Terrortimes, Terrorscapes

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Continuities of Space, Time, and Memory in Twentieth-Century War and Genocide

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Dedicated to Rachel G. Fuchs,
Distinguished Foundation Professor of History
at Arizona State University

Sadly, Rachel Fuchs passed away in October 2016 after thirty-two years of service at ASU. As editors of this volume, we are grateful for her many years of mentorship and generous support, and we recognize the unique opportunity to publish one of the last pieces of her work in this volume.

Rachel did not believe in *terrortimes* or *terrorscapes*. Her distinguished scholarship focused on continuities in how gender was constructed in nineteenth- and twentieth-century France. Despite the passage of time, she showed that "the gendered nature of poverty" was the same in the nineteenth century as it was in the twentieth century and that many of the issues concerning poverty, gender, and morality are not vastly different today.[1] Instead of imaginations of space, she shows in her contribution to this volume that people crossed boundaries and survived even in the most rigid systems. Rather than look at violence, her work explored survival of poor unmarried, pregnant women and young mothers despite a perception that they were markers of overall cultural decline among French elites.[2] Her insistence on survival against the odds of deeply moralizing state officials, her knowledge on the limits of policy even in France's darkest days under German occupation, and her scrutiny of sources were an inspiration for this volume and for us as scholars more generally.

NOTES

1. Rachel Fuchs, *Gender and Poverty in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245.
2. Rachel Fuchs, *Poor and Pregnant in Paris: Strategies for Survival in the Nineteenth Century* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 5.

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INTRODUCTION

TERRORTIMES AND TERRORSCAPES? RETHINKING CONTINUITIES OF SPACE, TIME, AND MEMORY

VOLKER BENKERT AND MICHAEL MAYER

"THE PRESENT EPOCH WILL PERHAPS BE ABOVE ALL THE EPOCH OF SPACE," the French philosopher Michel Foucault stated in 1987. He added: "The anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than time."[1] By privileging space over time—unthinkable for many historians who by definition considered time the most important variable—Foucault became an important voice of the so-called spatial turn in geography, social sciences, and history in the 1980s. The focus on space was also adopted by German historians, albeit with a little more caution. Reinhart Koselleck made the case in 1987 that "space as well as time are, categorically speaking, part of the conditions of potential history."[2] For Germans this connection seemed obvious: the German language even linguistically links space and time in the word *Zeitraum* (space of time). Following this line of thought, this volume argues that all history comes with a geography. A sense of space is inevitably linked to a sense of time.[3] Such a sense of space is imagined and reimagined based on tangible materialities of geography whose intangible meanings change over time, interpreted and reinterpreted in myriad ways. Likewise, our sense of time is subject to similar imaginations based on past material and textual evidence coupled with new interpretations. Space and time are thus not a repository of the past that can be replayed at leisure but are reimagined every time we revisit the past.[4] Imagination also shapes our ability to remember or forget the past as individuals, communities, or nations. Memory is thus alive in the present as constructions of past time and space contracting toward the future

with ever-new possibilities of imagination of space, time, and memory.[5] This book rests on an understanding of memory as highly dynamic and subject to societal negotiation of time and space, enabling many different readings about the possibilities of the past.[6] Investigating such continuities of ideas of space, time, and memory with respect to violence is at the heart of this volume.

The map in figure I.1 illustrates these continuities of notions of space, time, and memory. Printed for a Frankfurt-based shipping company, its representation of completed German highways versus those shown as under construction reveals that the map dates from 1936.[7] Although very much an object of everyday use, the map contains a host of clues to how its makers thought about space and national belonging. After all, German borders from before World War I are still indicated, and place-names are mostly rendered in the German form, sometimes with Polish names underneath. This kind of irredentism is not surprising for maps of the interwar period even before the Nazi takeover. Yet its owner—Wilhelm Benkert, grandfather of one of the authors of this chapter—felt the need to update the borders on the map. It is not difficult to imagine that the Wehrmacht soldier who first took part in the occupation of the Sudetenland and later marched into what remained of Czechoslovakia felt pride and glee as he redrew the borders to indicate the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the German dismantling of Czechoslovakia, and the forced cession of Memel from Lithuania in March 1939. The impromptu updates on the map seem to echo the triumphalist fanfare of Nazi propaganda. As if to give the new borders a sense of authenticity and permanence, he even used blue crayon to match the color of how borders were represented on the map. Still, the blue crayon cannot hide the fact that the map shows three versions of Germany while hiding another. The borders of Imperial Germany until 1918, the early Nazi state of 1936, and the soldier's updates on Nazi expansions made under the threat of war until March 1939 are visible, while the memory of Weimar is erased. The stroke of the blue crayon also sought to erase the memory of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The curious overlap of different spatial imaginations of different Germanies corresponds with different temporalities of German history whose memory traces can still be found on the map.

If the blue crayon marked the annexations on the previous map in an improvised fashion, the map in figure I.2, from between March and September 1939, already incorporated these forced border changes at the time it was printed in 1939. The annexation of Austria, the establishment of the Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, and the forced cession of Memel all blend into the German-dominated landmass indicated by the same color.[8] The borders of Imperial Germany are still marked, but they seem to matter only with respect to Poland, yet to be conquered. After the German invasion of Poland, Wilhelm Benkert also marked the new borders, first on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, largely following the Vistula River.

I.1. Map of Germany in 1932, with new borders drawn. *Source: Autoverkehr der Firma Carl Presser & Co.*, Maßstab 1: 1936 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag Stritzke & Rothe, 1936). Courtesy of Emily Vance.

Later he updated the map again, now in accordance with the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty of September 28, 1939, which also entailed a secret addendum concerning the borders, whose implications, however, became clear very rapidly. The "twin faces of totalitarianism" had carved up Poland,[9] and not only did Wilhelm Benkert take part in the actual invasion, his markings on the map echo the very map used by the dictators. This goes to show how easily many ordinary Germans like Wilhelm Benkert adopted the regime's expansionist goals. Yet the map also reveals how quickly Nazi ideas of space sparked the imagination of ordinary Germans, even if they went well beyond the most irredentist notions of the borders of Imperial Germany still included on the map. Wilhelm Benkert's blue crayon thus helped to create a Germany based solely on Nazi imaginings.[10] Finally, the map's updates suggest at least wholehearted agreement if not complicity, understood as "degrees of involvement, degrees of knowledge, degrees of intention, and degrees of agency,[11] all of which apply to a soldier decorated for his efforts during the campaign.[12] Such complicity, however, stands in stark contrast to family lore that highlighted noninvolvement (he was not in the party, he was not a Nazi), blissful ignorance (he was a frontline soldier unaware of what was happening around him), lack of intention to go to war (he only signed up for the army because the family business went bankrupt during the Great Depression), and passivity (as a soldier in the Weimar Reichswehr, he could not vote and therefore had no part in the Nazi takeover). Memory and map thus seem to contradict each other. Entangled notions of space, time, and memory are imprinted on this map—a document whose abstract colors hide the violence behind it—and inform today's decisions to remember or forget. Taken together, personal photos of his time in the army, family lore, his service records, and the maps offer a mix of experience tainted by narrative repetition, selective archival material, and spatial visualizations that shape a contradictory historical record.[13] To explore such entangled notions with respect to violence is the purpose of this book.

TIME AND SPACE AS MODES OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Describing change over time is the historian's creed, and arguing on the basis of historical evidence is the historian's craft. Yet change over time is always related to place, space, and sources that cannot be interpreted outside of the context of their temporal, spatial, and social conception. Edward W. Soja, who in 1989 coined the term "spatial turn,"[14] added only seven years later: "Contemporary critical studies have experienced a significant spatial turn. In what may be seen as one of the most important intellectual and political developments in the late twentieth century, scholars have begun to interpret space and the spatiality of human life with the same critical insight and emphasis

I.2. Map of western Germany, Poland, and western USSR in the 1930s. Source: *Der Deutsche Osten und Polen*, Maßstab 1:2000000 (Bielefeld: Verlag von Velhagen & Klafing, 1939). Courtesy of Emily Vance.

that has traditionally been given to time and history on the one hand, and to social relations and society on the other."[15]

Exploring the connection between time and space, however, is not as new as the advocates of the spatial turn would have us believe. The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for instance, asserted in 1830: "The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; philosophy rights against this 'also.'"[16] Martin Heidegger

went even further than Hegel, arguing that space and time had to be thought of together in one "*Zeit-Raum.*"[17]

Following Hegel, geographers and historians began studying the effects of geography on politics and international relations in the past and present around the turn of the twentieth century. This sudden relevance of space had much to do with the process of industrialization. Already at the end of the nineteenth century the world was interconnected through modern railways and telegraphs.[18] The time needed for people and information to move across vast spatial distances was reduced considerably. In 1870 most parts of the world were connected by commercial telegraphy.[19] Space and time seemed to contract, as much by means of faster travel as by means of quicker communication. People therefore observed what the anthropologist David Harvey called a "time-space compression."[20] The literary expression of this feeling is the obsession with temporality that can be observed in Marcel Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*.[21]

The fact that space seemed to shrink throughout the nineteenth century had the effect that space was given more thought than before. Academics like the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, and the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan began to study the effects of geography on politics and international relations as well as history. Their concepts can be subsumed under the term *geopolitics*, which was introduced by Rudolf Kjellén.[22] These theories were first tested on the periphery, in the colonies, the Middle East, and the Balkans, but in World War I these theories led to ethnic cleansing in large parts of Europe and from there beyond Europe. Ethnic cleansing as a geopolitical tool informed not only German fantasies of victory but also British, French, and Italian ideas about the actual postwar period.[23] Yet after the "golden age" of geopolitics in the 1920s and 1930s, the concept was heavily discredited by the National Socialist idea of Lebensraum and the unprecedented atrocities in its wake. Especially in Germany, historians lost interest in political developments linked to space, a development that was intensified by the shift to social sciences.[24]

The late 1980s saw a sudden renaissance of spatial concepts freed from their problematic geopolitical heritage. In 1991 the American literary critic Fredric Jameson wrote: "A certain spatial turn has often seemed to offer one of the more productive ways of distinguishing postmodernism from modernism proper."[25] How can this sudden renaissance be explained? Two factors seem crucial for an understanding of the comeback of space. One concerns the disappearance of borders, at least if seen through a European perspective. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the most palpable event, inviting spectators to participate in physically destroying a border. The effect was surprising: when the Iron Curtain was finally lifted, people discovered the lost space in Eastern Europe, which for a long time had remained forgotten in the shadow of the border. Similarly, the process of European integration—only dimly reproduced by the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—following the inception of the Schengen Convention brought the elimination of border controls in parts of Europe from 1990 onward.[26] However, the dissolution of inner-European borders was paralleled by a stricter enforcement of European external frontiers—not always successfully, as the immigration wave of 2015 has shown, and surely not fairly, as the burden rests mostly on states bordering countries outside the European Union (EU).[27] The dissolution of borders corresponded to the second factor, explaining the return of spatial approaches: historical inquiry changed to concentrate less on the nation-state and more on transnational and global history.[28] The nation-state, which since the nineteenth century had seemed the most important point of reference for historians, appeared fragile, even—in the case of the states of the EU—outdated; postnationalism reigned.[29] Only in recent years has nationalism regained strength through a host of populist movements in Europe and the United States, though scholarship so far seems to be very reluctant to focus on the national paradigm again.

Not only did borders seem to disappear from the 1980s on; apparently space itself also vanished due to the internet revolution. Comparable to the period around 1900 with its travel and communication advancements, another compression of time and space following the spread of global interconnectedness occurred. Space no longer mattered in Marshall McLuhan's interconnected and real-time "global village."[30] Yet, analogous to the emergence of geopolitics at the beginning of the twentieth century, space also suddenly returned to the center of attention at the turn of the twenty-first century. Spatial concepts flooded social and cultural studies as well as geography and history.[31] In history, Karl Schlögel's book *Im Raume lesen* especially popularized the "spatial turn" as much as it saw it from an ironic point of view.[32] Most importantly in this ebb and flow of space as a mode of inquiry, it seems that space cannot be disentangled from time. After all, history always "takes place."

TERRORTIMES AND TERRORSCAPES: VIOLENCE, SPACE, TIME, AND MEMORY AS INTERWOVEN FABRICS

Adding to scholarship linking time and space, this volume suggests describing continuities of violence as overlapping fabrics woven together from notions of space, time, and memory. Such an approach helps us highlight continuities of violence and avoid describing violence as limited to a certain space and time. As Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz stress, regions of bloody conflict—*terrorscapes*, as we call them in this volume[33]—are larger and more ambiguous than clearly defined bloodlands.[34] Similarly,

Jürgen Zimmerer has shown with respect to continuities between Germany's colonial genocide and the Holocaust that *terrortimes* are longer and endowed with less clear temporal boundaries than common periodizations of war and peace suggest.[35] Our probe highlights such continuities, but as Thomas Kühne suggests, ambiguities and complexities are never far from such an endeavor. On continuities between Germany's genocide of the Herero and Nama and the Holocaust, he warns that "instead of relying on vague, generalized and abstract concepts of colonialism and imperialism on the one hand, of the Holocaust, the Nazi empire, Nazi violence on the other, the diversity, shades, peculiarities and antagonisms of either case should be taken into account." This, he continues, will "identify which part, type or aspect of colonialism or imperialism is linked to, or can be compared with, which part, type, or aspect of the Holocaust, the Nazi empire and Nazi violence."[36] Memory, too, is woven into this fabric of notions of time and space, and here too complexities abound. As Georgi Verbeeck has shown with respect to Germany's colonial genocide, Germans reflect on their colonial past very differently than other former colonial powers do, because Germany had already lost its colonies in the wake of World War I, and memories of the colonial space and time are overshadowed by the paradigm of coming to terms with the Holocaust and its European and midcentury locus.[37] Our probe shows that notions of time, space, and memory thus reinforce and mesh with each other, which leads us to explore continuities rather than to accept neat categorizations of time and place in this volume.

Kühne's reminder to not ignore complexity and ambiguity in exploring continuities is thus well taken, yet we argue that its complexity and ambiguity often strengthen such overlapping fabrics of time, place, and memory. Terrortimes and terrorscapes sometimes cloak violence by seemingly relegating it to a bloody but distant past or bloodlands far away. However problematic such constructions are, past terrortimes and distant terrorscapes can thus also serve to legitimize a hopefully more peaceful era and space, as the Holocaust, for example, serves as a "negative founding myth" for the EU and an argument for further European integration, hoping to immunize Europe against future violence.[38] If such myths stress a break with a violent past and a reimagination of space beyond bloodlands, reference to terrortimes and terrorscapes can also be used to incite new violence by stressing continuities of violence. In this reading, the here and now is hanging by the threads of long-worn memory fabrics calling for irredentism to restore old borders and past greatness. Violence is thus conceived by actors and states who imagine often contested and heterogeneous spaces to fit their ideology in order to envision an allegedly brighter future after its application. Facilitated by asymmetrical power relations and colonial powers, who as third parties played colonized groups off against each other, violence is then both gratuitous in the region and absent among those who hope to benefit from its use. These spatial notions are accompanied by ideas about the temporal use of violence allegedly becoming obsolete once the utopian vision,

for example in its Nazi or Stalinist form, is reality. Even as such utopian visions crumble, echoes of terrortime*s* and terrorscapes reverberate back to us today, often altered or amplified by memory narratives. What emerges is an image of violence that must be thought of in thick yet flexible and fragile liaison to the space and time in which it is exercised and its overlapping, threaded, and torn relationship to memory. This volume probes these overlapping fabrics, following their threads and open seams to explore continuities in how communities understand violence spatially and temporally and how they remember the past to fit contemporary needs.

Understanding violence in this overlapping manner adds to scholarship that often has compartmentalized its study by wars, nations, theaters, dates, and atrocities. On the basis of diverse theories on violence, space, time, and memory, this volume identifies themes of violence that probe established spatial or temporal boundaries while also delineating dynamics common to diverse instances of violence in the twentieth century. These themes rest on spatial conceptions, states, and actors who envision and enforce these spaces; the imaginations and emotions with which they mobilize people; and the temporal and memory continuities that echo them. Linking themes to the texts included in this volume, each theme is then explored through the particular focus chosen by the contributors to this book.

THEORIES OF VIOLENCE: SPACE, TIME, AND MEMORY

This volume understands violence and nonviolence as situational options of human behavior embedded in overlapping temporal, spatial, and memory contexts.[39] Such violence-enabling situations have been theorized in a host of different ways, ranging from situations that normalize violence, processes of barbarization among perpetrators, and organizations spurring on violence, to affectual interactions driven by ideology and propaganda. Their underlying spatial, temporal, and memory connotations are what this volume hopes to investigate.

Reflecting on the situational metamorphosis of ordinary men into killers, Christopher Browning acquaints us with normal middle-aged policemen from Hamburg who became murderers when called upon to kill the Jews of Józefów even though they had a credible chance to opt out.[40] Worse still, among those few who refused to participate in their baptism of brutality in Józefów, some later changed their minds and accepted the horrific murders they committed as normal in that situation and that place. If situations change men in a short period of time, an encounter with violence over a longer period will also lead to barbarization of men who otherwise show no particular inclination to violence. Observing processes of barbarization of

regular Wehrmacht soldiers—draftees with a propensity for or aversion to violence no different from those of average Germans—Omer Bartov argues that the war turned men "into both highly professional and determined soldiers, brutalized instruments of a barbarous policy, and devoted believers in a murderous ideology." As such, the war "made the Wehrmacht into Adolf Hitler's army, the Germans into Hitler's people."[41] Enhancing this brutalization, organizations such as the Schutzstaffel (SS), the Einsatzgruppen, and the police battalions developed "an organizational culture of brutal attacks" that included torture and humiliation in their murderous task. This organizational culture strengthened unit cohesion, making skeptics overcome their reluctance and identify with the organization's goals and creating a comradeship among the murderers that caused "direct pleasure."[42] Such group violence almost always takes on institutional forms, if only to condone and legitimize it, but *Gewaltmassen* (violent masses) can also have a more temporal character, for example in pogroms and lynch mobs.[43] Group members then derive self-assurance and pleasure from exercising violence, because membership serves both their professional goals of advancement and their personal goals of emotional belonging.[44] Such an attachment to a group can also be aroused by emotional investment in a cause. Belonging and fear of the "other," who is often ridiculed and denigrated while also being declared a powerful threat to the entire group, go hand in glove. Belonging and fear thus reinforce ideologies of hate often delivered by powerful propaganda.

Even if violence-inducing situations are triggered in very different ways, they are defined by the space in which they emerge. After all, ideology-driven utopian visions of space of the Nazi and Soviet persuasions created the "Bloodlands" that Timothy Snyder describes. As German soldiers set out to conquer the East, they brought with them ideas of geopolitics long harbored by German intellectuals, generals, and politicians. These ideas were grounded in the desire to reorder and homogenize the East.[45] With the reconfiguring of space came notions about its inhabitants that ultimately led to genocide and mass murder, particularly of Jews and others deemed inferior. Joseph Stalin too had ideas about space and people. These ideas were not informed by race but by class and power, and they also led to horrific violence in the form of deliberate mass starvation and shootings in Ukraine and elsewhere on an unimaginable scale. "The bloodlands were where most of Europe's Jews lived, where Hitler and Stalin's imperial plans overlapped, where the Wehrmacht and the Red Army fought, and where the Soviet NKVD and the German SS concentrated their forces."[46] Borderlands thus are often the place of interethnic coexistence or clashing conceptions of space and time and thus are particularly prone to violence.[47]

Ideas of space echo temporal conceptions of how this space was defined in the past as well as giving voice to utopian notions of future use. Violence becomes a means to redeem past claims to space as well as to realize future conquest. Theorizing temporal

continuities of violence, some scholars have observed a decrease in violence due to the "civilizing processes" enabled through early modern state formation. In this reading "violence disappears, when the conditions that cause it (lust, want, aggression) disappear," as powerful states tame lust, decrease want, and sanction aggression.[48] Following Norbert Elias's lead, Heinrich Popitz also argues that violence will decrease. Though always a possible option of human behavior, intrinsically linked to power and thus needed for any societal organization, the increase in social and moral norms will help to bind the power of violence and channel it into acceptable norms.[49] The latest, and probably the most widely recognized, contribution to this school of thought comes from the American scholar Steven Pinker. Using a quote from Abraham Lincoln's first inaugural address in 1861, Pinker maintains that violence is not an innate condition of mankind but environmentally triggered. By training the equally situationally invoked "better angels of our nature,"[50] like empathy, self-control, moral sense, and reason, we can contain violence.[51] Past horrors can also have a civilizing character, as states renounce past violence on moral grounds as well as for strategic and diplomatic gain. Arguably, a nationalist backlash to justify and relativize German aggression in World War II would have eliminated all hopes for future unification of the two German states, which is why—except for the quickly defeated conservative position in the *Historikerstreit*—there was no concerted effort by German conservatives in this direction.[52] If those arguing in support of civilizing processes see the formation of the state coupled with an Enlightenment "humanitarian revolution" in the eighteenth century or the strategic concerns of states as civilizing forces,[53] other scholars point to the state as the very catalyst for violence. After all, it was state violence that transformed the "short 20th century" into the "Age of Extremes."[54] The crisis of the state gave way to historical processes that far from exercising civility resulted in a "century of genocide" in which "ideologies of race and nation, revolutionary regimes with vast utopian ambitions, [and] moments of crisis generated by war and domestic upheaval" spurred on unprecedented violence.[55] The focus on nation-states, ideologies, and revolutions as modern phenomena has also suggested a particular connection between violence and modernity. Considering the "rationalizing, engineering tendency of modernity," grand social designs of racial and ethnic homogeneity become possible, especially if powered by science and enabled by modern bureaucracy.[56]

Spatial and temporal notions of violence are deeply ingrained in communicative and cultural memory and thus inform group and cultural identity.[57] Maurice Halbwachs points to the social construction of memory in interactions between members of a group linked to a specific place.[58] This social embeddedness validates individual experiences and adopts them into or rejects them from a diffuse canon of collective memory. Interwoven into the canon of collective memory are notions of time and place. German collective memory on flight and expulsions, for example, favors memories of

German victimization over earlier memories of mass murder and genocide committed by Germans.[59] By the same token, in accounts of expellees collected by Theodor Schieder, a vaguely defined East emerged as the site of German collective martyrdom in which the wartime enemies easily morphed into new Cold War enemies.[60] In contrast to collective memory's reliance on social negotiation of memory, cultural memory relies on the interpretations of elites in politics and culture, such as politicians, scholars, curators, editors, writers, and so forth. It also differs from collective memory in its mediation in texts, rituals, performances, and formalized language.[61] Not even the cultural formations representing an event as incomprehensible as the Holocaust have "avoided the pitfalls of routine reproduction and effortless consumption."[62] Yet here too space and time are negotiated. Theodor Schieder, the aforementioned collector of accounts of expellees, who had previously advised the infamous Gauleiter Erich Koch on deportations of Poles and Jews after the German attack on Poland in 1939, carefully edited the accounts to highlight German victimization and renew claims to lost territories in the East.[63]

In this reading, violence triggered in a host of different situational contexts also has underlying notions of space, time, and memory, which together form a deep fabric of interwoven meanings difficult to disentangle.

THEMES AND TEXTS IN THIS VOLUME

Based on the conceptual framework linking notions of time, space, and memory, we developed nine general themes that help to explain why violence occurred or was stimulated in certain spaces at a given time. On the basis of these themes, which are open to further extension, we solicited articles grouped them into four categories. The first section explores spatial and temporal continuities with a particular focus on the themes "Contested Spaces" and conflicts based on "Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity." Fears concerning territorial boundaries and identities are often stoked by states and actors, which informs the second section around the themes "States as Contributors to or Enablers of Violence," "Asymmetric Power Relations," and "Third-Party Actors and the Question of Genocide." States and actors also fuel imagination and emotions, the focus of the third section, through "Utopian Ideologies and Their Limits" and "Emotion, Hope, Fear, and Belonging." Memory of terrortimes sometimes triggers new terrortimes, which is why the fourth and last section is devoted to temporal and memory continuities and their impact on violence. This section revolves around the themes "Crafting the History of Terrortimes" and "Terrortimes in Transnational Perspective."

SECTION 1: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CONTINUITIES

This section explores two themes, "Contested Spaces" and "Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity." The term *contested space* can refer to borderlands or regions disputed by two countries or different social or religious groups. Bukovina, a region divided between Romania and Ukraine, can be taken as an example. Romania, as a German ally, invaded the Soviet part of Bukovina in June 1941. In just a few weeks, tens of thousands of Jews were killed by Romanian troops in the newly annexed territory of Bukovina and in Bessarabia and Dorohoi, which were also seized from the Soviet Union. In part Romanian forces were joined by the German Einsatzgruppe D of Otto Ohlendorf, and in part they were supported by local Romanians and Ukrainians. More than 150,000 Jews were deported into the Transnistria Governorate under Romanian rule. Thousands died during transport. In September 1943, only around 50,000 had survived in ghettos and camps. Between October 1941 and March 1942 Romanian troops killed most of the Ukrainian Jews in Transnistria. In this case, German and Romanian antisemitism joined to form a murderous coalition, but in contested spaces such as Bukovina this coalition was particularly heinous, spurred on by Romanian interest in laying claim to the region and underlying historical notions of space, ethnicity, and religion.[64] Ethnic cleansing and genocide were the consequence. A similar dynamic web of entangled notions of space, temporal belonging, and memory of the past can also be observed in other contested regions. In Alsace-Lorraine, contested by France and Germany for centuries, in the 1920s and 1930s antisemitism was much more pronounced than elsewhere in France.[65] The same goes for Southern France at the border with Italy, contested by both countries. This region was the homeland of the extremist and anti-Semitic French Militia, which from 1943 on supported German troops against insurgents and often ended up being among the approximately 7,500 French who made up the French SS-Division Charlemagne. Here too a contested space fostered violent behavior, because national belonging after centuries of conflict seemed endangered.[66]

In the first chapter, Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner refers to the contested space Burgenland, an Austrian region that borders Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. She examines how the special situation as a contested space and a long history of continuous discrimination had a radicalizing effect on the treatment of the minority of the Roma who, especially after 1938, were persecuted violently.

The theme "Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity" discusses why certain spaces are contested. Regions with heterogeneous societies and large minorities were often ravaged by waves of violence. An example is the Baltic state of Lithuania, with its large Jewish, Polish, German, and Ukrainian minorities, which

accounted for about 25 percent of the country's population at the beginning of the war. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Lithuanians hoped for independence for their country, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union since 1939. Therefore, Lithuanian paramilitary troops took advantage of the German invasion of their territory. Enabled, encouraged, and enlisted by the Germans, sometimes acting on their own, they murdered most Jews living in the countryside in just two months. Why did the Jews of the country become a target, and how does this relate to the ambition to regain independence? Jews were seen as a pro-communist minority that had seemingly supported the earlier Soviet occupation of Lithuania.[67] Ethnic cleansing to create homogeneity—that is, fighting an imagined inner enemy to defend the country against an external enemy—seemed a way to support the independence of Lithuania. Even though ideas of space and time differed greatly—Germany had no plans to grant Lithuania independence, and some German officials even considered Lithuania a place for German settlement—Lithuanian ideas of ethnic homogeneity coincided with the Germans' murderous plans. Heterogeneity was perceived as a threat to national independence and thus personal security and prosperity. To cite another example, the same applies to the city of Thessaloniki, which was annexed by Greece in 1912. Greece's largest Jewish community of around fifty-five thousand people lived in this contested city (two-thirds of the total population). Jews had been considered a model minority and had been endowed with privileges by the Turkish government before 1912. As a result, Greeks saw Jews as pro-Turkish. The result of this perception was unexpected: while Jews were mostly able to survive in the Greek mainland, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau and murdered. German murderers were helped by the local Greek population, which played an important role in turning over the Jews to the Italian and later German occupiers. The Greek support for the German anti-Semitic measures in this heterogeneous town—in stark contrast to Greek behavior elsewhere—can be explained by the wish to homogenize the newly annexed city behind the backdrop of a web of historical notions of space and belonging of this region.[68] In Algeria, which was a French *département* until the independence of the country in 1962, antisemitism was also widespread among the European settlers and the native Muslim population. Muslims were especially antagonized because the French had accorded French citizenship to Jews in 1870 but not to Muslims. In 1932 the pogrom of the city of Constantine caused twenty-five deaths among the Jewish population. From October 1940, the Vichy regime deprived the Jews of their French citizenship in Northern Africa. More than thirty labor camps were opened in Algeria and Morocco, where about fifteen thousand Jews were detained. When the Allies took over the area in November 1942, nothing changed initially. The labor camps were not closed before April 1943, and French anti-Jewish legislation remained in force until March 14, 1943.[69] As these examples show, heterogeneity

was perceived as a threat in many regions. In periods of crisis or veritable terrortimes, violence stoked by states and actors erupted to restore false notions of homogeneity in places that had for a long time been marked by ethnic and religious diversity.

In the second chapter, Anna Cichopek-Gajraj discusses the treatment of surviving German and Polish Jews in the newly "recovered territories" in western Poland after liberation. She shows that the "foreign" German Jews were often deprived of their citizenship rights, even though they were as much victims of National Socialism as Polish Jews were, whereas Polish Jews were more often considered as nationals with—at least in public declarations—equal rights. This stands in contrast to the officially proclaimed policy of homogenization or Polonization, which rested on two different sets of criteria: ethnolinguistic aspects that had intellectual precursors long before the war and newer ideas on behavior during the war. The fact that their Jewishness was not a safeguard against new discrimination suggests that deeply ingrained continuities of racial, ethnic, and religious belonging in the Polish nation were inserted into the newly "recovered territories."

SECTION 2: STATES AND ACTORS

The next three themes presented in this volume can be summarized by the idea that actions of states, groups, or individuals can foster violence and genocide. Beginning with a focus on states, the first theme considers "States as Contributors to or Enablers of Violence." Terrorscapes may be a result of the state abusing its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force by imposing state terror; Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930s is a prime example. Violence was a way to consolidate Stalin's power, and the state was the agent to exercise this violence.[70] Measures conceived earlier, such as the collectivization of the agricultural sector, which led to the subsequent famine of 1932–33, were therefore accelerated and maintained despite the horrific results. Although famine impacted various parts of the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that particular vengeance was enacted against perceived threats to Stalin's rule.[71] Kulaks especially were seen not only as class enemies but also as bearers of Ukrainian nationalism.[72] Yet Stalin also feared that widespread discontent would lead to an uprising or other forms of opposition even within the party. Therefore, the Communist Party was purged of "suspicious characters" who were deemed dangerous less to the cause than to Stalin himself. In these instances, Stalin was the instigator of violence and the state his willing tool.

Bart Luttikhuis's contribution to this volume shows that a democratic state like the Netherlands could also act to ignite violence and later suppress information about its own agency. Shaken by years of brutal German occupation during World War II and forgetful of its own divisive history of resistance and collaboration, the Netherlands set

out to reestablish its colonial empire and brutally suppress independence movements after 1945. Against the backdrop of a country simultaneously rebuilding its own ravaged cities and continuing centuries of colonial rule, Luttikhuis's article focuses on the Dutch military campaigns in the Indonesian cities of Jambi and Rengat in 1948–49. The mission, carried out by troops of Dutch and Javanese origin, was to reinforce Dutch control over the region shaken by the Japanese occupation during World War II and Indonesian independence movements. Luttikhuis shows that even in cases when atrocities committed by the Dutch troops were discussed in public, the state that had ordered the campaigns refused to thoroughly investigate well-documented complaints from local residents of these cities. Furthermore, the state took measures to protect Dutch soldiers of European origin more than troops of Javanese origin, who on the basis of old stereotypes were seen as less disciplined. In doing so, the newly recreated Dutch state operated through a web of entangled expectations and stereotypes that fostered violence when challenged by a newly emboldened independence movement. The Dutch state also tried to shape the memory of this event while catering to much older discriminatory expectations that had long repercussions in Dutch historiography.

The next theme identifies "Asymmetric Power Relations" as another force that facilitates violence. Power relations are a crucial factor influencing the practice of violence against vulnerable individuals or groups. Such individuals, groups, or states then resort to asymmetric forms of violence as a means to fight more powerful adversaries, for example by using guerrilla tactics. During World War II, partisan movements fighting German occupation existed in most countries. Yet even if postwar memory presented a picture of a mass movement, actual numbers for France, for instance, show a participation of around 2 percent of the population.[73] In order to fight the German or other Axis troops, resistance fighters resorted to violence not only against occupiers but also against collaborators in order to balance their small numbers. German troops reacted brutally everywhere; in the East they often even linked genocidal action with fighting partisans. In France the struggle between the Maquisards and the extremist French Militia, which carried out acts of vengeance against each other, including killing many innocent civilians, brought the country to the brink of civil war in 1944.[74] Real or imagined asymmetric power relations were a contributing factor to terrorscapes.

In the fourth chapter, Michael Mayer discusses insurgencies in British- and Russian-dominated territories in Afghanistan, India, and Persia during World War I, where local groups fought the powerful foreign troops occupying their countries. These insurgencies were partly supported and sometimes incited by German intelligence officers, who also found themselves in an asymmetric power relation to the British and the Russians in territories far away from German power bases. Mayer argues that the common aim of locals and Germans was to create a terrorscape to influence the behavior of the ruling power. Local groups as well as Germans tried to offset their weak position

by using violence, triggering a violent reaction from British and Russian forces, which feared a general uprising in the area that had to be prevented at all costs in a situation of global war. Although this policy did not prove very successful in the first place, the long-term effects considerably changed the power structure between colonial subjects and colonial powers, influencing their paths to independence.

The last theme in this section focuses on "Third-Party Actors and the Question of Genocide." A third-party actor could be a state, a colonial power, or a group intervening in a region and influencing the scale of violence. The British colonial empire, with its policy of indirect rule, used and abused local conflicts and thus became a third-party actor. The British were mostly in control of the scale of violence through the use of powerful weapons like machine guns. Whenever local conflicts escalated in a way that did not support the interests of London, British units could impose their will because they were commanding the ultimate forms of violence. The British poet Hilaire Belloc 1898 put it this way: "Whatever happens we have got / The Maxim gun, and they have not."[75] Other colonial powers acted similarly. The classic example of a third-party state actor is Germany trying to exploit the conflicts that great powers like France, Russia, or the United Kingdom had with ethnic and religious groups under their dominion. For instance, the independence of Ukraine in 1918 was a way to enlarge German influence in Eastern Europe and restrict Russian/Soviet influence in the region. On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia was signed, granting Ukraine independence, which was supported by German soldiers who had pushed the Bolsheviks out of Kiev on March 1, 1918.[76] Something similar happened in Georgia, which became independent of the Russian empire on 26 May 1918. German troops in Tiflis protected this independence against the Russian and Turkish appetite to take over power in Georgia because Germany was longing for influence over the Caucasian oil fields at the same time. Both experiments in which local leaders tried to use Germany as a third-party actor to gain independence from the power that had dominated the region failed when the German army had to retreat after signing the armistice of November 11, 1918.[77] During World War II, Ukraine and Georgia again hoped for independence through German arms, which speaks to continuities in how these countries imagined space and actors in the region. All in all, the German third-party actor, as well as local leaders, resorted to violence as a means to gain influence and met a violent reaction from the powers they sought to depose.

In the fifth chapter, Jason Bruner examines settler colonialism and the question of genocide. He asks why mass exterminations of native people in Africa carried out by colonial powers are not considered "genocide" or "cultural genocide," whereas these terms are frequently applied to similar developments in Australia and America. Settlers and missionaries, as third-party actors accompanying European imperialism, were certainly complicit in genocidal acts, but their presence was not a necessary condition for

the occurrence of genocide in European colonies in Africa. Examining "new genocide history," which explores the many personal, intellectual, and structural links between genocide and imperialism under the term *settler colonialism*, Bruner argues that such histories emphasize outcomes and long-term effects rather than intent to systematically eliminate people and culture. According to Bruner, this paradigm shift is problematic in two ways. First, mass violence occurred both in places with settlers present and in places where few settlers were present. Second, the focus on outcomes makes genocide a frequent and common occurrence in human history across temporal and spatial lines, which may diminish the usefulness of the term *genocide*.

Violence employed by states and actors is always informed by underlying notions of gender and thus results in particular violence levied against women. Gendered violence is often fostered by images of masculinity that are linked to violence. Social norms constructing masculinity equate it with power and dominance, whereas femininity is seen as synonymous with weakness but also with "purity," which supposedly has to be protected by men. On the other hand, sexual violence against other men, which is less frequent, is a way to demasculinize men and to feminize them. As a result, violence in terrorscapes and terrortimes is often gendered and overcomes social norms of masculinity and femininity to contribute to violent behavior. The volume does not include a contribution specifically on the theme of gendered violence, but the theme does emerge in a variety of contributions, especially the article by Rachel Fuchs in section 3.

SECTION 3: IMAGINATION AND EMOTIONS

The previous sections focused on continuities of spatial conceptions and the influence of states and actors in igniting violence. This section pairs research on ideology and affect with concepts of violence. The first theme covered here is "Utopian Ideologies and Their Limits." Ideological imprinting conceived by states and actors serves as a justification to subdue society to its harsh logic and also as a "justifying" factor that helps perpetrators frame their deeds and exculpate themselves. Perceptions of cultural and racial superiority coupled with ideas on space, for example, played an extraordinary role for European colonial powers and helped to legitimize the use of violence against native people. The presence of native people was then often ignored in allegedly empty spaces. Their land was seen as ripe for reordering, since native people allegedly did not use it, an idea pertinent to American history almost from the beginning of the European presence in North America.[78] The German war against the Soviet Union also had similar ideological underpinnings of space, and it entailed enslavement and annihilation of those conquered.[79] From the start it was decided that the Hague Convention would not be applied to Soviet prisoners of war because of a perceived "slave brutality" and

"inferiority," leading to the murder of millions of Soviet prisoners of war.[80] Ideology also informed the "collective punishment" of Soviet civilians in reprisal for real or imagined partisan attacks in accordance with the criminal Kriegsgerichtsbarkeiterlass im Ostheer of 1941.[81] Jews in particular were almost by default considered partisans and thus likely targets of violent reprisals. Ideology in the form of anti-communism and antisemitism was the most powerful tool used to incite German and other Axis soldiers in the war against the Soviet Union. On a pan-European scale this ideological tool also worked to mobilize the half a million soldiers from various European countries—sometimes following direct or indirect pressure—to join the Belgian, Danish, Dutch, French, and other SS divisions.[82]

In the sixth chapter, Rachel G. Fuchs reminds us, however, of the limits of ideological indoctrination. Her contribution focuses on the question of the extent to which the shift from the French Third Republic to the authoritarian Vichy Regime in 1940 influenced private relationships, especially when it came to paternity suits. Fuchs cautions against attributing too much influence on ideology, pointing out that for those not directly impacted by persecution and war, it had a marginal influence on their private lives. Even terrortimes such as the German occupation of France during World War II, which clearly fostered collaboration and complicity among people and bureaucracies under the banner of anti-Semitic ideologies in some areas, left others unharmed. This speaks to the presence of an entangled web of ideas, laws, and perceptions from the previous Third Republic, from Vichy, and from the German occupiers, which all informed the lives of French women and men in highly varied ways. The harsh ideologies of race and gender imagined by Vichy and Nazi Germany thus found limits not only in private lives.

This section's second theme considers "Emotion, Hope, Fear, and Belonging." As the previous sections rested on situational aspects of violence seen through the lenses of space and actors, this part focuses on emotions fostering or inhibiting violent behavior. Spatial imagination, or the return to alleged better times, often functions as an emotional "projection screen" for people's desires and hopes.[83] For colonial powers just as on the American frontier, the space to be occupied was considered a space to be civilized. Settlers' gratuitous violence was often the result of the rejection of this civilizing mission by native people.[84] Frontier paranoia, for example, informed American responses to the Ghost Dance Movement, which not only resulted in large deployments of the US Army on reservations, but also led to the infamous massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890.[85] Not only Native people rejected colonialism; nature itself was intimidating to settlers. Colonial settlers coming to foreign lands who perished due to different climate conditions felt weakened and degraded by the space but also when comparing themselves to the Native population. Violence was a means for enfeebled Europeans to impose their will on seemingly resistant people and nature as well as to force a quick

construction of the envisioned civilized world that would allow them to survive and exploit it. If the envisioned civilized world provided the ideological underpinnings, one of the underlying emotions of such violence was fear.

Benjamin Beresford's chapter covers Soviet wartime jazz and emotional mobilization. His work examines how propaganda and popular culture meshed in terrortimes for the emotional mobilization of soldiers and the public at large. Jazz often reiterated the prescribed propaganda formulas of sacrifice, heroism, and Russian nationalism that overshadowed Soviet sentiment both in public opinion and propaganda. Yet as Beresford shows, jazz also operated in an entangled web of meanings that permitted it to highlight Allied contributions to the war effort, and by virtue of its American origins, also Western culture, when propaganda was less keen to mention the Allies. Furthermore, jazz songs sometimes depicted Soviet soldiers mourning regions lost to the Wehrmacht, which stands in stark contrast to the official image of stoic soldiers and the regime's reluctance to mention its own defeats. Particularly in a song about Crimea, Beresford uncovered evidence for Soviet transnationalism, which made Odessa a stand-in for other lost hometowns, be they Russian or Soviet. Finally, jazz also acted as a projection screen for Soviet hopes for a better life without violence after the war. As such, jazz was both a propaganda tool and an expression of popular culture, whose emotional power stemmed from its ability to mobilize masses through at times matching and surprising messages.

SECTION 4: MEMORY CONTINUITIES

Terrortimes are distinct from more peaceful periods, and memory reflects that. World War I, for example, is widely considered an important catalyst for violence. During this war, the majority of the male population in several countries—and many women as well—experienced large-scale violence that radicalized individual and collective actors. Atrocities committed, for instance during the Russian Civil War, were informed not only by the brutality of this conflict, but also by yearlong fighting, dying, and suffering in World War I. The Age of Catastrophe,[86] or, as we would call it, the Age of Violence, was a result of a process of mutual radicalization.[87] World War I was therefore followed by violent action; not only the particular terrorscapes of Eastern Europe but also Western countries like Britain, France, and the United States experienced violent postwar internal conflicts. Even when terrortimes changed into peacetimes, the hidden potential of violence reemerged, spurred on by national, political, economic, or social crises. The world economic crisis in 1929 therefore led to a radicalization of the political quarrel, especially in Germany, where Communists and National Socialists engaged in street battles.[88] Yet this phenomenon was not reserved to Germany alone; the

protests of right-wing extremists in Paris on February 6, 1934, caused more than thirty deaths and two thousand other casualties, the most violent demonstrations in France since 1891.[89] Violent outbursts in the interwar period had much to do with the memory of terrortimes and terrorscapes.

"Crafting the History of Terrortimes" is the focus of the first two chapters in this section. Yan Mann's contribution explores how the cult of the Great Patriotic War was crafted already during the war around topoi such as sacrifice and heroism. So powerful was this narrative that it created a bond between state and society that could not be easily altered after the war. As Yan Mann shows, Stalin tried to reinsert himself into the story after World War II war, but in the 1950s after his death, through destalinization Nikita Khrushchev worked to limit the leader's influence and return to the familiar story of sacrifice and heroism. Even under Leonid Brezhnev in the 1960s and 1970s no attempt was made to alter this narrative, though efforts increased to pass it down to the younger generation not impacted by the war and its legacy. Such efforts only increased under Vladimir Putin in the twenty-first century, when the war morphed into a mythic event to showcase much-needed national unity, while the central tenets of the narrative changed little. Memory manufactured during the war held up with remarkable stability despite the upheaval of Soviet and Russian transitions.

Also under the theme "Crafting the History of Terrortimes," Volker Benkert explores German memory of World War II at a crucial point at the turn of the twenty-first century, when discourses on ordinary Germans as victims and Germans as co-perpetrators clashed with new intensity. Though both discourses have been continuously in existence since 1945, the renewed confrontation of these two discourses around the year 2000 and the inability to link them in meaningful ways without apologia has led to a situation in which Germans seem to oscillate ever more rapidly between them. As Benkert shows by looking at more recent films on World War II, the quick succession of memory acts on Germans as victims and Germans as perpetrators established at the turn of the century led to a sincere attempt to portray ordinary Germans as complicit in the regime's crimes. In order to make the participation of these films' German protagonists acceptable to contemporary German audiences, their complicity is cushioned by the same apologetic narratives previously established.

If the preceding theme explored memory constructions on national levels, the last theme discussed in this volume revolves around the memory of "Terrortimes in Transnational Perspective." The central tenet of this section is that national memory does not evolve in isolation from other national narratives. For example, by founding and funding the European House of History in Brussels, the European Union has been active in creating a European identity based on the shared traumas of the twentieth century, particularly the Holocaust. Caner Tekin and Stefan Berger show that the "European Union has invested heavily in putting the Holocaust at the center of

its historical self-understanding and in influencing national understanding of the Holocaust in diverse European nation states." The European Union's attempt to create a transnational memory of World War II and the Holocaust has been exposed as self-serving in order to legitimize the larger project of European unification. Yet as Caner and Berger argue, it also often clashes with differences in the perception of the Holocaust in different member states, where the memory of the Holocaust often competes with the memory of the socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe.[90]

Ilse Raaijmakers explores in the tenth chapter the extent to which Dutch memory of war and Holocaust was influenced by European memory narratives in the mid-1990s. She understands references to Europe in Dutch liberation commemorations—however constructed and future oriented they were —as an attempted correction to national myths that had ignored the complicity of some parts of Dutch society with the German occupiers in World War II. While acknowledging the transnational references to Europe as important memory interventions, Raaijmakers also shows that Dutch memory, not unlike that of many other states, is still largely informed by a national narrative.

Georgi Verbeeck closes out the themed sections with an exploration on the role of the Holocaust as a European identity marker. He argues that the Holocaust has the status of an indisputable moral reference point, which lends itself to politicization while requiring other horrors to be similar to the Holocaust in order to be recognized. Other unintended consequences might be that the ubiquity of the Holocaust could desensitize and saturate audiences. Verbeeck also alerts readers to a new competition between the memory of Nazi and Communist crimes that divides the continent and challenges the Holocaust as an identity-shaping narrative for the European Union. The Holocaust, though surely a transnational moral reference point, remains imbued with different meanings across Europe.

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NOTES

1. Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16 (1986): 22.
2. Reinhard Koselleck, *Raum und Geschichte*, in *Zeitgeschichten: Studien zur Historik,* ed. Reinhard Koselleck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 82. Koselleck's statement was part of a paper given at the annual meeting of German historians in Trier in 1987.
3. Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005), 130–42. See also J. B. Jackson, "A Sense of Place, a Sense of Time," in *A Sense of Place, a Sense of Time* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 151–63. However, the German sociologist Georg Simmel, in *Space and the Spatial Ordering of Society*, in *Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 543, warned as early as 1908: "If an interpretation of history presents the spatial factor in the foreground to such an extent that it would understand the greatness or the smallness of the realm, the crowdedness or dispersion of populations, the mobility or stability of the masses etc. as the, as it were, motives radiating out from space to the whole of historical life, then here too the essential spatial preoccupation of all these constellations runs into danger of being confused with their positive functional causes." More recent sociologists have underlined the way space is being constructed by human imagination. Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).
4. The authors would like to acknowledge the input of Kevin McHugh for this article, whose unpublished "Ruminations on Space" was an invaluable source for us to link time and space.

5. Stephen Katz and Kevin McHugh, "Age, Meaning, and Place: Cultural Narratives and Retirement Communities," in *A Guide to Humanistic Studies in Aging*, ed. Thomas Cole, Ruth Ray, and Robert Kastenbaum (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 271–92.
6. Giorgio Agamben, "Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord's Films," in *Guy Debord and the Situationist International*, ed. Tom McDonough (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 313–19. For continuities of languages and cultural codes or mourning and grief in World War I sites of memory see Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
7. *Autoverkehr der Firma Carl Presser & Co.*, Maßstab 1:1000000. (Berlin: Druck und Verlag Stritzke & Rothe, 1936).
8. *Der Deutsche Osten und Polen*, Maßstab 1:2000000. Bielefeld: Verlag von Velhagen & Klafing, 1939.
9. Max Hastings, *Inferno: The World at War 1939–1945* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 5.
10. The editors of *Geographies of the Holocaust* even go so far as to argue that the Holocaust was "a profoundly geographical phenomenon." Anne K. Knowles, Tim Cole, and Alberto Giordano, eds., *Geographies of the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 1.
11. Cornelia Wächter, "Complicity and the Politics of Representation," in *Complicity and the Politics of Representation*, ed. Cornelia Wächter and Robert Wirth (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), 4.
12. Friedrich Wilhelm Benkert, Personal-Nachweis, p. 3. EK I, 2.12.1939, German Army Officer Personnel ("201") Files (Personalakten of the OKH, Heeres-Personalamt), 1939–1945, National Archives Microfilm Publication A3356, MFKL-G110.
13. Claudio Fogu, "A 'Spatial Turn' in Holocaust Studies?," in *Probing the Ethics of Holocaust Culture*, ed. Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner, and Todd Presner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 225.
14. Soja used the term "spatial turn" as a subheading Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (New York: Verso, 1989).
15. See the blurb on his book: Edward Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (New York: Wiley, 1996).
16. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Philosophy of Nature," in *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, ed. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 34.
17. Cf. Maria Villela-Petit, "Heidegger's Conception of Space," in *Critical Heidegger*, ed. Christopher E. Macann (London: Routledge, 1996), 134.
18. Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 117ff.

19. Cf. Roland Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World: The Telegraph and Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
20. Cf. David Harvey, *Paris: Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 48.
21. The novel was published in seven volumes from 1913 to 1927 by Grasset and Gallimard.
22. Cf. Martin Jones, Rhys Jones, and Michael Woods, *An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2004), 4–8.
23. Michael Schwartz, *Ethnische "Säuberungen" in der Moderne: Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 22.
24. Cf. Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 31–33.
25. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 151.
26. Cf. Ruben Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
27. For enhanced border enforcement cf. Warwick Armstrong and James Anderson, *Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire* (London: Routledge, 2007; for the immigration wave cf. Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* (London: Sage, 2016).
28. Cf. Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), in which approaches to a European or global entangled history are discussed.
29. Cf. Keith Breen and Shane O'Neill, eds., *After the Nation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism and Postnationalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
30. Cf. Paul Levinson, *Digital McLuhan: A Guide to the Information Millennium* (London: Routledge, 1999), esp. 65–79.
31. Cf., for instance, Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2009); Jörg Döring and Tristan Thielmann, eds., *Spatial Turn: Das Raumparadigma in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2009); Charles W. J. Withers: "Place and the 'Spatial Turn' in Geography and in History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70 (2009): 637–58; and Fiona Williamson, "The Spatial Turn of Social and Cultural History: A Review of the Current Field," *European History Quarterly* 44 (2014): 703–17. Cf. also from a feminist perspective, Kathryne Beebe, Angela Davis, and Kathryn Gleadle, eds., *Space, Place and Gendered Identities: Feminist History and the Spatial Turn* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
32. Cf. Karl Schlögel, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik*

(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003). Cf. also Karl Schlögel, "Kartenlesen, Augenarbeit: Über die Fälligkeit des spatial turn in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften," in *Was sind Kulturwissenschaften? Dreizehn Antworten*, ed. Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner (Munich: Fink Verlag, 2004), 261–83.

33. The term *terrorscapes* was coined by an international and transdisciplinary group of scholars of memory. The editors thank Georgi Verbeek for alerting us to this useful term (http://www.terrorscapes.org/).
34. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, Introduction to *Shatterzones of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 23.
35. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2011), 326ff.
36. Thomas Kühne, "Colonialism and the Holocaust: Continuities, Causations, and Complexities," *Journal of Genocide Research* 15, no. 3 (2013): 356.
37. Georgi Verbeeck, "Legacies of an Imperial Past in a Small Nation: Patterns of Postcolonialism in Belgium," *European Politics and Society* 21 (2019): 304.
38. Dan Diner, "Haider und der Schutzreflex Europas: Österreichs neue Regierung stört den wachsenden europäischen Gemeinsinn. Debatte," *Die Welt*, February 26, 2000. https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article504303/Haider-und-der-Schutzreflex-Europas.html. Similarly, see Claus Leggewie, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2001), 20f. See critique in Lothar Probst, "Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust," *New German Critique*, no. 90 (2003): 45–58.
39. Heinrich Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1986), 76.
40. Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 71–74.
41. Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 179. While barbarization might be a common response to the horrors of war, others were appalled by it. Konrad Jarausch describes how the war and particularly the plight of Soviet POWs changed his father, a Protestant nationalist with a penchant for German dominance over the "eternal East" into a compassionate observer and active helper. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *Reluctant Accomplice: A Wehrmacht Soldier's Letters from the Eastern Front* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 28ff.
42. Stefan Kühl, *Ordinary Organizations: Why Normal Men Carried out the Holocaust* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 112f.
43. Axel T. Paul, "Masse und Gewalt," in *Gewaltmasse: Über die Eigendynamik und Selbstorganisation kollektiver Gewalt,* ed. Axel T. Paul and Benjamin Schwalb (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2015), 19–62. See also Thomas Klatetzki, "'Hang

Them High': Der Lynchmob als temporäre Organisation," in Paul and Schwalb, *Gewaltmasse*, 147–73.

44. James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 293. See also Thomas Kühne, *Kameradschaft: Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2006), 152.
45. Ulrike Jureit, *Das Ordnen von Räumen: Territorium und Lebensraum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, 2016), 287ff.
46. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), xi.
47. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, introduction to *Shatterzones of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 16.
48. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 443.
49. Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht*, 87.
50. "Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature." Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, accessed April 12, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp.
51. Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), xxv.
52. Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 182.
53. Pinker, *Better Angels of Our Nature*, 129.
54. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 13
55. Eric Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 15.
56. Zygmund Baumann, "The Uniqueness and Normality of the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust: Theoretical Readings*, ed. Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 114.
57. Compare to the idea of a European memory space and the difficulties of forging a shared European identity based on history perceived vastly differently. Birgit Schwelling, "Identität—Differenz—Ähnlichkeit: Überlegungen zu Konzepten der Vermessung des europäischen Erinnerungsraumes," in *Gedächtnis und Gewalt: Nationale und transnationale Erinnerungsräume im östlichen Europa*, ed. Kerstin Schoor and Stefanie

Schüler-Springorum (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016), 21.

58. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, ed. and trans. Lewis Coser (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 52–53.
59. Gilat Margalit, *Guilt, Suffering, and Memory: Germany Remembers Its Dead of World War II* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 219.
60. *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ostmitteleuropa*, vols. 1–4, ed. Theodor Schieder (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 1953–1960).
61. Jan Assmann, "Communicative and Cultural Memory," in *Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook,* ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 110ff.
62. Wulf Kansteiner and Todd Presner, "Introduction: The Field of Holocaust Studies and the Emergence of Global Holocaust Culture," in *Probing the Ethics of Holocaust Culture*, ed. Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner, and Todd Presner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 25.
63. On a discussion of the omission of any German atrocities see Robert Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 72.
64. Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012); and International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (Elie Wiesel Report), (Bucharest: Polirom 2004), 382. http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/files/Raport%20Final/Final_Report.pdf.
65. Ralph Schor, *L'antisémitisme en France dans l'entre-deux-guerres. Prélude à Vichy* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe 2005), 161, 179, 207f., 220.
66. Michèle Cointet, *La Milice française* (Paris: Fayard, 2013); Pierre Giolitto, *Volontaires français sous l'uniforme allemand* (Paris: Perrin, 1999); and Robert Forbes, *For Europe: The French Volunteers of the Waffen-SS* (Solihull: Helion, 2006).
67. Christoph Dieckmann, *Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941–1944* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011); Christoph Dieckmann and Saulius Suziedelis, eds., *The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews during Summer and Fall of 1941: Sources and Analysis* (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2006), 100ff.; and Konrad Kwiet, "Rehearsing for Murder. The Beginning of the Final Solution in Lithuania in June 1941," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 12 (1998): 13.
68. Steven B. Bowman, *The Agony of Greek Jews, 1940–1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 58–93. See also the articles in Giorgos Antoniou and A. Dirk Moses, *The Holocaust in Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), especially Leon Saltiel, "A City against Its Citizens. Thessaloniki and the Jews," 113–34.
69. Sophie B. Roberts, *Citizenship and Antisemitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870–1962* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
70. James Harris, *The Great Fear: Stalin's Terror of the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2016); Robert Gellately, *Lenin, Stalin and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 251.

71. Of particular importance was the census of 1937, which showed "missing millions" of people in comparison to the census of 1926, documenting the famine and violence in Ukraine and other regions of the Soviet Union. The results were so obvious that the census could only be published fifty years later. Karl Schlögel, *Terror und Traum: Moskau 1937* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008), 163.
72. Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 133.
73. Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 294.
74. H. R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942–1944* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 112.
75. Hilaire Belloc, *The Modern Traveller* (London, 1898), 41.
76. Wolfram Dornik, *Die Ukraine Zwischen Selbstbestimmung und Fremdherrschaft, 1917–1922* (Graz: Leykam, 2011), 91–280.
77. Wolfdieter Bihl, *Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte*, *vol. 2, Die Zeit der versuchten kaukasischen Staatlichkeit, 1917–1918* (Vienna: Bohlau, 1992); Jonathan D. Smele, ed., *Historical Dictionary of the Russian Civil Wars, 1916–1926* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 455f.; and Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 119.
78. For example, John Winthrop's writings about land use in Massachusetts Bay Colony from 1629. "And for the Natives in New England they incloese noe land neither have any setled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have noe other but a naturall right to those countries. Soe as if wee leave them sufficient for their use wee may lawfully take the rest, there being more then enough for them & us." John Winthorop, "Reasons to Be Considered for Justifying the Undertakers of the Intended Plantation in New England . . .," in *Envisioning America: English Plans for the Colonization of North America, 1580–1640*, ed. Peter C. Mancall (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 134. See also Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 35f.
79. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, *Hitler's War in the East, 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 209–52. Holger Herweg rightly focuses on the role intellectuals like Karl Haushofer played in shaping Nazi ideas about space. Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and Hess* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 170.
80. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *Reluctant Accomplice: A Wehrmacht Soldier's Letters from the Eastern Front* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011) describes the transformation of a patriotic Protestant theologian who saw Germany on a "civilizing mission

in Eastern Europe" (28) into a skeptic of Nazi ideology who reported on the "great dying in the camps" and who could not see "an enemy in the broad strata of millions of Russian people" (32).

