radical.⁵⁶ Yet most had moved beyond the old Cold War ("Harmel") consensus. The old nightmare of West German foreign policy elites, that the Federal Republic could be "singularized" and decoupled from an American nuclear guarantee (which had provided the core argument for the NATO Double-Track Treaty), no longer found much resonance among the West German population.⁵⁷

4. Conclusion

Although the peace movement had lost the "1983 war over the Euromissiles," it had now won the "peace" by pushing Kohl toward a "double zero" solution that included Germany's outdated Pershing IA. Though many activists had been disappointed by the turn of events in 1983 and large-scale peace demonstrations were a thing of the past, some members of the peace movement had turned their disappointment into a political resource of democratic resilience.⁵⁸ Despite his qualified 1987 re-election success, Kohl was faced with an informal coalition of parliamentary deputies who had decisively moved in the direction of the peace camp.

Many now favored getting rid of the Pershing IA because perceptions of Europe's overall political situation had changed dramatically within a relatively short period. By the second half of the 1980s, Cold War fears and anti-Communism were largely gone; Germans were open to bigger disarmament steps. It seems that, after some initial hesitation, even the Chancellor was happy

55 Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, Munich 2005, pp. 550 f.; on the initial difficulties between Kohl and Gorbachev see Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 451–461.

56 Silke Mende, *Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn. Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen*, Munich 2011, pp. 483–485.

57 See Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, p. 164; it is quite remarkable that the participants in the debates in the Bundestag in early May 1987, frequently invoked public opinion polls, when making the point that times had changed. This included Genscher and the FDP.

58 Bernhard Gotto, *Enttäuschung als Politikressource. Zur Kohäsion der westdeutschen Friedensbewegung in den 1980er Jahren*, in: *VfZ* 62 (2014), pp. 1–33.

to play along. By aligning himself with Genscher and the Liberals as well as the more moderate members of the CDU, Kohl could keep his Bavarian archrival, Franz Josef Strauß, at bay. At the same time, he could undercut potential internal opposition from the more dovish members of his own Party, who were rallying against the Cold War hard-liners too.⁵⁹

While it created difficulties and fractures within Kohl's Christian Democrat-led coalition government, the INF Treaty was very much in sync with the feelings of a majority of West Germans—or rather those people who responded to public opinion surveys. It concluded the “move toward peace” and the acceptance of the status quo in Europe that had begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is obvious from the fact, that in the summer of 1987, Kohl was getting ready for an unprecedented visit by the East German Chief of State and Party, Erich Honecker. Though Kohl repeatedly stressed that West Germany had not given up on its ultimate goal of reunifying the two German states, the very fact that Honecker had been invited to visit amounted to a ratification of the status quo in Europe and Germany. It was just another step in mentally accepting that “the other German state” existed.

The same logic applies to the INF Treaty. While in hindsight, this Treaty may look like an opening gambit in the overcoming of the East–West division of Europe, blazing the way for the fall of the Wall, such a “post-Cold War” perspective was not held at all widely among contemporaries—at least, not in Germany. When, on June 12, 1987, U. S. President Reagan challenged Gorbachev to “tear down this wall,” it looked like a public relations stunt which willfully ignored the political basics in Europe. Many West Germans saw Reagan's speech as oratory mostly aimed at domestic U. S. consumption and as an almost comic return to a Cold War rhetoric that now belonged to the past.⁶⁰ It did not easily square with the same President's revolutionary work toward disarmament in Geneva. The INF Treaty thus seemed like one more piece of ratification, ultimately consolidating the same old European order that had been established by the victorious powers with the 1945 Potsdam Treaty.

59 The Southwestern CDU, under the leadership of the Baden-Württemberg State Premier Lothar Späth, who tried to replace Kohl in 1988/89, had called for a “double zero” solution on May 24, 1987, see Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, p. 166.

60 Jens Schöne, *Ronald Reagan in Berlin: Der Präsident, die Staatssicherheit und die geteilte Stadt*, Berlin 2017, pp. 44–45.

V. Legacy of the INF Treaty

Wolfgang Richter

Implementing the INF-Treaty

The Elimination and Verification Process

1. The Objectives of the INF Treaty and the Role of Basing Countries

The Treaty of December 8, 1987 between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)¹ came into force on June 1, 1988. This Treaty aimed at solving the “missile crisis” in Europe and its set objective was to eliminate a whole class of ground-based, nuclear-capable intermediate-, medium- and shorter-range missiles, launchers and support structures. Three years later, on June 1, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union had destroyed all such assets in accordance with the Treaty provisions.

The elimination process focused on deployed nuclear capable intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM) and Cruise Missiles (IRCM) with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km. NATO assessed that Soviet MRBM such as the SS-4 (RSD-10) and SS-5 (R-12) with ranges well beyond 1,500 km, and in particular the mobile SS-20 (RD-14) IRBM with a range of approximately 5,000 km, were a serious threat to Western Europe. The SS-20 carried three independently targetable re-entry vehicles with nuclear warheads that could reach targets throughout Europe, including the United Kingdom and Spain, and could do so to a high accuracy of an estimated 300 meters. Although these were deployed mainly in Soviet western military districts, the USSR had also based approximately one-third of the more than 1,800 INF systems that it had in service with rocket forces east of the Urals, including 162 SS-20, to threaten China.²

- 1 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987. Selected Documents No. 25, Department of State Publication 9555, published by the U.S. DoS, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication Editorial Division, Washington, D. C., December 1987 (in the following footnotes referred to as “INF Treaty”).
- 2 Steven Pifer, Avis T. Bohlen, William T. Burns, and John Woodworth, The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned. Brookings, Arms Control Series Paper 9, December 2012, p. 12; Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance. Fact Sheets & Briefs (updated August 2019), p. 2, <https://www.armscontrol.org>.

On the Western side, the U. S. had begun to station ground-launched medium-range ballistic missiles (GLBM) and Cruise Missiles (GLCM) on Allied territories in Western Europe following NATO's Dual-Track Decision of 1979. This deployment included 108 Pershing II GLBM in West Germany and 464 medium range BGM-109G Tomahawk GLCM systems in West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United Kingdom. With ranges from 1,800 to 2,500 km, such mobile systems could reach vital Soviet targets within short flight times. More such systems were held on U. S. territory in a non-deployed state. Despite this, NATO's Dual-Track Decision also kept the door open for dialogue and laid the ground for arms control negotiations aiming at the total elimination of ground-based INF systems.³

In Europe, the large quantity of forward-deployed mobile shorter-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km posed a significant threat to the frontline countries of both alliances. The Pershing IA in West-Germany and the SS-12 (OTR-22) and SS-23 (OTR-23) in the GDR, ČSSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria were prime examples. The latter also posed a risk to NATO's forward-deployed medium-range Cruise and ballistic missiles and, from a Western perspective, had to be included in the INF Treaty. As well as the SRBM held by the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR and ČSSR, Soviet allies like the GDR, ČSSR, Hungary and Bulgaria operated the same types of SRBM. As the West German Pershing IA SRBM, with a range of approximately 780 km, was capable of reaching the Polish–Soviet border area, the Soviet Union wanted a multilateral treaty that would oblige West Germany as well as themselves to scrap such missiles. However, the U. S. insisted on a bilateral agreement in order to keep issues of strategic relevance exclusively under national control.

One argument in favor of a bilateral solution was the fact that, in peacetime, nuclear warheads were held exclusively under the custody of U. S. or Soviet forces and could be released for use through allied delivery only after the President of the United States or the President of the Soviet Union had given authorization. In fact, the INF Treaty did not contain any provisions on counting, verifying or dismantling nuclear warheads other than by separating them from their means of delivery before their destruction.

Eventually, only U. S. and Soviet ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles with ranges from 500 km upwards were covered by the Treaty, together with their launchers and supporting structures. However, this agreement became possible only after Chancellor Helmut Kohl had declared that West

3 Overview in: U. S. Department of State. *Diplomacy in Action*. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. *Treaty Between The United States of America And The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)*, Signed December 8, 1987, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#narrative>; see also Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *INF Treaty At a Glance*. Fact Sheet. December 8, 2017; Pifer et al., *The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces*, pp. 6–13.

Germany would destroy its Pershing IA missiles unilaterally.⁴ National SRBM held by West Germany, the GDR, ČSSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria were destroyed between 1991 and 2002 following unilateral government decisions. The elimination processes of the non-superpowers were not verified under the umbrella of the INF verification regime, or with its methods.

In consequence of the bilateral construction of the INF Treaty, the legal responsibilities for its implementation lay exclusively with the United States and the Soviet Union as the sole state parties to its terms. Nevertheless, as large portions of the INF missiles, launchers and supporting infrastructure were stationed in third countries, the consent of other countries was required for Treaty implementation, in particular for on-site inspections. Therefore, additional multilateral agreements had to be concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union with stationing countries. To that end, the United States concluded “The INF Basing Countries Agreement” in December 1987 with Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.⁵

2. The INF Elimination and Verification Concept and Practice

To achieve the objective of eliminating all intermediate-, medium- and shorter-range U.S. and Soviet Union missiles globally, it was necessary to make unprecedented and detailed rules for defining, counting and verifying all relevant armaments and equipment. A phased elimination process had to be agreed upon and organized—one that was balanced, transparent and verifiable. Given the numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, what the state parties agreed to was reciprocity of results rather than reciprocity of each and every reduction step. This method ensured that the military balance was maintained at every stage, under intrusive mutual control and observation.

Verification played a crucial role in assuring compliance with a Treaty that had a pivotal impact on security in Europe. The INF concept of verification introduced ground-breaking and unprecedented rules of transparency, including requirements for comprehensive data exchange and on-site inspection. The verification regime had to be construed in line with the scheduled process of the complete elimination of a high number of missiles, launchers, bases, and

4 Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, New York 1989, pp. 421–462; Strobe Talbot, *The Road to Zero*, in: *Time*, December 14, 1987, pp. 18–30. See also the essays by Tim Geiger and Philipp Gassert in this volume.

5 Agreement among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987 (reprint July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium (henceforth “Basing Countries Agreement”).

facilities that the Treaty had banned. These were in various locations throughout Europe and scattered through entire territories of the Soviet Union and the United States. The task required an initial establishment of a reliable database from which to proceed with the withdrawal, separation, and elimination of armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty. On the basis of this, an intrusive and reliable verification regime was designed, capable not only of certifying the completion of the elimination process but also of assuring that every step of the elimination process was done in accordance with the Treaty provisions, and was duly monitored and documented. To that end, the main body of the Treaty's text established the principle provisions while details were specified in additional memoranda and protocols.

The Treaty's main text defined the assets that were to be eliminated, established time lines and basic provisions for the reduction processes, and set forth the verification concept. Details of types of missiles, launchers, and their supporting structures and equipment were contained in a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty (MoU).⁶ A Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty specified procedures for the elimination processes.⁷ Basic provisions for verification were enshrined in the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty,⁸ which was further complemented in December 1989 by the Memorandum of Agreement⁹ on verification.

2.1 Definitions and Counting Rules

According to Article I of the INF Treaty, both states party to it committed to "eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty." The state parties also had to eliminate all launchers of such missiles along with all

6 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following footnotes referred to as "MoU").

7 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following footnotes referred to as "PoE").

8 Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following footnotes referred to as "PoI").

9 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Geneva, December 21, 1989 (print July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium.

support structures and equipment.¹⁰ Once the Treaty came into force, the state parties were not allowed to produce, flight-test or launch any intermediate-range missiles (IRM) or shorter-range missiles (SRM) or produce any stages or launchers for such missiles.¹¹

The weaponry subject to the Treaty was confined to ground-launched missiles, with their support structures and equipment, that had range capabilities between 500 and 5,500 km. Those covered included all surface-to-surface missiles but excluded air- and missile defence (surface-to-air) missiles as well as air- and sea-launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM/SLCM).¹² The term “missile” included “ground-launched ballistic missiles” (GLBM) and “ground-launched Cruise Missiles” (GLCM) as weapon-delivery vehicles. “Intermediate-range missiles” (IRM) meant GLBM and GLCM with range capabilities above 1,000 km, reaching up to 5,500 km, while “shorter-range missiles” (SRM) referred to GLBM/GLCM with range capabilities between 500 and 1,000 km. “GLBM/GLCM launchers” were defined as fixed or mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanisms.¹³

The Treaty differentiated between deployed and non-deployed missiles and launchers according to their operational readiness and the stationing locations. Deployed IRM and IRM-launchers were located within deployment areas which contained one or more missile operating base (MOB) with a complex of support facilities. Deployed SRM and SRM-launchers were located at missile operating bases containing complexes of facilities and support equipment for the operation of SRM.¹⁴

The Treaty defined non-deployed missiles and launchers as those that were located outside deployment areas and MOBs. Such missiles and launchers were not held in a high readiness status for launch and were located in missile support facilities such as those specializing in production, repair, training, storage and elimination, or testing ranges. They could also be in transit—being moved between missile support facilities and deployment areas/MOBs after the transit had been duly notified following the notification provisions.¹⁵

According to article III of the INF Treaty, the following types of missile were subject to its terms: for the U. S.—the BGM-109G GLCM, Pershing II IRBM, and Pershing IA SRBM; for the USSR—the RSD-10 (SS-20), R-12 (SS-4), also the R-14 (SS-5) IRBM and OTR-22 (SS-12) and OTR-23 (SS-23) SRBM. In addition, tested but non-deployed missiles and launchers were subject to the Treaty: for the U. S.—the Pershing I B SR-GLBM; for the Soviet Union—the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) GLCM.¹⁶

10 INF Treaty, Art. IV, V, VI 1.

11 INF Treaty, Art. VI 1.

12 INF Treaty, Art. VII 3, 11.

13 INF Treaty, Art. II 1–6, Art. VII 4.

14 INF Treaty, Art. II 7, 8, 11, 13.

15 INF Treaty, Art. II 9, 10, 12, 14.

16 INF Treaty, Art. X 6.

2.2 Data Exchange and Update Notifications

Details were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. This contained the data exchanged by both state parties as of November 1, 1987, prior to the signing of the Treaty, a document which established the first baseline data for elimination and verification. These details were updated 30 days after the Treaty came into force. The MoU included 2,619 deployed and non-deployed SRBM, IRBM and IRCM, their launchers, support equipment such as unique missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks as well as the deployment areas, MOBs, and missile support facilities such as production, repair, training, storage, test, and elimination facilities. It also covered missile stages, full-scale inert training missiles, training launch canisters, training launchers, unique fixed support structures for deployed IRBM/IRCM and their launchers as well as research and development launch sites. After data updates, a total of 2,692 INF missiles—1,846 Soviet and 846 U.S. systems—had been destroyed at the end of the elimination process in May 1991, together with their support equipment and structures.¹⁷

The baseline data specified that the U.S. possessed 689 IRM (429 deployed, 260 non-deployed) and 170 non-deployed SRBM; while the Soviet Union possessed 826 IRBM (470 deployed, 356 non-deployed) and 926 SRBM (387 deployed, 539 non-deployed). The aggregate numbers of second stages of U.S. IRBM were 236, and of Soviet IRBM, 650. The aggregate numbers of second stages of U.S. SRBM amounted to 182, while the corresponding number for Soviet SRBM was 726. With the addition of the tested but not deployed 84 Soviet GLCM SSC-X-4, the aggregate number of Soviet missiles subject to the Treaty amounted to 1,836; the aggregate number of U.S. INF missiles was 859.

Furthermore, the MoU specified 292 launchers for U.S. IRM (224 deployed, 68 non-deployed) and one non-deployed launcher for U.S. SRBM. The USSR possessed 608 launchers for IRBM (484 deployed, 124 non-deployed) and 237 launchers for SRBM (197 deployed, 40 non-deployed). It also counted 6 launchers for the tested but not fielded SSC-X-4 GLCM.¹⁸

Soviet missiles, launchers and support structures were dispersed at 133 sites in three states, as shown in Table 1.

U.S. missiles, launchers and support structures were dispersed at 34 sites in six states. All 9 MOBs and three of the 24 supporting facilities were located in Europe, 21 in the United States. This is shown in Table 2.¹⁹

17 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/>.

18 All data referred to here are contained in MoU, Section II—V.

19 Regarding the figure cited for Pershing IIs: most authors refer to 108 P II only, planned to be held in operational readiness on 108 launchers in Germany. The higher number of such missiles indicated in the chart includes those that were kept in reserve in MOBs (12) or as maintenance spares and in a non-deployed status, partially in deployment areas (12), and to

Table 1: Dispersal of Soviet Missiles, Launchers, and Support Structures.

	Soviet Union	GDR	ČSSR	Total
Deployed SS-4/20	470	-	-	470
	61 MOB	-	-	
Deployed SS-12/23	241	107	39	387
	11 MOB	6 MOB	1 MOB	18 MOB
Non-depl. SS-4/5/20	356	-	-	356
	30 facilities	-	-	30 facilities
Non-depl. SS-12/23 and SSC-X-4	539	-	-	539
	24 facilities	-	-	24 facilities

Table 2: Dispersal of U.S. Missiles, Launchers, and Support Structures.

	FRG	UK	Italy	Belg.	Neths.	U. S. A.	Total
Deployed Pershing II	120	-	-	-	-	-	120
	3 MOB						3 MOB
Deployed BGM-109G	62	119	108	20	0	-	309
	1 MOB	2 MOB	1 MOB	1 MOB	1 MOB		6 MOB
Non-depl. Pershing II	12	-	-	-	-	115	127
	2 facil					11 facil	13 facil
Non-depl. BGM-109G	-	-	-	16	-	117	133
				1 facil		6 facil	7 facil
Non-depl, Pershing 1A	-	-	-	-	-	170	170
							4 facil

Belg. = Belgium *Neths.* = Netherlands

Non-depl. = non-deployed *facil* = facilities *MOB* = missile operating base

a larger extent in the United States (115). In 1987, the American figure (exceeding the official 108) caused some concern amongst members of the West German Government, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1987, Munich 1988, Doc. 319, pp. 1610f.

In addition, the MoU specified 11 U. S. and two Soviet Research and Development (R&D) Launch Sites with 30 U. S. and 5 Soviet R&D Booster Systems.²⁰

The data contained in the MoU reflected the situation on November 1, 1987. Details were updated on July 1, 1988, to account for changes that had occurred before the beginning of the scheduled elimination process. After the end of each six-month interval following the moment when the Treaty came into force, each party had to provide a comprehensive new update through its Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) to inform about changes in progress or completed removal and elimination processes made during the last half-year.²¹

The scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, MOB or missile support facility, as well as changes to the numbers of items subject to the Treaty at such facilities, had to be notified not later than 30 days in advance. Notifications no later than 30 days in advance were also required for announcing the dates scheduled for the initiation of the elimination of IRM and SRBM, along with stages, launchers and support equipment and structures. The notifications had to include, *inter alia*, the location from which IRM, launchers and support equipment were being moved. For scheduled elimination of launchers of unarmed IRBMs or of research and development boosters a notification no later than 10 days in advance was required.²²

The elimination process progressively changed the numbers of missiles, launchers and support structures, and equipment held by each side, and these changed numbers had to be communicated no later than 48 hours after elimination had occurred. Transits of INF missiles and launchers, including training missiles and training launchers, had to be notified no later than 48 hours after their completion.²³ Further notifications were delivered, as required by the elimination process and its verification, through on-site inspections or cooperative measures by use of National Technical Means (NTM).

2.3 Reduction Phases and Methods of Elimination

The Treaty required each party to have destroyed all deployed and non-deployed IRM and SRBM, launchers, support structures and equipment no later than three years after its entry into force.²⁴ Reductions had to be carried out in defined phases which distinguished between IRM and SRBM. Rather than specify equal numbers of missiles and launchers to be destroyed, the Treaty opted for these phases to ensure a strategic balance of warhead delivery capabilities during the

20 MoU, Section VII.

21 INF Treaty, Art. IX 1–4.

22 INF Treaty, Art. IX 5 (a)–(d), 6.

23 INF Treaty, Art. IX 5 (e)–(f).

24 Parties agreed that all missiles shall be eliminated 15 days prior to the end of the overall elimination period. During the last 15 days, re-entry vehicles shall be withdrawn to national territories and be destroyed, PoE II. 9.

entire process. Changes in the ratio between deployed and non-deployed IRMs and the ratio between the existing types of GLBM reflected in the MoU valid as of November 1, 1987 had to be avoided too.²⁵

2.3.1 IRM, Launchers, Support Structures and Equipment

By the end of the first phase, which ended 29 months after the Treaty came into force, no party was allowed to exceed the following numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers:

- an aggregate capability of deployed IRM launchers carrying or containing, at one launch, missiles deemed to carry 171 warheads;
- numbers of deployed IRM deemed to carry 180 warheads;
- aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed launchers capable of carrying or containing, at one launch, missiles deemed to carry 200 warheads;
- aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed IRM deemed to carry 200 warheads.²⁶

By the end of the second phase—i. e. no later than three years after the Treaty's coming into force—all IRM, launchers, support structures and equipment had to be eliminated.

2.3.2 SRBM, Launchers and Support Equipment

All deployed SRBMs and deployed and non-deployed SRBM-launchers had to be removed to elimination facilities by a date not later than 90 days after the Treaty's coming into force. They were to be retained there until the time of their destruction. The same applied to all non-deployed SRBMs, but within a time limit of 12 months. The elimination of all these, together with elimination of their launchers and support equipment, had to be completed not later than 18 months after the Treaty became operative. It was not permitted for SRBMs and their launchers to be gathered in the same elimination facility: they had to be separated by a distance of at least 1,000 km.²⁷

25 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a), (v).

26 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv).

27 INF Treaty, Art. V 1–3.

2.3.3 Elimination Process and Methods of Destruction

The numerous items subject to the Treaty were scattered in approximately 160 sites across the northern hemisphere, but the elimination process required them to be concentrated at just a few elimination facilities. Thus, a significant number of movements (or “transits”) between MOB, supporting facilities and elimination sites had to be regularly notified and monitored, together with the respective changes in numbers of missiles, launchers and support equipment. Each transit had to be completed within 25 days.²⁸ Prior to the arrival of missiles at elimination facilities their nuclear warheads and guidance elements were removed, while re-entry vehicles were subject to elimination.²⁹

To keep the withdrawal process orderly and verifiable, it was obligatory for the state parties to withdraw complete organizational units, such as Pershing II batteries, BGM-109G flights, and SS-20 regiments with two or three battalions, from the deployment areas and MOBs to the elimination facilities.³⁰ However, during the first six months of the Treaty’s coming into force, both sides were allowed to eliminate up to 100 unarmed IRBM by means of launching.³¹ Within the same time frame, missiles, launchers and support equipment that had been tested prior to the Treaty becoming operative but which had never been deployed had to be eliminated too. This provision related to the U.S. Pershing IB GLBM and the Soviet RK-55 (SSC-X-4) GLCM.³²

At the elimination facilities, missiles and launchers had to be destroyed by crushing, flattening, burning, or exploding stages, by severing airframes, wings, and tail sections into two pieces of equal size, or by cutting other components in half, in accordance with the technical provisions specified in the Protocol on Elimination. These destruction processes were observed and registered by inspectors from the opposite side.³³

Fixed support structures had to be eliminated *in situ*, their superstructures dismantled or demolished and removed from their base. The foundations of fixed structures or shelters had to be destroyed by excavation or explosion. Such methods were registered and verified through on-site inspections or observation by photo-camera satellites. So that this could be done, destroyed bases had to remain visible to National Technical Means (NTM) of verification for six months, or until completion of an on-site inspection.³⁴

28 INF Treaty, Art. VIII 4.

29 PoE, II. 3, 9.

30 INF Treaty, Art. X 3.

31 INF Treaty, Art. X 4, 5; PoE, III. 2.: “No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.”

32 INF Treaty, Art. X 6.

33 PoE, II. 7, 8, 10, with specifications for all missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty.

34 PoE, IV. 1. On NTM see section 2. f. (2) of this chapter.

Training missiles, launchers and launch canisters were generally eliminated *in situ*, subject to on-site inspections. The Treaty also permitted elimination by static display of armaments and equipment after they had been rendered unusable. For each state party, this option was limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters, and 15 launchers.³⁵

Deployment areas, MOBs and missile support facilities had to be eliminated by removal of all missiles, launchers and support equipment from the sites, destruction or conversion of support structures and termination of all INF-related activities such as production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage, or deployment of missiles and launchers. Elimination was counted as being accomplished once all this was certified by an inspection, or when 60 days had elapsed since the notified scheduled elimination.³⁶ In addition, conversion of any MOBs listed in the MoU for use as a base for GLBM/GLCM not subject to the Treaty was allowed, but this had to be notified no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled conversion.³⁷

2.4 On-site Inspections (OSI)

2.4.1 Phases and Quotas for OSI

Each state party had the right to conduct on-site inspections (OSI). The Treaty provided for a variety of mutual OSI to be made, either triggered by elimination action or based on annual quotas for short-notice verification. OSI could be carried out both within the territories of state parties and within the territories of basing countries.³⁸

During the first 30 to 90 days after the Treaty came into force—i. e. between July 1 and August 29, 1988—the state parties had the right to conduct OSI of all MOBs, support facilities (other than missile production facilities), and elimination facilities. The purpose of such “baseline inspections” was to confirm the numbers and locations of missiles, launchers, support equipment and structures specified in the MoU, and thus build confidence in the reliability of the basic data.³⁹

From 90 days after the Treaty’s coming into force, each state party had the right to conduct inspections of the elimination of MOBs and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities). Any such inspection had to be carried

35 PoE, IV. 3, V. 2.

36 INF Treaty, Art. X 8. Before the Treaty came into force, elimination of sites included in the MoU was possible without prior notification and on-site inspection. These sites were then subject to close-out inspections.