81. Felix Römer, "'Im alten Deutschland wäre ein solcher Befehl nicht möglich gewesen': Rezeption, Adaption und Umsetzung des Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlasses im Ostheer 1941/42," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 56, no. 1 (2008): 55f.
82. Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, eds., *The Waffen-SS: A European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.
83. Jureit, *Ordnen von Räumen*, 75–126. Cartography is a way to directly imagine space. William Rankin, *After the Map: Cartography, Navigation, and the Transformation of Territory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), asserts that maps had an influence on how the United States reflected about the nature of power and international relations in the twentieth century.
84. A. Dirk Moses, "Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History," in *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 15.
85. Alex Alvarez, *Native America and the Question of Genocide* (New York: Roman & Littlefield, 2014), 102ff.
86. Heinrich August Winkler, *The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West 1914–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015).
87. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).
88. Timothy Scott Brown, *Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 83–119.
89. Pierre Pellissier, *6 février 1934: La République en flammes* (Paris: Perrin, 2000).
90. Caner Tekin and Stefan Berger, "Towards a 'Europeanized' European History?," in *History and Belonging: Representations of the Past in Contemporary European Politics*, ed. Stefan Berger and Caner Tekin (New York: Berghahn, 2018), 5.
91. For the original program and a conference report, see Michael Mayer, "Tagungsbericht: Terrortimes, Terrorscapes? Temporal, Spatial, and Memory Continuities of War and Genocide in 20th Century Europe" (conference report, Tutzing, August 1–4, 2014), https://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-5775.
92. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, "Coming into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire," in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 5.

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PART 1

SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CONTINUITIES

1

CONTESTED SPACES

Criminalization of Marginalized Communities in Former Habsburg Lands in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: The Case Study of Austrian *Zigeuner* ("Gypsies")

URSULA K. MINDLER-STEINER

TODAY, "THE ROMA PEOPLE ARE EUROPE'S LARGEST ETHNIC MINORITY."[1] Yet for a long time their fate had been underrepresented in twentieth-century commemorative culture and research on the persecution of minorities. This is also due to the fact that up to this day, *Zigeuner* ("gypsies") have often been regarded as "criminals." Among the most influential people laying the foundation for this "scientifically verified" perception was Austrian criminologist Hans Gross (1847–1915), who described the "gypsy" "type of criminal" at the end of the nineteenth century as follows: "The gypsy is simply overall different from any '*Kulturmensch*' [civilized man], he himself is of the most brute and most degenerated nature and everything you have learned and practiced when communicating with many other people, is useless when you have dealings with gypsies."[2] Gross was professor at the University of Graz, and for a long time his publications set the international standard and even served as police manuals.[3] His continued use of the "criminal gypsy" stereotype was received internationally and became one of the preconditions for the claim for crime prevention measures against "gypsies."

In the history of the Roma people, *terrortimes* usually refers to the Roma genocide (*Samudaripen*) under National Socialism. But there is a temporal continuity discernible, a continuity of stereotypization and discrimination, throughout time. By including new source material, this chapter contributes to the argument that the history of discrimination and persecution of Austrian "gypsies" cannot be reduced to the era of National Socialism but goes back hundreds of years. Nevertheless, the

National Socialists persecuted "gypsies" in thitherto unknown radical ways, culminating in genocide. As I argue, the criminalization of "gypsies" occurred on different levels—juridical-legal-administrative, social, and ideological-racist—linked by a common acceptance that "gypsies" were "different" and that their absence (by means of deportation or annihilation) would not do harm to society or the economy. National Socialist "gypsy politics" can only be analyzed in context with the preceding developments. This chapter provides an overview of the complexity of the mechanisms and structure that allowed for the discriminations and persecutions in Austria-Hungary and later National Socialist Austria. Since at the time of National Socialism, most of the Austrian "gypsies" were living in the eastern part of the country, focus is laid on the area of Eastern Austria and Western Hungary (today the Austrian provinces of Burgenland and Styria). The chapter is based on a thorough study of primary sources,[4] as well as on scholarly works.[5] Besides, special attention has to be paid to sources made accessible or created within the last few years, such as the recently rediscovered early testimonials of Austrian Roma and Romnia,[6] or to oral history,[7] which are included in this chapter.

SOME NOTES ON THE TERMINOLOGY USED

Before going into detail, it is important to clarify terms used in this chapter. Much has been published on the problematic use of "gypsy." End, Herold, and Robel, for instance, emphasize the omnipresence of the imagination of "the gypsy" and demonstrate that the term refers to a projective picture produced in the hegemonial discourse, which is itself dominated by non-Romani people.[8] To this day, the question of concepts and terminology is highly controversial, not only in regard to the autonym used by the ethnic group itself but in particular when talking about the exonym. The scientific community has undertaken various attempts to discuss nonstigmatizing umbrella terms. In German and Hungarian, as in many other European languages, the terms *Zigeuner* and *cigány* not only implicate a fuzzy concept ranging between social and ethnic definitions but also have a pejorative connotation. Thus, German academics usually apply the autonym "Sinti and Roma," which has some shortcomings. First, according to linguistic theory, Sinti are only a subgroup of the larger Roma.[9] Second, Sinti and Roma are both victim groups, but the term does not encompass other ethnic subgroups persecuted as "gypsies," such as Lovara, Kale, and Manouche. According to Rombase, "today, Roma living in various lands around the world use different 'autonyma' for their societies (Sinti, Kale, Manouche, etc.)" but "all acknowledge a common origin and basic identity with Roma."[10] However, the use of the term *Roma* would be anachronistic in the context of historical research because the sources use an expansive definition of "gypsies," and it would disguise the heterogeneity of the group of people discriminated

against as "gypsies." In the absence of objective criteria, depending on the context and on the subjective assessment of officials, *Zigeuner* comprised different meanings, thus deliberately addressing one or another group.[11] Sometimes it referred to a racist or ethnic ascription, sometimes to "vagrancy" in general, and at other times to "antisocial behavior."[12] As Freund noted, "State and local authorities almost never made distinctions between beggars, vagabonds, and Gypsies."[13] The term was applied notwithstanding the individual's self-perceptions and thus also affected people who did not regard themselves as gypsies.[14] Benedik pointed out that "these people . . . were not persecuted as Rom or Romni but as 'Zigeuner' or 'Zigeunerin' and these concepts are by no means synonymous or even arbitrarily exchangeable."[15] To sum it up, the term *Zigeuner* or "gypsy" was and still is a discriminatory and stigmatizing exonym and thus is rejected by most of the Romani people. However, because this term is found in the sources this chapter is based on, it is used throughout, although in quotation marks and with some reservations, too.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST "GYPSIES" BEFORE MARCH 1938

An analysis of the criminalization of "gypsies" shows that this took place on various levels.[16] The juridical-legal-administrative level refers to questions of government and the creation, implementation, and enforcement of law. This includes, for instance "measures to combat the gypsy nuisance" (*Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens*),[17] decreed in 1888 by the minister of the interior of the Austrian half of the monarchy (Cisleithania) or regulations on poor relief and right of residence (*Heimatrecht*),[18] which became a predominant part of the "gypsy discourse" as of the second half of the nineteenth century.[19] The ideological-racist level comprises different ideas of the treatment of "gypsies," from enlightened absolutism, the First Republic, and the Austrian corporate state to National Socialism and the racist persecution of "gypsies."[20] Finally, on a social level of discrimination, focus is laid on the social position of "gypsies" in society, as discussed in the following.

In March 1938, at the time of the so-called Anschluss, which incorporated Austria into National Socialist Germany, most of the Austrian "gypsies" lived in the province of Burgenland, former Western Hungary. According to estimates, about nine thousand of eleven thousand Austrian "gypsies" lived there.[21] Within this province, most, and the largest, "gypsy settlements" (*Zigeunersiedlungen*) were documented in the district of Oberwart.[22] In contrast to other parts of Austria and Europe, "gypsies" had been permanently settling in this district since the seventeenth century, which is considered quite an exceptional development.[23] Although resident, they kept on "traveling" in the greater area,

as did many other non-"gypsies" as well. Therefore, this practice must be seen in the context of a generally high internal migration at that time but also in relation to their specific occupations.[24] Quite for the benefit of the countrified people, they carried out some of their trades in their workshops and/or peddling; for example, they produced baskets, chairs, brushes, and brooms; worked as polishers/grinders and musicians; or fixed umbrellas.[25] Even before the economic crisis, poverty was widespread, and many of the non-"gypsy" peasants also lived on the bread line. Furthermore, the Austrian Historical Commission has documented that contrary to popular prejudice that all "gypsies" would be a burden on the taxpayers, some "gypsies" even owned real estate, bank accounts, and so forth, which became of note in the National Socialist era, when expropriations took place.[26]

The relationship of the "gypsy" with the non-"gypsy" population can be characterized as ambivalent. On the one hand, "gypsies" were exposed to many stereotypes due to their ascribed "otherness," were verbally harassed,[27] and were exposed to racist coverage by the local media, which often stoked certain fears and presented them as frauds and thieves.[28] In general they lived on the margins of society, which was also visible in the segregation of settlement, since their settlements were often on the outskirts of the villages.[29] On the other hand, they were popular musicians and thus contributed as "gypsy bands" to village festivals and customs, and their participation was not only welcomed but taken for granted.[30] In addition, among Catholics it was a common practice for non-"gypsies" to agree to be godparents or sponsors to "gypsy" children.[31] In fact, "gypsies" were part of the rural community, even though social interaction alleged a dichotomy between the community members and the "gypsies." These boundaries were context-specific as well as fluent, as Wilhelm Horvath recounts: "You know, the non-Roma have also made an exception. We were, so to say, respected 'gypsies' because we were musicians."[32] Not only was the acceptance of the entire group changeable—celebrated as musicians, but suspected as criminals—but belonging to the group of "gypsies" was open to negotiation. Before, during, and after National Socialism markers of "gypsyness" varied in visibility; for example, a blond person might not be regarded as a "gypsy" because he or she did not conform to the traditional image of the darkhaired "gypsy."[33] A marker could also be a certain address; a person who would not live in the gypsy settlement was thus not immediately classifiable as "gypsy" via his or her address.[34] In terms of belonging, someone would simply not consider himself or herself to be a "gypsy."[35]

Since the nineteenth century, the question of "gypsy" identity—although in terms of identity authentication—had occupied the minds of cis- and transleithanian authorities too. The registration of "gypsies" was widely discussed and in parts implemented by the means of "gypsy conscriptions," photography, and fingerprint identification.[36] However, in their interpellation in the House of Representatives of the Austrian Imperial Council, German-national deputies pointed out that photography would not be a reliable method. As early as 1908 they demanded that "every gypsy picked up

should be marked in a way that he is recognizable any time. For example, he could receive a figure tat[t]ooed on his right forearm, and the name, which the gypsy has given himself, should be added. . . . In this case, the particular district court, similar to automobiles, . . . could receive the figures, which it would then ordain to be tattooed."[37] In 1933, the local newspaper in Oberwart reported that the Hungarian district of Abaúj was thinking about tattooing "gypsies" in order to verify their identity.[38] As can be seen, the idea of identification of inmates with identification numbers tattooed on the left forearm, with a specific symbol or name added (e.g., "Z" for "gypsy"), was by no means a National Socialist invention at Auschwitz but can be traced back to the turn of the century. The economic crisis and the crisis of the social welfare system reinforced the image of the "criminal gypsy," which was sustained by the media. The discussion of the "gypsy menace" was hallmarked by suggestions to "solve" the "Gypsy Question," comprising the deprivation of civil rights, the establishment of segregated schools, a note on "race" in the passports of "gypsies," compulsory registration and deregistration at police stations, deportation to their communities of origin, confiscation of their carriages and horses to provide security for cost recovery (for deportations), commitment to a penitentiary or an institution for forced labor, and other provisions.[39] Again, these measures were often picked up ideas from older (canceled) edicts or from legal regulations that were effective in other countries.[40] However, Austria soon had to realize that most of them could not be implemented for legal reasons;[41] the constitution, the League of Nations, and the Treaty of St. Germain made this impossible.[42] Only the idea of segregated schools was put into practice, when "gypsy" schools (*Zigeunerschulen*) were established in Burgenland, for example in the village of Stegersbach.[43]

Throughout the 1920s, the public discussion was less affected by racial questions than by considerations of security policy. When after World War I the former German Western Hungary became the Austrian province of Burgenland, the police started to collect extensive data on "gypsies" as of 1924, and a "gypsy card file" (*Zigeunerkartothek*) was created, which contained photographs, data, and fingerprints of about eight thousand gypsies.[44] When the National Socialists seized power in Burgenland, they were able to access the file, which became a basic source for the "efficient persecution of the gypsies" in this area.[45] In 1931, an Austrian newsreel company shot a documentary that shows this "gypsy" card file.[46] The card file vanished into thin air, and this footage remains the only evidence of it. Unfortunately, little is known about the International Central Agency to Combat the Gypsy Nuisance (Internationale Zentralstelle zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens), established in Vienna in 1936, but the name refers to the international (at least European) dimension of the "problem" discussed.[47] In any case, measures taken on a local or regional level seem to have been of greater importance than the establishment of international agencies. An example is the "gypsy conference" (*Zigeunerkonferenz*) held in Oberwart in 1933, at which participants—local politicians

and "gypsy experts" — even suggested to deport "gypsies" to overseas countries or to sterilize them.[48] However, the problem remained that there was no common definition and that "it was left up to the local authorities to determine who was or was not a Gypsy."[49] In the 1930s the security-political discussions became increasingly racist, although still without legal consequences. This was to be changed after the Anschluss. As Freund has demonstrated, the interwar identification and registration of "gypsies" was of vital importance to their deportation and annihilation during National Socialism.[50]

NATIONAL SOCIALIST PERSECUTION AFTER MARCH 1938

The Anschluss in March 1938 also had a severe impact on the situation of Austrians labeled as "gypsies." On the one hand, discriminatory measures were taken on a superregional level: "gypsies" were deprived of the right to vote in the 10 April 1938 plebiscite, and in May 1938, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), chief of the German Police, ordered the registration of all Austrian "gypsies." Under reference to Himmler's decree on "crime prevention" (*Erlass über die vorbeugende Verbrechensbekämpfung*), from March to June 1938 more than two hundred Burgenland "gypsies" considered able to work were arrested and sent to camps.[51] On the other hand, local and regional National Socialists were also very active. National Socialist *Gauleiter* and governor of the Burgenland, Tobias Portschy (1905–96),[52] not only implemented the instructions he received but also refined them.[53] He acted on the "proposals for solutions" that had been discussed in earlier decades and presented these ideas in a radicalized way in his racist memorandum, "The Gypsy Question" (*Die Zigeunerfrage*), in which he preached a "final solution of the gypsy question": "Only by an effective diminuation [*sic*] of their reproduction [i.e., sterilization], by a compulsory detention in labor camps [i.e., forced labor] and by enabling their mandatory migration to a foreign country [i.e., deportation] we will be able to free ourselves from the gypsy plague. . . . This kind of solution . . . is the National Socialist solution and thus the only true solution."[54] In 1988, Portschy defended his memorandum by referring to the fact that he had only compiled ideas based on speeches of democratic politicians and that he had been supported by officials who had collected the material.[55] Even though Portschy had not been the spin doctor of all discriminatory measures, this does not release him from his responsibility in general and for the steps he took to radicalize the anti-"gypsy" policy at that time. As early as 1983 Erika Thurner pointed out: "The radical suggestions . . . by Portschy and others largely agreed with the persecution program of the Nazis, or, rather, they preceded and influenced it."[56] The contribution of Austrian authorities to the cumulative radicalization of Nazi policy must not be underestimated.[57]

In 1938, Portschy legalized a whole slew of discriminations specifically targeted at "gypsies," such as the prohibition against performing music, which deprived them of legal means of existence. In fact, years before the Anschluss he had admonished his followers not to employ "gypsies" as musicians in order to exclude them from society and expel them from a field where they had been generally accepted.[58] It can be asserted that the discussion—which had so far been conducted in the realms of politics and society as well as in a legal and media framework, hallmarked by arguments of security policy and crime prevention—was now augmented by an ideological-racist component. The already existing proposals for solutions were seized upon and gradually implemented under the overarching legitimation of race theory. As the Austrian Historical Commission has shown, it took months or even years to absorb and implement some of the Burgenland regulations in other parts of National Socialist Germany. Portschy's prohibition of school attendance for "gypsy" children, decreed in September 1938,[59] was implemented in other districts at the beginning of the school year 1939–40 and in the entire German Reich only in March 1941.[60] In the long run this meant that after 1945, the majority of survivors were illiterate. Portschy's order sending "gypsies to roadworks" (*Zigeuner zur Straßenarbeit*) was based on pre–National Socialist ideas and became effective in August 1938.[61] It basically decreed that all male "gypsies" able to work would be exploited in forced labor. Separated from other workers, they had to work under survey of guards (see figures 1.1–1.4). From their small wages, social service expenses were subtracted, and some money was automatically transferred to their communities of origin.[62] This "Burgenland model of forced labor for gypsies,"[63] which was introduced even before special "gypsy" labor camps were established, was later adopted in other districts too.

In October 1938, the Burgenland was split and became part of Gau Lower Danube (Niederdonau) and Gau Styria (Steiermark), and Southern Burgenland became Styrian. This meant that now the debate about the "gypsy question" was transferred to Lower Danube and Styria. At this time, almost a quarter of all Austrian "gypsies"—about four thousand—lived in the Southern Burgenland district of Oberwart.[64] Tobias Portschy was appointed deputy gauleiter of Styria, which was led by Gauleiter Sigfried Uiberreither (1908–84). Although the two of them had many conflicts of opinion,[65] they agreed upon a "solution" of the "gypsy question," and Uiberreither gave Portschy a free hand as much as possible in managing the issue.[66] Consequently, time and again various Styrian government agencies interceded in Berlin in order to pressure higher-ranking authorities in Berlin on the topic. In Lower Danube, "gypsy expert" Bernhard Neureiter, who had worked for Portschy in the 1930s, was now responsible for the persecution of "gypsies."[67] Thus Michael Zimmermann's findings are true for Austria, too: "The interaction between center and periphery, between government officials, police and SS leadership, and local authorities, was crucial to the development

1.1. "Gypsies" at forced labor in Oberwart, Austria. *Source:* Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, LReg. 384, L-Z, box 2148.

1.2. "Gypsies" at forced labor in Oberwart, Austria. *Source:* Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, LReg. 384, L-Z, box 2149.

1.3. "Gypsies" at forced labor in Oberwart, Austria. *Source:* Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, LReg. 384, L-Z, box 2150.

1.4. "Gypsies" at forced labor in Oberwart, Austria. *Source:* Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, LReg. 384, L-Z, box 2151.

of a Nazi Gypsy policy that culminated in forced sterilization and murder."[68] I would even argue that the roles of local and regional authorities and the population must not be underestimated. The radicalization and implementation of anti-"gypsy" measures relied on the assistance and contribution of the local population as well as local and regional political elites (mayors, district officials, etc.). Only a few people would help their neighbors or friends;[69] most would remain bystanders, and some even played an active part in the persecution of the "gypsies," which provided for an "efficient" policy of persecution and annihilation. It is important to emphasize that people not only reacted and carried out orders but also acted. This is discussed in detail later.

The legal basis for the further "suppression of the gypsy nuisance" was an edict by Himmler dated 8 December 1938. In this document he ordered to register all "gypsies."[70] At the Reich Criminal Office's (Reichkriminalpolizeiamt) disposition, more than seven hundred male and female former Burgenland "gypsies" were arrested in June 1939 and either taken into "preventive detention" (*Vorbeugehaft*) or deported to the concentration camps of Dachau and Ravensbrück.[71] In October, the chief of the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), Reinhard Heydrich (1904–42), decreed a detainment decree (*Festsetzungserlass*), which banned "gypsies" from leaving their current place of residence. Here, too, it becomes apparent that even on the Reich level the issue of "gypsies" was under the responsibility of different authorities and not unified. A secret report of the SS Security Service (SS-Sicherheitsdienst) in Berlin from 9 October 1939 sheds light on the pressing role of Austrians: "From Austria we have received the suggestion to now implement the absolutely essential solution of the gypsy question by a ruthless accommodation of the gypsies in secured camps."[72] Austrians were not just carrying out orders issued by Berlin but exerted pressure in order to get the "gypsy question" "solved." Further interventions by the Styrian government were ineffective, but on 31 October 1940 Heydrich issued guidelines on the establishment of camps for forced laborers.[73] In former Austria, such forced labor "gypsy" camps were established in Vienna, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Danube (e.g., Lackenbach),[74] and Styria.[75] It is apparent that the National Socialists acted quite paradoxically. Many of the arrested "gypsies" who were urged to hold down a job in the labor camp were in fact arrested at their regular working place and transferred to camps, arbitrarily taken away from their jobs.[76] Allegedly "unwilling to work," they were, for example, taken from their jobs as farm or seasonal laborers and transferred to labor camps and forced to work. This was in sharp contrast to their supposedly antisocial behavior. A similar situation occurred when in 1941–42 all "gypsies," among them medaled and/or frontline soldiers, were expelled from the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) and deported to Auschwitz.[77] Even before 1941, it happened that "gypsy" soldiers on leave from the Wehrmacht, wearing their Wehrmacht uniforms, were arrested and deported, or that they voluntarily accompanied their families when these were arrested.[78]

FROM PERSECUTION TO ANNIHILATION

In the course of time, in particular after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the National Socialists changed their tactics. They did not aim at discrimination directed against "gypsies" and exploitation of their labor anymore; the goal changed to annihilation.[79] Early plans to deport "gypsies" had failed, but in 1940 the systematic deportation of "gypsies" from Styria to the Lackenbach camp started.[80] One of the greatest deportations—euphemistically called *Umsiedlung* (change of residence)—was the transport to Łódź/Litzmannstadt (today in Poland), where more than five thousand Austrian "gypsies" from camps in Styria and Lower Danube were deported between 5 and 9 November 1941 (see figure 1.5).[81] Those who survived the shortage of supplies and the disastrous sanitary conditions were gassed in the extermination camp of Chelmno/Kulmhof in December 1941 and January 1942.[82] No one survived.[83]

It can be assumed that it is no coincidence that just at the time when the deportations started, the *Landrat* (district administrator) of Oberwart explicitly barred "gypsies" from using public transport, with the exception of the railroad.[84] At first glance this may be seen as an almost liberal bylaw, but in fact it was a logistical necessity. After all, the railroad was the most important means of deportation. "Gypsy" settlements were demolished, and the municipalities had permission to sell what was left.[85] In spite of the prohibition against enrichment, the local population took what remained,[86] although the Landrat called it "dishonorable for a German *Volksgenosse* to enrich himself financially with the belonging of gypsies. Unfortunately, this has happened."[87]

Based on Himmler's infamous Auschwitz decree (*Auschwitz-Erlass*) of 16 December 1942 and its instructions on 29 January 1943, all "gypsies" were to be deported to Auschwitz. Subsequently, about 22,700 people were transported to the Auschwitz-Birkenau "gypsy family camp."[88] Once the "gypsies" were gone, a lively debate unfolded in Styria over who was allowed to keep the assets and estates left behind. In the end, it was decided that the assets were to be confiscated on behalf of the German Reich.[89] This too conflicts with the National Socialist argument that due to their poverty "gypsies" posed a threat to the social system and thus a burden on the taxpayers. It can be said that Himmler's Auschwitz decree constitutes the final stage of the "solution of the gypsy question."

To this day, reliable information is not available, and thus casualty figures are rough estimates. According to the Austrian Historical Commission, only about fifteen hundred to two thousand of eleven thousand "gypsies" survived National Socialism.[90] In the district of Oberwart, about two hundred of four thousand survived.[91]



Staatliche Kriminalpolizei
Kriminalpolizeistelle Graz
Der Leiter

Graz, den 30. Oktober 1941.

Betrifft: Umsiedlung von Zigeunern. GEHEIM!

Bezug: Erlass des Reichsführers-SS und Chefs der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern vom 1. Oktober 1941 - S- V A 2 b Nr. 81/41 g II -.

Auf Grund des oben genannten Erlasses werden am 5., 7. und 8. November 1941 zusammen 3.000 Zigeuner aus der Steiermark in das Ghetto in Litzmannstadt umgesiedelt. Im Einvernehmen mit den hierbei beteiligten Stellen wird die Durchführung der Aktion wie folgt geregelt:

I. Bestimmung des abzutransportierenden Personenkreises.

Zum Abtransport sind vorgesehen:

a) 2.000 Zigeuner aus dem Kreise Oberwart und
b) 1.000 Zigeuner aus den Kreisen Fürstenfeld und Feldbach, sowie aus den übrigen Kreisen des Reichsgaues Steiermark.

Unter Berücksichtigung der im Erlass bestimmten Ausnahmen und der von den Landräten in Oberwart, Fürstenfeld und Feldbach gemachten Vorschläge sind die von den Gendarmerie- und anderen Polizeidienststellen eingereichten Zigeunersippenlisten von der Kriminalpolizeistelle Graz überprüft und, soweit die einzelnen Sippen oder Personen von der Umsiedlung betroffen werden sollen, mit dem Stempel "Festnehmen" versehen und zurückgeschickt worden. Es ist dabei das Ziel verfolgt worden, den Reichsgau Steiermark bis auf die Kreise Oberwart, Fürstenfeld und Feldbach möglichst völlig zigeunerfrei zu machen. Zigeuner, die über den bereits festgesetzten Rahmen hinaus in die Sammellager eingeliefert werden, werden nicht mehr angenommen.

II. Errichtung von Sammellagern.

Zum Zwecke der Zusammenfassung der Zigeuner für den bevorstehenden Abtransport sind zwei Sammelager errichtet worden, und zwar:

1.) in Pinkafeld für die unter Ziffer I a) erwähnten 2.000 Zigeuner und
2.) in Fürstenfeld für die unter Ziffer I b) erwähnten 1.000 Zigeuner.

Stmk. Landesarchiv

1.5. "Instructions on the Deportation of the 'Gypsies' to Litzmannstadt, 30 October 1941." *Source:* Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, LReg. 120, K2093.

POPULATION INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION: POSSIBILITIES OF AGENCY

The following case examples reveal the powerlessness and helplessness of people classified as "gypsies" as well as the populations' limits of agency and their different reactions to their neighbors' persecution. Because Roma tradition is oral, written evidence, in particular personal accounts, is scarce. From most archival material no information can be obtained if a person considered himself or herself to be a "gypsy" or if this status was merely ascribed by others.[92] The case of Franz Baranyai (1891–1943) is exceptional; sources reveal his faith in the authorities and in the justice system as well as the heterogeneity of the lives of people labeled "gypsies" and thus discriminated against. Baranyai was a police officer in Graz (Styria).[93] In March 1942, he wrote to Gauleiter Uiberreither to complain about "unfair treatment as a gypsy" and argued that his "thought" was "German" and that he could not be a "gypsy" at all "since neither my ancestors nor my parents had tramped. And never had feelings or thoughts like gypsies."[94] His statement was checked thoroughly, and it was discovered that his name appeared in a local "gypsy file." In spite of his valid "Aryan certificate" (*Ariernachweis*), the police arrived at the conclusion that he was to be considered "a full gypsy." In 1942 he was expelled from the police, and in July 1943 he was murdered in Auschwitz.[95] Baranyai's trust in the authorities was in vain and his hopes for help dashed. This was true for many other Austrian "gypsies" too. In rare cases locals provided support. Some people pitied "gypsies,"[96] or helped by assigning work to them and treating them well,[97] by providing them with food,[98] or by warning them of an upcoming deportation; a survivor described his mother's flight, which was only possible "because someone from the village knew her, a non-Rom, and he said, 'Get out of here, because all of you will be taken away!'"[99] A form of nonviolent resistance could be seen in nonobservance of orders, such as teaching "gypsy" children although it was prohibited.[100] These examples show that even in restrictive times there were people who assumed responsibility, used the opportunities and means available, and displayed courage.

Nevertheless, the prevailing mood was affirmative, as a contemporary witness recounted when interviewed about his life and his memories of local Roma people: "My mother once said—she was a very religious woman—I don't know, if I should say this here at all. She said, it was good though that Hitler put away the 'gypsies' but he should not have killed them."[101] The lion's share of sources, however, suggest that most of the population was either passive,[102] showed approval, or was even voluntarily involved in incidents of discrimination and persecution.[103] The following case exemplifies this. After World War II, a "gypsy" survivor pressed charges against police officer Ernst Chwojka, who had mistreated him in a small Burgenland village. The accused was brought before the People's Court (Volksgericht); in July 1947, he was sentenced to half a year, but he was released in September.[104]

Chwojka's wife Marie had been involved in the mistreatment of a "gypsy" too. That man survived the concentration camp, and after the war he filed charges. The police report states that in 1939, "he fled from the camp to an open field, where he was stopped and held by the policeman's wife Marie Chwojka."[105] In the course of denazification, Marie Chwojka was registered because of her illegal NSDAP membership. However, the police did not prosecute the fact that she had been actively involved in the persecution of a "gypsy."[106] In regard to the question of pressing charges against former offenders, the Chwojka case is somewhat exceptional, since after 1945, for various reasons, most of the survivors did not file charges against former National Socialists. Anton Müller explains his decision to remain silent as follows: "Our farmers certainly tried to ingratiate themselves with us and brought bread and lard to us. They were Nazis and did not want to be betrayed [to the Allies]. But I did not betray anybody, least of all from our village. I just would have had to tell the Russians who had been a Nazi. If you live in the same village, that's simply not done. Yes, that's just the way it was."[107] However, in regard to the question of penalties after 1945, the Chwojka case is not isolated at all.

ROMA IN POSTWAR AUSTRIA

In postwar Austria, it was common that People's Courts found former National Socialists not guilty of mistreatment of "gypsies," even if there was substantial evidence to support the allegations.[108] Often testimony given by "gypsies" was not considered reliable. This must be seen in the postwar context, when collective stigmatization, criminalization, and exclusion persisted.[109] In public opinion "gypsies" were considered to have been "unwilling to work," "antisocial," and "criminals" who had been detained rightfully.[110] Prevailing attitudes stipulated that "what he [Hitler] did to the Jews, he would not have needed to do, but what he did to the gypsies was right."[111] Legislation penalized "gypsies"; racist laws originating from the monarchy were still effective;[112] and for decades "gypsies" were excluded from the Austrian compensation measures (*Opferfürsorge*) on grounds of the legal regulations, which only defined two categories of victims: resistance fighters and people persecuted for political reasons.[113] Tobias Portschy's further career also acts as an indicator for the general attitudes of the time. In 1949 a People's Court sentenced him to fifteen years and forfeiture of his assets, but he was released early in 1951.[114] Although his racist memorandum was among the documents presented to the court, his co-responsibility for the murder of thousands of "gypsies" was not prosecuted. He neither admitted guilt nor regretted his doings; on the contrary, all his life he did "not take back any word" of his memorandum.[115] Victims,

though, remained underprivileged. To escape classification and stigmatization and to find work, some would leave their rural settlements and move to cities, hide their Roma background, or even change their "typical" surnames to "German" names in order to avoid being identified as "gypsy."[116] It is obvious that this had a bearing on the people left behind and the social structure of their rural settlements, which were threatened with extinction. Furthermore, victims were traumatized by the atrocities they had suffered in the camps, such as sterilization and gassing. Ludwig Horvath, whose mother had been imprisoned in a concentration camp, remembers an incident after the war: "When we moved to the new Roma settlement, suddenly there was electricity and running water. And what did she say when she saw the new water pipe? 'Children, don't take a shower, gas will come out!'"[117] The long shadow cast by National Socialism affected all Roma families, cross-generationally. And fifty years after the end of the war Burgenland Roma again had to fear for their lives for racial reasons, when in 1995 a bomb killed four young men of the Roma settlement in Oberwart. The assassin, who had carried out a series of bomb attacks, was finally sentenced to life imprisonment. This attack was one of the most violent acts of domestic terrorism in Austria since 1945.[118]

After World War II it took decades for an autonomous organization of the Romani minority to be established in the course of the 1980s people's movement.[119] In 1989, the first Romani association in Austria was founded in Oberwart, and others followed.[120] They worked hard to gain public recognition. So far they have achieved a great deal, and many projects have been carried out; for example, the spoken language of Burgenland Romani was standardized and transferred into writing,[121] and memorials have been established as well as a commemorative culture (e.g., the implementation of annual cultural and memorial events). In 1993, the Austrian state officially recognized Romani people as a national ethnic community.[122] Thereby they received the same status as other autochthonous minorities of Austria such as Hungarians or Croatians. Two years later, the Roma Ethnic Group's Advisory Board (Volksgruppenbeirat) was constituted,[123] and financial grants allowed for maintaining a sound infrastructure to protect Romani interests. In 1999 the Adult Education Center of the Burgenland Romani (Volkshochschule der Burgenländischen Roma) was established to offer learning opportunities and promote Romani–non-Romani dialogue.[124] In 2011 the European Commission called for national strategies for Roma integration, and thus Austria too implemented a national Roma strategy and established a National Roma Contact Point in the Federal Chancellery.[125] In spite of all achievements, anti-gypsyism is increasing,[126] and there is still a lot to be done. A Romani newspaper stated in 2014 that "a comprehensive integration still fails due to the stereotypical notions deployed from the people and the media. In many contemporary people's minds Romani people have simply remained 'gypsies.'"[127] This is still an incontrovertible fact.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the ways in which marginalized groups in Austria were discriminated against and persecuted at the end of the nineteenth and in the course of the twentieth centuries. As demonstrated, this discrimination occurred over centuries. Many of the discriminatory measures had already been contemplated decades before the Anschluss and were then implemented by the National Socialists. As can be seen, these developments were based not only on the mere execution of instructions in a hierarchical structure but also on a bottom-up process. A "successful" implementation was only possible due to the concerted action and interaction of National Socialist politicians and executive, legislative, and judiciary personnel on all levels (local, regional, Reich) with the local population. Because Roma were also criminalized and stigmatized as "gypsies" after 1945, many people who had been involved in crimes against humanity could avoid legal persecution, often even investigation. They were able to attain positions in society again without any lasting disruption. Although today every European Union country has a "responsibility to improve the lives of the EU's Roma citizens," the European Commission has pointed out that "many Roma in the EU are victims of prejudice and social exclusion, despite the fact that EU countries have banned discrimination."[128]

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NOTES

1. "Of an estimated 10–12 million in the whole of Europe, some six million live in the EU, most of them EU citizens." "Tackling Discrimination, European Commission," accessed October 10, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm. Romani/Roma people are also known by the exonym "gypsies," which is

widely perceived as pejorative. Since the sources analyzed for this chapter use an extremely expansive definition of *Zigeuner* ("gypsy"), the term is used but with certain reservations. This is discussed in more detail later.

2. "Der Zigeuner ist eben ganz anders als jeder Kulturmensch, selbst von der rohesten und verkommensten Gestalt und alles, was man im Verkehr mit zahlreichen anderen gelernt und geübt hat, ist nicht zu brauchen, wenn man es mit dem Zigeuner zu tun hat." Hans Gross, cited in Norbert Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung der vermeintlichen Zigeunerplage in Österreich (1848–1938)" (thesis, University of Graz, 1999), 39. See Ursula Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung und Verfolgung von Randgruppen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel der österreichischen 'Zigeuner,'" in *Kriminologische Theorie & Praxis*, ed. C. Bachhiesl and S. M. Bachhiesl (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 2011), 59–79.
3. Alison Adam, *A History of Forensic Science* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2016), 52–53, 64–72, 77; and Florian Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory: Persecution of Gypsies in Austria, 1938–1945," in *The Nazi Genocide of the Roma: Reassessment and Commemoration*, ed. A. Weiss-Wendt (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 51.
4. This is also reflected in publications on the topic, on which this chapter is based, although extended by new sources. See Ursula Mindler, "'Die Zigeuner und die Juden sind seit der Gründung des Dritten Reiches untragbar': Das Südburgenland im Gau Steiermark und sein Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit nach 1945," in *NS-Herrschaft in der Steiermark: Positionen und Diskurse*, ed. H. Halbrainer, G. Lamprecht, and U. Mindler (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2012), 117–39; Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung"; Gerald Lamprecht and Ursula Mindler, "Verfolgung—Flucht—Deportation: Die Eisenbahn und die Schattenseiten der Moderne," *Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Graz* 37 (2007): 241–63; and Ursula Mindler, *Tobias Portschy: Biographie eines Nationalsozialisten; Die Jahre bis 1945* (Eisenstadt: Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 2006), 92–124.
5. For example, see Selma Steinmetz, *Österreichs Zigeuner im NS-Staat* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1966); Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, *The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Erika Thurner, *National Socialism and Gypsies in Austria* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998); Claudia Mayerhofer, *Dorfzigeuner: Kultur und Geschichte der Burgenland-Roma von der Ersten Republik bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Picus, 1988); Susanne Uslu-Pauer, "'Verdrängtes Unrecht': Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den in Zusammenhang mit NS-Verbrechen an Roma und Sinti stehenden Volksgerichtsverfahren (1945–1955) mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Lagers Lackenbach im Burgenland" (thesis, University of Vienna, 2002); Susanne Uslu-Pauer, "'Keine Chance auf eine gerechte Behandlung vor Gericht': Analyse von Volksgerichtsverfahren wegen NS-Verbrechen an Roma und Sinti," in *Kriegsverbrecherprozesse in Österreich: Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, ed. H. Halbrainer and M. Polaschek (Graz: Clio, 2003), 99–115; Florian Freund, Gerhard Baumgartner,

and Harald Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug, Restitution und Entschädigung der Roma und Sinti* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2004); Gerhard Baumgartner and Florian Freund, "Der Holocaust an den österreichischen Sinti und Roma," in *Zwischen Erziehung und Vernichtung: Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerforschung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts,* ed. M. Zimmermann (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007), 203–25; Heimo Halbrainer, Gerald Lamprecht, and Ursula Mindler, *Unsichtbar: NS-Herrschaft; Widerstand und Verfolgung in der Steiermark* (Graz: Clio, 2008), 87–95; Michael Teichmann and Roman Urbaner, "'. . . dass die Zigeuner wenigstens aus dem Landschaftsbilde verschwinden': Die NS-Verfolgung der Roma im Gau Steiermark am Beispiel zweier steirischer 'Zigeunerlager'; Das Arbeitslager Kobenz (bei Knittelfeld) und das Sammellager Dietersdorf (bei Fürstenfeld)," in *NS-Herrschaft in der Steiermark: Positionen und Diskurse*, ed. H. Halbrainer, G. Lamprecht, and U. Mindler (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2012), 347–383; Stefan Benedik, "Un-Stete Verfolgung: Verortungen des 'Zigeunerischen' vor dem nationalsozialistischen Landgericht Graz," *Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Graz* 44 (2015): 285–309; and Tara Zahra, "'Condemned to Rootlessness and Unable to Budge': Roma, Migration Panics, and Internment in the Habsburg Empire," *American Historical Review* 122, no. 3 (2017): 702–26.

6. Susanne Urban, Sascha Feuchert, and Markus Roth, eds., *Stimmen der Überlebenden des "Zigeunerlagers" Lackenbach* (Göttingen, 2014); and G. Baumgartner, "'Wann endlich wird dies himmelschreiende Unrecht an uns gut gemacht werden?': Frühe Zeugnisse österreichischer Roma und Romnia zu ihrer Verfolgung während des Nationalsozialismus," *DÖW-Jahrbuch* (2015): 43–80. Roma = masculine plural; Romni(j)a = feminine plural.
7. See Erich Maria Schneller, *Zigeuner, Roma, Menschen: Lebensberichte burgenländischer Roma* (Oberwart: edition lex liszt 12, 2006); *Mri Historija: Lebensgeschichten burgenländischer Roma; Eine Zeitzeugendokumentation von Roma-Service*, 15 vols. (Kleinbachselten: Roma-Service, [2009]); and *Amari historija: Burgenländer erzählen; Eine Zeitzeugendokumentation von Roma-Service* (Kleinbachselten: Roma-Service, 2011). See the interviews in USC Shoah Foundation, The Institute for Visual History and Education, accessed November 14, 2013, https://sfi.usc.edu/.
8. Markus End, Kathrin Herold, and Yvonne Robel , "Antiziganistische Zustände—eine Einleitung: Virulenzen des Antiziganismus und Defizite in der Kritik," in *Antiziganistische Zustände: Zur Kritik eines allgegenwärtigen Ressentiments*, ed. M. End, K. Herold, and Y. Robel (Münster: Unrast Verlag, 2009), 19; see Klaus-Michael Bogdal, *Europa erfindet die Zigeuner: Eine Geschichte von Faszination und Verachtung* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011).
9. Rombase, "Language," accessed October 5, 2015, http://rombase.uni-graz.at//.
10. Rombase, "Roma Groups," accessed October 5, 2015, http://rombase.uni-graz.at//.
11. See F. Freund, "Der polizeilich-administrative Zigeunerbegriff: Ein Beitrag zur

Klärung des Begriffes 'Zigeuner,'" *Zeitgeschichte* 30, no. 2 (2003): 76–90; Freiherr Franz Aichelburg-Labia, *Verwaltungspolizeiliche Vorschriften: Eine Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen über Arbeitsscheue und Landstreicher, Zwangsarbeitsanstalten, Schüblinge (auszuweisende Fremde), Zigeunerunwesen, Naturalverpflegstationen, Pass- und Meldewesen* (Linz: n.p., 1904); Leo Lucassen, *Zigeuner: Die Geschichte eines polizeilichen Ordnungsbegriffes in Deutschland 1700–1945* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1996); Baumgartner and Freund, "Der Holocaust," 205–12; Juliane Hanschkow, "Etikettierung, Kriminalisierung und Verfolgung von 'Zigeunern' in der südlichen Rheinprovinz zur Zeit des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik 1906 bis 1933," in *"Zigeuner" und Nation: Repräsentation—Inklusion—Exklusion*, ed. H. Uerlings and I.-K. Patrut (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 249–72; Karola Fings, "'Rasse: Zigeuner': Sinti und Roma im Fadenkreuz von Kriminologie und Rassenhygiene 1933–1945," in *"Zigeuner" und Nation: Repräsentation—Inklusion—Exklusion*, ed. H. Uerlings and I.-K. Patrut (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 273–309; Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung," 60–61; and Benedik, "Un-Stete Verfolgung," 286–87.

12. Aichelburg-Labia, *Verwaltungspolizeiliche Vorschriften*.
13. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 44.
14. Halbrainer, Lamprecht, and Mindler, *Unsichtbar*, 94–95; and Fings, "'Rasse: Zigeuner,'" 273.
15. "Diese Menschen [wurden] . . . nicht als Rom oder Romni verfolgt, sondern als 'Zigeuner' oder 'Zigeunerin' und diese Konzepte sind keineswegs synonym oder überhaupt beliebig austauschbar." Quoted in Benedik, "Un-Stete Verfolgung," 287.
16. See Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung," 62.
17. See Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung."
18. See Jirí Klabouch, "Die Lokalverwaltung in Cisleithanien, in Verwaltung und Rechtswesen," in *Verwaltung und Rechtswesen*, ed. A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1975), 299–300; Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung," 57–66; and Harald Wendelin, "Schub und Heimatrecht," in *Grenze und Staat: Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremdengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750–1867*, ed. W. Heindl and E. Saurer (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2000), 173–343.
19. See Georg Gesellmann, "Die Zigeuner im Burgenland in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Die Geschichte einer Diskriminierung" (thesis, University of Vienna, 1989); Dietmar Hummer, "Die Zigeuner im Burgenland von 1921 bis 1945" (thesis, University of Graz, 1989); Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung"; Freund, "Der polizeilich-administrative Zigeunerbegriff"; Marius Weigl, "'Für die öffentliche Sicherheit': Zur Genese der antiziganistischen Norm in Österreich zwischen 1918 und 1938" (thesis, University of Vienna, 2012); and Marius Weigl, "Fremdmachung und Entrechtung: Der polizeiliche Ordnungsbegriff 'Zigeuner' in Österreich 1918–1938," in *Romane Thana: Orte*

der Roma und Sinti; Ausstellungskatalog (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2015), 56–60. For Hungary see Zoltan Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

20. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Education: The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States*, Roma Survey: Data in Focus. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.Accessed March 14, 2010, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014_roma-survey_education_tk0113748enc.pdf.
21. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 244 and 26–31; DÖW, ed., *Widerstand und Verfolgung im Burgenland 1934–1945: Eine Dokumentation*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1983), 262; and Tobias Portschy, "Mission des Burgenlandes," undated, file 2770, fol. 103–10, 3, Austrian State Archive. See also Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 244.
22. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 31 and 29; Ludwig Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 15:5; and Helmut Samer, *Die Roma von Oberwart: Zur Geschichte und aktuellen Situation der Roma in Oberwart* (Oberwart: edition lex liszt 12, 2001).
23. See Mayerhofer, *Dorfzigeuner*, 18–19.
24. See Andrea Komlosy, *Grenze und ungleiche regionale Entwicklung: Binnenmarkt und Migration in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2003).
25. See Mayerhofer, *Dorfzigeuner*, 128; and Susanne Fuchs-Nebel, "Rom, das heißt Mensch: Die Roma des Burgenlandes," in *Grenzfall: Burgenland 1921–1991*, ed. E. Deinhofer and T. Horvath (Eisenstadt: Kanica Verlag, 1991), 131.
26. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*.
27. See also the interviews in *Mri Historija* and *Amari historija*.
28. See Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung," 64n19.
29. Gerhard Baumgartner, "Auf den Spuren der 'verschwundenen' Roma-Siedlungen des Burgenlandes," in *Romane Thana: Orte der Roma und Sinti; Ausstellungskatalog* (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2015), 67.
30. Adolf Papai in *Mri Historija*, 6:5; see also *Amari historija*; and Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung," 64n20.
31. *Amari historija*, 117 and 181.
32. "Wissen Sie, die Nicht-Roma haben auch Ausnahmen gemacht: Wir waren sozusagen angesehene 'Zigeuner', weil wir Musiker waren." Wilhelm Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 7:4.
33. Anton Papai in *Mri Historija*, 5:16.
34. Karl Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 13:4.
35. Halbrainer, Lamprecht, and Mindler, *Unsichtbar*, 94–95.
36. Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung," 58–59, 115; and Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 44–50.
37. "Nach unserer Ansicht sollte jeder aufgegriffene Zigeuner auf eine Art und Weise

bezeichnet werden, daß man ihn jederzeit erkennt. Er könnte beispielsweise am rechten Unterarm eine Ziffer tätowiert erhalten, dieser wäre der Name, den sich der Zigeuner beigegeben, anzufügen. . . . In diesem Falle könnten den einzelnen Bezirksgerichten, ähnlich wie bei Automobilen . . . die Zahlen zugewiesen werden, die sie dann eintätowieren ließen." Quoted in "Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907," 28th Session, June 5, 1908, 9833f., accessed March 14, 2010, http://alex.onb.ac.at; see also Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung," 116.

38. *Oberwarther Sonntags-Zeitung*, October 12, 1933, 4.
39. Mindler, "Die Kriminalisierung," 66–67.
40. Mayerhofer, *Dorfzigeuner*, 21.
41. Freund, "Der polizeilich-administrative Zigeunerbegriff," 80.
42. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 53.
43. Karl-Heinz Gober, "'Leider ist der Erfolg gleich Null': Die 'Zigeunerschule' in Stegersbach," in *Die Volksgruppe der Roma und Sinti bis 1938*, ed. R. Kropf and G. Polster (Eisenstadt: Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 2016), 391–429; and Eva Maria Gober, "Die Instrumentalisierungs- bzw. Sozialisierungsversuche und Erziehungsprinzipien im Autoritären Ständestaat Österreichs 1933/34–1938" (thesis, University of Vienna, 2008), 38–47.
44. *Oberwarther Sonntags-Zeitung*, April 13, 1924; "Polizeiakten I A, 1938, Zigeunerakten 25" (ca. 1938), BLA; Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung," 122f; and Hummer, "Die Zigeuner," 24; see also Karola Fings, "Nationalsozialistische Zwangslager für Sinti und Roma," in *Der Ort des Terrors*, ed. W. Benz and B. Distel (Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2009), 9:195.
45. Thurner, *National Socialism*, 38–39; and DÖW, *Widerstand und Verfolgung*, 262.
46. *Das Burgenland und die Eisenstädter Polizei* (Vienna: Federal Police Central Bureau, 1931), in *Historisches Burgenland* (Vienna: Filmarchiv Austria, 2012), DVD.
47. See Tandl, "Die Bekämpfung," 126n521.
48. Baumgartner and Freund, "Der Holocaust," 211–12; Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 98; and *Romane Thana: Orte der Roma und Sinti; Ausstellungskatalog* (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2015), 88.
49. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 48.
50. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory."
51. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug,* 33–34.
52. Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*; Ursula Mindler, "Die Begriffe 'Heimat' und 'Dorf' in den autobiographischen Zeugnissen von Tobias Portschy," *Danubiana Carpathica* 52, no. 5 (2011): 53–72; and Marcus Wagner, "Tobias Portschy—ein Leben für die völkisch-nationale Idee: Sozialisation und Reintegration eines ewig Gestrigen" (thesis, University of Vienna, 2013).
53. See Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 92–124.

54. "Nur durch nachhaltige Verminderung ihrer Vermehrung, durch das zwangsmäßige Verhalten in Arbeitslagern und durch die Ermöglichung freiwilliger Abwanderung ins Ausland vermögen wir uns von der Zigeunerpest zu befreien. . . . Diese Art der Lösung . . . ist die nationalsozialistische Lösung und somit die einzige wirkliche Lösung." Quoted in Tobias Portschy, *Die Zigeunerfrage* (Eisenstadt: n.p., 1938), 27.
55. Tobias Portschy, interview by Kid Möchel, May 2, 1988, quoted in Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 106; and Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 92–124 (esp. 105–10).
56. Thurner, *National Socialism*, 39; see also Uslu-Pauer, "'Verdrängtes Unrecht,'" 62.
57. See also Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 53.
58. See Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 98.
59. See "Letter from the Superintendent of Schools" (ca. September 8, 1938), BLA; see also Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 59; and *Mri Historija*.
60. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 33; see also the life stories in *Mri Historija* and *Amari historija*.
61. *Grenzmark Burgenland*, July 31, 1938, 1.
62. *Grenzmark Burgenland*, July 31, 1938, 1; Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 97–101; and Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 104–5.
63. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 97.
64. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 29.
65. See Ursula Mindler, "'Portschy ist Burgenländer, ich bin Steirer': Ein Burgenländer als Gauleiter-Stellvertreter von Steiermark," *Blätter für Heimatkunde* 80, no. 4 (2006): 117–43.
66. Oral History Archive, Department of Economic, Social, and Company History (University of Graz), 2/85.
67. "Polizeiakten I A, Zigeunerakten 25, I-811 [K] 32" (ca. 1938), BLA; *Oberwarther Sonntags-Zeitung*, May 1, 1932, 3; Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 97; Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 126–33; and Susanne Uslu-Pauer and Eva Holpfer, *Vor dem Volksgericht: Verfahren gegen burgenländische NS-Täter 1945–1955* (Eisenstadt: Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 2008), 81–85.
68. Michael Zimmermann, "The National Socialist 'Solution of the Gypsy Question': Central Decisions, Local Initiatives, and Their Interrelation," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 15, no. 3 (2001): 422.
69. *Mri Historija*; and *Amari historija*.
70. Edict from December 8, 1938 and instructions from March 1, 1939, in *Vorbeugende Verbrechensbekämpfung: Erlasssammlung; Vertraulich!* (n.p.: n.p., 1941), 108–11, 119–23.
71. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 103–8; *Mri Historija*; and *Amari historija*.
72. "Aus Österreich kommt die Anregung, die dringend notwendige Lösung der

Zigeunerfrage jetzt durch rücksichtslose Unterbringung der Zigeuner in geschlossenen Lagern zur Durchsetzung zu bringen." Quoted in Fings, "Nationalsozialistische Zwangslager," 205.

73. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 109–110.
74. See Thurner, *National Socialism*, 42–101; and Uslu-Pauer, "'Verdrängtes Unrecht.'"
75. Fings, "Nationalsozialistische Zwangslager," 206; Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 109–37; and Teichmann and Urbaner, "'. . . Dass die Zigeuner."
76. See *Mri Historija*; *Amari historija*; Barbara Tiefenbacher and Stefan Benedik, "Der unnütze Fleiß der 'Arbeitsscheuen': Unterstellte Arbeitsunwilligkeit als Kontinuität rassistischer NS-Festschreibungen von ROMnIJA," in *Diktatorpuppe zerstört: Schaden gering. Kunst und Geschichtspolitik im Postnazismus*, ed. L. Bolyos and K. Morawek, 2012), 189–95.
77. "Ausschluss aus der Wehrmacht," Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.sintiundroma.org/de/weg-in-den-voelkermord/formen-der-ausgrenzung/wehrmacht/. The author is currently working on her habilitation on Austrian Roma in the Wehrmacht.
78. See Wilhelm Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 7:5; and Anton Papai in *Mri Historija*, 3:9.
79. See also Anton Weiss-Wendt, ed., *The Nazi Genocide of the Roma: Reassessment and Commemoration* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); and János Bársony and Á. Daróczi, eds., *Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma during the Holocaust* (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2008).
80. See Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 115–17; and Lamprecht and Mindler, "Verfolgung."
81. See Lamprecht and Mindler, "Verfolgung," 255 and nn70–71; see also Peter Klein, *Die "Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt" 1940 bis 1944: Eine Dienststelle im Spannungsfeld von Kommunalbürokratie und staatlicher Verfolgungspolitik* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009), 407–418; and "Landesregierung 384 Zi 1-1940," Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv.
82. Fings, "Nationalsozialistische Zwangslager," 209.
83. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 65.
84. Facsimile of Peter Hinterlechner's order of November 7, 1941, Oberwart, in Romani Rose, ed., *"Den Rauch hatten wir täglich vor Augen": Der nationalsozialistische Völkermord an den Sinti und Roma* (Heidelberg: Wunderhorn, 1999), 130.
85. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*; see also Peter Hinterlechner's order of November 11, 1941, Oberwart, in DÖW, *Widerstand und Verfolgung*, 283.
86. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 138–211; *Mri Historija*; and *Amari historija*.
87. "Es ist eines deutschen Volksgenossen unwürdig, dass er sich mit Habe von Zigeunern

bereichert. Bedauerlicherweise ist dies aber vorgekommen." See Hinterlechner's order of November 11, 1941, in DÖW, *Widerstand und Verfolgung*, 283.

88. See Fings, "Nationalsozialistische Zwangslager," 210.
89. See Peter Hinterlechner's order of September 6, 1944, Oberwart in DÖW, *Widerstand und Verfolgung*, 289.
90. A victim's database can be retrieved at the Cultural Association for Austrian Roma (Kulturverein österreichischer Roma) in Vienna, which includes information regarding eleven thousand Austrian "gypsy" victims. See Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 244.
91. See report by the police department of the district of Oberwart, May 30, 1946, in DÖW, *Widerstand und Verfolgung*, 279; Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 29; and Ludwig Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 15:5.
92. In particular *Amari historija*; and *Mri Historija*.
93. See Halbrainer, Lamprecht and Mindler, *Unsichtbar*, 94–95.
94. "Bei mir kann das kaum zutreffen das[s] ich rein Zigeunerischer Abstammung bin[,] da weder meine Ahnen noch Eltern gewandert sind. Und nie das Gefühl u. Denken wie Zigeuner hatten." Facsimile of the letter, in Halbrainer, Lamprecht, and Mindler, *Unsichtbar*, 95.
95. Halbrainer, Lamprecht, and Mindler, *Unsichtbar*, 94.
96. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 56.
97. See Adolf Papai in *Mri Historija*, 6:16.
98. *Amari historija*, 31.
99. "Weil aus dem Dorf hat sie einer gekannt, ein Nicht-Rom, und der hat gesagt: 'Schau, dass du verschwindest, weil ihr kommt weg!'" Josef Horwath in *Mri Historija*, 11:3; see also *Amari historija*, 177; and Koloman Baranyai in *Mri Historija*, 9:4.
100. Adolf Papai in *Mri Historija*, 6:7.
101. "Meine Mutter hat einmal gesagt—sie war eine sehr religiöse Frau—, ich weiß nicht, ob ich das überhaupt sagen soll: Sie hat gesagt, es war schon gut, dass der Hitler die 'Zigeuner' weggetan habe, aber er hätte sie nicht umbringen sollen." Quoted in *Amari historija*, 103.
102. See Anton Papai in *Mri Historija*, 5:6.
103. See *Amari historija*; and *Mri Historija*.
104. "BH Oberwart 15," BLA; Uslu-Pauer, "'Verdrängtes Unrecht,'" 146f.; and Mindler, "'Die Zigeuner,'" 137–38.
105. "Er flüchtete aus dem Lager auf ein freies Feld, wo er von der Gendarmenfrau Marie Chwojka angehalten und gestellt wurde." "BH Oberwart 12." BLA.
106. "BH Oberwart 12," BLA.
107. "Unsere Bauern haben natürlich versucht, sich einzuschmeicheln, und haben uns Brot und Schmalz vorbeigebracht. Sie sind Nazis gewesen und haben nicht wollen, dass man

sie verrät. Aber ich habe keine verraten, aus dem Ort schon überhaupt nicht. Ich hätte den Russen nur sagen müssen, wer ein Nazi gewesen ist. Wenn man im selben Ort lebt, macht man das nicht. Ja, so war das." Anton Müller in *Mri Historija*, 2:14.