37 INF Treaty, Art. X 9.

38 INF Treaty, Art. XI 1–5, 7, 8.

39 INF Treaty, Art. XI 3.

out within 60 days of the scheduled date of the elimination of that MOB or facility, which had to be notified 30 days in advance.⁴⁰

Also from this 90-day mark, each state party had the right to conduct short-notice inspections at MOBs and support facilities (other than production and elimination facilities) to ascertain either the number of missiles, launchers and support equipment located there at the time of inspection, or to confirm the elimination of former MOBs and support facilities. This arrangement was set to last 13 years. During the first three of these years, each state party could conduct 20 short-notice inspections per calendar year; during the following five years 15 such inspections; and for the remaining five years, 10.⁴¹

2.4.2 General Procedures for OSI

In preparation for OSI, the state parties established and exchanged lists of certified aircrew members and inspectors. The lists were limited to a maximum of 200 individuals and notification of their names had to be made one day after the Treaty came into force. It was possible to amend the lists if one side refused to accept certain individuals, so long as this was done within the next 20 days. Within 30 days, individual visas had to be issued, granting the right of the listed inspectors and aircrew members to enter the territory to be inspected and remain there for the “in-country time” of the inspection. During this time, inspectors and aircrew members enjoyed special privileges and immunities.⁴²

Notification of intent to conduct an inspection had to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated arrival time at the point of entry (POE). The inspected country had to acknowledge the receipt of such a request within one hour of its transmission. In cases of inspections of the completion of elimination of missiles, launchers and support equipment at elimination facilities, or of the accidental loss or static display of such items, notifications had to be issued no less than 72 hours in advance of the expected arrival time at the POE.⁴³ The NRRC of the country to be inspected would then provide a flight plan enabling entry into its national airspace. This had to be done no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time of the inspection team from the last airfield outside the territory from which they were departing. The inspection team had to specify the inspection

40 INF Treaty, Art. XI 4; PoE II. 2.

41 INF Treaty, Art. XI 5.

42 PoI, III. 2–7, Annex.

43 PoI, IV. 1. The Point of Entry (POE) is the airport specified in PoI I. 7. where inspection teams would arrive before conducting an inspection. There were two POEs each for the USSR (Moscow, Ulan Ude) and the U. S. (Washington, D. C., San Francisco, Calif.) and one each for the seven basing countries.

site they had chosen to visit no less than four hours and no more than 24 hours after arrival at the POE.⁴⁴

At the POE, an escort team from the inspected country would meet the inspection team and aircrew, the latter consisting of no more than ten individuals. The equipment of the inspectors would be examined to ensure that it could not perform functions beyond those required for the inspection. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected country was obliged to provide logistics, transportation, security protection, and medical care for the inspection team and the aircrew, bearing all costs associated with these services.⁴⁵

The escort teams accompanied the inspection teams and aircrew throughout the in-country period and organized their in-country movements. Inspectors had to keep confidentiality on the information received during their inspections. They were not allowed to hamper operations at the inspected facilities unnecessarily and had to observe safety regulations. They did, however, have the right to stay in communication with their own embassy in the inspected country throughout the inspection period using telephone communications the host country provided.⁴⁶

Inspection teams were allowed to carry the documents that were needed for inspection purposes as well as cameras, linear measurers, portable weighing and radiation detection devices, and other equipment agreed on by the parties. Escort teams had the right to observe their use. Cameras were to be used only by the inspected party. At the request of the inspectors, the in-country escort team could take photographs of the inspected facilities using the camera systems of the inspection team. These systems were capable of producing duplicate, instant-development photographic prints, and each party had the right to receive a copy of every photograph.⁴⁷

Except in the case of missile production facilities, when the inspection team arrived at the inspection site, the pre-inspection briefings and safety-related procedures had to be completed within the first hour. Immediately afterwards, the inspection had to begin. It was not to go on longer than 24 hours (except for elimination and close-out inspections).⁴⁸ Inspection teams had the right to split into sub-groups, each having at least two inspectors. Within the team as a whole, at least two inspectors were required to speak the language of the inspected country.⁴⁹

44 PoI, IV. 2–4.

45 PoI, V. 1, 4–6.

46 PoI, VI. 2, 3, 5–7, 13.

47 PoI, VI. 9, 10.

48 INF Treaty, Art. XI 7, 8. Inspections could be extended by up to eight hours if the escort agreed. POI, VI. 14.

49 PoI, VI. 15.

2.4.2.1 “Base-line,” “close-out,” and “short-notice” inspections

The INF Treaty distinguished between types of inspection and laid down special provisions. Art. XI 3. covered the initial “base-line” inspections made to verify the validity of information exchanges. Art. XI 4. covered the “close-out” inspections which verified that elimination of MOBs and missile support facilities (except for missile production facilities) had taken place. And Art. XI 5. covered the short-notice inspections that had to be conducted in accordance with specified annual quotas.

In cases of “short-notice” inspections of MOBs and support facilities (other than elimination sites and missile production facilities) and cases of eliminated former MOBs and support facilities, no more than one inspection was permitted at any one time. With “base-line inspections,” no more than ten inspections could be conducted at any one time. The inspection teams were to have no more than ten inspectors each.⁵⁰

Within one hour of the inspection site being specified, the inspected country had to implement pre-inspection movement restrictions there and ensure that no missiles, launchers, and support equipment would be removed from it before the arrival of the inspection team. The inspection team had to arrive at the site within nine hours. During their inspection, they had the right to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying banned items and, by stationing inspectors at the exits, ensure that no such vehicle could leave without being inspected.⁵¹

Members of the escort team had duties too. When the inspectors arrived, they had to deliver a briefing on the number of missiles, stages, launchers, support structures, and equipment at the site and provide a site diagram indicating their locations. The inspectors had the right to inspect the entire inspection site within the boundaries declared by the MoU, including the interiors of structures, containers or vehicles, as well as covered objects that had dimensions equal or greater than the dimensions of the armaments and support equipment specified in the MoU. As for missiles, or launch containers that could contain them, only external visual observation and measuring of dimensions was allowed. In the case of large containers, visual observation of the interior and weighing were both permitted, to ascertain that they did not carry a missile or a missile stage. In the case of launch canisters for missiles not subject to the Treaty, the inspection team had the right to make external visual observations, take linear measurements, and use radiation detection devices.⁵² If covered or shrouded objects and spaces within structures were large enough to contain banned armaments and equipment, the inspected party had to demonstrate that they did not contain such items: they had to allow visual inspection inside an enclosed space from its entrance.⁵³

50 PoI, VI. 15, VII. 4.

51 PoI, VII. 1, 2, 11–13.

52 PoI, VII. 7–9, 11, 14.

53 PoI, VII. 10.

2.4.2.2 “Elimination” inspections

The Treaty covered elimination inspections in Art. XI 7. and Art. XI 8. The provisions in the first of these texts covered how, at elimination facilities, inspectors should verify the process of eliminating missiles (including the launching of IRM as a disposal method), and also the destruction of launchers and support equipment. The second covered inspections made to confirm the completion of elimination phases of missiles, launchers, support equipment, or training missiles and launchers.

The inspection teams were to have no more than 20 inspectors each. When they arrived to verify the elimination processes, they had to be provided with a schedule of elimination activities which they could compare with the data notified in advance. The inspectors then observed the specific procedures for the elimination, making sure they followed what was required by the Protocol on Elimination. If they found any deviations, they had the right to remind the in-country escort of the need for strict compliance. Completion of the elimination of each item had to be confirmed and registered in the inspection report.⁵⁴

When missiles were eliminated by means of launching, the inspectors had the right to ascertain the type of missile prepared for launch in a visual inspection, and could then observe the launch from a safe position. They might have to observe several launches from various locations.⁵⁵ When confirming that eliminations had taken place, the inspectors had the right to inspect the results, and ascertain that all processes had been carried out in compliance with the technical procedures set out in the Protocol on Elimination.⁵⁶

2.4.2.3 Ambiguities, post-inspection activities, inspection reports, and follow-up inspections

If ambiguities arose during an inspection, inspectors had the right to request clarifications. The in-country escort team then had to take action to remove the ambiguity during the inspection. If questions relating to an object located within the inspection site could not be resolved, the inspected party had to take a photograph in order to clarify its nature and function. If it was not possible to remove the ambiguity, the question, relevant clarifications, and a copy of any photograph taken had to be included in the inspection report. All measurements recorded during the inspections needed to be certified by both teams and included in the inspection record.⁵⁷

54 PoI, VI. 15, VIII. 1.

55 Ibid.

56 PoI, VIII. 2.

57 PoI, VI. 11, 12.

Upon completion of the inspection, post-inspection procedures including finalizing the inspection report had to be concluded at the inspection site within four hours. Within two hours after the end of the inspection the inspection team had to provide the in-country escort with a written report in English and Russian language. It contained the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages, launchers and support equipment observed and any recorded measurements, photographs and diagrams.⁵⁸

Inspection reports had to be factual. Inspection teams had the right to note ambiguities while inspected parties could include written comments. Both were required to resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the report and include relevant clarifications.⁵⁹ But neither the inspection nor the escort teams were entitled to evaluate compliance with Treaty provisions. Such assessment was reserved for governments.

In case of short-notice inspections, inspection teams had to return to the POE promptly upon completion of the post-inspection procedures and then leave the inspected country within 24 hours. Except for CPM inspections, inspection teams were entitled to conduct another inspection provided that the intent to carry out a follow-up inspection was duly notified, either after completion of post-inspection procedures or after the return of the inspection team to the POE.⁶⁰

2.5 On-site Inspections (OSI) in Basing Countries

The state parties to the INF Treaty had to conduct OSI in the basing countries as well as on each other's home territories. So agreement had to be made with these basing countries allowing inspections to be made on their territories in accordance with the Protocol of Inspection.⁶¹

On December 11, 1987, the United States concluded the INF Basing Countries Agreement with Belgium, the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK which sealed this agreement and assured that the basing countries would facilitate such inspections without assuming any obligations or rights deriving from the INF Treaty. The U. S. agreed to bear the full responsibility for Treaty implementation while respecting the basing countries' sovereign rights.⁶² Although the basing countries did not bear primary responsibility for the Treaty's implementation they became significantly involved and had to carry considerable burdens. The agreed obligations led to the establishment of additional organizational units in their armed forces and their Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

58 PoI, VI. 14, XI. 1.

59 PoI, XI. 1, 3, 4.

60 PoI, VI. 16.

61 INF Treaty, Art. XI 2; PoI II. 2.

62 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. I 1-5, VI 7.

Basing countries were obliged to establish communication channels and points of contact capable of receiving and acknowledging notification on a 24-hour continuous basis. They had to keep personnel available on short notice for in-country escorts, because both the aircrew of the inspected country and the escort team would need to include representatives of the basing country.⁶³ The inspected country had to notify the basing country when an inspecting country intended to conduct an inspection as soon as the request was received. The notification had to include the estimated date and time when the inspection team would arrive at the POE, the names of the aircrew and inspectors, and the flight plan. Basing countries retained control over their own airspace when guiding the aircraft of the inspecting country. Within 90 minutes of receipt of a flight plan, the basing country was required to provide its approval for the inspectors' plane to proceed to the POE.⁶⁴

Along with the escort team of the inspected country, basing countries had the right to escort the aircrew and inspection team of the inspecting country throughout their in-country presence. At POEs, they granted privileges and immunities to the inspectors and aircrew in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, waived customs duties, expedited customs processing requirements as to their equipment, and provided lodging and food.⁶⁵ The POEs themselves were determined by the basing countries and included in the Protocol on Inspections.⁶⁶ Basing countries also had the right to receive the list of aircrew members and inspectors provided by the inspecting party and, under certain circumstances, could even reject named individuals. In all other cases, they agreed to provide the necessary visas within 25 days of receipt of the initial lists.⁶⁷

No less than one hour before departure of the inspection team from the POE to an inspection site or from there to another inspection site, the inspected party had to inform the basing country. The authorities in the basing country would then take all the necessary steps, such as traffic control and safety and security measures, to enable the inspection and escort team to proceed expeditiously to the inspection site and arrive there within nine hours after its designation. While the routing of such travels remained the exclusive responsibility of the basing country, the mode of transportation was determined in consultation with the escort team. The basing country also had to assist in providing logistical support for the inspection team and two-way voice communication systems between the inspection site and the inspecting party's embassy.⁶⁸

63 PoI, VII. 3; Basing Countries Agreement, Art. II 12, III 1.

64 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. III 1, 2, IV 3, V 1.

65 *Ibid.*, Art. IV 4–7, V 2. “Diplomatic aircrew escorts” were assigned to embassies of the inspected country in the basing countries for escorting aircrews of the inspecting country, Art. II 7.

66 PoI, I. 7., see also right to change POEs in Basing Countries Agreement, Art. VI 5.

67 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. IV 1, 2, 4.

68 *Ibid.*, Art. III 3, V 3–5.

After completion of the inspection, the inspected country had to brief the basing country, should the latter so request. Coordination meetings between both sides were required to discuss implementation schedules and upcoming issues. The first of these had to take place five days after the Treaty came into force; others were expected five days after either side put in a request. For immediate handling of questions there were standing communication lines between the inspected country and the basing countries.⁶⁹

The INF Basing Countries Agreement was subject to national ratification procedures, which came into force at the same time as the INF Treaty and, like it, continued for a period of thirteen years—until 31 May 2001.⁷⁰

2.6 Continuous Portal Monitoring (CPM) and National Technical Means (NTM)

In addition to on-site inspections, each state party had the right to monitor the portals of certain missile support facilities continuously with technical sensors and observe their elimination processes through National Technical Means (NTM), such as photo-reconnaissance satellites.⁷¹ This was another way of verifying compliance with the Treaty provisions.

2.6.1 Resident On-site Inspections with Continuous Portal Monitoring (CPM)

From 30 days after the Treaty came into force, each state party had the right to monitor the other side's missile production facilities continuously to ensure that no new GLBM were being manufactured. This provision was to last for 13 years. Within six months of the Treaty coming into force, resident on-site inspection teams were posted at facilities where the final assembly of GLBM stages was carried out. They operated devices for continuous portal monitoring (CPM), and these included technical sensors. These were set up to detect stages that were outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM but were, in fact, not prohibited by the Treaty, for instance the Soviet SS-25 ICBM.

The provision covered facilities that had stopped production of existing types of GLBM before the Treaty came into force, and facilities that were still producing these stages that appeared so similar to the banned GLBM. However, if a party refrained from the final assembly of these look-alike stages for 12 consecutive months after the end of the second year of the Treaty's coming into operation, this provision ceased—unless a party restarted this kind of assembly at a later date.

69 Ibid, Art. VI 1–3, 6.

70 Ibid, Art. VII.

71 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6, XII 1.

Early on, the U.S. Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, and the Soviet Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt ASSR in the Russian SFSR were earmarked for CPM inspections.⁷²

For CPM inspections, the inspected country had to maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and designate a portal with no more than a single rail line and one road running in parallel, not more than 50 meters apart. All vehicles capable of containing an IRBM or the longest stage of this type of missile had to exit through this portal alone. Only two other exits from the inspection site were permitted, and these were monitored by technical sensors.⁷³

An inspection team of no more than 30 inspectors had the right to install CPM systems at the portal and additional exits, and carry out the necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems for all this to work. The systems could include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems such as photo and infrared cameras, dimensional measuring equipment to examine vehicle and missile stages, and non-damaging X-ray image-producing sensors for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers. Inspectors could use their own two-way radio communication systems and patrol the whole perimeter of the site.⁷⁴

At the expense of the inspecting party, the inspected party had to provide all the utilities needed for the construction and operation of the CPM system, including a center for data collection, at least two telephone lines, and high frequency radio equipment to enable the inspecting team to communicate with its embassy in the inspected country. The inspection team had the right to build up to three buildings outside the perimeter of the inspection site for their data center and team headquarters, plus an additional building for the storage of supplies and equipment.⁷⁵

Any shipment exiting through the portals of the site capable of containing an IRBM or the longest stage of one of these missiles had to be declared by the inspected party in advance, and that declaration had to be accompanied by a statement that the shipment contained no banned items. The inspection team had the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of suspect vehicles and railcars. When vehicles with the capability of carrying banned items exited the portals, the inspection team was entitled to inspect its interior or ensure by outside visual observation that no containers or shrouded objects contained an IRBM or its longest stage. Otherwise, the inspected party had to demonstrate fully that no such banned items were being carried.⁷⁶

If a vehicle exiting the portals was declared to contain missiles or stages as heavy, or heavier, than IRBM—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) for

72 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6.

73 PoI, IX. 1.

74 PoI, VI. 15, IX. 3, 4, 6 (b)-(d), 9.

75 PoI, IX. 6 (a), X. 5.

76 PoI, IX. 11, 13.

instance—the inspection team had to place measuring equipment outside the launch canister or shipping container and have this certified by the in-country escort. Inspection teams were allowed to view, weigh, and take measurements of the dimensions of suspect missiles and stages in launch canisters or shipping containers up to eight times per calendar year, in the presence of the escort team.⁷⁷

Within three days of the end of each month, the team leaders of CPM inspections had to provide their in-country escort with a written inspection report in English and in Russian. This had to be factual and had to include the number of vehicles leaving the inspection site declared to have contained a missile or stage as large, or larger than, and as heavy, or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a missile. The report had also to include details of any measurements taken of launch canisters or containers carried by the recorded vehicles, and the length and diameter of missile stages inspected through visual observation.⁷⁸

2.6.2 National Technical Means (NTM)

In addition to on-site inspections, reductions were certified through National Technical Means (NTM), in other words, by satellite observation. In this case, support structures eliminated *in situ* had to remain visible to NTM for six months after the notified date of completion or until an on-site inspection was done.⁷⁹ To ensure unhindered operation of NTM for verification purposes, the Treaty prohibited any interference with the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites and the impediment of such observation by concealment of missiles, launchers and support equipment. As such verification methods only applied to the INF elimination process, normal concealment practices within deployment areas associated with training, maintenance and operations, or the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers continued to be allowed.⁸⁰

So that they could distinguish between IRBM and strategic ballistic missiles with an intercontinental range (ICBM), parties could request the implementation of cooperative measures at specified deployment bases for road-mobile GLBM with a range capability in excess of 5,500 km, even when these bases were not former MOBs and were not subject to the INF Treaty elimination provisions. No later than six hours after such a request, the parties to whom a request was made had to open the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers at one specified deployment base and display the missiles or launchers kept there in the open, without resorting to concealment measures. The roofs had to be left open for 12 hours following the receipt of the request. Such cooperative measures could

77 PoI, IX. 14.

78 PoI, XI. 2.

79 PoE, IV. 1.

80 INF Treaty, Art. XII 1, 2.

be requested a maximum of six times per calendar year until a treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (START) came into force, but otherwise for no more than three years after the INF Treaty became operative.⁸¹

2.7 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) and Special Verification Commission (SVC)

The state parties to the INF Treaty agreed to use their Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) as continuous communication channels to exchange data and provide and receive the notifications and information required by the Treaty.⁸² Such centers, operating 24 hours every day, were established on September 15, 1987, on the basis of a bilateral agreement to keep permanent satellite communication links relating to impending ballistic missile launches, nuclear accidents, or naval incidents at sea.⁸³

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the parties established a Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC convened at the request of either of the parties and met regularly for several weeks per session in Geneva, Switzerland. It was tasked with resolving questions of compliance and agreeing on measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.⁸⁴ Even before the Treaty came into force, senior representatives of both verification agencies had held three bilateral technical talks in Washington, Moscow, and Vienna to discuss details relating to aircraft and crews, notification formats, inspection procedures, and CPM activities. These talks took place in the period from March to May 1988, and had reached an understanding about the interpretation of nine Treaty issues by mid-May. Once this had been achieved, formal diplomatic notes were exchanged, and these “diplomatic minutes” became part of the Treaty’s documents.⁸⁵ On December 20, 1988, a Memorandum of Understanding on procedures for SVC operations was signed.⁸⁶

81 INF Treaty, Art. XII 3.

82 INF Treaty, Art. XIII 2.

83 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology, <https://fas.org/nuk/control/inf/inf-chron.htm>.

84 INF Treaty, Art. XIII 1.

85 U.S. Department of State. *Diplomacy in Action. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. Treaty Between The United States of America And The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), Signed December 8, 1987*, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#diplomaticnotes>; Joseph P. Harahan, *On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty. A History of the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988–1991. Treaty History Series. Published by On-Site Inspection Agency, Washington, D. C. 1993, Chapter 2*, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/infbook/ch1a.html>.

86 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission, December 20, 1988.

On December 21, 1989, after gaining considerable experience with the operation of the Treaty and making steady improvement on a “provisional basis,” senior representatives of the SVC from the United States and the Soviet Union signed a Memorandum of Agreement, in Geneva, to enhance the implementation of the verification provisions of the Treaty. The Memorandum contained detailed clarifications concerning inspection notifications, refined or alternative methods of destruction, permitted radiation measuring devices, and CPM operations. Lists of clearance numbers, navigation equipment, air routes, and types of inspection aircraft appeared in annexes to the Memorandum, as did details of agreed inspection equipment, measurement devices, cameras, sensors, and detectors.⁸⁷

3. The Elimination and Verification Process of the INF Treaty 1988–2001

The elimination of thousands of missiles, stages, launchers and supporting structures and equipment within the three-year timespan stipulated by the INF Treaty, together with the proper verification of the process, posed a significant challenge in terms of resources, expertise and preparatory training. On-site inspections and escort activities covered five types of inspection in 130 Soviet inspection sites in the USSR, the GDR and ČSSR, and 31 U.S. inspection sites in the United States, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

The verification agencies were faced with the largest verification operations ever conducted up to that point in peacetime history. Their task required the exchange of thousands of notifications and information details, as they carried out hundreds of OSI at MOBs, support facilities, test sites, former production or assembly facilities, and elimination sites. The armories and equipment in these places contained thousands of items to be checked. After the INF Treaty came into effect, the exchanges of messages through the NRRCs multiplied dramatically as enormous quantities of INF-related notifications and information came to be communicated on a daily basis. In the first full year of the Treaty’s enforcement, the United States and the Soviet Union had the right to carry out more than 340 on-site inspections. More than 200 inspections had already been conducted by December 20, 1988.⁸⁸ The inspectors had to monitor and certify that elimination obligations had been fulfilled according to the timelines established.

87 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Geneva, December 21, 1989 (print July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium.

88 Harahan, *On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty*, Chapter 1, 3.

3.1 Organizational Aspects

On January, 15, 1988 President Reagan instructed Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci to establish the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) in Dulles International Airport outside Washington D.C., to implement the unprecedented inspection and escort obligations enshrined in the Treaty.⁸⁹ OSIA, with an annual budget of \$ 120 million, created two divisions with up to 200 experts and linguists for the conduct of inspections in the Soviet Union, the GDR and ČSSR, and for escorting Soviet inspection teams in the United States and in five European basing countries. There were also up to 200 people in the aircrews that were required. For portal monitoring in Votkinsk, USSR, OSIA set up a specific directorate: as teams of 30 inspectors had to be continuously present for 365 days a year, a larger pool of personnel was needed allowing for replacements in several shifts.

In addition, OSIA established field offices with escort teams at the two in-country POEs in Washington D.C. and San Francisco, California, one field office at the POE Frankfurt/Main, West-Germany for the five basing countries in Europe, and another field office in Tokyo, Japan for inspections in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. The field office in Frankfurt/Main was also used as a “gateway” for inspections in the western part of the Soviet Union through the POE in Moscow while inspections in the eastern part of the Soviet Union via POE Ulan Ude were dispatched from the Yokota Airbase, Tokyo. The State Department assigned an Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, a sub-unit to the POE Ulan Ude, and “diplomatic aircrew escort” units to embassies in the basing countries.⁹⁰ The U.S. Air Force, which operated the GLCM BGM-109G Tomahawk, and the U.S. Army, which held the GLBM Pershing II and Pershing IA, remained responsible for decommissioning, transporting and eliminating the missiles, launchers, support equipment and structures of these systems.

In the Soviet Union, preparations for the INF elimination process were organized in similar ways. The Soviet NRRC, which operated in the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, played a crucial role in the implementation of the Treaty. It was not only entrusted with the permanent and immediate communication of all INF-related information and notifications but also assumed the task of preparing and conducting all INF inspection and escort activities. While the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces that operated INF missiles were responsible for decommissioning, transporting and eliminating the missiles and associated equipment and structures, the NRRC coordinated all such Treaty-related operations, with the one exception of overseeing the CPM system at the missile production plant

89 National Security Decision Directive 296 of January 15, 1988, cited in: FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF).

90 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 1.

in Votkinsk, which was managed by the Ministry of Defense Industries.⁹¹ The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs established arms control implementation units in the Soviet embassy in Washington D. C. and in the consulate general in San Francisco.

After establishing the verification agencies in the two months preceding the coming into force of the Treaty, both sides conducted a series of mock inspections in the inspection sites they had in national territories and basing countries to establish the capabilities and routines needed to implement the verification provisions. Temporary housing quarters were built in Soviet and U. S. inspection sites in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union to accommodate the inspection teams.

3.2 INF Baseline Inspections

INF baseline inspections in 164 sites began on July 1, 1988, and lasted for 60 days up to August 29, 1988. Their purpose was to check and buildup trust in the reliability of the data exchange established in the MoU as of November 1, 1987 and the first update notification of July 1, 1988, according to which a total of 1,846 Soviet and 846 U. S. deployed and non-deployed missiles, launchers and support equipment had to be verified. The figures can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3: Items Checked in Baseline Inspections, July to August 1988.

	USSR	U.S.A
IR-GLBM	654 SS-20 149 SS-4 6 SS-5	234 Pershing II
IR-GLCM	80 SSC-X-4	443 BGM-109G
<i>Sum IR-INF</i>	889	677
SRBM	718 SS-12 239 SS-23	169 Pershing 1A
<i>Sum SR-INF</i>	957	169
Total INF missiles	1,846	846
Total INF launchers	825	289
Total Treaty-limited items	5,439	2,332

91 Ibid, Chapter 4.

These armaments and their items of support equipment were located, on the one side, at 130 dispersed Soviet inspection sites in the Soviet Union and in two of its basing countries, and, on the other side, in 31 more concentrated U.S. inspection sites in the United States and five of the U.S.'s basing countries. The update numbers communicated reflected corrections to the numbers contained in the data exchange of November 1, 1987, as the MoU had not at that time included U.S. elimination facilities and (using different counting criteria) had double-counted missile support facilities that were actually located at the same sites. The Soviet Union had established eight elimination sites; the United States, four.

Both state parties conducted baseline inspections at all MOBs and support facilities (except for production plants) between July 1 and August 29, 1988. Given the dispersal of all Treaty-limited armaments and equipment over approximately 160 sites, these sixty days were the most intensive ones during the whole elimination and verification process. The inspection teams sometimes had to conduct several consecutive inspections per week. All the inspection teams consisted of ten inspectors, including a team leader, a deputy team leader and two linguists.

OSIA had organized 20 inspection teams, which began activities via the POEs in Moscow and Ulan Ude on July 1, 1988, and which carried out 129 inspections by August 29. Sixteen of these inspections were counted as close-out inspections, as the inspected MOBs and facilities declared that they no longer had any missile systems, launchers, or associated equipment. On July 31, U.S. inspection teams had already conducted approximately 50 inspections in the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, a number that rose to 108 by August 18. By that time, an additional four elimination inspections at elimination facilities had been carried out while one larger team of resident inspectors had begun the CPM inspection at the Votkinsk missile production plant.⁹²

The Soviet Union also started inspections as soon as the baseline inspection period began, with 72 inspectors arriving at Travis AFB, California on July 1, 1988. These 72 consisted of five inspection teams with ten inspectors each for baseline inspections and one 22-person inspection team tasked with setting up the CPM system at Hercules Plant No. 1 in Magna, Utah. On July 4, Soviet inspectors started inspections in Europe with a baseline inspection of the BGM-109G Tomahawk MOB in Wüschheim and the Pershing II MOB in Schwäbisch Gmünd, both in West-Germany. By the end of July, Soviet inspection teams had inspected 13 U.S. MOBs and facilities in the United States and Western Europe, a number that had increased to 26 (out of a total of 30) by August, 18.⁹³

By the end of the baseline period on August 29, 1988, U.S. teams had inspected 79 Soviet INF MOBs, 19 missile and launcher storage facilities, 6 training facilities, 2 test ranges, 12 repair facilities, 3 production facilities, and 8 elimination facilities; while Soviet inspectors had conducted 31 baseline inspections of U.S. MOBs and missile support facilities. Special inspections by U.S. teams in six

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

Soviet elimination sites and by Soviet teams in three U.S. elimination sites took on the task of measuring and updating the length, width, height, and weight of all missiles subject to the Treaty. The data harvested in this way then became the standard for all subsequent inspections. Altogether, in the first 60 days of the Treaty's implementation, the U.S. Airforce flew 54 missions from Frankfurt to Moscow and 31 missions with 36 teams from Tokyo to Ulan Ude. If the in-country escort missions are included, the Military Airlift Command flew 185 INF teams on 114 baseline inspection missions.⁹⁴

The initial baseline inspections were crucial not only in establishing logistics, flight activities and numbers of personnel involved but, especially, in the operational and political impact they achieved. They could either establish trust in the reliability of data exchange or destroy the whole implementation process, which would then have severe political consequences during a critical time of détente. The outcome, however, was encouraging. Both sides were able and eager to put into practice the procedures that had been set out in the Protocol on Inspections. The inspection teams gained significant additional knowledge about each other's forces, operations and doctrines and friendly professional relations were built up between the inspectors and their escorts. In general, the inspection results confirmed the validity of the data exchanges of November 1, 1987, and July 1, 1988. Overall, there was a growth of trust not only in the viability of the Treaty's concepts but in how each side saw the other's intentions.

3.3 INF Continuous Portal Monitoring (CPM) Inspections

The aim of INF continuous portal monitoring (CPM) inspections was to verify that the parties to the Treaty stopped production of INF missiles. To that end, a U.S. resident on-site inspection team was stationed at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt ASSR in the Russian SFSR, and a Soviet team at the Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah. Inspections were scheduled to start 30 days after the Treaty came into force. Five months later, teams of up to 30 inspectors were entitled to buildup a CPM system with the assistance of the host state, so they could confirm that no new INF missiles were being produced.

Inspectors had to be stationed outside the periphery of the plant they were observing. Their task was to patrol the periphery, including the portals, and operate the required sensors at the permitted main portal and at two side portals. They were allowed to use approved sensors and non-damaging imaging (X-rays) to weigh, measure, and image rail cars and trucks large enough to contain an INF missile. Eight times a year, they also had the right to inspect containers or launch-canisters visually from inside. These had to be opened for that purpose by the inspected side. At no time did the inspectors have the right to enter the plant itself.

94 Ibid.

This last proviso was important because, in the Votkinsk production plant, the Soviet Union continued building missiles that were not subject to the Treaty, but were “outwardly similar to a stage of solid-propellant GLBM.”⁹⁵ At Votkinsk, the production of SS-20 IRBM and SS-12 and SS-23 SRBM had been stopped, while the final assembly of SS-25 ICBM continued. The second stages of both missile types were quite similar and their length differed by only a few centimeters. The Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, had produced Pershing II rocket motors from 1982 to 1987. Here too, an average of 400 to 500 vehicles entered and left every day.⁹⁶

Both sides had prepared extensive CPM systems during technical talks and mutual expert visits in the spring of 1988. They started to station inspectors and buildup such systems on July 2, 1988. Sensors, communication assets, headquarters and permanent residence equipment had to be flown in and then transported via rail and road. The U.S. chose to install non-damaging radiographic sensors (CargoScan) used together with infrared profilers to monitor road and rail traffic at the Votkinsk plant but relinquished weighing scales, which were also authorized by the Treaty. The Soviet Union did not install an imaging system at the Magna plant but did use road and rail weighing scales. However, it took more than a year for this equipment and the U.S. CargoScan sensors to be put in place, and initially inspections had to be carried out visually.⁹⁷ During the installation phase, these differences caused some controversies, since all equipment had to be approved by the inspected party. Furthermore, the U.S. used contractors (Hughes Technical Services) to operate and maintain the monitoring system in Votkinsk under the supervision of an OSIA site commander and his staff. Eventually, the INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement⁹⁸ of December 21, 1989, standardized the sensors and equipment that could be used for CPM inspections.

Despite this agreement, a major issue arose in February 1989 when the Soviet side voiced concerns about the operation of the CargoScan system at Votkinsk. The concerns related to magnetic tape storage, joint operations procedures, and X-ray safety procedures. In March, the crisis reached a nadir when the Soviet side declared that three cargo railcars leaving the plant and containing missile stages should be barred from U.S. cargo scanning because it had not yet been agreed that the CargoScan equipment was ready for use. The U.S. team was confined to visual and manual inspection only.

This incident at Votkinsk lasted from March 1 to March 9, 1989. The U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker, filed an official complaint with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze. Subsequently, the two sides sent expert delegations to Votkinsk to solve the issue. After five days of meetings, the delegations

95 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6 (a).

96 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 5.

97 Ibid.

98 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty.

“agreed to technical and operational steps that addressed Soviet concerns without altering Treaty provisions, while the Soviet side agreed that the CargoScan system could become operational.”⁹⁹ Once this issue had been resolved, CPM inspections were conducted in accordance with the agreed provisions and no further problems occurred throughout the period of operation, although inspection teams rotated several times.

Twenty-four-hour monitoring required dividing the teams into shifts and sub-groups to operate the CPM system, document and register data, patrol the perimeter and carry out headquarters tasks such as organizing daily work schedules, keeping up communications with embassies, and coordinating with escorts, using their own linguistic capabilities. All daily reports, including the acquired data, were compiled in monthly Portal Monitoring Inspection Reports, which were exchanged between both parties. Daily operations continued to be carried out smoothly until the regime was transformed into the Perimeter and Portal Control System of the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991.¹⁰⁰

3.4 INF Elimination Inspections

The objectives of the INF elimination inspections were to observe and confirm that all eliminations were carried out completely within the Treaty timelines and in accordance with the destruction or conversion provisions of the elimination protocol. The protocol distinguished between

- (1) OSI to monitor the elimination of fixed structures of MOBs and missile support facilities (excluding missile production facilities), that would be carried out *in situ* within 60 days after the scheduled date of that elimination;
- (2) OSI to monitor the elimination of IRM and SRBM, their launchers, and support equipment at *elimination facilities*, which had to be notified at least 30 days in advance;
- (3) OSI to monitor the elimination of IRM by *launching* within the first six months of the Treaty’s coming into force, which had to be notified at least 10 days in advance of the launching. The same rule applied for launches of research and development boosters.

The revised data exchange of July 1, 1988 specified eight Soviet and four U.S. elimination sites together with the designation of types and numbers of missiles that would be eliminated at each site.

The U.S. side declared that it would eliminate its 846 missiles at the following sites:

- 169 Pershing IA GLBM and a portion of the Pershing II GLBM stages at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas;

⁹⁹ Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 5.

¹⁰⁰ Pifer et al., The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, p. 21.

- another portion of the total of 234 Pershing II GLBM and selected Pershing II launchers at the Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado;
- the bulk of Pershing II launchers at the U.S. Army Equipment Maintenance Center (EMC) in Frankfurt-Hausen, West Germany;
- 443 BGM-109G GLCM and their launchers, operated by the U.S. Air Force, at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona.

The 1,846 INF missiles of the Soviet Union were eliminated at the following eight sites:

- the deployment areas at Kansk and Chita in the eastern USSR, which were used for the launch of 72 unarmed SS-20 GLBM, as the Treaty permitted this method for up to 100 IRBM within the first six months of its coming into force—i. e. up to December 1, 1988;
- the test range Kapustin Yar by the Caspian Sea and the elimination facility at Sarny, which served for the destruction of 582 SS-20 IRBM and support equipment by explosive demolition;
- the Lesnaya elimination facility for the destruction of 155 SS-4/-5 missiles and their support equipment;
- Jelgava, in the western part of the USSR, for the elimination of 80 non-deployed SSC-X-4 missiles and launchers;
- Saryozek in Kazakhstan for the elimination of 957 SS-12 and SS-23 SRBMs, which had to be destroyed within 18 months after the Treaty came into force—i. e. by December 1, 1989;
- the Stan'kovo elimination site in western USSR, more than 1,000 km distant from Saryozek, where transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles for SS-12 and SS-23 SRBM were destroyed.

Operational parity had to be maintained in the numbers of deployed IRM warheads during the destruction process, and this required coordination of the withdrawal and elimination schedules. Within 29 months after the Treaty's coming into force, both sides had to reduce their IRM launchers so that no side could field more than 171 deployed IRM warheads.¹⁰¹ Thus, by November 1, 1990, the Soviets were allowed to deploy no more than 57 SS-20 IRBM, each carrying three warheads, while the U. S. still had carte blanche to field all 120 Pershing II in Europe, since they carried one warhead only. In reality by that time, however, the U.S. had reduced the number of Pershing II IRBMs stationed in West-Germany down to 66 missiles.¹⁰²

Disparity of SRBM numbers—957 deployed and non-deployed Soviet SS-12 and SS-23, as opposed to 169 non-deployed U.S. Pershing IA—also implied that the Soviet Union had to eliminate missiles at much higher destruction rates than

101 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a).

102 See Memorandum, February 1, 1988, in: AAPD 1988, Doc. 46, p. 260. However, the memo, does not mention the 12 “non-deployed” Pershing IIs in Weilerbach.

the U.S. This appeared to be so right up to December 1, 1989, the date when the elimination of all SRBMs had to be completed.

All eliminations were monitored and certified by inspection teams consisting of up to 20 persons. Inspected parties had to notify eliminations, at latest, 30 days before initiation; inspecting parties had to notify the arrival of inspection teams no later than 72 hours in advance. The inspectors had the right to stay in the inspection site and observe the elimination process up to the scheduled time of its completion and the certification of results in the inspection reports. On average, scheduled elimination processes in elimination facilities lasted for ten days.

The U.S. started the elimination of 169 Pershing IA SRBM on September 8, 1988 with the destruction of the first Pershing IA at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas. The last Pershing IA was destroyed on July 6, 1989. Destruction of Pershing IA launchers began in December 1988 at the Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado, and was completed by July 1, 1989. Elimination of Pershing II GLBM missile stages was carried out at the Pueblo Depot Activity too, and the last Pershing II missile stages were destroyed there on May 6, 1991. In October 1988 elimination of Pershing II launchers started at EMC Hausen in West Germany. The last Pershing II launcher in Europe was destroyed there on April 16, 1991.

The elimination of the 443 BGM-109G GLCM, launch canisters and launchers began in October 1988 at the Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, Arizona, and proceeded at a rate of approximately 40 systems per month. The last U.S. GLCM was destroyed on May 1, 1991. GLCM and Pershing II deployed in MOBs in Western Europe had to be removed in operational units—GLBM batteries and GLCM flights—and be withdrawn to elimination sites within 25 days. Getting them to these sites included withdrawal from operational status, transport via road and rail through Germany and then by airlift from Frankfurt, Stuttgart or Ramstein AFB to the U.S., and finally again by road and rail.

All 169 Pershing IA SRBM were eliminated in the first Treaty year, and the elimination rates shown in Table 4 were achieved for the 234 Pershing II GLBM and the 443 BGM-109G GLCM.¹⁰³

Table 4: Elimination Rates for Pershing II GLBM and BGM-109G GLCM.

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91
234 Pershing II	34	72 (106)	128 (234)
443 GLCM	130	90 (220)	223 (443)
677 IR-INF	164	162 (322)	351 (677)

Cumulative numbers in brackets

103 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 6; on the chronology of elimination see also FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology, <https://fas.org/nuk/control/inf/inf-chron.htm>.

The Soviet side began eliminations at the Kapustin Yar missile test range with the demolition of an SS-20 IRBM by explosion. Then 72 SS-20 missiles were destroyed by launch from the Chita and Kansk MOBs in the fall of 1988. On August 1, 1988, the first SS-12 SRBM was destroyed at Saryozek, again by explosion. The last SS-23 was destroyed on July 25, 1989. The SS-12 and SS-23 launchers and support equipment were destroyed at Stan'kovo elimination site before November 1, 1989, ahead of schedule. The last SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were eliminated at Lesnaya May 22, 1990 and August 16, 1990.

The USSR started eliminations during the baseline inspection phase with enormous speed. This was because it had to cope with a much higher number of items to destroy than the U.S., in particular its large arsenal of SRBMs. Already by the end of the first Treaty year, it had destroyed almost one-third of its SS-20, all SS-4 and SSC-X-4 and 83 per cent of SS-12 SRBM. On May 12, 1991, the last SS-20 IRBM was destroyed in Kapustin Yar.

In sum, the Soviet side achieved the elimination rates shown in Table 5.¹⁰⁴

Table 5: Elimination Rates for Soviet INF.

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91
654 SS-20	192	262 (454)	200 (654)
149 SS-4	149	0 (149)	0
6 SS-5	1	5 (6)	0
80 SSC-X-4	80	0 (80)	0
<i>Total IR-INF</i>	<i>422</i>	<i>267 (689)</i>	<i>200 (889)</i>
718 SS-12	600	118 (718)	0 (718)
239 SS-23	0	239 (239)	0 (239)
<i>Total SR-INF</i>	<i>600</i>	<i>357 (957)</i>	<i>0 (957)</i>

Cumulative numbers in brackets

By May 31, 1991, all eliminations required by the INF Treaty had been carried out in compliance with Treaty provisions and ahead of timelines. By that time, more than 400 on-site inspections by OSIA and 230 on-site inspections by the Soviet NRRC had been conducted.

104 Ibid.

3.5 INF Close-out Inspections

INF close-out inspections in both elimination facilities and the fixed structures of MOBs and support facilities had to be carried out, once elimination was declared completed at these sites. These inspections were tasked with certifying that all elimination obligations had been fulfilled and that the site under observation was indeed closed. The inspected parties had to show that they had removed all INF missiles, launchers and associated equipment from that facility, had ceased any INF related activities there, and had dismantled, destroyed, or converted to other purposes all support facilities such as missile and launcher structures or launch pads. The sites could be accepted as closed after their on-site inspection had certified that this had been achieved, or after 60 days had elapsed from the closure declaration.

All declared inspection sites had to be closed within three years of the Treaty going into operation—at the latest by 31 May, 1991. If parties to the Treaty declared that certain sites had already fulfilled such requirements before the Treaty came into force, baseline inspections could be counted as close-out inspections. Both the U. S. and the Soviet Union had prepared a number of INF sites for elimination in advance. The presence of MOBs and facilities without listed missiles and support equipment in the MoU data update explain why close-out inspections had already started during the baseline inspection phase in the summer of 1988.

Among the first close-out inspections was one at the M. I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant in Sverdlovsk where the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM had been produced, but where production had ceased prior to the Treaty's coming into force. Similarly, the V. I. Lenin Heavy Machine Building Plant in Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan, had terminated production of SS-23 missiles prior to that date. Two U. S. inspection teams carried out close-out inspections in both facilities as early as July 17 and July 21, 1988. They confirmed that missile production had indeed ceased. At the same time, another U. S. team traveled to the Soviet SS-12 MOB at Hranice in the ČSSR, where Soviet missiles had already been withdrawn in March 1988. The Soviet escort team included representatives of the host country, following bilateral agreements the Soviet Union had concluded with both the ČSSR and the GDR.¹⁰⁵ Altogether OSIA carried out 16 close-out inspection during the baseline inspection period.

The Soviet side conducted five close-out inspections during this period. They began on July 3, 1988 with the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, a former test range for GLCMs, and the Air Force Plant 19 in California, a former production plant for GLCM launchers. More inspections followed on August 4, 1988 at the Missile Test Range Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and the Martin

105 Harahan, *On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty*, Chapter 7; see also *FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology*.

Marietta Pershing IA Launcher Production Facility in Middle River, Maryland. In the summer of 1988, a Soviet team inspected the BGM-109G GLCM MOB in Woensdrecht in the Netherlands, where no missiles, launchers and support equipment had been reported in the MoU or the data update of June 1, 1988.

After the initial baseline period, another phase of routine close-out inspections started up, following the process of gradual elimination of MOBs and support facilities in accordance with the timelines specified in the Treaty. Thus in the first 90 days after the Treaty came into force, all deployed SRBM SS-12 and SS-23 and all SRBM launchers had to be withdrawn from 18 MOBs under Soviet control—11 in the Soviet Union, six in the GDR, and one in Czechoslovakia—and be taken to elimination sites. Within 12 months all non-deployed SRBM from other facilities had to go to their elimination sites. The process of SRBM elimination had to be concluded within the next 18 months, i. e. by December 1, 1989. Subsequently, SRBM MOBs and support facilities were successively closed-out. In parallel, all SS-4 and a number of SS-20 MOBs were closed while the last SS-20 MOBs were eventually eliminated in the last six months of the total elimination period.

In Europe, the sequence of closure of U. S. MOBs followed the still unfinished build-up of their operational status. It started with Woensdrecht in the Netherlands, where no GLCMs (BGM-109G Tomahawk) were yet stationed. The U. S. Air Force had only just begun to deploy GLCMs in MOB Molesworth in the UK when the Treaty came into force, and this base was scheduled for closure in the fall of 1988 with an official notification in December. A Soviet inspection was carried out there on January 19, 1989. Similarly, in MOB Florennes in Belgium, the stationing of GLCM had not been completed in the summer of 1988. Consequently, withdrawal of its missiles started in the fall and was accomplished by December 13, 1988. A Soviet close-out inspection on March 10, 1989, certified the closure of the base.¹⁰⁶

In contrast, all three Pershing II MOBs (initially 120 missiles) in West Germany remained active throughout the first two years of the Treaty's operations in order to maintain the parity in warhead delivery capabilities stipulated in the Treaty.¹⁰⁷ Also still active in the second Treaty year were: the large GLCM (BGM-109G Tomahawk) MOBs at Greenham Common, in the UK (initially 101 missiles, 29 launchers); at Comiso in Italy (initially 108 missiles, 31 launchers) and at Wüschheim, West Germany (initially 62 missiles, 31 launchers), as well as support facilities in Weilerbach and Frankfurt-Hausen, West Germany, and at Grosselies, Belgium.

Between June and December 1990 the three sites at Groselies, Belgium, and Wüschheim and Waldheide-Neckarsulm, West Germany were declared closed and were inspected. The remaining 21 U. S. INF sites, including the MOBs at

106 *Ibid.*

107 The West German Foreign Office noted on February 1, 1989, that by December 31, 1988, the U. S. had withdrawn 27 Pershing II from the FRG and 64 GLCM from Belgium, Italy, and the UK. Cf. AAPD 1989, Doc. 12, Anm. 7, p. 54.

Greenham Common, U. K., Neu-Ulm and Schwäbisch-Gmünd, West Germany, along with the support facilities in Weilerbach and Frankfurt-Hausen, West Germany, were closed between December 1990 and May 1991.

Though, in late April and May 1991, both sides made declarations that the last remaining INF MOBs and support facilities had been closed, close-out inspections were still conducted throughout the summer and up to August of that year. The closure of 31 U. S. and 133 Soviet¹⁰⁸ former INF sites was confirmed by close-out inspections in the sequence shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Confirmed Closed INF Sites.

	1 st Treaty Year 1988/89	2 nd Treaty Year 1989/90	3 rd Treaty Year 1990/91
31 U.S sites	7	0	24
133 Soviet sites	50	36	47

Closure of INF bases could include conversion to either civilian or alternative military purposes. Thus, a number of Soviet MOBs were converted to missile operation bases for mobile SS-25 ICBM which later became subject to START I agreements. They could still be inspected regularly by short-notice inspections which lasted up to May 2001.

3.6 INF Short-notice Inspections

INF short-notice inspections at MOBs and missile support facilities (excluding missile production and elimination facilities) could be made “anytime, anywhere.” The purpose of such non-scheduled monitoring was so that the state parties could ascertain that each side was abiding by the Treaty obligations. The Treaty laid down that short-notice inspections could begin 90 days after it came into force—i. e. on August 30, 1988—and that this arrangement would last for 13 years, up to May 31, 2001. Each state party had an annual inspection quota: 20 short-notice inspections during the first three years (up to May 31, 1991); 15 during the subsequent five years; and 10 for the five years after that.

Short-notice inspections had to be notified no less than 16 hours prior to the arrival of the 10-person inspection team at the POE. There, the inspection team had to specify the inspection site they were intending to visit within 4 to 24 hours of their arrival. The inspected party then had the obligation to transport the

108 The MoU of November 1, 1987, still contained 133 Soviet INF bases and facilities some of which were collocated. They were subsequently reduced to 130 sites by the update of July 1, 1988.

inspection team to the selected site within nine hours. The inspection would last for 24 hours, which could be exceeded by a maximum of eight hours if both team chiefs agreed on it. Inspection results had to be certified in inspection reports. After May 31, 1991, the only purpose of short notice inspections was to confirm that former INF MOBs and support facilities were indeed closed and that no new INF-related activities had been resumed there.

Short-notice inspections began during the elimination period that started in September 1988, but, as some former Soviet INF SS-20 MOBs were converted to operating bases for SS-25 ICBMs, such sites were of particular interest to U.S. inspection teams *after* the end of the elimination period. Distinguishing SS-20 and SS-25 missiles, which had outwardly similar stages, required special verification techniques. As the SS-25 carried one warhead while the SS-20 had carried three, one particular measurement was to gauge the differences in radiation the two types of missile emitted. Radiation detection equipment had been agreed in the Memorandum of Agreement of December 1989. Random sampling by visual observation of the interiors of one-launch canisters was used to strengthen verification.

Since many short-notice inspections were made to former missile bases in Europe, the verification agencies of the basing countries there continued to be involved in escorting Russian or U.S. inspections right up to May 2001. After Germany's unification on October 3, 1990, the German verification agency had to escort both Soviet and U.S. inspection teams, since both sides had based MOBs and support facilities on German territory. The German Armed Forces Verification Center, located in Geilenkirchen, registered a total of 74 inspections conducted in the 12 INF sites in Germany between 1989 and 1998.¹⁰⁹ The bulk of these were carried out between the summer of 1989 and May 1991. Subsequently, eleven of these sites were converted to civilian uses. When the INF verification regime ceased to exist on May 31, 2001, an illustrated volume was distributed to the INF state parties documenting what former INF sites in Germany had been turned into.

Throughout its existence between 1988 and 2001 the short-notice on-site inspection regime proved to be a valuable, additional and lasting tool for monitoring compliance with the INF Treaty. It complemented—and outlived—baseline, elimination, and close-out inspections. During the time of its implementation no major problems were recorded.

109 Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, Jahresbericht Implementierung von Rüstungskontrollabkommen durch die Bundeswehr im Jahre 2001, BMVg FüS III 5, Berlin, July 2, 2002, p. 45.

4. Conclusions

In the three years from when the INF Treaty came into force—the years beginning in June 1988 and ending in May 1991—the United States and the Soviet Union eliminated a whole class of land-based, nuclear-capable intermediate-, medium- and shorter-range missiles and launchers, along with their support equipment and structures in accordance with the Treaty's provisions. They destroyed a total of 2,692 missiles, 1,114 launchers, and 7,771 other pieces of equipment that were prohibited by the Treaty and eliminated 161 missile operating bases and support facilities in the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.

This process was verified by more than 630 on-site inspections of five different types, including the stationing of resident inspection teams tasked with continuous monitoring of the periphery and portals of missile production plants. Verification was complemented by “cooperative measures” that permitted the use of National Technical Means of verification, managed without interference or concealment. Thousands of information details and notifications were exchanged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of both sides and several thousand inspectors, escorts, staff and aircrews were involved in the process along with the military and civilian personnel who operated the missile bases, and support and elimination facilities. Special new arms control agencies were set up, and existing risk reduction organizations expanded.

The INF elimination and verification process was unprecedented in peacetime history up to that point. The successful implementation of rather complex elimination and verification provisions, hitherto conceptualized only in studies and at the negotiation table, proved that such rules were feasible and viable in practice. They provided a cooperative control mechanism by which the opposing sides could assure each other of compliance with Treaty provisions to a very high degree of reliability. Thus, the implementation of the INF Treaty marked a turning point, shifting the superpowers' stances from confrontation to security cooperation. This shift constituted a crucial milestone on the way to ending the Cold War. Implementation of the Treaty demonstrated the intent and political resolve of governments to solve security problems cooperatively, and to reduce offensive military capabilities on the basis of parity of remaining armaments rather than on parity of reductions. In this way, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for further arms control treaties. In particular, it was the precedent on which the reduction and verification provisions of the bilateral START Treaty (including its Periphery and Portal Control System) were built; and, then again, it lay behind those of the multilateral CFE Treaty. In consequence, regular information exchanges and notifications, on-site inspections, observation of large military exercises, and observation flights became a weekly routine.