108. See work from Susanne Uslu-Pauer.
109. See Erika Thurner, "'Zigeuner': Das Vorurteil als gesellschaftlicher Platzanweiser," *SWS-Rundschau* 34, no. 4 (1994): 437–47; and Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 65–67.
110. Tiefenbacher and Benedik, "Der unnütze Fleiß."
111. "Das, was er [Hitler] mit den Juden getan hat, hätte er nicht müssen, aber das, was er mit den Zigeunern getan hat, war schon richtig." Quoted in *Amari historija*, 141.
112. The 1873 Vagabond Law was effective until the 1970s, and the 1888 Gypsy Edict until the 1960s. Freund, "Genocidal Trajectory," 44 and 46.
113. Freund, Baumgartner, and Greifeneder, *Vermögensentzug*, 212–43; and Andrea Strutz, "'The Treatment Is No Different to Hitler's Direction': Compensation Measures for Austrian 'Gypsies' after 1945 Exemplified by Opferfürsorge Applications in the Province of Styria," in *Justice, Politics and Memory in Europe after the Second World War*, ed. S. Bardgett, D. Cesarani, J. Reinisch, and J.-D. Steinert (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2011), 81–98.
114. Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*.
115. Tobias Portschy, interview by Kid Möchel, May 2, 1988, quoted in Mindler, *Tobias Portschy*, 124.
116. Johann Baranyai in *Mri Historija*, 14:7 and 11, and 3:17.
117. "Als wir damals in die neue Roma-Siedlung gezogen sind, hat es auf einmal Strom und fließendes Wasser gegeben. Und was hat sie gesagt, als sie die neue Wasserleitung gesehen hat? 'Kinder, geht nicht duschen, es kommt Gas heraus!'" Ludwig Horvath in *Mri Historija*, 15:165.
118. Gerhard Baumgartner and Florian Freund, *Roma-Politics in Austria* (Vienna: Cultural Association of Austrian Roma, 2005), 36.
119. Samer, *Die Roma von Oberwart*, 49–62; see also Gerhard Baumgartner and Florian Freund, *Die Burgenland Roma 1945–2000* (Eisenstadt: Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 2004).
120. Roma 2020, "Verein Roma," accessed May 11, 2022, https://www.burgenland-roma.at/index.php/vereine-projekte/vereine/burgenland/verein-roma.
121. [Romani] Projekt, "Willkommen auf der Webseite des [romani] Projekts," accessed July 20, 2015, http://romaniprojekt.uni-graz.at/.
122. Baumgartner and Freund, *Roma-Politics in Austria*, 37.
123. Baumgartner and Freund, *Roma-Politics in Austria*, 38.
124. VHS Roma, "Über Uns," accessed August 28, 2015, http://www.vhs-roma.eu/index.php/ueber-uns.
125. "Roma Equality, Inclusion and Participation in the EU," European Commission, accessed

March 26, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-and-eu/roma-integration-eu_en; and "Roma Strategy," Federal Chancellery of Austria. Accessed August 20, 2015, https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/en/topics/ethnic-groups/roma-strategy.html.

126. Since 2013, Romano Centro has periodically published an "Antiziganismus-Bericht," documentation on racist incidents against Roma and Romnija. Accessed August 15, 2020, http://www.romano-centro.org/downloads/AntiziganismusEnglisch.pdf.

127. Erich Schneller, "Kommentar zum Jubiläumsjahr: Ein bisschen Tamtam," *Roma cajtung* (Spring/Summer 2014): 3.

128. "Tackling Discrimination," European Commission, accessed July 7, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm.

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2

SPACE AND IDEAS OF NATIONAL, ETHNIC, OR RELIGIOUS HOMOGENEITY

Polish and German Jewish Survivors in the Recovered Territories in Post – World War II Poland

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The recovered territories (ziemie odzyskane) were the provinces along the new western, southern, and northern borders of postwar Poland: southern East Prussia, Pomerania with Danzig/Gdańsk, parts of East Brandenburg, Lower Silesia with Breslau/Wrocław, and parts of Upper Silesia. The name "Recovered Territories" was coined by the Communist government in a remarkably successful propaganda campaign in the first years after the war. The campaign claimed that these territories were part of the original Polish motherland (*macierz*), which had been forcefully Germanized and was now finally returned to the rightful Polish owners.[1] Historically, most of these lands belonged briefly to the medieval Polish Crown, but for centuries they were under the shifting jurisdictions of the Holy Roman Empire, the Prussian Kingdom, the German Empire, and the Third Reich. At the Tehran Conference at the end of 1943, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed upon the allocation of the territories to Poland that was later confirmed in Potsdam in August 1945.[2]

This redrawing of borders, or "westward shift," had wide-ranging political, economic, social, demographic, and cultural consequences.[3] What follows is a brief exploration of one facet of this dramatic rupture: its effect on Jewish survivors in the Recovered Territories in the first years after the war. This chapter explores how the

Polish state treated German Jews (prewar German citizens) versus Polish Jews (prewar Polish citizens) in the region. It demonstrates that while the Polish central government bestowed (conditionally) equal rights and special protections on Jewish survivors as special victims of Nazism, only Polish Jews reaped the benefits of this rule, becoming active participants in the government's politics in the region.[4] Local German Jews, who held prewar German citizenship, faced considerable difficulty in obtaining these protections and suffered discrimination from the local administration and the population at large.[5] Thus the chapter shows that anti-Germanism, more than antisemitism, played a decisive role in affecting Jewish lives in the region in the aftermath of World War II. Although eventually the majority of both German and Polish Jews left the Territories and the country, the German Jewish "exodus" happened earlier and for reasons different than those affecting Polish Jews, who were able to briefly reconstitute a thriving Jewish communal life.

The Jewish history of the Recovered Territories builds on and contributes to the larger historiography on Jewish survivors in postwar Poland. In the last thirty years, the field has bourgeoned, covering a broad spectrum of topics from anti-Jewish violence; to the social, political, and cultural lives of survivors; to their emigration to the displaced person (DP) camps, Palestine, and the United States.[6] Anti-Jewish violence, in particular, attracted the best pens in the field, including Jan T. Gross's influential *Fear: Antisemitism in Poland after Auschwitz*, which introduced the Kielce pogrom of July 1946 to the broader English-language public.[7] More recent work in historical anthropology by Joanna Tokarska-Bakir broke new ground in our understanding of the pogrom and contributed to the general (re)turn to violence in Jewish studies more broadly (including in this volume).[8]

Yet current historiography had to go beyond violence to nuance our knowledge of survivors' lives in postwar Poland. Karen Auerbach, Audrey Kichelewski, Łukasz Krzyżanowski, Monika Rice, and myself, among others, did precisely that.[9] As I have written elsewhere, a sole focus on violence and emigration reduces the diversity and multiplicity of Jewish experiences in postwar Poland to one aspect, antisemitism. It thus simplifies and homogenizes postwar history, reducing it to a meta-tragedy: a uniformly gloomy picture that silences all experiences that do not conform. Such a focus also disregards any identity other than a victim, an emigrant, or a perpetrator. In other words, it obscures the multiple ways in which Jews and non-Jews encountered each other in postwar Poland.[10] Regional or local histories are especially useful in complicating such meta-narratives, and the Recovered Territories is a good case in point. It illuminates the brief opportunity for the rebuilding of (Polish) Jewish life in the region (unlike elsewhere in Poland) and the continuing terror against (German) Jews, inflicted by local administration and neighbors, often in defiance of the central government.

In the immediate postwar period, successive Polish governments subjected the Recovered Territories to an intense and effective campaign of ethnic engineering—including expulsions, expropriations, repopulation, and repolonization—showing the power of the state apparatus to make and remake a place.[11] The simultaneous loss of the most ethnically diverse eastern territories to the Soviet Union led to the emergence of an anomaly in the long history of the country: a nationally homogenous Polish state. Although Roman Dmowski and his nationalist movement Endecja or National Democrats had called for a "Poland for Poles" since the 1890s, and the prewar Polish government had discriminated against ethnic minorities, actual national homogeneity was never a realistic option. The sheer demographics of prewar Poland made homogeneity a utopian project.[12] Only the massive catastrophe of World War II, the Holocaust, and the subsequent postwar reshuffling of borders, with mass population transfers, could turn Poland into Dmowski's dream.

After the war, the drive toward the creation of homogenous nation-states through population transfers was not unique to Poland. It reflected a general political trend in Eastern Europe that dated back to the aftermath of World War I: the belief that population transfers were "the only means of ending the ethnic violence that plagued Eastern Europe, and . . . the only path to a stable postwar peace."[13] Having said that, Polish communists also had national considerations. Krystyna Kersten argued that Polish communism evolved over time toward prioritizing the concept of nation over class, which contributed to the predominance of the dogma of Polish national homogeneity (*państwo jednonarodowe*) after the war.[14] Moreover, as Marcin Zaremba demonstrated, nationalism (*nacjonalizm*), with its powerful symbols and rhetoric, was "one of the more important ways (*formuły*) to legitimize the communist system of power" in the 1940s–80s.[15] T. David Curp and Gregor Thum built on Zaremba's argument, adding that popular distress over enormous territorial losses in the east gave urgency to the governments' push for legitimacy in the first years after the war. Both noted the considerable success of this ideological shift, in which Communists cooperated with such unlikely partners as the Catholic Church and the prewar nationalists from Endecja.[16]

Rampant anti-German sentiment helped to solidify this newly found solidarity. In his study of Polish attitudes to Germans in 1945–48, Edmund Dmitrów wrote that there was "an exceptional convergence and uniformity of views on the German question in Polish political thought of various shades as well as in official propaganda; this uniformity was even more exceptional under circumstances of fierce political struggle and conflict between views of the ruling and the ruled on other national problems."[17] Calls for justice and revenge dominated private and public discourse. The harassment of Germans had both the political and social stamp of approval, so much so that when

a Jewish woman, Hanna Zajtman, was beaten during the Kraków pogrom in August 1945, she wondered, "Why were they beating me? I'm not a German."[18]

In consequence, millions of Germans in the annexed territories were exposed to vengeance, discrimination, and persecution after the war. However, it should be noted that for many of them, the terror was not new. The fate of Breslau/Wrocław was particularly revealing. Although non-Jewish Breslauers experienced "an odd kind of vitality" in the wartime economy, as Thum showed, their fate changed in fall 1944, when Hitler declared the city a fortress.[19] By the time the fortress capitulated on 6 May 1945, the city lay in ruins, 80,000 residents had been killed, and hundreds of thousands were forced to leave their homes. In this, they were not exceptional. In the final months and weeks of the war, almost seven million Germans, fearing the Soviet Army and reprisals by the local population, fled the territories of western and northern Poland.[20] Between 600,000 and 1.2 million lost their lives.[21]

The flight and expulsions continued after the war. In June 1945, the Polish Army ruthlessly expelled approximately 400,000 ethnic Germans from the Polish-German borderlands.[22] In the final months of 1945, another half a million Germans left these territories, in what Hugo Service called, "voluntary" migrations "encouraged" by local pressure to leave.[23] The organized mass transfer of the remaining Germans began in February 1946 and lasted until November 1947. Between February and June 1946, more than 700,000 Germans were forced out of Polish territories (200,000 people in June 1946 alone). In the second half of 1946, another 700,000 Germans were expelled. Joseph B. Schechtman estimated that a total of 1.6 million Germans were forced out of Poland in 1946 alone. In 1947, 500,000 Germans were forced to leave.[24]

The expulsions and the parallel de-Germanization of the public and private spaces of the Recovered Territories, including the demolition of German monuments and any traces of the German past, were accompanied by a mass "repolonization." The *repolonization* required populating the region with "true Poles" to reclaim the land and its "Polish essence," and to restore "its roots, and its soil."[25] The government brought in about 2.5 million "resettlers" (*przesiedleńcy*) from central Poland and 1.3 million "repatriates" (*repatrianci*) from prewar eastern Polish territories, now annexed by the Soviet Union.[26] Polish Jews were among them. As Józef Adelson found, the Polish government sent about 124 trains with Jewish repatriates to forty-two cities (Wrocław, Dzierżoniów, Wałbrzych, Legnica, and others) in the region.[27] More than 80,000 of approximately 136,000 Polish Jews, repatriated from the Soviet Union between February and July 1946, were now brought to Lower Silesia alone, not to mention almost 20,000 Jews sent to western Pomerania, mainly Szczecin (former Stettin).[28] In the beginning of the summer of 1946, there were approximately 90,000 Jews in the area. And although this number decreased precipitously to 50,000–60,000 with the mass emigration after the

Kielce pogrom in July 1946, Lower Silesia remained the largest center of Jewish life in Poland until the mid-1950s.[29]

This aggregation of Jewish population must be understood in the context of policies toward Jews in postwar Poland in general, and in the Recovered Territories in particular.[30] In the July 1944 Manifesto, the Polish Committee of National Liberation pointed to Jews as a group of particular interest: "The Jews, whom the occupant so bestially annihilated, will now be assured of rebuilding their existence and equality of rights de jure and de facto."[31] References to death camps and ghettos signaled governmental recognition of the particularity of Jewish victimhood. In January 1945, Prime Minister Edward Osóbka-Morawski proclaimed, "The Jewish population who remain alive will be able to take full advantage of not only de jure but also de facto legal equality."[32] Thus the central government situated itself as a protector of Jewish survivors and the guarantor of their rights. Although the postwar Polish governments had a fluctuating and ambivalent, if not contradictory, political stance on the national autonomy of Jewish survivors in Poland, they encouraged and supported Jewish national and cultural institutions as long as they served their political aims.[33] The reciprocity was thus expected. As Alina Cała and Halina Datner-Śpiewak argued, the Communist Party of Poland "considered the fight [against antisemitism] to be a significant tactic against [rightist] opponents after the war and counted on the Jewish population for widespread support for political transformations. Communists supported [Jewish] initiatives of self-governance and used the reconstruction of Jewish life as fodder for propaganda, particularly outside of Poland."[34]

The support of the Jewish community was especially useful in the Recovered Territories, where the government employed Polish Jews in its project of Polish nation-building or repolonization of the region. In Kamil Kijek's words, "Jewish victimhood from the hands of the Nazis was used by the authorities to legitimize the Polish presence and permanent acquisition of Lower Silesia."[35] In June 1945, the government declared that Jews in Lower Silesia should be given extensive aid, considering "that, after the martyrdom of German concentration camps, they will be *a loyal guard over Polishness* in the Recovered Territories."[36] The Jewish leadership accepted their new role. As the Central Committee of Jews in Poland proclaimed: "Lower Silesia became their fatherland. . . . With Germany's downfall . . . Jews took guard [*objęli straż*] of factories and workshops, *declaring their Polishness* loudly and proudly. They paid dearly with their blood and sweat for the right of citizenship in Lower Silesia."[37] To build a national, social, and cultural life in the region, they had no choice but to oblige. They also recognized that the government's invitation meant the inclusion of Jews in the Polish national project, an inclusion that was unseen in the interwar period.[38] However, as Kijek argued, the Jewish participation in the communist nation-building project came with a price tag:

> At the beginning, Jews were exceptional as the only ethnic group which was provided with a degree of self-government, and the opportunity to rebuild their connections with Jewish centers outside of Poland. But this was done with many caveats, and one, paradoxically, was participation in the nationalist policies of ethnic homogenization performed by the Polish State in Lower Silesia. The consequence of this paradox was that by fulfilling this condition by supporting the state propaganda and rhetoric of polonizing the "Western Territories," the Jews were losing their own political subjectivity. They were also losing the capacity to speak their own language and, with that, the ability to express and manifest their Jewish presence in Lower Silesia. Jews who came to the conclusion that they had no other alternative in Poland were thus forced to support the state. . . . And, paradoxically, participation in this policy subverted Jewish autonomy of Lower Silesia and was decisive in spelling the end of Jewish social, cultural, and political pluralism.[39]

Still, in the first postwar years Polish Jews could create vibrant national and cultural centers of Jewish life in the region.[40] Although in 1945 and 1946 Lower Silesia was as dangerous (high rates of robbery, murder, and rape) for Jews as any other part of Poland, it became a unique milieu for the "revival" of Polish Jewish life from as early as the summer of 1945.[41] In 1947 leaders of the Lower Silesian Jewry spoke openly about their enthusiasm for the local conditions. Dr. Shalom Treistman (Trojstman), the chief rabbi of Wrocław, felt that the conditions in 1947 were "much better," and he believed that seventy-five thousand, or 75 percent, of all Jews in Poland would remain there.[42]

Indeed, although antisemitism by no means disappeared, it was not a major problem in Lower Silesia after 1946. The laws against antisemitism, and the population's rising fear of the governmental penal system, played a role in improving Jews' safety. Even more significant were the specific conditions in the region. Although newcomers from central and eastern Poland brought their anti-Jewish prejudices with them, they also faced new conditions that generated new priorities and new preoccupations. They were all uprooted "resettlers" and "polonizers"; they all started anew.[43] They also had a common German "enemy" around whom the main conflicts in the annexed territories revolved, including tensions around "formerly German" (*poniemieckie*) property with a myriad of goods, houses, businesses, and pieces of land up for grabs.[44] "Formerly Jewish" (*pożydowskie*) property was much less of a concern here than in central or eastern Poland, where wartime robbery and postwar restitution of Jewish property became the major source of anti-Jewish hostility and violence.[45]

Germanness was thus the most significant irritant in the region, which can explain the contrasting treatments that Polish and German Jews received there. While Polish Jews had governmental support for their rebuilding efforts, the small community of German Jews did not enjoy similar backing. Although their numbers were small, the

tensions around their legal status, and the discrimination they suffered, can provide an important insight into the Jewish (and national) politics in the region. As Kijek pointed out, the language of "rhetorical collectivism" or "public speaking in strict and clearly defined categories of large social and national groups, with extensive use of stereotypes and aggressive images . . . was used against the German population in the Regained Territories, and justified not only their Polish resettlement, but for a time, also the reconstruction of Polish Jewish national life in a new place, in Lower Silesia."[46] Unlike Polish Jews, German Jews were on the receiving end of that rhetoric, used by the Polish administration, the population at large, and Polish Jewish institutions. As Katharina Friedla showed, although initially Polish Jews extended a helping hand to German Jews, eventually the two communities found themselves at odds with each other in the region.[47]

Estimates of the number of German Jews who lived in Poland during the first two years after the war are imprecise. Szyja Bronsztejn wrote of 135 "indigenous Jews" (*autochtoni-Żydzi*) living in Lower Silesia immediately after the liberation of 1945.[48] Friedla estimated that a year later, in February 1946, 1,600 German Jews (including spouses and children from mixed marriages) lived in Wrocław alone.[49] It must have been a younger population, since Ewa Waszkiewicz found records of only twenty-seven German Jewish funerals in the city between 1945 and 1946.[50] In the summer of 1947, there were only 30 German Jews left in Wrocław. They were the tiny remnant of a thriving Breslau Jewish community of more than 20,000 in the 1920s, devastated by expropriations, expulsions, and then deportations to concentration and death camps in World War II.[51] Their persecution, alas, did not cease with the end of the war.

Anti-German discrimination and harassment from Soviet soldiers, local administration, and the population at large affected German Jews immediately after the war. In her analysis of the German Jewish community in postwar Wrocław, Friedla succinctly described their experience:

> Their situation was particularly difficult because, on the one hand, they did belong to the world of German culture but, on the other, they had been victimized by the National Socialist racial policies. For both the Soviet soldiers and the freshly established Polish civil administration, the Jewish survivors of Wrocław were problematic. The Red Army soldiers were seen as liberators, but simultaneously they elicited fear and terror. For most survivors the encounters with Soviet soldiers were traumatic. Robberies, violence, humiliations, and rapes became daily occurrences. Age, sex, religious affiliation, or nationality made no difference. German Jews were usually treated like the other German inhabitants of Wrocław, and were seen as belonging to the nation of the persecutors—after all they did speak only German.[52]

Despite the problems they faced, German Jews in Wrocław created their own community and tried to reconstitute their institutional life there, often competing with Polish Jews. As Friedla summed up: "Deep differences between the eastern and western European Jewish worlds were not bridged. Diverse ways of thinking, different cultural values, and social status proved too significant to be overcome. For this reason, the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, although common, did not help to establish bonds based on solidarity."[53]

In July 1945, the Ministry of Public Administration regulated the status of German Jews, promising to enforce "legal equality in every sphere and in every respect [*w każdej dziedzinie i pod każdym względem*] between German Jews and Polish Jews."[54] The ministry extended the eligibility for certificates/passes of Polish nationality (*zaświadczenia polskiej przynależności narodowej*) to former citizens of Germany and the Third Reich who, "on 31 August 1939, resided in the territories recovered by Poland in 1945 and maintained Polish nationality; who were not members of the NSDAP . . .; and who would sign a statement of loyalty to the Polish nation [*złożą pisemną deklarację wierności narodowi polskiemu*]."[55] The certificates shielded the holder from discrimination, guaranteeing exemption from forced labor, displacement, and deportation; the right to regular food rations; and temporary residence until a final determination of legal status (citizenship) in Poland could be made. The ministry also instructed the lower administration to issue attestations of Polish nationality to people persecuted by the Nazi government because of their nationality or marriage.[56] The instruction specifically pointed to victims who were of "Jewish nationality" and ethnic Germans who had been discriminated against because they refused to divorce their Jewish spouses.[57]

Correspondence between local Jewish committees and local and central government shows, however, that ministerial regulations had limited bearing on bureaucratic practice at the local level. In August 1945, the Jewish committee in the Gdańsk province had to remind their voivode (head of the province administration) that German Jews, despite their foreign citizenship, should enjoy the same rights as Polish citizens due to their suffering during the war:

> People, who were submitted to painful or even horrific personal persecutions and property reprisals from Germans, who have not gotten civil rights since 1933 . . . are now, after the expulsion of Germans and downfall of the murderous Nazi regime, in an unchanged situation. . . . In the absence of relevant laws, the *Polish authorities treat them as German citizens* with all consequences, i.e., loss of property, forced labor, and, recently, even resettlement from the territory of the Gdańsk province. . . . Then it seems supremely right and fair that the new democratic Polish State does not identify [these Jews] with Germans but rather treats them equally with *its own citizens* considering the oceans of wrongs, tears, and blood that these people suffered from Germans.[58]

The Jewish committee also requested that German Jews be removed from deportation lists and their resettlement be suspended per the ministry's regulation.[59] In the same month, the plenipotentiary of the central government in Jelenia Góra (Lower Silesia) requested information on how to deal with "Jews whose loyalty during the war was under suspicion," suggesting that the provincial authorities did not trust German Jewish survivors and suspected them of collaboration with the Nazis, thus tapping into both anti-German and anti-Semitic tropes at once.[60] In September 1945, a national security office in Jelenia Góra demanded that a local Jewish committee remove all German Jews from its membership: "We cannot allow that members of your institution would be 'a half-Jew' or a 'quarter-Jew,' not to mention Germans," seemingly replicating well-learned Nazi racial categories.[61] In October 1945, the same plenipotentiary asked his superiors in Lignica (Lower Silesia) if the local Jewish committee should admit and issue Jewish committee certificates to German Jews persecuted by Nazism.[62] Bożena Szaynok found that the national security office banned several district Jewish committees from issuing such certificates to German Jews.[63]

In the same month, the central government further modified the rules and emphasized loyalty to the nation as the primary criterion for the issuance of certificates of Polish nationality. Half a year later, in April 1946, the government confirmed that patriotic conduct carried the same weight as ethnicity, language, and culture:

> Article III: Persons who will submit required application and prove their Polish origins *or* show their unity with the Polish Nation and will declare loyalty to the Nation and the State of Poland will be considered persons of the Polish national affiliation [*posiadające polską przynależność narodową*].
>
> Article IV: The interested persons can prove Polish national affiliation by all evidence available, in particular:
>
> 1. Polish origin can be proved by ID cards or registrar records, *or* by the sound of a family name, *or* by blood relations [*pokrewieństwo*] with Poles,
>
> 2. Unity with the Polish Nation could be proved by membership in Polish organizations or participation in the fight for the Polish cause [*sprawa polska*], *or* by the inner attitude [*postawa wewnętrzna*] and language, *or* by cultivation of Polish customs in family, *or* by the connection with the Polish folk culture and the life of Poles, *or* by the outer attitude [*zewnętrzna postawa*] during the Nazi rule showing solidarity with Poles while exposing oneself to danger.[64]

Thereby the central government confirmed a framework that allowed Polishness to be *earned* through patriotic behavior and opened the door, at least on paper, to citizenship for all Jews in postwar Poland, regardless of their previous citizenship and native language.[65] I should note that these regulations were part and parcel of a broader process of "verification" or *weryfikacja* of the residents of the Recovered Territories.[66] In theory, the verification was to reclaim the "Polish essence" of the land "recovered" from Germany. In practice, the verification served to increase the number of "indigenous Poles" (*autochtoni*) to repolonize and populate the region and thus regulate the distribution of property.[67] Prewar residents who declared "local" or "here" (*tutejsi*) nationality before the war and "neutral" after the war became the main target of the verification process. Once they claimed Polish nationality and expressed their desire to stay in the country, they had to undergo an assessment of their "Polishness." If approved, they obtained a certificate of Polish nationality and had to pledge their loyalty to the nation and the state.

That these prescriptions were often ignored further illuminates the disconnect between the governmental regulations and administrative practice on the ground. The following story illustrates some of that dynamics in a small town in Lower Silesia. In April 1946, Capitan Kulczycki of the Border Defense Troops and his family took over a lodging house belonging to a German Jewish woman, Augusta Sara Thiel, who had survived Theresienstadt.[68] The takeover was violent. Three months after the fact, Thiel reported that she was "slapped in the face, thrown on the ground, and threatened with a revolver."[69] She and her coworkers were then locked in a bathroom for twenty-four hours, after which they were allowed to take a few essentials and were forced to leave.[70] Apparently the mayor of the district (*starosta*) offered to return the house to Thiel, which she refused unless the German coworkers/tenants could return as well.[71] The mayor then suggested that Thiel leave her house "voluntarily," in solidarity with the German tenants.[72] Her temporary certificate of Polish nationality, which stated that "Thiel Sara-Auguste . . . should be treated as a person excluded from the German population and therefore should not come under the law concerning Germans," was dismissed.[73] It may have been dismissed with due cause, as it expired in February 1946. More likely, however, it was dismissed because Thiel was treated as a German and her property was too tempting to pass up. After all, the expulsions of Germans were closely interconnected with the grand-scale robbery of their property.

The local administration kept denying German Jews certificates of Polish nationality as late as July 1947, when the chairman of the provincial Jewish committee, Jakub Egit, complained to the Central Committee of Polish Jews:

> [These German Jews] have not obtained Polish citizenship yet and their applications for [being declared] "indigenous population" have been denied. Local authorities

> want to start resettling these people to Germany where [Jews] dread to go to live among their enemies. By treating them like Germans, the local authorities contradict a political stance of the government, which granted protection to people of Jewish nationality, persecuted by the Nazi regime. . . . We request an intervention with the central authorities, so they will instruct local officials on how to treat these people [German Jews] in order to enable them to stay and keep their apartments and property.[74]

If the lower administration had treated wartime conduct as the primary criterion for exclusion from anti-German policies, German Jews would not have faced bureaucratic problems. Their Jewishness and their persecution at the hands of the Nazis would have served as a protective shield, as prescribed by the central government. That this was not the case illustrated, on the one hand, bureaucratic incompetence and corruption, and on the other hand, the persistence of traditional markers of nationality.[75]

Local administrators had their own understanding of nationality and citizenship, embedded in local social relations and cultural codes, which did not always concur with governmental prescriptions. In other words, the local apparatchiks shared the convictions, fears, and prejudices of the local population. One example was the belief that a language itself stood for good patriotic conduct and as such signified nationality. "Why should we declare to be Poles or non-Poles when that piece of paper with a signature does not say anything about our nationality, *but actions do,* like participation in the uprisings, the *Polish language*, customs and habits, and our Polish hearts," wrote representatives of Poles in Prudnik (Upper Silesia).[76] If the Polish language signified a quintessentially Polish "action," then the use of German was a disqualifying non-Polish behavior. Whatever the interpretation, language undeniably played an important role in the bureaucratic determination of nationality.

How did these problems affect German Jews' decisions to stay or leave? Many shared a common belief that the German-Polish borders were temporary and would soon shift. For example, the leaders of the German Jewish community in Szczecin had no intention to apply for Polish citizenship because they believed that "when Szczecin is a free city and the German authorities come back here, they will disband our union if we have *foreign* [Polish] *citizens* in our ranks."[77] Still, those German Jews who intended to stay in Poland had the option to do so. Szaynok showed that those who applied for Polish citizenship in Lower Silesia ultimately received it.[78]

The majority of German Jews, however, did not stay. Facing discrimination from all sides, they left the postwar Recovered Territories as early as the summer of 1945. As Friedla summed up: "From August to the end of September1945, a dozen transports of German Jews left Wroclaw for Erfurt. By the end of 1945, about twelve hundred German Wrocław Jews had reached Thuringia, and many of them settled in Erfurt.

Others came to Germany in trains. With the approval of the Polish authorities, the first transports were organized at the beginning of November 1945, and they continued until the summer of 1946."[79] German Jews elsewhere in the Territories followed suit. Polish Jews stayed longer, although they eventually left as well. Thousands left the region and the country after the Kielce pogrom of July 1946. Those who stayed saw their "space for Jewish national subjectivity," in Kijek's words, "drastically limited and, ultimately liquidated."[80] After 1948, whenever the borders and emigration opportunities opened up, the majority of Polish Jews opted to leave.[81]

Although by the 1960s there were hardly any Jewish communities left in Poland in general, and in the annexed territories in particular, the hindsight of their ultimate emigration should not obscure the brief, albeit complex, history of the possibilities and challenges of Jewish life in the country in the wake of the war. A closer analysis of the treatment of the Polish and German Jewish communities in the Recovered Territories shows that antisemitism does not suffice as an exhaustive explanation for the ultimate decline of Jewish communal life in postwar Poland. Rather, it points to tensions between the central and local administration in the region over who belonged there and who did not. The central government, focused on national politics in its quest for legitimacy, was willing to employ both Polish and German Jews in its nation-building project. It regularly issued policies to protect both communities from antisemitism and anti-Germanism. However, it was not the central government but bureaucrats in local offices who made decisions on who could keep or acquired property, who could get a job, and who could receive citizenship. That Polish Jews could rebuild their communities and stay longer than German Jews demonstrates that, over and above antisemitism and material greed, bureaucrats were primarily motivated by anti-German sentiment. As described in these pages, the German Jews faced administrative discrimination of a kind not experienced by the Polish Jews. Their Germanness, more than their Jewishness, sealed their fate.

NOTES

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1. Hereafter I use the term Recovered Territories without quotation marks. There is a rich historiography on the postwar history of these territories. Among the notable works

are Hugo Service, *Germans to Poles: Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Michael Meng, *Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Gregor Thum, *Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions*, trans. Tom Lampert, Allison Brown, W. Martin, and Jasper Tilbury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945–1960* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006); Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds., *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Bernadetta Nitschke, *Wysiedlenie czy wypędzenie? Ludność niemiecka w Polsce w latach 1945–1949* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2001); Janusz Mieczkowski, *Żydzi, Niemcy i Ukraińcy na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1945–1956: Liczba, położenie i działalność polityczna* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 1994); Jan Misztal, *Polityka władz polskich wobec stałych mieszkańców Ziem Odzyskanych w pierwszych latach po zakończeniu drugiej wojny światowej* (Gliwice: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej, 1991); Jan Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990); and Tomasz Szarota, *Osadnictwo miejskie na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1948* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1969).

2. The Potsdam decision was provisional. The treaties of 1950, 1970, and 1990 formally established and guaranteed the Polish western borders.
3. For insightful explorations of the long-term impact, see Thum, *Uprooted;* and Curp, *A Clean Sweep?*
4. The growing historiography on Polish Jews in the region includes such important studies as Kamil Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts: The Polonization of Lower Silesia and its Jewish Community in the Years 1945–1950," in *Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe: Shared and Comparative Histories*, ed. Tobias Grill (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 234–55; August Grabski, *Działalność komunistów wśród Żydów w Polsce 1944–1949* (Warsaw: Trio, 2004); Bożena Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku, 1945–1950* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000); Grzegorz Berendt, *Żydzi na gdańskim rozdrożu 1945–1950* (Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 2000); Ewa Waszkiewicz, *Kongregacja wyznania mojżeszowego na Dolnym Śląsku na tle polityki wyznaniowej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 1945–1968* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1999); Szyja Bronsztejn, *Z dziejów ludności żydowskiej na Dolnym Śląsku po II wojnie światowej* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1993); and Michał Grynberg, *Żydowska spółdzielczość pracy w Polsce w latach 1945–1949* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986). Also see chapter 6 in Anna Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence*, 179–212.

5. The works on German Jews in the Recovered Territories used in this chapter include Katharina Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion: German-Jewish Survivors in Wrocław, 1945–1947," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 62 (2017): 95–113; Katharina Friedla, *Juden in Breslau/Wrocław 1933–1949. Überlebensstrategien, Selbstbehauptung und Verfolgungserfahrungen* (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 2015), 332–62; Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*; Waszkiewicz, *Kongregacja wyznania mojżeszowego*; and Bronsztejn, *Z dziejów ludności żydowskiej*.
6. These are just a few of the most notable works: Feliks Tych and Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska, eds., *Jewish Presence in Absence: The Aftermath of the Holocaust in Poland, 1944–2010* (Jerusalem: The International Institute for Holocaust Research Yad Vashem and the Diana Zborowski Center for the Study of the Aftermath of the Shoah, 2014); Feliks Tych and Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska, eds., *Następstwa zagłady Żydów: Polska 1944–2010* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2011); Dariusz Stola, *Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2012); Natalia Aleksiun, *Dokąd dalej? Ruch syjonistyczny w Polsce (1944–1950)* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2002); David Engel, "Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1944–1946," *Yad Vashem Studies* 26 (1998): 43–85; and Józef Adelson, "W Polsce zwanej ludową," in *Najnowsze dzieje Żydów w Polsce w zarysie do 1950 roku*, ed. Jerzy Tomaszewski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993).
7. Jan Tomasz Gross, *Fear: Antisemitism in Poland After Auschwitz; An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 2006).
8. Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, *Pod klątwą: Społeczny portret pogromu kieleckiego* (Warsaw: Czarna Owca, 2018).
9. Łukasz Krzyżanowski, *Dom, którego nie było: Powroty ocalałych do powojennego miasta* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2018); Monika Rice, *What! Still Alive?! Jewish Survivors in Poland and Israel Remember Homecoming* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2017); Audrey Kichelewski, "To Stay or to Go? Reconfigurations of Jewish Life in Post-War Poland, 1944–1947," in *Seeking Peace in the Wake of War: Europe, 1943–1947*, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Sandrine Kott, Peter Romijn, and Olivier Wieviorka (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 183–202; Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence*; and Karen Auerbach, *The House at Ujazdowskie 16: Jewish Families in Warsaw after the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
10. Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence*, 6–8.
11. For the most recent work on these processes, see Thum, *Uprooted;* and Service, *Germans to Poles*.
12. Out of a population of 32 million, by religion there were 20.6 million Catholics, 7.1 million Orthodox and Greek Orthodox, 3.1 million Jews, and more than 800,000 Protestants; by language, there were 22 million speakers of Polish, 3.2 million of

Ukrainian, 2.4 million of Yiddish, 1.2 million of Ruthenian, 1 million of Byelorussian, 700,000 of German, 700,000 of the "local" (*tutejszy*) language, and about 550,000 speakers of other languages. Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [The Main Polish Statistical Office] series C, book 94a, *Drugi powszechny spis ludności* z dnia 9 grudnia *1931* r. [The Second General Census from 9 December 1931], table 10, p. 15, http://statlibr.stat.gov.pl/exlibris/aleph/a22_1/apache_media/VUNVGMLANSCQQFGYHCN3VDLK12A9U5.pdf.

13. Ana Siljak, "Conclusion," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948*, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 329.
14. Krystyna Kersten, "Polska: Państwo narodowe, dylematy i rzeczywistość," in *Narody: Jak powstawały i jak wybijały się na niepodległość?*, ed. Marcin Kula and Tadeusz Łepkowski (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989).
15. Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm: Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2001), 7.
16. Curp, *A Clean Sweep?*; *and* Thum, *Uprooted*.
17. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine. Edmund Dmitrów, *Niemcy i okupacja hitlerowska w oczach Polaków: Poglądy i opinie z lat 1945–1948* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1987), 17. Also see Jerzy Holzer, "Uraz, nacjonalizm, manipulacja: Kwestia niemiecka w komunistycznej Polsce," *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki* 1 (1992), 7–17; and Tomasz Szarota, *Niemcy i Polacy: Wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1996).
18. "Testimony of Hanna Zajtman, August 20, 1945," file 301/1582, Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute (AŻIH), Warsaw, Poland. See Anna Cichopek, *Pogrom Żydów w Krakowie: 11 sierpnia 1945* (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2000).
19. Thum, *Uprooted*, 18.
20. Małgorzata Ruchniewicz, "Niemcy," in *Wysiedlenia, wypędzenia, ucieczki 1939–1959: Atlas ziem Polski; Polacy, Żydzi, Niemcy, Ukraińcy*, ed. Witold Sienkiewicz and Grzegorz Hryciuk (Warsaw: Demart, 2008), 171.
21. Ruchniewicz, "Niemcy," 171.
22. Nitschke, *Wysiedlenie czy wypędzenie?* Also see Stanisław Jankowiak, "'Cleansing' Poland of Germans: The Province of Pomerania, 1945–1949," in Ther and Siljak, *Redrawing Nations*. Also see Ruchniewicz, "Niemcy," 182–83; *and* Service, *Germans to Poles*, 97.
23. Service, *Germans to Poles*, 100.
24. Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945–1955* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 207; and Misztal, *Polityka władz polskich wobec stałych mieszkańców Ziem Odzyskanych*, 178–203. Also see Ruchniewicz, "Niemcy," 186–93.

25. Leszek Olejnik, *Polityka narodowościowa Polski w latach 1944–1960* (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2003).
26. Thum, *Uprooted*; *and* Service, *Germans to Poles*, 126–49.
27. Adelson, "W Polsce zwanej ludową," 395–99.
28. Adelson, "W Polsce zwanej ludową," 395–99. Kamil Kijek reminded me of the Szczecin's significance for the story of the Recovered Territories.
29. Based on "Report on the Jewish Population in Poland" (September 30, 1946), collection 45/54, file 734, Archives of the American JOINT Distribution Committee (hereafter JOINT Archives),New York, NY. For population statistics, also see Albert Stankowski and Piotr Weiser, "Demograficzne skutki Holokaustu," in Tych and Adamczyk-Garbowska, *Następstwa zagłady Żydów*, 15–38; and Lucjan Dobroszycki, *Survivors of the Holocaust in Poland: A Portrait Based on Jewish Community Records, 1944–1947* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
30. For excellent analysis of the Polish Jews' position in the broader communist politics of the late 1940s, see Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 234–55.
31. The July Manifesto (Manifest Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN), July 22, 1944. The text is available in a collection of historical sources, Ryszard Kozłowski and Jan Sziling, eds., *Historia PRL: Wybór źródeł* (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1978).
32. Program declaration of Prime Minister Edward Osóbka-Morawski, January 2, 1945, quoted in Olejnik, *Polityka narodowościowa*, 353.
33. The government expected that Jewish communal life would take on a more *cultural* than *national* character. Eugeniusz Mironowicz, *Polityka narodowościowa PRL* (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Białoruskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego, 2000), 86. Tomasz Szarota insightfully noted that the Jewish communities in Lower Silesia were a "national minority enclave in-the-making" in a "nationally homogenous state in-the-making." Szarota, *Osadnictwo miejskie na Dolnym Śląsku*, 160–62.
34. Alina Cała and Helena Datner-Śpiewak, eds., *Dzieje Żydów w Polsce, 1944–1968: Teksty źródłowe* (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 1997), 11. For a recent interpretation, see Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 234–55.
35. Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 242.
36. Circular of the ministry of public administration, June 6, 1945, in Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*, 24 (emphasis added).
37. Memo concerning Jewish settlement in Lower Silesia, June 23, 1945, The Central Committee of Jews in Poland (Centralny Komitet Żydów w Polsce, CKŻP), in Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*, 20 (emphasis added).
38. I am grateful to Kijek for this observation.
39. Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 250.
40. See note 5. For more details, see Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence*, 179–212. Also see

Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 237–44.

41. For the conditions in Lower Silesia, see Marcin Zaremba, *Wielka trwoga: Polska 1944–1947; Ludowa reakcja na kryzys* (Kraków: Znak, 2012), 158–62. After the Kielce pogrom, "there was not the urgent haste which was present elsewhere"; nonetheless, almost half of Lower Silesian Jews left. See "Report on the Jewish Population in Poland" (September 30, 1946), collection 45/54, file 734; and "Survey on Community Interrelations: Poland," S. D. Wolkowicz for the World Jewish Congress (September 1947), collection 45/54, file 731, JOINT Archives. Also see note 30; Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 239–40.
42. "Report on a Two-Day Tour of Jewish Communities in Lower Silesia, 1947," collection 45/54, file 731, JOINT Archives. See the opinion of Dr. Shalom Treistman (Trojstman), the Chief Rabbi of Wrocław, in "Report of Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein to General Joseph T. McNarney in Germany" (August 2, 1946; received on September 3, 1946), collection 45/54, file 734, JOINT Archives. Also see "Lower Silesia, Statistical Data" (Summer 1947), Collection of Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) in Warsaw, Office of the Government Commissar for Productivity of Jews in Poland, RG 15.003 M, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Washington, DC.
43. Thum, *Uprooted*.
44. Zaremba described looting trips from all over Poland to the "Wild West" (Dziki Zachód) of the Recovered Territories. See Zaremba, *Wielka trwoga*, 295–300. Also see a collection of fascinating reportages by Magdalena Grzebałkowska, *1945: Wojna i pokój* (Warsaw: Agora S.A., 2015).
45. Jan Grabowski and Dariusz Libionka, eds., *Klucze i kasa: O mieniu żydowskim w Polsce pod okupacją niemiecką i we wczesnych latach powojennych 1939–1950* (Warsaw: Polish Center for Holocaust Research, 2014); Jan Tomasz Gross with Irena Grudzińska-Gross, *Golden Harvest: Events at the Periphery of the Holocaust* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Gross, *Fear: Antisemitism in Poland*.
46. Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 249.
47. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion"; and Friedla, *Juden in Breslau/Wrocław*, 254–331.
48. Bronsztejn, *Z dziejów ludności żydowskiej*, 8. Szaynok mentioned "a large group" of German Jews living in Lower Silesia until at least the beginning of 1946. See Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*.
49. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 101.
50. Waszkiewicz, *Kongregacja wyznania mojżeszowego*. Waszkiewicz also pointed out that the correspondence of the Jewish Religious Congregation was written mainly in German and Hebrew. Also see Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*.
51. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 111; and Friedla, *Juden in Breslau/Wrocław*, 254–331.

52. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 104.
53. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 109.
54. "Letter from the Jewish Committee in Wrocław to the Plenipotentiary of the Government in Lower Silesia Concerning the Legal Status of Jews/Former German Citizens" (July 30, 1945), Collection of the Voivode Office in Wrocław (hereafter UWW), UWW VI-269, 9, State Archives in Wrocław, Poland (hereafter APW).
55. Directive of the minister of public administration, June 20, 1945 (*Okólnik Ministerstwa Administracji Publicznej z 20 VI 1945 określającego zasady przyznawania obywatelstwa polskiego byłym obywatelom niemieckim L.dz. II.C. 805/45*), quoted in Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*, 210.
56. Letter from the minister of public administration, July 10, 1945, quoted in Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa, 210*. Also see a short discussion of the decree (L.dz. 9337/II/P.909/45) in Berendt, *Żydzi na gdańskim rozdrożu*, 42.
57. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*. Also see Misztal, *Polityka władz polskich,* 65.
58. Quoted in Berendt, *Żydzi na gdańskim rozdrożu*, 41 (emphasis added).
59. IBerendt, *Żydzi na gdańskim rozdrożu, 41*. Also see in Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 106.
60. "Letter from the Plenipotentiary of the Central Government in Jelenia Góra to the Plenipotentiary of the Central Government in Lignica (August 2, 1945), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-269, 3, APW.
61. "Note from the District National Security Office to the Jewish Committee in Jelenia Góra" (September 15, 1945), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-269, 30, APW. Also see Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*.
62. The plenipotentiary stressed that "in order to avoid abuses of power [*nadużycia*], the issuance of such certificates by his Office was necessary." "Letter from the Plenipotentiary of the Central Government in Jelenia Góra to the Plenipotentiary of the Central Government in Lignica" (October 2, 1945), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-269, 27, APW.
63. Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku,* 43.
64. Directive of the ministry of the Recovered Territories concerning the attestation of Polish nationality for the residents of the Recovered Territories, 6 April 1946. In Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*, 350. For the translated fragments of the directive see, Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence*, 241–42.
65. Berendt, *Żydzi na gdańskim rozdrożu*. Jewish committees were supposed to routinely certify Jewish nationality with a document that included the following phrase: "Based on the submitted ID . . . and a birth certificate . . . we testify that . . . the citizen . . . is a Jew and *as such was persecuted by national-socialist fascism* [emphasis added]." "Attestation Concerning Jewishness of Walther Kurnik (November 16, 1946), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 32, APW. Also see Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku,* 42–43.
66. The verification process was separate from the rehabilitation. The former was designed

to separate the Polish from the German "autochthonous" population to grant them a path to Polish citizenship. The latter was offered to ethnic Germans who signed the "volksliste of III and IV degree" during the war. For more on the rehabilitation policies, see Sylwia Bykowska, "Karać czy rehabilitować? Powojenne ustawodawstwo polskie wobec osób wpisanych na niemiecką listę narodowościową," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne*, 64, no. 1 (2012): 149–67.

67. For an in-depth discussion of the verification in Upper Silesia and other parts of the annexed territories, see Service, *Germans to Poles*. Also see Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*; and Bernard Linek, *„Odniemczanie" województwa śląskiego w latach 1945–1950: W świetle materiałów wojewódzkich* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Instytut Śląski, 1997).
68. "Letter from Augusta Sara Thiel to the Ministry of Public Administration in Warsaw" (July 16, 1946), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 39–40, APW.
69. "Letter from Augusta Sara Thiel," Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 39–40, APW.
70. "Letter from Augusta Sara Thiel," Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 39–40, APW.
71. "Letter from the Voivode of Wrocław to the Ministry of the Recovered Territories" (October 31, 1946), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 33, APW.
72. "Letter from the Mayor of Jelenia Góra District to the Voivode's Office in Wrocław" (October 21, 1946), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 34, APW.
73. "Temporary Certificate Issued by the Plenipotentiary of the Government in Jelenia Góra" (December 3, 1945), Collection of the UWW, UWW VI-270, 38, APW.
74. Letter from Jakub Egit to the CKŻP, June 11, 1947, quoted in Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*.
75. In his book on the verification process, Misztal suggested that language lost its importance as an ethnic marker after the war because many residents of western Poland had "a sense of developed separate national consciousness" (*poczucie rozwiniętej odmiennej świadomości narodowej*) without the ability to speak the Polish language. While language may have had a limited impact on individual self-identification, it did remain an important indicator in bureaucratic practice. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*.
76. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa*, 226 (emphasis added).
77. Mieczkowski, *Żydzi, Niemcy i Ukraińcy*.
78. Szaynok, *Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku*.
79. Friedla, "Experiences of Stigmatization, Discrimination, and Exclusion," 110.
80. Kijek, "Aliens in the Lands of the Piasts," 251.
81. Ewa Węgrzyn, *Wyjeżdżamy! Wyjeżdżamy?! Alija gomułkowska, 1956–1960* (Kraków: Austeria, 2016); Stola, *Kraj bez wyjścia?*; Aleksiun, *Dokąd dalej?*; Albert Stankowski, "Nowe spojrzenie na statystyki dotyczące emigracji Żydów z Polski po 1944 roku," in *Studia z historii Żydów w Polsce po 1945 roku*, ed. Grzegorz *Berendt*, August *Grabski*, and Albert Stankowski (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2000); and Adelson, "W Polsce zwanej ludową."

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PART 2

STATES AND ACTORS

3

STATES AS CONTRIBUTORS TO OR ENABLERS OF VIOLENCE

Colonial Thinking Is Still with Us: Investigating the Colonial Record on the Occupation of Jambi and Rengat (1948–49) in the Indonesian War of Independence

BART LUTTIKHUIS

JAMBI AND RENGAT, 1948–49

In the early morning on 30 December 1948, the city of Jambi (central Sumatra) awoke to the sound of shooting, while thick clouds of black smoke arising from burning rubber hung over the harbor. Dutch paratroopers had taken the nearby airport, Paal Merah, the previous evening, and Indonesians had set on fire some strategic objects. The paratroopers were now ready to take the town, which they managed to secure by 9:00 a.m. Reports of various sorts of wrongdoing supposedly perpetrated by the Dutch soldiers during this action soon surfaced: widespread plunder, random shooting in the street with consequent civilian casualties, and the cold-blooded execution of three Indonesian Red Cross employees at a local hospital. The responsible commanders quickly dismissed all of these reports as unfounded rumors.[1]

Less than a week after the occupation of Jambi, paratroopers were involved in another daring action. The small city of Rengat, about two hundred kilometers north of Jambi, was occupied on the morning of 5 January 1949 in a surprise airdrop, mere hours before a general cease-fire was to go into effect. This action was executed by mostly indigenous recruits, especially of Ambonese ethnicity, an Indonesian group

traditionally renowned for their loyalty and martial qualities and hence overrepresented in the Dutch colonial army. Before their airdrop over Rengat, they had been supplied with Benzedrine (a form of amphetamine) to stave off the fatigue of the continued actions of the previous weeks. Their drop had been poorly calculated, landing them in the middle of a deep swamp, struggling to make it to dry land under enemy fire. In their subsequent taking of the city the paratroopers did not hold back. According to reports that came in later, they had fired randomly in the streets, broken into homes, and summarily shot some of the inhabitants. They had executed unarmed policemen and other officials while they were sat at their desks, and they had shot a fifteen-year-old nurse because she "had refused to fulfill the wish of the paratroopers."[2] Scores of bodies were later seen floating in the river. The victim count in Rengat would be hotly contested, but probably numbered in the several hundreds (including at least some women and children).[3]

Both the occupations of Jambi and Rengat were part of a large-scale Dutch military offensive toward the back end of the Indonesian War of Independence. After the Republic of Indonesia had declared independence in 1945, much of the conflict was marked by less- or more-intensive guerrilla warfare (with simultaneous negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians leading to no decisive outcome). But the Dutch authorities also launched two comprehensive military assaults on the Republic of Indonesia, in July–August 1947 and December 1948–January 1949 respectively, which they euphemistically called "police actions" to assuage increasingly critical international opinion. Dutch authorities by the time of the "second police action" were under increasing international and domestic pressure to settle the conflict in Indonesia. With the "second police action" they hoped to deal a decisive blow against the Indonesian Republic. Dutch forces aimed both to "decapitate" the Indonesian war effort by occupying Yogyakarta, the capital of the Indonesian Republic, and capturing its military and political leaders, and to occupy economically and strategically important locations such as ports or oil fields. This is where the occupation of oil fields around the ports of Jambi and Rengat came into the picture, even though both these locations were far removed from previously Dutch-occupied territory.

INTRODUCTION: UNEQUAL INVESTIGATIONS

The occupations of both Jambi and Rengat sparked questions and heated debate about what had transpired: Were these normal military actions, did something "get out of hand," or did Dutch soldiers commit willful atrocities? However, both cases were handled very differently by Dutch (civilian and military) authorities. For either case, we can find substantive—though in the case of Jambi ultimately inconclusive—evidence in

the archives of serious wrongdoing. But while the allegations about Jambi were quickly and vehemently dismissed, resulting in only a perfunctory official investigation, the bloodbath in Rengat caused much more commotion among the responsible authorities, spawning thorough and extensive investigations. This chapter asks why both these cases were handled so differently at the time, with considerable consequences for how Jambi and Rengat have since been treated in the historiography of the Dutch-Indonesian war.

An obvious potential reason for (some of) the discrepancy in concern about Jambi and Rengat, respectively, could be a difference in the intensity and extent of the violence: Jambi presumably involved less atrocious violence and resulted in fewer victims. As I argue in this chapter, however, the problem is that we cannot really know this for sure, precisely because of the relative scarcity of sources on Jambi. By contrast, another contributing factor to the difference in concern about both affairs is abundantly clear from the available material. The respective investigations betray a deep-seated, ethnically charged prejudice that the worst atrocities tended to be perpetrated by the more brutal, less-restrained indigenous recruits of the colonial army, not by the presumably more professional Dutch-born recruits. This is a prejudice that has inadvertently carried over into Dutch historiography of the conflict, due to the bias of the sources: the atrocities in Rengat have been described in detail by Dutch historians, while wrongdoings in Jambi are at best cited in passing.[4]

Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the handling of these two affairs betrays a peculiar dynamic of the decolonization wars of the immediate post–Second World War era: the overlapping in these conflicts of two eras of (thinking about) military violence. On the one hand, Dutch military thinking and conduct in the decolonization war in Indonesia resembled a classic colonial war,[5] characterized by the application of indiscriminate, brutal, exemplary violence. On the other hand, the responsible commanders (and politicians) were thinking in terms of the needs of "modern" warfare, in which they drew explicit lessons from the world war that they had recently witnessed.[6] In fact, the very notions of "Special Forces' and "paratroopers," though they had colonial forebears, were clearly borrowed from their emergence as valued weapons in the Second World War. The way the responsible commanders spoke of the role of such troops strongly emphasized their skill, their sophistication, and the application of modern techniques to overcome the difficulties of counterinsurgency in the tropics.[7] The fact, for instance, that paratroopers had received Benzedrine to amp them up for their next action was actually not reported by their commander as an excuse or explanation for unrestrained behavior, but rather as a sign of the professionalism of his unit.[8]

In short, the terrortimes of "colonial" and "modern" counterinsurgency overlap in the Indonesian war of decolonization, as is highlighted in the different ways in which the atrocities in Jambi and Rengat were handled. The mostly ethnically Dutch troops who had taken Jambi were interpreted as professional, disciplined troops;[9] the reports

of their misbehavior were therefore dismissed as untrustworthy. Conversely, in the eyes of the military and civilian authorities, the mostly indigenous (especially Ambonese) troops who had taken Rengat could safely be interpreted as colonial relics in their unruliness and ruthlessness.[10] Thus, an investigation of their violent behavior (though possibly inconvenient) at least was not damaging to the reputation of the Dutch army as a whole. This ethnically inflected interpretation of counterinsurgent violence in the Indonesian decolonization war has had a long legacy in Dutch historiography of the conflict.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first provide some background on the paratroopers in Indonesia and their organization. In fact, the paratroopers fighting in Jambi and Rengat came from two distinct organizational backgrounds: those in Jambi were explicitly modeled after British and American examples; those in Rengat were more inspired by colonial tradition. After that, the respective official investigations into Jambi and Rengat are discussed in more detail, followed by a discussion of how both these affairs have been portrayed in Dutch historiography. Ultimately, this leads to my conclusion that in the handling of both these affairs we can discern a possibly unintentional but nonetheless significant tendency to blame atrocities on indigenous troops while exculpating Dutch soldiers: a tendency that has carried over into historiography and correlates with notions of colonial versus modern warfare, the two terrortimes that overlapped in the war of decolonization.