Based on the “Presidential Initiatives” of 1991/92 the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation carried out large-scale reductions of “tactical

nuclear weapons” (TNW) and withdrew them from European basing countries without legally binding treaties. By October 17, 1991, the United States had reduced its TNW in Europe from a peak of 7,400 amassed during the Cold War to a remaining figure of 400 to 600 gravity bombs.¹¹⁰ All ground-launched short-range missiles with ranges below 500 km and nuclear artillery shells were withdrawn and destroyed. Similarly, the Russian Federation withdrew TNW from basing countries and former Soviet Republics, destroying a large portion and keeping the remainder in centralized storage sites. These processes were completed in the summer of 1992.

The European basing countries eliminated their national SRBMs too. The last German Pershing IA missile was decommissioned on October 4, 1990—just one day after Germany’s unification and only a few days after the last U.S. INF missile had left Europe. The last of the 24 former GDR SS-23 was destroyed on November 14, 1991. The remaining SS-23 of the Czech Republic were destroyed in 1996, those of Slovakia in October 2000, and those of Bulgaria in October 2002.¹¹¹

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the INF Treaty became a multilateral agreement to include the USSR’s successor states—the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan—as INF bases and support facilities had been stationed on their territories.¹¹² The former Soviet Republics agreed to continue the INF on-site inspection regime. With the consent of the other parties, however, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not take part in the meetings of the Special Verification Commission (SVC). On November 31, 1994, representatives of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed a formal agreement to continue implementing the INF Treaty.¹¹³

The on-site inspection regime of the INF Treaty ended on May 31, 2001. After that date, parties could still convene the SVC, but they had no verification tools other than National Technical Means (NTM). While early official assessments in the United States were confident that U.S. intelligence was in a position to cope with that task,¹¹⁴ other assessments stressed that information gained by intelligence sources needed to be analyzed and judged in accordance with the pre-

110 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology.

111 Ibid; see also Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance*, <https://www.armscontrol.org>.

112 The Baltic States were not considered to be “successor states” of the Soviet Union and, therefore, did not become state parties to the INF Treaty although several INF sites had been based on their territories.

113 Daryl Kimball, Kingston Reif. Arms Control Association. *U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance. Fact Sheets&Briefs* (updated February 2019), p. 4, <https://www.armscontrol.org>.

114 United States Information Service. Press Section: Document Defense Policy. Senate Committee Finds INF Verification Feasible (Text: Boren report summary on verification), March 23, 1988, Embassy of the United States, Stockholm (EUR-207, 03/22/88).

vailing political climate.¹¹⁵ After 2014, when the United States and Russia began to accuse each other of Treaty violations, there was no cooperatively acquired database for clarification of ambiguities. The powers were unable to revive either a suitable verification regime or a new Memorandum of Agreement capable of defining criteria for new systems permitted by the Treaty while others remained banned. On August 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty. The Russian Federation followed suit and the Treaty ceased to exist.

115 Amy F. Woolf, *Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control*. Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress 7-5700, December 23, 2011, p. 5, 8, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41201.pdf>.

Oliver Bange

A Swan Song

The INF Treaty and Europe's Security Architecture, 1987–2019

The life-span of the INF Treaty is remarkable: it lasted for over three decades. When the Treaty was signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, it was under a lucky star. Or so it seemed at the time. President Reagan's wife, Nancy, had her personal astrologist check on the date originally envisaged for the signature in late November 1987. The astrologist foresaw a much more promising constellation of stars several days later, so the Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987, at 13:45 hrs, in Washington D. C.¹

Over the following months and years the INF treaty did indeed prove to be a success. Both the U.S. and the USSR were quick to dismantle their INF systems—Cruise Missiles, Pershing II missiles, and SS-20 missiles²—according to the agreed timetable. The INF Treaty survived even when, first, the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR dissolved in 1991. A control and inspection regime was installed which now also covered the successor states of the Soviet Union in addition to the Russian Federation, which remained in control of the former USSR's nuclear stockpile.³ Under the INF Treaty the Special Verification Commission (SVC) undertook arms control and verification missions in four of the twelve USSR successor states—Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus—while in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan only one installation under the INF Treaty had existed anyway. On-site inspections ended only in 2001, when the means of control and verification changed to satellite information.

The years between 1986 and 1994 saw the formation of a new security architecture in Europe, and the bilateral INF Treaty became an integral part of this

- 1 See the memoirs of President Reagan's White House Chief of Staff about the influence of the Reagans' personal astrologer on the President's agenda: Donald Regan, *For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington*, San Diego 1988, for example pp. 3–5, 70–74, 300 f., 344, 367–370. For the anecdote above, see Joan Quigley, "What Does Joan Say?" *My Seven Years as White House Astrologer to Nancy and Ronald Reagan*, New York 1990; George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, p. 1005; Colin Powell, *Mein Weg*, Munich 1995, p. 376.
- 2 For the development and deployment history of these systems, see Oliver Bange, *SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East–West relations*, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), *The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s*, New York 2020, pp. 70–86.
- 3 Mariana Budjeryn and Steven E. Steiner, *Forgotten Parties to the INF*, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/forgotten-parties-to-the-inf> (accessed May 10, 2020).

predominantly multilateral framework. In 1986 the Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe triggered the so-called Stockholm process (so called because the agreement was signed in the Swedish capital).⁴ Its stipulations included: prior announcement of military maneuvers, a limitation on the number of soldiers participating in these exercises, an invitation for observers, to witness, a right for them to inspect military units of other signatories, and an obligation to exchange information on dislocation and doctrines. These were supported by many other instruments meant to create transparency, and thus confidence in the non-aggressive postures of either side.⁵

The years 1989–1991 were full of epochal events: the implosion of Communist rule in most Central and East European states in 1989, Germany's reunification in 1990, and then the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR in 1991. All these turns were accompanied by new instruments for arms control and disarmament. These included the various treaties regulating the long withdrawal of the Soviet (later Russian) armed forces from the territory of their former allies in the Warsaw Pact,⁶ the outcomes from the Summit of Paris, including the Charter of Paris for a New Europe⁷ and the Treaty on (the reduction of) Conventional Forces in Europe.⁸ Furthermore the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on intercontinental nuclear systems⁹ was made, along with various directives from the U.S.

4 Oliver Bange and Karl-Heinz Lutz, *Ohne Öffentlichkeit keine Vertrauensbildung. Deutsche Medien und deutsche Armeen im KVAE-Prozess*, in: Heiner Möllers and Jörg Jacobs (eds.), *Bundeswehr und Medien. Ereignisse—Handlungsmuster—Mechanismen in jüngster Geschichte und heute*, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 219–248. Josef Holik, *Die Rüstungskontrolle. Rückblick auf eine kurze Ära*, Berlin 2008, pp. 45 f. For the term itself, see for example West German reports and analyses of the Stockholm negotiations such as telegram No. 274, Stockholm, September 22, 1986, from Ambassador Citron; and the memorandum from Hartmann, head of the conventional Disarmament Unit in the German Foreign Office, Berlin, September 30, 1986. Both in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1986*, Munich 2017, Doc. 253 and 267.

5 For the far-reaching vision of Willy Brandt with regard to a new security structure in Europe, see Oliver Bange, *Conceptualizing “Common Security”—Willy Brandt’s Vision of Trans-bloc Security and Its International Perception, 1981–1990*, in: Bernd Rother and Klaus Larres (eds.), *Willy Brandt and International Relations—Europe, the USA, and Latin America, 1974–1992*, London 2019, pp. 143–160. For a collection of contemporary personal experiences in arms control measures, see Guntram König (ed.), *Kontrollierte Feindschaft—Manöverbeobachtungen und Inspektionen 1987–1990*, Aachen 2011.

6 Oliver Bange, *Die Sicherheitspolitik Moskaus und der Stationierungsalltag in der DDR. Vorgeschichte und Beginn des Abzugs von 1983 bis 1991*, in: Museum Berlin-Karlshorst e. V. (ed.), *Der Abzug. Die letzten Jahre der russischen Truppen in Deutschland. Eine fotografische Dokumentation von Detlev Steinberg*, Berlin 2016, pp. 37–55.

7 For the Charter of Paris, November 21, 1990, see *Europa-Archiv* 1990, pp. D 656–664.

8 For the CFE Treaty of November 19, 1990, see <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/index.html> (accessed June 20, 2020).

9 For the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991, see <https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

President on tactical nuclear weapons, and the Treaty on Open Skies allowing for unarmed surveillance flights over the territories of signatory states.¹⁰

The capstone of this dynamic was the unanimous decision made in 1994 to institutionalize the so-called “Helsinki process.”¹¹ Back in 1975 in Finland’s capital, all the European states (with the exception of Albania) had, together with the U.S. and Canada, signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) in Europe. Its four “baskets” included instruments to improve economic exchange, human rights, and access to information; also measures for a peaceful solution to conflicts (including “peaceful change of frontiers,”¹² which would become the reference point for Germany’s reunification process) along with those for improving political relations. Military détente¹³ and cooperation received relatively little space in the final document, but several codes of behavior mentioned in the list of principles also applied to military policies, as did the call for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). While back in 1975 these last were framed in rather general, non-obligatory language, the CBMs—or CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures) as they were called later—took on a dynamic of their own within the Stockholm process.

This process was capped in 1994 by the decision of the CSCE conference in Budapest to turn the rather loose set of follow-up meetings into one permanent organization—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since then, the OSCE has formed the world’s largest security-oriented multilateral organization, mandated by its 57 participating and 11 partner states with arms control, the promotion of human rights, and monitoring the freedom of the press and fair elections. Almost 3,500 people work for the OSCE today at its various institutions and in its secretariat in Vienna. For most of the post-Cold War years the OSCE has formed an umbrella framework for the various aspects of Europe’s security architecture—sometimes inspecting and controlling the implementation of treaties, sometimes providing a useful platform for discussing wider issues at stake. As, for many years thereafter, security and military issues were widely seen as somewhat non-pressing items on the European agenda, the OSCE remained out of the spotlight of the public media until fairly recently.

With the crisis in Ukraine, Russia’s occupation of the Crimea 2014, and a new military buildup in Europe, the OSCE once again found itself in the center of the security–political dynamics of the continent and the ensuing efforts at pacification, arms control, and verification. On March 21, 2014, following a request by

10 For the Open Skies Treaty of March 24, 1992, see the FAS Fact Sheet, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/os/index.html> (accessed May 10, 2020).

11 Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect. International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*, Princeton 2001.

12 Gottfried Niedhart and Oliver Bange (eds.), *Helsinki and the Transformation of Europe*, New York 2008; Gottfried Niedhart, *Ostpolitik. Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change*, in: *Cold War History* 18/3 (2016), pp. 14–59.

13 Stephan Kieninger, *Dynamic Détente. The United States and Europe, 1964–1975*, Lanham 2016, pp. 103–158.

the Ukraine government, and after agreement by the 57 participating states in the organization, the OSCE Council decided to send a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of unarmed civilian observers to Eastern Ukraine. At its height the SMM consisted of 700 unarmed civilian monitors from 40 OSCE member-states.¹⁴ The mission was intended to be an interlocutor between all parties in the conflict, and a neutral source of information about incidents on the ground. In January 2020, after the at least atmospherically successful readoption of the so-called “Normandy format” in Paris the previous December (consisting of the Ukrainian, Russian, German, and French heads of government),¹⁵ Kiev even asked the OSCE to expand its Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine.¹⁶

However, the crisis in Ukraine also showed up the limitations of the OSCE instruments, originally geared towards the prevention of military crises in the region. Combined with the end of the INF Treaty, and in many ways linked to it, this might well herald the end of the security architecture of the Helsinki system. It is doubtful if the Helsinki system will be replaced by a “Yalta 2” system, dominated by Russia and the U.S., as has been repeatedly called for by Moscow.¹⁷

Precisely because many of the links between the INF Treaty and the Helsinki/OSCE system from the years 1987–1994 are still valid today, the end of the INF Treaty may well serve as a catalyst to trigger a negative domino effect amongst the other security and arms control treaties mentioned above. It therefore seems appropriate to consider in some detail the aspects that linked the INF Treaty to the wider, predominantly multilateral security issues in Europe.

14 OSCE (ed.), OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine: The Facts, Geneva, December 2016, <https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879?download=true> (accessed May 10, 2020).

15 Ergebnisse bei Gipfel in Paris: Ukraine und Russland einigen sich auf Truppenabzug und Waffenstillstand, in: Der Tagesspiegel, December 10, 2020, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ergebnisse-bei-gipfel-in-paris-ukraine-und-russland-einigen-sich-auf-truppen-abzug-und-waffenstillstand/25316996.html> (accessed May 10, 2020).

16 Kyiv Asks OSCE To Expand Ukraine Monitoring Mission, in: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 20, 2020, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyiv-asks-osce-to-expand-ukraine-monitoring-mission/30387572.html> (accessed May 10, 2020). The first meeting in the “Normandy format” took place on June 6, 2016 on the occasion of the D-Day commemorations in Northern France. There have been nine meetings in this format since.

17 Pavel Felgenhauer, Russia Proposes a Yalta-2 Geopolitical Tradeoff to Solve the Ukrainian Crisis, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor 12/26 (February 26, 2015), <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-proposes-a-yalta-2-geopolitical-tradeoff-to-solve-the-ukrainian-crisis/> (accessed May 10, 2020). Frida Ghitis, Putin wants Yalta 2.0 and Trump may give it to him, in: CNN, January 27, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/opinions/putin-wants-yalta-2-0-and-trump-may-give-it-to-him-ghitis/index.html> (accessed May 10, 2020).

1. The INF Treaty: The Implementation Issue— and What it Meant for the Two Germanies as Non-Signatory States to the Treaty

The key to the impact of the INF Treaty on the course of events during the last years of the systemic conflict between East and West was the way in which it was implemented, and the stringency of that implementation. It meant the abolition of 846 missiles on the U. S. side and 1846 missiles on the Soviet side to be achieved by the end of May 1991. The dismantling and destruction of the missiles of either side was to be controlled by its opposite number.¹⁸

However, many U.S. INF-systems were stationed on West German territory and a sizeable portion of the Soviet systems were on East German soil. This armory included all 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in the Federal Republic of Germany and 54 SS-12 Scaleboard and 53 SS-23 Spider in the German Democratic Republic.¹⁹ All in all, this amounted to almost one-third of American intermediate-range missiles (with a 1,000–5,500 km range) and nearly one-quarter of Soviet short medium-range missiles (with a 500–1,000 km range) deployed on West and East German soil.²⁰ It was therefore essential that American inspectors had the right to control missile sites in the German Democratic Republic, while Soviet inspectors could do the same on West German territory.²¹

A key element of the implementation procedures was the so-called “territorial principle.” This regulated that the state on whose territory the weapons were deployed had to make the provisions enabling the inspections to take place. The territorial principle was not a feature exclusively developed for the INF Treaty

18 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF], <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/> (accessed March 24, 2019). Lukas Trakimavičius, Why Europe needs to support the US–Russia INF Treaty, in: EurActiv, May 15, 2018, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/why-europe-needs-to-support-the-us-russia-inf-treaty/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

19 Out of the 54 SS-12 missiles, 19 were stationed in Königsbrück, 8 in Bischofswerda, 22 in Waren, 5 in Wokuhl. Out of the 53 SS-23 missiles, 6 were stationed in Weißenfels and 47 in Jena-Forst.

20 The numbers are taken from the original INF Treaty, signed on December 8, 1987, and additional material to the Treaty as published online by the U.S. Department of State (no date of publication provided), <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trtry/102360.htm> (accessed May 10, 2020).

21 For the Multilateral Basing Country Agreement (MBCA) between the U.S. and the deployment countries Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK of December 11, 1987, see *Bundesgesetzblatt* 1988, II, pp. 431–437. See also the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

but, rather, was modeled on a similar clause in the Stockholm agreement on conventional forces and weapons that had been signed one year earlier.²²

Accordingly, East Germany's Ministry for National Defense and West Germany's Federal Ministry of Defense had to provide the organizational set-up guaranteeing that U.S. and Soviet inspectors could fulfill their tasks within the guidelines and timespans defined in the INF Treaty. Arrangements included provision of landing rights, transport, communication, supporting personnel, and more. While the dismantling of U.S. nuclear devices in the FRG was coordinated with the West German authorities and was thus well known to them, this was not the case in the German Democratic Republic. Soviet information given to the Party and state leadership in East Berlin on nuclear (and also chemical) weapons on GDR territory remained rather meager throughout. But accompanying INF inspectors from the U.S. allowed East German military experts and politicians a rare glimpse into Soviet installations with nuclear INF equipment, and provided valuable technical/organizational knowledge beyond mere political consultation. This expertise was welcomed by the first democratic government of the GDR, elected in March 1990, and by the Federal German government after reunification, and it formed a valuable backdrop to the negotiations on Soviet troop withdrawals and the monitoring of these withdrawals thereafter. Indeed, officials from West Germany and the USSR had apparently agreed that the withdrawal of all Soviet nuclear weapons from GDR territory should be accomplished before German reunification in October 1990.²³ However, a sizable number of these weapons secretly remained in Altengrabow, probably because the limited number of special railway wagons²⁴ devised for the transport of nuclear weapons was insufficient when they were needed for the prioritized withdrawal from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the break-away Baltic states.²⁵

22 For the crucial role of the "territorial principle" for the enactment of the Stockholm agreement (Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures) between 1986 and 1990, see Bange and Lutz, *Ohne Öffentlichkeit keine Vertrauensbildung*, pp. 219–248.

23 For relevant literature and eye-witness accounts, see Oliver Bange, *Sicherheit und Staat. Die Bündnis und Militärpolitik der DDR im internationalen Kontext 1969 bis 1990*, Berlin 2017, pp. 491–494. As the U.S. inspections under the INF Treaty had shown, the nuclear warheads of the short medium-range missile systems stationed in the GDR (SS-12 and SS-3) had been removed before German reunification in October 1990. This is also confirmed by the memoirs of a West German intelligence officer of the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND): Norbert Juretzko and Wilhelm Dietl, *Bedingt dienstbereit: Im Herzen des BND—die Abrechnung eines Aussteigers*, Berlin 2004, pp. 12–52. The commanding officer of those German military forces stationed after the reunification on the territory of the former GDR, Jörg Schönbohm, confided in several interviews with the author that he assumed in early 1991 that the Soviet military had concentrated its remaining nuclear artillery shells in Altengrabow until their final removal to the USSR was technically possible in the summer of 1991.

24 The railway wagons were concealed by a cover of lead.

25 This was confirmed to the author by László Borsits, the former Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces, in Budapest on November 15, 2016.




Fig. 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2017.

2. Remaining Nuclear Threats: ICBMs and Tactical Nuclear Weapons—and What This Meant for Those Most Affected

The withdrawal and scrapping of ground-launched INF systems left both German states still exposed to a huge number of remaining nuclear weapons. This store included a vast quantity of tactical nuclear devices intended for potential battlefields in Central Europe—either to blow a (nuclear) gap into enemy defenses in order to facilitate a break-through, or else, ironically, to block any similar advance by the enemy.²⁶ The armory included nuclear artillery, atomic demolition devices (ADM, or “atomic mines”), bombs, and short-range ballistic missiles.²⁷ Also remaining were the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the two superpowers as well as their sea- and air-launched Cruise Missiles. And there were the French and British nuclear arsenals as well. The vast majority of these nuclear systems were still aimed at Central Europe, with the two German states at its heart.

While the nuclear threat against German territory and the German population thus remained almost unchanged, the only strategic deterrent against Soviet territory in case of a war in Central Europe had been abolished with the INF missiles.

26 For the evolving tactical and strategic planning in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact during these years, see Bange, *Sicherheit und Staat*, pp. 301–464.

27 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) or Short-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (SRTNFs)—with “theater” serving as *chiffre* for Central Europe, or more precisely Germany and its adjacent regions.

The term “strategic” here is used in the classical sense, found in Clausewitz.²⁸ It describes a military means, operation or policy with the power to decide a conflict. “Punishing” an attacker either by causing “massive destruction” to its cities and industries or by “decapitating” its leadership (by pinpointing its headquarters) were the strategic nuclear options—and were therefore of central importance for a viable nuclear deterrence. Following this logic, between 1983 and 1987, any attack against NATO in West Germany would immediately have led to the launch of Pershing II missiles and Gryphon Cruise Missiles against key military and political installations sited within the member-states of the Warsaw Pact.²⁹ The CPSU leadership in Moscow, in all likelihood, would have answered with an equally strategic counter- or pre-emptive nuclear strike, using ICBMs against U.S. territory. The INFs therefore linked West Germany’s security to that of both superpowers. From a West German perspective, following the logic of nuclear gamery, these weapons therefore constituted a viable deterrent.

Hence the abolition of the ground-launched INFs was tantamount to a step back in time—to the years before 1983. As German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had explained in his speech at the International Institute for Security Studies in London in 1977, the absence of this class of weapons meant that an aggressor could use (and face the usage of) nuclear weapons on the German battlefield without having to fear an automatic nuclear response against his own territory.³⁰ In all likelihood, the first use—or at latest the follow-on use—of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would be followed by a telephone call between the American President and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the next step would have meant intercontinental nuclear disaster for both the U.S. and the USSR. Without the INFs, the two superpowers were once again “de-coupled”³¹ from a conventional tactical nuclear response in Central Europe.

28 According to the definition by Clausewitz, tactics describe “the theory of the use” (planful use) “of military forces in combat,” while strategy is “the theory of the use of *combat for the object of the war*.” The difference is that tactics aim at victory in a specific combat operation while strategy aims at ultimate victory in the war itself. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, New York 2004, p. 71.

29 Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II, in: Gassert et al. (eds.), *Nuclear Crisis*, pp. 79f. See also the essay by Tim Geiger in this volume.

30 Helmut Schmidt’s remarks were closely connected to the public debate over the deployment of U.S. Cruise Missiles armed with neutron-bomb warheads in Europe and especially in Germany. His fears reflected the public debate in West Germany and were mirrored by the concerns of the East German head of state, Erich Honecker. See Bange, *Sicherheit und Staat*, pp. 124–143.

31 Helmut Schmidt’s speech at the IISS in London was published eleven days later in the West German government journal: *Vortrag des Bundeskanzlers in London am 28.10.1977*, in: *Bulletin Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, No. 112, p. 1013, Bonn, November 8, 1977. For the impact of this speech, see Oliver Thränert, Helmut Schmidt. In der nuklearen Grauzone: Londoner Rede tritt Nachrüstung los, in: *Die Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte*, 1–2 (2001), pp. 57–60.

The well known German proverb, “The shorter the nukes’ range, the deadlier for the Germans” was true once again. However aptly the proverb described the geostrategic nuclear position of both West and East Germany, it seems that it was only coined in early 1987, a mere half year before the signing of the INF Treaty.³² On April 18, 1987 the parliamentary leader of the ruling conservative parties, the CDU and CSU, demanded in public that the two superpowers should also include all nuclear weapons with a reach between 150 and 500 kilometers in any feasible nuclear deal. Like most of the INF missiles, this class of nuclear weaponry was aimed at German territory, both in the East and the West. Seen from a German perspective (from whatever side of the Iron Curtain), the abolition of the INF systems merely obliterated the threat of nuclear disaster. In his article in West Germany’s prominent conservative daily newspaper *Die Welt*, Alfred Dregger summarized the situation: “The shorter the reach, the more threatening they [these missiles] are for our country.”³³ Only a few days later, on May 7, 1987, while speaking before West Germany’s parliament, Dregger compressed the rather complex message even further: “The shorter the reach, the more German the destruction.”³⁴ Although Dregger was still arguing from an exclusively security-political perspective in the spring of 1987 (trying to maintain West German security interests), his catch-phrase was soon claimed by other, rather different actors. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher seized on it in support of his own line, of “voluntarily” abolishing the FRG’s Pershing IA missiles (a Soviet prerequisite for signing the INF Treaty with the U.S.); and West Germany’s peace movement used it throughout as apparent proof of the irrationality of nuclear deterrence in Central Europe.

Whoever may have been right in retrospect, in December 1987 the signing of the INF Treaty by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev left the Germans with the problem of hundreds of short-range nuclear systems, all directed more or less exclusively at their own territory. Within a few months, Dregger’s fears had indeed come true. While West Germany’s liberal Foreign Minister was willing to accept, at least temporarily, increased nuclear exposure in order to make the best play with the East–West détente dynamics that were unfolding in 1988, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in two minds. Kohl was acutely aware of the INF Treaty’s consequences for the military and nuclear security of his state; at the same time he was desperate to avoid yet another split in the West German public over the issue. While discussions within the German government and with the German peace movement dragged on, the issue soon enough took

32 The author is indebted to Tim Geiger for his helpful remarks concerning the historical genesis of this clause.

33 Alfred Dregger, Konventionelle Abrüstung ist das wichtigste Ziel, in: *Die Welt*, April 18, 1987, p. 4.

34 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation Period, 10th Session, May 7, 1987, p. 538, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf>.

second place and was overtaken by East–West events unfolding between 1988 and 1990.³⁵

Furthermore, while the INF Treaty may have de-coupled the superpowers from nuclear war in Central Europe, they still threatened each other's territories with ICBMs and SLCMs and their forces in Central Europe with SNFs, just as they had before. It was therefore hardly surprising when the U. S. Administration tried to obtain the consent of its NATO partners in Europe to modernize the Lance short-range nuclear missile system in the remaining months of the East–West conflict. It was equally unsurprising that this triggered a serious dispute within the coalition government in Bonn and a major crisis within NATO in early 1989.

3. Germany's Reunification: Security from Germany through Security with Germany. On the Importance of Conventional and Nuclear Safeguards

Though the "2+4" Treaty of September 12, 1990—involving West and East Germany plus France, Great Britain, the U. S., and the USSR—became the central document on German reunification, many other documents were signed during the crucial months in the fall of 1990 and in early 1991. And all of them dealt with security from a reunified Germany: limitation of German conventional forces, an assurance that German forces in former Eastern Germany would not come under NATO command until Soviet withdrawal, a guarantee of Germany's final borders (especially with regard to Poland), a reconfirmation of Germany's renunciation of force in international affairs and, last but not least, confirmation that the new Germany would honour the FRG's signature on the Nonproliferation Treaty (and thus be a final confirmation of its abstention from nuclear weapons).³⁶

A crucial stepping stone in this overall construction related both to Germany's reunification and to Europe's future security architecture. This was the interconnection between the question of eventual NATO membership for the future Germany and the proposed limits on conventional forces in Europe. In 1990, both issues were negotiated in parallel, but while Germany's reunification was settled in the 2+4 Treaty, the conventional forces issue was codified in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Considering the importance of security from and with Germany for Europe's future, and thus the importance

35 Michael Broer, *Die nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen in Europa: Eine Analyse des deutsch-amerikanischen Streits über die Einbeziehung der SRINF in den INF-Vertrag und die SNF-Kontroverse*, Frankfurt am Main 1991.

36 A helpful overview is provided in Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, *Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess*, Göttingen 2014, pp. 45–48; Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, *Das Auswärtige Amt und die Wiedervereinigung 1989/90*, in: Michael Gehler und Maximilian Graf (eds.), *Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen*, Göttingen 2017, pp. 65–90.

of the interconnection between the two issues, it is somewhat surprising to find that the CFE Treaty is both under-researched and under-estimated in the bulk of historiographical publications that have come out on 1989/1990.³⁷

4. Dealing with the Deterrence Gap: The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

The CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990 in Paris and formed a crucial part of the new political and security structure in Europe—or so it was thought at the time. It reduced conventional arms to a critical minimum, thus creating a “structural inability for offensive action,” while maintaining viable defense capabilities. As such, it served a vital function within the logic of deterrence. If strategic nuclear weapons were reduced and if tactical nuclear weapons were to be withdrawn (as was the case with Soviet withdrawal from the GDR, Poland, Hungary, the ČSSR, and the Baltic states) then the likelihood of an armed conflict fought with conventional weapons alone appeared to rise. The CFE negotiations started in early 1989 and were meant to stabilize a potentially asymmetric military situation before Germany’s unification, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet withdrawal could become feasible.³⁸

Like the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the CFE negotiations were initiated on a mandate from the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna (1986–1989). The CFE negotiations could build on the experiences gained during the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR) held between 1973 and 1989, but several crucial stumbling blocks in the MBFR talks were avoided.³⁹ Thus the CFE negotiations differed from the MBFR talks in significant ways: (i) the territorial scope of CFE was not limited to Central Europe, so that it could include military forces relevant for the area, but deployed in areas from the Atlantic to the Urals;

37 For the partial or complete absence of the CFE Treaty in the historiography on Germany’s reunification see the above-mentioned publications which at least recognize the CFE’s importance, but offer no “parallel historiography” on the unification and the CFE processes. For examples see Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*, Princeton 1997; the various contributions in two recently published edited volumes: Frédéric Bozo, Andreas Rödder, and Mary Elise Sarotte (eds.), *German Reunification: A Multinational History*, London 2016; Bernhard Blumenau, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, and Barbara Zanchetta (eds.), *New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected Transformations?*, London 2018. However, clear hints at the importance of this interrelation between German unification and the CFE Treaty had already been provided a few years after the events by two protagonists: Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, Harvard 1995.

38 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), *A Chronology: CFE Treaty Negotiations and Implementation, 1972–1996*, no date, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/cfebook/chrono.html> (accessed May 10, 2020).

39 Author’s conversations with Philip Zelikow in 2007 and 2008.

(ii) participation in the CFE negotiations was limited to NATO and Warsaw Pact member-states (excluding all so-called neutral and non-aligned countries); (iii) the negotiations were designed to result in a legally binding treaty (and not a mere political agreement). But a fourth difference was the most important one.

This fourth difference was that the CFE negotiations, at least initially, worked on weapons systems (and military units to serve them) and not on overall numbers of military personnel. In the end the CFE Treaty provided upper ceilings for each alliance for the entire region (20,000 tanks, 20,000 pieces of artillery, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, 2,000 helicopters) as well as national and regional limits. Thus the CFE aimed at equal numbers in defined key areas of armament and key regions, and sought to prevent any national superiority in each class of armament. No single country was meant to possess more than one-third of the total number of each item of armament or equipment. This in turn necessitated a comprehensive and rather complex verification system, including notifications about the holdings of weapon systems and their locations, on-site inspections of both notified and suspected arms locations, and close monitoring of the arms-destruction process (weapon systems beyond the above mentioned limits had to be destroyed within 40 months after the enactment of the CFE Treaty). The Joint Consultative Group (JCG) consisted of representatives from all participating states, and was envisaged as a regular forum for consultations,⁴⁰ which would provide a lasting institutionalized process of arms control. This complicated balance of weapons systems kept at low levels, and particularly in crucial regions, was meant to hinder any possible offensive military action—at least in the dimensions necessary for waging and winning a war.

However, once the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, new efforts started up, now with the aim of including limits on the numbers of military personnel (which had been the focus of the fruitless MBFR talks). This resulted in the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in July 1992.⁴¹ However, this so-called “CFE-1A” agreement did not contain limits for sea-based naval forces, internal security forces, or forces serving under UN command.

40 With regular meeting sessions twice a year, allowing for additional sessions if necessary. Each session was meant to last no longer than four weeks. Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group of the CFE, https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/prot_jointcons.htm (accessed May 10, 2020).

41 For the various strains of thought and historical developments leading to the arms control decisions at the CSCE conference in Helsinki in 1992, see the contributions to Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis (eds.), *Disconcerted Europe. The Search for a New Security Architecture*, New York 1994. For the contemporary optimism about this, see the following two articles: Victor-Yves Ghebali, *Towards an Operational Institution for Comprehensive Security*; Pertti Torstila, *The Helsinki Process: A Success Story and New Challenges*, both in: *Disarmament* 15/4 (1992), pp. 1–12, 26–37. For a contemporary (and equally over-optimistic) overview: Jenonne Walker, *Security and Arms Control in Post-Confrontation Europe*, Oxford 1994.

5. Dealing with the Remaining Nuclear Weapons: The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

While the ground-launched INFs were removed from Europe and the number of conventional forces was dramatically reduced and their offensive capabilities curbed, it remained up to Washington and Moscow, as the only proprietors at the time,⁴² to deal with the vast number of intercontinental nuclear systems. With the systemic conflict between liberalism/capitalism and socialism quickly evaporating at least in its power-political dimension, maintaining an overly large number of intercontinental systems—missiles and aircraft—appeared to be an increasingly obsolete posture.

Already in their SALT I and SALT II Treaties of 1972 and 1979 the U.S. and the USSR under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev had tried to define limits for their intercontinental nuclear arsenals. Both sides recognized the other's interest in a viable nuclear deterrence. As a result, in the ABM Treaty, anti-ballistic missile defences were limited to two sites each, merely protecting the two capitals; in the Interim Agreement (SALT I), ICBM numbers were limited to 1,054 U.S. and 1,618 Soviet missiles, of which only 1,000 U.S. and 1,408 Soviet missiles were allowed to be armed with multiple nuclear warheads (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, MIRVs). Similar restrictions were laid down for nuclear submarines. SALT II, which was not ratified by the U.S. Senate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also featured limits to long-range nuclear bombers, air-launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs).⁴³ However, as both trea-

42 It should be noted however that the first Trident II missiles started their operational life on British submarines in December 1994. The Trident II has a reach of about 12,000 km. Its predecessor system was the Polaris missile with a reach of up to 4,600 km. With Trident II therefore an intercontinental system replaced an intermediate-range nuclear missile system. The French S3 and M2 missiles, in service at the time, had a reach of 3,500 and 3,100 km respectively, and are intermediate-range nuclear systems. Suzanne Doyle, *The United States Sale of Trident to Britain, 1977–1982: Deal Making in the Anglo–American Nuclear Relationship*, in: *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28/3 (2017), pp. 477–493; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, *French Nuclear Forces*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 1, 2001.

43 For SALT I and SALT II, see <https://fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/text/index.html> and <https://fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/text/index.html> (accessed May 10, 2020). See also Matthew J. Ambrose, *The Control Agenda. A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, Ithaca/London 2018; David Tal, *U.S. Strategic Arms Policy in the Cold War. Negotiations and Confrontation over SALT, 1969–1979*, London/New York 2017; Arvid Schors, *Doppelter Boden. Die SALT-Verhandlungen 1963–1979*, Göttingen 2016; Stephan Kiener, “Diverting the Arms Race into the Permitted Channels.” *The Nixon Administration, the MIRV-Mistake, and the SALT Negotiations*, in: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Nuclear Proliferation International History Project*, Working Paper No. 9, Washington, D.C. 2016; Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age*, Ithaca/London 2012.

ties primarily only defined numerical limits to the number of delivery systems, but not to the number of nuclear warheads carried by them, the actual number of warheads quadrupled between 1970 and 1983.⁴⁴

When the societies in Central and Eastern Europe began to put an end to the conflict of ideologies, and the bipolarism in political and military affairs evaporated, it was once again time to deal with the intercontinental nuclear systems. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in July 1991 and put into force in December 1994. It allowed 6,000 warheads on 1,600 ICBMs and bombers on each side. As a consequence, 80 per cent of all strategic nuclear weapons were dismantled by 2001, the treaty itself expiring at the end of 2009.⁴⁵ With START II Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin set out to go even further and abolish the use of MIRVs altogether, in what became known as the “de-MIRV-ing agreement.”⁴⁶ However, START II—though ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996 and the Russian parliament in 2000—never came into effect. The U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and Russia reacted by withdrawing from START II.

Only three weeks before this, on May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin had signed a treaty—the “Moscow Treaty”—which is widely held to have been the peak of post-Cold War nuclear rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia.⁴⁷ The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), as it is properly named, was meant to reduce the operationally active strategic nuclear warheads of each of the two states to an overall number between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. In order to obtain this treaty, Moscow gave up its earlier demands for the guaranteed destruction of warheads, while Washington maintained a free hand over the fate of its decommissioned warheads and strategic nuclear weapons systems. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave an assurance that “the treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want.”⁴⁸ The treaty’s innovative focus on operational nuclear warheads rather than on the destruction of delivery vehicles and equipment was also its biggest disadvantage: non-operational warheads could be placed in storage with an option of redeploying them at a later stage. Furthermore, the ceiling of operational warheads had only to be reached at the actual expiry date of the treaty: December 31, 2012. What is more, apart from

44 Wichard Woyke (ed.), *Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik*, Bonn 2000, p. 349.

45 For the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991, see <https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

46 For the START II Treaty of January 3, 1993, see <https://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

47 Nuclear Threat Initiative, *Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)*, <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-offensive-reductions-treaty-sort/> (accessed May 15, 2020).

48 Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, *The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) at a Glance*, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, Washington, September 2006, <https://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/SORT-AtAGlance.pdf> (accessed May 15, 2020).

bi-annual consultations, no verification regime was established.⁴⁹ Even before its delivery and expiry date, SORT was superseded by NEW START on February 5, 2011. Thus many thousands of operationally inactive warheads still remain in U.S. and Russian inventories.

Under the NEW START treaty—the “Prague Treaty”—signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry A. Medvedev in April 2010, the limit for deployed missiles and bombers is 700, for deployed warheads 1,550, and for ICBM launch-systems (including submarines and bombers) 800. Both sides acted on the treaty and these number requirements were met by September 2018.⁵⁰ The treaty expires in 2021 and it was criticised by President Trump in a telephone call with Vladimir Putin as “one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama administration.”⁵¹



Fig. 2: U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile 1962–2017.

6. Dealing with the Remaining Tactical Nuclear Weapons

When the Warsaw Pact disbanded, on March 31, 1991, Soviet (and then Russian) tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of the USSR’s former allies in Central and Eastern Europe and from the territory of the former

49 For the SORT Treaty of May 24, 2002, see <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/10527.htm> (accessed May 10, 2020).

50 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms—Fact Sheet, September 1, 2018.

51 Jonathan Landy and David Rohde, Exclusive: In Call with Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-era Nuclear Arms Treaty—Sources, Reuters World News, February 9, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2A5>.

Soviet republics, particularly from the newly independent Baltic states. With much smaller Russian forces around, diminishing NATO forces, a long distance between NATO and Russian troops (during these years before NATO's enlargement in the East), and an apparent end to military confrontations, there seemed to be little reason to have tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent.⁵²

The withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (outside the USSR) was therefore based on unilateral decisions by the superpower leaders, taking account of this new situation. In his Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) of September 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced the unilateral withdrawal of all ground-launched short-range nuclear forces (SNFs), the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. warships (i. e. Cruise Missiles not covered by the INF) and the reduction of U.S. nuclear stockpiles in Europe (leaving a few hundred rather than thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe).⁵³ In 1994, this was complemented by President Clinton's Presidential Review Directive 34.⁵⁴ This PRD provided the framework for the U.S. Nuclear Policy Review finalized in the same year. According to its terms, the U.S. would retain 450 nuclear weapons in Europe—enough to deter an attack on U.S. Allies, target 2,500 sites in Russia in case of all-out war, and deploy more accurate missiles on four additional nuclear submarines (which were not covered by the INF Treaty).⁵⁵

52 The continent appeared so firmly to be at peace with itself, that a well known U.S. academic even revived and scrutinized the Marxist idea of “the end of history”—predicted for an eventual victory of Socialism (which had clearly failed to achieve this objective). Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York 1992. The book was based on a far-sighted article published in the summer of 1989: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, in: *The National Interest* 16 (summer 1989), pp. 3–18.

53 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, September 27, 1991. The Text of the Presidential Nuclear Initiative Announcement is published in Annex A of Susan J. Koch, *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992*, Washington, D. C. 2012, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a577537.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2020). Relevant background material can be found in the George Bush Presidential Library: Bush Presidential Records, Staff and Office Files, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject File PNI. On the following day, September 28, 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell explained at a press conference that this involved three types of nuclear artillery warheads (W-33, W-79, and W-48 for 8 inch and 155 mm artillery pieces respectively). All in all, this amounted to the removal from Europe of about 1,000 artillery rounds and 700 Lance missile warheads, which were to be destroyed, together with another 400 nuclear artillery and Lance warheads in the U.S.

54 For the history of Presidential Review Directive 34, initiating the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 1994, see Tom Sauer, *Nuclear Inertia. US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War*, London 2005, pp. 102–114.

55 Arthur J. Laffin and Anne Montgomery (eds.), *Swords into Plowshares. Nonviolent Direct Action for Disarmament, Peace, Social Justice*, Eugene, OR 2010, p. 263. See also Janne E. Nolan, *An Elusive Consensus. Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War*, Washington, D. C. 1999.

7. The Demise of the INF Treaty, 2014–2019

The present book represents the proceedings of a conference of historians held in Berlin in late 2017. When this conference reflected on the INF Treaty at that time, the INF issue seemed to have withdrawn from major public attention since the jubilant earlier days. But already dark clouds were looming on the security–political horizon and the INF Treaty was moving back into the political spotlight. Back then—almost two years before the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty—it seemed appropriate to consider the relevance of the INF Treaty for the larger security architecture in Europe.

Over the preceding thirty years, both Russia and the U.S. had found ways and means of dealing with the gap in nuclear deterrence posed by the Treaty, and from 2013 on, the numerous possibilities for circumventing or even breaking the Treaty came under increasing discussion by the interested public.

The malaise of the INF Treaty began with the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty (ABM) in June 2002. The ABM Treaty had been agreed upon between Washington and Moscow in the early 1970s, and it formed an integral part of the SALT agreement of 1972. While all the treaties on nuclear weapons mentioned so far dealt with the limitation, withdrawal, and destruction of weapons systems and nuclear warheads, the ABM treaty ruled that neither of the two contemporary superpowers should produce or deploy technological systems capable of destroying attacking nuclear missiles launched by their opponent. The ABM Treaty precluded defensive systems of this kind in order to establish and maintain a balanced nuclear deterrent. The underlying principle assumed that if both the U.S. and the USSR possessed the capability to respond in kind to a nuclear attack from the other—in “mutually assured destruction” (MAD)—then neither side would dare to wage nuclear war. Two aspects were of central importance to this concept: firstly, both sides had to maintain comparable numbers of nuclear weapons (mirrored in the ceilings codified in the SALT, START, SORT and INF agreements); and, secondly, both sides had to accept their own national vulnerability to nuclear war.⁵⁶

This second pillar of MAD (and with it the entire concept) became obsolete, when the U.S. stepped away from the treaty as a consequence of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, arguing that it needed ABM systems in order to provide more protection against this new kind of threat. The Press Secretary of the White House stressed at the time that “Russia is not an enemy,” and Russia’s President

56 For the ABM logic, see for example: James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Defending America*. Updated: *The Case for Limited National Missile Defense*, Washington, D. C. 2002. Alexander T.J. Lennon, *Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defenses, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century*, Boston (MIT) 2002. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (Studies in International Security & Arms Control)*, Stanford 1984.

Vladimir Putin declared in turn that his country's security interests would not be concerned.⁵⁷

However, Putin's perception of U. S. intentions was soon to change. The reason was to be found in American plans to deploy the new ABM systems (SM-3 block-IIA missiles and far-reaching X-Band radar systems in their support) not only in the U. S., but also in the Czech Republic and in Poland.⁵⁸ Washington explained this as an effort to defend Europe against possible missile attacks or blackmail from Iran, but Russia did not see it that way. Rather, it perceived a strategic threat to itself at its own doorstep, a next logical step, following on from the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, in a bid to undercut the established nuclear balance. As early as 2004, Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov was therefore voicing the case for Russia to leave the INF Treaty.⁵⁹ This idea was followed by further soundings over the succeeding years until, on February 10, 2007, President Putin declared before the Munich Security Conference that the INF Treaty no longer satisfied Russia's security interests.⁶⁰ Putin's argument was that since 1987 a whole number of additional states—North and South Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Israel—had obtained INF systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads; but the real reason for his statement was clearly that the American ABM systems were to be stationed in Europe. Only four days later, on February 14, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Yury Baluyevsky, made it clear that “the European shield” of future American ABMs “would destroy the strategic balance of forces and threaten Russia's national interests.”⁶¹ A few months later, Russian officials

57 ABM Treaty Fact Sheet, Statement by the White House Press Secretary, announcing the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Washington, December 13, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html> (accessed May 10, 2020). For Putin's statement see the U.S. response, also by the White House Press Secretary on December 13, 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/prsrl/2001/6849.htm> (accessed May 10, 2020).

58 While the deployment of the radar system in the Czech Republic was eventually cancelled, an additional deployment in Romania was decided upon. At present, in 2020, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland is not yet completed, but SM-3 Block IB missiles for Poland are already on-site and the Romanian site for the same missile-type is operational. Paul McLeary, Stalled Polish Missile Defense Site Needs Extra \$96M, 2 Years—Getting Problem-Plagued Ballistic Missile Defense Site Online is an Ever-Higher-Priority for the Pentagon as Iran and Russia Move Out on New Missiles, in: *Breaking Defense*, December 12, 2020, <https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/stalled-polish-missile-defense-site-needs-extra-96-million-two-years/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

59 Nikolai Zlobin, A Close Look at Russia's Leaders: Meeting Putin and Ivanov, in: *The Defense Monitor—Newsletter of the Center for Defense Information* (Washington, D. C.) 33/5 (September/October 2004), pp. 3 f., 6 f. (on the INF issue see p. 7).

60 For President Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, and the ensuing discussion, see the official Russian record online, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (accessed May 10, 2020).

61 Cited in: Russia to compensate for INF losses with Iskander missile system, in: *Sputnik International*, November 14, 2007, <https://sputniknews.com/russia/2007111488066432/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

publicly warned that, after leaving the INF Treaty, Russia might deploy a new version of the Iskander missile in Belarus to make up for the anticipated imbalance. This was a missile with a much enhanced reach.

Ten years later—at the time of the “INF Treaty” history conference in 2017, and still before the U. S. decision to withdraw from the Treaty—Russian missile boats (corvettes with Kalibr missiles) had been transferred from Russia’s Pacific coast to the Black Sea and to Kaliningrad. It was widely alleged that these navy units carried a version of the Kalibr that had a reach exceeding 1,500 kilometres. This posed (and still poses) an imminent threat to Denmark, its capital Copenhagen, the Danish Straits, and even London. However, neither this nor the modernization of Russia’s air-launched Cruise Missiles were in violation of the INF Treaty. Even though the corvettes remained almost stationary in the vicinity of Kaliningrad, their missiles were by definition “sea-launched” ones. However, this exemption does not apply to a new version of the Iskander ballistic missile (the Iskander-K or SSC-8 R-500), which U. S. sources have claimed have the capability to reach well over 500 kilometers, perhaps even more than 1,000.⁶²

The political linkage between the INF Treaty and other multilateral treaties established by the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives does show clearly that the INF Treaty was deeply embedded in Europe’s security architecture, and therefore that its destruction could potentially cause considerable harm to the overall structure. Already in 2017, there were members of the U. S. Congress who called for retaliatory measures if Russia did not cease its violations of the INF Treaty. They called for a renunciation of the Open Skies Treaty (OST) and raised the possibility of refusing to continue with the NEW START Treaty beyond 2021.

Subsequently, there were numerous public accusations that Russia was violating the OST, which had been negotiated between 1990 and 1992 and came into force in 2002. The OST allows all its current 34 signatories “mutual aerial observation” of each others’ military activities.⁶³ But there seems to be more behind the strident voices in Congress than just a retaliatory measure for Russian breaches of the INF Treaty. In late 2018 Aaron Mehta, a well known defense analyst, drew attention to Russia’s new digital electro-optical sensors which “would give Russia an informational edge over what can be gathered by the equipment used by the U. S.”⁶⁴ Pulling out of existing agreements means crossing the threshold between U. S.–Russian bilateral treaties and Europe’s multilateral security architecture with as yet unpredictable effects. For example,

62 Hans M. Kristensen, *Russia Declared in Violation of INF Treaty—New Cruise Missile May Be Deploying*, July 30, 2014, <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/07/russia-inf> (accessed March 17, 2019).

63 Alexandra Bell and Anthony Wier, *Open Skies Treaty—A Quiet Legacy Under Threat*, in: *Arms Control Today* 49/1 (2019), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/features/open-skies-treaty-quiet-legacy-under-threat> (accessed March 2019).

64 Aaron Mehta, *US, Russia Remain at ‘Impasse’ Over Open Skies Treaty Flights*, in: *Defense News*, September 14, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/09/14/us-russia-remain-at-impasse-over-nuclear-treaty-flights/> (accessed March 2019).

the Open Skies Treaty and the OSCE's Vienna Document of 1994 on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) complement each other. As another American analyst warned: "Tearing up the Open Skies Treaty means killing the confidence-building regime between Russia and NATO. With the treaty in force, transparency is enhanced and the risk of war and miscalculation is reduced."⁶⁵ Without these complementary treaties, and after the domino-effect across arms control treaties that would ensue, Europe could become an increasingly insecure place.

8. The INF's Swan Song: An Argument for Reinventing and Enlarging the Treaty

When U.S. President Trump announced the withdrawal of his country from the INF Treaty during an election campaign rally in October 2018⁶⁶ and proceeded to enact this withdrawal on February 1, 2019, there was a remarkable initial outcry amongst the public in Europe. One of Germany's most influential daily papers, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, wrote of the "full portfolio of fears" raised by Trump's decision.⁶⁷ But the end of the bilateral INF Treaty between Russia and the U.S. has important repercussions not only for Europe but also for the states in East Asia—above all China, North and South Korea, and Japan.

Trump informed the European Allies of the U.S. a few days after his initial announcement, during a NATO meeting held in October 2018. Politicians, security experts, and the media in Europe (particularly in Germany) were shocked. A new nuclear arms race appeared to be looming, and Horst Teltschik, former Security Advisor to Chancellor Kohl, publicly described Trump's planned pullout as "a catastrophe."⁶⁸ Europe's political leadership and elites looked for options to save the Treaty. One of the most discussed options was the possibility of enlarging the Treaty and getting other European states to join it. Thus, at a press conference following a meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on January 18, 2019, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas proposed expanding the INF Treaty

65 Alex Gorka, US Takes New Steps to Dismantle Open Skies Treaty, in: Online Journal of the Strategic Culture Foundation, <https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/09/30/us-takes-new-steps-to-dismantle-open-skies-treaty/> (accessed March 2019).

66 USA kündigen INF-Vertrag: 'Das Spiel ist ausgespielt' (The Game is Over), in: Hannoversche Allgemeine, February 1, 2019.

67 For example: Trump kündigt INF-Vertrag—Pralles Angstportfolio, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 24, 2018. Exemplary for reactions in the academic world: Wolfgang Richter, Der INF-Vertrag vor dem Aus—Ein neuer nuklearer Rüstungswettlauf könnte dennoch verhindert werden, in: SWP-Aktuell 2018/A 63, November 2018.