SPECIAL FORCES TIMES TWO

The Dutch war against Indonesian independence, which lasted from 1945 to 1949, was the first war in which the Dutch army or the Dutch colonial army developed the notion of special forces.[11] Over the course of the conflict, the army leadership increasingly came to rely on special forces to do much of the harsh and dirty work of war. Interestingly, during this war two separate elite infantry units developed, which continued to exist side-by-side for most of the conflict. The first was the Korps Speciale Troepen (KST) or Special Forces Corps, also known as the Green Berets. The second was the so-called Eerste Parachutisten Compagnie or First Para Company, also known as the Red Berets. The occupation of Jambi was executed by the First Para Company, while the occupation of Rengat was undertaken by paratroopers of the KST. The occupation of the city of Jambi was executed by an advance force of 250 paratroopers of the First Para Company, who were followed by regular infantry troops, while the 120 paratroopers of the KST were engaged in more minor operations on surrounding oil fields. In the occupation of the city of Rengat and its oil fields, by contrast, the 120 paratroopers of the KST took the lead; regular infantry reinforcements here took a little longer to arrive than they had

in Jambi. The members of the First Para Company were meanwhile tasked with capturing a number of more isolated and remote oil fields farther up the Indragiri River.[12]

Despite what their respective names might suggest, both the First Para Company and the KST were used for largely the same purposes during the war in Indonesia, and both units were trained in commando as well as paratrooper tactics. The fact that they continued to exist side by side seems mainly to have been a consequence of irreconcilable differences between their respective leaderships, as well as of differences in military culture. According to historian Jaap de Moor, who wrote the canonic work on the Dutch special forces during the Indonesian war of decolonization, the First Para Company was marked by an ethos of professionalism and technical proficiency: airborne operations were dangerous and were seen as a task that required intellectually capable and disciplined men. The First Para Company, for that reason, preferred to recruit ethnically Dutch soldiers, who were presumable more sophisticated and disciplined. By contrast, the KST or Special Forces Corps developed almost as a private army around its infamous commander Raymond Westerling, who himself had received commando training in Britain during the Second World War, but who in Indonesia preferred to recruit hardened indigenous soldiers with a background in the prewar colonial army. The men of the KST were imbued with unshakable loyalty to their commander and became known not so much for their technical expertise as for their fearlessness, physical stamina, and unrelenting fighting spirit. In short, De Moor summarizes the differences between the two units as a juxtaposition of technicians on the one hand with fierce warriors or adventurers on the other hand. The recruits of the First Para Company enjoyed a reputation for professionalism and were predominantly Dutch; the KST were known as hardened, ruthless, and extremely loyal, and were predominantly "colonial."[13]

RENGAT: A DOUBLE INVESTIGATION

This difference in reputation and ethos can also be discerned in the Jambi and Rengat affairs. Here I discuss these cases in reverse chronological order, so as to highlight the difference in investigative treatment of indigenous Indonesian and ethnically Dutch troops. I do not here delve deeply into the specifics of what actually happened in Jambi on 30 December 1948 and in Rengat on 5 January 1949.[14] Instead I focus on the handling of the investigations into both affairs. Suffice it to say that in the case of the predominantly indigenous paratroopers in Rengat, it is fairly certain that the Indonesian victim number ran in the several hundreds—some Indonesian reports even cited numbers up to two thousand—including many noncombatants, at least some of whom were deliberately executed.[15] Meanwhile, in the case of Jambi much less is clear: only the point-blank execution of three Indonesian Red Cross employees is reasonably certain,

while the early reports of random shooting in the streets were not further investigated, making it difficult to assess their veracity. The accusations of widespread plunder were only superficially investigated.[16]

In the case of the occupation of Rengat by paratroopers of the Korps Speciale Troepen, the investigation into the alleged atrocities took some time to get off the ground, but was ultimately quite thorough. As was often the case in the Indonesian war of decolonization,[17] the first reports that something was amiss originated with the Dutch civilian authorities rather than from inside the army. A representative of the Dutch Indies economics department, in his February report on the situation in Rengat, made an offhand remark that the occupation of Rengat had proceeded "rather rigorously." This remark set off a chain of events when his superior asked the military authorities for clarification.[18] The matter received further urgency when a Dutch diplomat alerted the Dutch foreign minister that a Chinese newspaper in Singapore had written about the occupation of Rengat, claiming that Ambonese soldiers fighting for the Dutch had killed over a thousand people. The minister of foreign affairs in The Hague in turn asked for clarification from the Dutch authorities in Indonesia.[19]

This dual spark first set off an investigation by the public prosecutor's office, which asked the local public prosecutor to interview eyewitnesses. The official responsible for this investigation, assistant prosecutor Mr. Hins, hardly did a thorough job, seemingly feeling more loyalty to the local military authorities than to the Indonesian population in his district. For his report, dated 16 April 1949, he mostly relied on witness statements by the responsible military commanders, as well as interviews with five local village or neighborhood chiefs (who were either traditionally loyal to the Dutch or scared to speak out). On the basis of this rather one-sided investigation, Hins concluded that "due to an unfortunate confluence of events . . . a number of persons from the civilian population have lost their lives. The number is approximately 80, but biased reporters grossly exaggerate it." Hins further rejected reports of deliberate executions of civilians or unarmed military personnel.[20]

Before Hins had even delivered his report, the army commander, General Simon Spoor, had already ordered his own investigation by the Military Police. He clearly was not confident that his special forces in Rengat had necessarily conducted themselves appropriately. In an order to the head of the Military Police, he wrote: "I refuse to resign myself with the perfunctory remarks that I have so far received from the military side; in my opinion, the documents coming from the civilian side and from the Attorney General . . . contain such incriminating allegations, that I would like to see this matter thoroughly investigated."[21] As a consequence, two members of the Dutch Military Police traveled to Rengat and between 6 and 9 June interviewed twenty-two people, mostly ordinary inhabitants or widows of men who had been killed, as well as one local informant (of Ambonese ethnicity) of the Dutch intelligence services.

The minutes of these interrogations make for shocking reading, including recurring stories of soldiers breaking into homes and summarily executing the male inhabitants if they admitted to having worked for the Indonesian Republic, accusations of rape, reports of citizens being ordered by paratroopers to dump bodies in the river, and even a report of the shooting of a woman with a baby in her arms. In every case, the authors of the report made sure to ask the witnesses about the ethnicity or identifying features of the soldiers, and usually they received answers that they wore green berets, and that they were Ambonese or "native" or had a colored skin; in short, that they were indigenous rather than Dutch troops. Ultimately, the authors of the report did not attempt to estimate a victim count, but they did conclude that no individual perpetrators could be traced, and that therefore no one could be prosecuted.[22]

This is where the story of the investigation into the Rengat atrocities ends. It is unclear whether the report from the Military Police ever made its way back up the military and civilian hierarchy,[23] but it is certainly clear that as the final cease-fire between the Netherlands and Indonesia went into effect in August 1949, the appetite and urgency for further steps reached a minimum. The new local public prosecutor, J. D. van Pelt, asked his superiors to be allowed to let the matter rest, as he had only just arrived in his post and hence was "a total outsider to this case."[24] His superiors in the attorney general's office agreed, concluding that it would be impossible to identify and prosecute any of the individual perpetrators: "The witnesses speak of Ambonese [perpetrators], but cannot provide any details, and there are large numbers of Ambonese among these paratroopers."[25] Nevertheless, even though this is where the case was closed, due to the dual investigation over the first half of 1949, the paper trail of the Rengat bloodbath is significant, which has made it possible for Dutch historians and journalists to rediscover it. In Ann Stoler's terms, the Rengat controversy created a "thickening" of the archival record.[26] Consequently, Rengat has recently gained a reputation as one of the major atrocities committed by the Dutch army in Indonesia.[27]

JAMBI: A PERFUNCTORY INVESTIGATION

The archival treasure trove is much less dense for the actions by the First Para Company in Jambi on 30 December 1948, the more predominantly "Dutch" special forces. Consequently, as mentioned previously, much less is clear about what actually happened in Jambi. What is certain, however, is that the investigations into this case got off the ground much quicker than in Rengat but were pursued with much less vigor.

The instigator of the inquiries was one Lieutenant Rudolf Welling of the Army Information Service. Welling had joined the troops entering Jambi as a reporter but was disturbed about what he witnessed and wrote a concerned letter to his superior: "The

raid was accompanied by constant shooting from the paras, killing a number of civilians who had been left behind. In the city itself, I followed the 'group kota,' whose job degenerated into plunder and robbery."[28] When questioned about his allegations in a later interrogation by the Military Police, Welling further recalled that the paratroopers had been shooting constantly, despite never receiving fire themselves. At the local hospital, three young Indonesians with Red Cross bands on their arms had been killed: "I saw the three young men being shot by a European soldier with a weapon, not a pistol but I suspect a jungle carbine, from a distance of approximately 1.5 meters. When they lay on the ground they were still moving, after which I saw another soldier give them a mercy shot in the head with a pistol."[29] Welling reported that one of his colleagues, a camera man, had also been present during the action to shoot film images.

What followed this whistleblower report is revealing.[30] First, the head of the Army Commander's Cabinet, Lieutenant-Colonel K. J. Luchsinger, when he received word of these allegations immediately—even before informing the army commander himself—asked the commander of the paratroopers through a private, confidential note whether he could invalidate the accusations. Luchsinger simultaneously asked the territorial commander responsible for the whole action in Jambi for his comments on the matter.[31]

Captain W. D. H. Eekhout, the commander of the paratroopers, was swift in his indignant rebuttal. He conceded that due to the chaotic situation some civilians may have died, but he was adamant that his paratroopers were much too professional for the kind of behavior of which they were being accused. They had been confronted with "fanatical" opponents, not all of whom had been clothed in uniform. Eekhout stated: "That as a consequence the paratroopers may have been quicker to open fire on civilians who refused to surrender or were running away, should be understandable. . . . Indeed, we are not used to wait passively. But that the paratroopers during the raid would have shot constantly at civilians (innocents) I can hardly imagine. . . . Most certainly, no shooting occurred for the mere reason of raising morale; such a thing is not necessary among the paratroopers."[32]

Lieutenant-Colonel F. Rietveld, the territorial commander ultimately responsible for the actions in and around Jambi, was even more straightforwardly dismissive of the reports, which he qualified as "grossly exaggerated." He was adamant that paratroopers had not fired unnecessarily, explaining that all Indonesian victims must have been plunderers who had been caught red-handed. The reports of theft and plunder by Dutch paratroopers were equally overblown. In fact, Rietveld explained, most of the thefts had probably been perpetrated by Indonesians themselves and especially by members of the Chinese minority. Rietveld conceded that the Dutch paratroopers had been somewhat unruly after the occupation of the city had been completed. Still, he reported, "It is my conviction that paratroopers have *not* plundered in such a way that we

can speak of 'plunder by the para company.' Some individual cases may have occurred, but so far no complaints of this nature have reached me from the population." Overall, Rietveld gave no evidence for his flat-out denials, and he did not interview witnesses, even though it is clear from his letter that he himself had only arrived in the city several hours after the occupation had been completed.[33]

This is where the matter was laid to rest for the most part, a mere eleven days after the events. The Military Police did continue to look for the camera man, because he might have shot footage of the execution of the Red Cross members, material that was obviously deemed unfit to be published.[34] It is only because of this search for the camera man that we can find several witness statements in the archives that provide credible evidence for the occurrence of this execution.[35] Furthermore, several months later, after numerous complaints had come in from the local population, the Military Police started an additional investigation into some reports of theft. It seems that none of these led to any further action, let alone prosecution, as those responsible could not be identified.[36] The reports of shootings of civilians were never further investigated.

RENGAT AND JAMBI IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

As the exposé on the contemporary investigations into the affairs in Rengat and Jambi should make clear, the archival paperwork on Rengat is much more extensive than that on Jambi. This explains the difficulty in assessing the relative severity and extent of the violence in both these cases. It may well be that Rengat was a much larger and more serious atrocity than Jambi, but we simply cannot know this because the sources do not allow us to make a clean comparison.

Precisely this problem has also dogged Dutch historiography. It is a common chorus in the historiography that indigenous recruits in the Dutch colonial army, and in particular the Ambonese and Menadonese, were overrepresented as perpetrators of atrocities. Recently this point has been made by Gert Oostindie in the book *Soldaat in Indonesië*. Oostindie does not discuss the cases of Rengat and Jambi per se, but he does explain more generally—and rightly so—that some of the overrepresentation of indigenous recruits is likely due to biased reporting.[37] Nevertheless, the image of "dirty" indigenous troops versus "clean" Dutch troops lingers.

The first time that the cases discussed here were included in a historical study was in the so-called *Excessennota* (Memorandum on excesses), a government report from 1969 that was later also published.[38] This report, though produced in a very short period based on only a "cursory tour of the archives" and hence highly incomplete,[39] became very important because it was frequently used by later historians as a primary source. In the report, the sources on Rengat are discussed quite extensively, confirming

an impression of substantive bloodletting. On Jambi, by contrast, the *Excessennota* only cites the categorical denial of any wrongdoing by the territorial commander, Rietveld. The execution of the three Red Cross members is also not mentioned.[40]

In the previously mentioned canonic book about the Dutch special forces by De Moor, something similar happens. In his descriptions of the actions around Jambi and Rengat, De Moor mostly bases his statements on the internal sources of the military, relying especially on the relevant reports by the responsible military commanders. He also uses the *Excessennota* extensively. De Moor describes the action against Jambi, but nowhere does he discuss the allegations of possible misdeeds. For Rengat, De Moor does discuss the atrocities, mainly because the *Excessennota* provides the relevant material.[41] In fact, De Moor does note that the First Para Company received unexpectedly heavy resistance in Jambi, including surprise attacks from Indonesian civilians and soldiers without uniforms, creating confusion for the Dutch paratroopers. The problem is that De Moor's main source for these assertions (which he presents as plain facts rather than allegations by a Dutch commander) is the very letter written by commander Eekhout to Lieutenant-Colonel Luchsinger, in which he was asked to defend his paratroopers against the allegations of misdeeds—hardly a neutral document![42]

The most recent book on this topic, *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor* (The burning villages of General Spoor), by historian Rémy Limpach, gives the most detailed and balanced account to date of the Rengat affair, but again omits the Jambi affair.[43] Limpach's work is a wide-ranging and very critical study of atrocities perpetrated by the Dutch military during the Indonesian decolonization war, arguing that extreme violence was structural and covered up or even approved throughout all hierarchical layers of the army. At various points in his work, especially in the more reflective passages, Limpach addresses the relative brutality of soldiers from the (Dutch) Koninklijke Landmacht and the (largely mixed-race or indigenous) Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, explaining that the latter may have been overrepresented but emphasizing that the former were by no means blameless.[44] Nevertheless, in the choice of cases that he can discuss in more detail—which even in a voluminous work like this are necessarily limited—the bias of the availability of sources resurfaces: hence Rengat, but no Jambi, because for the latter the source material is too scarce or uncertain for a meticulous analysis. Thus, the biases of the contemporary sources remain with us.

The way in which historiography has generally tended to reproduce the bias of the archival sources is perhaps best illustrated in a passage from the conclusion of De Moor's work. In this passage, he makes an interesting twist in his reasoning that brings him close to the argument made in this chapter, though he ultimately backs away from it. In discussing the propensity of the various special forces to perpetrate crimes, De Moor first concludes: "The overwhelming use of force characterized the conduct of the Special Forces in general. This applies both to the KST and to the Para Company."

However, a few sentences later he discusses a major difference between KST and Para Company: the extent to which the rough-and-eager KST or Green Berets and their commander Raymond Westerling were the center of press publicity, compared to the relative quiet around the presumably more professional Para Company or Red Berets: "The Red Berets received much less public scrutiny. [. . .] Although this unit matched the KST in their harsh conduct in the field, there are no examples known of excesses by the Para Company, such as those that occurred at the hands of KST soldiers at Yogyakarta and Kalioerang [another infamous atrocity, BL]. It seems that the conduct of the Paras has been harsh, but still more restrained [than that of the KST]."[45]

Within these two sentences, De Moor first acknowledges that perhaps we simply do not know about any major atrocities by the Para Company merely because they were less closely scrutinized. But in the very next sentence, he turns around and takes that lack of reporting as a reason to conclude that the Paras were indeed less violent than their colleagues of the KST.

What, then, can we as historians do to avoid following the evidence of the colonial archives too slavishly in studying wars like the Indonesian War of Independence? There is no easy solution. The colonial archive remains the most extensive and most complete record that we have. But there are avenues we can take. For one, we should be much more aware of the instances in which victims (and colonial subjects in general) do speak in the colonial archives, and pay them more heed. There is absolutely no reason to lend the colonial officers or administrators compiling and summarizing the reports more credibility than the subjects they are interviewing.[46] Second, we may use colonial archives as sources, but we should avoid letting the structure of the colonial archives guide the agenda and the structure of our research. There is simply no excuse for taking a list of incidents compiled by colonial authorities—let alone the hastily compiled *Excessennota*!—as the starting point and guiding path for our investigations. Sources from Indonesia and by Indonesians, both official and informal ones, are more fragmented and dispersed than the colonial archive, but ultimately plenty are available, and they pose different questions and use different categories if we take them as a starting point.[47] Finally, and perhaps most banal, we should constantly question the biases and agenda of the sources that we do use.

CONCLUSION: PERSISTENT PREJUDICES AND ENTANGLED TERRORTIMES

In this chapter I have argued, on the basis of a close reading of the cases of Jambi and Rengat, that Dutch historiography has tended to reproduce ethnically charged prejudices about the propensity for violence. At the time of the Indonesian decolonization

war, the Korps Speciale Troepen was generally perceived as a fascinating but ruthless and undisciplined group, grafted on the prewar military traditions of the colonial army. That image was amplified by the preponderance in this unit of Ambonese soldiers with long (family) traditions in the colonial army. Their harshness attracted some admiration but was also increasingly the subject of condemnation; it was not "of the time." Meanwhile, the predominant image of the First Para Company was one of hardened but professional, intelligent soldiers: a "modern" Western army. This is the image that the Paras liked to broadcast of themselves; recall Captain Eekhout's adamant claim that the disciplined Paras did not need to resort to random violence. And this is also the image that has stuck in the historiography: De Moor in his book presents the same Captain Eekhout as the embodiment of a modern, "professional," and technically and administratively proficient soldier, especially compared to the stormier image of his counterpart, Captain Raymond Westerling.[48]

To maintain this professional ethos, the Para Company, in contrast to the KST, preferred to recruit primarily Dutch soldiers. And also because of that ethos and image, rumors about inappropriate conduct by the Paras were simply brushed aside as implausible. The silence of the archives on the behaviour of the First Para Company is deafening and highly consequential. The Para Company was supposed to be the epitome of sophisticated, targeted, modern warfare, and as such was contrasted with the rougher, atavistic side of the colonial military medallion embodied in the KST. Because this bias has influenced the focus of the archival and other sources, its legacy remains with us today in the historiography of this conflict. The image of dirty indigenous troops versus clean Dutch troops is persistent; one could call it an ethnically inflected equivalent to the German *Wehrmachtsmythos*. We may never know the extent to which this ethnically inflected contrast reflected reality. But as historians, it behooves us at least to question more thoroughly whether we are not inadvertently mirroring the colonial biases of our sources.

NOTES

1. The official action reports for the occupation of Jambi can be found in Collection 512: Antoniëtti, 43–45, Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague. Reports on the subsequent allegations, the investigations, and the dismissals by the responsible commanders in can be found in Ministry of Defence: Armed Forces in the Netherlands-Indies, 2.13.132, 3933, National Archives, The Hague. Also see Jaap de Moor, *Westerling's oorlog, Indonesië 1945–1950: De geschiedenis van de commando's en parachutisten in Nederlands-Indië 1945–1950* (Amsterdam: Balans 1999), 306–9.
2. "Bezetting Rengat by Sabirroedin," March 2, 1949.
3. "Official Action Report for the Occupation of Rengat," collection 512, Antoniëtti, 52. The

occupation of Rengat was more thoroughly investigated than the occupation of Jambi, resulting in more extensive archival papers. See "Main Reports on the Allegations and Investigations on the Occupation of Rengat," 3933; and "Main Report on the Allegations and Investigations on the Occupation of Rengat," 2.10.17, 1327. Also see De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 324–28; Anne-Lot Hoek, "Rengat, 1949 (Part 1)," *Inside Indonesia* 125 (July–September 2016); and Rémy Limpach, *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), 663–69. A number of local histories in Indonesian also deal with what is called the "5 January affair": Yusril Ardanis, *Lagu sunyi dari Indragiri: Sebuah biografi H.M Wasmad Rads* (Jakarta: RuangBaca, 2011), 99–110; Harto Juwono, and Yosephine Hutagalung, *Tiga tungku sejarangan: Sejarah kesultanan Indragiri sampai peristiwa 5 Januari 1949* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2006), 355–78; and Saiman, Zulfa, and Refinaldi, *Perjuangan tiada mengenal akhir: Biografi Kolonel Inf. (Purn) H. Himron Saheman* (Pekanbaru: Unri Press, 2003), 52–55.

4. Jan Bank, ed., *De Excessennota: Nota betreffende het archiefonderzoek naar de gegevens omtrent excessen in Indonesië begaan door Nederlandse militairen in de periode 1945–1950* (The Hague: SDU, 1995), 35–37; de Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 306–9, 324–28; Anne-Lot Hoek, "Ook op Sumatra richtten Nederlanders een bloedbad aan," *NRC Handelsblad*, February 13, 2016; Hoek, "Rengat, 1949"; and Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 663–69.
5. Cf. Petra Groen, "Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1941," in *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia*, ed. Bart Luttikhuis and A. Dirk Moses (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 25–44.; and Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 704–11.
6. See, for example, on the thinking of army commander General S. H. Spoor, Jaap de Moor, *Generaal Spoor: Triomf en tragiek van een legercommandant* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011).
7. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 15–38.
8. "Letter from Captain W.D.H. Eekhout to Lieutenant-Colonel Luchsinger," January 8, 1949.
9. "List of Paratroopers Involved in the Occupation of Jambi," collection 512, Antoniëtti, 43, "Groep Rood" and "Groep Oranje."
10. "List of Paratroopers Involved in the Occupation of Rengat," collection 512, Antoniëtti, 50.
11. The following paragraphs rely heavily on de Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*.
12. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 306–13, 324–28.
13. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, especially 525–40. In reality, the First Para Company was less "Dutch" than its reputation suggested: the leadership preferred to recruit Dutch soldiers, but due to insufficient applications was forced to also recruit indigenous Indonesians. The Para Company ultimately consisted of approximately two-thirds Dutch recruits.

14. For a detailed study of the Rengat affair see Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 663–69. On the occupation of Jambi see de Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 306–9.
15. "Report by Mr. Hins (Assistant Prosecutor in Tanjung Pinang)," April 16, 1949; "Report of Investigation by Huizinga and De Lange (Military Police)," June 19, 1949; and "Memorandum from the Ministry of Overseas Territories," April 5, 1949. Also cf. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 663–69.
16. See especially "Letter from Lt. R.L. Welling to the Head of Army Information Services," January 5, 1949; "Reports of Interrogations by Sgt. Bovendeur and Pvt. Soewardi (Military Police)," February–April 1949; and "Report of Investigation by De Lange and Huizinga (Military Police)," July 4, 1949.
17. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 656–70.
18. "Letter from General Secretary E. O. van Boetzelaar to the Army Commander and the State Secretary of Interior Affairs," February 23, 1949; "Letter from Lt.-Col. Luchsinger on Behalf of the Army Commander to the State Secretary for Economic Affairs," February 28, 1949; and "Letter from J. Martens to the Army Commander," March 4, 1949.
19. "Letter from Consul General A. M. L. Winkelman to the Minister of Foreign Affairs," March 5, 1949 (with a translated copy of an article from *Nan Chio Jih Pao* dated February 14, 1949); "Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Army Commander," March 26, 1949; and "Memorandum from the Ministry of Overseas Territories," April 5, 1949.
20. "Report by Mr. Hins (Assistant Prosecutor in Tanjung Pinang)," April 16, 1949.
21. "Letter from Lieutenant-General Spoor to the Head of the Military Police Corps," April 2, 1949.
22. "Report of Investigation by Huizinga and De Lange (Military Police)," June 19, 1949. Also compare to eleven further witness statements by widows of victims in "Letter from the Local Military Commander in Rengat Lt. W. J. van den Veen to the General Staff," April 8, 1949.
23. This may be doubted, considering that the Army Command urged the head of the Military Police to complete this case on September 10 and October 31, even though we know the report had been completed in June: "Letter from General Staff to Head of Military Police Corps," September 10, 1949; and "Letter from General Staff to Head of Military Police Corps," October 31, 1949.
24. "Letter from Pelt to Bondam," October 14, 1949.
25. "Letter from J. D. van Pelt," October 24, 1949.
26. Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 20.
27. See, for example, Hoek, "Ook op Sumatra"; KRO-Radio Reporter, "Het bloedbad van Rengat," Radio 1, February 14, 2016.

28. "Letter from Lt. R. L. Welling to the Head of Army Information Services," January 5, 1949.
29. "Report of the Interview with Lt. Welling," April 26, 1949.
30. On the treatment of whistle blowers in general see Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 627–39.
31. "Confidential Note from Luchsinger to Eekhout," January 5, 1949; and "Letter from Luchsinger to Rietveld," January 5, 1949.
32. "Letter from Captain W. D. H. Eekhout to Lieutenant-Colonel Luchsinger," January 8, 1949.
33. "Letter from Rietveld to Luchsinger," January 10, 1949.
34. "Report by D. Ornee and J.W. Huizinga Regarding Their Search for A. J. A. van den Berg," May 7, 1949.
35. "Investigation Report by De Lange and Huizinga (Military Police)," July 4, 1949 (including witness statements by R. Welling, the camera man A. J. A. van den Berg, photographer H. J. van Krieken, and driver Abdul Rachman).
36. "Reports of Interrogations by Sgt. Bovendeur and Pvt. Soewardi (Military Police)," February–April 1949.
37. Gert Oostindie, *Soldaat in Indonesië, 1945–1950: Getuigenissen van een oorlog aan de verkeerde kant van de geschiedenis* (Amsterdam: Prometheus 2015), 177.
38. Bank, *De Excessennota*.
39. Tom van den Berge, Ireen Hoogenboom, Bart Luttikhuis, and Gert Oostindie, '"Alles is natuurlijk te begrijpen als je erover nadenkt': Interview met Prof. dr. Cees Fasseur over Nederlandse oorlogsmisdrijven in Indonesië, het ontstaan van de 'Excessennota' en het metier van de historicus," *Leidschrift*, October 2016.
40. Bank, *De Excessennota*, 35–37.
41. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 306–9, 324–28.
42. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 307n24–25. De Moor later (n29–30) also cites as plain fact a much later recollection by one of the paratroopers that they had been attacked in Jambi by Indonesians wearing Red Cross bands. This recollection was noted down in the context of a 1968 memoir article by former platoon commander Antoniëtti: NIMH, Antoniëtti, 134–35 (cited in De Moor).
43. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*. The research and writing for this chapter was completed before the publication in the Netherlands of the major Dutch government–funded research program in 2022. The results of that research program could not be evaluated for this chapter.
44. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs*, 74–80, 109–19, 743–46.
45. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 536, 539.
46. A promising but almost completely untapped resource of this nature for the Indonesian War is the collection of interrogation reports by the Netherlands Indies Intelligence

Services: NL-HaNA, NEFIS/CMI, 2387–2480. I have used some of this material myself in previous work; see Luttikhuis, "Generating Distrust," 151–71.

47. For an attempt to bring these sources in, see Bart Luttikhuis and C. H. C. Harinck, "Nothing to Report? Challenging Dutch Discourse on Colonial Counterinsurgency in Indonesia, 1945–1949," in *Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World*, ed. Philip Dwyer and Amanda Nettelbeck (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 265–85.
48. De Moor, *Westerling's oorlog*, 328–33.

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4

ASYMMETRIC POWER RELATIONS

Jihad Made in Germany? Creating Terrorscapes through German Undercover Intelligence Operations against Britain and Russia in Afghanistan, India, and Persia during the First World War: An Entangled History of Violence

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INTRODUCTION

"Our consuls . . . have to lead the whole Mohammedan world . . . to ferocious insurrection." On the eve of hostilities, Emperor Wilhelm II issued this order at the end of July 1914 to defeat the enemies of the German Reich. The emperor believed that "England, Russia and France have agreed . . . to begin a war of annihilation against us."[1] By embracing the "whole Mohammedan world" Wilhelm explicitly considered transnational spaces that he wanted to transform into terrorscapes to harm his adversaries. Brand-new geopolitical concepts considering large spaces were combined with new military insurgency strategies supposed to support traditional military action on battlefields.[2] War began to change into its "modern version" of the twentieth century, which included large-scale atrocities against civilians as well as total war. Germans thus connected terrortimes and terrorscapes and created an entangled history of violence.

This chapter examines the development of terrorscapes by using the example of German warfare in the so-called Orient. This term was used in Europe to describe a space comprising not only the Middle East but sometimes even South Asia and North Africa. It has to be used very cautiously because it conveys specific European colonial images of this region, ranging from irrational longing for the sweetness of the "Orient"

to racist notions of superiority. This term is nevertheless employed in this chapter to capture the spatial notions used by Europeans to describe Northern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia and to show how his term was weaponized to create terrorscapes.

When the First World War broke out, German officials started considering how to set on fire the highly sensitive region at the interface between the British, French, and Russian spheres of influence to inflict damage upon their enemies. The Germans identified a continuous area extending from Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt to the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. This space should be transformed into a terrorscape by instigating the local Muslim population to rise up against the British, French, and Russian rulers. The Islamic tradition of holy war was used to fan the fire. Here, the Ottoman Empire, which was a German ally, held all the cards. Sultan Mehmed V, caliph of Islam, was the nominal head of Muslims worldwide. Only he could proclaim the global jihad. Using the concept of jihad, the Germans wanted to establish an identity-creating narrative to encourage the disparate local groups in the region to take joint action with Germany.

By using the selected example, this chapter examines the theme "Asymmetric Power Relations" identified in the introduction to this book. It therefore asks how the German Reich resorted to asymmetric forms of violence—in this case jihad—as a means to fight more powerful adversaries in the Orient, like Britain, France, and Russia. What was the impact of the German external actor coming into a region that had a years-long experience of violent suppression of the local population by European colonial powers? In which way did this experience facilitate the creation of terrorscapes? By using this example, the chapter illustrates the impact of actions of state or nonstate actors in certain terrorscapes during extraordinary terrortimes. Furthermore, the it shows to what extent this constitutes a transnational entangled history of violence.

The chapter also explores how the concept of inciting popular uprisings became part of German military planning before 1914, and how this tactic took shape after the beginning of the First World War. The following section examines which actions the Germans took in the first months of the war to realize their jihad planning. The last section is devoted to one of the key terrorscapes: the region comprising Afghanistan, India, and Persia, which was of central importance for the Germans.

THE CONCEPT OF INCITING POPULAR UPRISINGS AND GERMAN MILITARY PLANNING THROUGH FALL 1914

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, military planners recognized the full significance of popular uprisings when they realized how much difficulty the French army

encountered with the Spanish independence movement and its guerrilla tactics during the Peninsular War between 1807 and 1814. Prussia first thought of implementing this new military strategy in its war against the Habsburg Empire in 1866, as France had done in its conflict with Vienna in 1859. In the following years, Prussian and German militaries discussed how to direct the insurrection strategy against Britain, France, or Russia by abusing independence movements in their spheres of influence. Emperor Wilhelm II was notably enthusiastic about the idea of using the military potential of colonial, particularly Islamic, insurrections for German warfare. For this purpose, he successfully presented the German Reich as a power protecting the Islamic world, for instance during his journey to the Orient in 1898.[3] For the emperor, insurgencies of apparently fanatical Muslims seemed to be particularly advantageous for Germany, a country that did not rule over followers of Islam, while most Muslim subjects lived in the British, French, and Russians empires. Considering the constant Muslim uprisings in the these empires' spheres of influence—the insurrections in the Caucasus against Russia in the 1820s, the Mahdist War against Britain in Sudan (1881–99), and the continuous rebellions in French Algeria, to name just a few—a jihad seemed highly promising in times of war.

One region in particular stood out: the seemingly conflict-ridden Islamic world from Northern Africa through the Middle East all the way to India. At the beginning of the war, the emperor's appeal to "the whole Mohammedan world" was further specified.[4] On August 5, 1914, German chief of staff Helmut von Moltke stated in a memorandum for the Foreign Office: "The insurrection of India and Egypt . . . is of utmost importance." A war alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which remained broadly neutral until November 1914, would allow Germany to "realize this idea and to arouse Islamic fanaticism."[5] Shortly afterward, Wilhelm II took the initiative and cabled to the Ottoman war minister, Enver Pascha: "Turkey has to strike out. His Majesty the Sultan has to call Muslims in Asia, India, Egypt, Africa for Jihad for the caliphate."[6] The propositions of the German emperor fell on understanding ears. On August 18, the German ambassador in Constantinople, Hans von Wangenheim, reported Enver Pascha's response: "His Majesty's wish to revolutionize the Islamic world has already been prepared for some time."[7] A few days after the British, French, and Russian declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mehmed V called for jihad, on November 11, 1914. In his appeal he accused the three European powers in the Orient of suppressing "millions of Muslims."[8]

To realize the German insurrection plans, the Foreign Office established the Intelligence Agency for the Orient. Max von Oppenheim, head of this new service, was a famous expert on "Oriental affairs" and had excellent contacts due to his many trips to the region and observer status at the German consulate general in Cairo between 1896 and 1909. The object of the Intelligence Agency was to coordinate German

propaganda activities in the Islamic world. This seemed to be necessary to break the British news monopoly, which London used to spread false information or half-truths about the Central Powers in its sphere of influence. Berlin had a clear idea why the British acted this way: "The Oriental peoples under British domination and occupation like Indians, Egyptians etc.," Oppenheim wrote to Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg on August 15, 1914, should be prevented from "taking advantage of the world war to shake off the yoke."[9]

In fall of 1914, Oppenheim submitted a memorandum, "Revolutionizing the Islamic Territories of Our Enemies," to present concrete guidelines on how to proceed.[10] To establish successful counterpropaganda, newspapers and pamphlets were to be provided. These printed materials should be brought to the region by using intermediaries like German missionary stations or schools, banks, and merchants on-site, but also Islamic religious brotherhoods, Muslim merchants, and owners of firms with a large network of branches.[11] In addition it was planned to build up a wireless telegraphic net, which should encompass the entire Orient, all the way to Persia and Afghanistan. Thus, the whole region, including the "enemy Islamic territories" like India, should be flooded with German propaganda.[12]

In addition to the intended propaganda, Oppenheim planned the "direct incitement and support of insurrections against our enemies." For this, he concluded, Germany needed to provide "humans, money and materials": "Only with very much effort satisfying results can be achieved." Nevertheless, the effort seemed worthwhile, because "if the Turks invade Egypt and insurgencies are spreading in India, England will be worn down." Oppenheim calculated that the German insurrection strategy would cost 100 million marks.[13] All in all, the Germans tried to create terrorscapes via propaganda, bribes, transfer of arms and military equipment, and the deployment of German officers to train rebels and to coordinate local uprisings. Was this enough to establish terrorscapes? How successful were these efforts?

INSURGENCY AND JIHAD "MADE IN GERMANY" IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the concrete implementation of the elaborated plans started. On August 14, 1914, Enver Pascha rejoiced: "Preparations made for insurrections in Caucasus, Bagdad, Bengasi, Egypt, Jerusalem."[14] Berlin and Constantinople agreed "that the success of the operations to revolutionize the Islamic world essentially depend on the supply of arms and munitions to the different insurgent

areas."[15] Yet Berlin deplored that it had not reacted to Arabic requests for help against Britain and France in the previous years based on the consideration that a mutual understanding remained possible.[16] Therefore, at the outbreak of the war Germany wanted to act as quickly as possible. On August 6, 1914, only a few days after the German declaration of war against its enemies, Ambassador Wangenheim requested the following from Berlin: "Supply of as many rifles and munitions of any kind and quality as possible necessary to intensify insurrections in Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Persia, Afghanistan, India. Uprisings are breaking out in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan."[17] Through a variety of channels, weapons and funds reached the areas to be incited, sometimes directly via the Ottoman Empire. At the end of November 1914, to cite one example, twenty-six railway wagons filled with weapons and munitions left Germany heading toward Constantinople.[18] They contained, among other things, twenty-three thousand rifles, thirty machine guns, and ammunition. The weapons were mostly smuggled into the Caucasus and Persia.[19] In January 1915, after various individual payments, 2.9 million gold marks were brought to Constantinople to have enough money at German disposal to bribe local chieftains and eminent personalities. In February and March 1915, the Foreign Office provided first another 2 and then another 8 million marks for insurrections.[20] Further sums followed.

Which immediate measures were taken in the various regions to create terrorscapes in Northern Africa and the Orient? The Mannesmann brothers, who had founded the Mannesmann-Marokko Kompanie in 1909, were responsible for "inciting natives in Morocco with pamphlets etc. against the French rule." They had close contacts with the famous rebel leader Mulai Ahmed er Raisuli, who was in command of an army of insurgents of the Rif tribes, who fought the Spanish and the French in 1909 and 1921.[21] Weapons organized by the German consulate general in Barcelona, the center of arms smuggling to Africa at that time, reached Morocco via intermediaries.[22] One of the brothers, Otto Mannesmann, was sent to Tripoli to incite uprisings in French territories in Algeria and Tunisia. He was equipped with printing machines to duplicate pamphlets and appeals in Arabic. To distribute them, he was given a large number of balloons: "With the help of these balloons it will be intended to distribute appeals among the Arabic population in Tunis and Algeria to create unrest in the French North African territories." His contacts with the Senussi, a Sufi Islamic brotherhood, were expected to support his propaganda activity. The son of the famous Algerian freedom fighter Abdelkader El Djezairi, Emir Said, promised to "take action against the French with 500 horsemen, if the necessary funds would be provided." Berlin immediately made available a larger sum.[23]

In Egypt, Max von Oppenheim reactivated his long-standing contacts and dispatched confidants to "incite unrest among the natives." The Egyptian National Agitation Committee in Geneva planned to interrupt the water pipe to Port Said to

disrupt the operation of the Suez Canal.[24] Berlin wanted to support these activities and provided 2 million marks.[25] In addition, emissaries were sent to the western parts of the Ottoman Empire to prepare an eventual invasion of Egypt by inciting local tribes against British rule.[26] Here, the Germans deliberately identified transnational terrorscapes: "One might hope that an insurrection in Egypt spreads out via Mecca and the rest of the Islamic world to India."[27]

The Caucasus, with its large Muslim population, also came into German focus. Here the Russians could be harmed by inciting insurrections of Muslims or by supporting local independence movements. Constantinople asked the Germans on August 9, 1914, to back the "already initiated measures to revolutionize the Caucasus."[28] Only days later Berlin approved the delivery of four thousand rifles.[29] The Germans also supported already ongoing Georgian insurrections with large sums of money, which were used to buy more weapons. By December 1914 700,000 Swiss francs had been paid in cash to franc-tireurs and saboteurs in the Caucasus.[30] Ambassador Wangenheim was pleased to cable to Berlin that "the number of Muslim insurgents has risen to 50,000."[31]

The World Zionist Organization, founded by Theodor Herzl, which was headed by the Berlin University professor Otto Warburg, also agreed to support the German plans. The Foreign Office rejoiced in view of its one hundred thousand open members and an unknown number of secret members worldwide: "The organization of Zionism represents a tool of inestimable value for our intelligence and our agitation abroad." Agents of the organization, especially in Constantinople and Jaffa, periodically received the telegrams of the German news agency Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau to spread "authentic news about the war events" in the Orient.[32]

The presence of thousands of pilgrims in Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah on the occasion of the autumnal pilgrimages was used to spread pro-German news in the Orient all the way to Afghanistan and India. Therefore, the Germans especially provided the sacred sites of Islam with propaganda material and let Muslims carry out the distribution.[33] On the last day of the religious celebrations in Mecca and Medina in fall of 1914, all believers received a pamphlet "which called for struggle against the oppressors of Islam and for support of Germany."[34] Berlin's hope for close cooperation with the Muslim faithful was not in vain. On August 29, 1914, Ambassador Wangenheim received the sharifs of Mecca and Medina, that is, the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. They congratulated him on the German victories and stated: "All Muslims see in Germany the saviour from the English and French yoke. In all mosques of Arabia, but also in Mecca and Medina, people pray for the German victory day-to-day."[35]

All in all, diverse actions, individuals, and tribes in various regions were supported. Taken together, all these measures aimed to create interconnected terrorscapes. However, the German insurrection strategy in the Orient was only an additional element of warfare, as the Foreign Office stated as early as September 1914, because it

largely "depends on victories in Europe and the intervention of Turkey";[36] the different terrorscapes in Europe and the Orient were thus closely entangled. Without the propaganda effect of a predictable German final victory over its opponents, the hesitant leaders in the Orient would not dare to wage open war against Britain, France, or Russia. Moreover, direct German potential influence was naturally quite limited because the German military command wanted to use all available funds for the European battlegrounds. Therefore, Berlin depended on the Ottoman Empire to remain cooperative and militarily successful, with German help. In the event of Ottoman defeats in the Orient, the entire German insurrection strategy would be worthless.

THE GERMAN INSURRECTION STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, AND PERSIA

India seemed particularly prone to a revolution incited by German action that could have a devastating impact on Britain. Max von Oppenheim therefore stated: "If the domestic stability of this region was deeply disturbed, England would be forced to send a major part of its fleet to India to protect uncountable British interests, the numerous Britons und the British international standing. The British public opinion would add another piece and soon England would see the necessity to conclude a peace agreement with us that suits us."[37] The German administration consciously considered large geographic spaces where violence should be sparked, especially Afghanistan and Northern India. Or, as Oppenheim put it, the "most dangerous for the English" would be these "mountain people, mostly Muslims." They were "the only ones who are well armed."[38] The British were also aware of this danger. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Archer, chief commissioner of the Indian region of Balochistan, stated in August 1916 that uprisings had occurred on the frontier from India to Afghanistan "that may be charged up directly to the account of England's enemies," that is, Turkey and Germany: "Should such efforts succeed, there is no doubt that Afghanistan could make us a certain amount of trouble."[39]

In the German view, Afghanistan had to fulfil a particular role. This country under British influence owned a relatively well-equipped army of fifty-thousand fighters. In Kabul there were even factories to produce rifles and cannons. Everything seemed to fit perfectly: "The intervention of an Afghan army, especially with Turkish and German officers would make a great impression on India and would represent a fundamental danger for the British rule there. . . . Already for a long time England fears that Afghanistan could intervene during a world war."[40] This would allow Kabul to get rid of the factual British dominance over the country. Therefore, Arthur Zimmermann, undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, opined that "influencing the Emir of Afghanistan

would be the best way to achieve the objective of an insurrection in British India."[41] The Germans had already sent a former employee of the Indian government and others into the region to support German propaganda efforts.[42] At the same time, Constantinople had a permanent link to the Muslims in India at its disposal.[43]

On August 14, 1914, Berlin received a long-awaited message. Enver Pascha informed them that his emissaries had told him that the emir of Afghanistan was "ready for any hostile action against England and Russia."[44] Now it seemed possible to realize the German plans and to create terrorscapes in the Orient to harm the enemies of the Reich. Detailed preparations for a revolution in India immediately started. Enver Pascha asked to dispatch twenty to thirty German officers to Constantinople. They were supposed to be assigned to an Ottoman military mission tasked to persuade Afghanistan to take up the fight against Britain. The officers had to provide military assistance and training to enable the Afghan army to invade its neighboring country.[45] At the beginning, the "secret mission to the Emir" should only "carefully provide information," but at a chosen point the officers were authorized to promise British and Russian territories to the emir. To prepare the ground for the expedition, emissaries were sent to Western Afghanistan to build up an "intelligence and spy network."[46] However, when the first German advance party arrived in Constantinople in September 1914, it quickly came to the sobering conclusion that Berlin had been dazzled by the alleged Ottoman preparations for the Afghanistan expedition. The head of the German delegation, Wilhelm Wassmuss, bitterly remarked that Constantinople "has not yet been concerned with the question how the plan could be realized." This turned out to be even more frustrating since "the Foreign Office had already spent a considerable amount of money" for the realization of the expedition. Furthermore, more than twenty officers and experts, followed by weapons, equipment items, and gifts for the emir, were underway.[47]

As a result, Wassmuss accelerated the preparations. It was planned that the expedition should be accompanied by an Ottoman military unit of one thousand soldiers when crossing Persia to reach Afghanistan in case the Persian tribes gave them an unfriendly welcome. If some of the tribes seemed hostile, "a Turkish division" should clear the way.[48] Yet the Ottoman invasion of Northern Persia and the Caucasus in November 1914 changed priorities. From now on Constantinople's interest in the expedition was nil. The Germans had to try to "achieve their aim on their own."[49]

In January 1915 the expedition traveled to Baghdad.[50] Shortly afterward the Persian border was crossed. The Germans actually felt much safer without Ottoman accompaniment because according to the new head of the Afghanistan expedition, First Lieutenant Oskar von Niedermayer, "the Germans were met with more sympathy than the Turks" in Persia. He added, in view of past Ottoman assaults against Persian tribes, "Our task is not to constantly make up for Turkish mistakes."[51] For the time being, the Germans had to stop in Persia because as Christians they needed the permission of the

emir to cross the border into Afghanistan. The resulting downtime was to be used to promote the insurrection of Persia, a semiautonomous country dominated by Britain and Russia.[52] The Germans planned to weaponize internal conflicts between the central government in Tehran and local chieftains, who enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Money and delivery of arms were intended to incite tribes against the British and Russian troops in the country. Yet the main target was to take over the Persian gendarmerie, which was commanded by Swedish officers. This armed force had not received its pay regularly because of empty coffers in Tehran. Furthermore, the Swedish officers and their Persian crew were glad to be able to fight the much-hated British and Russians. The Germans promised regular pay as well as future employment in the German colonies, generous pensions, and German nationality.[53] From January 1915 on Berlin spent 100,000 to 120,000 Persian toman monthly for the troop of ten thousand soldiers and provided 206,000 toman for credits.[54] With the help of the gendarmerie the Germans were able to temporarily gain control over large parts of Middle Persia, especially the region around Kermanshah, Isfahan, and Tehran.[55]

Wassmuss and a group of German and Indian companions moved on to Southern Persia to incite local chieftains against the British.[56] The rest of the group, headed by Niedermayer, went to Tehran to create unrest in Middle and Northern Persia.[57] All in all the Germans succeeded in arming their sympathizers. In the following months the British and Russian consulates in Western and Southern Persia, like Isfahan, Kerman, Shiraz, and Yazd, had to be abandoned. British and Russians only felt safe in those parts of the country where regular British or Russian troops were deployed.[58] In Southwest Persia, in the region around the cities Shiraz and Yazd, Wassmuss succeeded in inciting local tribes. For several months vast areas, including the city of Shiraz, fell into the hands of the rebels. Not until the beginning of 1919 could the uprising be quashed. The British Secret Service estimated that Wassmuss, the "German Lawrence of Arabia" and "Chief German Intriguer in South Persia,"[59] had brought together a troop of three hundred Germans and Austrians (many of whom had fled from Russian prisoner of war camps in the Caucasus to Persia), fifty Ottomans and Indians, and around twenty thousand Persians.[60] Over time the British army had to deploy forty thousand soldiers in Persia and make use of massive repression to be able to transform the terrorscape back into a shaky peacescape.[61]

Altogether, the German commitment largely depended on the military action of the Ottoman Empire. The Persian terrorscape was closely linked to other terrorscapes in the Caucasus or Mesopotamia. When the sultan's army suffered several severe defeats against the British and the Russians throughout the year 1915, the Persian tribes started turning away from the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the German expedition stayed the course. The troops left for Afghanistan in June 1915 and reached Kabul on October 22, 1915. The emir welcomed the Germans kindly, knowing that he could use the delegation

as leverage against the British, who wanted to prevent an alliance between Afghanistan and Germany at any price. In the following months, the supporters of a continued pact with Britain at the court in Kabul sparred with those who preferred Germany. In January 1916, a bilateral friendship treaty in fairly general terms was signed between Afghanistan and Germany. Yet the emir did not want to commit fully as long as he was not sure which party would win the war. So far, he signalized his negotiating partners his demands to switch sides: one hundred thousand modern rifles, three hundred modern cannons including accessories, and subsidies amounting to 10 million pounds. While waiting for new instructions from Berlin regarding the emir's demands, the Germans trained the heads of the Afghan army in general staff courses, and they taught the Afghans how to use machine guns and large artillery. However, the British did not remain inactive. They increased their subsidies paid to the emir and could thus successfully prevent an Afghan defection. The emir was also aware that faraway Germany would not be much help in a struggle against Britain.[62] In May 1916, the German expedition left Kabul to return home. The majority of the group chose the direct way through Persia even though this seemed dangerous due to the advancing British and Russian troops. A smaller group, led by the diplomat Werner Otto von Hentig, who had worked for the German diplomatic missions in Peking, Constantinople, and Tehran, preferred the eastern route. Crossing the Himalayas, Hentig arrived in China, whence he left for the United States. There he received a very friendly welcome, which annoyed the British. The Secret Service (MI5) could not fathom how "naive" the Americans were: "It looks as though the Americans so admired von Hentig's pluck, that they were anxious to do all they could to help him."[63] On June 9, 1917, Hentig finally reached Berlin.[64]

Even if the German action in Persia and Afghanistan was rather limited, it still seemed important to London. This is evident from the way the British reacted: throughout the entire interwar period, any international letter to Niedermayer, Hentig, or others was intercepted by the British Secret Service. Furthermore, significant efforts were made to locate and punish Persian tribes as well as Swedish or Swiss accomplices of the Germans, whereby the latter only had to face expulsion from Persia.[65] There was even more fallout from the German involvement during the First World War; some of the families of chieftains whom the British colonial power had imprisoned and expropriated received compensation payments from the German government in the 1920s.[66] But traces of the "jihad made in Germany" can be found in the archives even for the period after the Second World War. One of the sons of a Persian chieftain who was fighting alongside the Germans in the Fars province in southwest Persia applied for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s. He claimed that the shah's regime had imprisoned and killed his father in 1930 as punishment for his pro-German behavior. On March 7, 1967, the son was recognized as a political refugee due to the prospect of his being persecuted by the regime; the story of his father had only marginal effects on this decision.[67]

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the First World War, the German Empire identified a geographical space between Northern Africa and Afghanistan/India that it sought to transform into a terrorscape. This appeared to be quite easy because the Muslim population apparently was ready to use violence when called to jihad against the British, French, and Russian foreign rulers. The traditional positive image of Germany as protector of Islam helped to support Berlin's planning, as did the long-term frustration of people in the Orient with the European colonial powers. Berlin also benefited from the perception that the Germans were not seeking territorial annexations. Germany succeeded in turning parts of the region into a terrorscape because the strategies of domination carried out by the British, French, and Russians had long been based on the use of violence to suppress local independence movements. Violence had become the preferred strategy for the assertion of interests in the Orient. Hence little was needed for an external actor to incite insurrections and to coordinate them; decades of anger and frustration could easily be used by German officers.

In the long run, the German efforts failed, for a variety reasons. For the German leadership the insurrection strategy represented a minor aspect of the war. Only small sums were spent to support the uprisings, and few German officers were sent to the region. They could not count on much assistance from the Ottoman Empire and mostly had to act on their own. All in all, Constantinople was the decisive factor. The Ottomans blatantly aimed at annexing parts of the neighboring countries, which is why local chieftains hesitated to ally themselves closely with Constantinople. Political, cultural, and religious (Sunnis vs. Shiites) differences had an inhibiting effect on the unfolding of terrorscapes. The interests of the Ottomans and their neighbors were too different. There did not seem much advantage in exchanging one regime, the British and Russians, for another, the Ottomans. Furthermore, the defeats of the sultan's army had the effect that local chieftains turned away from the Central Powers and—out of pragmatic considerations—accepted British or Russian rule again. However, the colonial powers were not able to get rid of the violence incited by the Germans in the long run. It was impossible for them to completely restore peace in the terrorscapes. In Persia, Shah Reza Pahlavi succeeded in liberating the country from British and Russian rule in 1921. The German action had shown the Persian national movement that the British and the Russians were not invincible. German propaganda efforts and measures to coordinate the actions of different tribes had long-term effects.

In Afghanistan, Emir Amanullah Khan came into power at the beginning of 1919. He had been the head of the pro-German faction at court and had been in close contact with Niedermayer and Hentig. Shortly after that he started the third Anglo-Afghan War in May 1919 by invading Northern India. In a way, he implemented the German

planning. After a month-long stalemate, Britain finally concluded a peace treaty in August 1919. Now Afghanistan was a fully independent state, and Amanullah became the first emir to modernize the country on Western designs. In 1926 he signed the Afghan-German friendship treaty, an extension of the bilateral treaty concluded in 1916 during the stay of the Afghanistan expedition in Kabul. After Britain and Russia, "there was now a third European power steadily gaining traction in Kabul, and that was Germany."[68]

In conclusion, this chapter has identified an entangled history of violence in interwoven and mutually responding terrorscapes. The actions on European or Asian battlefields had a large impact on how violence developed in other parts of the world. Victories and defeats were especially noticed in areas with smoldering conflicts between the local population and the ruling European colonial powers. Here it was easy for an external actor like Germany to incite insurrections. Transnational terrorscapes could be created with few ingredients: an oppressive power, which was not considered a legitimate ruler by the population; local personalities willing to take up the fight; an external actor who provided money, weapons, and propaganda; and finally a unique terrortime, which seemed to carry the opportunity to succeed.

The Germans, like their Allied adversaries, made use of violence to gain or regain control over terrorscapes in somewhat similar ways.[69] Especially the Allies, as seen in Persia, extensively made use of violence to suppress the uprisings incited by German insurrectionists, which threatened their power base in the region. Yet there is no evidence of a potential for mass destruction—other than in the European theater—to become actual.[70] The reason for that might be that the asymmetry of power between the small German deployment and the Allied forces was far too overwhelming to allow any hazardous German move based on large-scale atrocities to have a chance to succeed. Therefore, violence didn't develop there as it did in other terrorscapes.

NOTES

1. Karl Kautsky, *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, vol. 2, no. 401 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Gesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1919), 133.
2. Cf. Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehrs und des Krieges*, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1903).
3. Cf. Stefan Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser: Max von Oppenheim und die Neuordnung des Orients (1914–1918)*, (Graz: Ares, 2012), 79–117.
4. Kautsky, *Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, no. 401, 133.
5. Wolfdieter Bihl, *Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte* (Vienna: Bohlau, 1975), 41.
6. Cited in Gabriele Teichmann and Gisela Völger, eds., *Faszination Orient. Max von*

Oppenheim, (Cologne: DuMont, 2001), 127.

7. "Cable 527," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 30.
8. Gottfried Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg: Flugblätter und Flugschriften in arabischer, persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache. Aus einer Sammlung der Universitätbibliothek Heidelberg: Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), 55–58.
9. "Cable 527," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 36.
10. "Revolutionierung der Islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde," ca. October 28, 1914, R20937-2, 1.
11. Cf. "Oppenheim for Bethmann Hollweg," August 15, 1914, R20.936, 37–40.
12. "Oppenheim, Errichtung von Telefunkenstationen in Persien, Afghanistan und der asiatischen Türkei," December 15, 1914, R21.033.
13. "Revolutionierung der Islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde," R20.937-2, 1–5.
14. "Cable 508, Wangenheim," August 14, 1914, R21.028, 18.
15. "Cable 534, Wangenheim," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 47.
16. Cf. "Cable 612, Wangenheim," August 26, 1914, R20.936, 51.
17. "Cable 443, Wangenheim," August 6, 1914, R20.936, 11.
18. "Cable 1042," R21.009.
19. "Cable 465, Wangenheim," R21.008.
20. Cf. "Letters from the Reich Treasury to the Foreign Office," February 18 and March 28, 1915, R21.036, 45, and R 20.936, 275.
21. "Überblick über die in der islamistisch-israelitischen Welt eingeleitete Agitationstätigkeit," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
22. Cf. "Cable 285, Under-Secretary of State Artur Zimmermann, AA, to Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow," September 5, 1914, R22.411.
23. "Überblick über die in der islamistisch-israelitischen Welt eingeleitete Agitationstätigkeit," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
24. "Überblick über die in der islamistisch-israelitischen Welt eingeleitete Agitationstätigkeit," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
25. "Cable 1482, Zimmermann to Wangenheim," December 10, 1914, R21.032, 203.
26. Cf. "Cable 527, Wangenheim," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 30–32.
27. "Überblick über die in der islamistisch-israelitischen Welt eingeleitete Agitationstätigkeit," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
28. "Cable 465, Wangenheim," R21.008, 2.
29. "Cable 30, Zimmermann to Jagow," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
30. Cf. "Zimmermann," December 10, 1914, R21.009.
31. "Cable 1042," R21.009.
32. "Überblick über die in der islamistisch-israelitischen Welt eingeleitete Agitationstätigkeit," August 20, 1914, R22.411.

33. Cf. "Revolutionierung der Islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde," R20937-2, 9ff.
34. "Cable 734, Wangenheim," September 7, 1914, R22.411.
35. "Cable 197, Wangenheim," August 20, 1914, R22.411.
36. "Cable 542, Zimmermann to Jagow," September 24, 1914, R22.425, 4.
37. "Oppenheim for Bethmann Hollweg," August 15, 1914, R20.936, 37.
38. "Oppenheim for Bethmann Hollweg," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 42–45.
39. "India Normal Despite German Agitators," *New York Times*, August 13, 1916.
40. "India Normal Despite German Agitators."
41. "Zimmermann," August 30, 1914, R22.411.
42. Cf. "Cable 527, Wangenheim," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 30–32.
43. "Cable 508, Wangenheim," August 14, 1914, R21.028, 18.
44. "Cable 508, Wangenheim," 18.
45. "Oppenheim for Bethmann Hollweg," August 18, 1914, R20.936, 42–45.
46. "Cable 542, Zimmermann to Jagow," September 24, 1914, R22.425, 4.
47. "Wassmuss to Bethmann Hollweg," September 18, 1914, R22.411.
48. "Zimmermann," January 3, 1915, R20.936, 223.
49. "Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg," January 18, 1915, R21.034, 139.
50. "Cable 90, Wangenheim," January 10, 1915, R21.034, 4.
51. "Niedermayer," January 20, 1915, and March 15, 1915, R21.039, 92 and 161.
52. "Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg," January 18, 1915, R 21.034, 139ff.
53. "Cable 95, Zimmermann to Jagow," January 11, 1915, R22.425.
54. Cf. "Cable 12, Zimmermann to Jagow," January 16, 1915, R22.425.
55. Cf. file R22.425 which contains a large number of cables and memorandums concerning the question. Cf. also Mohammad Gholi Majd, *The Great Famine and Genocide in Persia, 1917–1919* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2013), 19ff.
56. Cf. "Cable 98, Wangenheim," January 1, 1915, R21.034, 7.
57. Cf. "Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg," January 4, 1915, R21.034, 14f.
58. Cf. Majd, *Great Famine*, 21. The British and Russian War Offices mostly published positive news on the German agitation in Persia, which were reproduced in the international press. See, for example, the articles "German Defeat in Persia" and "Persia Rid of Germans," *New York Times*, January 17 and August 11, 1916.
59. National Archives, London, file WO 106-55, 77663.
60. Cf. Stefan M. Kreutzer, "Wilhelm Wassmuss: Ein deutscher Lawrence," in *Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad: Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Orients*, ed. Wilfried Loth (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014), 91–117; and Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den Deutschen Kaiser*, 156.
61. Kreutzer, "Wilhelm Wassmuss," 91.
62. Cf. Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, files R 21033–21041. Cf. also Jules Stewart, *The Kaiser's Mission to Kabul: A Secret Expedition to Afghanistan in World War*

I (London: Tauris, 2014).