68 Teltschik in an interview with Deutschlandfunk (DLF), October 22, 2018, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/reaktion-auf-fall-khashoggi-es-braucht-eine-grundsuetzliche.694.de.html?dram:article_id=431151 (accessed May 10, 2020).

by means of a new document which could be signed by other countries, including China.⁶⁹

However, the Trump Administration's decision to curb the INF Treaty might well be aimed beyond Russia, precisely at this rising superpower. Like all nuclear weapon states other than the U.S. and Russia, China is not a signatory to the INF Treaty. This is what has allowed the Chinese to make a substantial buildup of nuclear forces over the past decades. The current goal of China's political leadership is the creation of a nuclear triad with a second-strike capability in all circumstances.⁷⁰ China's armed forces possess 200 older and 150 new missile systems with a reach between 1,500 and 4,000 kilometers. This puts the U.S. military base in Guam within the reach of ground-launched Chinese missiles. The overall number of Chinese nuclear warheads is still only around 5 per cent of the U.S. and Russian stockpiles (320 Chinese warheads as against 6,370 Russian and 5,800 U.S. ones).⁷¹ According to the numbers provided by the London-based International Institute for Security Studies and experts like Taylor Fravel,⁷² up to 80 per cent of China's nuclear arsenal could fall into the category of ground-launched intermediate nuclear forces as defined by the INF Treaty. However, it is especially the prospect of a rapid diversification of Chinese delivery vehicles for these warheads that matters. These delivery vehicles have become increasingly diversified, mobile, and resilient. The Chinese also have nuclear capabilities at sea and in the air. So despite the rather limited number of warheads in its possession, China is about to enter the exclusive club of states possessing a nuclear triad.⁷³

The idea of including China in an extended NEW START treaty does appear to be an adequate starting point. While NEW START (or a similar successor treaty) contains an arms control regime over a variety of classes of nuclear

69 Maas calls for expanding INF Treaty, in: *Vestnik Kavkaza*, January 18, 2019, <https://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/Maas-calls-for-expanding-INF-Treaty.html> (accessed May 10, 2020). See also: Maas' Appell an Russland. Mit Abrüstung den INF-Vertrag retten, in: *ARD Tagesschau* (German TV news), January 18, 2019, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/maas-russland-109.html> (accessed May 10, 2020).

70 On China's nuclear deterrence, see Office of the Secretary of Defense (ed.), *Annual Report to Congress—Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017*, Washington, D. C., May 2017, p. 61. Eric Heginbotham et al., *China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent. Major Drivers and Issues for the United States*, Santa Monica (Rand) 2017, p. 112.

71 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, *Status of World Nuclear Forces*. Report from the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C., April 2020, <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

72 IISS, *The Military Balance 2018*, London, February 2018. M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949*, Princeton 2019, pp. 236–269.

73 A 'World-Class Military': Assessing China's Global Military Ambitions, testimony by David Santoro, Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum International, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the United States Senate on June 20, 2019, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=826699> (accessed May 10 2020).




Fig. 3: Global Nuclear Forces, 2019.

weapon systems, a new multilateral and global INF Treaty and/or the deployment of U.S. INFs in the East Asian region (Japan, South Korea, Palau, or Guam)⁷⁴ would diminish the relative Chinese advantage in the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces deployed in its orbit. Many observers in Washington therefore saw China, and not so much Russia, as the real addressee of Trump's announcement in October 2018. Official reactions in Beijing stressed that the country had no

74 Opinions about the probabilities, likely locations, and possible reactions of U.S. Allies in East and South-East Asia differ widely, however. For example: Evan Karlik, Where Will the U.S. Base Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Pacific? Japan's Ryukyu Islands and Palau Are the Most Probable Contenders for New U.S. Intermediate-Range Missiles, in: *The Diplomat*, August 30, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/where-will-the-us-base-intermediate-range-missiles-in-the-pacific/> (accessed May 10, 2020). Steven Stashwick, US Intermediate-Range Missiles in East Asia: Critical Deterrent or Needless Provocation? It Isn't Clear That the United States Necessarily Needs Land-Based Intermediate Missiles to Achieve the Missions They Are Envisioned For, in: *The Diplomat*, November 15, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/u-s-intermediate-range-missiles-in-east-asia-critical-deterrent-or-needless-provocation/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

part in the INF controversy as it was not a signatory state.⁷⁵ Other observers in South-East Asia, however, claim that the Chinese authorities perceive Trump's INF decision as yet another means to limit their country's military influence in the region and to drive it into a destructive arms race, just as the U. S. had done with the USSR in the 1980s.⁷⁶

When, in the spring of 2020, President Trump proposed that China might join trilateral negotiations with the U. S. and Russia on a new NEW START agreement, Beijing smelt a rat, suspecting that Trump might use China again as a pretext to leave the treaty. Though the Chinese government immediately rejected the invitation, Chinese academics and academics with Chinese expertise began arguing for a different framework. Future nuclear arms negotiations with China, they proposed, should be international (rather than multi-national), based on mutual vulnerability (necessitating limits on missile defense), and come up with serious no-first-use-policies.⁷⁷

It seems that U. S. Administrations under both Presidents Obama and Trump came to see the INF Treaty as basically worthless because of the numerous circumventions and breaks on the Russian side. This made withdrawal from the Treaty merely a matter of timing. However, the current threat, that there could be a renewal of the nuclear arms race, has sent strong signals of deterrence to both Russia and China. In time, this might persuade China that it would be wise to participate in multilateral negotiations on global INFs or collaborate on an extended NEW START.

If the renunciation of the old INF Treaty is not to be followed up by a new multilateral INF Treaty in due time, however, then a kind of domino effect might well put Europe's entire security architecture into question. On May 21, 2020, President Trump announced that the U.S. would be leaving the Open

75 For the consistency of this theme in Chinese press conferences and public statements since November 2018, see Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on November 5, 2018 (on the webpage of the Chinese Foreign Ministry), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1610459.shtml (accessed May 10, 2020); Spokesperson of the Chinese Mission to the EU Speaks on a Question Concerning the INF Treaty, July 27, 2019 (on the webpage of China's Mission to the EU), <http://www.chinamission.be/eng/fyrjh/t1683870.htm> (accessed May 10, 2020). China reiterates opposition to multilateralization of INF Treaty, in: Xinhua press agency, July 30, 2019 (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/30/c_138270534.htm (accessed May 10, 2020)).

76 Vijay Prashad, US military hellbent on trying to overpower China. While some in China are urging against an arms race, relentless US saber-rattling makes a global peace movement crucial, in: Asia Times, May 13, 2020.

77 See Tong Zhao (senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing), Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control Engagement With China, in: Arms Control Today 50/1 (2020), (<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/features/opportunities-nuclear-arms-control-engagement-china> (accessed May 10, 2020)). Gregory Kulacki, China is Willing to Negotiate on Nuclear Arms, But Not on Trump's Terms, in: Defense One, March 30, 2020, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/03/china-willing-negotiate-nuclear-arms-not-trumps-terms/164204/> (accessed May 10, 2020).

Skies Treaty.⁷⁸ According to treaty regulations, this will take place six months later. With this announcement, it would appear that the first European domino following the abandonment of the INF Treaty might indeed be about to fall. Trump's announcement came only days after the renowned American and Russian diplomats Rose Gottemoeller (former Deputy Secretary General of NATO) and Anatoly Antonov (Russian Ambassador to the U.S.) had published their appeal for a prolongation of the NEW START agreement beyond 2021.⁷⁹ Both authors called NEW START the "gold standard" of nuclear arms control, without which the world would slip into a phase of intransparency and unpredictability.

The states of East Asia perceive the security system of Europe as a shining example in their own search for a meaningful regional security structure. The irony of history is that, with the entire process now unraveling, this European exemplar could collapse. With the INF Treaty, the "lucky star" prediction of Nancy Reagan's astrologist proved true for its time, but now we see its temporal limitations.

78 President Trump claimed that Russia was violating OST by limiting observation over Kaliningrad and over the Russian–Georgian border. "Open Skies"-Flüge—Trump kündigt weiteres Abkommen, in: ARD Tagesschau, May 21, 2020, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/openskies-trump-usa-101.html> (accessed May 22, 2020).

79 Anatoly Antonov and Rose Gottemoeller, Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age. Why Washington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty, in both: *Foreign Affairs*, April 29, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-29/keeping-peace-nuclear-age> (accessed May 22, 2020); and *Kommersant*, April 20, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4109694 (accessed May 22, 2020).

Bernd Greiner

The INF Treaty in Perspective: Trust and the Story of an Unlikely Success

Arms control and disarmament are above all matters of trust. This, in a nutshell, has been the essence of negotiating bilateral and multilateral treaties for almost a century. The INF Treaty of December 1987 is yet another example illustrating this insight. Had it not been for two leaders who, after a rough start in their mutual relationship, finally came to trust one another, Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles would never have been withdrawn from Europe and recycled into items for everyday consumption. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did the trick—to everyone's surprise at the time and to the lasting amazement of historians.¹

In order to clarify disputed issues, it is helpful to debate history in reverse order. Turning our agenda on its head, we can and should ask a simple question: Why was disarmament a dead-end issue before 1987, and why did all efforts to substantially reduce the nuclear arsenal amount to nothing for 40 odd years? In other words: why was trust so disdained for all these decades? Why did mistrust and suspicion have such a paramount impact on national interests and international relations?

At first sight, it comes as little surprise that the Cold War was a hotbed for distrust. This is simply because distrust is either the offspring or twin (or in any case a close relative) of fear. For each and every decade between 1945 and 1991, we can make the case that, at its core, the Cold War was based on fear.² Time and again, it provides stories of how fear took hold of peoples' hearts and minds, about the manner in which societies coped with fear, and, last but not least, about the techniques used to exploit fear for political purposes, be it in domestic or global arenas. In dealing with the Cold War, historians are well advised to view their subject matter—be it diplomacy, cultural affairs or the military—through this lens. Political psychology not only provides additional insights; it takes us to the common denominator of the Cold War, namely to the political and social impact of insecurity, fear and mistrust.

1 Nicolas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, *Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty*, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), *Trust, But Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, Washington, D.C. 2016, pp. 121–139.

2 Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), *Angst im Kalten Krieg. Studien zum Kalten Krieg*, Hamburg 2009.

Conventional wisdom has it that antagonistic ideologies and adverse self-images nourished distrust, and that they did so inevitably, and sometimes behind the backs of political actors, whether they were ill-intentioned or well-meaning. There is, indeed, ample evidence to vindicate this reading. Just think of Joseph Stalin's urge to speed up the development of Soviet atomic weapons, a decision grounded in the unwavering belief that inter-imperialist contradictions in combination with an outright hatred of Socialism would unleash another world war in 20 or 30 years' time.³ Or think of the widespread perception, popularized by Henry Kissinger in his 1957 book on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, of both the Soviet Union and Communist China as "illegitimate powers" who could and should never be trusted, no matter when and no matter why: allegedly, they were aiming to destabilize and upset the international order forever. "Diplomats can still meet," Kissinger claimed in a dogmatic diatribe, "but they cannot persuade each other. Instead, diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to influence and win over public opinion in other nations; their purpose is less the settlement of disputes than the definition of issues for which to contend. They are less a forum for negotiation than a platform for propaganda."⁴ Please note the publisher's comment when a 1984 reprint of this book came out, three short years before the INF Treaty: "Dr. Kissinger's masterful account is as relevant today as when it was first published for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1957."⁵ No matter how ill-informed this judgement was, it is all too obvious how Cold War perceptions were poisoned by ideology, prejudice and bias.

And yet I suggest we take a different perspective on the historical setting of the INF Treaty. Important as they were, ideological controversies are not sufficient in themselves to explain the dynamics of distrust and trust. Something else needs to be added to the factors considered—an accelerant that stirred up contested issues and turned divergent interests into non-negotiable assets. This is where the nuclear arms race comes into play. Without it, the root, scope, and momentum of distrust cannot be appreciated; without it, the history of Cold War foreign relations fades away into an opaque twilight zone. The arms race fed on distrust, and vice versa, both of them promoting an entangled history of self-fulfilling prophecies. It is therefore quite appropriate to suggest a clear-cut assumption that, if any single factor captures the essence of the Cold War, it is the presence of nuclear weapons and the fears they unleashed.

3 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956*, Yale 1994.

4 Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York 1957, p. 318.

5 Westview Encore Edition, Boulder, Co. 1984, Publisher's Comment.

1. Weapons Technology and Distrust

Atomic weapons technology has been identified as a source of mutual suspicion, bewilderment and distrust. And rightly so. Ever since the nuclear genie left its bottle, the rate of technological innovations moved into fast-track mode. Revolutionary breakthroughs came no longer in decades, but, rather, in years—with thermonuclear H-bombs coming on the heels of atomic prototypes, with intercontinental ballistic missiles augmenting the fleet of long-range bombers and with satellites exploiting outer space as auxiliary battleground. Neither side could rest assured that rivals and potential enemies were not on the verge of yet another revolution in military weaponry. Neither side could make the case that its arsenal was designed and deployed for defensive purposes only. With each technological gain, the line of demarcation between offensive and defensive weapons became ever more blurred.⁶

Take the infamous MIRV warheads—multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles—as a case in point. Introduced in 1969, they fueled mutual distrust not only because of their increased number of warheads. The broad range of new and unprecedented military options they made available nourished an anxiety on the verge of paranoia. Mainly, people feared the contingency of massive launches made either in retaliation or as first strikes, either in response to an attack or in an attempt to disarm the other side before it could attack. The number of equally telling samples is unending—from MIRV to ABM (anti-ballistic missiles), from ABM to SDI (the Strategic Defense Initiative), from SDI to nuclear-tipped Cruise Missiles. No matter which we single out, the motivation behind it all boils down to the same—a deep-rooted mistrust that investments in technology might signal aggressive designs or that, in times of crisis, any given rival might be tempted to overbid his cards.

Consequently, a striving for ever more sophisticated weapons, even a quest for outright military superiority, became the political routine and was routinely justified as basic for national security. Speaking for the U.S., Henry Kissinger did not mince his words in a 1958 essay published in *Foreign Affairs*: the defending side—also known as “the West”—must be equipped with more and better weapons to counterbalance an aggressor’s surprise move. American superiority in arms was not up for negotiation and should never be mistaken as a bargaining chip for trust-builders.⁷ Ironically enough, in 1976, when Kissinger, as Secretary of State, wanted to eat his words and promote arms control, he was undercut by hard-core conservatives from within and without the “Committee

6 Fred Kaplan, *The Bomb. Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War*, New York 2020; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London 1989.

7 Henry Kissinger, *Missiles and the Western Alliance*, in: *Foreign Affairs* 36/3 (1958), pp. 383–400.

on the Present Danger,” whose agenda was first and foremost built on suspicion and fear, with revitalized superiority as the antidote.⁸ Once again, the vicious cycle of mutual distrust was confirmed. It would have sounded like a political pipedream to imagine that, roughly ten years later, an agreement would be signed scrapping a whole generation of nuclear weapons.

Disarmament seemed all the more a pastime for dreamers because the dominant elite of self-proclaimed nuclear realists had subscribed to a worst-case logic. This notorious Cold War-style thinking was written in stone for decades, its basic principles promoted by think tanks, universities, and unknown numbers of defense intellectuals. By definition, reliability, confidence and trust were barred from worst-case models, no matter what their design. This was especially true of its most radical form popularized from the mid-1950s, and rejuvenated in the “war on terror” after 9/11: the so-called “One Percent Doctrine”. This was built on the notion that a one per cent possibility should always be perceived as a one hundred per cent probability. In other words, it was assumed that miniscule dangers could turn into existential threats at any time and place, all the more so when the competition was with inscrutable rivals like the USSR or Communist China. The likelihood of any given “threat” scenario was not the issue; the thinking was that literally nothing should be excluded from the imagination. This was the logic of a pro-active security policy: dangers should be fought off before they actually took shape and before they could be proven by solid evidence. By definition, therefore, inaction was more risky than actually taking risks. That it was once again Henry Kissinger who promulgated this rationale in his seminal study on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* tells us a story—not only a story about deeply enshrined academic paradigms, but above all a story about having the lowest possible expectations of trust in international relations, and of unflinching resourcefulness in arguing the case for distrust. Generations of policy and security strategists knew no better; and, with minor exceptions, did not want to know better.

At this point one might legitimately object, and argue that nuclear weapons generated “negative trust,” namely a shared assumption that, out of sheer self-interest, rivals, or even enemies, would refrain from getting carried away. There is, indeed, ample evidence that leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain had a keen understanding of the limited scope they had for military action. Whichever power employed nuclear weapons invited its own self-destruction. In 1954, at the latest, after the United States had conducted a series of thermonuclear tests in the South Pacific, reports to the President were unequivocal in their conclusion that “super bombs” could wipe out human life from Planet Earth. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s public comment about “race suicide” was endorsed by Winston

8 Justin Vaisse, *Neoconservatism. The Biography of a Movement*, Harvard 2010; Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment*, New York 1983.

Churchill and Kremlin leaders alike.⁹ “Our probable adversaries feared us just as we feared them,” Nikita Khrushchev noted in his memoirs, and he is also on record as telling American officials that “nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that coexistence was elementary.”¹⁰ In sharp contrast to pre-nuclear times, when a combination of arms races and political crisis more often than not escalated into military confrontations, the post-1945 world did not see any great power wars. Hence, the popular proverb of the time, “First shooters are second to die,” was more than mere folklore: in the nuclear age, all actors could trust in their rivals’ mirror-imaged perspective—or in their common rationality.

There is, however, a flipside to this story and an ambiguity all too often ignored or papered over. Neither side believed that nuclear war was impossible; but all sides bent over backwards to be permanently prepared for the unimaginable. This observation identifies the second source of deep-rooted distrust: war-plan options masterminded by military elites and signed off by their political superiors.

2. Nuclear Strategies and Distrust

Since the early 1980s, ample documentary evidence on contingency war plans has been available on the American side.¹¹ Compared with the density of Pentagon, White House, and National Security Council records, available resources from Soviet archives are only fragmentary. But, taken as a whole, documents from both sides conclusively verify a set of mirror-imaged assumptions about nuclear war and allegedly successful strategies to prevail and win should deterrence fail.¹² Two questions provided a common East–West denominator for war-planners: Was it possible to completely disarm the other side? Or could damage be inflicted on the enemy that was sufficient at least to curtail a counterstrike and thus avoid unacceptable losses for one’s own society?

For American Strategic Air Command planners in the 1950s, “the idea of a single war-winning blow was an irresistible temptation,” David Alan Rosenberg notes in a seminal study on the origins of overkill.¹³ Internal discussions and paperwork were rife with talk about a nuclear “Blitzkrieg” and fantasies about preventive wars turning the Soviet Union into a radioactive ruin within hours. It is true that President Dwight D. Eisenhower rebuffed his most hawkish advisors

9 David Holloway, *Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962*, in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1: *Origins*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 383–386.

10 Nikita Khrushchev, in: David Holloway, *Racing toward Armageddon? Soviet Views of Strategic Nuclear War, 1955–1972*, Unpublished Manuscript, July 2017, p. 7.

11 Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, New York 1983.

12 Holloway, *Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War*.

13 David Alan Rosenberg, *The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960*, in: *International Security* 7/4 (1983), p. 36.

and sidelined the idea of a Pearl Harbor in reverse. He did, however, confirm a National Security Council guideline, in effect since October 1953, stating that, in the event of hostilities, the United States would consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions and that in peacetime the U. S. must make clear its determination to prevail if general war should eventuate.¹⁴ “Prevail” and “survive” were key terms of the 1959 Presidential guidance, which in years to come also informed the war-plans of the Kennedy Administration and the McNamara Pentagon. Until the mid-1970s, prevailing and surviving in case of war was predicated on one option—the delivery of a quick and devastating blow if intelligence should detect Soviet war preparations. This, in other words, was a strategy of pre-emption, or of striking first, in a grey-area of more or less solid information about the other side’s intentions.¹⁵

That Soviet leaders excelled as copy-cats of pre-emption most certainly contributed to the war of nerves and to the inflation of mutual distrust. Whether they explicitly referred to the term or not is of minor importance. In essence, Party declarations, open-source publications, and internal debates testify to the fact that Soviet rocket forces were poised to strike against American missile silos and strategic aviation and forward-based systems. Their purpose was to disarm the other side and they needed to be launched pre-emptively to secure victory and survival. Ironically, this option seemed all the more attractive against the backdrop of major technical and military shortcomings. For a long time, and with good reason, the Soviets had been worried about the efficiency of their air defense system as well as their capacity to retaliate against a U. S. attack. Without any verifiable reason, they also feared a Barbarossa-style attack conducted with superior American arms. Thus it was Soviet weakness that promoted a strategy the other side perceived as indicative of aggressive designs—a suspicion only increased by public bragging that another world war would see the Red Army victorious over moribund imperialism. To quote from a 1964 internal study directed by Defense Minister Rodion Y. Malinovsky: “The conditions of nuclear war [...] present us with the alternative: either the offensive or defeat.” And from that perspective, striking first was “the chief form of nuclear war fighting.”¹⁶ For what all this was worth, it at least kept the illusion of containing war-damage alive.

In the 1970s, both sides refrained from pre-emptive strategies and gravitated to launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack postures.¹⁷ But the preponder-

14 Holloway, *Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War*, p. 385; Bernd Greiner, *Politik am Rande des Abgrunds? Die Außen- und Militärpolitik der USA im Kalten Krieg*, Heilbronn 1986, pp. 55–73.

15 William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg, *Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963–1975*, in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 2: *Crises and Détente*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 95, 104.

16 Quoted in: Holloway, *Racing toward Armageddon?*, p. 11; see *ibid.*, pp. 12 f., p. 16; Burr and Rosenberg, *Nuclear Competition*, p. 97.

17 Holloway, *Racing toward Armageddon?*, pp. 19, 26; Burr and Rosenberg, *Nuclear Competition*, pp. 96, 105.

ance of mistrust remained. The technological race for ever more refined nuclear weapons continued, and delivery systems of unprecedented target precision were devised. These innovations went hand in glove with drastically reduced warning times against an impending attack. Because of this, the specter of disarming first strikes was reanimated, and the notion of mutual assured destruction was once more called into question by fantasies of “limited damage” and “survival.” Strategy was continually couched in ill-defined, murky and risky terms. In the end this nourished completely preposterous ideas like the Soviet “Dead Hand” system. In the early 1980s, measuring devices sensitive to pressure, light, and radiation were installed all over the USSR and programed to execute a fully automatic counterstrike in response to a U.S.-orchestrated decapitation of the Soviet leadership.¹⁸ “Doomsday Machine” would have been an appropriate code name for it, as an exact replication of a device in Stanley Kubrick’s movie *Dr. Strangelove*.

All told, during the Cold War the nuclear powers were the hostages of suspicion, insinuation and mistrust. Fully aware of the apocalyptic impact of another total war, political and military elites declared a nuclear taboo. And yet they sponsored “as if” investments, strategies, and force postures—as if the devaluation of military power could be reversed, as if technological breakthroughs could offer a way out of the nuclear dilemma, as if, in the event of war, they could limit the damage, prevail, and ultimately win. Day in, day out, the “unthinkable” was not only reflected on, but was also seen as something possible. Hence the Eisenhower Administration toyed with the idea of employing nuclear weapons on three occasions: during the war in Korea, at the time of the siege of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, and when there was conflict over the Chinese offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu;¹⁹ John F. Kennedy and his advisors, too, debated

18 David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy*, New York 2009; *The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War*, Part I, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 426, Interviews with Lieutenant General Geli V. Batenin, ed. by Nate Jones, Document 23, p. 10; Viktor M. Surikov and Colonel Varfolomei V. Korobushin, *ibid.*, Document 7, p. 135 and Document 24, p. 107.

19 Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, Brookings Institution 1987, pp. 63–93; Fred Kaplan, *The Bomb. Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War*, New York, 2020, pp. 9, 103–106, 201. For more details on the Korean war, see Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Henry Andrews (eds.), *Security in Korea: War, Stalemate, and Negotiation*, Boulder, Co. 1994, pp. 153–158; Roger Dingman, *Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War*, in: *International Security* 3 (1988), pp. 50–91; Carl A. Posey, *How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear*, in: *Air&Space Magazine*, July 2015, pp. 15–23. For more details on Dien Bien Phu see Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support. The Early Years, 1941–1960: The United States Army in Vietnam*, Washington, D. C./Center of Military History 1983, pp. 211–216; Frederic Logevall, “We might give them a few.” Did the US Offer to Drop Atom Bombs at Dien Bien Phu?, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 2, 2016, pp. 8–12; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, Cambridge 2017, pp. 182–184; John Prados, *Operation Vulture: America’s Dien*

pre-emptive options during the Berlin Crisis of 1961.²⁰ In the words of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk: “We can’t assume nuclear war won’t happen.” There was just no certainty in “this God damn poker game.”²¹ As in a poker game, you might be apprehensive, but your fear must never be perceived as anxiety. Intimidating the other side was always the better choice.

Henry Kissinger got to the heart of the “God damn poker game” in his 1957 book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*: “The key problem of present-day strategy is to devise a spectrum of capabilities with which to resist Soviet challenges. These capabilities should enable us to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself *only* by all-out war, while deterring him from this step by a superior retaliatory capacity.” And he added in even bolder words: “The side which is more willing to risk an all-out war or can convince its opponent of its greater readiness to run that risk is in the stronger position.” This strategy “will not be easy to implement. [...] Above all, it requires strong nerves. [...] Its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to the risks of Armageddon.”²² Keep in mind that this plea for strong nerves was much more than a young professor’s unsolicited contribution; it reflected the intellectual mainstream in America’s major foreign policy think tank at the time, the Council on Foreign Relations.

Whether you call it “war of nerves,” “atomic blackmail,” “atomic diplomacy,” or simply “deterrence” is immaterial in the end. No matter what, it boiled down to a simple, yet sweeping message: though militarily unusable, nuclear weapons were tools for political and diplomatic leverage. Leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain were at one with each other in the shared conviction that a nuclear threat posture was needed if they were to play a central role in world affairs. Nuclear weapons were the currency of status, prestige, and global power, the means to prevent others from overextending their influence and to demonstrate national assertiveness. They were a power booster in constant need of being recharged. Grinding this blunt weapon seemed to be the inevitable order of the new age. It was based on an ancient rationale: whoever refrains from threats of force and military engagements demonstrates political impotence and bids goodbye to vital interests; but those willing to move into the grey areas of intimidation and uncertainty can extend their scope of action—and all the more so if they convey the impression that events might actually get out of hand. Needless to point out,

Bien Phu, New York 2014, pp. 91–98; Rebecca Grant, Dien Bien Phu, in: Air Force Magazine, January 8, 2004, pp. 18–21. For more details on the the Quemoy-Matsu-crisis, see Gordon H. Chang, To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu-Crisis, in: International Security 4 (1988), pp. 96–123.

20 Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*, Princeton 1999, p. 183; Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam*, New York 2000, p. 97; Kaplan, *The Bomb*, pp. 51–63.

21 Burr and Rosenberg, *Nuclear Competition*, p. 90. Andrei Sakharov argued alike. See Holmoway, *Racing toward Armageddon?*, p. 29.

22 Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 144, 168, 173 (emphasis *ibid.*).

a policy of making outspoken nuclear threats was a risky one. But the risk was accepted, if not welcomed. It goes without saying that its price tag was chronic mistrust.²³

3. “Atomic Diplomacy” and Distrust

Neither side was ever ready to provoke, much less to unleash, nuclear war. The mutually shared policy of deterrence, however, was a mind game, born in fear, which had to perpetuate fear to drive its point home. In the 1950s, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles therefore defined Cold War statecraft as a war of nerves—as the art of approaching the abyss and holding your adversary in suspense about the borderline between a policy of reckless gambling and mere bluff. Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikita Khrushchev argued likewise. Molotov’s active advice was to keep the opposite side under permanent pressure, but always be conscious of personal limits. And in 1958 Khrushchev claimed that “the people with the strongest nerves will be the winners. That is the most important consideration in the power struggle of our time. The people with weak nerves will go to the wall.”²⁴ On various occasions John F. Kennedy followed suit and, to cite a 1962 interview as a case in point, publicly toyed with the idea of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union should America’s “vital interests” be challenged.²⁵ Needless to say, any definition of what actually constituted “vital interests” was kept in limbo. Up to the early 1980s, both sides employed such strategies of psychological attrition time and again.

Because of this, the sheer presence of nuclear weapons and attending fantasies rank prominently in the history of Cold War crises. Certainly, the manifold confrontations of the time cannot be measured by the same yardstick: events in Berlin, Korea, Suez, Congo, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Syria and Israel, Angola, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa not only occurred in different settings, they followed their own patterns of logic. Yet there was a common background noise: a feeling of uncertainty, suspicion and mistrust. No actor could be confident that the other side would respect red lines; each side tended to “overload the enemy” without knowing how its coded language of power would eventually be deciphered and understood. That some protagonists lived on an overdose of rational actor-logic was no comfort—indeed, quite the opposite, as a conversation of January 1973 between Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Ambassador to Washington, illustrates. Lecturing his guest about the intertwined workings of

23 See Jeremi Suri, *Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung oder Politik mit der Bombe*, in: Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), *Krisen im Kalten Krieg, Studien zum Kalten Krieg, Band 2*, Hamburg 2008, p. 34; Burr and Rosenberg, *Nuclear competition*, pp. 91 f.

24 Holloway, *Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 382, 392.

25 Bernd Greiner, *Die Kuba-Krise. Die Welt an der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg*, Munich 2010, p. 37.

force and diplomacy, Kissinger maintained that exceeding the limit by 30 per cent was better than to fall short by five per cent, and that, whenever force was either threatened or applied, a slightly hysterical reaction would do the trick.²⁶ This was another, and arguably the most precise, shorthand for “atomic diplomacy” and distrust in the Cold War.

Buttressing the credibility of nuclear weapons shaped foreign policy and crisis-management throughout the period. Alternatively, debunking the usefulness of nuclear power was also an option. In both respects, the Berlin Crisis of 1948, the Korean War, the Suez Affair, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are telling examples. In July 1948, weeks after the Soviets had imposed a blockade on West Berlin, President Harry S. Truman dispatched B-29 bombers to Europe. Beyond the walls of the Pentagon and the White House nobody was aware that these planes had not been modified to carry atomic weapons and that the American stockpile at the time was miniscule. However, the rest of the world was to be led to believe in American steadfastness and that it retained the option to go nuclear anytime.²⁷ For fear of seeming weak and inviting further pressure, Stalin sought refuge in a forward strategy of his own: stand your ground, do not give in, offer no compromise. Clearly, a similar rationale was in play in early 1950. Whatever really motivated Stalin to give Kim Il Sung the green light to attack South Korea, atomic diplomacy loomed large—if only to demonstrate the sheer ineffectiveness of America’s nuclear superiority.

The matchless master in this game was Nikita Khrushchev. His threats of missile attacks on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv in early November 1956, his defiance of the West once more over Berlin, and his deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba all amounted to outright bluff. But, to him, exposing the other side’s vulnerability and calling its credibility into question always seemed worth the effort. As is well known, Khrushchev was kicked out of office in 1964 on a charge of political adventurism—an allegation which did not stop his rivals from following in his footsteps. Leonid Brezhnev lost no time in pronouncing the new rulers’ reading of the Cuban Missile Crisis: never again would they allow the United States to humiliate the Soviet Union with a superior nuclear force. Another round in the armaments race was set off; once again a superpower took a run to sharpen its arsenal of blunt weapons.

To cut a long crisis-story short, we can conclude that nuclear weapons prodded the United States and the Soviet Union into competition for a superior power-rating. As historian Jeremi Suri states, both raised geopolitical claims, incurred liabilities and took risks beyond the means of non-nuclear powers. Again, one of the most famous authorities to attest to this claim is Henry Kissinger. Without nuclear threats, he contended in a much acclaimed essay for *Foreign Affairs*, the United States would forgo any chance to rewrite the global map in its

26 Suri, *Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung*, p. 40.

27 Greiner, *Politik am Rande des Abgrunds?*, pp. 61 ff.

favor.²⁸ As Special Consultant for National Security from 1969 to 1975 and Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, Kissinger followed his own advice, making use of nuclear weapons for political coercion. On three occasions, he and President Richard M. Nixon applied the so-called “Madman Theory”—a policy of feigned madness to bring the Soviets into line. During the Vietnam peace negotiations, the Jordan Crisis in 1970, and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, American armed forces were put on high levels of alert despite the risk of inadvertent escalation. Nuclear weapons were an incentive to the superpowers to overdraw their political accounts and to enter into contests over power and influence in literally every corner of the world.²⁹ This was the perfect recipe for perpetuating distrust: threatening the worst at places and times of their own choosing, merely for the sake of being on eye-level with the other side, undermining its credibility, or giving it a dose of its own medicine.

In contrast, we might refer to the policy of *détente* and arms control agreements like SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) as successful moves towards a trust- and confidence-based security policy—or at least as attempts to defuse the toxic legacy of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the 1970s saw a loosening of the old, deep-seated patterns of mutual distrust. Especially in Europe, an easing of tensions proved durable and contributed in multiple ways to the eventual demise of the Cold War.³⁰ When we focus on U.S.–Soviet relations, however, the record looks less bright. Arrival at a lasting policy shift was compromised in many ways: Nixon and Kissinger saw *détente* as a subtle form of anti-Soviet containment; the Soviets in turn seized on every opportunity to gain ground in the Third World; and even moderate plans for arms control drew heavy fire from American conservatives and fear-mongers who fantasized about “windows of vulnerability” and Soviet first-strike capabilities. In 1979, when SALT II was locked in stalemate, “atomic diplomacy” had its latest comeback.³¹

4. Distrust Writ Large: The Early 1980s

Again in the early 1980s, we witness the interplay of all too familiar patterns. First, technological progress and the modernization of nuclear weapons increased. Second, another chapter in a policy of fear was staged by the Reagan Administration during its first term. Just recall the political rhetoric of that time. Secretary of State Alexander Haig is on record making the infamous claim that there are

28 Henry Kissinger, *Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Grey Areas’*, in: *Foreign Affairs* 33/3 (1955), pp. 416–428.

29 Suri, *Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung*, pp. 27, 31.

30 Matthias Peter, *Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess, 1975–1983. Die Umkehrung der Diplomatie*, Berlin/Boston 2015.

31 Arvid Schors, *Doppelter Boden. Die SALT-Verhandlungen 1963–1979*, Göttingen 2016.

more important things than living in peace.³² President Ronald Reagan put the disposal of Communism to the rubbish dump of history as the top item on his foreign policy agenda—a logical extension of his belief that Communism stood for a bizarre chapter in human history which had outlived itself.³³ And, according to Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, if deterrence should fail, the U.S. should be able to wage and win an all-out nuclear war.³⁴ Maintaining the traditional Cold War mirror-imaging, the Soviets responded in kind. The Communist Party's Secretary General, Yuri Andropov, charged the U.S. with following in Nazi-Germany's "Blitzkrieg" footsteps and cited Hiroshima as an instance of American unscrupulousness. In the words of a close Andropov advisor: "Here comes the recipe for total war against the Soviet Union and its allies."³⁵

Month after month, Pentagon officials disseminated bizarre ideas about surviving Armageddon. Respective contingency plans were leaked to the press—not by whistleblowers, but by government insiders and their intellectual consultants. A variety of troubling documents saw the light of day: Jimmy Carter's "Presidential Directive 59,"³⁶ two "National Security Decision Directives" by Ronald Reagan,³⁷ the "Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance," and, to top it all, parts of the "Single Integrated Operation Plan No. 6" or "SIOP 6."³⁸ Different as they were in topic and range, all these memoranda had one crucial item in common: they envisioned protracted atomic wars and fine-tuned nuclear exchanges. The authors of the "Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance," for instance, postulated "plans to prevail against the Soviet Union on all levels of conflict, be it insurgen-

32 "If we make just the maintenance of peace alone [...] the *raison d'être* on the core of our policy deliberations, I'm afraid we're going to bring about [...] the destruction of the very objective we've established for ourselves: peace. There are things that we Americans must be willing to fight for. I know this republic was spawned by armed conflict [...]. It was Patrick Henry who stated 'give me liberty or give me death'. [...] Clearly, in the nuclear age the responsibilities in this area become all the more awesome. But the point I wanted to make is, there are things worth fighting for. We must understand that. We must structure our policy under that credible and justified premise." Alexander Haig, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his nomination as Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1981, in: *The New York Times*, Major Points From Appearance by Haig Before Senate Committee, January 10, 1981, Section 1, p. 9.

33 Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando/Florida, March 3, 1983, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 28/10 (1983), pp. 994–1001, here pp. 1000 f.

34 United States Information Service, *Wireless Bulletin*, June 18, 1981.

35 *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 27/11 (1982), p. 1137; see also Dima Adamsky, *The 1983 Nuclear Crisis—Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice*, in: *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36/1 (2013), pp. 18, 22.

36 For Presidential Directive (PD) 59 "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy" from July 25, 1980 see <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd59.pdf>.

37 For an overview of Reagan's National Security Decision Directives see <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html>.

38 William M. Arkin, *Why SIOP-6?*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 39/4 (1983), p. 9.

cies or nuclear war.”³⁹ And, in this same vein in the summer of 1980, the editors of the mainstream magazine *Foreign Policy* published an article headlined “Victory is Possible,” and with it the scenario of a nuclear war waged to deny the Soviet Union an extended sphere of influence.⁴⁰

However preposterous all this may sound, it also points to a political-military twilight zone at the core of the “Second Cold War.” Beyond belligerent verbal skirmishes played out in the open, the superpowers engaged in a military war of nerves. For the Soviet Union, the main places to contain Western power and influence were Afghanistan and Poland. For the United States, “psychological operations” or so-called “psyops” were the means of choice. Time and again, American intelligence and military operations were staged with an ulterior motive in mind: to make a convincing case that the Soviet Union could not adequately defend its airspace and coastline, that its early warning systems were outdated and that, in case of war, American forces would get a head start. U. S. bomber wings repeatedly flew mock-attacks against the Soviet homeland veering away only within seconds from its borders; in September 1981, American warships sneaked into the Barents Sea near Murmansk unnoticed by Soviet radar; navy fighters deployed for naval exercise “Fleetex 83” in the vicinity of the Kurile islands repeatedly entered Soviet airspace.⁴¹

Keep it in mind that the United States did not intend to provoke, much less to unleash, a nuclear war. The plan was that the Soviet leadership should henceforth live in fear—fear of both the capacity and the disposition of the United States to carry out devastating “decapitation strikes” against centers of political and military command, control and communication. The Soviets should be kept in doubt over when and why the United States might push the button, and should stay tenuous in its judgement of what Washington’s decision-making body was thinking. Showering all kinds of troubling and dubious information on Moscow was at the core of this psychological warfare strategy. The more you intimidate an adversary, the more you extend your own scope of action: this mantra-like slogan was maintained for years.⁴²

Inadvertent risks accompanying this show of force were all too obvious. In the summer of 1983, Soviet border forces had become increasingly edgy because of intensified U. S. missions probing Moscow’s air defense facilities—on average, 70 close approaches per month. When, in the early hours of September 1, a U. S. reconnaissance plane again drew near to the Soviet defense zone over Sachalin and crossed the flight path of a civilian Korean carrier, military air-controllers made a fateful identification error and ordered missile-fire on KAL 007, killing

39 Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance, in: *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982, and *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 27/10 (1982), pp. 1011–1016.

40 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, *Victory is Possible*, in: *Foreign Policy* 39/10 (1980), pp. 14–27.

41 Seymour M. Hersh, *The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It*, New York 1986.

42 Adamsky, 1983 Nuclear Crisis, pp. 11, 23, 24.

269 people. This was not the only misjudgement made during this time, but it was the first with tragic ramifications. U. S. officials, including the President, kept on charging the Soviets with wanton murder and terror, even after being supplied by their own intelligence network with evidence to the contrary.⁴³ Even superb intelligence did not count; instead, deeply entrenched anti-Soviet emotions, prejudices, and mindsets carried the day, only increased by the prospect of winning an easy propaganda victory over Moscow. Perpetuating traditional patterns on their side, the Soviets responded in kind: to retaliate for Washington's show of force, they announced an increase in the number of Soviet submarine-based missiles targeted at the United States. Within days, U.S.–Soviet relations had sunk to their lowest point since the Cuba Missile Crisis.

KAL 007 was still in international headlines, when, unnoticed by the public, potentially disastrous incidents happened elsewhere. On September 26, shortly after midnight, a red alert was set off in a military reconnaissance installation south of Moscow. A space-based satellite system called “Okol” signaled the approach of five American intercontinental ballistic missiles against the Soviet homeland. 17 minutes passed before ground radar operators verified a malfunction in the system. In all probability, air controllers had been led astray by a combination of trivial circumstances—computer sensors had presumably confused cloud-reflected sunrays in the sky above an American airbase with the red tail of an airborne missile.⁴⁴

In early November 1983, there was again ample reason for bewilderment, misinterpretation, and distrust on account of dubious signals sent off by NATO's command post exercise “Able Archer.” In a way that differed from similar exercises in the past, all levels of escalation from conventional to nuclear war were rehearsed; and, departing from previous understandings, the orders for launching nuclear weapons were camouflaged in codes indecipherable by Soviet services.⁴⁵ It is true that “Able Archer” was nothing but an exercise; but against the backdrop of long-standing saber-rattling, it could also have been interpreted as a smokescreen for an imminent attack. Whatever it was meant to signal, there can be no dispute that it occasioned a runway alert for a number of Soviet nuclear fighter jets deployed in East Germany, a combat alert for some Soviet ground units in Eastern Europe and an enhanced readiness alert for a variety of Soviet ICBMs. Some historians claim that Moscow's war scare put world peace on a razor's edge; others interpret these Soviet countermeasures as yet another example of the Cold War's routine mirror-imaging: nuclear impression-management on one side

43 Hersh, *The Target is Destroyed*.

44 Interview with Stanislav Petrov, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 19, 2013, p. 7.

45 Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare*, Washington, D. C. 1997, pp. 6–10; Len Scott, *Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited*, in: *Intelligence and National Security* 22/6 (2011), p. 767; Klaas Voß, *Die Enden der Parabel. Die Nuklearwaffenübung Able Archer im Krisenjahr 1983*, in: *Mittelweg* 36 23/1 (2015), pp. 73–92.

provoking responses in kind from the other.⁴⁶ Be that as it may, “Able Archer” testifies to deep-rooted distrust and to a political fabric that encouraged crisis escalation, inadvertent decision-making, and potentially even war.

5. The Demise of “Old Thinking”

To dub 1983 “the most dangerous year of the Cold War” is certainly way off the mark,⁴⁷ but the early 1980s certainly qualify as yet another twilight zone of nuclear bravado and deep-seated mistrust. The atmosphere in the ranks of the Moscow Politburo and Soviet military and intelligence services deepened into a brooding anticipation of war. Whether Andropov actually believed in his slogan of an impending “nuclear Barbarossa” or not, nobody can tell for sure. But in terms of military hardware, it looked as if the U.S. was about to build up an uncatchable advantage. To some observers, its combination of sophisticated computer technology with new MX intercontinental and Pershing II intermediate-range missiles amounted to a veritable first-strike capability; and the endless blustering about “limited nuclear wars” and “decapitating strikes” aroused suspicion that an overly power-confident United States might be tempted to overbid its stakes in future crises and to engage in escalating modes of confrontation. This is why Andropov, along with the military Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, and Secretary of State Andrei Gromyko, time and again referred back to the summer of 1941. For all its propagandistic maneuvering, the “Barbarossa” generation of Moscow’s *nomenklatura* was genuinely concerned. According to the first-hand evidence of observers, the officials had not been so edgy at any time since the Cuba Missile Crisis in late 1962.⁴⁸

With this as the background, it comes as little surprise that the Kremlin intensified its emergency preparations. It did so most notably in an endeavor dating back to 1981 which had the codename “RYAN” (shorthand for *Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie*, or “Nuclear Missile Attack”). This involved a sweeping attempt by Soviet and Eastern European intelligence services to collect data that

46 Mark Kramer, Die Nicht-Krise um ‘Able Archer 1983’: Fürchtete die sowjetische Führung tatsächlich einen atomaren Großangriff im Herbst 1983?, in: Oliver Bange and Bernd Lemke (eds.), *Wege zur Wiedervereinigung. Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen 1970 bis 1990*, Munich 2013, pp. 129–150; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Able Archer’: An der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg?, in: Greiner, Müller, and Walter (eds.), *Krisen im Kalten Krieg*, pp. 505–523.

47 Georg Schild, 1983. Das gefährlichste Jahr des Kalten Krieges, Paderborn 2013; Berliner Colloquien zur Zeitgeschichte, #15, “1983: The Most Dangerous Year of the Cold War?,” <https://www.berlinercolloquien.de/colloquien/1983-the-most-dangerous-year-of-the-cold-war/index.html>.

48 Nate Jones (ed.), *The 1983 War Scare*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 426, Interview with Lieutenant General Gelii V. Batenin, Document 23, p. 10; see also Document 24, pp. 106f and Beatrice Heuser, *The Soviet Response to the Euromissile Crisis, 1982–83*, in: Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975–1985*, London 2008, pp. 137–149.

might possibly indicate the coming of a Western nuclear attack: information on troop movements, radio traffic, police activities, daily schedules of high-ranking politicians and military leaders, emergency scenarios for hospitals, call-ups for blood donations, long working hours in ministries of defense, even the activities of military chaplains. Though many aspects of operation “RYAN” are still unknown, the operation testifies to the rampant distrust of the time.

Again, the metaphor of nuclear weapons as the Cold War’s game-changer seems appropriate. Even though political leaders understood the difference between threat and action, they time and again underrated the political and psychological price of nuclear brinkmanship, especially the potential for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. Nuclear weapons did not, as such, create post-1945 tensions, but they certainly made conflicts ever more contentious by feeding fear, suspicion and mistrust, if not outright paranoia. It is hard to imagine any other force-multiplier of political controversies so powerful and persistent. Despite the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterring outright war, they stimulated international crises; and even though they set limits to the Cold War itself, they kept the confrontation alive.⁴⁹

Against the backdrop of these cycles, which at the time seemed carved in stone, the abolition of an entire generation of nuclear weapons, agreed upon in the INF Treaty of 1987 is one of the most remarkable achievements in all Cold War History. It should encourage historians to readjust their analytical focus—away from the well-documented history of distrust to the delicate and little understood dynamics of positive trust-building.

49 Suri, *Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung*, p. 46; Holloway, *Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 380, 396.

Ulrich Kühn

Back to the Future? The New Missile Crisis

1. Introduction

The 1987 INF Treaty¹ between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—more commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty²—can easily be considered a landmark arms control and disarmament treaty.³ It was the first bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to effectively eliminate a whole class of missiles and missile launchers. It lifted the most imminent nuclear threat to Western Europe, served as a significant turning point in U.S.–Soviet relations, and introduced the most intrusive verification measures up to that point. Its background history was the first period of détente, NATO's Dual-Track Decision to counter the Soviet SS-20 threat, and a negotiation record which finally achieved what almost no one would have expected when negotiators first sat down in Geneva.

31 years after the INF Treaty entered into force (in 1988), the Administration of U.S. President Donald Trump decided to quit the agreement in the summer of 2019. Since 2014 the United States had been publicly accusing Moscow of violating the Treaty by flight-testing a ground-launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the ranges banned by the INF Treaty (500–5,500 km).⁴ Subsequently, U.S. officials expressed concerns that Russia might have started to produce more missiles

- 1 Parts of this article are taken from an earlier article on the INF crisis. See Ulrich Kühn and Anna Péczeli, Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty, in: *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11/1 (2017), pp. 66–99.
- 2 Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>.
- 3 Cf. Avis Bohlen, William Burns, Steven Pifer, and John Woodworth (eds.), *The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned*, in: The Brookings Institution (December 2012), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2012/12/arms-control-inf-treaty-pifer/30-arms-control-pifer-paper.pdf>; Amy F. Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service (April 25, 2018), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf>.
- 4 U.S. Department of State, *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments*, Report, (April, 2017), <https://www.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/> (accessed March 30, 2020).

than needed to sustain a flight-test program.⁵ Russia rejected the accusations and tabled a number of counter-allegations against the United States.⁶ The diplomatic back-and-forth finally culminated in the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Treaty—a decision with potentially wide-ranging repercussions for the security of Europe and East Asia.

The end of the INF Treaty comes at a critical time. Ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Moscow's relations with the West have plummeted to an all-time post-Cold War low. Against a background of mutual accusations of violating the norms and principles of the European security order, covert Russian involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow's alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections, the unresolved case of the poisoning of former operative Sergei Skripal, the continued rhetorical Russian nuclear saber-rattling and intimidation of European NATO allies, the European Union's economic sanctions against Russia, and the Russian military intervention in Syria, the West and Russia find themselves trapped in a dangerous downward spiral, which some have already labeled a "New Cold War."⁷

The renewed confrontation has also left its mark on the instruments of arms control. Through its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in which it, along with the United States and Britain, had agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine (a key element in securing Kiev's agreement to transfer all Soviet-era nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination).⁸ In so doing, Moscow further damaged the integrity of so-called negative security guarantees in general. In March 2015, Russia completed its "suspension" of the most important conventional arms control treaty—the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe—and walked out of that treaty's decision-making body.⁹ On nuclear safety and security, Russia ended almost all cooperation with the United States on bilateral efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities under the auspices of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and cancelled the US–Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

5 Michael R. Gordon, *Russia Is Moving Ahead with Missile Program That Violates Treaty*, U.S. Officials Say, in: *The New York Times*, October 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/europe/russia-missiles-inf-treaty.html?_r=0.

6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Comments on the report of the U. S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments*, (August 1, 2014) http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D2D396AE143B098144257D2A0054C7FD.

7 Robert Legvold, *Managing the New Cold War*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 93/4 (2014), pp. 74–84.

8 For the Budapest Memorandum between Russia, the USA, the UK and Ukraine from December 5, 1994 see https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atfcl/%7BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s19941399_.pdf (last accessed March 30, 2020).

9 Kingston Reif, *Russia Completes CFE Treaty Suspension*, in: *Arms Control Today*, April 2015, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-04/news-briefs/russia-completes-cfe-treaty-suspension> (last accessed March 30, 2020).

Taken together, these developments have led some to caution that the world is experiencing “the end of the history of nuclear arms control.”¹⁰ Others have argued that Russia has effectively broken with the rules and constraints of the European and global security order and that the West (that is, NATO) is, therefore, no longer bound by agreements like the INF Treaty.¹¹ After the end of the INF Treaty, the United States and its Allies in Europe and East Asia face a choice of what to do to enhance security: give arms control another chance or provide the ground for another missile buildup.

This essay recounts the history of the INF Treaty from the latter days of détente to the current developments after the end of INF. It explains why the current post-INF environment is highly problematic for European security, and what the way forward—reviving arms control or re-entering an arms race—might look like. Even though the new missile crisis might create additional negative ripple effects for East Asia, the essay focuses primarily on Europe.

2. The Cold War Missile Crisis

It is crucial to note that, from the very beginning, the history of the INF Treaty was mainly a history of European security concerns. The precarious military balance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact came under increasing pressure when the Soviet Union decided to replace its aging SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles (all single-warhead missiles) with the three-warhead SS-20 ballistic missile. Deployed deep inside Soviet territory and having a maximum range of 5,000 kilometers, the SS-20 was potentially able to strike any target in Western Europe as well as targets in Southeast Asia and Alaska.

The European NATO allies, first and foremost West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, identified those weapons as destabilizing the security system, creating a gap in NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. They had no similar capabilities to match the threat. When, in 1979, the NATO Allies decided effectively to mount a response to the growing SS-20 threat, they opted for a dyadic concept.¹² The Dual-Track Decision had two components. On the deployment track, NATO

10 Alexei Arbatov, *An Unnoticed Crisis: The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?*, in: Carnegie Endowment, June 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Arbatov2015_n_web_Eng.pdf (last accessed March 30, 2020).

11 Matthew Kroenig, *Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War*, in: *Survival* 57/1 (2015), pp. 49–70.

12 The Harmel Doctrine of 1967, named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, outlined a two-pronged strategy based on deterrence and engagement for NATO. The doctrine’s core concern was the maintenance of an adequate defense of all Allies. That concern was coupled with a political agenda of engagement with the Soviet Union aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and reducing the dangerous tensions between the two blocs. See NATO, *The Future Tasks of the Alliance*, Report of the Council Ministerial Communiqué, Brussels, December 1967, pp.13 f., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.

threatened to introduce 108 newly built Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 GLCMs into Europe. On the arms control track, NATO reached out to the Soviets and offered negotiations aimed at achieving limits that could affect the scale of the deployment it proposed.