63. "Concerning Rumors That Hentig Had Returned to Afghanistan," April 3, 1918, KV 2-394.
64. Cf. Werner Otto von Hentig, *Ins verschlossene Land: Ein Kampf mit Mensch und Meile* (Potsdam: Voggenreiter, 1928); and Oskar von Niedermayer, *Krieg in Irans Wüsten: Erlebnisse der deutschen Expedition nach Persien und Afghanistan* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940).
65. Cf. National Archives, WO 106-55 or KV 2-393 and KV 394.
66. See Kreutzer, "WilhelmWassmuss," 116ff.
67. Political Archives of the Federal Foreign Office, B52/527.
68. Stewart, *Kaiser's Mission to Kabul*, 163.
69. Isabel V. Hull, in *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005), 102, states that "Western militaries fought very similar imperial campaigns guided by almost identical doctrines." However, she differentiates for certain situations during World War I.
70. For World War I see Sönke Neitzel, *Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik* (Munich: Prophyläen 2020), 56–79. See also Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 197–323.

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5

THIRD-PARTY ACTORS AND THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE

Imperialism and the Question of Genocide in Colonial-Era Africa

JASON BRUNER

INTRODUCTION

I explore two overarching questions in this chapter. Why are the terms *genocide* and *cultural genocide* so infrequently applied to African experiences in colonial-era Africa, as compared in particular to Australia and Native America? Is there a meaningful connection between genocide, variously defined, and settler colonialism, as distinct from other forms of imperialism? The historical record provides few easy answers to these questions. It does show that a number of regions of colonial Africa were subject to many, if not most, of the same cultural, political, economic, religious, and biological forces that could be found in Australia or North America, which scholars have described in those contexts as genocide. These experiences, however, have much more infrequently been described as genocidal with respect to colonial Africa, even with a broadened version of the United Nations (UN) 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide definition, which locates genocide less in the intentional development of a campaign of systematic or bureaucratized slaughter and more in the long-term processes that were nevertheless imbued with a "racial eliminationist ideology."[1] Discussions of genocide and Africa are typically limited to instances of mass violence in contexts like German Southwest Africa, Rwanda, or Sudan.[2]

This chapter is not a historical overview of all genocides that have happened in Africa.[3] Rather, what follows is a review of pertinent literature on the subject of

European colonialism and the question of genocide. First, I conclude that within the broad field of African studies, historical analysis has tended to prioritize African agency, as opposed to making arguments about classifying the kinds of violence experienced by Africans under European imperial influences. Second, I question the preoccupation with settler colonialism as a rubric for assessing the genocidal character of European imperialism in colonial-era Africa.

IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND GENOCIDE

The scholarship on imperialism or colonialism is voluminous, just as the literature on genocide has expanded enormously in recent decades. Studies that connect imperialism and the question of genocide, however, are relatively new, and those that pertain to imperialism and genocide in colonial-era Africa are few. The scholarship on colonialism and genocide, however, has not only brought historiographically neglected instances and processes of violence to the fore but has also led to a vigorous debate regarding the assumptions that have been imbedded within the concept of genocide, particularly as it was defined and institutionalized in the UN Convention. Article II of the Convention states: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."[4]

With respect to discussions of colonial-era violence and genocide, the most relevant of these challenged assumptions has to do with the issue of "intent to destroy."[5] That is, if genocide is primarily a crime, then how might one locate sufficient historical evidence to substantiate the intent of Western colonists to eliminate Native or Indigenous peoples? In colonial contexts, such intent is often difficult to find because the processes and policies that resulted in excessive death do not always resemble models of criminal intent established by the Nuremberg Trials or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It can be particularly challenging to identify eliminationist intent that constitutes the crime of genocide as defined by the UN when addressing the deadly spread of diseases due both to lack of immunity and to changed social conditions brought on by colonialism. Still, as Patrick Brantlinger has demonstrated, "extinction discourse" was pervasive and common within nineteenth-century Western literature, policy debates, and culture.[6] In some colonial contexts, however, there might be a scant historical

record because the documents did not exist in the first place, or because they were later destroyed or concealed.[7] Furthermore, colonial-era policies, as manifested, for example, in laws that prohibited or deeply altered rituals, marriage and family relations, planting and hunting, and so on, often blur the line that discursively distinguishes between genocide and cultural genocide.

The result of these processes, circumstances, and policies was, in many cases, the destruction or disintegration of a people "as such." For these reasons, scholars of colonial genocides, especially in Australia, New Zealand, and the American West, have sometimes questioned the criteria of establishing clear criminal intent on the part of colonists or colonial bureaucrats in order to describe these catastrophically deadly histories as "genocidal."[8] In some modern colonial contexts, therefore, the concept of genocide as a historical descriptor would appear to conflict with the notion of the crime of genocide. While the concept of genocide grew out of Western modernity, including its political, anthropological, legal, and moral sensibilities, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term, insisted that it was a recurring feature of human societies, one that was frequently associated with imperial expansion. His development of the concept, how that concept was codified in the UN Convention, and whether there is a substantial gap between the two have been the subjects of a recurring historiographical debate.[9] Lemkin's use of historical examples involving imperialism and genocide suggests complex (if not entirely consistent) interrelations among them. On the one hand, Lemkin condemned forms of colonial violence that later scholars and activists would identify as being "genocidal" (such as enslavement or the removal of Native and Aboriginal children and placing them in boarding schools). But he also held out the possibility of a beneficent, civilizing end of Western imperial expansion.[10] Still, Lemkin's formulation and use of the concept of genocide seems to be more expansive and less particularly legal, when compared with the UN Convention. In this sense, many of the studies that use the term *genocide* to describe colonial policies, outcomes, and violence can often be termed "neo-Lemkinian." As the term is generally used within this literature, it is inclusive of both intentional actions (i.e., massacres) and broader structures (i.e., laws, education, and public policies) and processes (i.e., spread of diseases). It is within this framework, represented most clearly by A. Dirk Moses, among others, that I raise the historiographical question pertaining to the classification and description of colonial-era violence in Africa.

An early exception to the relative paucity of studies examining genocide and imperialism is Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Arendt argued that imperialism provided many of the ideological roots for the racist bureaucracies that developed in twentieth-century Europe. The Holocaust could then be understood as the outworking of European presumptions about dominating a globe populated with non-European peoples and the machinations by which Europeans accomplished that dominance. Stated more tersely: subjugation overseas led to slaughter in Europe. For

Arendt, the imperial impulse fomented the final solution, as both were inherently dependent upon the supremacy of the white man—specifically, the Anglo-Saxon.[11]

Generally speaking, it took some time for historians to take up Arendt's hypothesis and draw connections between Europe's larger imperial projects and genocidal violence. Attention instead was often directed toward understanding the Holocaust with respect to continental European history, as the subsequent Nuremberg Trials kept attention focused squarely on Europe. The scholarship that followed in the mid-twentieth century often examined the structural elements of German society that were contextually important: the legal proscriptions placed on Jews, the history of European antisemitism, German nationalism, and World War I and its aftermath, to name a few. These histories were often developmental, with occasional focus being given to Jewish or Christian resistance to Nazi policies, followed then by increased attention given to bystanders and the complicit majority. By the late twentieth century, Holocaust research had become voluminous and enormously diverse. Comparative perspectives on the Holocaust, however, including perspectives from outside of Europe and those that examined the role of imperialism and its history in the development of the Holocaust, were not in the mainstream of Holocaust research, nor are they today. Some exceptions here include works that examine World War II as an imperialistic war within Europe. These works still tend to be less interested in connecting the Holocaust to European imperialism overseas, though they have, as in Carroll Kakel's case, established an association between imagined geographies and the perpetuation of mass violence.[12] In general, however, the Holocaust was described as a unique event, or a "uniquely unique" event, but mostly a European event, nevertheless.[13]

Some historians of genocide have searched for precursors to the Holocaust in Germany's colonial history, particularly in the German genocide of the Herrero in German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) in 1907–8 and the massacres during the "Maji Maji" Rebellion in German East Africa between 1905 and 1908.[14] These scholars see in these events a German military culture that permitted bureaucratic decisions toward elimination before the Holocaust, with the implication that these African massacres impacted in some way German responses to the "Jewish question" during World War II.[15] (Germany still officially denies that the massacres of the Herrero constituted genocide, in part because German officials say that the term did not exist in 1908.)[16]

Thomas Kühne, however, has argued that there is no "unique German colonial path to the Holocaust," given the similarities between how Germany and other European powers treated their colonial subjects.[17] Here, one sees evidence emerging that not only problematizes the Holocaust's historiographical uniqueness but also questions the uniqueness of any European power's treatment of its subjects. Decades earlier, Aimé Césaire observed more tersely than Arendt or Kühne: "Hitler did to Europe what Europe did to Africa."[18] For Césaire, not only was there nothing new about what

Germany did in the Holocaust, there was nothing unique about it because such tactics defined Europe's interactions with colonial Africa.[19]

Other postcolonial critiques emerged in the 1960s and 1970s that lambasted European presumptions of racial, cultural, religious, and political supremacy.[20] They assailed Europeans' dismissal of non-Western cultural, social, religious, and political complexity and the discursive methods Europeans employed to enact and ensure their hegemony around the globe in the age of empires.[21] While postcolonial scholars critiqued the forms of imperial structural power, only occasionally did they use the language of genocide to frame their critiques with respect to Africa. They spoke of complicity and collusion; the creation of the feminized, demonized, and subhuman "Other"; and the political and cultural turmoil that followed in the wake of colonialism. Violent, destructive, alienating, and humiliating, yes, but rarely was the term *genocide* used as such. Though Fanon termed the transatlantic slave trade the "bloodless genocide,"[22] colonialism in Africa was not described as genocidal tout court.

More recent studies by David Stannard, A. Dirk Moses, and others on Australia or North America have fostered a historical interest in the genocidal character of colonialism, specifically settler colonialism.[23] These scholars argue for a correlation between settler colonialism (as distinguished from imperialism in general) and genocidal violence. While they describe European settlers' eliminationist imaginings and actions, they often focus on the long-term effects of settler societies on indigenous populations in Australia and North America. This emphasis stands in contrast to early scholarship on the Holocaust, which largely focused on the systematic intent and attempt to eradicate Jews from central Europe. As a result, the new literature on settler colonialism and genocide has challenged the notion of the Holocaust as the paradigmatic genocide. This is evinced in part by the fact that Stannard's *American Holocaust* seems to be more interested in using the provocative cultural capital of the term *Holocaust* than it is in drawing meaningful comparisons between European Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe and Native Americans.[24]

These studies help constitute the "new genocide history." Indeed, this history has often highlighted the problems surrounding the issue of intent, as conceptualized in the UN Convention and in legal formulations of the crime of genocide. Work in this literature remains divided, both over where one might locate intent in colonial violence and in the general importance given to this criterion. William Galois observes that the new genocide history has moved away "from the commonplace that genocides must necessarily be rigorously planned exercises."[25] Some scholars have attempted to get around intent by coining terms such as "indirect genocide."[26] It is this sort of framing of colonial atrocities, however, "as *happenings* rather than actions," argues Tracey Banivanua-Mar, that allow colonial peoples to be washed away by history, regarded as the "byproduct of a misguided benevolence" rather than as the intended victims of violent regimes.[27]

Central to understanding genocide as it is used by new genocide scholars who expound the connections between settler colonialism and genocide seems to be a different model than that codified currently under the UN Convention and international law and focused on the intent of the actors involved in the planning and enacting of genocide. Instead, the focus of the scholarship on genocide and settler colonialism generally has moved from the intention to systematically eliminate a people to a focus on the effects and outcomes of settler colonial societies. How intent is understood in defining genocide and the crime of genocide, however, remains an essential analytical element within this literature. In discussing colonialism and genocide in Indonesia, Remco Raben cautions: "Historians tend to assess processes of genocide in quantitative terms – the killing should be massive—and in terms of intent—the killings should be based on an ideology, or planning or premeditation. Both conditions are problematic in colonial situations, but less so than may be thought at first sight."[28]

On the notion of intent, A. Dirk Moses responds that the likely harmful effects of European settlement on Aboriginal peoples in Australia were known to colonialists. Moses maintains that while the Australian outback did not resemble Auschwitz, one could still identify historical evidence that indicates a willful, knowledgeable acceptance of an eliminatory process that created a modern settler colony.[29] Similarly, Patrick Wolfe argues compellingly for the genocidal logic of settler colonialism itself.[30] William Galois made the case for the genocidal nature of the colonial encounter, justifying this terminology by arguing that French colonial violence had been "annihilatory in its aims" and "often had the destruction of whole tribes as their explicit rationale."[31]

This trajectory of scholarship has focused increasingly on settler colonialism as a foundational category of analysis. The application of this category is of limited use when one considers colonial violence in Africa, as there were relatively few settler societies along the lines of Australia or North America present on the continent. Violence in colonial Africa, therefore, was often manifested under different social and political conditions; the results, however, were not entirely different in some areas from processes one observes in settler colonial societies. When many scholars consider colonialism and genocide in Africa, they have almost uniformly done so with respect to clear genocidal incidents in which lethal force was used to attempt to physically eliminate a defined religious or ethnic group or "tribe"—either during colonial rule, as with the Herero, or afterward, as in Rwanda or Sudan.[32] This is also to say that compared to scholarship on North America and Australia, relatively few studies of colonial Africa have described the colonial experience tout court as "genocidal," even if genocide is taken to include what is referred to as cultural genocide.

Instead, scholars of colonial Africa have focused more generally on questions of agency of Africans in the midst of the colonial encounter rather than on their destruction at the hands of Europeans. Take, for example, E. A. Ayandele's 1966 monograph,

The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria. Ayandele helped to catalyze new historiographical approaches to the study of African history by making a fundamental argument: Africans were not simply the exotic backdrop for explorers' "discoveries" or missionaries' heroic proselytization efforts. Writing the introduction to Ayandele's book, K. Onwuka Dike tersely critiqued Eurocentric African histories: "Historians [continue] to write as if Africans were not active participants in the great events that shaped their continent."[33] This assumption shaped the methodologies of a number of major studies of colonial Africa. It is relevant to note here that Jean and John Comaroffs' *Of Revelation and Revolution*, which describes the insidious cultural violence of the impact of colonialism on the Tswana of southern Africa, does not to my knowledge use the terms genocide, cultural genocide, or ethnocide. However, they do describe a colonial violence so insidious that it battled for the very consciousness of African subjects, which the Comaroffs described as a "colonization of consciousness."[34]

The emphasis on agency and the limits of colonial authority and violence in Africa can be shown even with respect to King Leopold's Congo, which was the location of some of the most horrific traumas of colonial Africa and whose population may have been reduced by ten to thirty million people in the early twentieth century.[35] Historians like Osumaka Likaka question the extent to which, even in the brutal early twentieth-century Congo, colonists were able to gain supposed control over Africans' minds. The emphasis here is on the endurance of indigenous African agency through cultural and linguistic practices and less on their victimization by Europeans, though Likaka and others do not deny Belgian brutality.[36]

One could also consider the Mau Mau movement in late colonial Kenya, about which British courts have ruled that Mau Mau detainees suffered crimes against humanity while they were in detention camps during the "Emergency" between 1952 and 1960.[37] During the Mau Mau Emergency, nearly the entire Gikuyu population—around one and a half million people—was placed in guarded removal villages or concentration camps. As has come to light through the research of David Anderson and Carolyn Elkins, the British systematically inflicted various forms of severe physical, psychological, and cultural violence on the Gikuyu during the 1950s. But even here, the issue of agency has also been foregrounded. It is noteworthy that Derek Peterson did not emphasize the violence experienced by the Gikuyu under British repression, but rather focused on the intellectual autonomy and political creativity made possible through the British response to the Mau Mau Emergency.[38] Only recently have scholars attempted to make the case for this facet of British imperialism being described as genocide.[39]

The scholarship described here has done important work in refuting the racist colonial assumptions that Africans were uncivilized, simple-minded, quasi-human brutes inhabiting a "dark continent."[40] But why are the various forms of colonial and imperial violence in Africa—setter colonies or otherwise—not generally described as genocide?

The reasons for this difference are not easy to explain, but I want to explore a few points in more specific detail—specifically, religion and disease, since these are often discussed with respect to genocide in America and Australia. In the literature on genocide and cultural genocide emerging from those historical contexts, these elements are important parts of describing a larger genocidal sociopolitical structure that had devastating consequences for the Indigenous peoples there. These historical factors also illuminate both the complex processes of cultural change that impacted non-European societies as a result of colonialism and the difficulty of establishing criminal intent.

MISSIONARIES AND COLONIAL AGENTS

From the Catholic missions of present-day Mexico and the southwestern United States to the church-run boarding schools of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Australia and Canada, the relationship of Christianity to the question of genocide in North America has been closely connected. A mundane point bears noting here: that the missionaries sent to the American West were not so different than those sent to colonial Africa or Asia or the Pacific Islands. The majority of Protestant missionaries could be described as broadly evangelical, with revival and holiness movements providing the spiritual impetus for their decision to devote their lives to missions. By the 1890s, in Britain at least, many of them were educated in British public schools and had a Cambridge or Oxford degree. More could be said here, but I simply want to emphasize that there is not any evidence that I have seen suggesting a coordinated effort to send more loathsome missionaries to Australia or Canada and the more congenial ones to Congo or India.

Missionary activities were broadly similar throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: they built boarding schools and hospitals, they translated the Bible and *Pilgrim's Progress*, and they often met with relatively little success by way of direct converts.[41] Missionary schools in colonial Africa did not operate using fundamentally different practices than those in the American West.[42] Most required Western-style uniforms and the use of English. They learned Shakespeare. Chapel was mandatory; there were marching drills, and the British cult of athleticism was fostered through soccer and cricket.[43] The schools, as a result, could significantly disrupt the lives of the families whose children were sent to them, as the school year usually did not necessarily correspond with their hunting expeditions, planting seasons, cattle migrations, or ritual seasons. If there was an overall goal of these colonial-era missionary boarding schools, it could have been to produce a "native Christianized elite" who would become model modern leaders. The system of mission education has been criticized by many African historians as representing the collusion of religion with empire in the undermining of

African societies and cultures.[44] It has not to my knowledge, however, been described specifically as "genocidal" in itself; at least this is not part of the mainstream discourse in the historiography of colonial-era Africa.

Missionaries were also involved in various activities that sought to eliminate what they described as "paganism" or "heathenism" in African societies. This included spiritual destruction, sometimes accompanied by physical violence. For example, evangelical Anglican missionaries in southwestern Uganda worked with the British Protectorate government to attempt to eliminate the Nyabingi cult from the area, as it was believed to be the source of anti-colonial resistance, and they consequently imprisoned many cultic leaders.[45] British missionaries along the Niger River colluded with Niger Delta Company boatmen, who turned their maxim guns on the famous Onitsha shrine.[46] Or one might consider the construction of the fictional Protestant church in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, whose location in a forest had the effect of seemingly demonstrating that the ancestors would not or could not take revenge for the affront.[47] The examples could be multiplied ad nauseum, the point here being that missionaries in Africa, both Catholics and Protestants, were complicit or active participants in the destruction of various forms of cultural and religious life in colonial-era Africa. One could say that this was their intention: to destroy (and/or convert) those they deemed to be "primitive."[48]

With respect to Lemkin's formulation of genocide, which sought to protect those things that allowed a group of people to cohere, do the episodes described here constitute genocidal destruction?[49] Following Patrick Wolfe, are these episodes, despite the fact that they often occurred in contexts that were not technically settler colonies, imbued with the "logic of elimination" of the native, as such? One's answer would need to factor in an important caveat: the reality that much of this destruction, in the case of Christianity, was performed by African converts themselves, who may have had tangential or even nonexistent relationships to Western missionaries. The Watchtower movement of south-central Africa, the Harrist churches of west-central Africa, and Alice Lenshina's movement in Northern Rhodesia all engaged in similar forms of cultural and religious destruction.[50] Can it rightfully be considered part of genocide if people destroy aspects of their own culture in order to construct a new one? Or is such a question overly focused on "African agency" and insufficiently concerned with European colonial violence? When does cultural and religious change become genocide?

DISEASE

The role of disease in decimating the populations of the Americas is well known. Smallpox and tuberculosis made their way through native populations with horrifying rapidity, often moving faster than European settlers and explorers. The spread of

diseases to which native peoples had virtually no resistance then meant that Europeans confronted populations that were far weaker politically and militarily than they would have been otherwise. In some cases, infectious diseases themselves have been described as genocidal or as tools of genocide with respect to Native America, and it seems that there is some scholarly agreement that a tremendous percentage of the Native populations in North America died as a result of these diseases rather than through direct physical slaughter by Europeans.[51]

In colonial Africa, particularly in West Africa, the inverse narrative emerged in the nineteenth century: tropical Africa was the "white man's graveyard." Euro-Americans frequently succumbed quickly—sometimes within just a couple of weeks—to the environment and its new diseases. The high rate of European mortality in West Africa was a serious challenge to its settlement by Europeans up until the late nineteenth century, contributing to the establishment of schools of tropical medicine throughout Europe. This is one reason that missionary societies, both American and British, during this period favored the use of former or ransomed slaves to serve as missionaries in the region that is today Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon.[52] The predominant narrative, therefore, assumed that those of European descent were the most adversely affected by diseases in tropical climates during the colonial era. But this narrative occludes much about disease in colonial Africa.

There are many reasons to think that this narrative is profoundly problematic, one of which is the tremendous number of Africans who died as a result of changing health patterns in the colonial era. In Uganda, which was not a settler colony, an outbreak of sleeping sickness around Lake Victoria in the first decade of the twentieth century left the population absolutely decimated, with the population of the Buvuma Islands being reduced from an estimated three hundred thousand to under one hundred thousand. Some coastal regions in Uganda fared equally poorly.[53]

Other regions impacted by European imperialism suffered similar outbreaks and epidemics. Yellow fever outbreaks in late nineteenth-century Senegal killed 20 percent or more of the population of multiple cities and towns.[54] These diseases were exacerbated by colonial processes of labor conscription and urbanization or of new labor environments, like schools or mines, in which people worked together closely and then dispersed to rural areas. It is not difficult to see why many Africans viewed Europeans' responses to these outbreaks, which could include removing people entirely from villages and burning down the affected houses, to be violent, extreme, and unnecessary.[55] The population of certain areas was at times reduced by 50 percent or more because of illnesses or conditions created in part by Europeans. But this is not described by any scholars of colonial Africa, so far as I know, as part of genocide or as being genocidal, in contrast to similar dynamics among indigenous communities in the Americas. It is certainly very difficult, if not impossible, to locate intent in the expansion of diseases

in most of Africa, as in the Americas. It also seems, however, that a substantially larger percentage of the population survived in Africa than in the Americas, which constitutes a significant difference. Might one, as Mike Davis contends in *Late Victorian Holocausts*, be able to locate a logic of the reasoned and inevitable implications of colonial processes in these instances, at least one sufficient enough to warrant the employment of a term like *indirect genocide*?[56]

CONCLUSION

What of the more fundamental question: Can we speak of Africa's experiences of European imperialism in terms of genocide, or cultural genocide, or ethnocide? The presence of a settler society does seem to be an important historical variable in thinking about this question, at least in the new genocide historical literature. But what of cases like Uganda, which were not settler colonies but which nevertheless experienced mass death as a result of colonial encroachment, sometimes amounting to 30 percent or greater death tolls among peoples? How does one meaningfully set this alongside evidence from among the Maori of New Zealand, whose history contemporary Maori activists have described as a "holocaust" in relation to settler colonialism?[57] I am less interested in finding a way around the question of intent as it relates to the category of genocide than I am in suggesting that settler colonialism might be a less meaningful category to use in relation to colonial-era violence than some scholars in the new genocide history might argue. Furthermore, if one follows Césaire's contention that Hitler did to Europe what Europe did to Africa, then one must move toward an acceptance of the "genocidal" logic of imperialism more broadly. And if one does that, then one has not only undermined a preoccupation with the idea that the Holocaust is both (paradoxically) unique as well as the paradigmatic example of genocide, but also the idea that Germany was unique or exceptional in its colonial violence. Rather, one has to grapple with the realities of the genocidal nature of all imperialism. Such a turn, of course, reframes the discussion of the relationship between imperialism and genocide beyond an exclusively European imperialism.[58]

Evidence from colonial contexts, settler colonial or not, seeks to unsettle Western formulations of the very concept of genocide away from their jurisprudential basis. If we are to reframe the scope of inquiry in this way, then genocide seems to become a common and recurring feature of human history, almost mundane. In Canadian or Australian boarding schools, it should be noted, genocidal processes were experienced as quotidian phenomena: in the prohibition of vernacular speech, in the regulation of Western dress or hairstyles. One clearly observes in such practices the active inhibition of the reproduction of group life. In light of this seemingly quotidian banality

of genocidal evil that the new genocide history has foregrounded, one is again confronted with the analytical choice of locating the intent of violence and the agency of those who found ways to survive. But just how "ordinary" are we comfortable with the concept of genocide becoming?

NOTES

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PART 3

IMAGINATION AND EMOTIONS

6

UTOPIAN IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR LIMITS

Private Lives in Wartime France: Desertion, Divorce, and Deprivation

RACHEL G. FUCHS

IT HAS BECOME A WELL-KNOWN CLICHÉ THAT PRIVATE LIFE GOES ON DURING wars; people get married, get divorced, give birth, and continue with the triumphs and tragedies of their daily lives—unless they are in the military; on the war front; in an active resistance movement; or just happen to be a member of one of the groups that the wartime powers round up, confine, and kill.

During the Second World War French men and women continued to divorce, contest child custody, file paternity suits, and commit adultery. They paid scant attention to political events around them, unless, of course, they were Jewish, and then they were only too painfully aware of events. Based on one of the keystones of social history—that everyday people make history—this chapter focuses on three family dramas that entered the judicial system during the occupation and Vichy years: one paternity suit; one of adultery, divorce, and disavowal of paternity; and one child custody case. These three were among the many in the archives of one Parisian law firm that litigated throughout the war.[1] Aside from comments about fuel shortages, difficulties in travel, or the consequences of being Jewish—quite serious in themselves—little distinguishes these cases from the many hundreds brought before the Tribunal Civil of Paris during the interwar period.[2] Since this work relies on judicial and legal records, it is important to note that despite wars and successive vicissitudes of government changes, the judiciary in civil cases survived without significant shifts in personnel or procedures. Regular magistrates could maintain some semblance of continuation because the Vichy regime established special courts to do the dirty work of that government. As during other eras, private lives and the public sphere intermingled, especially when those lives involved a civil

procedure. Throughout the war, families adapted, doing what they could in times of turmoil, even when they had to adjust from the traumas of one war to those of another.

The paternity suit that Jeanne Victoire and her son Henri Victoire brought against Henri Roget illustrates how war affected men's and women's behavior and their actions during both the First and Second World Wars. It started when a French soldier had an intimate relationship with a woman while he was deployed during the First World War and then deserted her. It also reveals how one man refused to do his "patriotic duty to the nation" by recognizing his son until the law and a judge forced him. This drama begins in January 1917, when Jeanne Victoire had a sexual relationship with a soldier, Henri Roget, quartered near her home near Neuchâtelin the Department of the Vosges, a wooded area near the Meuse River but away from the trenches and main fighting on the Western Front.[3] By April 1917 he was deployed elsewhere, and Jeanne realized she was pregnant. The ravages of war did not prevent him from writing fourteen letters to her between March 1917 and May 1918. She saved the letters and turned them over to her lawyer when her son, Henri, began his suit in 1939 to name Roget as his legal father, which would entitle him to an inheritance from him.

In the first letter, Roget wrote tenderly of the nights he and Jeanne had spent together "in your little room where we were so happy. . . . Each day I loved you more." After learning that she was pregnant, he was solicitous of her welfare. "You know well, my little Jeanette, that I will do all that is possible for you." In July he wrote: "I made you suffer my little Jeannette, and you respond with kindness; . . . My little treasure, you know that there was never a question of a future between us and you know that we would never marry, but bear in mind that I'm not heartless and I will never forget my little Jeannette. . . . You are always 'ma petite amie.'"

This quote indicates that he thought of her as his girlfriend for pleasure, for love, but not for marriage. His letters did not change significantly after Jeanne had a nine-pound boy on 4 November 1918, whom she named Henri, after Roget. Until the end of May 1918 Roget continued to write to her. He promised to help her out materially if she asked, but there is no evidence that he did so. Jeanne paid her sister and brother-in-law a monthly stipend to raise young Henri until he was thirteen.[4]

In 1939 Henri reached his majority (age eighteen); according to law this was his last chance to start a paternity suit. At that time Henri, fils, was deployed in the French navy. The legal proceedings lasted from 1939 through January 1945, a few years longer than similar suits had done before the war, in part because the son's lawyer was mobilized in March 1940, resulting in the transferral of the case to another lawyer; the battles within that region during 1944 added further delays. The war did not stop a paternity suit caused by sexual activity during the previous war. Although Jeanne Victoire lived in the Department of the Vosges, the paternity suit was brought in Paris because that is where Roget lived throughout the Second World War. Mail, and people, despite

the war and the occupation, traveled easily between Paris and the Vosges during the entire period. This area of the Vosges was not a part of Alsace that Germany annexed; it was a German area of settlement in what some have called the "reserved zone." The Victoires' lawyer based his argument on Roget's recognition of sexual relations during the probable time of conception and on Roget's promise of material support, although he had not explicitly acknowledged paternity. In 1943 the judge ruled that implicit written indications of paternity provided sufficient proof. Roget appealed and tried to supply proof of Jeanne Victoire's sexual immorality; she brought testimony that her only lover was Roget. In March 1944 the appeals judge agreed with the Civil Tribunal, declaring Henri Roget the father of Henri Victoire. Henri Victoire was henceforth Henri Victoire-Roget and could obtain a portion of Roget's inheritance, although the records are mum about how significant the inheritance was.

Immediately after this decision in 1944, Jeanne sued for damages to cover the 50,000 francs she had paid her sister for rearing Henri. However, the legal grounds for this type of suit were abuse of authority or fraudulent seduction based on false promises of marriage. The extant letters revealed that Roget had never promised marriage and that Jeanne willingly engaged in sexual relations with him. Her lawyer did not think she could win. After February 1945 the case apparently was dropped; the records are unclear, but that was the period of intense fighting in the Vosges, and it would be remarkable if any civil procedure continued during that time.

This dossier could be any one of hundreds of similar ones from the 1920s and 1930s.[5] It indicates that in terms of civil jurisprudence, Vichy was not an aberration but on a continuum from the Third Republic. Lawyers in 1942 and 1943 even used the letterhead of the defunct "République française" and invoked the jurisprudence of the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, there was no mention of the war, occupation, or government policy on any document in this dossier. In keeping with Third Republic jurisprudence as well as Vichy policy, the courts could order fathers to acknowledge paternity of their illegitimate children when they had deserted the mother and child and if there was sufficient proof of paternity, as in letters. The only effect of war in the two-inch-thick dossier is the billeting of a soldier near the civilian population and perhaps delays in the procedures because one attorney was called to serve from March through August 1940.[6] This aspect of daily life, no different from similar situations of the 1920s and 1930s, hardly evokes the terrors of war, except for what Jeanne Victoire experienced with a soldier billeted near her.

Continuities from one war to another and from the last three decades of the democratic Third Republic to the authoritarian Vichy regime and harsh German occupation outweigh the differences. War, whether the fighting took place on French soil with great loss of life in 1914–18 or warfare ended in six weeks in 1940, until the battles for liberation in 1944, disrupted many families' lives and created emotional and material

hardships for untold others. Nevertheless, despite wars, regime changes, and the political climate, men and women continued to marry, separate, divorce, have sexual relationships, and fight custody battles; they struggled to support their children emotionally and materially regardless of their circumstances. Most significantly, regime changes did not lead to major shifts in official ideologies concerning people's private lives. The emphasis on good parenting and the child's welfare prevailed despite the regime. Moreover, the Vichy government accepted the Third Republic's 1939 Code de la Famille (Family Code), which extolled women's primary roles as mothers and wives within the heterosexual conjugal family. Private lives, however, did not always conform to political ideologies, whatever the regime, nor did the regimes successfully enforce those ideologies.

The story of the Duprès family in the 1940s reveals some of the hardships of wartime shortages because Suzanne did not post her letters through the severely censored postal system, but hand delivered them. It also provides details of adultery, divorce, and denial of paternity during the Second World War.[7] Pierre and Suzanne Duprès married in 1934. He was a government employee working in the Paris region, and they soon had a son, Alain, born in 1935. In April 1939 Duprès was mobilized to nearby Tours, and in June 1939 his unit left the Indre-et-Loire for the Charente, on the western edge of France. He was demobilized at the end of July 1940. Suzanne had remained in their suburban Paris house and did not join her husband and the many hundreds of thousands in the exodus from Paris when the Germans invaded.

On 24 December 1940 Suzanne had another son, Daniel, conceived in April 1940. Doubting his paternity of this second son, Pierre Duprès moved out of his home with Suzanne soon after his demobilization. Louis LePont, Suzanne's lover, then moved in. During the remainder of the war, LePont and Suzanne lived on the ground floor and her parents on the first floor of their private house in a Parisian suburb. On 1 January 1942 Suzanne visited Pierre's Paris apartment, and not finding him home, she slipped a note under the door. She complained that he had promised to give her something each month for the care of their son, Alain. She wrote: "I know that I have acted badly, but what you have done is not much better. . . . If you don't want to see me, or if you want nothing more to do with me, I prefer that you take revenge on me rather than make 'mon petit' suffer. . . . I think of my little Alain." Three weeks later, Pierre wrote to her saying that he would not be responsible for paying the electricity for everyone living in her house. He added, "Your place is next to me and you should take it for your sake and that of the little ones. Believe me, it's your duty and it's in their interest. . . . Think of your little Alain. If you return, Suzette, be assured that I will forget all. But you must break completely with the past." Suzanne replied the next day saying that she was quite sick. In that letter and each subsequent one she mentioned her need for coal to heat the house and to cook: "I thank you a thousand times for the coal. You do us a great service because we no longer have any fire in the house. . . . Would it be possible to have a little

more?" She adds that she is still in turmoil. "I do not want to be separated from my little Alain. I love him as much as Danny and I don't see life without either one. This is too serious a decision for me to make right away. . . . It is only death that will separate me from either one of my children."

Her letters of January 1942 had a constant refrain: she asked for more coal and complained about traveling long distances and standing in long lines to obtain it. Food and fuel shortages were universal and serious problems in Paris under the occupation in January 1942 and did contribute to the terrortimes and terrorscapes of war, even more so during the winter of 1942–43 than during the previous year.[8] Her notes also reveal her self-torture about her decision not to return to Pierre:

> Sometimes I would like to go back to the past and erase all that has happened . . . . My heart refuses that, however. Pierre . . . do not take Alain, I beg you. You have asked me to return to you. Have you thought carefully of what would happen if I returned? Would you love me as before? I would like to make you happy, but for the moment it is not possible. . . . Please have a little patience and if my health gets better I will tell you frankly what I will do. Pierrot, if I become even sicker, you will come to see me won't you? I would not like to die without having seen you.

This is her last letter in the dossier, but she didn't die then.

In March 1942, Pierre Duprès began divorce proceedings, charging Suzanne and Louis LePont with adultery. Police came to her house early one morning, and LePont opened the door. Suzanne and LePont acknowledged that they were living together "maritally" and had a child together, Daniel, born in December 1940. A judgment of nonreconciliation issued in July 1942 was followed by the birth of a daughter to Suzanne, in January 1943. Suzanne's father filed the birth certificate reporting Duprès as the father because she was still technically married to him, and the law stipulated that the man married to the mother is the father of the child. The divorce was finalized on 7 July 1943 in favor of Pierre. Legal proceedings for Pierre Duprès's denial of paternity of Suzanne's son Daniel and her subsequent daughter then began.[9] Pierre brought written testimony that he was away from home during the legal period of conception and that he had had no contact with his wife. Suzanne did not contest the divorce or the disavowal of paternity, which became effective 24 May 1945. At that point Suzanne was not Suzanne Duprès but Suzanne LePont. Throughout the dossier of legal proceedings, no language existed condemning Suzanne for immorality or for not fulfilling her role as a "good mother," as Vichy propaganda demanded. The Vichy dictates of the National Revolution extolling women's virtue as good mothers and the patriarchal power of the father never appear in the documents. Only the omnipresent need for coal distinguished this story from prewar dramas. Moreover, although this case lasted

from 1940 to 1945, there is not a word about the violence of war, occupation, or liberation forces throughout this dossier—just the need for coal.

A different family drama demonstrates the terror of the occupation, the Vichy government, and the violence of war, because one person, Léon Kahan, was Jewish.[10] In 1927 Kahan married Arlette Ponelle, and they had two boys. In 1929 Arlette's brother, Jean-Pierre Ponelle, married Renée Chavet, and a year later they had a daughter, Doris. Jean-Pierre was a *couturier,* and Renée managed his business. The Kahan and Ponelle households were closely tied in terms of marriage, friendship, and residential proximity—so closely tied that Renée Ponelle and Léon Kahan fell in love. The Kahan couple divorced in 1937; Arlette Ponelle was granted custody of their two boys, and Léon Kahan paid a sizable sum in child support. Two years later the Ponelles divorced. The judge gave guardianship of Doris to Renée's mother, Mme LeBois, and both parents had visitation rights. Then at the beginning of 1940 Renée Ponelle married her former brother-in-law, Léon Kahan. But the war and occupation created a tumultuous marriage for Léon and Renée.

The anti-Jewish Statutes of October 1940 excluded Jews from positions of responsibility in government, teaching, and cultural life, but from winter 1940 to winter 1942 Jews were allowed to pay for exit visas and passports. Léon Kahan, who had been one of the directors of a large petrol company,[11] had the means to pay, and he became one of many Jews who fled the occupied areas for the south of France then perhaps to Algeria or Portugal, customary escape routes, and then to the United States.

Since the divorce in 1939 had Doris traversed the short distance between her mother's and grandmother's homes. Her father saw her on Sundays. In July 1940 he discovered that Doris and her grandmother had left Paris, as did so many thousands of other Parisians at that time who fled in fear and panic in face of the German invasion.[12] Ponelle was gratified to receive written word that they were safe at a resort in the Gironde. Then in April 1941 Léon Kahan wrote to his ex-wife, Arlette Ponelle, asking for custody of his boys so he could take them to Algiers. Arlette refused and warned Jean-Pierre that his ex-wife would soon take his daughter away. Arlette stated that the Kahans had already left for the so-called Free Zone and were headed for Algeria with Doris. In May 1941 Jean-Pierre Ponelle filed suit to obtain legal custody of Doris. He alleged that "because of certain questions of religion, M. Kahan left the Occupied Zone to go to the Free Zone with the goal of going to Africa if not America."

Renée Kahan (Doris's mother and Ponelle's ex-wife) did not want the custody case to go court, so her lawyer proposed that guardianship remain with Doris's maternal grandmother, with Jean-Pierre paying child support until Doris was eighteen. Renée Kahan's lawyer further stipulated that in case Renée left for Algeria, Doris should live in Paris with her father for six months of the year and in Algeria with her mother for the other six months. In the early summer of 1941 people in Paris did not suspect the nature or duration

of the war and accepted the situation as stable. Ponelle rejected this, and in August 1941 Renée Kahan brought a counter-suit demanding guardianship and custody of Doris.

That same month, however, August 1941, Mme LeBois had left Paris with Doris to spend two months in the mountains of Megève in the Free Zone under the orders of Doris's doctor in Paris.[13] Although it took several weeks, they crossed the Demarcation Line from the Occupied to the Free Zone despite severe restrictions on travel. Jean-Pierre Ponelle alleged that their departure was clandestine and sudden and there was no actual medical need. He stated that he could not get permission to cross the line to visit them.[14] Doris's first postcard to her father from the mountains indicated that her doctor in Paris had said that she was getting thinner and had a fever, so he recommended mountain air for a cure. In October 1941 Doris and *grandmaman* returned to Paris as promised, but maybe not as originally planned.

None of the letters mention the war or shortages, perhaps because of censorship. Doris's letters and postcards to her father discussed her health or the new dress that he had sent her; Mme LeBois wrote requesting more money for Doris's doctors' bills. Doris and her grandmother traveled throughout the war, although their travels were limited to Occupied France after that one visit across the Demarcation Line and back. They were among the few who had the money to go to spas and take cures during wartime.

Jean-Pierre Ponelle did not win his case for custody, despite the facts that he was Catholic and his ex-wife was now married to a Jew and that Ponelle's lawyer based his arguments on Ponelle's qualities "as a good father." Ponelle's lawyer further alleged that Kahan had "sacrificed" his two sons when he divorced. However, in a nonaccusatory argument, the lawyer acknowledged that although Kahan and Renée Ponelle had "sacrificed two homes, it had a moral *dénouement*; they married." Ponelle's reason for not contesting the divorce was that Kahan had "more money in this battle." His lawyer added that "he was beaten by the money of his brother-in-law." If there was antisemitism, it was coded, as in use of the word *sacrifice* and references to Kahan's money. Ponelle's lawyer based his arguments for custody on the same criteria that lawyers had used before and after 1940: evidence that the father had acted "*en qualité de père,*" had participated "materially and emotionally" in rearing the child, and had provided proof of good fatherhood. Ponelle had not only paid a monthly pension for Doris's care, he also had paid for medicines, vacations, and presents for her; moreover, he had spent Sundays with her when they were both in Paris. Renée Kahan's countersuit focused on Ponelle's immorality and on Doris's best interests. In 1940 and 1941 Ponelle was living with a mistress, who was one of his models. He married her in 1942, shortly before the case went to court. The judge denied both the mother's and father's arguments for custody. Instead, he ruled that since Doris's grandmother had raised her for nine years it was in Doris's best interest to remain with her. Questions of the child's best interest and of marital morality trumped a Jewish connection, even in occupied Paris during the Second World War.

Neither Léon Kahan nor his two boys were among the eleven thousand French children killed in Nazi extermination camps or among the more than seventy-five thousand French killed during the Holocaust.[15] His two boys were not technically Jewish by the October 1940 Vichy decree on the status of Jews.[16] Léon Kahan disappears from the historical records in 1940 but reappears in 1944 in Washington, D.C., as a leading member of the Jean Monnet Commission on postwar economic reconstruction, representing the industries of fuel and oil refineries, still having close ties as an executive in the same petrol company that had employed him since 1929, shortly after he received his degree from the Ecole Polytechnique.[17] He returned to Paris upon the city's liberation at the end of August 1944. Kahan remained with that petrol company, becoming a high-ranking official there until his resignation in 1963. He died in Paris at the age of eighty in 1984; his wife and sons were at his funeral. In no extant account of Kahan's life is there any word of his whereabouts during the years between 1940 and 1944. People like Kahan travel down the memory lane of silence, refusing to speak of those terrible events of the war and the Shoah. Others follow the other memory lane to talk about the terror and keep it in historical memory.

Serge Klarsfeld is one person who helps the world remember. Taking just one example from the many thousands of French Jewish children who were killed during the Shoah, Suzanne and Alice Geiger, who had lived on rue de Tournelles, ended up on Convoy 63 headed from Drancy to their death in Auschwitz on 17 December 1943 at the ages of twelve and fourteen. Two-thirds of the children in that convoy were seized from their hiding places in the countryside, some of whom the Union générale des Israélites de France (UGIF) had originally sheltered.[18] In the terrorscapes of the terrortimes of the Second World War, many did not find shelter for long, while others could escape some of the violence of war.

CONCLUSION

Evidence from these bourgeois Parisian family dramas indicates that except for Léon Kahan, the war, Vichy policies, and rhetoric had little influence on how everyday people lived their intimate lives. Nevertheless, life during wartime was difficult. Although almost no one in these case histories of private lives mentioned a need for food, even a cursory examination of rationing during the war indicates how severely limited people's diet was. Moreover, historians point out how the black market served as a critical survival strategy in the Parisian wartime economy.[19] Only Suzanne Duprès commented on the dearth of food and fuel and how important she found her little garden. Problems of provisions were not apparent in part because of heavy censorship, with only Suzanne Duprès's hand-delivered notes escaping the censors. Furthermore, the

people in these stories were among the most economically well-to-do, such as the Duprèses, the Ponelles, and the Kahans. Jeanne Victoire, whose condition was more humble, lived in a relatively rural area of the Department of the Vosges with other food and fuel sources. Equally important, food did not loom large because the correspondence provides only a snapshot of life relevant to the particular case of family law. Negotiating paternity and precarious marriages was more crucial, at least in the lawyer's files. For Léon Kahan, however, his religion was of overriding importance during these times of terror.

On the surface, there is little to distinguish family survival strategies during the war years from those during the interwar Third Republic. Family strategies were driven by an interaction of social forces as well as people's emotional bonds. Women relied on their families for help in rearing their children: Suzanne Duprès on her father, Renée Ponelle Kahan on her mother, and Jeanne Victoire on her sister and brother-in-law.

Adultery and divorce continued despite the patriarchal pro-family Vichy government's rhetoric. Before and during Vichy, adultery, excessive cruelty, or failure to fulfill the duties and obligations of the marriage were major grounds for divorce, and catching one's wife living with another man *en flagrant délit* was required for disavowal of children born within marriage. Although Vichy ideology viewed adultery as a "social danger" and sought to regulate women's sexual behavior, even Pierre Duprès's lawyer did not castigate Suzanne. Nor did anyone criticize Jeanne Victoire for having an ex-nuptial child either during the earlier war or in following decades; criticism of Renée Kahan was ambivalent. In these three cases, emblematic of dozens more, there was a disjuncture between Vichy discourse and people's daily family lives.[20] Vichy rhetoric declared that women were to be *femmes de foyer:* pious, good mothers, loving their children, rearing them well, and maintaining a good home. But in Vichy, just as in the preceding decades, how these women lived their lives contradicted prevailing political ideology. On the one hand, these women were not ideal *femmes de foyer*; on the other hand, they were good mothers. Suzanne Duprès may have been one of many bourgeois women outside the metaphorical surveillance cameras that Vichy rhetoric established to control illicit female activity. Although she committed adultery and refused her legally married husband's enjoinders to fulfill her duty and live by his side, her correspondence always expressed love for all her children. Only Pierre Duprès's letters contain Vichy rhetoric of wifely duty. Despite her adultery and lack of the regime-dictated obedience and submission to her husband, she fulfilled her role as a good mother.[21] Moreover, she married the father of her last two children. Renée Kahan, despite her adultery, divorce, and marriage to a Jew, was not a so-called bad mother. She relinquished going to Algiers so she could remain close to her daughter. During Vichy, ideal families were strong, glorifying fatherhood and motherhood. In these dramas the women remained good mothers and gave new definitions to a functioning family.

Tensions and contradictions abounded between family lives and political discourse. The National Revolution extolled a patriarchal *père de famille.*[22] Yet among the tensions and contradictions between policy and people's lives, paternity was problematic. People lived their personal lives within a dominant discourse but also within the social and cultural mores of their own communities. In these three civil cases, Vichy rhetoric of the National Revolution had little, or no, evident effect on intimate lives. None of the fathers was a strong patriarch or *chef de famille*.[23] The courts ruled against two of them, denying one custody despite the evidence that he was a good father and forcing a deserting father to acknowledge paternity because he had once promised material support. Vichy ideology granted fathers the superior position in the family hierarchy, but the Parisian courts did not always concur. Judges in civil cases did not necessarily buy into the Vichy rhetoric. Protection of children was the guiding principle in these cases, overriding religion and the gender discourse of Vichy.[24] This is not to imply anything good about the occupation and Vichy, only that some bourgeois Parisians lived outside the wartime restrictions. Unless they were Jewish, they could escape the violence of war.

NOTES

1. The portion of this chapter dealing with the Kahan case previously appeared in the *Pacific Historical Review*, 79, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–22. I thank the editors and the University of California Press for permission to reprint portions. I also wish to thank Volker Benkert and Michael Mayer for inviting me to their exciting conference in Tutzing and requesting this chapter.

   The Parisian law firm of Leveillé-Nizerolles deposited their records from the 1920s through the early 1950s at the Archives de Paris, where they form part of the fonds Mermet. After receiving a *dérogation* I obtained access to them. From roughly one hundred dossiers that I examined for the period from 1924 to 1950, I selected these three for this chapter because of their variety and because they contained more personal letters than others for this time period. Archives de Paris, fonds Mermet, VRAC VL10 A/21/8/Mermet/89/1/8, dossiers 22510, 22926, and 23514, are listed here in the order discussed in the chapter. These cases are derived from a segment of one chapter of my book *Contested Paternity: Constructing Families in Modern France* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). As part of my agreement to obtain permission to see documents, I agreed not to reveal the true names. Therefore, the names are fictitious. Despite historians' best efforts, the history of the war years is full of mysteries, with lots of lacunae in the historical record, especially concerning daily lies.
2. For my book *Contested Paternity* I analyzed more than 500 *jugements* concerning divorce, *recherche de paternité*, and *désaveu de paternité* from the Tribunal Civil of Paris, 1880–1940.

3. "Victoire-Roget Case," D10 J34, liasse 816, dossier 22510.. All details provided here come from this dossier.
4. Because Jeanne had repeated surgeries after the birth of Henri and was physically weak, she could not file a paternity suit within the two-year limit of the 1912 law, which was in effect throughout the twentieth century.
5. For example, "Tribunal Civil, Assistance judiciaire January 1–8, 1920, Decision of January 3, 1920," file D1U5 AJ (287); and "Tribunal Civil, Assistance judiciaire January 18–31, 1923, Case #1940 of 1921, Judgment of January 18, 1923," file D1U5 AJ (370). See also "Tribunal Civil, Assistance judiciaire July 1–10, 1930, Case January 1928, Judgment of July 1, 1930; D1U5 AJ (550) May 1–14, 1931, Case #5112 of 1928. Judgment of May 12, 1931," file D1U5 AJ (530); and "Tribunal Civil, Assistance judiciaire March 9–17, 1937, Case #2495 of 1934, Decision of March 12, 1937," file D1U5 AJ (710).
6. Legal delays were common throughout the war, as these and numerous other cases attest. In one adoption case begun at the end of 1939 and culminating in 1943, the lawyer apologized because he was at the "front" and "because of the war the cases (*affaires*) do not go as quickly as during ordinary times." There is no mention of politics or the hardships of occupation or war in this case, just as it is absent in most others. See "Case of Lacoudre-Venet Adoption," file 8.Mermet.89.1.29.
7. Archives de Paris, file D10 J32, liasse 811, dossier 23514.
8. The winter of 1942 was especially severe, with food and fuel shortages stemming in large part from the blockade after the Allied victory in North Africa during Operation Torch in November 1942 and German confiscation of French livestock, grain, and other foodstuffs that winter. Rationing was severe. On rationing see Direction de la statistique générale, Auteur du texte, and Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (France), "Bulletin De La Statistique Générale De La France," Gallica, November 1, 1942, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6269374g/f19.item.r=.zoom; and INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques [France]), *Bulletin de la Statistique générale de la France* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1942). For evidence of the severely cold winter see "Hiver 1942." Metro Paris. http://www.meteo-paris.com/france/hiver-1942.html.
9. According to law, any child born into a marriage was legally the husband's. He was responsible for the child's education and for providing the child with a legal status and inheritance. He could only deny paternity by going to court and proving his wife's infidelity.
10. Archives Paris, file D10 J32, liasse 783. All information in the Kahan-Ponelle case comes from dossier 22926.
11. This international petrol company has the reputation of collaborating with the Nazis. Whether the French branch of this company did anything to save its high-ranking French Jewish employees is unknown.
12. For the context of daily life in France during the war years see Dominique Veillon, *Vivre*

et Survivre en France, 1939–1947 (Paris: Payot, 1995).

13. Megève in the Haute Savoie is 70 kilometers from Geneva and about 80 kilometers from the Italian border. Now a ski resort, it served as a sanctuary for many Jews fleeing France after 1940, and especially after German occupation of the entire country in November 1942. It is entirely possible Doris, her mother, and her grandmother might have hoped to leave France and join Kahan there, possibly en route to Algeria or the United States.
14. The only way they could get across the demarcation line was with a doctor's certificate for a *maladie grave*. Even for a temporary *laissez-passer* such as Doris had, people had to wait in long lines to get the authorization to pass the boundary. Veillon, *Vivre et Survivre*, 83–85.
15. The best printed source for lists of French children sent to extermination camps and then killed by the Nazis is Serge Klarsfeld, *French Children of the Holocaust: A Memorial* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).
16. Act of October 3, 1940, on the Status of Jews. Printed in the *Journal official,* October 18, 1940, readily found on many websites. Article 1: Any person with three grandparents of Jewish race or two grandparents of that race if their spouse is Jewish is regarded as Jewish. Kahan's two boys had only two Jewish grandparents.
17. Philippe Mioche, *Le Plan Monnet: Genèse et élaboration, 1941–1947* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987), 261; and Philip Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 157. I was able to locate Kahan after the war and can complete the story of his life, except for the critical years 1940– 944.
18. Klarsfeld, *French Children of the Holocaust*, 309, 410. These children had lived in the building in which I rented an apartment in 2014. That building had front and back stairways, and one apartment up the back stairway had a top room where one might hide from the Gestapo and *milice*.
19. On rationing, see, for example, INSEE, *Bulletin de la Statistique générale de la France*. Historian Kenneth Mouré has provided clear evidence and analysis of the dearth of foodstuffs and the critical role of the black market. Kenneth Mouré, "*La capitale de la Faim*: Black Market Restaurants in Paris, 1940–1944," *French Historical Studies* 38, no. 2 (April 2015): 281–341; Mouré, "Food Rationing and the Black Market in France (1940–1944)," *French History* 24, no. 2 (2010): 262–82; and Mouré and Paula Schwartz, "*On Vit Mal*: Food Shortages and Popular Culture in Occupied France, 1940–1944," *Food, Culture and Society* 10, no. 2 (2007): 261–95.
20. Miranda Pollard wrote: "Appropriating and regulating sexuality was at the heart of Vichy's politics." Miranda Pollard, *Reign of Virtue: Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 56.

21. The records are mute on whether she lost her older son, Alain, in the divorce. The divorce was decreed in Pierre Duprès's favor, but that meant that he did not have to pay his ex-wife anything. In similar divorce cases, even though the decision was in the man's favor, he did not always obtain custody. Often a grandmother or aunt would have custody, with legal guardianship going to the father if the judge considered the mother immoral.
22. For a discussion of Vichy rhetoric and fatherhood see Kristen Stromberg Childers, *Fathers, Families, and the State in France, 1914–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
23. A revision to article 213 of the Code Civil proclaimed that the "father is the *chef de famille*."
24. This has been most ably discussed by Miranda Pollard (in *Reign of Virtue*) and by Francine Muel-Dreyfus, *Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender*, trans. Kathleen A. Johnson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

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7

EMOTION, HOPE, FEAR, AND BELONGING

Soviet Wartime Jazz: Propaganda and Popular Culture on the Eastern Front

BENJAMIN BERESFORD

INTRODUCTION

In the opening scene of the 1942 Soviet film *Concert for the Front* (*Kontsert frontu*), a small cluster of Soviet soldiers celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution deep in a bunker while Germans shell their position. The soldiers talk about how they used to celebrate the holiday before the war, with parades and concerts. Suddenly one of the soldiers proposes a brilliant idea: a jubilee concert featuring their favorite performers that could be filmed and sent to units across the front so that soldiers and sailors could celebrate the revolution's silver anniversary the way they would have in peacetime. Excitedly, the soldiers begin to put together a list of performers they want to see in this concert film, and almost immediately they shout in unison, "Utesov! Utesov!," referring to jazz singer and bandleader Leonid Utesov. They add the names of other performers like folk singer Lidia Ruslanova, tenor Ivan Kozlovskii, and the Red Army Ensemble and send the list off to Moscow. The rest of the film is the resulting concert and a veritable who's who of Soviet entertainment from the Stalin period; it features poetry recitals and a ballet routine and concludes with a performance by Utesov and his jazz orchestra.

This opening vignette, along with the rest of *Concert for the Front*, is informative in illustrating the push and pull of wartime culture, including jazz, on the Eastern Front. The film was created and produced in Moscow in order to mobilize Red Army soldiers to keep up the fight against Germany. From this perspective, the film is an example of propaganda, which Karel Berkhoff defines as "a deliberate and systematic attempt to

shape perceptions, mental states, and, above all, behavior, so as to achieve a response that furthers the propagandist's intent." In essence, propaganda is the means by which an institution convinces a group of people to do what it wants them to, while granting them some amount of personal autonomy in deciding to do so.[1]

At the same time, the Soviet leadership did not force these performers upon audiences against their will. Luminaries like Utesov, the clown Karandash, and singer Klavdiia Shul'zhenko were already established and popular entertainers well before the German invasion of 1941. Since propaganda is powerless if audiences do not engage with it, it would have been pointless to make a musical film starring personalities nobody wanted to see or hear. From this perspective, the film is as much a reflection of popular taste as it is state propaganda. The question, then, is whether wartime culture, jazz music in particular, is predominantly state propaganda or popular sentiment.

While many recent histories of wartime Soviet mass culture emphasize the role of cultural and political elites in shaping it, a more flexible framework is possible. David MacFadyen argues that "sometimes Soviet song runs parallel with politics for a while and is happy to do so, but it then moves off on another tangent to embrace other phenomena."[2] Not all Soviet audiences were political all the time, and for many, he argues, everyday life was rarely political. Therefore, the music they embraced resonated beyond ideology.[3] This can clearly be seen in Soviet jazz both before and after the war. Before the war, musicians, critics, bureaucrats, and audiences debated whether jazz was sufficiently "cultured" or "proletarian" to contribute to the creation of the New Soviet Man.[4] In the years immediately after the Allied victory, debate swirled about whether jazz, even jazz that incorporated Soviet ideological and musical themes, was anything more than a Trojan horse for American influence.[5] During the terrortime of 1941–45 however, in which Soviet citizens endured invasion, occupation, starvation, and a host of other hardships, a greater unity of purpose in defeating the fascists emerged, and the scale of the debate over jazz diminished to the point of almost total absence. Jazz during this period was employed to conquer fear, harness hope, and cultivate belonging within the larger Soviet community.