The first round of negotiations (1981–1983) was completely fruitless, due to both sides sticking to their maximum positions. Washington wanted to include all INF-systems—those in the 1,000 to 5,500 km range—wherever they were deployed and proposed the so-called “double zero” option (put forward by President Ronald Reagan), by which all SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles should be dismantled and the Pershing II and GLCM not be deployed. Meanwhile, the Soviets insisted on including British and French systems, limiting the geographical scope to cover only the European part of the Soviet Union (thus allowing for Soviet INF-range deployments in the Asian part of the USSR), and including all American nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft in Europe. In November 1983, as a result of this diplomatic deadlock, the first weapons were deployed in West Germany. As a direct reaction, the Soviet delegation to the INF talks in Geneva walked out.¹³

3. An Arms Control Solution

When Mikhail Gorbachev took office as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, a resumption of the INF talks had already been agreed upon (two months earlier). However, it was only in 1986 that the Soviet position changed markedly, and in a surprising way. By the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, the Soviets had already come close to the original U. S. double zero proposal, even though Gorbachev wanted to retain a small number of INF missiles in Asia. To the surprise of Western analysts, Moscow subsequently went even further than the original U. S. proposal had, by suggesting the inclusion of missiles of shorter ranges (between 500 and 1,000 km)—which meant including the West German Pershing IA and the Soviet SS-23 and SS-12.¹⁴ On 8 December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in the East Room of the White House.

Being of unlimited duration, the Treaty eliminated all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles as well as SSC-X-4 Cruise Missiles and launchers on the one side; on the other, all U. S. Pershing II and Pershing IB ballistic missiles; and the relevant U. S. ground-launched Cruise Missiles and launchers. In fact, the Treaty banned all U. S. and Soviet ground-launched nuclear and conventional missiles and launchers with a range between 500 and 5,500 km worldwide. By June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 intermediate-range missiles had been

13 U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Understanding the INF Treaty*, Washington, D. C., 1989, p. 9.

14 Bohlen et al. (eds.), *The Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces*, p. 6.

entirely eliminated. In addition, the Treaty prohibited producing or flight-testing any new INF systems or separate stages of INF missiles or launchers. It did not, however, ban sea-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) or air-launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). A further novelty was the asymmetric character of the reductions. While the Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles, the United States destroyed 846 missiles. To address possible compliance concerns and to oversee implementation, the Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC).¹⁵

For Europe, INF meant the beginning of a process which resulted in a densely institutionalized network of various multilateral arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, including, among others, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the various formal stipulations on military transparency and predictability of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (the later OSCE), as well as the bilateral Strategic Arms Reductions treaties (START I and II) and the U.S.–Soviet Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons with shorter ranges.

4. Growing Russian Discomfort and the U. S. Allegations

The subsequent years saw little reason to worry about the bargain. On-site inspections continued until mid-2001 when, according to the Treaty's provisions, the extensive inspection regime was finally terminated and replaced by national technical means of verification—ten years after the last INF systems had been destroyed. However, below the level of public attention, Russian dissatisfaction with the Treaty did surface now and then. Russian officials and President Vladimir Putin himself questioned the continued viability of the INF Treaty. Several times, they went so far as formulating arguments in favor of abandoning the agreement.¹⁶

In 2007, the then Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov publicly questioned the Treaty: “The gravest mistake was the decision to scrap a whole class of missile weapons—medium-range ballistic missiles. Only Russia and the United States do not have the right to have such weapons, although they would be quite useful for us.”¹⁷ What Ivanov hinted at was concern amongst the Russian military over China's intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, a capability Russia could not match with land-based systems.¹⁸

15 See Article XIII of the INF Treaty, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm> (accessed March 30, 2020).

16 Evgeny Buzhinsky, Does the INF Treaty Have a Future?, in: Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 20/2 (2014), pp. 89–93; Bohlen et al. (eds.), *The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces*, p. 22.

17 RIA Novosti, Scrapping Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles a Mistake—Ivanov, in: Sputnik, February 7, 2007, <http://sputniknews.com/russia/20070207/60350944.html>.

18 Victor Yesin, Nuclear Disarmament: Problems and Prospects, in: *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 2, 2008, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10357.

Then, in 2010, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated its earlier claim that the continued U.S. use of “a whole family of target missiles” for its missile defense programs represented “direct violations” of the Treaty.¹⁹ As we know today, the U.S. government at that time already suspected that Russia was developing a new GLCM of intermediate-range. Finally, in 2014, the INF crisis reached the level of full public attention, when the U.S. State Department declared “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a GLCM with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”²⁰

Moscow’s reaction came immediately. In an official statement, Russia rejected the U.S. allegations and presented its own list of counter-accusations, most prominently U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, allegedly in violation of the INF Treaty.²¹ According to the Russian accusations, those missile defense installations could easily be converted—just by changing the necessary software—into launching sea-launched Tomahawk Cruise Missiles as ground-launched ones. In the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, if America were to withdraw from the treaty, “our response would be immediate [...] and reciprocal.”²² What followed was a fruitless diplomatic back-and-forth which reached a first peak in November 2016 with the U.S. request to re-convene the SVC in Geneva (the commission which had been dormant for over 13 years) after information had surfaced that Russia was allegedly producing more missiles than needed for a flight-test program.²³ Neither the U.S. nor the Russian concerns could be resolved at that meeting.

5. INF and the Trump Administration

With Donald Trump’s unexpected ascent to the White House, U.S.–Russian relations took center stage due to U.S. accusations that Russia had influenced the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections and had actively aided the Trump campaign. Questions were also raised about the new President’s business ties to Moscow, his somewhat ambiguous stance towards U.S. security guarantees for European NATO Allies, and his embrace of Russia’s authoritarian model. Against this background of largely poisoned relations, all decisions with regard

19 Quoted from Kühn, Péczeli, Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty, p. 9.

20 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Report.

21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov’s interview with the Interfax news agency, December 19, 2017, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2998923.

22 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 19, 2017, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882>.

23 Gordon, Russia Is Moving, in: The New York Times, October 19, 2016.

to Russia became a bone of contention in domestic U.S. politics, sometimes with far-reaching repercussions for European security. The INF Treaty was just one policy topic amongst many where U.S. policy-makers were raising their anti-Russian profile.

What has spurred the end of INF is also the fact that U.S. policy towards Russia under Donald Trump is not coherent or homogenous but breaks down into varying lines taken by different, sometimes competing, groups of actors. There are some in the U.S. government who favor a tough stance towards Russia, and in particular want to contain and push back against Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most prominent voice for this course was that of John Bolton, Trump's National Security Advisor from April 2018 to September 2019. During his time in office, Bolton emerged as the main critic of the INF Treaty. Bolton had a proven track record of deep-seated skepticism towards treaties constraining U.S. power, particularly arms control agreements.²⁴ In 2014, he publicly lobbied for the United States to end the INF Treaty, arguing that "with Russia's violations of the Treaty, America remains the only country bound by and honoring a prohibition on deploying intermediate-range forces."²⁵ He inferred that "maintaining international security requires that the U.S. have access to the full spectrum of conventional and nuclear options."²⁶ In addition, Bolton saw the United States as ill-prepared in the looming power struggle with China, which was never a party to the INF Treaty.²⁷

This group got significant support from defense hawks in the U.S. Congress. In a hearing before Congress in early 2017, U.S. General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that Russia had already deployed a significant number of prohibited missiles in the ranges banned by the Treaty.²⁸ In late 2017, in order to increase pressure on Russia to return to compliance, the U.S. Congress mandated the Secretary of Defense to develop a conventional ground-launched cruise missile within INF ranges.²⁹ The original bill by the Senate went even further, authorizing research and development for a nuclear-

24 Joseph Cirincione, John Bolton is a serial arms control killer, in: *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldpost/wp/2019/02/01/inf/>.

25 John R. Bolton and John Yoo, An obsolete nuclear treaty even before Russia cheated, in: *The Wall Street Journal*, September 9, 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-bolton-and-john-yoo-an-obsolete-nuclear-treaty-even-before-russia-cheated-1410304847>.

26 *Ibid.*

27 Franz-Stefan Gady, INF Withdrawal: Bolton's Tool to Shatter China-Russia Military Ties?, in: *The Diplomat*, October 24, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/inf-withdrawal-boltons-tool-to-shatter-china-russia-military-ties/>.

28 General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Transcript of Hearing on Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements, March 8, 2017, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2017/0917_nuclear-deterrence/docs/Transcript-HASC-Hearing-on-Nuclear-Deterrence-8-March-2017.pdf.

29 115th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report 115-404, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-congress/house-report/404/1>.

capable version—an endeavor ultimately blocked by the White House.³⁰ In the words of an anonymous U.S. official, the idea behind this proposal was “to send a message to the Russians that they will pay a military price” for violating INF by “posturing ourselves to live in a post-INF world [...] if that is the world the Russians want.”³¹

Last but not least, the U.S. Department of Defense, in consultation with the White House and the Department of Energy, developed its own approach towards the INF crisis. This approach can be subsumed under the headline of “staying within the regime while being tough on Russia.” In essence, that meant formulating INF Treaty-compliant military responses, including responses in the nuclear realm. In early 2018, the Pentagon released an updated version of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),³² a document outlining U.S. policy on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation for the years to come. The NPR suggested the United States should “modify a small number of existing sea-launched ballistic missile warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).”³³ The new SLCM, the NPR argued, would “provide an arms control compliant response to Russia’s non-compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.” Further on, it said: “If Russia returns to compliance with its arms control obligations, reduces its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors, the United States may reconsider the pursuit of a SLCM.” Finally, on October 20, 2018, Donald Trump announced the United States’ intention to withdraw from the Treaty.³⁴

6. Europe and the New Missile Crisis

For Europe, the end of INF has the potential to plunge the continent deeper into a security dilemma with the Russian Federation. Back in July 2018, NATO heads of state and governments had reaffirmed their intention to “remain fully committed to the preservation of this landmark arms control treaty.”³⁵ So Trump’s

30 Kingston Reif, Hill Wants Development of Banned Missile, *Arms Control Today*, December 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-12/news/hill-wants-development-banned-missile>.

31 *Ibid.*

32 Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review 2018*, p. 54.

34 Julian Borger, “Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia,” in: *The Guardian*, October 21, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia.

35 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, July 11–12, 2018, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

withdrawal announcement came somewhat as a surprise to most U.S. Allies. In the weeks following Trump's announcement, U.S. officials began to provide more details about the Russian violation. According to these public statements, Russia had tested a GLCM, the Novator 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-8, "Screwdriver") from both fixed and mobile launchers, far surpassing a range beyond the INF compliance threshold.³⁶ Even the German government, which had previously been hesitant to call out Russia publicly, shifted course. On November 20, 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that "we know" that Russia has not been complying with INF "for some time."³⁷ In December 2018, the NATO Allies announced that they "strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty."³⁸ A last-ditch effort to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, suggested by Chancellor Merkel, would only delay U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. On February 1, 2019, Donald Trump declared that the United States would exit the INF Treaty six months later. On August 2, 2019, INF became history.

The implications are clear. Europeans could be the first to see the negative effects of the end of INF. Because of the extremely short flight times they take (around five minutes only), intermediate-range weapons, if directed at Europe, would give the targeted states almost no warning time. In the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, the 1980s' threat of INF weapons "was like holding a gun to our head."³⁹ This effect would immediately come back, and it would pertain to almost all of Europe, should Russia deploy the alleged new systems in its western military district (perhaps including deployment in its westernmost exclave of Kaliningrad).

Such deployments, if they were to occur in the years ahead, would also lend additional arguments to those warning of Russia's assumed nuclear doctrine of "escalate to de-escalate." According to the drafters of the new American NPR, Moscow "mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to 'de-escalate' a conflict on terms favorable to Russia."⁴⁰ What they refer to is the fear of extended deterrence failure in

36 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats on Russia's INF Treaty Violation, November 30, 2018, www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/item/1923-director-of-national-intelligence-daniel-coats-on-russia-s-inf-treaty-violation.

37 "Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem dänischen Ministerpräsidenten Rasmussen," November 20, 2018, www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/presse-statements-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-daenischen-ministerpraesidenten-rasmussen-1552136.

38 Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers, Brussels, December 4, 2018, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_161122.htm.

39 Quoted from Q&A: 25 Years On, Gorbachev Recalls Nuclear Milestone, in: The Moscow Times, December 6, 2012, <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/qa-25-years-on-gorbachev-recalls-nuclear-milestone-19978>.

40 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 8.

the context of Russia attacking one of NATO's militarily weak member states in Eastern Europe, perhaps in the Baltic area. In that scenario—so the argument by Western analysts goes⁴¹—Russia could resort to the early and limited use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to coerce NATO into accepting a military *fait accompli*. Without the capabilities for an immediate, measured nuclear response, NATO would then have little choice but to accept defeat.⁴² Seen from this angle, additional Russian intermediate-weapons would give the Russian military additional assets to hold at risk NATO targets deep in Western Europe and critical for reinforcement in the event of a military crisis, say (again) in the Baltic region. Against a pre-existent background of NATO grappling with the worst-case scenario of not being able to defend the Baltic States in a conflict with Russia, intermediate-range missiles would further tip the already precarious regional military balance in favor of Russia, most notably by threatening to disrupt NATO's supply and reinforcement chains.

Even though most of such military considerations currently take place in expert circles behind closed doors and stay largely unnoticed by the wider public, the coming years might well see a renaissance of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, together with a political debate akin to that of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

7. Back to the Future: Arms Racing or Arms Control?

With the end of the INF Treaty, Europe's security is once more very much up in the air. Two scenarios are possible in the years ahead. Both of them would, to different degrees, mirror past developments surrounding the emergence of the INF Treaty in the 1980s.

The first scenario—arms racing—sees Russia and the United States developing and deploying more and more intermediate-range missiles. This course would be in line with other developments on the strategic nuclear level. In his State of the Union speech in March 2018,⁴³ Vladimir Putin revealed a number of new or planned strategic nuclear systems aimed at offsetting America's advantage in

41 Matthew Kroenig, Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War, in: Survival 57 (2015), pp. 49–70.

42 Proponents of that logic refer to the readiness levels of NATO's dual-capable aircraft in Europe which are currently measured in weeks and the assumption that the Allies' aircraft might not be able to penetrate Russian airspace. According to NATO, its dual-capable aircraft "are available for nuclear roles at various levels of readiness"—the highest level of readiness is measured in weeks. NATO, NATO's Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces, December 3, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm#. See also Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region, in: RUSI Journal 161/5 (2016), pp. 12–18.

43 Russia's Putin unveils 'invincible' nuclear weapons, March 1, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43239331>.

strategic missile defense installations, and made it abundantly clear that Moscow views its missile inventory as the ultimate security and great power guarantee. While a stance like this does not rule out the possibility of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms reductions in the future, it makes it less likely against the background of the current political tensions.

Even though the Trump Administration says otherwise, a reintroduction of U.S. ground-launched intermediate-range missiles becomes quite likely now that the INF Treaty is ended. The Pentagon has been researching a new conventional GLCM and a modern medium-range ballistic missile since 2018, and the first tests of these weapons systems were made in 2019.⁴⁴ The latest reports from Washington indicate that the GLCM could be ready for deployment in early 2021.⁴⁵ Defense hawks in Washington would probably welcome a decision to fund these systems to the full in the years ahead, even more so since leaving the INF Treaty has finally untied America's hands in East Asia, where China can field as many missiles in INF-ranges as it wants while the U.S. military has up to now been barred from reciprocating.⁴⁶

In this scenario, America's European Allies would face the daunting challenge of consulting with Washington over what to do with the new missiles—where to deploy them. Complicating all this, NATO's European members share no common position on how to respond to Russia's new missile challenge. While French President Emmanuel Macron is pushing ever harder for European “strategic autonomy” in the realm of defense and perhaps even in nuclear matters,⁴⁷ some members of the German Social Democrats have been discussing requesting the removal of some twenty U.S. nuclear gravity bombs from German soil, which would result in Berlin opting out of NATO's operational nuclear sharing arrangement.⁴⁸ Fueled by the growing transatlantic rift, strong public opposition to a new arms race on the continent could easily resurface in a number of countries, and not just in Germany.

At the same time, some European allies, such as Poland, would be extremely eager to host new U.S. intermediate-range missiles, for the simple reason that

44 Paul McLeary, U.S. Busts INF Wall With Ballistic Missile, Puts Putin & Xi On Notice, *Breaking Defense*, December 12, 2019, <https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/pentagon-busts-though-the-inf-wall-puts-putin-and-xi-on-notice/>.

45 Shervin Taheran, U.S. to Test INF Treaty-Range Missiles, in: *Arms Control Today*, April 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/news/us-test-inf-treaty-range-missiles>.

46 Evan Braden Montgomery, Managing China's Missile Threat: Future Options to Preserve Forward Defense, in: *China's Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States*, April 1, 2015, pp. 6–7, <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/04/managing-chinas-missile-threat-future-options-to-preserve-forward-defense/>.

47 William Drozdiak, France is prepared to extend its nuclear deterrent to Germany, *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/28/france-is-prepared-extend-its-nuclear-deterrent-germany/?utm_term=.8813e0a9ae06.

48 Bojan Pancevski, In Germany, a Cold War Deal to Host U.S. Nuclear Weapons Is Now in Question, *Wall Street Journal*, February 12, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-germany-anger-at-trump-throws-cold-war-nuclear-pact-into-question-11549976449>.

those missiles would mean a permanent presence of U.S. forces on the ground. Poland's offer of May 2018 to pay \$2 billion for the permanent stationing of a U.S. Army tank division on Polish soil underscores that point. In the end, under a possible second Trump term, the U.S. Administration might simply sideline hesitant Allies like Germany and decide on bilateral basing agreements with more supportive member states, Poland amongst them. The political damage to the NATO Alliance would be massive. Crafting a common political approach vis-à-vis Moscow would be almost impossible, and the Russians would in all certainty respond by producing and deploying even more missiles.⁴⁹

Perhaps the biggest difference between the current situation and the original missile crisis of the Cold War is that in today's crisis, U.S. Allies in Europe play almost no visible role. Back in the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt was adamant in ensuring that Western Europe's security concerns were properly addressed—first by publicly raising awareness of the Soviet missile buildup and then by making sure that burden-sharing and diplomatic outreach to the Soviets would inform NATO's Dual-Track Decision. Today, Germany, still a key European NATO Ally, has taken a “wait and see” approach, with Chancellor Angela Merkel keeping the issue below the level of public attention. The result is that the new missile crisis largely plays out as a bilateral game between Moscow and Washington, with the latter moving incrementally forward in formulating its own policy responses. Thereby the United States is defining European leaders' room for maneuver. This self-imposed restraint on the part of the Europeans may, one day, come to haunt Europe's leaders—if a new missiles arms race should kick in on the continent.

The good news is that there are other military means to respond to Russia than simply producing and fielding new intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Some U.S. military officials see no specific military need for new ground-launched systems.⁵⁰ Instead, the limited rotational forward deployment of conventional cruise missiles on U.S. bombers and ships in Western Europe, supported by the deployment of Cruise Missile defenses at NATO's vital logistics and transportation nodes, could well thwart the military advantage Moscow might hope to gain from allegedly violating the INF Treaty.⁵¹

These military options might open up room for maneuver for a second scenario, which would be an arms control solution to the current crisis. In concrete terms, the military countermeasures already announced by the United States in

49 In 2015, Colonel General Victor Zavarzin, a member of the Russian federal assembly's Defense Committee, warned “if the Americans indeed deploy their ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe, in this case we will face the necessity of retaliating.” Quoted from Lawmaker, Moscow can answer possible deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe, in: Tass, June 5, 2015, <http://tass.com/russia/799098>.

50 Cf. Maggie Tennis, Republicans Aim to Produce Banned Missile, in: Arms Control Today (2017), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/news/republicans-aim-produce-banned-missile>.

51 Ulrich Kühn, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Europe in a Post-INF World, in: The Nonproliferation Review 26 (2019), pp. 155–166.

the new NPR and legislated by Congress might well lead the Kremlin to take a more transparent stance. And transparency, on a reciprocal basis, would be most urgently needed. For that to happen, Russia and the United States would have to be willing to “trade transparency for transparency.” On the one hand, Russia’s concerns about a potential dual-use applicability of U.S. missile defense systems in Romania and Poland could be addressed by offering on-site demonstrations of the system to Russian inspectors. As one Russian arms control expert suggested, “Washington should agree to modify the tubes of the interceptor launchers in Romania and Poland so that canisters containing Tomahawks or other offensive missiles cannot be installed there.”⁵² Such a solution would go beyond just mere fixes to the software, currently one of the distinguishing features between offensive and defensive capabilities. In turn, U.S. concerns could be clarified by showing U.S. inspectors the fuel tank capacity of the Russian missile that caused the end of INF.

A second option would be for NATO to make a no-first-deployment pledge in exchange for Russian geographical restraint. In essence, NATO would pledge not to deploy new land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe first. Russia would reciprocate by relocating its SSC-8 missiles east of the Ural Mountains. The verification of Russian withdrawal could be achieved using national technical means, which have already been sufficient to detect the Russian violation in the first place.

Another, more complex option, would be the separation of nuclear warheads and launch vehicles on both sides. That would mean storing nuclear warheads verifiably several hours away from the respective launch systems. That way, both sides would increase crisis stability by reducing the potential for misunderstandings triggering an overreaction. Such an approach could apply to mobile land-based launchers and ballistic missiles as well as to NATO’s forward-deployed fighter jets. A technical study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research recently came to the conclusion that verifying the absence of nuclear warheads from their non-strategic delivery vehicles could be possible.⁵³

Another reason to engage in compliance, and perhaps arms control talks, lies in the risk of losing the New START agreement over the INF crisis. The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) limits the strategic systems of the United States and Russia with ranges beyond 5,500 kilometers. New START, signed in 2010, entered into force in 2011 and expires in February 2021. On a one-time basis, the Treaty can be extended by another five years. In the United States it would only need an executive agreement by the U.S. President and no

52 Sergey Rogov, How to Prevent a Dangerous Escalation, in: *Foreign Affairs*, May 22, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-05-22/can-us-and-russia-find-path-forward-arms-control>.

53 Pavel Podvig, Ryan Snyder and Wilfred Wan, Evidence of Absence: Verifying the Removal of Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR, 2018, <https://www.unidir.org/publication/evidence-absence-verifying-removal-nuclear-weapons>.

advice and consent by the Senate to do so. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has, so far, not taken up the Russian initiative to extend the treaty for another five years.⁵⁴ Without INF, and, perhaps, also New START in place, the U.S.–Russian security relationship would be thrown back into a state of almost complete non-transparency and unpredictability—a highly dangerous state, last experienced in the 1960s.

8. Conclusion

Today, thirty years after stipulations under the INF Treaty entered into force, a tragic security dilemma is once more unfolding. Again, Russia seems to find value in fielding a new generation of intermediate-range missiles. Again, the United States is contemplating the option of engaging in a missile tit-for-tat, answering Russia's actions. Again, the bilateral relationship is at a significant low. And again, the ramifications for Europe are anything but positive. More worrisome these days, the renewed missile crisis has not gained center stage in public discussions yet. Even though the voices warning of a New Cold War are growing, no commonly shared sense of risk seems to be present, and the urgency of formulating a multilateral diplomatic response to the crisis is not pressed. In the vacuum of political leadership addressing the question and its absence from public debate amongst Europeans, the crisis will further fester in the years ahead, if no unexpected diplomatic breakthrough is made.

In the end, that could well mean that Europe will experience another sudden, vehement debate over hosting new U.S. intermediate-range missiles on the continent. As a result of the end of INF, the New START agreement could expire without being replaced. The negative ripple effects of this dual misfortune—INF and New START withering away—would be felt in Europe and beyond. As this essay demonstrates, there are a number of possible arms control steps that both sides could take in order to prevent a new arms race from unfolding. Unfortunately, it is not good advice or new ideas the U.S.–Russian relationship lacks; fundamentally, it is trust that is missing. And just as much as it was during the Cold War, trust is a necessary ingredient for entering into a cooperative security dialogue.

54 Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, Putin Invites U.S. to Extend New START, in: Arms Control Today, January/February 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/news/putin-invites-us-extend-new-start>.

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Acronyms

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACIU	Arms Control Implementation Unit
ADM	Atomic Demolition Mines
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
AFB	Air Force Base
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i> (Federal Intelligence Service)
BStU	<i>Bundesbeauftragte(r) für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik</i> (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security of the former German Democratic Republic)
CBM	Confidence Building Measure(s)
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CISAC	Committee on International Security and Arms Control
CPM	Continuous Portal Monitoring
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CTBT	Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty
DoD	Department of Defense
ERW	Enhanced Radiation Weapon/Warhead
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FAZ	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> (West Germany)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GLBM	Ground-Launched (medium-range) Ballistic Missiles
GLCM	Ground-launched Cruise Missiles
HLG	High Level Group
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (UK)
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
IRM	Intermediate-Range Missiles
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
LRINF	Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MBCA	Multilateral Basing Country Agreement
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles
MLF	Multilateral Nuclear Force
MOB	Missile Operating Base
MOD	Ministry of Defense/Ministry of Defence (UK)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (regarding the establishment of an INF data-base)
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NNFZ	Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
NSC	National Security Council
NTM	National Technical Means (of verification)
NWFC	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI	On-Site Inspection
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OST	Open Skies Treaty
PA/AA	<i>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts</i> (Political Archive of the [German] Foreign Office)
PCC	Political Consultative Committee
PNI	Presidential Nuclear Initiative
PoE or POE	(1) Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems. (2) Point of Entry (for inspection teams)
PoI	Protocol regarding Inspections
PRI	Presidential Review Directive
PUWP	Polish United Workers Party
R&D	Research and Development
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SANE	Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
SCG	Special Consultative Group
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Party of East Germany)
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
SNF	Short-Range Nuclear Forces
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Social Democratic Party of West Germany)

SRBM	Shorter-Range Ballistic Missiles
SRINF	Short(er)-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
SRM	Shorter-Range Missiles
SRTNF	Short-Range Theater Nuclear Force
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
SVC	Special Verification Commission
TEL	Transporter Erector Launcher
TNN	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
UCS	Union of Concerned Scientists
VfZ	<i>Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte</i>
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
ZfG	<i>Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft</i>

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