With this understanding in mind, I argue that Soviet jazz music during the Great Patriotic War was simultaneously propaganda and popular. The ways that jazz groups formed and functioned were rooted in both the needs of the Soviet state and audience tastes. In the same way, some jazz songs evoked narratives akin to those projected in other state-managed media—narratives about the motherland (*rodina*) and Russia, and about heroism—while others tapped into ideas and emotions marginal to or absent from these narratives, including highly localized understandings of patriotism, the humanity of soldiers, and expressions of friendship with the Allies.

SOVIET JAZZ AND PROPAGANDA

There are many ways that wartime jazz can be construed as an extension of state propaganda. First, by 1941 Soviet jazz had already developed a close relationship with the Soviet military. One of the first amateur jazz competitions held in the Soviet Union occurred at the Leningrad House of the Red Army (Dom Krasnoi armii or DKA) in 1934 and featured ensembles made up of sailors from the Baltic Fleet.[6] The Central House (TsDKA) in Moscow was a major venue for jazz throughout the 1930s as well. African American singer Celestine Cole debuted there, and bandleaders like Aleksandr Varlamov and Aleksandr Tsfasman performed there to great acclaim.[7]

The jazz performer who had the best relationship with the Soviet military was Leonid Utesov. Utesov performed at TsDKA many times during the prewar years. More significantly, Utesov and his band developed a close relationship with the Red Army leadership. Arkady Kotliarskii, Utesov's longtime tenor saxophonist, recalled that the group performed repeatedly for the army's "top brass" (*bol'shoe nachal'stvo*) and for the Revolutionary Military Council (akin to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) in 1936.[8] So close was the relationship between Utesov's orchestra and the Red Army that *prior* to the outbreak of hostilities in 1941, Utesov offered his orchestra's services to the Red Army in the event that war should break out.[9]

When war finally did break out, many jazz groups followed Utesov's lead and put themselves at the military's disposal. Bigger state-sponsored orchestras like Aleksandr Tsfasman's All-Union Radio Committee Jazz Orchestra and Eddie Rosner's Belarussian State Jazz Orchestra toured the country, performing for soldiers at the front, for civilians in theaters and factories, and for radio audiences as well. Other jazz groups, like that led by singer Klavdiia Shul'zhenko and her husband Vladimir Koralli, enlisted en masse and became official military bands. Nikolai Minkh and his Leningrad Radio Orchestra, for example, became the official jazz orchestra of the Baltic Fleet. Individual jazz musicians like Iakov Skomorovskii left their orchestras entirely. Performing in Rostov-on-Don when war broke out, Skomorovskii abandoned his orchestra and traveled to Leningrad to take the helm of the Red Navy jazz ensemble.[10]

Regardless of where and how these groups operated, they and their music were put under state supervision. No song could be published, recorded, or included in repertoires (at least for groups that formally toured the front) without the explicit approval of Glavlit, the state censorship agency.[11] Therefore, no matter how much a song may have catered to soldier or civilian tastes, it had to, first and foremost, conform to those of the state. On the road, the ideological purity of touring jazz groups was further ensured through the constant presence of *politruki* (political commissars). *Politruki* traveled with the groups, liaised with individual military units, and made sure there were

no inappropriate performances. Divisional and local party cell *politruki* also helped to organize visits from touring artists to both military and civilian locations.[12]

Though this discussion shows the control that the state had over jazz during the war, there is plenty to suggest that wartime jazz was more an expression of popular demand than an arm of the Soviet propaganda machine. For one thing, "western entertainment music" (*zapadnaia razvlekatel'naia muzyka*), of which jazz was a component, constituted a small minority of the media that Soviet listeners could hear on the radio. According to an All-Union Radio Committee report, such music made up only 6 percent of all music broadcast in 1943.[13] Because the committee was responsible for all media broadcast over Soviet airwaves, it had the final say about what would be broadcast. If the committee, as an arm of the state, had had more faith in jazz's potential as a mobilizing force, the genre would have received a greater share of precious airtime. There were also some who thought jazz had no place in Soviet wartime culture. *Literatura i iskusstvo*, the main cultural newspaper to run throughout the war, criticized jazz bands for their "hellish noisemaking" and for playing "cheap imports," the implication being that jazz was not sufficiently cultured to boost morale.[14]

Despite criticism and limited exposure on the radio, jazz artists put their own lives at risk in order to serve soldiers on the front lines. The Central Committee of Rabis, the art workers' union, declared that "wherever parts of our Red Army and Navy are located, art workers will share life on the front with them," and many jazz musicians joined the thousands of other art workers who responded to the call either by enlisting themselves, forming artistic "brigades" and embedding themselves within frontline divisions, or touring the front.[15] David MacFadyen estimates that by the end of 1941, there were four thousand such groups entertaining soldiers and that over the course of the war forty-two thousand artists went to the front and performed an estimated 500,000 concerts (out of a total 1.3 million wartime concerts).[16]

Jazz groups at the front, even those who were state sponsored, tailored their programs to audience tastes. Utesov and Shul'zhenko separately recalled that when it came to determining what songs to perform during frontline tours, taking soldier attitudes and mindsets into account was of the utmost importance.[17]

The prevalence of amateur jazz ensembles within military units is further evidence of jazz's popularity. Unknown numbers of amateur and professional jazz musicians left their groups and enlisted as individuals, and many of them quickly formed new groups. Minkh recalled that during the war "there was a great majority of jazz orchestras. Almost every army, almost every flotilla had a jazz orchestra—in the North, the Black Sea, the Caspian, the Baltic, all the way to the Pacific Ocean."[18] Another jazz musician, Boris Krupyshev, said that his division alone boasted up to three hundred musicians involved in all kinds of amateur ensembles, alternately playing music and fighting (and dying).[19] Utesov received fan mail from several of these amateur military

jazz ensembles, many of them asking for song lyrics or notes and thanking him for his music.[20]

The overlap of and disconnect between propaganda and populism in wartime jazz comes through not only in the ways that jazz ensembles functioned but also in the themes that their songs evoked. Karel Berkhoff argues that Soviet wartime propaganda articulated a number of specific narratives.[21] Some of these narratives were present in jazz songs, the most frequent being patriotism, heroism, and the Soviet relationship with the Allies. However, while these themes persisted in Soviet jazz, some songs occasionally extended beyond standardized narratives or were reinterpreted by musicians and audiences.

When asked what drove them to continue fighting against Germany, many Soviet veterans respond that they were driven by patriotism.[22] The question of what exactly constituted "patriotism" during the Great Patriotic War is still debated by historians. David Brandenberger argues that during the war, patriotism was intimately linked to Russian national identity. Wartime mass culture, including plays, literature, and other forms of culture, largely abandoned inter- or multinationalism in favor of a focus on Russian folk heroes, Russian culture, and Russian military traditions (intriguingly, Brandenberger does not include music in his analysis). While he admits that recognition of non-Russian nationalities persisted, it lacked the prominence or staying power of Russian equivalents.[23] Berkhoff complements Brandenberger's thesis by showing how wartime propaganda was overwhelmingly "Russocentric" while still being couched in the sufficiently vague language of the "motherland" (*rodina*).[24]

Other scholars challenge such notions. Both Roger Reese and Catherine Merridale, who conducted extensive interviews with veterans and others who lived through the war, argue that for most soldiers and civilians, *patriotism* was an extremely flexible term. While some veterans did equate patriotism with the Soviet Union or Russia, others equated it with "home village, family, language, and even . . . peasant religion."[25] Some cared deeply about the "motherland," while others rejected the concept outright in favor of more knowable and intimate things like family and hometown.[26] As Merridale summarizes, "patriotism . . . was a shorthand for a range of sentiments that ideological leaders might not have recognized. . . . 'Our' people and 'our' country did not have to mean Stalin's empire, or even, for millions, Russia itself."[27]

Some jazz repertoires, to some degree, corroborate Berkhoff's Russocentrism thesis. Utesov recalled that one of his most popular wartime concert repertoires was "Warrior Fantasy" (*bogatyrskaia fantaziia*), a largely historical program that featured songs about the Russian soldier throughout history. Utesov's group performed jazz interpretations of songs about the Battle of Poltava and Generals Suvorov and Kutuzov, heroes of the Napoleonic wars.[28] One division commander told Utesov that this program reminded him that "we are Russian soldiers, custodians of the great ancient (*drevnego*) armies."

A captain's review of the show in a frontline newspaper praised the show's ability to "revive for audiences the glorious path of Russian arms."[29]

Another Utesov hit from 1942, "Baron fon der Pshik," like Ilia Ehrenburg's articles in *Pravda* and *Red Star*, promoted the idea of Russian-Jewish friendship through its combination of lyrics and music.[30] "Baron von der Pshik" tells of a haughty German baron rapidly approaching Stalingrad only to be repelled (and killed) by "Russian" bayonets as opposed to Soviet ones. What is more, the song's melody is derived note for note from Sholem Secunda's Yiddish-language hit song "Bei mir bist du schein."[31] The combination of Russocentric lyrics with a Yiddish melody accentuated the supposed friendship between Russians and Jews in the Soviet Union.

The flexible and multifaceted patriotism that Merridale and Reese describe comes through in many jazz songs as well. For those soldiers who thought of their homes and families as the "motherland," there was a whole subset of songs devoted to the relationship between soldiers and the (invariably female) loved ones they had left behind. One of the earliest songs in this vein was "Wait for Me" (*Zhdi menia*). Written by M. Blanter and K. Simonov and performed by several jazz groups, the song is written from the perspective of a soldier telling his love interest to patiently await his return even though "letters may not come." The song even suggests that by remaining true, the loved one left behind will help the soldier survive.

The most famous example of this type of "patriotic" song is Klavdiia Shul'zhenko's rendition of "Blue Kerchief" (*Sinii platochek*), which she performed in *Concert for the Front* and which was arguably the biggest hit of the war. Though Shul'zhenko is the song's most well-known interpreter, it was originally composed by Iurii Petersburgskii for his own jazz orchestra before the war.[32] In Petersburgskii's relatively uninteresting version the blue kerchief is a sentimental image of a relationship amid the changing seasons. However, in 1942 Mikhail Maksimov, a soldier, wrote new lyrics and gave them to Shul'zhenko. Maksimov reimagined the blue kerchief as a symbol of the bond between a husband and wife who are separated by the war.[33] Shul'zhenko preferred the new lyrics and incorporated them into her repertoire, proof that, within certain limits, artists could represent audience sentiment as much as state narrative.

"Blue Kerchief" resonated with Soviet audiences throughout the war. K. Adezhemov, who worked for the All-Union Radio station in Moscow during the war, recalled that the song was particularly popular among listeners, and Shul'zhenko's jazz orchestra featured in the celebratory radio program that aired after the battle of Stalingrad.[34] According to MacFadyen, soldiers and pilots went into battle with literal or metaphorical "blue kerchiefs" that represented their own loved ones. One was rumored to have charged into battle shouting "For the Blue Kerchief!" instead of the prescribed "For the Motherland! For Stalin!"[35] The song resonated on the home front as well. When Shul'zhenko and her group went into the studio to record "Blue Kerchief,"

they had to scrap the first recording because the engineer's tears fell on the wax recording disc.[36] Though the song lacks any explicit reference to Russia or the motherland, it evoked powerful images of what many soldiers considered to be their own "little motherlands."

Not only songs about loved ones and family but also those that referenced highly localized geography can be considered patriotic. Rather than sing about the Soviet Union broadly, some jazz artists depicted specific locations. There were, of course, songs about heroic cities like Leningrad and Moscow, but the most impactful jazz song in this vein was "Mishka from Odessa" (*Odessit-Mishka*). Performed by Leonid Utesov, himself a native Odessan, the song is a sailor's mournful lament about the fall of his beloved hometown. In the song a sailor in the Black Sea Fleet reminisces about his home city of Odessa, now occupied by the Germans. He recalls the beauty of its streets and trees and memories of his family. In the chorus, Mishka remembers the words of his mother: "You, Mishka, are an Odessan, which means you do not fear trouble or sorrow / You know that you are a sailor, Mishka, which means that you don't cry or lose good spirit." This refrain changes subtly in the final stanza when instead Utesov sings "Though you are a sailor, Mishka, and a sailor never cries, you can cry a little bit, truly without trouble."

"Mishka From Odessa" was arguably Utesov's biggest wartime hit. He began performing the song in June 1942, and within the first month he received well over two hundred letters from fans praising the song.[37] Not surprisingly, Odessans particularly liked the song, but for other listeners, Odessa could stand in for other hometowns captured by the Germans. One boy wrote to Utesov to say that the song reminded him of his hometown of Sevastopol and of his father, who "probably" died defending the city.[38]

In this sense, "Mishka from Odessa" and other songs like it are examples of what Mayhill Fowler calls "internal transnationalism," in which local cultures on the Soviet "periphery" are brought to Moscow and then disseminated broadly and appropriated on a national scale.[39] That songs about Odessa, Crimea, and the Black Sea region, of which "Mishka from Odessa" is the most famous, were transmitted nationally during the war and reinterpreted by audiences may help to explain why many Russians consider these regions to be integral to Russian national identity to this day.

Another popular trope in wartime Soviet propaganda was the war hero. The prominence of individual heroes in the Soviet press was partially a default decision. Josef Stalin's staunch refusal to publish any information that might aid the enemy or invoke panic (even if not doing so angered civilians or put their lives at risk) meant that Soviet journalists could write very little about events on the front. Instead, they were encouraged to highlight the great deeds of individuals as a means of keeping up the fighting spirit and encouraging new recruits to join the military.[40] To be considered heroes for the purposes of propaganda, soldiers had to fulfill certain criteria. They had to

be "capable, staunch, obedient, courageous, smart, and 'full of hate' for the Germans." It was also preferred that they had committed a great selfless act of heroism for their comrades.[41]

Soviet jazz also painted a picture of the heroic Soviet soldier, but the heroes of song were more generic and transparently fictional. Some songs depicted heroic individuals like Aleksandr Tsfasman's "Two Maxims" (*Dva Maksima*), which tells of a machine gunner named Maxim ("Maxim" referring to both the male name and the maxim gun) who dutifully fights the Germans and if injured, returns to the fight with industrial-like reliability. Other songs glorified groups of soldiers or branches of the military. Nikolai Minkh's "Migratory Birds" (*Pereletnyi ptitsy*), for instance, is about a group of fighter pilots who are so devoted to winning the war that they swear not to fall in love until victory has been achieved. In his "Song of the War Correspondents" (*Pesenka voennykh korrespondentov*), Utesov toasts military correspondents and praises their diligence and courage on the front lines alongside regular soldiers.

Despite the prevalence of female combatants, Soviet hero propaganda was overwhelmingly masculine, and jazz followed this trend. Being reminded of women in combat was off-putting for many and only reinforced the notion that the prewar days were gone. Shul'zhenko initially wore military fatigues during her performances but was told that soldiers did not like being reminded of this aspect of the war and, from late 1941 onward, she performed exclusively in civilian clothing.[42] Heroic jazz was also sung from a masculine perspective. The only songs from a female perspective were those about waiting at home for a loved one to return from the front. At the amateur level, however, female voices could be heard. For example, Utesov received a letter from two female soldiers that contained the lyrics to two songs they had written about women on the front. They asked if he would add the songs to his repertoire, but there is no evidence that he did, and it is not likely that he would have done so.[43]

For every song about the heroism of soldiers, there were others that depicted their humanity. "Mishka from Odessa" depicted a sailor who was mournful and sensitive as opposed to proud, obedient, or courageous. One of the most popular songs in this vein was Shul'zhenko's rendition of "Let's Have a Smoke" (*Davai zakurim*). The song depicts two soldiers on the Southwestern Front in Ukraine who reflect on how they will remember their experiences after the war. In the chorus one soldier says to the other, "About the firelights / about our comrades / somewhere, someday we will talk / I will remember the infantry and my native company / And you, because you gave me a cigarette / Let's have a smoke, one comrade with another / Let's have a smoke my comrade." The song's message of comradeship on the front and the bonds that formed between soldiers was a major motivation for Red Army soldiers to keep fighting but was less prevalent in propaganda.[44]

A third propaganda narrative complicated by Soviet jazz was the somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the Western Allies. When characterizing the extent to which the Soviet leadership or media acknowledged the Allies, Berkhoff describes it as "real but faint."[45] While the anti-American/British sentiment of pre-1941 disappeared, the media were reticent in their acknowledgment of Allied successes or contributions to the war effort, and any references to "friendship" between the USSR and its allies were discouraged.[46]

If this was indeed the case, the growth of American and British cultural influences in the Soviet Union during this same time must have frustrated authorities. During the later war years, the Soviet Union experienced an influx of films and music not seen since the late 1920s. The stream of American films that flooded Soviet cinemas under the New Economic Policy had all but dried up by the mid-1930s. Now, Soviet audiences were treated to new foreign films. An American version of *The Three Musketeers* (likely the 1939 musical version starring Don Amece and the Ritz Brothers) hit the screen, and the George Formby vehicle *Let George Do It!*, about a bumbling ukulele player turned British spy, was retitled *George of the Dinky Jazz [Orchestra]* (*Dzhordzh iz dinki dzhaza*) for Soviet audiences.

With American and British films came the latest jazz music, and Soviet musicians were quick to incorporate this music into their repertoires. Emil Gegner, one of Aleksandr Tsfasman's bandmates, recalled seeing the 1941 American film *Sun Valley Serenade*, a musical comedy that prominently featured the music of (and live performances by) Glenn Miller. Gegner described Miller's songs, which included "Chattanooga Choo-Choo" and "In the Mood," as unlike any other jazz they had heard during the war. He made a bootleg recording of the film's soundtrack and gave it to Tsfasman in order incorporate it into their repertoire. Gegner stated that from that point until the end of the war, the band performed "Chattanooga Choo-Choo" every week during their radio performances.[47] Utesov also appropriated music from these films, receiving praise for his 1943 rendition of an unknown song from *The Three Musketeers*.[48]

Jazz groups also expressed comradeship with the Allies in their own compositions. Utesov and his daughter Edit recorded a bilingual version of the American composition "On a Wing and a Prayer" with both Russian and English lyrics that was well received by Soviet audiences.[49] Minkh expressed similar sentiments in his own composition "James Kennedy" (*Dzheims Kennedi*), about a British sea captain who is awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" for delivering vital goods to the USSR, all while shooting down German planes and sinking German U-boats. The existence of such songs and the fact that they were recorded and performed raises questions about how extensively the authorities tried to limit pro-Allied sentiment in the media.[50]

CONCLUSION

It is still difficult to precisely parse the difference between jazz as propaganda and jazz as popular expression during the Great Patriotic War. Most jazz ensembles, especially those that toured the battlefront and the home front, were under state supervision, with their repertoires scrutinized by censors and political officers. The themes embedded in many of the songs they played dovetailed with propaganda narratives on display elsewhere, especially in regard to Russocentric patriotism and, to a lesser degree, the heroic soldier. At the same time, propaganda may not have been all that necessary because people were willing to fight for their homes, their families, and each other if not for the party, state, or motherland. Jazz touched on all these sentiments and consequently helped mobilize the Soviet population to win the war.

NOTES

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Karel C. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 3–4.

2. David MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People: Affect, Emotion, and Celebrity in the Russian Popular Song, 1900–1955* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 4.
3. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 4.
4. Benjamin J. Beresford, "Rhapsody in Red: Jazz and a Soviet Public Sphere Under Stalin" (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2017), 24–55.
5. Beresford, "Rhapsody in Red," 164–206.
6. "Iskusstvo krasnoznamennoi Baltiki," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, March 29, 1934.
7. For example, "'Estradnik i zritel': V estradnykh teatrakh 'Ermitazh' i TsDKA," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, June 11, 1934.
8. Arkadii Kotliarskii, *Spasibo, dzhazu! Vospominanie starogo utesovtsa* (Moscow: Khudozhestvannaia literatura, 1990), 43–44.
9. Rossisskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (hereafter RGALI), f. 3005, op. 1, d. 856, l. 1.
10. Olga Anatol'evna Korzhova, *Dzhaz v Rostove-na-donu: "Ot" i "Po"* (Rostov-on-Don: Pegas, 2001), 19; and Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstv Sankt-Peterburga (TsGALI SPb), f. 747, op. 1, d. 7., l. 1.
11. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 31.

12. A. N. Golubev, *Aleksandr Tsfasman: Korifei sovetskogo dzhaza* (Moscow: Muzyka, 2006), 56; and Korzhova, *Dzhaz v Rostove-na-donu*, 21. See also the many letters Utesov received from *politruki* during the war. RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, dd. 856–58.
13. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 25.
14. S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Limelight Editions, 1994), 187.
15. Aleksei Batashev, *Sovetskii dzhaz: Istoricheskii ocherk* (Moscow: Muzyka, 1972), 88–89.
16. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 151–52.
17. Leonid Utesov, *Spasibo serdtse!*, (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 252; and Klavdiia Shul'zhenko, *Kogda vy sprosite menia . . .* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1981), 99.
18. Batashev, *Sovetskii dzhaz*, 92.
19. Batashev, *Sovetskii dzhaz*, 94.
20. See, for example, RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 748, l. 62 or RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 751, l. 8.
21. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 269-274.
22. Roger R. Reese, "Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War," *Journal of Slavic and Military Studies* 20 (2007): 266.
23. David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 144–80.
24. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 202–22.
25. Catherine Merridale, "Culture, Ideology and Combat in the Red Army, 1939–45," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 2 (2006): 315.
26. Reese, "Motivations to Serve," 272.
27. Merridale, "Culture, Ideology and Combat," 315.
28. Utesov, *Spasibo, serdtse!*, 252–53.
29. RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 860, ll. 17, 21.
30. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 203.
31. It is not clear where Utesov first heard this melody. By the late 1930s at least two Soviet jazz ensembles had recorded it. On the other hand, before emigrating to America, Secunda grew up in Nikolaev, not far from Utesov's hometown of Odessa, so it is possible that it was a Yiddish folk melody with which Utesov had been familiar since his youth.
32. RGALI, f. 656, op. 3, d. 4781, l. 7. Prior to Eddie Rosner's immigration in 1939, Petersburgksii's orchestra doubled as the Belorussian State Jazz Orchestra.
33. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 154–55.
34. Irina Andreevna Medved, ed., *Muzyka v bor'be s fashizmom: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Sovetskii kompozitor, 1985), 71.
35. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 155.
36. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 156.

37. Utesov, *Spasibo, serdtse!*, 260.
38. RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 749, l. 30.
39. Mayhill C. Fowler, "Mikhail Bulgakov, Mykola Kulish, and Soviet Theater: How Internal Transnationalism Remade Center and Periphery," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 16, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 263–90.
40. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 60.
41. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 61.
42. MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People*, 153.
43. RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 6.
44. Merridale, "Culture, Ideology and Combat," 322.
45. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 266.
46. See Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 244–68.
47. Golubev, *Aleksandr Tsfasman,* 58.
48. RGALI, f. 3005, op. 1, d. 748, l. 52.
49. See, for example, RGALI f. 3005, op. 1, d. 751, l. 19.
50. "James Kennedy" was performed on Soviet radio at least once in September 1944. GARF f. 6903, op. 14, d. 104, l. 193.

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Rossiisskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (RGALI), Moscow, Russia. f. 3005, op. 1, d. 749, l. 30.

Rossiisskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (RGALI), Moscow, Russia. f. 3005, op. 1, d. 751, l. 8.

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PART 4

MEMORY CONTINUITIES

8

CRAFTING THE HISTORY OF TERRORTIMES 1

Manufactured Memory: Crafting the Cult of the Great Patriotic War

YAN MANN

In a 2015 interview in *Kommersant* with Sergei Mironenko, the director of the Russian Federation's State Archive, Viktor Khamraev inquired about the veracity of the heroic actions performed outside Moscow in 1941 by twenty-eight men from General Ivan Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division. Mironenko commented that the original newspaper article that gave rise to the myth was a fabrication. Khamraev replied that "since my childhood I have considered them heroes, and I do not want to think otherwise." In turn, Mironenko insisted that "historical facts" and "documents" confirmed that the story of the twenty-eight heroes was nothing more than a Soviet journalistic creation. A few months later, a BBC article commented that despite a historical "debunking," many Russians continue to believe the myth.[1]

For the Soviet Union, the Second World War served as a defining event, overshadowing the importance of the Russian Revolution and Civil War (1917–22). War on the Eastern Front, which became known as "The Great Patriotic War," provided a profound memory for the entire country to unite around. Every family participated in the war experience, whether fighting on the front lines, toiling in the rear, or enduring enemy occupation. Tens of millions were left dead, tens of thousands of villages were obliterated, and tremors from the war years continued to impact Soviet society in the postwar period. Thus, it should come as no surprise that presently many Russians continue to believe not only in the self-sacrificial tales of individual heroes and heroines, but also in the overall socialist realist narrative created about the war under Joseph Stalin, which infused their lives and sacrifices with meaning.

The politics of memory over the war period showcase the interplay of both individual and collective memory. In this chapter, *memory* or *individual memory*, refers to events that individuals can recall having lived through, while *collective memory* references the creation of a framework based on social interactions that individuals within a state can utilize to organize their history.[2] Collective memory and history are engaged in a constant struggle. Where history is complex, inclusive of multiple viewpoints and detached from obvious biases, collective memory relies on oversimplifications and familiar stereotypes to appeal to the masses. Collective memory reflects numerous variables and conditions that through a selective process become defining moments of significant historical events within a collective body.[3]

An essential question is whether individual memory and collective or national memory can be kept separate. As soon as individual memory joins the greater collective, it no longer solely belongs to the individual but occupies a space in something that is not constructed based on distinctly personal past experiences and traumas but rather by present-day needs; in many ways it retains a type of truth but also mixes in aspects of *myth*, which in this case need not mean something fictitious. On the contrary, the myth that is created around a collective war experience creates "order and meaning . . . to the incoherence of war," a consumable narrative in its simplicity and relies on previously examined and resolved historical issues.[4] It could be argued that collective memory provides the tapestry onto which details from individual memories are embroidered, establishing a simplistic narrative that conveys the myth, which constitutes a learned truth an authority aims to embed within the public consciousness. The political scientist Thomas D. Sherlock views the final product as "political myth," which creates "a narrative of past events that gives them special significance for the present and the future."[5] The Soviet Union remained dependent on maintaining a number of myths in order to legitimize its existence, and the twenty-eight Panfilovtsy story is one of the most recognizable examples.

For the Soviet population, the myth of the war experience as propagated by the state became so all-encompassing that in some instances it was the *preferred version*, displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual documentation. The war's collective memory was propagated by multiple outlets, and due to the shortage of war histories, the dominance of literary publications centered on the war resulted in individual memories becoming intertwined with literature. The collective memory of the war was less reflective of a war experience and more superimposed by what Olga Kucherenko has termed a "universality of experience," in which not only were significant events similarly recalled but their interpretations were prepackaged and standardized for easier consumption by professional representatives of the state.[6]

Historian Catherine Merridale has argued that "Red Army troops were presented, effectively, with two wars simultaneously. The first, the one that they alone could know,

was the war of the battlefield, the screaming war of shells and smoke, the shameful war of terror and retreat. But the other, whose shape was crafted by writers, was a war that propaganda created."[7] This binary, which draws on the traditional dichotomy through which the relationship between the Soviet masses and state has been viewed by scholars, does not fully explain the situation that developed during the war. In numerous instances the language and rhetoric used by Stalin, newspaper correspondents, and readers came to resemble each other and left an enduring memory preference that many turned to when recalling the war period. This raises the question of to what extent each influenced the others and whether the discourse created during the Great Patriotic War was a combination of efforts from information producers and consumers as well as censors, all of whom initially occupied a partly flexible territory thanks to the limited openness created by the war.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union created an opening within Soviet society, literally and metaphorically. Although the publications that appeared were hardly free of censorship, this period was consistently viewed as defined by a "freedom" that many fondly recalled years after the war. This freedom was also experienced by artists, including photographers and filmmakers, thanks to the relaxation of certain cultural regulations. They might have been told *what* subjects to concentrate on, but they were given some latitude in deciding *how* to portray them.[8] The hope and freedom many associated with the war years endured into the postwar period and contributed to a sense of failure when the expected changes never materialized.[9]

Drawing on contemporary newspaper articles, which signify an engagement with constructed memories, as well as letters from previously published and unpublished sources written by civilians and veterans, this chapter tackles the question of how much influence journalists and writers had on the creation of the war's initial narrative and its continuing influence and popularity among veterans and future generations of Soviet and contemporary Russian citizens.[10] It will become evident that the textual language used by state representatives, correspondents, and the reading public often mirrored each other's, but the question of who wielded the greater influence or if it was shared rather than directed is open-ended.[11] This language was then regularly recycled by future Soviet administrations in the post-Stalin period. No matter how much they vilified or praised Stalin, his successors could not commit to fundamentally reevaluating the Great Patriotic War and relied on Stalinist rhetoric to understand Soviet achievements.

In examining newspaper articles, the reader will encounter numerous references to the more prolific authors, such as Vasilii Grossman, Konstantin Simonov, and Ilia Ehrenburg. Grossman began his writing career in the late 1920s. His earlier work was highly regarded for its authenticity and for being populated with "real people" rather than stereotypes. He worked as a correspondent for *Krasnaia Zvezda* during the war.[12]

Simonov became famous thanks to the war and his widely popular poem "Wait for Me." Finally, Ehrenburg was already well-known for his reports during the First World War and his coverage of the Spanish Civil War. He was one of the most popular authors in the USSR, writing hundreds of articles for domestic newspapers and the foreign press.[13] He also received a constant stream of letters from readers during the war and after. Ehrenburg helped define the war's narrative and, in part through orders from above and in conversation with readers themselves, helped craft an initial narrative of the war's history that has continued to influence popular views.[14]

REPLACING STALIN IN THE MEDIA

In the wake of the German invasion, the war was transformed into a people's war, with Stalin and the Communist Party relegated to the background. Stalin's omnipresence in the media ceased as the triumphs of the 1930s, collectivization, and industrialization, built on the shoulders of Lenin and the Revolution, were put in jeopardy. News of initial defeats suffered by the Red Army meant a situation arose wherein Stalin's name and image were increasingly absent for fear of identifying defeat with his leadership.[15] The truth of the war's initial period was hidden from the population as journalists bypassed Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and appealed to Russian patriotism as a rallying cry for the defense of the state.

The war's official title came from a *Pravda* article on June 23 by Emel'ian Iaroslavskii, a revolutionary, journalist, and historian, entitled "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People." The "Patriotic War of 1812" described the Napoleonic invasion of Russia; consequently the new title connected well-known tales of Russian resilience, courage, and eventual triumph to the current war. The words "Great Patriotic War" offered the Soviet Union an exceptional war experience and helped to separate and easily identify the Soviet war effort from what was previously portrayed as a conflict unleashed by two sides of the same capitalist coin (Britain and France, imperialists; Germany and Italy, fascists).[16]

In the press, a lack of reference to Stalin's words was replaced by the writings of popular reporters such as Ehrenburg and Simonov. With Stalin failing to dictate all aspects of society and becoming a closed-off figure, new narratives and a broader range of perspectives were allowed a place in the spotlight, which often resulted in more open conversations.[17] Between August and October 1941, as the situation deteriorated further at the front, Stalin's image slowly faded from reports. It was only with Stalin's decision to remain in Moscow, in the face of continuing German advances, and his speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution in early November, that his image was published in *Pravda* on November 7 for the first time in many weeks.[18]

JOURNALISTS, NEWSPAPERS, AND PROPAGANDA

Historian Anna Krylova notes that for Soviet citizens, newspapers were the "primary literary medium of wartime."[19] Correspondents themselves "waited for each communique with bated breath."[20] In 1943 Ehrenburg summed up the importance of newspapers for readers: "In peacetime the newspaper is a supplier of information, but in wartime the newspaper becomes the very air one breathes. . . . [P]eople open the newspaper before they open a letter from a friend, for their fate is tied up with what is printed in the newspaper."[21] The war provided a space in which newspaper articles represented the conflated needs of the population and government: simplistic wartime accounts and heroic tales that downplayed and concealed the administration's prewar and wartime miscalculations while emphasizing the population's penchant for heroic self-sacrifice based on love for the motherland, reconfigured into symbolic, stylized productions. Consequently, one of the most enduring aspects of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet Union was the creation of what came to be the Cult of Heroes (or the Cult of Martyrs).[22]

During the chaos of the first days of the war, frontline reports by journalists included crude reprints of articles from central papers exhibiting a low level of professionalism. Therefore, when correspondents were told of the importance newspapers carried for the war effort, they responded by requesting the removal of "stock phrases" and that they "be allowed to speak to readers in their own voices." Ehrenburg argued that writers could help the cause with their talents and literary skills, as the "best agitator" was a writer who utilized his own voice, vocabulary, and tone.[23] The atmosphere of the early period allowed such instances of "freedom" in creative thought to permeate wartime articles, and Ehrenburg noticed the difference: "War inevitably brings with it the censor's scissors, but in Russia during the first eighteen months of the war writers felt much freer."[24]

Soviet readers were informed of the war's progress by daily Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) communiqués, which mainly tracked changes on the front lines and were tasked with controlling print and broadcast media that touched on major internal, international, and military events, as well as counterpropaganda work.[25] Alongside official communiqués, well-known literary personalities, rather than journalists, took up the task of reporting on the war and offered newspapers pieces that reflected a "literary style" that deviated from traditional journalism.[26] These authors were highly regarded by both the state and the people. It should be noted that readers viewed Sovinformburo communiqués and reports from frontline correspondents differently. While they questioned the former, the latter were eagerly consumed and internalized.[27]

Authors took up the fight in their own way, and while serving on the front lines they were fulfilling a separate although equally important role in arming the population with

a hatred for the enemy. An editorial in *Literaturnaia gazetta* discussed the place of writers in the war less than two months after its beginning. Writers were encouraged to create generalizations in order to "reveal artistically in every example of heroism the national character of the Soviet people, the nobility of their ideas, which inculcate a scorn of death and hatred of the enemy."[28] Ehrenburg claimed many of his articles "were written at the front. . . . I was not thinking about the objective truth when I was writing. . . . I was thinking of one thing only: of victory."[29] Truth and objectivity were overshadowed by examples of heroism and the required slogans that authors and censors wanted imbibed by readers. Similarly, Ehrenburg's exhortations for violence and retribution were often perceived as appeals for indiscriminate revenge.[30] He was so well-known to the Germans that some believed "outside every uncaptured German village the political officer of a unit would read a declaration by Ilya Ehrenburg inciting the Red Army men to wreak vengeance."[31]

Wartime accounts created a direct link between readers and correspondents, forging a partnership. Grossman, writing to his father from the front, mentioned his popularity with frontline troops and how he would often see his books in their foxholes and bunkers. Works by Simonov and Ehrenburg were not only popular but deemed akin to holy symbols and icons by soldiers at the front.[32] Due to the proximity of correspondents to soldiers, often readers could picture their own suffering or that of their families in articles. In April 1942 Ehrenburg received a letter from a Red Army captain mentioning that his mother remained in Kiev and asking if Ehrenburg "perchance" wrote "about her tears? Maybe you described her suffering?" A letter from A. F. Morozov at the end of 1943 compared Ehrenburg's pieces with his memories of the war, filled with "feelings and passionate convictions and exhortations." Readers expressed a similar sentiment in letters to Simonov about his war novels. Historian Polly Jones discovered that "a mother from Omsk and a son from Moscow both wrote to Simonov expecting him to be able to clarify the manner of their relatives' deaths, since they had perceived unmistakable parallels between their biographies and those of the fictional heroes. Another widow, Kuznetsova, wrote more angrily, complaining about Simonov's failure to mention her husband's contribution to the battle at Borisov." Soviet readers believed depictions of heroes needed to be "true to life," and young audiences were heavily influenced by and identified with fictional heroes.[33]

Much of the language utilized in reports appealed to the soldiers at the front, as writers rendered in print and often exaggerated their experiences for an audience desperate for information. Their goal was to support morale on the front lines and in the rear. Correspondents often found themselves in the midst of battles, entwining themselves and their struggles with those on the front lines. Alexander Poliakov was encircled with the 24th Rifle Division. His articles described the division's struggle to get back to Soviet lines. Grossman witnessed the Battle of Stalingrad from the ruins of the city

and offered one of the first documented accounts of the Holocaust in his article "The Hell of Treblinka," which was used as evidence in the Nuremberg Trials.[34] Ehrenburg claimed in 1944 that "on the first day of the war I forgot that I had previously written novels and poems. I became a journalist, only a journalist, whose place is on the firing line. I breathe the air of battle."[35] In all, the war's propaganda effort encompassed the work of more than 1,000 writers. Hundreds participated at the front; 140 died and 300 received decorations.[36] Many lived through much of what the Red Army suffered. Orders from editors and censors reinforced their training as writers. They utilized their experiences at the front as a foundation for the imagery they employed while exploiting emotions and crafting a tapestry of Soviet heroism based on a mixture of facts and cliché slogans that often went unchallenged.

Soviet authors also had to operate within the confined space set up by Stalin, who limited talk of military defeats. Simultaneously, Stalin predicated the idea that surrender was the equivalent of treason, and a brave death in battle was considered the norm. Heroic exploits, including death, became expected and acceptable for soldiers and their families. Stories of selfless sacrifice were refined by authors as Stalin personally edited drafts, while censors continually checked text and photographs for transgressions before and after publication.[37] Newspapers and correspondents were stymied in their efforts to report on events, resulting in a repetition of heroic exploits that became fixed in Soviet minds and were soon internalized and reiterated on a regular if not daily basis.

MAKING SENSE OF DEFEAT: HEROES AND MARTYRS, 1941

Like an assembly line, stories began to be churned out about individual heroism, while reports of defeats were curiously absent. Almost immediately the population noticed the inconsistent claims and omissions evident in official reports. In the summer of 1941 V. Kazik, a disabled Soviet citizen, wrote to the editors of *Pravda* insisting that readers of a newspaper entitled "Truth" expected the truth, no matter how harsh.[38] In September 1941 an anonymous letter arrived at the Sovinformburo claiming, "You do not systematically inform [readers] about the situation on the front, instead, reports for more than a week [contain] the stereotypical phrase—'fighting along the entire front.'"[39] Unlike the British, who portrayed Dunkirk as a "national epic," or the Germans, who utilized the struggle for Stalingrad "to energize their forces," the loss of Soviet cities was concealed throughout the summer of 1941.[40] As a result, Soviet citizens approached Sovinformburo reports with skepticism, and many refused to believe official communiqués.

Reports of self-sacrificial actions, however, were regularly believed and used as inspiration. From the first days of the war, Soviet readers were presented with articles mentioning ramming attacks by Soviet pilots against the German Luftwaffe and dive-ramming attacks by pilots whose planes had caught fire and who were left with few other options. One of the most famous heroes was Captain Nikolai Gastello, who purportedly flew his damaged plane into a column of enemy vehicles, killing himself and his crew while inflicting damage and death on the enemy. For his selfless act, Gastello was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The rest of his crew became recipients of the Order of the Patriotic War, First Degree.[41]

While ramming in general was described as heroic, some disagreed. When Grossman visited a fighter regiment, he was met with a variety of views. One respondent believed ramming was representative of the "Russian character" and "Soviet upbringing," but another claimed, "Ramming isn't heroism. Heroism is to shoot down as many of them as possible." Finally, a third insisted on asking: "What sort of a hero is a man who has a full load [of ammunition] and doesn't manage to shoot [an enemy plane] down and has to ram [it]?"[42] As much as Soviet correspondents and the state attempted to demonstrate what heroism meant in news reports, views on the ground were still conflicted when it came to pilots ramming enemy aircraft.

Heroism on the ground was epitomized by the ultimate sacrifice of twenty-eight men from Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division. On November 16, 1941, to the east of Volokolamsk at the railroad junction of Dubosekovo, the Germans launched an attack against the 1075th Rifle Regiment, which sustained hundreds of casualties in hours of fierce fighting. The following day, before news about the German attack had made its way to higher headquarters, the division was renamed the 8th Guards Rifle Division for its steadfast defense. Panfilov was killed on November 18, creating a rare opportunity to associate the regiment's heroic defense with its fallen divisional commander.[43] Instead of highlighting the heroic actions of the entire regiment, a handful of men who supposedly gave their lives to the last, sacrificing themselves on the approaches to Moscow, were treated as heroes. This case highlights the important role played by journalists and editors and the limited freedom they enjoyed from state censors in 1941. Without the involvement of state representatives on the ground, they knew without direction from above what was required of them. Writers took the initiative and aimed to serve a higher goal of mobilizing soldiers for battle. In highlighting this event, journalists were reinforcing Soviet war propaganda, which claimed it was possible to stop enemy attacks if only soldiers stood to the death and refused to retreat.[44] The popularity of the Panfilovtsy was utilized to define "heroism," resulting in countless reiterations of similar actions.[45]

The tale of the 28 Panfilovtsy can be dated to a similar story in a 1931 Soviet play, *The Final Battle*, which highlighted the idea of an imminent war for Soviet

citizens. Historian Jochen Hellbeck described how "the final scene shows a group of twenty-seven Red Army soldiers defending the border against an imperialist enemy. In a hail of machine gun fire, all die but one. The injured survivor drags himself to a blackboard, where just before collapsing, he writes, '162,000,000 – 27 = 161,999,973.'"[46] The writing was already on the proverbial wall, the deeds described and entrenched in Soviet memory; all that was missing was a war to superimpose familiar memories onto. However, the truth about these twenty-eight heroes was known as early as 1948, when a report about Panfilov's men by Nikolai Afansiev, the chief military prosecutor, was sent to Stalin and a number of high-ranking officials, detailing how the story was crafted from the imagination of journalists and the editor of *Krasnaia Zvezda*.[47]

Another hero appeared in the form of Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia, a high school girl selected to go behind enemy lines as a saboteur. She was caught torching a stable of German horses. Reportedly, although tortured, she refused to give the enemy any information and died while defiantly proclaiming "It is happiness to die for my people" and "Stalin is with us" before being hanged.[48] A few weeks later, in the midst of the Red Army's Moscow counteroffensive, a reporter from *Pravda* glorified her deeds after her frozen corpse was discovered, establishing one of the most iconic stories that became a national cry for vengeance. The British correspondent Alexander Werth remarked in 1946 that while there were others who performed similar deeds and suffered a similar fate, Kosmodem'ianskaia "was the name people were made to remember."[49] While her torture and death were a fact, details surrounding her capture and treatment by locals remained in the shadows, as did the fact that the sabotage she was responsible for in the village of Petrishchevo left several families without a roof as winter was fast approaching. The truth would have undermined the narrative of the population's support for the all-out partisan war Stalin initiated in the German rear.[50]

The state and journalists never had trouble finding heroes to embrace and emulate, especially those who perished, since histories and facts could be amended to suit the needs of the greater collective. When it came to Kosmodem'ianskaia, two articles appeared, in *Pravda* and *Komsomol'skaia pravda*. The article in the latter became an obscure reference, while Petr Lidov's "Tania," which appeared in the former, received the nation's attention because of its "vivid" quality.[51] Elena Seniavskaia recounts that according to "legend," "Stalin, on reading the newspaper account of the partisan's response to the Hitlerites' question, 'Where is Stalin?' namely, 'Stalin is at his post!'—himself uttered the words that decided her posthumous fate: 'There is a true national heroine.'" The propaganda apparatus went into action, and Tania, an unknown member of the Komsomol, was turned into Zoia, the first woman to be awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union during the war.[52]

THE TURNING POINT: 1942

With the retreat of German forces outside Moscow in January 1942, Stalin began to reassert control over the narrative about the war in the press. If 1941 was characterized by Stalin's marginalization in the press, the beginning of 1942 found the Soviet leader portrayed as a strategic genius. Previous defeats were now portrayed in the press as part of his grandiose plans to lure German forces into the Soviet interior while operations were made for their ultimate defeat, a rehashing of 1812.[53] Stalin leaned into the Red Army's retreats and allowed the enormous loss of territory to influence future descriptions of his strategic brilliance. Similar rhetoric could then be applied to describe the German advance on Stalingrad. Soon reports about Stalin's genius were being consumed and reiterated by soldiers at the front. In a letter to his parents in April 1942, a frontline soldier wrote that Stalin's "ingenious strategy" was responsible for the successful defense of Moscow.[54]

As Red Army success in early 1942 proved unsustainable and failures were again omitted, covered up, or excused in reports, at the end of July Stalin issued Order 227, "Not a Step Back!" The order was read out to every unit in the Red Army. On July 30 *Pravda* exclaimed "Not a step back!" at the top of its front page, and a leading article invoked the feat of the twenty-eight Panfilovtsy during the defense of Moscow. The same day *Krasnaia Zvezda* featured an article exhorting the troops to stand their ground: "Not one step back!—such is the country's order, such is the order of the Commissar of Defense, our leader and general comrade Stalin." For those who retreated without orders, no mercy was to be expected, as soldiers could utilize all the powers given to them by the state.[55] Soon soldiers themselves exhibited the same mindset. In an August 1942 letter, the soldier Iosif Gil'man commented, "Every day we beat the Fascists under the slogan 'Not one step back,' and we fulfill this slogan with honor."[56] Many viewed exhortations to defend Stalingrad to the death as needed support, but commanding officers in the field differed in how they interpreted and implemented the order, allowing veiled or explicit threats of bodily harm and execution to substitute for patriotic zeal.[57]

Defeats were masked behind the veneer of a learning experience that would unite and strengthen the Soviet population. Although large swaths of territory were lost, Ehrenburg argued that "we can say that we are stronger now than in the 22nd of June, 1941." Ehrenburg urged his audience to "remember about what has been acquired and tell ourselves that the man who will return from the Front is worth ten prewar men. . . . In the war we have acquired initiative, discipline, and inner freedom."[58] Ehrenburg's thoughts were reflected in a letter he received from a Guards first lieutenant in the summer of 1942, who exclaimed, "We shall return from the war, not purer, not more upright—before the war we were as pure as white snow and completely upright. We shall return wise, more clear-sighted, and sterner."[59]

If the preceding is an example of when reader's thoughts matched Ehrenburg's, the summer of 1942 also witnessed an exchange in which Ehrenburg reflected the thoughts of his readers. On July 14, a letter from S. Kazantsev to Ehrenburg stated:

> We, the men at the front, beg you to write articles which may still more effectively summon the Russian men, small and great, to fine deeds and to heroism. It is necessary to arouse in our Russian people such fury, such hatred for the Germans that the Russian will fight the German with whatever is available. So that a woman, and a little girl, an old man, and a boy may arm themselves with axes, scythes, stones, and in any encounter with a German kill him. It is necessary to say more loudly to the Russian man: he who does not kill a German is helping the Germans.[60]

Ehrenburg's response was an article he became infamous for, "Kill!," published on July 24:

> We know everything. We remember everything. We have understood: the Germans are not human beings. From now on the word 'German' is for us the most horrible curse. From now on the word 'German' discharges a rifle. We shall do no talking. We shall not express indignation. We will kill. If you have not killed one German during the day, you have lost a day. If you think that instead of you your neighbor will kill a German, you have failed to understand the menace. If you will not kill a German, a German will kill you. . . . If you cannot kill a German with a bullet, kill him with a bayonet. If there is a momentary calm in your sector, if you are awaiting a battle, kill a German before the battle. If you leave a German alive, a German will hang a Russian man and will dishonor a Russian woman. If you have killed one German, kill another—nothing gladdens us more than German corpses. Do not count the days. Do not count the miles. Count one thing: the Germans you have killed. Kill a German!—this is what an old mother begs of you. Kill a German!—this is what a child implores you to do. Kill a German!—this is what your native land cries to you. Do not miss fire. Do not let him by. Kill![61]

This exchange illustrates how the population worked in tandem with correspondents during the war, or even how the latter saw readers as muses. Ehrenburg comments in his memoirs that he received "hundreds" of requests from soldiers at the front to "tear the Fritzes to pieces in *Red Star*."[62] The textual inspiration for those begging Ehrenburg to write about killing Germans, like Kazantsev, could have originated from the previous year and from an unexpected source. When Stalin addressed the nation on November 6, 1941, he quoted from a directive found on a dead German lieutenant from Frankfurt/Main: "You have no heart and nerves; they are not needed in war. Destroy the pity and

compassion within you—kill each and every Russian, Soviet, don't stop if you have an old man or woman, girl or boy before you—kill, you will save yourself from death, ensure your family's future, and gain renown for the ages."[63] Rhetoric appeared that was based on a shared textual language, even from unlikely sources; not only were correspondents like Ehrenburg taking cues from Stalin and the censors, but readers themselves offered support and championed the creation of a narrative of the war that became inseparable from themes focused on by journalists and at times enforced by the Soviet leadership.

The Red Army's victory at Stalingrad in February 1943 coincided with Soviet attempts to tighten control over the media, as there was a fear of reporters inadvertently divulging military secrets due to inadequate experience. The state hoped to control the flow of information by placing limits on the number of reporters at the front. Correspondents went through additional training, while lists were circulated with preapproved subjects for both journalists and photojournalists. Simultaneously, censors continued their work. In 1943 Ehrenburg's book *One Hundred Letters*, a collection of articles and letters received from soldiers at the front, was rejected for publication. When he asked why, he was told: "This isn't 1941."[64]

Thus ended a period of the war when Soviet correspondents enjoyed a level of freedom they would never again experience in Stalin's lifetime. As the Red Army found itself on the offensive, correspondents attempted to clarify the failures of 1941 and 1942. In doing so they highlighted ideas that explained away initial Soviet retreats, arguing that the Red Army had no experience and learned to "fight by fighting." They steered attention away from the sacrifices and achievements of the allies after their landings at Normandy, keeping the focus on the Soviet war experience and the Red Army's sacrifices.[65]

In early 1945 Soviet outlets continued to stress that most of the fighting was taking place on the Eastern Front. An article by Ehrenburg on April 11 entitled "Enough!" described German soldiers surrendering to the western allies with "fanatical enthusiasm," in contrast to the casualties Soviet forces suffered as they continued their advance.[66] Ehrenburg was soon rebuked by the head of Agitprop (the Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda), G. Aleksandrov, for "over-simplifying" the situation.[67] In response, Ehrenburg wrote to Stalin claiming that he was not expressing his own "line [but] the feelings of the people."[68] Ehrenburg was not arrested, and he published again on May 10, 1945.[69] As this incident shows, he seemingly believed that he retained a freedom and ability to portray and interpret events as he saw fit.

The public agreed with Ehrenburg to some extent, demonstrating that they preferred the narrative some journalists were championing over that of highly placed officials who represented Stalin's position. Ehrenburg later claimed that he received "many sympathetic letters" in the wake of Aleksandrov's rebuke.[70] As one example, a frontline

soldier wrote him that "comrade Aleksandrov speaks from the point of view of the TsK [Central Committee] and reflects the party line, however my voice and the voice of my comrades are with you."[71] Readers had become so familiar with Ehrenburg's work and valued his contributions so much that they preferred his narrative over that of a highly ranked public official who represented the party line.

STALIN AND THE MEMORY OF THE WAR

In the immediate postwar period Stalin started to do away with anything that was not part of a polished, sanitized version of Soviet experiences in the Second World War. The memory of the war constituted a threat to Stalin's power just when it had reached its zenith and his status as demigod was cemented in the minds of the population. As Stalin's cult dominated the war's narrative, limits appeared on publications about personal experiences. Many understood that their memories needed to be amended to fit the state's version of events and mirror Stalin's interpretations, creating a shared war experience that extended from the top to the bottom. Deviation by authors in public was initially evident but soon extinguished as recollections that opposed the party line were attacked in the press.[72] With Stalin continuously found at the center of events, historians were left with nothing to do but repeat well-known myths. Those who tried to utilize source material deemed unacceptable were denied the use of key documents.[73]

Aside from amending the war's historiography, discussions and public expressions revolving around the war's memory were discouraged. Initially, May 9, 1945, was treated as a festival and a general holiday. The Victory Day parade was held on June 24, 1945. There was no parade the following year; local events took its place. In 1947 Victory Day was done away with as a state holiday, not to be resurrected until 1965. This decision, combined with the prohibition against demobilized soldiers' forming veterans' organizations in the immediate postwar period, severed the ability of veterans to gather for public recognition.[74] Finally, Stalin did not want the public to dwell on the damage sustained during the war years. Instead the war needed to be portrayed as a stepping-stone, with the focus oriented on the future rather than the past. The victory was a bridge to a new society, built on the blood and sacrifice of millions.

Stalin's speech on February 9, 1945, which began to codify various themes that were present during the war, signified a shift from military campaigns and achievements to the economic and political foundations that were able to sustain them. Such an adjustment to the war's history facilitated two shifts that remained intrinsic parts of the postwar narrative. The role of the party was enlarged, while that of the people, soldiers, and military leadership was diminished. The war's portrayal relied on abstract notions rather than on the actual bloody encounters that had left a marked trace on

every frontline veteran and defined the war experience for more than one generation.[75] With the war depicted as a "bloodless" affair, the memories of the defeats in 1941 were erased, to be replaced by universal myths. Authors suffered as they were forced to rewrite their novels in order to obscure the initial period of the war and play up the role of the Communist Party.[76] But unlike historians, literary authors could write about their own experiences without needing to consult government documents or archival information.[77]

When it came to war literature, readers expected authenticity. Veterans themselves reconfigured the war's collective memory into a history written in blood. This was initially evident in an emblematic Jewish partisan song, "Zog nit keynmol," from 1943, which claimed its lyrics were written "in blood and not in lead."[78] Similarly, an August 1952 letter to Grossman from A. Adamovich, a major in the reserves, stressed that "the Soviet reader requires good historical fiction literature on the Great Patriotic War from writers, but authors should work carefully and painstakingly around recent history, many pages of which are written in our blood." High-ranking veterans were able and willing to lend their expertise and "services" so that historical episodes could be "truthfully" depicted. Grossman's work in particular was greatly prized at the front, and his novels were also valued as historical documents. In *The People Immortal*, published in 1942, he was one of the first authors to discuss the Red Army's retreats of 1941, something no other writer dared to mention, and *For a Just Cause* was considered by a reader to be the best thing written about the war. Stalingrad veterans viewed Grossman as "more than a journalist—he was one of their own, their comrade in arms."[79] The editor of *Krasnaia Zvezda*, David Ortenberg, commented on *The People Immortal*: "Nothing of the kind was written since the war began. And even after the war literary historians regarded *The People Immortal* among the most significant works of the period."[80] Consequently, novels and novellas about the war experience blurred the line between fact and fiction.

The culmination of a war narrative that forfeited realistic portrayals of heroic acts and propagated a specific heroic archetype meant a revised understanding of what defined heroism and victory while steering discussion away from fundamental errors perpetrated by the leadership and armed forces. The ability of the Soviet media to create a heroic narrative around the selfless sacrifices of the population paved the way for Stalin to reconfigure the portrayal of the war's initial period. Defeats were transformed into preplanned retreats, serving as part of a greater plan to defeat the enemy in exchange for space and time.

Wartime depictions of heroism became intertwined with the war's collective memory. During the war, in 1944, the film *Zoia* appeared in Soviet cinemas. The movie was shown at the front and a soldier, in a March 1945 letter to his family, commented that the film "made a great impression" on him and insisted "here is the real truth [*istinnaia*

pravda], [down] to the smallest detail."[81] After the war, the film's director met a friend, a war correspondent, who arrived from the front and hinted that the "real" story of Zoia differed from the cinematic production. The director, rather than being upset, replied, "I would have made the film just the same. The story is more important than the actual details." Margarita Aliger, a poet who wrote about Zoia's feat, agreed with this notion. Almost three decades after the war she continued to insist "that her depiction of Zoia was not invented, but 'reflected the truth we believed in.'"[82] Thus, the various representations of "Zoia" reflected stylized depictions that people wanted to believe in as the "truth," superimposed onto their memories by wartime correspondents and state-endorsed propaganda. Continued exposure to the same idealized narrative made a dent in Soviet minds that continued to influence perceptions, ideas, and beliefs. According to Kucherenko, "as the war was gradually mythologized . . . interpretations also became standardized, creating an impression of universality of experience." In such a way, "uncomfortable truths were either bent or concealed to fit the overall heroic picture, and personal experiences made irrelevant to the master narrative."[83]

WAR MEMORY AFTER STALIN

After Stalin's death in 1953, Stalinist thinking was still a formidable obstacle to interpretations that might devalue the Soviet war effort. While there were detectable differences in how the history of the Great Patriotic War was discussed under Nikita Khrushchev, more often than not its foundations, including terminology and rhetoric, mirrored the Stalin period. Once again, Soviet literary personalities were at the forefront of discussing historical issues, and literature provided a medium for historians to explore Soviet history, including the Second World War.[84] Inspired by de-Stalinization, writers such as Grigorii Baklanov, Iuri Bondarev, and Vasil' Bykov pushed against previously imposed boundaries and discussed the war while the Communist Party and censors continued to limit what could be admitted about the war's true costs. Authors produced fictional works that often "resembled memoirs in their autographical perspective" and "aroused furious discussion about topics that were so new that they required unfamiliar phrases and neologisms," including "the truth of the trenches (*okopnaya Pravda*)" and "'deheroisation' (*degeroizatsiya*)."[85]

The dearth of historic literature on the war was addressed by Khrushchev when the Institute of Marxism and Leninism created a commission in 1957 tasked with researching and publishing the first official history of the Great Patriotic War. Commission members identified numerous weaknesses in previous publications on the war, including drafts of the official history. They were guilty of presenting a "dry" history that lacked any "vivid" character that might capture readers' interest.[86] For instance, the

official history's depiction of the battle for Stalingrad was considered too bland to describe an event of "great importance . . . it should be spoken of more vividly, colorfully."[87] One of the main editors argued that the "dryness" in the volumes was due to the authors' being military historians, and it was "our misfortune, that our military authors have often dealt with purely military books" that revolved around the art of war. The multivolume history, however, was of a "different character." Given to a general reader, the war's history "will strain his thoughts, and he will be left with the impression that this is a military book, but we need to affect people's minds and hearts." Facts and "protocols" needed to be transformed into a memorable "living historical narrative." Editors pleaded with authors that their main goal and challenge should be a "need to correctly squeeze out all that is possible, not only in the content but in the form of presentation, so that it is vivid, intelligible material, maybe even so that at times tears will appear, because these events are full of drama, because tens, hundreds of thousands of people died, often as a result of errors, and often deliberately sacrificing themselves so as to defend this or that boundary. . . . I appeal to you . . . when you work on this material, think, so that the material is dripping blood, blood that was shed, then our goal will be achieved."[88] Undoubtedly this was a reference to the heroic self-sacrificial narrative that so many had grown familiar with from wartime articles. If under Stalin the war was sanitized, then under Khrushchev the goal was to insert once more the human element, but within limits that allowed for justifications for Soviet domestic and foreign policies; whether a shortage of housing or the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern and Central Europe, everything was a result of the blood spilled during the war.

Attempting to remedy the problem of a historical narrative that lacked mass appeal, commission members petitioned for the inclusion of heroic acts such as that of the twenty-eight Panfilovtsy, arguing that their actions represented "mass heroism" and claiming that "they alone defended our land and delayed a large number of the enemy."[89] Such assertions reinforced the narrative of the war created under Stalin, emphasizing a heroic feat already part of the war's collective memory that many would not question. Stories of heroism seemed to ignite regular debate among commission members. One member was unhappy with how Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia's heroic feat was portrayed, comparing it to a "protocol" with its "dry" description of events and people. Leaning on literature produced during the war, he advocated including "excerpts from documents published in *Pravda*. [Like] Lidov's wonderful literary, political and artistic article 'Tania' with Strunnikov's photo—Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia with a rope around her neck as soon as she was removed from the gallows." It was "necessary to remember these documents" as they "enrich[ed] the work" and should be included.[90] Consequently, even those privy to detailed information and with access to archives preferred to lean on wartime literary publications with their raw emotional appeal. This speaks in part to the lack of historical information available on the war in general, but also shows the

connection that many retained with the news they were exposed to during the war and what writers believed would continue to resonate with readers.

Consistently concentrating on a familiar heroic narrative omitted the question of why Red Army soldiers needed to sacrifice their lives in the first place. It was more important to figure out who had performed a specific heroic deed first, as in the case of a reader who wrote to the head editor of *Pravda* asking for clarification concerning the famous Aleksandr Matrosov, who threw himself on an enemy machine gun embrasure in 1943. The reader's main concern was why Matrosov received all the praise for his selfless act when others had performed similar feats before him.[91] A reply to another letter, inquiring about why two previous examples of a similar exploit were practically unknown, claimed that because Matrosov's name and actions had fallen into the hands of some "lucky journalist, who publicized them through the press," the reading public had become familiar with his story before that of anyone else. Moreover, he was also mentioned in fictional literature.[92] Consequently, a journalist's wartime exposure of Matrosov's heroic feat to the population, combined with mentions in literature, embedded his exploit in Soviet collective memory with little concern for why such sacrifices were necessary.

The enduring legacy of the narrative that appeared during the war was a result of the efforts undertaken by numerous literary personalities as they attempted to follow the party line while being cognizant of censors. Because collective memory relies on simplification, the universalization of the war experience made it that much easier for all sectors of society to eventually build a cult around it. Famous war correspondents gave voice to an event that impacted every Soviet family and, in part, a tragedy that could not be hidden from the population or the international community. The war's beginning could only be represented as a treacherous betrayal that allowed Soviet citizens to unite and help the Red Army and their state achieve victory. Tales of heroism and self-sacrifice became entrenched in readers' memories, representative of the desperate situation the state found itself facing, and the portrayal of a Manichean version of the war made it that much easier for many to internalize its narrative and make it their own. Germany's invasion and the existential threat it unleashed created a break from the prewar period when it came to censorship that allowed a limited period of "freedom" and forged an unforgettable unity between the state and society that the population had never before experienced.

When Leonid Brezhnev came to power in 1964, Khrushchev's reforms ground to a halt; the initial period of the war was never objectively examined due to the perceived harm it would cause the Soviet state at home and abroad. Soviet writers were urged to portray the darkest period of the war in 1941 as the first step toward Germany's eventual defeat. Concentrating on the tragedy of the first days meant taking attention away from Red Army victories. Aleksei Epishev, the head of the Political

Administration of the Army and Navy, only allowed historical studies that would be advantageous; failures were hushed up and defeats were turned into victorious episodes of the Red Army's inevitable march toward Berlin. State censors went to work and, in analyzing narratives that dealt with the war's initial period, they seemingly followed in footsteps that portrayed the entire war as one whose victory could be predicted from day one.[93]

This view became enshrined in memorial complexes like Brest Fortress, which altered perceptions about the war experience. The defense of Brest Fortress was made famous by Sergei Smirnov's *Brestskaia krepost*, published in 1957—another book by a literary personality that helped define the heroism of Red Army soldiers in 1941.[94] In 1971, one visitor saw the memory of Brest transformed from a site that formerly housed "a modest exhibition of photographs and newspaper clippings" into a home for "rows of granite graves, photographs of the 'heroic defenders' of the fortress, an eternal flame, immense statues, the works!" A "tragic defeat" was reshaped "into an exploit of heroic defense" with the Communist Party leading the people. "It was incredible."[95] Defeats became representations of selfless Red Army heroism.

A connection to the war was also passed down to Soviet youth. They were ingrained with an appreciation for their parents' and grandparents' accomplishments and vicariously established a connection to the war. Historian Donald Raleigh encountered a veteran's son who recalled how his father "shared his experiences with me in great detail to the point where I sometimes would think that all this happened to me rather than to him." The war experience was ritualized and became a constant companion for Soviet citizens from cradle to grave as they were turned "into ex post facto participants."[96] A former Soviet citizen recalled that during her childhood "war and hunger [were] the two words we hear[d] everywhere: in our classrooms, in our news, in the conversations of babushkas on the benches of our courtyard. They [were] nonspecific and worn out, something that happened not to individuals but to the entire country."[97]

The further removed the events of the war were, the more contested issues became. In conversations during the 1980s and 1990s it became apparent that people with no real way of knowing the truth about the Panfilovtsy continued to vehemently defend the original version of the myth.[98] The war narrative's entrenchment in the minds of veterans and the continued exposure of current Russian citizens to the heroic and self-sacrificial collective memory of the war have resulted in the defense of a history based on socialist realist ideals—defined as depictions of events as they should be and not as they are—and emotions rather than facts and research.

If under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s Russia initially moved away from its Stalinist past—military parades were abolished and the war became less prominent in media outlets—under Vladimir Putin the government turned to the Second World War for a ready source of patriotism. In 2000 the wartime Soviet anthem was restored as the

new Russian anthem (albeit with different lyrics), and in 2003 a textbook critical of Stalin's role in the war was removed from circulation. Stalin was still intertwined with the war's history thanks to a narrative that continued to link him to victory.[99] Putin's administration fixated on a mythic event that underlined national unity, struggle, and perseverance, a narrative familiar to many. An attack on the memory of the war was transformed into "a personal insult, a sacrilege."[100] The general war narrative persists in revolving around the themes of Russian exceptionalism, selfless heroism, and victimization at the hands of belligerent enemies.[101] Unfortunately, the ongoing portrayal of the war in a simplistic binary continues to influence Russian historians and inhibits a more nuanced understanding of a war treated as sacrosanct.

The increasing popularity of May 9, which became a yearly national holiday in 1965, speaks to how the war continues to resonate with the population. The war offered inspirational examples for an "apathetic populace" struggling with national identity, and elderly war veterans were reinvigorated with self-esteem.[102] Victory Day celebrations are reinforced by a heroic narrative many continue to favor. In a conversation between a librarian and a veteran who liked to read about the war, the librarian asked, "But why? You yourself were a soldier in the war. Wasn't that enough?" The veteran replied, "Oh, what kind of war was that? I like to read about a real war that has heroism and brave deeds."[103] Similarly, Soviet families developed strong connections with the memory of the war and its stylized narrative. A "Soviet baby boomer" claimed that "I don't want to know or to hear that Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya's feats never happened. The war was always a sacred topic in my family. I continue to believe that the people fought for justice . . . and that the country and the people were united like never before. For me the war is sacred, and I don't want to subject this to reexamination."[104] Breaking away from memories of the sacredness of the war disconnected many with a nostalgia for a time of "freedom," which featured a heroic history that became the cornerstone of their understanding of the value and worth of the USSR's accomplishments during the Second World War, the only event all can confidently celebrate.

Veterans preferred a familiar and idealized historical narrative. The author Vasil Bykov commented on the attitude of war veterans in a letter in 1996: "No country in the world has such remarkable veterans as our native and beloved USSR. Not only are they not promoting the truth and justice of the war, but on the contrary—they are most concerned with hiding the truth, most eager to replace it with mythologizing propaganda, in which they appear to be heroes and nothing else. They like this inflated role of theirs, and would not tolerate any attempt to challenge it."[105] Entwining their wartime experiences with those of Stalin's Soviet Union meant that invalidating the legitimacy of one risked nullifying the other. The courage, heroism, and sacrifice of their generation would be left in the dustbin of history together with the "Soviet experiment."

Another author, Viktor Astafiev, reflected in 1999 that "everything connected with" the war "has been so confused, that in the end the 'made up' war eclipsed the real one." When he decided to leave the theme of war behind, he commented that "it is difficult and pointless. The young cannot understand, hardly anyone understands, and older folks don't want to be reminded. If you must write about the war, it should be about the one that was made up, where they look heroic, where it wasn't the Germans beating them, but them beating the Germans."[106] Thus the original narrative of the war, crafted in fire and blood, continues to resonate and displace efforts to offer a more nuanced and objective account.

For Soviet veterans, the war was continuously cloaked in an aura of heroic self-sacrifice throughout the Soviet period. Future generations were raised on a multilayered diet of heroism, exceptionalism, and victimhood that hid the war's true complexity behind a simplistic binary of Soviet altruism and Hitlerite tyranny. The enemy were easily discernible by the language they spoke and the uniforms they wore. Soviet heroes, united in their hatred for the perfidious invader, waged war in unity with the state. Denouncing Stalin's cult of personality during de-Stalinization only reinforced Soviet victimhood and that the world continued to owe a debt it could never repay to a generation of Soviet idealists who had paid the ultimate price for Hitler's defeat. For veterans, a deep-rooted nostalgia for a past that infuses their sacrifices with meaning and present-day pensions and benefits underpin their wartime contributions, making any invalidation of the heroism of their war effort not only an emotional trauma but an attack on their quality of life.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union created a fertile environment for a narrative of selfless heroism to take hold in the hearts and minds of the Soviet population. Well-known authors, correspondents, and editors went to work as Stalin's voice was momentarily marginalized and, using their talents, they crafted a beautiful tapestry of sacred heroism frozen in time. Objectivity and truth were a secondary concern as writers joined the troops on the front line, suffered with them in the trenches or behind enemy lines, and witnessed heroism on an unprecedented scale. Others took a back seat to the action and used what minor facts they came across in battle reports to create the heroic narrative they knew readers needed to be exposed to in order to sustain the war effort. Memorable stories came to represent what the Soviet population was capable of in an existential crisis as correspondents emphasized the all-important role played by the Red Army and Soviet state: they were saving Europe and the world from Hitler's tyranny. Literary flair, generalizations, and an author's imagination created a literary style that filled the reading public with an appreciation for Soviet self-sacrifice and nostalgia for a time of unity between the state and the people that endures in the present.

NOTES

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3. For discussions about memory and collective memory specifically in the wake of wars, see Jan-Wener Muller, ed., *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Richard Ned Lebow, ed., *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Maria Ferretti, "Memory Disorder: Russia and Stalinism," *Russian Politics and Law* 41, no. 6 (2003): 38–82; Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Aleksandr S. Seniavskii and Elena S. Seniavskaia, "The Historical Memory of Twentieth-Century Wars as an Arena of Ideological, Political, and Psychological Confrontation," *Russian Studies in History* 49, no. 1 (2010): 53–91.
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5. Sherlock, *Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia,* 3.
6. Olga Kucherenko, *Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16.
7. Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 109.
8. David Shneer, *Through Soviet Jewish Eyes: Photography, War, and the Holocaust* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 91.
9. Ilya Ehrenburg, *The War: 1941–1945*, trans Yvonne Kapp and Tatiana Shebunina (New York: World Publishing, 1964), 124; and Ilia Al'tman, Leonid Terushkin, and

Irina Brodskaia, eds., *Sokhrani Moi Pisma . . . : Sbornik Pisem Evreev Perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny* (Moscow: MIK, 2010), 137.

10. Benedikt Sarnov, *Stalin i Pisateli, kniga Pervaia* (Moscow: EKSMO, 2010); B. Sarnov, *Stalin i Pisateli, kniga Chetvertaia* (Moscow: EKSMO, 2011); I. I. Anisimov, ed., *Sovetskie Pisateli Na Frontakh Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny*, kniga pervaia (Moscow: Nauka, 1966); and B. Ia. Frezinskii, ed., *Pochta Il'i Erenburga: Ia slyshu vse . . . 1916–1967* (Moscow: AGRAF, 2006).
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14. Ilya Ehrenburg, *The Tempering of Russia*, trans. Alexander Kaun (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944); Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*; and IIya Ehrenburg and Konstantin Simonov, *In One Newspaper: A Chronicle of Unforgettable Years* (New York: Sphinx Press, 1985).
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18. Barber, "Image of Stalin in Soviet Propaganda," 42, 43.
19. Anna Krylova, "'Healers of Wounded Souls': The Crisis of Private Life in Soviet Literature, 1944–1946," *Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 2 (June 2001): 313.
20. Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 10.
21. Ehrenburg and Simonov, *In One Newspaper*, xiii.
22. Elena Seniavskaia, "Heroic Symbols: The Reality and Mythology of War," *Russian Studies in History* 37, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 61–63.

23. RGASPI, f. 629, op. 1, d. 110, l. 1.
24. Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 13, 20.
25. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 13.
26. *Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine: Sbornik dokumentov,* tom vtoroi, kniga 1, *Nachalo 22 iiunia–31 avgusta 1941 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rus, 2000), 63; Marc Slonim, *Soviet Russian Literature: Writers & Problems 1917–1967* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 265; and Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 268–69.
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31. James Lucas, *War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia 1941–1945* (London: Frontline Books, 2014), 59.
32. Krylova, "Healers of Wounded Souls," 313–14; Alexander Werth, *The Year of Stalingrad: an historical record and a study of Russian mentality, methods and policies* (Safety Harbor, FL: Simon Publications, 2001), 80; Frezinskii, *Pochta Il'i Erenburga,* 97; Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, 246; and Popoff, *Vasily Grossman*, 128.
33. Polly Jones, *Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953–70* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 191–92; Frezinskii, *Pochta Il'i Erenburga,* 142; Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, 245, 247; and Evegeny Dobrenko, *The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 128, 151.
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35. Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, v, 35, 248; A. Poliakov, "V tylu vraga," *Krasnaya zvezda,* August 23, 1941, 4; A. Poliakov, *V tylu vraga* (Moscow: Voenno-Morskoe Izdatel'stvo NKVMF, 1942); Alexander Poliakov, *Russians Don't Surrender* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1942); Frezinskii, *Pochta Il'i Erenburga,* 105; and Dmitrii Shepilov, *The Kremlin's Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev*, ed. Stephen

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36. Anisimov, *Sovetskie Pisateli,* 7; and Krylova, "Healers of Wounded Souls," 313.
37. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 5, 35; and Shneer, *Through Soviet Jewish Eyes*, 90.
38. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 58, l. 95–96.
39. Cited in G. V. Kostyrchenko, "Sovetskaia tsenzura v 1941–1952 godakh," *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 11–12 (1996): 88. Similar reports could be found in the British press about the German invasion of France when a communiqué from the French claimed that while fighting was taking place "on a large front . . . the enemy was everywhere repulsed." Michael Korda, *Alone: Britain, Churchill, and Dunkirk; Defeat into Victory* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2017), 154.
40. Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, xvii; and Jochen Hellbeck, *Stalingrad: The City That Defeated the Third Reich* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 12.
41. Seniavskaia, "Heroic Symbols," 73. One "debunking theory" posits that in 1951 authorities discovered Nikolai Gastello was not the hero he was purported to be. It was, in fact, Aleksandr Maslov, another captain from the same unit as Gastello, who, according to evidence, attempted to fly his plane into a German anti-aircraft emplacement and wound up hitting the ground some 180 meters away from the highway. Eduard Polianovskii, "Dva kapitana," *Izvestia*, January 28–29, 1997.
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43. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 62.
44. Sergei Kudryashov, "Remembering and Researching the War: The Soviet and Russian Experience," in *Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe*, ed. Jorg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens (New York: Berghahn, 2010), 100.
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46. Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 30.
47. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 890, l. 85–88. The most recent case study of this event and its history is Alexander Statiev, "'La Garde muert mais ne se rend pas!': Once Again on the 28 Panfilov Heroes," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 769–98.
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49. Alexander Werth, *Year of Stalingrad*, 76.
50. Seniavskaia, "Heroic Symbols," 76–77.
51. P. Lidov, "Tania," *Pravda*, January 27, 1942, 3.
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53. Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, 191–92. For additional references to 1812, see Mikhail Bragin, "1812—Borodinskaia Bitva—1942," *Pravda*, September 7, 1942, 3; and "Rasshirenie vystavki 'Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda,'" *Pravda*, July 2, 1941, 3.
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55. *Pravda,* July 30, 1942, 1; and "Stoiko zashchishchat' rodnuiu zemliu!," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* July 30, 1942, 1.
56. Cited in Al'tman, Terushkin, and Brodskaia, *Sokhrani Moi Pisma,* 157.
57. Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 51–-53.
58. Ilia Ehrenburg, "Ispytanie Ognem," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, June 27, 1942, 3; and Ehrenburg and Simonov, *In One Newspaper*, 230, 231, 232.
59. Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, 350.
60. Ehrenburg, *Tempering of Russia*, 351.
61. Ilia Ehrenburg, "Ubei!," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, July 24, 1942, 4.
62. Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 58. Similar articles, written before Ehrenburg's piece, included Alexei Tolstoy's "Kill the Beast," published in late June 1942, and Simonov's poem "Kill Him!," published on July 18. Werth, *Year of Stalingrad*, 108–9; and Konstantin Simonov, "Ubei ego!," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, July 18, 1942, 3.
63. I. V. Stalin, "Doklad na torzhestvenno zasedanii Moskovskogo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia s partiinymi I obshchestvennymi organizatsiiami goroda Moskvy 6 noiabria 1941 goda," *Pravda*, November 7, 1941, 2. This quote from a dead German lieutenant was again invoked in *Pravda* in 1943. "Surovoe vozmezdie ozhidaet gitlerovskikh razboinikov!," *Pravda,* July 14, 1943, 1. Moreover, Nazi propaganda being broadcast to the Middle East on July 7, 1942, exhibited strikingly similar language, including the statement "Kill the Jews Before They Kill You." Jeffrey Herf, "Nazi Germany's Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims During World War II and the Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings," *Central European History* 42 (2009): 724–25.
64. Shneer, *Through Soviet Jewish Eyes*, 111–12; and Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 121.
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67. Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 176; G. Aleksandrov, "Tovarishch Erenburg uproshchaet," *Pravda,* April 14, 1945, 2; Timothy Johnston, *Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life under Stalin 1939–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59–60; and Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 193.
68. Sarnov, *Stalin i Pisateli, kniga pervaia,* 620.
69. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 191.

70. Ehrenburg, *War: 1941–1945*, 178.
71. Frezinskii, *Pochta Il'i Erenburga,* 210, 211.
72. O. Kurganov and A. Koloskov, "Ob 'ispovediakh' I 'propovediakh' v zhurnale 'Oktiabr,'" *Pravda,* June 24, 1946, 5; Harold Swayze, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946–1959* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 33–34; Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 40; and Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976), 108, 112, 118–19, 121–22.
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9

CRAFTING THE HISTORY OF TERRORTIMES 2

Compartmentalized Memory: Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past and the Discourse on German Sufferings at the Turn of the Millennium

VOLKER BENKERT

Es [das Volk] war so hart, als es die anderen schlug,
so taub für seiner Opfer Todesklagen—
Wie mag es nun das Opfer-Sein ertragen.
— ALBRECHT HAUSHOFER, "MOABITER SONETTE,"
FRANKFURTER HEFTE 1, NO. 4. (1946): 84

INTRODUCTION: "WHY ONLY NOW?"

With this opening line of his 2002 novel *Im Krebsgang,* Günter Grass seemingly sparked a new discussion about the sufferings of Germans in World War II.[1] Though the Nobel laureate was perhaps the most influential figure to weigh in on this issue, he was not the first to spearhead this debate. W. G. Sebald argued in his 1997 lecture *Literatur und Bombenkrieg* that there was a taboo against writing about the bombings of German cities.[2] With a similar view of breaking inhibitions, *Eine Frau in Berlin* (1959), an eyewitness account describing the rape of German women at the onset of Soviet occupation, was reedited in 2002 and turned into a large-budget movie in 2008.[3] Quick to pick up on the notion of neglect of Germans' wartime agonies, *Der Spiegel* featured a series entitled "Germans as Victims" in spring 2002.[4] Although these debates focused on civilians, the defeated soldier at the end of the war and as prisoner of war (POW) is also included in today's victim discourse, often indiscriminately with civilians. Guido Knopp's television documentaries

Stalingrad: Das Drama (2002) and *Die Gefangenen* (2003) showed the sufferings of German soldiers at war and in captivity but almost ignored the army's participation in war crimes, described by the Wehrmacht exhibitions in 1995 and 2002 and in 2011 in soldiers' own words through the discovery of wiretappings of German POWs in American captivity.[5] In this supposedly novel discourse about the miseries at home and on the front lines, four topics become evident: flight and expulsion from the eastern parts of the former Reich, the bombings, the rape of German women by Soviet troops, and war as well as prisoners of war. One wonders why Germans, having long integrated refugees from the East, rebuilt cities, and seemingly overcome losses and injuries, at the turn of the millennium were still haunted by the ordeals of past generations with such intensity, almost sixty years later. Striking, too, is the idea of breaking a taboo, as if—as Günter Grass puts it—the German crimes had overshadowed injustices committed against Germans or rendered it impossible to look at the victimization of Germans with empathy.[6] In this chapter I argue that this debate suggests a highly compartmentalized memory of World War II and the Holocaust, strictly divided between a learned discourse on German crimes and a continuous family and public narrative of German victimization since the 1950s. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Germans failed to establish a profound connection between these discourses, as the narrative on Germans as victims still relied on highly apologetic discourse patterns. The heightened awareness of the past as a result of generational changes and the passage of the past from collective to cultural memory in the young Berliner Republik did not reconcile this rift in memory, and Germans missed the opportunity that these changes provided for telling the story of their ancestors with empathy and understanding while casting no doubt on their collective failure. I claim that Germans at this time seemed to oscillate ever more rapidly between commemorative works in both realms, which are amplified by a highly engaged media as well as literature and popular films. Indeed, Germans at the beginning of the century and to a significant extent today are prisoners of apologetic discourse patterns that neither do justice to the sufferings of Germans during and after World War II nor allow for a meaningful understanding of their relationship to the German crimes.[7]

INCOMPATIBLE MEMORIES: VICTIMS OF GERMANY AND GERMAN VICTIMS

Contrary to the alleged originality of the discourse on Germans as victims, Robert Moeller and others have argued that the discussion at the start of this century drew from a discursive tradition of victimization already established in the 1950s.[8] Only in the 1960s, as awareness of the Nazi crimes finally grew, was the notion of devoting

attention to Germans as victims seen as scandalously ignoring the victims of genocide and war crimes. Yet the discourse on coming to terms with the past did not overshadow the self-perceptions of many older Germans as victims or completely silence the family narratives that supported them. Not surprisingly, the victim discourse thus reemerged during Helmut Kohl's long tenure as chancellor from 1982 to 1998. His inability to establish a meaningful relationship to the discourse on German crimes was most obviously revealed in the ambiguous dedication of the Neue Wache Memorial in Berlin to commemorate all victims of war and tyranny without distinction between victims of Germany and German victims—a gross failure that Kohl only corrected by consenting to the erection of the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.[9] Just as in the 1950s, the renewed debate on German sufferings was thus not only an attempt to come to terms with the traumas of loss and suffering; it also served to use the dialectic of victims and perpetrators to redefine ordinary Germans as victims and not as tacit accomplices of the Nazis or worse. This collective exculpation also reinforced narratives on the family level, where complex stories of involvement, complicity, and guilt were woven into simplistic narratives of innocence and victimization.[10] As a result, Germans developed two largely disconnected memory realms dominated by the learned cultural memory of the Holocaust and other crimes and the family and public narratives of German victimization. With regard to children as well as grandchildren of the war generation, Harald Welzer, for example, demonstrated that in the emotional context of the family both cohorts tend to unquestioningly accept the stories of almost heroic though futile resistance to the regime and victimization of the eyewitness generation.[11] Thus, the blueprint of a decades-old discourse on Germans as victims crucially influenced their perception of their fathers' or grandfathers' past even though they had all gratuitously encountered the Holocaust in public commemoration, in print, on TV, or in school. Even outside the family narrative, Germans at the turn of the millennium encountered a public debate structured along highly apologetic discourse patterns. Although the two issues are intimately related, the discourse on German sufferings thus continues to be divorced from that of Nazi crimes, betraying a fundamental lack of coming to terms with the terrors portrayed in both.

APOLOGETIC DISCOURSE PATTERNS IN GERMANY AROUND THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Widely used discourse patterns such as universalizing or relativizing the sufferings of Germans against German crimes, lack of contextualization, and distancing ordinary Germans from the heinous Nazi crimes pervaded the debate around 2000.

Universalization of suffering that blurs the lines of responsibility and causality frequently occurs in popular infotainment history programs, most notably those produced by ZDF, Germany's second largest public television channel. These programs often present German and Soviet soldiers as equally suffering in a war that seemingly knows neither aggressor nor perpetrators but only equal victims.[12] Although soliciting a sense of empathy among Germans towards Soviet POWs might be considered a step forward, such universalization veils German responsibility for the war.[13] Worse still, sufferings of Germans are often used to *relativize* German war crimes. Jörg Friedrich's best-selling books, for example, argue that a "war of annihilation" was waged against the German populace by bombing German cities.[14] Consciously employing language reminiscent of the Holocaust, Friedrich describes how bombing victims were gassed, burned, or simply consumed by the raging firestorms. Even though Friedrich carefully avoided the term *war crimes*, the point of this work was not only to highlight the horrors of the bombings but to weigh German crimes against German sufferings caused by the Allies.[15] Adding to an already rich iconography and established name (Dresden!) and number symbolism, Friedrich also published an illustrated volume that spared no gruesome detail of the slaughter in German cities. Often, however, the rich pictorial memory of Germans fails to problematize that many of its images and figures come directly from Joseph Goebbels's propaganda ministry.[16] Thus, the arranged images of the victims of rape and murder in the East Prussian village of Nemmersdorf fail to do justice to the actual victims whose bodies were shamelessly used by Goebbels to spur on more futile resistance in defense of the Nazi tyranny. Surely these images should not be reproduced uncritically. What is more, they are also almost exclusively presented in isolation from a discussion on sexual violence committed by German soldiers in the Soviet Union, still a taboo topic in Germany.[17]

A tendency to ignore the *context* of complicity in which German sufferings could be embedded can also be observed in the way the last months of the war are depicted as a period of unnecessary revenge and retaliation on the part of the Allies against essentially beaten and helpless Germans. Especially the February 1945 bombing of Dresden is taken as a prime example of a militarily pointless act of destruction. However, in the eyes of the Allies the Germans were neither defeated nor defenseless in February 1945. Thomas Childers stresses the casualties American forces still suffered, especially in the Battle of the Bulge, which dragged on to mid-January 1945.[18] German cities contributed to the war effort to the very day they were conquered. These cities also helped produce the bombs and planes that had brought destruction over the entire continent. Frederick Taylor thus concludes that the loss of human life in Dresden, "most of it by normal standards classifiable as innocent," was indeed tragic, "even if the city itself was not."[19]

Germany's biggest cinema productions since the 1990s are also marred by a remarkable lack of contextualization. Strikingly, the stories told in these movies focus on the

encirclement and death and not on the murderous march of the 6th Army to Stalingrad (e.g., *Stalingrad,* 1993).[20] Another film recounts the rape of a woman in Berlin but fails to contextualize that the author of the book was not just a random woman in Berlin but had previously been employed in Goebbels's propaganda ministry (*Eine Frau in Berlin*, 2008).[21] Arguably the most widely known production of the early 2000s focuses on Adolf Hitler's and his entourage's pathetic last days, not their crimes beforehand (*Der Untergang*, 2004).[22] Horrible as the sufferings of Germans were, they must be evaluated in the framework of the war that Germany unleashed in order to establish due context, chronology, and responsibility. Yet even when deliberate suppression of context is not the case, the discourse on German sufferings often attempts to *distance* German victims from German crimes. Already in 1946, Karl Jaspers dissociated ordinary Germans from "moral, metaphysical or a criminal" responsibility for the atrocities by arguing that Germans were only in a political sense guilty of having allowed the Nazis to come to power. Average Germans thus could distance themselves from the wrongs seemingly committed only by their leaders. Furthermore, the crimes were falsely placed in a spatial dimension far away from where these ordinary Germans were; the crimes allegedly happened only behind the men fighting on the front lines and also far away from the home front. The discourse on German sufferings, however, is not distant from collective memories. It talks about immediate, familiar, and ordinary places and people. It stresses *Heimat* even as it is lost, homes destroyed by bombs, ordinary German men—who often as involuntary draftees or seduced teenagers became soldiers—and POWs, who after years of captivity finally come home. These are narratives that are in some way present in any given German family. Adding to the perception of average Germans as victims of a history greater than themselves, the contemporary discourse on Germans as victims also tends to focus on the near, the emotional, and the individual account. Sönke Wortmann's movie *Das Wunder von Bern* (2003) thus tells the sentimental story of a returned soldier, whose tale of rising above his problems to integrate into society is linked to Germany's victory in the 1954 Soccer World Cup.[23] The protagonist's sufferings as a returning POW, his wife's survival in bombed Germany, his children's hardships growing up without a father, and above all the way they overcome all of these problems, are taken as an archetypal pars pro toto for all Germans. This type of mythology helps viewers to identify with the sufferings and unexpected recovery of ordinary Germans and simultaneously distances those ordinary Germans, the alleged vast majority, from those few who perpetrated the heinous Nazi, not German, crimes.

While commemoration of the suffering of Germans during and after World War II is a vital part of the country's identity, discourse patterns such as universalization, relativization, lack of context, and distancing Germans from the crimes prevent a meaningful relationship between the two discourses on German crimes and German suffering and thus compartmentalize society's understanding even more.

THE BERLINER REPUBLIK: INCREASED MOMENTUM OF MEMORY WARS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

Due to the continuing use of the aforementioned apologetic discourse patterns, the memory debates came to the fore in the Berliner Republik at the turn of the century with great force. Generational changes, the passage from communicative to cultural memory, and the renegotiation of German identity after unification caused these debates to increase in momentum. This new rigor stood in marked contrast to the voices that called for bridging the divide between the two discourses, albeit often in the same relativizing manner as before.[24] To its credit, German society also continued and still continues to commit to the ongoing commemoration of German crimes and engage the recent scholarly debate around the complicity of ordinary Germans. Thus, the Wehrmacht exhibitions drew crowds in all major German cities, even sparking a parliamentary debate. The public also engaged in controversial scholarship on Aryanization, arguing that ordinary German civilians were willing beneficiaries of the expulsion and murder of the Jews, and German audiences now discuss the discovery of wiretappings of German POWs, which reveal the widespread autotelic and sexual violence exercised by ordinary Germans.[25] Yet as I showed earlier, Germans delved with equal rigor into literature, scholarship, and media with apologetic undertones portraying Germans as victims. For some commentators the appeal to commemorate German sufferings from Grass and others just continued to be a means of gradually substituting German perpetrators for German victims.[26] Others, however, hinted at a necessity to work through this allegedly denied part of the German past in much the same way that Germans had come to terms with the Holocaust.[27] As a result, Germans at this crucial moment were presented "as simultaneously guilty and suffering in proportions still very much open to dispute."[28]

As the debate sought to settle this score with renewed passion, generational fault lines played an important role in shaping the discourse on Germans as victims. Since both the cohort that gave birth to most of the perpetrators and the war generation had largely passed away, the generation shaping the discourse on German sufferings around 2000 was made up of those who were children and teenagers in 1945.[29] Naturally they perceived themselves as victims seduced and exploited by the regime as air defense helpers (*Flakhelfer*) or child soldiers (*Kindersoldaten*).[30] Their urge to overcome long-buried personal traumas was met with a growing interest from oral historians and the media.[31] On the occasion of the May 8 commemoration in 2005, *Der Spiegel* and the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* both published a series of eyewitness accounts mostly from this generation. Not surprisingly, these featured above all their horrific experiences at the war's end.[32] With perpetrators and soldiers, and even those whose only fault might have been voting for Hitler in 1932, having passed away, the lone voice from the past

then was one of German victims. What is more, even the first postwar generation, which had challenged the culture of denial before 1968, seemed to have developed a new interest in German sufferings. In 2004 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made no secret of his very first visit to his father's grave in Romania, where he was killed in action in 1944. Many authors, such as W. G. Sebald, Jörg Friedrich, and Helke Sanders, who spearheaded the discourse on German sufferings, hail from the so-labeled 68er generation. Their contemporary books on German sufferings were often preceded by extensive work on Nazi crimes, as if, as Herman Beyersdorf suggests, they felt a moral obligation to address the crimes first to overcome their ideological qualms about writing on German suffering.[33] It is thus not surprising that the idea of breaking a self-imposed taboo against writing about German sufferings was prominent among former 68ers.

In addition to generational shifts, a renewed search for national identity after unification in 1990 triggered a "process of internal introspection" with respect to the past that accelerated the memory debates in Germany.[34] Having overcome a second dictatorship on German soil, and building on decades of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the Federal Republic gained legitimacy internationally and sought to establish greater ease toward its past.[35] As a country that wanted be seen as having learned its lesson from history, the Berliner Republik even used the discourse on the Holocaust and that on German sufferings to support the moral obligation for or the moral reserve against intervention on foreign soil.[36] While Germans thus seem to draw on both discourses to finally be on the morally right side of history, countries terrorized by Germany during World War II began to question their established historical master narratives of resistance and noncollaboration under German occupation. After long and painful debate, the Paris Shoah Memorial of 2005 acknowledged French assistance to the Holocaust under German pressure.[37] The Polish Institute of National Remembrance largely concurred with Jan T. Gross's assertions that the Jews had been murdered by their Polish neighbors, albeit at the instigation of the German occupiers, which sparked an intense debate about antisemitism in Poland.[38] As a result, Germany's former victims underwent a painful process of facing the past around 2000, which allowed Germany, now equipped with a sense of having mastered its past, to become part of a European-wide commemoration of a universally burdened past.[39]

Applying the terms of Jan Assmann, this decade also saw a change from a communicative memory to a cultural memory of the past, which together with the aforementioned generational shift and changes in German identity added to the increased momentum of the debate.[40] In order to preserve the communicative memory as our cultural heritage, the new millennium saw an enormous increase in eyewitness accounts and biographical data, encouraged by the "biographical turn" in research and literature and the aforementioned generational shifts. In this context, one might think of Steven Spielberg's Shoah Foundation or Walter Kempowski's *Echolot* (1993) as much-needed

attempts to keep the voices of the past alive.[41] Yet the audience in Germany had much less exposure to communicative memory of the Holocaust, because Germans were by and large children and grandchildren of those who were deemed racially and politically acceptable to the Nazi regime. Thus, they were well attuned to the communicative memory of German sufferings, while their perceptions of German crimes stemmed from an accepted but learned discourse on German crimes. This discrepancy becomes apparent when considering the acclaim for Martin Walser's autobiographical novel *Ein springender Brunnen* (1998).[42] In essence, Walser sought to dissociate his childhood memories of Nazi Germany from the context of German crimes, to which he did not refer at all. Following the familiar discourse pattern of distancing near personal memories from historical context, he thus perpetuated it for a younger audience.[43] He claimed that the story of ordinary Germans can and should be seen in isolation from the learned cultural memory of the German crimes.[44] What became evident from this debate was that the relationship between the discourses on the Holocaust and on German sufferings can be seen as a clash between learned cultural memory of the Holocaust and narrations on German sufferings handed down from generation to generation. While the contemporary discussion of German sufferings around the year 2000 easily fit into long-established family traditions and thus was likely to be passed on to future generations, it remained largely disconnected from the learned heritage of the Holocaust. It was in this debate that gradual transition to cultural memory was negotiated. Given the predominance of the discourse patterns that separate the two discourses, this division was firmly cemented into a future understanding of the past in Germany.[45]

MEMORY COMPARTMENTALIZATION TODAY

The turn of the millennium as a moment when discourses on the past clashed with renewed rigor also informs memory discourses today. A look at contemporary miniseries about the war suggests that ordinary Germans, in productions such as *Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter* (2013), *Tannbach* (2015), *Das Boot* (2018), and *Charité im Krieg* (2019), are much more likely to be portrayed as complicit in the regime's crimes, yet they also remain victims of an all-powerful regime and an all-consuming war.[46] While the filmmakers' interest in problematizing the dichotomy between victims and perpetrators and expanding the categories of investigation to men and women is admirable, apologetic narratives similar to those explored here still cushion the realization that Germans' ancestors were often all too willing accomplices.

Universalization to blur the lines of responsibility and causality can be observed in *Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter.* In the first part, a group of Wehrmacht soldiers led by the protagonists force Russian civilians to walk ahead of them to clear a path through a

minefield. Three times the soldiers are reminded that their current position is untenable and that they have to move through the minefield to reach safety. After taking casualties themselves, they decide to force the Russian civilians to go in front of them. One of the protagonists even declares that the losses that are sure to result from crossing the minefield would not have to come from their own. In this scene, the soldiers are seemingly responding to the pressures of war to justify the inhumanity of their actions. The protagonist even underscores this notion by saying: "The war will only bring out the worst in us," as viewers hear German soldiers yelling orders at the civilians and exploding mines killing them.[47] The crime against the civilians is thus relativized as part of the horrors of war, whose agency—not the soldiers'—is marshalled to cushion their responsibility.

Relativization of German crimes plays a role in the more recent Sky production *Das Boot*. The film is a sequel to Wolfgang Petersen's blockbuster movie *Das Boot* from 1981, based on Lothar-Günther Buchheim's novel by the same name. While the earlier *Das Boot* film and the book focused on the experience of the crew at sea, the new Sky series makes considerable efforts to link the front in the Atlantic Ocean with the home front in occupied France. No longer avoiding any discussion of complicity of sailors in crimes committed on German submarine bases in France, the new Sky series, for example, discusses brutal German reprisals against the civilian population for acts of sabotage by the French resistance. Even sexual violence by German sailors—still a taboo topic in Germany—is shown.[48] Yet German crimes are relativized in the character of Samuel Greenwood, an American businessman who claims that his family financed Hitler's rearmament policies in the 1930.[49] Even though American companies such as Ford and IBM, through their German affiliates, indeed made money in Germany even after 1939, the German rearmament boom was financed almost primarily by German businesses, which profited handsomely.[50] Through this false claim in an absurd twist of the plot, German responsibility is relativized by suggesting an American co-responsibility, and German heroes, however tainted they may be, are confronted with the evils of American capitalism, represented by Greenwood.

Embedding stories of German suffering into the *context* of complicity of ordinary Germans is what recent films have set out to accomplish. Indeed, contemporary German films problematize this complicity of their protagonists like never before. In *Tannbach,* for example, not only do viewers see Graf von Striesow as a victim of Soviet postwar dispossession, but the film also reveals him to be a war criminal who ordered the shooting of civilians as reprisal for partisan attacks in the Soviet Union. Yet Striesow's complicity is wrapped into apologia to humanize him to viewers today. Confessing to his later wife, he argues that it was cowardice, not conviction, that forced him to order the shooting. What is more, his confession and acknowledgment of guilt redeem him in the eyes of viewers today: "I did not have the strength; I did not have the courage. There is no excuse. Time does not heal wounds. . . . What remains is guilt."[51]

Finally, *distancing* Germans from the wrongs seemingly only committed by their leaders can be observed in *Charité*. In the last gasp of the Third Reich in 1944–45, Nobel Prize laureate Ferdinand Sauerbruch is shown as a tireless physician helping hundreds of war casualties regardless of their station in the Nazi regime. The film, however, also distances him from the complicity of many physicians in Nazi crimes by neglecting to problematize his knowledge and support of human experiments conducted by the likes of Josef Mengele and Karl Gebhardt. As Robert Jütte has argued, Sauerbruch, in his capacity as a member of the Reich Research Council, had favorably reviewed a proposal by Mengele to conduct human experiments at Auschwitz. He had also heard Gebhardt speak about experiments on captured Soviet partisans.[52] By failing to explore Sauerbruch's knowledge of the inhumanity of so many members of his profession, the film distances him from the crimes.

CONCLUSION: COMPARTMENTALIZED MEMORY IN THE BERLINER REPUBLIK

At the turn of the millennium, German memory of war and genocide was still highly compartmentalized. Its main tenets—the public discourse on coming to terms with the Nazi past through remembrance of its victims and the private and public memory of Germans as victims of bombs, expulsions, rape, and Soviet captivity—remained largely divorced from each other. The continuing use of apologetic discourse patterns like universalizing suffering, relativizing German crimes, failure to render German sufferings in context, and distancing German victims from German crimes prevented a meaningful engagement with both discourses. What is more, the heated memory debates of the Berliner Republik, amplified by the media, literature, and film, seemed to oscillate ever more rapidly between these poles, making it more difficult to overcome this compartmentalization. The compartmentalization of memory around the turn of the millennium and the apologetic discourse patterns that emerged from it also shape representations of the Nazi past in film today. Unable to speak about the complicity of ordinary Germans without wrapping it in apologia, portrayals of the Nazi past at the turn of the millennium, like their contemporary variants, remain hollow despite their professed novelty in showing ordinary Germans as co-perpetrators. As a result, their attempts to show empathy with German suffering remain equally shallow and divorced from an engagement with Germans as beneficiaries and accomplices of the regime's crimes.

NOTES

1. Günter Grass, *Im Krebsgang* [Crabwalk] (Göttingen: Steidl, 2002), 7. In this chapter, I focus on West German and post-unification discourses. Specific remarks on East Germany can be found in Robert G. Moeller, "Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post–Cold War history of World War II Legacies," *History and Memory* 17, no. 1 (2005): 155. See also Dorothee Wierling's comments in "The Changing Legacy of 1945 in Germany: A Round-Table Discussion between Doris Bergen, Volker Berghahn, Robert Moeller, Dirk Moses, and Dorothee Wierling," *German History* 23, no. 4 (2005): 552f.; and Monika Maron, "Der Fisch und die Bomben," in *Zeugen der Zerstörung* , ed. Volker Hage (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer 2003), 215. On the memory of Dresden bombings in the GDR, see Matthias Neutzner, "Vom Anklagen zum Erinnern," in *Das rote Leuchten. Dresden im Bombenkrieg,* ed. Oliver Reinhard, Matthias Neutzner, and Wolfgang Hesse (Dresden: Sächsische Zeitung 2005), 128–64.
2. W. G. Sebald, *Literatur und Luftkrieg* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999), 19. See also Frank Schirrmacher, "Luftkrieg," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 15, 1998.
3. Anonymous, *Eine Frau in Berlin*, ed. Kurt W. Marek (Geneva: Helmut Kossodo, 1959). Anonymous, *Eine Frau in Berlin: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen vom 20. April bis 22. Juni 1945*, ed. Hans Magnus Enzensberger (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 2002); and *Anonyma: Eine Frau in Berlin*, dir. Max Färberböck (Constantin Film, 2008, 132 min.).
4. Hans-Joachin Noak, "Die Deutschen als Opfer," *Der Spiegel* 56, no. 13 (2002), https://www.spiegel.de/politik/die-deutschen-als-opfer-a-026a09c5-0002-0001-0000-000021856125. This article appeared in a series of contributions entitled "Die Flucht: Spiegel Serie über die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten."
5. Guido Knopp, *Stalingrad* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 2002), 51; and Guido Knopp, *Die Gefangenen* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 2003). On the Wehrmacht exhibitions, see Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, eds., *Vernichtungskrieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995); Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002); and Sönke Neitzel und Harald Welzer, *Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2011).
6. Günter Grass: "Ich erinnere mich…" (Rede im Rahmen der Litauisch-deutsch-polnischen Gespräche über die Zukunft der Erinnerung, Vilnius, 2. Oktober, 2000) ,in Günter Grass, Czeslas Milosz, Wislawa Szymborska und Tomas Venclova, *Die Zukunft der Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallenstein Verlag, 2001).
7. On apologetic themes today, see Volker Benkert, "Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter — Apologie und Erlösung von der Vergangenheit im Fernsehkrieg," in *So war der deutsche Landser: Die populäre und populärwissenschaftliche Darstellung der Wehrmacht*, ed. Jens Westemeier (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh Verlag, 2019), 155–67.

8. Robert G. Moeller, "Sinking Ships, Lost Heimat, and Broken Taboos," *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 2 (2003): 158; Volker Ulrich, "Weltuntergang kann nicht schlimmer sein," *Die Zeit*, November 28, 2002; and Nicholas Stargardt, "Opfer der Bomben und er Vergeltung," in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Lothar Kettenacker (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2003), 62f.
9. Peter Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland. Die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute* (Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2001). For an overview of the debate on the Berlin memorials see James Young, *At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
10. See, for example, Werner Hassel's account—"A large number of people really didn't know anything,—in Eric A. Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband, *What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder, and Everyday Life in Germany; An Oral History* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 180–84.
11. Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, *"Opa war kein Nazi": Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Verlag, 2002).
12. Jens Ebert, "Verlorene Siege, vergebliche Opfer, vergessene Verbrechen," *Krieg und Literatur* 8 (2002): 82.
13. Vgl. Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ed., *Kriegsgefangene—военнопленные: Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene in Deutschland; Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1995).
14. Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945* (Munich: Propyläen Verlag 2002).
15. Achatz von Müller, "Volk der Täter, Volk der Opfer," Die Zeit, October 23, 2003, 35. https://www.zeit.de/2003/44/OpferDeutsche/seite-4.
16. Popular films such as *Der Untergang*, directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel and starring Bruno Ganz, Corinna Harfouch, Ulrich Matthes, and Alexandra Maria Lara (Constantin Film, 2004, 155min.) and *Anonyma: Eine Frau in Berlin*, directed by Max Färberböck and starring Nina Hoss and Eugeny Sidikhin (Constantin Film, 2008, 132 min.), use or even minutely reconstruct images from Goebbel's propaganda units, yet they fail to put them in context and perspective. See also Volker Benkert, "Kein 'Untergang' der Geschichtskultur, Aber auch keine Bereicherung," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 56, no. 7 (2005): 414–19.
17. Regina Mühlhäuser, *Eroberungen: Sexuelle Gewalttaten und intime Beziehungen deutscher Soldaten in der Sowjetunion 1941–1945* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010).
18. Thomas Childers, "'Facilis descendus Averni Est': The Allied Bombing of Germany and the Issue of German Suffering," *Central European History* 38, no.1 (March 2005): 103.
19. Frederick Taylor, *Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945* (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).

20. *Stalingrad*, directed by Joseph Vilsmaier and starring Dominique Horwitz, Thomas Kretschmann, Jochen Nickel, Sylvester Groth, Martin Benrath, and Dana Vávrová (Senator Film, 1993, 134 min.).
21. *Anonyma: Eine Frau in Berlin*.
22. *Der Untergang*.
23. *Das Wunder von Bern*, directed by Sönke Wortmann and starring Louis Klamroth and Peter Lohmeyer (Constantin Film 2003 113 min.).
24. For example, Horst Köhler, "Rede zum 8. Mai 2005 vor dem deutschen Bundestag," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 5, 2005: "Wir trauern um alle Opfer Deutschlands—um die Opfer der Gewalt, die von Deutschland ausging, und um die Opfer der Gewalt, die auf Deutschland zurückschlug. Wir trauern um alle Opfer, weil wir gerecht gegen alle Völker sein wollen, auch gegen unser eigenes" ("We mourn for all those victimized by Germany—for the victims of violence starting in Germany and for the victims of violence that returned to Germany. We mourn for all victims, because we want to do justice to all peoples, including our own"; trans. V.B.).
25. On the Wehrmacht exhibitions, see Heer and Naumann, *Vernichtungskrieg*; and Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht*. On Aryanization, see Götz Aly, *Hitlers Volksstaat. Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005). On violence of soldiers, see Sönke Neitzel, *Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 2011). On autotelic violence, see Jan Philipp Reemtsma, *Vertrauen und Gewalt: Versuch über eine besondere Konstellation der Moderne* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2008).
26. Dan Diner, *Gedächtniszeiten: Über jüdische und andere Geschichten* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003), 200. See also Michael Klundt, *Die Nation im Helden- und Opfertaumel: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und seine Folgen im deutschen Geschichtsdiskurs* (Cologne: PapyRossa Verlag, 2004), 158f.; and Achatz von Müller, "Passionsspiel Mit Hintersinn," *Die Zeit*, February 3, 2005, https://www.zeit.de/2005/06/passionsspiel.
27. Wolfgang Sofsky, "Die halbierte Erinnerung," in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Lothar Kettenacker (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2003), 126; Peter Schneider, "Deutsche als Opfer?," in Kettenacker, *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, 163; and Arnulf Baring, "Wir brauchen mehr Mut zur Erinnerung: Die Deutschen wagen es nicht, eigene Verluste zu betrauern," *Die Welt*, September 2, 2000, https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article531407/Wir-brauchen-Mut-zur-Erinnerung.html. Critically, see Nicholas Berg, "Eine deutsche Sehnsucht," *Die Zeit*, November 6, 2003, 38, https://www.zeit.de/2003/46/Debatte/seite-2.
28. Mary Nolan, "Germans as Victims during the Second World War," *Central European History* 38, no. 1 (2005): 8.
29. Norbert Frei, *1945 und wir. Das Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 13. On perpetrators from the cohort born between 1900 and

1913, see Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002).

30. Micha Brumlik, "Der Schwanengesang der Flakhelfer," *TAZ*, December 3, 1998. Günter Grass also belongs to this age cohort. See Günter Grass, "Ich glaube, wir haben unsere Lektion kapiert," Gespräch mit Fritz Pleitgen, *Spiegel Online*, October 10, 2002, https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/interview-mit-guenter-grass-ich-glaube-wir-haben-unsere-lektion-kapiert-a-217571.html.
31. Hans Ulrich Wehler, "Vergleichen—nicht moralisieren," *Der Spiegel Spezial*, January 6, 2003, 140, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-26060055.html. For the media's attention, see "Kriegsende 1945," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 20–May 5, 2005. See also Stefan Aust and Frank Schirrmacher, "Was haben Sie am 8. Mai 1945 gemacht: Gespräche mit Zeitzeugen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 15 to May 5 2005; "Die Stunde Null, Teil 1: Was das Kriegsende für die Deutschen bedeutet"and "Teil 2: Lehren aus der Katastrophe," in *Die Zeit Geschichte,* January 2005; and "Kriegsende 1945: Das Finale des Weltenbrandes," *Geo Epoche* 17 (2005). See also Walter Kempowski's collection of eyewitness accounts of the bombing of Dresden: Walter Kempowski, *Der rote Hahn: Dresden Im February 1945* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001).
32. Matthias Drobinski, "Wirkliche Erinnerung," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 14, 2005; Stephan Schlak, "Die 29er. Der deutsche Nachkriegsgeist wird 75—kurzer Ausblick auf eine ausdauernde Generation," *Berliner Zeitung*, January 23, 2004; and Hartmut Radebold, "Dir ist etwas Schreckliches passiert," *Der Spiegel* 49 (2005): 172–77.
33. Hartmut Beyersdorf, "Von der *Blechtrommel* bis zum *Krebsgang*: Günter Grass als Schriftsteller der Vertreibung," *Weimarer Beiträge* 48, no. 4 (2002): 568–93.
34. "Changing Legacy of 1945 in Germany," 520.
35. See, for example, Angela Merkel's speech in 2003. Angela Merkel, "Rede der Vorsitzenden der CDU Deutschlands Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem 17," Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands am 1. Dezember 2003 in Leipzig, http://www.cdu.de/pt-leipzig-03/download/rede_pv_parteitag_leipzig_01122003_presse.pdf, 12f. See also the commentary by Bernd Ulrich, "Alle Menschen werden Brüder: Notwendig oder heikel? Das Volk versöhnt sich mit seinen Vergangenheiten—weil die Zukunft zum großen Streitfall wird," *Die Zeit*, October 30, 2003, https://www.zeit.de/2003/45/Alle_Deutschen_werden_Brueder.
36. See especially the debates on NATO-led bombings to stop ethnic cleansing and murder in Bosnia in 1995, which were supported by analogies to the Holocaust. Likewise, the bombings to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 1999 were accompanied by invoking the expulsions of Germans.
37. Mémorial de la Shoah, Musée, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris. Compare to the debate about Henri Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), originally

published in French in 1987.

38. Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For an investigation of memory work in Poland and the role of the IPN, see Ewa Ochman, "Collective Remembrance in Jedwabne: Unsettled Memory of World War II in Postcommunist Poland," History & Memory 18, no. 1 (April 2006): 166.
39. On the difficulty of creating European memory of World War II, see Claus Leggewie, "The Second World War in European Memory: Calamity, Loss of Power and a New Beginning," Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Brussels—European Union, September 2, 2014, https://eu.boell.org/en/2014/09/02/second-world-war-european-memory-calamity-loss-power-and-new-beginning.
40. Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992).
41. Walter Kempowski, *Das Echolot: Ein kollektives Tagebuch* (Munich: Knaus Verlag, 1993).
42. Martin Walser, *Ein springender Brunnen: Roman* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998).
43. Hans Günter Hockerts, "Zugänge zur Zeitgeschichte: Primärerfahrung, Erinnerungskultur, Geschichtswissenschaft," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 28 (2001): 15–30.
44. Heinz-Peter Preusser, *Krieg in den Medien* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 496.
45. One notable exception from this compartmentalization of the past can be seen in the Stolpersteine project in German cities. These "stumbling blocks" are small makers of the displacement or murder of Jewish Germans in front of the houses in which they last lived. This brings the discourse on the Holocaust into everyday life in contemporary Germany.
46. *Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter*, directed by Philipp Kadelbach and starring Volker Bruch, Tom Schilling, Katharina Schüttler, Ludwig Trepte, and Miriam Stein (ZDF, 2013, 90 min.), DVD (distributed in the US by Music Box as *Generation War*); *Tannbach*," Dir. Alexander Diesbach, with Heiner Lauterbach, Natalia Wörner, Henriette Confurius and Ludwig Trepte (ZDF, 2015, 115 min.) DVD; *Das Boot*, directed by Andreas Prochaska and starring Rick Okon, Vicky Krieps, and Leonard Scheicher (Bavaria Films, Sky and Sonar Entertainment, 2018, 60 min.); and *Charité im Krieg*, directed by Anno Saul and starring Ulrich Noethen, Mala Emde, Jannik Schümann, and Luise Wolfram (UFA, 2019, 90 min.).
47. "Der Krieg wird nur das Schlechteste in uns hervorbringen." *Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter*," pt. 1, i:09:18.
48. On rape by German soilders, see Mühlhäuser, *Eroberungen*, 140.
49. Sven Felix Kellerhoff, "'Das Boot' spielt mit einer Geschichtsklitterung," *Die Welt,* November 12, 2018, https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/article184341446/Hitler-Finanzierung-Das-Boot-spielt-mit-einer-Geschichtsklitterung.html.

50. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 133f.
51. "Ich hatte nicht die Kraft, ich hatte nicht den Mut. Es gibt keine Entschuldigung. Die Zeit heilt keine Wunden. (. . .) Was bleibt ist die Schuld" (trans. V. B.). *Tannbach*, pt. 3, 1:22:20.
52. Wiebke Hollersen, "Wie ging es an der Charité im Nationalsozialismus wirklich zu?," *Die Welt*, February 2, 2019, https://www.welt.de/gesundheit/article189020075/Charite-in-der-ARD-War-Ferdinand-Sauerbruch-wirklich-ein-Held.html. For a more favorable representation of Sauerbruch supporting his statements that he did not realize the impact of Mengele's experiments on prisoners, see Christian Hardinghaus, *Ferdinand Sauerbruch und die Charité: Operationen gegen Hitler* (Berlin: Europa Verlag, 2019), 116f.

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10

TERRORTIMES IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1

Between National and European Memory? About Temporal and Spatial (Dis)Continuities in Post-1989 Dutch Memory Culture

ILSE RAAIJMAKERS

INTRODUCTION

"A DELICATE MISSION."[1] WITH THESE WORDS THE DUTCH AND GERMAN media described the invitation to German federal president Joachim Gauck to deliver a speech on Dutch liberation day, 5 May 2012. On this day, the Dutch people remembered and celebrated their liberation from German occupation in 1945. This was not only an exceptional event because the *former victim* invited the *former perpetrator* to commemorate the liberation together; it was also the very first time a foreign head of state was invited to give a speech on this national commemoration day. In his speech, the president referred to several episodes of Dutch occupation history, but he also addressed the present and future. This is especially evident in Gauck's closing words:

> Some 67 years ago, we would have described our current state of affairs as pure paradise: for three generations, Dutch and Germans have lived with shared values and have been working together in Europe and worldwide to promote these values. We can be proud that our countries have been part of this united Europe from the very beginning, and that we are considered honest and reliable partners in many regions

> of the world. We are jointly benefiting from the freedom, peace and prosperity that come with strengthened European and international cooperation. I hope this unique success will give us the strength we need to master our present-day challenges and to shape our common future in Europe.[2]

The final part of the speech is completely dedicated to Europe. In fact, there is no statement in this passage that doesn't contain a reference to Europe, and all of it has a positive connotation. A joint Dutch-German commemoration of the end of World War II on 5 May provided the perfect occasion for Gauck's ode to Europe.

Such references to Europe on commemorations of World War II in the Netherlands are not new. They appeared with increasing frequency in the post-1989 period, often in relation to Dutch-German commemorations that became the topic of debate in the same period. The debate over whether, and how, to include the Germans in the celebration of Dutch national commemoration days represents an important turning point in Dutch memory culture. This discussion started in the mid-1990s and still remains an ongoing story; witness the mixed reactions to the invitation to Gauck. In this chapter I examine the use of *Europe* in the context of Dutch-German commemorations in the mid-1990s around 4 and 5 May, the national commemoration days of World War II in the Netherlands. In addition to liberation day on 5 May, the Dutch commemorate their war victims on 4 May.

To understand the background of the mid-1990s debate, I first give a brief overview of the European national memory discourse since 1945 to which the actors in the debate reacted. Subsequently I describe the immediate cause of the debate in 1994 that was triggered by international developments. Then I scrutinize the political-cultural context of the debate as well as the different points of view represented in it. Finally, I return to the question of the meaning of Europe in this debate. As we will see, Europe is often referred to as being opposed to national memory. Some of the major actors propose that Europe should supplant the nation as the central reference of commemorations. This debate has still not ended. As I argue here, it may be more fruitful to strive for a synthesis between European and national memory.

EUROPEAN NATIONAL MEMORIES AFTER 1945

After the liberation by Allied forces in May 1945, the Netherlands found itself in dire straits. The nation had suffered more from World War II than other Western European country; in particular, it experienced severe damage, economic and social chaos, and above all large numbers of casualties. This was all remembered in terms of *national*

terrortimes and *national* terrorscapes, leaving little space for the international aspects of World War II. National suffering played an important role in the narrative about the war alongside another essential national element: resistance. The foundation myth of postwar Dutch society was rooted in the resistance. In this myth, *resistance* was characterized as the distinguishing attitude or mentality of the entire population: the Dutch people as a nation stood up against the Germans. In public memory, the war became the paragon of national unity. Many Dutch people identified with this image of World War II as a period of "oppression and resistance." It supported both the postwar reconstruction and the morale of the population; one could be proud of the past. This national myth compensated for the humiliating and shocking experience that actually characterized the war.[3] Such national war narratives, which distorted history in order to forget or support the foundation myth of postwar society, were widespread in postwar Europe. "Every occupied country in Europe developed its own 'Vichy syndrome,'" as Tony Judt has described it, referring to the French memory discourse.[4]

In the immediate postwar period, the Dutch national memory discourse was very exclusive. Mainly (Allied) soldiers and resistance fighters were collectively remembered. Other victims, such as Jews, Roma, Sinti, and other civilian casualties, had no place in the public commemorations. Again, this was not particular to the Netherlands, for at the time many European countries centered cultural memory of World War II on *active* victims, persons who had died because of their (heroic) actions. Their death was not in vain; they had made a sacrifice for the community. By contrast, this logic would imply that *passive* victims had not died through something they had *done* but because of who they *were*.[5] Their death was useless to the postwar community. As Judt put it: "Whereas liberation, resistance and deportees [. . .] could all be put to some service in compensatory national myth-making, there was nothing 'usable' about the Holocaust."[6]

This memory discourse of national terrortimes and national terrorscapes was already showing cracks before the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. The tide turned from the 1960s onward as the Holocaust began to take a central place in the public memory of the war. It became widely known that an incredibly high number of Dutch Jews were murdered during the war, though mainly not in the Netherlands but elsewhere in Europe. There was an increasing interest in and acknowledgment of the suffering of the Jews in Dutch society. The representation of World War II changed from the heroic and nationalistic notion of "oppression and resistance" to an image of senseless suffering—the persecution and the camps—and individual harm. Within this memory discourse, the private memories of survivors and other first-generation victims and their feelings earned significant status. These changes since the 1960s were naturally linked to the social and cultural upheaval of that time.[7]

In spite of these major shifts in the representation of the war, Dutch historian J. C. H. Blom pointed to the fact that the basic consensus on the meaning of the war

was unchanged. The memory of the war remained a "moral touchstone" in Dutch society, "the basis of a clear distinction between moral and immoral, good and bad [*goed en fout*]."[8] These "judicial-moral terms,"[9] used to describe the Dutch behavior in World War II between resistance (*goed*) and collaboration (*fout*), were an important political-moral framework to interpret the war, both by historians and the wider public. In his inaugural lecture "Under the Spell of Good and Bad?," delivered in 1983,[10] Blom denounced this political-moral historiography of World War II. He incited historians to struggle out of this "goed-fout perspective" and come up with new perspectives on the war that contained fewer value judgments. Dutch behavior in the war could not be categorized as either *goed* or *fout*, according to Blom.[11] His plea was heard by historians, but not as quickly by the wider public. In fact, in his farewell speech before retirement in 2007, Blom stated that public opinion was still under the spell of *goed* and *fout*.[12]

This does not mean that *goed* and *fout* were not discussed in public before. In the mid-1990s the supposedly black-and-white perspective on the war was openly criticized and used to plead for a more European perspective. In general, there was a widespread call at that time for a more critical view of the Dutch war past, in which Europe played an important role. This call was a reaction to the national memory discourse described previously.

COMMEMORATING WITH GERMANS?

The invitation to the German federal president to come to the Netherlands in 2012 must be seen through the longitudinal lens of the debate about the question of whether Dutchmen and Germans should commemorate together on the Dutch remembrance days, 4 and 5 May. To understand why this debate is so crucial for Dutch memory culture and why Europe plays such an important role in it, we have to look at its origins. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European integration gained momentum, and the *memory boom* of World War II came to a tentative head with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. The link between both developments is clearly visible in the Dutch debate of the mid-1990s.

The start of this debate in 1994 was triggered by developments elsewhere in Europe. In the run-up to the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Europe, governments, municipalities, and civil society were in full preparation for what would become a true commemoration marathon. The kickoff was the fifty-year anniversary of D-Day on 6 June 1994. In Germany and France a fierce discussion had ensued months before about the question of whether German chancellor Helmut Kohl should get an invitation for this commemoration. To his disappointment, Kohl was not welcome at the D-Day commemoration, where twenty-five heads of states celebrated the invasion in Normandy.

As a reaction to these international debates, which drew widespread attention in Dutch media, a similar debate started in early 1994 in the Netherlands about whether German representatives should be invited to the commemorations on 4 and 5 May. The debate was initially started by remarks by the Dutch ambassador to Germany, Peter van Walsum. On several occasions he had pleaded for a less nationalistic approach to celebrating liberation day in the Netherlands, because this event had, in his view, a more European meaning. This plea was supported by historical arguments. Van Walsum was an advocate of the perspective that World War II was not a conflict between nation-states but rather a fight between democracy on the one hand and Nazism and fascism on the other—that is, a struggle of ideologies. In line with the argument in German federal president Richard von Weizsäcker's famous speech in 1985, to which Van Walsum referred, the ambassador saw the end of World War II not as a defeat of Germany but as a worldwide liberation from Nazism, in which Germany was included.[13]

According to Van Walsum, this view also implied a correction of the Dutch nationalistic image of the war, in which all Germans were wrong and all Dutch were good. Along these lines, he thought that the Dutch should stop commemorating the war in nationalistic terms; it was about time to celebrate together with the Germans. The commemorative collaboration would do justice to this perspective.[14]

We should keep in mind that this was a plea made by the Dutch ambassador to Germany, who saw himself as "the guardian of Dutch-German relations."[15] These relations had been under stress in the early 1990s for several reasons. First there was German irritation about the publicly expressed Dutch doubts with regard to the reunification of the two Germanies in 1990. With other European heads of government, Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers was skeptical about German reunification, fearing renewed German nationalism and expansionism. More European cooperation proved the answer to this fear. The strengthened European integration process of the 1990s was not so much the result of renewed friendships in Europe but of the memory of European terrortimes.

Second, in 1993 the outcome of a survey showed that Dutch adolescents had an extremely negative image of Germany. But above all there were frictions about the 1.2 million Dutch postcards with the presumptuous text "I am furious" that were sent to Kohl after the antiforeigner violence in Solingen in 1993, where five people were killed in a fire—as if the Germans themselves had not been outraged.[16] Therefore, the ambassador may have had a hidden agenda for the improvement of Dutch-German relations behind this public plea for commemorative collaboration. In March 1994, his words were picked up by Dutch media and caused a huge public debate. In this controversy, the concept of Europe assumed a central position in the various arguments.

DIVIDED PASTS, COMMON FUTURE

Within the debate concerning the joint commemoration with Germans an important topic became this question: *What* should be remembered? Temporal and spatial dimensions were important here. Proponents of a joint commemoration focused on the postwar period. They found it important to concentrate not only on the terrortimes of World War II but also on the postwar successes. In these proponents' view, a common Dutch-German commemoration could reflect and underline postwar reconciliation and cooperation between the Netherlands and Germany: *in Europe*. From former enemies the Germans had turned into allies in a united Europe, wherein both countries supported the same values, like freedom and democracy. Europe was an important spatial frame of reference in this line of argument that *enabled* a joint commemoration. The success of a united Europe was what bound the Germans and Dutch together.

In the Dutch newspapers, several examples emerged that contributed to this way of thinking. The Anne Frank foundation wrote: "In the present Europe, in which there is talk of fraternization, we should involve them [the Germans] in one way or another in the liberation."[17] Others stressed that there could be no real Dutch-German reconciliation as long as the Dutch kept excluding the former enemies from their commemorations.[18] One newspaper editorial presented Germany as a guarantee for European stability, arguing that "this Germany deserves a place at the commemoration of the end of the period of the Third Reich. [...] Fifty years later, the commemoration is the pre-eminent moment for reconciliation and affirmation of the normalized relations [in Europe]."[19]

A collective commemoration is thus explained as a reward for Germany's achievements in Europe. The European spatial frame of reference adds weight to these arguments: Germany was important not only for the Netherlands but for Europe in general. Some even reversed the debate by arguing that it would be inappropriate behavior toward the fully European-integrated and democratic Germany to not invite it to the commemoration.[20]

Many dissenting opinions were also represented in the newspapers. The most frequently stated argument against Dutch-German commemorations was that of respect for the victims of World War II. They were not ready to commemorate together with their former perpetrators, it was said; this would hurt their feelings.[21] One commentator wrote: "It befits the Dutch government [...] to spare the feelings of resisters and victims on this Day [5 May]."[22] This perspective nicely demonstrates the "psychological" narrative of the war that was still dominant in the mid-1990s.[23] In public memory, the suffering of the victims still retained a central place, and the victims themselves held a high social status. Therefore, according to many opponents of the joint commemorations, people should respect their wishes if they did not want Germans present. Indeed, in the weeks of discussion in September and October 1994,

groups of former resistance fighters and Jewish organizations, among others, had expressed precisely this wish.[24]

As far as Europe was concerned, the opponents rejected the spatial reference to Europe as a common frame, proposing instead to stay focused on the national space. They stressed that they had nothing against European cooperation and reconciliation, and they acknowledged the achievements of Germany in this respect, but *national* commemoration days of World War II were in their view not the occasion to be utilized for this cause.[25] Some extended this argument by casting doubt on the intentions of the supporters for Dutch-German commemorations. What was striking in the whole debate was that the advocates were mainly politicians and intellectuals; the opponents, by contrast, were mainly members of resistance and victims' organizations or other members of the "first generation." In several readers' letters to newspaper editors this distinction was observed. According to the readers, the collective commemoration was a top-down initiative, imposed on the Dutch public by politicians. The general message of these letters was clear: don't use "our" national commemorations for political purposes.[26]

An opinion poll at that time showed that a small majority in the Netherlands had nothing against the involvement of Germans in the national liberation day. The poll result also revealed that mainly older people opposed the joint commemorations.[27] Nevertheless, the psychological narrative of the war caused the solidarity of the majority with the minority.

In the end, it was the Dutch government that would decide if a German representative was invited or not for a national commemoration. Initially, Dutch prime minister Willem Kok cautiously supported the idea of a common Dutch-German commemoration. After several talks with groups involved, such as the Jewish community and organizations of former resistance fighters, however, he had come to the conclusion that the Dutch commemoration days should remain a national affair.[28] One can conclude that the government had had to surrender to the dominant psychological perspective on the war. Too much resistance among the first generation had arisen against the proposal to commemorate together with Germans.

BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MEMORY?

I return here to the meaning of Europe in this debate. What narratives of World War II are articulated by referring to "Europe"? A closer look at the reference to Europe shows that European memory was used as opposed to national memory. This spatial dichotomy was important; it was however not fruitful in bringing closer a European memory discourse.

Most advocates of a joint commemoration contested, in their view, the hegemonic nationalistic memory discourse of that time. The Dutch ambassador to Germany, for example, who had started the debate, supported his plea for a Dutch-German commemoration with historical arguments, namely a different perspective on how people should view World War II. According to Van Walsum, a correction of the nationalistic image of the war in which all Germans were wrong and all Dutch were good was needed. In his view, the war was not a struggle between nation-states but between ideologies. The ambassador was not alone in his call for a more self-critical perspective on the past.

Next to historians and other intellectuals, in 1994–95 it was the Dutch government itself that repeatedly advocated cutting across the perspective of *goed* and *fout*, black and white. This clear memory politics was visible on several occasions, for example, in the speech given by Queen Beatrix during her state visit to Israel in March 1995. In front of the Knesset she spoke about "courageous and sometimes successful resistance." "But," she continued, "we also know that they were the exceptional ones, that the people of the Netherlands could not prevent the destruction of their Jewish fellow citizens."[29] These were the exact phrases that were picked up and spread by the media.

Two months later, on the national liberation day, the queen expressed words of similar meaning. In her speech on 5 May Beatrix said: "How weak the heart can be in such distress [World War II], may not be forgotten. After half a century, the recollections of these days are sometimes colored too black-and-white. To allow an honest representation it shouldn't be concealed that besides courageous behavior, passive conduct and active support to the occupiers have occurred."[30]

In April 1995, prime minister Kok also addressed the black-and-white stereotypes, in an interview with the German newspaper *Die Zeit*: "We need to look with open eyes to our own role [in the past]. The longer we have moved away from the events back then, the bigger the danger of black-and-white perspectives—we were the good guys, the others the bad guys. In this context one forgets that at that time, many Dutchmen also did not meet their human commitments and that innumerable Germans, like the Dutch, have also suffered from the Nazis."[31] These remarks make clear that, following the historians in the 1980s, the Dutch government in the 1990s pleaded for revisiting the past in a more self-critical way. The cozy image of a nation in which a large part of the population had been *goed* during the war and only a handful Dutchmen had been *fout* was publicly challenged. Instead, a narrative of shame and guilt was brought forward. A common insight in historiography for years was now presented in public debate as breaking a taboo.

In the debate about commemorating together with Germans, many advocates of a joint commemoration referred to the supposedly distorted national image of the war in public memory. With the same structure of arguments as the challenging of the *goed*

versus *fout* perspective, they questioned the dichotomy of the evil and guilty Germans and the good and innocent Dutchmen. According to proponents, the Dutch had cherished their role as victims too long, ignoring that there were among them also perpetrators, just as there were also victims among the Germans.[32] This new narrative of the war proposed by the supporters of a Dutch-German commemoration was presented as a *correction* of the national (resistance) myth; their view would be a more nuanced and even "honest representation" of the past. Not surprisingly, a joint commemoration was, according to its advocates, the perfect occasion to express this image of World War II.

However, the supposedly more nuanced representation of the war in the debate has mythical elements as well. This becomes clear when looking at the role of Europe in the debate. "Europe" was only used with positive connotations. It was the concept that embodied postwar peace, freedom, democracy, reconciliation, and cooperation. The new narrative of the war included a foundation myth: "On the ruins of World War II the *European Union* has appeared,"[33] ignoring the fact that there were several decades between these events.

Apart from stressing postwar European successes, proponents of a joint commemoration also underlined the common European present and future of Germany and the Netherlands. In the mid-1990s, the concept of an integrated Europe was presented as a *reality* that couldn't be ignored by cleaving to the tradition of national commemorations. In this way, (united) Europe served as a spatial frame of reference that *enabled* a Dutch-German commemoration of World War II. Such a commemoration would reflect all positive stories about Europe—reconciliation between former enemies who are now working together on their future—without completely losing sight of World War II. In this narrative, the European terrorscape during the war was the ultimate negative contrast to the present peaceful and united Europe.

This use of Europe was clearly a product of its time. After 1989 European integration gained momentum, partly and literally, on Dutch soil with the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The Netherlands considered itself part of the vanguard of postwar European integration. In this context, proponents of a joint commemoration had every reason to present the war as the birthplace of European integration. This supported the self-image of a *European* nation and gave a positive connotation to the commemorated past, just as the resistance had done in the immediate postwar period.

Nevertheless, this use of Europe was also part of the *correction* of a national myth and its replacement with a *more nuanced* image of the past, as presented in the debate in the mid-1990s. My aim here is not to criticize these actors in the debate—it is inescapable for societies to produce myths to account for their collective past—but rather to reveal the constructed character of Europe and the interests of the people it served. But it is problematic when such a dominant European memory discourse comes to replace rather than supplement a national memory discourse, as it did in the arguments of

some of these actors, leaving little room for nuance and ambivalence. Yet in the Dutch case, the European perspective did not replace national narratives of World War II. The basic consensus on the meaning of the war went unchanged, as Dutch historian Blom observed in 2007.[34] World War II memory remains a "moral touchstone" in Dutch society, and even now this memory is mainly understood in national terms.[35]

Overall, then, the legacy of the debate in the mid-1990s can be seen as a correction of a national myth and its replacement with a more nuanced image of the past, opening up the geographic imagination referred to during "national" commemoration. "Europe" received a more important place in the Dutch memory discourse of World War II from 1989 onward, as was clearly visible in the debate about commemorating with Germans. Europe can allow for common themes—reconciliation, peace, freedom—but we must not forget that the memory underneath is still often understood in national terms. It is useful not to see a national and European perspective in memory culture as mutually exclusive. Both perspectives can coexist. The Netherlands and many other European countries are still in the process of overcoming the dichotomy of national and European memory. But maybe it would serve us well to remember that our nations are part of Europe, not its antithesis.

NOTES

1. The English translations of quotations are by the author unless otherwise noted. "Ludger Kazmierczak: Bundespräsident Gauck in den Niederlanden," *WDR Tagesschau*, May 4, 2012.
2. "Joachim Gauck: Befreiung feiern—Verantwortung leben: Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck zum Nationalen Befreiungstag der Niederlande am 5. Mai 2012 in Breda/Niederlande." The text of the speech, including Dutch and English translations, is available at www.bundespraesident.de (accessed November 8, 2016).
3. J. C. H. Blom, "Suffering as a Warning: The Netherlands and the Legacy of a War," *Revue Canadienne d'Études Néerlandaises/Canadian Journal of Netherlandic Studies* 16, no. 2 (1995): 64–68; and Frank van Vree, "Auschwitz and the Origins of Contemporary Historical Culture: Memories of the Second World War in a European Perspective," in *European History: Challenge for a Common Future*, ed. Attila Pók, Jörn Rüssen, and Jutta Scherrer (Hamburg: Edition Körber Stiftung, 2002), 202–20.
4. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 808.
5. Aleida Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik* (Munich: Beck, 2006), 73–74.
6. Judt, Postwar, 809.

7. Blom, "Suffering as a Warning"; and Van Vree, "Auschwitz and the Origins."
8. Blom, "Suffering as a Warning," 64.
9. Robert Moore, "'Goed en fout' or 'Grijs verleden'? Competing Perspectives on the History of the Netherlands under German Occupation," *Dutch Crossing: A Journal for Students of Dutch in Britain* 27, no. 2 (2003): 155.
10. J. C. H. Blom, "In de ban van goed en fout? Wetenschappelijke geschiedschrijving over de bezetting in Nederland," in *Crisis, bezetting en herstel: Tien studies over Nederland 1930–1950* (The Hague: Nijgh & Van Ditmar Universitair, 1989), 102–20.
11. Blom, "In de ban van goed en fout?," 102–20.
12. Hans Blom, "Nog altijd in de ban van goed en fout," *De Volkskrant*, April 20, 2007, 11.
13. Leonoor Wagenaar, "Per ongeluk reed ik een heilige koe aan," *Het Parool*, January 22, 1994, 29; Wim Boevink, "Herdenking D-day zorgt voor beroering," *Trouw*, March 9, 1994, 7; and "Bevrijding samen vieren met Duitsers," *NRC Handelsblad*, March 11, 1994, 3.
14. Wagenaar, "Per ongeluk reed ik een heilige koe aan."
15. Wagenaar, "Per ongeluk reed ik een heilige koe aan."
16. Maud van de Reijt, *Zestig jaar herrie om twee minuten stilte: Hoe wij steeds meer doden gingen herdenken* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 85–90.
17. "Herdenking met Duitsers gevoelig," *Het Parool*, September 20, 1994, 1.
18. For example, Jan Durk Tuinier and Geu Visser, "Het wordt tijd om met de Duitsers vrijheid te vieren," *Trouw*, September 22, 1994.
19. "De lijn doortrekken," *Het Parool*, September 24, 1994, 7.
20. "Gebaar van verzoening," *Algemeen Dagblad*, September 20, 1994, 9.
21. "Bevrijding samen vieren met Duitsers."
22. Theo Gerritse, "Verzoening laat zich niet van bovenaf opleggen," *Algemeen Dagblad*, September 28, 1994, 9.
23. Jolande Withuis and Annet Mooij, eds. "From Totalitarianism to Trauma. A Paradigm Change in the Netherlands," in *The Politics of War Trauma. The Aftermath of the Second World War in Eleven European Countries* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 193–215.
24. "Voormalig verzet: Geen Duitse delegatie bij herdenkingen," *Trouw*, September 21, 1994; and "Joodse gemeenschap tegen herdenking met Duitsers," *Trouw*, October 1, 1994.
25. Awraham Soetendorp, "Herdenken moet een volk in intimiteit doen," *Het Parool*, October 14, 1994, 7.
26. See, for example, Jos Bloemgarten: "Duitsers 5," *Het Parool*, October 1, 1994, 9; D. J. Mulder, "Duitsers 7," *Het Parool*, October 14, 1994, 6; and Hans Schellinkhout, "Lust tot gezamenlijkheid," *Het Parool*, October 8, 1994, 4.
27. "Verdeeldheid over Duitsers op 5 mei," *Het Parool*, September 23, 1994, 3; and "Duitsers welkom op 5 mei bij 52 procent bevolking," *Trouw*, September 23, 1994.

28. "Geen herdenking met Duitsers op 4 en 5 mei 1995," *Trouw*, October 27, 1994.
29. Beatrix, *Koningin der Nederlanden: Voor het behoud van de menselijkheid; Vier redevoeringen van Koningin Beatrix* (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 29.
30. "H. M. de Koningin: Herdenken na vijftig jaar; Uitgesproken op 5 mei 1995 in de Ridderzaal te 's-Gravenhage ter gelegenheid van de vijftigste herdenking van de bevrijding," http://www.4en5mei.nl/media/documenten/beatrix-1995.pdf (accessed November 8, 2016).
31. Klaus Peter Schmid, "Was heißt das: Versöhnen?," *Die Zeit* 18 (April 25, 1995).
32. Herman von der Dunk, "Herdenking ritueel om waarheid te vergeten," *Het Parool*, November 5, 1994, 7; and Paul Scheffer, "Het verzet tegen verzoening," *NRC Handelsblad*, October 17, 1994, 9.
33. Ronny Naftaniel, "Gezamenlijke viering hoeft een traditionele samenkomst niet uit te sluiten: Betrek Duitsland bij 5 mei-viering," *NRC Handelsblad*, September 27, 1994, 9 (emphasis added).
34. Blom. "Nog altijd in de ban."
35. As State Secretary Martin van Rijn recently informed parliament: Kamerbrief met voortgangsrapportage Oorlogsgetroffenen en Herinnering WOII, November 3, 2016. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-volksgezondheid-welzijn-en-sport/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/11/03/kamerbrief-met-voortgangsrapportage-oorlogsgetroffenen-en-herinnering-woii.

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11

TERRORTIMES IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2

Remembering the Holocaust: Opportunities and Challenges

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The past is rarely if ever a closed book. Take the Holocaust.[1] The systematic murder of around six million Jews during the Second World War continues to be an open wound, but at the same time it has come to serve as a major point of reference for the collective memory of postwar Europe. In his study *Postwar* (2005), the British American historian Tony Judt (1948–2010) embarked on a search for the central meaning of the Holocaust for the political leaders and citizens of Europe today.[2] He recalled the works of the German poet Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), who in the early nineteenth century had arrived at the conclusion that Christian baptism was the only option available to the Jews of Europe to be accepted as full citizens of their countries. After 1945 this changed fundamentally, however, as Judt argued: "Today the pertinent European reference is not baptism. It is extermination."[3] The memory and recognition of the fate of the Jews in the extermination camps of Nazi Germany, in other words, turned into an "entrance ticket to Europe." Those who doubt the history of the Holocaust or question or minimize its seriousness position themselves outside of the social consensus. Any denial or downplaying of the Holocaust is equal to excluding oneself from civilized public debate. "Auschwitz," then, has become a benchmark of postwar European identity.[4]

THE HOLOCAUST AS IDENTITY MARKER

The memory of the Holocaust has deeply penetrated our political and moral consciousness more deeply than any other historical episode. Keeping this event at the forefront of our recollection, it is argued, helps us to sustain the moral foundations of a democratic society. How we relate to the Jewish tragedy is decisive for the functioning of our moral compass. It becomes a "mark of honor" that needs to be "deserved." Recognition or denial of the Holocaust now coincides with acceptance or rejection of the international political and legal order.[5] In other words, historical awareness is more than just a noncommittal, intellectual interest in events from the past. It is about the way in which contemporary citizens position themselves and build a social, political, and moral compass. Judt formulated this as follows: "The memory of Europe's dead Jews has become the very definition and guarantee of the restored humanity on the European continent."[6]

Putting the Holocaust at center stage in our collective memory and emphasizing its unique character also comes with a few side effects, of course. Although it reveals something about the way in which we look at the Judeocide as such, it also has implications for our historical awareness regarding other historical events. Put differently, the crimes of the Nazis have become a "gold standard" and a point of reference for the way in which we look at other genocides and other forms of massive violence. Since the end of the Second World War, it has grown familiar to us, at least in the North Atlantic world, to measure genocides and large-scale violence, as it were, against the yardstick of the extermination of the Jews. The fate of human beings and population groups in times of massive violence—both *before* and *after* the Holocaust—thus is looked at through the prism of *the* crime par excellence: namely, a largely successful attempt at systematic extermination of a group of Europeans (Jews) by another group of Europeans (Germans).[7]

Does this turn the Holocaust into a generally accepted international icon, vested with a universal meaning transcending historical time and place?[8] Will the memory of the Holocaust be conceived as having to do more with morality than with historical factuality? This would imply that the Holocaust is lifted out of history, so to speak. But precisely this issue is a subject of debate and controversy.[9] After all, should we look at the Holocaust as a kind of template that allows us to measure the size of other genocides and severe human rights violations, in the past as well as today and eventually in the future? Putting too much emphasis on the idiosyncratic character of the Holocaust may be accompanied by the risk of ignoring other genocides (and their victims in particular). The image of the Holocaust, in other words, vacillates constantly between the two poles of unicity (total incomparableness) on the one hand and universalism on the other (including the competence to compare it with and measure it against other

genocides). In both cases Auschwitz is turned into a "warning from history."[10] This assessment strongly influenced the Stockholm Declaration of 2000. It claimed that "the magnitude of the Holocaust, planned and carried out by the Nazis, must be forever seared in our collective memory," and "the depths of that horror . . . can be touchstones in our understanding of the human capacity for evil."[11] In response to the Stockholm Declaration, many countries launched a Holocaust Memorial Day, to commemorate each year on 27 January the liberation of Auschwitz on that same day in 1945.[12]

A CONTESTED MASTER NARRATIVE

More than seventy-five years after the end of the Second World War, the mass murder by Nazi Germany of the European Jews remains solidly embedded in the historical awareness of the Western world, and this is true in both the public sphere and the lives of many individual citizens.[13] The attention given to this episode in academia, the media, and public space is increasing rather than growing smaller. Those unfamiliar with the subject belong to a small and negligible minority. There is little doubt about the fact of the Holocaust's prominent presence in the collective memory of the West. But what is debatable is whether this is also truly desirable. One can ask oneself if putting the Holocaust center stage in our memory is useful, and if the large attention given to it in research, education, and public debate—including public space and its many monuments, museums, and commemorative sites—is perhaps tied to particular risks as well. Some scholars, such as the British scholar David Patrick, have in fact formulated sharp criticism of the omnipresence of the Holocaust.[14] Patrick has indicated at least four potential dangers articulated as questions: (1) Is it possible that inordinate attention to the Holocaust will be accompanied with the risk of its becoming an instrument for political or ideological reasons? (2) Is the notion of "drawing lessons from the past" not infused too often with overly large expectations? (3) Does a one-sided "overrepresentation" of the Holocaust perhaps have undesirable moral or pedagogical effects, in the shape of a decreasing sensibilization? (4) To what extent is it possible for "overrepresentation" of the Holocaust to lead to the opposite, and is a backlash inevitable? These four concerns are mainly of a pedagogical nature. But one can also, as a fifth concern, point to the epistemological implications of a certain one-sided Holocaust representation. This pertains to the issue of whether or not fixation on the Holocaust is essentially a form of historical anachronism. It must be pointed out that this kind of concern regarding the representation of the Holocaust ought *not* to be put on a par with a plea to ban it from collective memory or to downplay its meaning. What is at stake, however, is that Holocaust education and remembrance will benefit from critical self-reflection, and that in the end all will benefit from a careful and balanced knowledge and understanding of the past.

Politicization

In politics, in the media, and in public space, but also in international politics, it has become a commonplace to use the Holocaust as a moral benchmark, as it were.[15] Few will be afraid to do so, in particular when it seems politically advantageous or when it contributes to realizing loftier goals. Even wars or international confrontations are justified when considering the crimes of opponents—Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milošević, Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, the "Islamic State"—as on a par with those of the Nazis. This was the case, for instance, during the civil war in former Yugoslavia, in which in particular the Serbian-Bosnian concentration camps were compared to Auschwitz, or in which fighters on the Croatian side were presented as the new Ustaša (the Croatian fascist collaborators during the Second World War).[16] American historian Peter Novick once described the Holocaust as a "yardstick of evil," which particularly since the collapse of the Berlin Wall was used by various actors for their own political gains, notably in efforts to convince their supporters and disqualify their opponents.[17] The problem is, however, that a permanent reference to the Holocaust, whether desirable or not, can easily lead to a new form of trivialization.[18] It may indeed undermine one's line of reasoning rather than contribute to achieving its primary objective (which is to convince people of the validity of a particular argument). Whenever trying to convince another person, after all, one is likely to be more successful when staying away from demonizing the opponent in advance.

As a universal symbol of suffering and injustice, the Holocaust has increasingly evolved into an instrument for political, ideological, and moral causes. Controversial examples are the radical opponents of abortion, who describe termination of pregnancy as a "Baby-caust,"[19] as well as radical animal rights activists, who speak of "Animal-caust," or an "Auschwitz for animals" when they address the fate of animals in the meat industry's slaughterhouses.[20] And who has never been exposed to the image of a "nuclear Holocaust"?[21] The question that arises, then, is whether labels like these, and the implicit comparisons involved, generate support for the issue at hand, irrespective of whether or not the issue itself is justified. Is the issue of animal rights or unborn lives promoted by comparing its victims with those who died in the extermination camps of the Nazis? Is it not the case that such comparisons that systematically start from the Holocaust rather lead to trivialization and, subsequently, to moral indifference?[22] Put differently, these cases of sustained comparison with the Holocaust as the central point of reference seem in fact to detract from its power as a warning signal. When a trope is used too often or without leaving room for reflection, the argument of the speaker is undermined instead of strengthened, and its impact—contrary to expectation—will be rather limited.

A similar development may also occur in academic debates.[23] Among activist historians it is common practice to use the Holocaust at least implicitly as a point of reference

for linking the fate of a specific group with that of the Jews during the Second World War. Another common practice is terminological extension, for instance when reference is made to an "Armenian Holocaust,"[24] an "American Indian Holocaust,"[25] a "Black Holocaust," or a "Red Holocaust" (violence and oppression in communist countries).[26] Comparison between the Holocaust on the one side and other genocides on the other has always posed special theoretical and conceptual problems for historians. If the unicity and therefore the incomparability of the Jewish Holocaust are stressed, this produces an image of a history that is exclusive and enclosed within itself. It may well be the case that it is *not* possible to draw any lessons from the past. What is absolutely unique and incomparable by definition never repeats itself. In a sense, then, nothing is to be "learned" from history, for the future will always be new and different by definition. But if one stresses the universal character of the Holocaust, thus implicitly comparing it with other genocides, there is the potential danger of trivializing the past. Between *unicity* and *comparability* as extremes, it seems, Holocaust remembrance constantly has to steer a middle course.

"Drawing Lessons from the Past"

Is it possible to draw lessons from the past at all?[27] Both in historical research and in history education, it is commonly observed that sound knowledge of the history of the Holocaust and its permanent remembrance are necessary in order "to be able to draw lessons from the past."[28] Since the end of the Second World War, many generations of young people have been reminded again and again that the example of the Holocaust must be kept in mind to develop an attitude of tolerance, as well as to stand ready whenever new violations of human rights and large-scale violence would present themselves. Yet it is questionable if this is a justified expectation. Was it possible to prevent the genocides in Indonesia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia with the memory of the Holocaust in the back of our minds? Isn't this rather a misplaced optimism about the power of history? Too often it is assumed that Holocaust remembrance *as such* provides insight. But insight alone does not necessarily lead to decisive action. By dealing with the past we are not automatically well prepared for the future, let alone does dealing with the past make us better people.[29]

If the Holocaust is represented as the genocide par excellence, this may easily cause people to develop the illusion that genocide can only occur *in that particular form*, that is, by means of extermination camps and gas chambers. To many, this may turn the Holocaust into the only "genuine" genocide, so to speak. Is this perhaps the reason so many genocides have largely remained beyond the scope of international attention? One example is the killing fields in Cambodia, right at a moment when the Western world was exposed to the American TV miniseries *Holocaust*; another example is the

genocide in Rwanda in 1994, barely a few weeks after the first screening of *Schindler's List*. This is one of the consequences of presenting the Holocaust as an absolutely unique event: this very gesture renders any "lessons from the past" well-nigh impossible. What lessons for our own era can we draw, after all, from a historical experience that could only take place in a quite specific context of the past?[30]

Desensitization

Closely linked to the preceding issue is the situation identified by many that (too) much attention to the historical Holocaust may cause people to actually become less sensitive and alert to newer forms of massive violence.[31] Social sensitivity, then, in fact diminishes over time. What has been etched into our historical mind too often and too long as an extremely shocking experience, then, may no longer manage to keep our attention permanently. This might explain, for example, the rather lax attitude among Western countries regarding the events in Bosnia and Rwanda at the end of the previous century. Is there a gradual process of desensitization when genocide is involved? If one sketches an all too conventional image of the Shoah, the things that come after it may hardly be shocking to us anymore. As Leo Tolstoy wrote in *Anna Karenina*: "There seem to be no circumstances and conditions of life to which a man cannot get accustomed, especially if he sees them accepted by everyone around him." This may explain why a world in which so many images of the historical Holocaust circulate tends to respond slowly or inadequately to the threat of a new genocide. But the suggestion that the Holocaust constantly has to be compared comes with risks as well. This, too, may give rise to a form of desensitization. As noted by Novick, "the Holocaust is the emblematic horror against which all other horrors are measured," which implies that every form of large-scale violence has to compete, as it were, with the scale and the size of the Holocaust.[32] And this renders the Holocaust, with its six million victims, basically unbeatable. Popular consensus, after all, adopted the notion that genocides need to have at least an equal number of victims. Can a fixation on the atrociousness of the Holocaust offer an explanation for why in comparable cases one actually does *not i*ntervene (or only too little or too late)? And does this perhaps explain why relative inactivity, precisely in reference to that atrociousness, can be reasoned away?

Saturation

Decreasing sensitivity may easily lead to a sense of saturation, as has been identified by many scholars.[33] Every form of attention to the Holocaust that some may experience as exaggerated can easily backfire. This is what happened for instance in Germany among conservative or right-wing nationalist politicians who were eager to show their

frustration about what they considered an "obsessional" dealing with the past. As early as 1969, the Bavarian Christian-Democratic politician Franz-Josef Strauss (1915–88) observed that "a people that has achieved such remarkable economic success has the right not to have to hear any more about Auschwitz."[34] Strauss was followed by Helmuth Kohl (1930–2017), whose famous comment on the "mercy of the late birth" (*Gnade der späten Geburt*)[35] centered on the notion that postwar German generations should liberate themselves from unnecessary "feelings of guilt" and "shame" about events for which in fact their ancestors should be held accountable. Kohl and his supporters felt that it was all too easy for those who were born after 1945—which included those on the political Left—to point reproachfully at those who actually experienced the Nazi regime. But Kohl was also fiercely criticized for this argument, because it exonerated him and his postwar generation from the obligation to think critically about the past, while he seemed to suggest that it was possible, finally and definitively, to close the black pages of history (symbolized by the infamous *Schlussstrich* [final stroke]). Kohl's plea fit perfectly in the conservative *Wende* (turn) of the 1980s.[36]

Politicians such as Strauss and Kohl paved the way for a development that will not be concluded anytime soon. At the start of the twenty-first century, a debate emerged in Germany on the issue of whether only those who had suffered directly under the Nazi regime had to be considered as victims (Jews in particular), or whether ordinary German citizens should also be seen as such. In particular right-wing circles began to request attention to another historical trauma: all the things ordinary German citizens had gone through during the years of the Third Reich.[37] Accordingly, public attention also began to shift toward the horrors of the Allied airstrikes during the war, the systematic expulsion of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe, and the mass rape of German women and girls by Red Army soldiers.[38] Stretching this logic even further, it was finally suggested that "ordinary Germans" should largely be regarded as victims of their own regime. In this way the borders of national victimhood were pushed to the extent that the boundaries between perpetrators, spectators, and victims began to blur. This revisionist movement can best be considered as a countermovement to conventional commemoration culture, which continued to center chiefly on the Holocaust. But is this backlash an effect of a particular overrepresentation of the Holocaust, at least for Germany as the home country of the perpetrators? Much appears to point into that direction.

Anachronism

This political, pedagogical, and moral backlash could be the result of a strong fixation on the Holocaust in our collective memory. In addition, one can formulate critical concerns from an epistemological angle. Tony Judt was strongly aware of this. He specified

the uncomfortable truth that what happened to the Jews in the period between 1938 and 1945 was not at all experienced in a way we would expect from today's perspective of contemporaries at the time. What is meant here is the following. For many years after 1945, most people in Germany and elsewhere succeeded in *forgetting* and suppressing the fate of their Jewish fellow citizens during the Shoah—and this had little or nothing to do with feelings of guilt or shame. Nor did it have much to do with consciously wanting to suppress unbearable memories that as unresolved traumas continued to disturb one's peace of mind. Rather, this mainly resulted from the simple fact that for most people at the time, the war was hardly, if at all, about the Jews as such. One could perhaps make an exception here for the leading figures within the Nazi hierarchy. But this elite, namely the ideologues and architects of the Holocaust, considered the extermination of the Jews part of a much larger plan, involving, among other things, a radical geopolitical and demographic rearrangement of Europe.[39]

It is hardly likely that the majority of the citizens in Germany and the occupied countries who embraced National Socialism did so merely because they were glad to live in a system that murdered massive numbers of Jews. It is much more likely that they did so to save their own skin and to keep up a semblance of normalcy.[40] How Jews were treated was in most cases a matter of secondary importance or even of moral indifference. In other words, the fate of the Jewish population was in fact seen as not so relevant. Together with Judt we may now experience this moral indifference as downright shocking.[41] But ignoring this historical fact of moral indifference and assuming that ordinary citizens during the Nazi period experienced the fate of the Jews as the victims themselves experienced it will only lead to bad history writing and is in itself a form of *mis-memory*. In retrospect, of course, Auschwitz is one of the most important chapters to be recalled from the history of the Second World War, but this is only the case from a strictly post-1945 perspective. Timothy Snyder has called this an example of "commemorative causality," in particular the inclination to interpret the past according to the frames of what *now* seems logical and important, not on the basis of the erratic nature and the relative incomprehensibility of the past as such.[42]

It is quite tempting and understandable to look at the events of the 1940s through the lens of over half a century later, or from the perspective of today's knowledge and emotions. Only in this way does the Holocaust become a pivotal moment in the history of Europe, as well as a political and moral benchmark. But this is retrospective history writing by definition and therefore essentially anachronistic.[43] What seems inevitable is the notion that history only becomes instructive when one rewrites it in the light of current decisions. But in so doing, "history" is no longer subject to the historical discipline, the scholarly study of the past, and rather enters the domain of memory studies. *History* becomes *memory*, a completely new realm with different methods and epistemologies.

COMPETING MEMORIES

The central position that the Holocaust appears to have in collective memory ought not to make us forget that for a long time this pertained to countries in the West almost exclusively. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the situation was completely different during the communist era. In many respects, an orthodox Marxist view of history was diametrically opposed to views common in the liberal democracies.[44] The situation in the countries of the Eastern Bloc was complex. After 1945, citizens in Central and Eastern Europe had much more to memorize than those in Western Europe; at least one might expect that. Was it not true, after all, that the Jewish population of Eastern Europe had suffered immensely more under the German occupation than the Jews in the West? Many more Jews were murdered in the East, and many more citizens witnessed the horrors of the Judeocide. Many more collaborators were complicit and played an active role in the Nazi extermination camps.[45] At the same time, however, the Marxist view of history has tried hard to ban the Holocaust from collective memory. The war as such, including the many crimes by the German occupier, was obviously all but ignored in the Eastern Bloc. Party and state institutions in fact ensured that these crimes were extensively and ritually commemorated. But after 1945 the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust—the fact that Germans murdered Jews *because* they were Jews—continued to be covered by a heavy blanket of public silence.

For the German Democratic Republic (GDR) this historical representation played a crucial role in legitimating the raison d'être of both the communist regime and the state itself.[46] The reasoning basically came down to the following. Fascism was seen as the preliminary end-stage of capitalism, and its essence could only be grasped if it was analyzed as a social and economic system. In Marxist interpretation the class structure was pivotal.[47] All that mattered was what could be interpreted in terms of social and economic categories. National, cultural, or religious issues fell beyond that scope or were dismissed as irrelevant. Groups victimized for such reasons, Jews in particular, were automatically ignored. In addition, the responsibility for dealing with the historical burden of National Socialism was passed on to the West German state. This state was seen, after all, as the "heir of the Third Reich" because it had restored capitalism and had thus left in place the breeding ground for fascism.[48] In the GDR it was common to present Hitler literally as a "puppet of monopoly capitalism," a spokesman for those who had started the war to safeguard their own economic interests. The communist authorities chose to highlight in public memory not the millions of victims persecuted for their national, cultural, ethnic, or religious identity, but those who for political reasons fought "Hitler-Fascism." And communists featured prominently in this last group. Their role better fitted the model of class struggle. Sites where Hitler-Fascism was commemorated—in particular Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen—foregrounded the suffering of those who had

persisted in their fight against Nazism, rather than the suffering of the victims of a racial war.[49] This image of history remained basically in place until 1989: Hitler-Fascism had largely aimed to fight the revolutionary workers' movement, while its violence was mainly targeting resistance fighters, rather than the Jews or other ethnic groups.

Roughly the same image of the past can be found in the other countries of the Eastern Bloc. In Poland, the country with by far the most victims during the Holocaust, it was virtually impossible not to address the genocide. But here too many commemorative sites (Sobibor, Majdanek, Treblinka, Bełżec) were literally gone from the face of the earth because the Germans had dismantled them prior to the arrival of the Red Army.[50] In places where memories could linger most palpably, such as in Auschwitz, postwar communist leadership would manage to find other meanings. Although a large majority of the approximately 1.5 million murdered victims in Auschwitz were Jews, its museum identified them only in terms of their nationality, silently disregarding any ethnic or religious dimension.[51] Yet during the era of the Polish People's Republic the first signs could be seen of a growing competition between Jewish and Polish victimhood, which after 1989 would lead to heated and emotional debates.[52]

In general, there was little interest in addressing the fate of the Jews in the Second World War in the various other East European countries either. Local communists who had taken the lead in resistance activities against the German occupier were again portrayed as heroes and the only people worthy of commemoration. Ethnic and religious categories were again ignored. The Second World War was presented as a major theater of anti-fascist struggle, one against the excrescences of a "monopoly-capitalist" system. If the ethnic or "racial" dimension hardly featured in dealing with the past, it is possible in this respect to identify some minor differences between East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria (the former aggressor and its associates) on the one hand and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (which sided with the Allied forces) on the other. Yet in particular the first group of countries (and notably the GDR) tried hard to impose a rigid ideological frame on history that completely managed to push the Jewish Holocaust into the background.

Such a strongly politicized view of history would largely lose its relevance in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. With the collapse of "real actual existing socialism" in 1989, the Marxist interpretation of history (in its dogmatic form) had had its day. However, the end of communism in those countries gave rise to a new battle for collective memory.[53] After 1989, fierce and emotional debates were conducted on matters pertaining to a more recent past: deportations, expropriations, ethnic cleansings, arrests and show trials, severe punishments sometimes ending in death, and the tyranny of an omnipresent secret police. In short, the dangers and challenges of everyday life under communism now lived on as painful memories. In many countries, in post-1989 Germany in particular, fierce discussions were held about what to do with the archives of the secret

intelligence and police services covering the years under communism. But much more was actually at stake, namely the question of how the old communist perception of history could be replaced by a new outlook on the past.[54] This often led to a reversal of the old roles: what used to be official truth was now condemned as an official lie. But breaking the old taboos was not without risks. Until 1989, anti-communism had been seen as equal to fascism. Because the official pre-1989 anti-fascist doctrine had now been robbed of all credibility, it became quite tempting after 1989 to look back with some sympathy toward those who under the old communist regime were castigated as anti-communists, including the fascists of the interwar period and during the Second World War.

The downfall of communism accelerated change and gave rise to a new memory landscape. This mainly had effects on the representation of everything related to the Second World War. The old anti-fascism had lost its shine, and in particular the history of the Soviet Union came to be seen in a new light. In countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, bitter memories of the Soviet annexation again came to the fore. The history of communism turned into one of suppression, violence, and expansion. The old totalitarianism theory—the notion that communism and fascism had in fact more in common than they had differences—again grew more important. As a result, one's "own" population was presented as an innocent victim of a dictatorial system that failed to take into account the legitimate interests of the people. This account of affairs had at least two implications. First, it caused a rewriting of history, whereby the fact was ignored that large groups of people in the past had always and with enthusiasm and conviction supported authoritarian movements and regimes. Second, there was an important political implication. If the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, as Judt argued, no longer attributed an unfavorable role to themselves in the dark pages of their own history, and if "evil," then, was always seen as coming from "others," it was not inconceivable that a burdened past would be put in brackets, as it were: a phenomenon known in France as "Vichy syndrome."[55] History was divided into "good" and "evil," and the latter simply needed to be as much as possible externalized.

The diminished taboo on the comparison between communism and fascism was not only found in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc; it was also noticeable in "old" Western Europe. In the 1980s, a fierce debate was waged on this theme among historians in the German Federal Republic,[56] and in France a similar discussion erupted some years later after the publication of the controversial *Black Book of Communism*.[57] Also for leftist intellectuals in the West, it was an uncomfortable idea that the cherished legacy of humanism and the Enlightenment had been ruined in the totalitarianism of Soviet Communism. By and large, however, the gap between Eastern and Western Europe would continue to persist. East of the old Iron Curtain the memories of at least two repressive regimes (whether or not they were comparable with each other) remained vivid, while the interrelated uneasiness was completely absent in the

West. Politically and economically, as Judt believed long before Brexit, Europe might be evolving toward an *ever closer union*, even though the memory landscapes in both parts of Europa did not necessarily follow this trend.[58]

Finally, the rise of postcolonial discourses further reinforced the clash of memories. Aside from the traumas of the First and Second World Wars and the many painful memories following from the modern history of Europe (e.g., experiences of flight and expulsion, civil wars, and ethnic cleansings), the long-term consequences of the slave trade and slavery caused by European imperialism increasingly began to transpire in collective memory. As a result of all these clashing memories, which are intrinsic to an increasingly multicultural society, it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify a clear hierarchy of dominant historical narratives.[59] In this respect, an artificial consensus as to *what* one should commemorate and in particular *how* one should do so—which was still common in, for instance, in the nationalist nineteenth century—is hardly realistic. Moreover, it is also, and in particular, undesirable. All these factors explain why the Holocaust in an era of increasingly clashing memories will continue to play a highly important but no longer an exclusive, role.[60]

CONCLUSION

Putting the Holocaust at center stage in our collective memory does not only have political, social, and moral implications. It also comes with risks, as argued in this chapter. Revisionist voices have seized upon this fact to minimize the historical meaning of the Holocaust, if not to deny it altogether. This is, again, explicitly not the intention of this chapter. What is argued here, however, is the relevance of sustained critical reflection on the possible side effects of a Holocaust representation that meets today's political and moral sensitivities more than it agrees with the erratic realities of the past. Furthermore, it is relevant to ponder the fact that not a single representation of history is chiseled in stone. Global political and cultural developments lead to new insights and accents in commemorative landscapes. This will inevitably influence the image of the Holocaust as a moral and political benchmark of Europe.

NOTES

1. A range of alternatives has been used to label the mass murder of some six million Jews by Nazi Germany in World War II: Holocaust, Shoah, judeocide, Jewish genocide, etc.
2. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005), 803–31.

3. Judt, Postwar, 803.
4. An obvious and strong inclination in public discourse and imagination to conceive of "Auschwitz" as the *definition par excellence* of the Nazi genocide of the Jews is clearly at odds with growing insights from historical research since the 1990s. This work stresses the fact that only a segment of the Jewish population was killed in gas chambers, and that in Eastern Europe many Jews were in fact executed before ever arriving in a camp.
5. Georgi Verbeeck and Beate Kosmala, introduction to *Facing the Catastrophe: Jews and Non-Jews in Europe during World War II*, ed. Beate Kosmala and Georgi Verbeeck (Oxford: Berg, 2011), 1–12.
6. Judt, *Postwar*, 804.
7. Judt, *Postwar*, 804. It should be noted, however, that newer research has increasingly and consistently stressed the interaction between German initiatives (and final responsibilities) and the participation of local populations.
8. Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009).
9. John K. Roth, "The Ethics of Uniqueness," in *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, ed. A. S. Rosenbaum (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 27–38.
10. See, for instance, Laurence Rees, *The Nazis: A Warning from History* (London: BBC Books, 2006).
11. "Stockholm Declaration," IHRA, n.d., https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration/.
12. "Outreach Programme on the Holocaust," United Nations, n.d., http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/. See also "Why We Remember the Holocaust," USHMM, n.d., https://www.ushmm.org/remember/days-of-remembrance/resources/why-we-remember.
13. Geoffrey H. Hartman, *The Longest Shadow. In the Aftermath of the Holocaust* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).
14. David Patrick, "Keep the Truth Small: Has the Use of the 'Holocaust' Diluted Its Impact?" Retrieved online July 9, 2013; no longer available.
15. Richard J. Goldstone, "From the Holocaust: Some Moral and Legal Implications," in *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 47–54.
16. Mark Danner, "America and the Bosnia Genocide," *New York Review of Books*, December 4, 1997.
17. Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 197.
18. Patrick, *Keep the Truth Small*.
19. "Die Webseite die Unrecht beim Namen nennt! Kindermord im Mutterleib! Der neue Holocaust!," http://www.babykaust.de/.

20. David Sztybel, "Can the Treatment of Nonhuman Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?," *Ethics and the Environment* 11 (Spring 2006): 97–132.
21. Paul Brians, *Nuclear Holocausts: Atomic War in Fiction 1895–1984* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987).
22. Patrick, *Keep the Truth Small*.
23. See the various discussions in A. S. Rosenbaum, *Is the Holocaust Unique?*
24. Robert Fisk, "Let Me Denounce Genocide from the Dock," *Independent*, October 14, 2006.
25. "American Indian Holocaust," United Native America, n.d., http://www.unitednativeamerica.com/aiholocaust.html.
26. Horst Möller, *Der rote Holocaust und die Deutschen: Die Debatte um das "Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus"* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1999).
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EPILOGUE

THE YARDSTICK OF HISTORY AND THE MEASURE OF REDEMPTION: DIFFICULT PASTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY TODAY

VOLKER BENKERT

THE PAST IS OMNIPRESENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. REFERENCES TO temporal and memory continuities as explored in this volume abound in American discourses today. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's video message on Twitter from June 2019 that ICE detention facilities were like Nazi concentration camps, for example, created a historical analogy to equate present injustices in the United States with past horrors in Nazi Germany.[1] Predictable outrage from Conservatives such as Representative Liz Cheney and an equally anticipated defense from liberals followed.[2] Seconded by genocide scholars, many liberals argued that the term should be seen in its historical continuities from colonial times to the Holocaust to today.[3] Yet the debate focused mostly on the historical and moral validity of her claim rather than on the flawed purpose of making the Holocaust the yardstick by which to measure today's injustices.

As historical continuities span a large arc across time and space, memory analogies too invite a comparison between different ways to commemorate the past. Susan Neiman recently argued that Germany's alleged success in working through its Nazi past was a model for America's struggle to atone for slavery and its long legacy of discrimination and prejudice.[4] This intervention is embedded into the larger debate in the

United States on the legacy of the Confederacy, its falling monuments, and the long shadow of slavery still present today. Here too, the debate centers more on prescribing how the United States should engage the past and less on the purpose and consequences of making German memory the measure of redemption.

This short epilogue explores the question of whether historical and memory analogies are useful in understanding our current moment in time. It argues that invoking the horrors of the Holocaust to protest against Donald Trump's detention practices at the border and measuring American memory against redemption achieved elsewhere says little about the past, which is—as this volume shows—always a complex web of entangled meanings. By saying that the conditions in ICE detention facilities are *like* concentration camps and that American atonement for the past should be *like* Germany's reckoning with the Holocaust, the past becomes the measure of today's failures. Exploring continuities of violence across space and time and in memory as an overlapping fabric of ideas, *Terrortimes, Terrorscapes* does not imply sameness of past and present horrors or sameness of pathways to redemption after them. Instead, this book probes these overlapping fabrics for underlying spatial, temporal, and memory connotations and suggests that we focus on themes to explain past horrors and the need for atonement afterward.



E.1. Memorial Corridor at The National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama. *Source:* https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Memorial_Corridor_at_The_National_Memorial_for_Peace_and_Justice.jpg.



E.2. Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin. *Source:* https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Holocaust_memorial_Berlin.JPG.

The theme "Imagination and Emotions" identified in this volume particularly speaks to the current moment. Many Americans today cannot imagine that the normalcy of their lives stands in stark contrast to the experience of those discriminated against or denied safety in the United States. Their emotional response for too long has been denial and rejection, delaying what Ta-Nehisi Coates calls "a national reckoning that would lead to spiritual renewal."[5] This defense of normalcy has made many Americans dismiss efforts to bring down memorials to Confederates or to at least engage in conversation about the inhumanity they fought to uphold. Normalcy is also what has made many Americans blind for too long to rampant police brutality against people of color and inequality, once more brought to the fore by the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit African Americans much harder than white Americans. Emil Kerenji points to the coexistence of normalcy and horror that makes those who are not persecuted become indifferent to cruelty against others and dismiss the possibility that it might be the harbinger of worse to come. In the 1930s, ordinary Germans indeed found ample ways to normalize the Third Reich's ostracism and persecution of Jews and others. Many even directly and knowingly profited from the plunder of Jewish possessions.[6] Few acknowledged that their complicity in the regime's actions paved the way for genocide, and even fewer offered any resistance when persecution turned to mass murder. Kerenji's call for "careful historical comparison [that] does not imply sameness or necessity" might indeed inoculate us against such normalizing tendencies.[7] His intervention should also alert us that President Trump's 2019 cruelty and vitriol against immigrants, coupled with his defense of white supremacists in Charlottesville, Virginia, was the harbinger of even worse—for example, the brutal conduct of federal agents on the streets of Portland to quell peaceful protests in the wake of the killing of George Floyd and the storming of the Capitol in January 2021.[8] It is heartening to see that so many and so diverse protesters were no longer willing to normalize police brutality, gross inequality, and a memory culture that lionizes Confederates who fought in defense of slavery. They raise attention less to the sameness of our time with historical events; instead many protesters imagine a country freed from notions of space informed by imperialism and westward expansion, history that focused on whites, and memory shaped by lost cause ideology that helped justify deeply unjust structures.

The problem with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's statement, replicated by so many others, is that it clearly implied sameness by arguing that the United States was "running concentration camps at our southern border."[9] Whether the early Nazi camps, American internment camps for Japanese Americans, or the later Nazi extermination camps were the reference point of her comparison was less clear. Rather than highlighting the enormous problems of ICE detention centers, past horrors taken out of their historical contexts are not the yardstick for contemporary injustices. Nor do they have to be. Americans on both sides of the aisle rejected family separation, showing that Americans share some sense of decency.[10]

Historical analogies cannot help us understand contemporary injustice, nor can Germany's coming to terms with the past serve as a model for America. German redemption did not only emerge from a painful recognition of the horrors Nazi Germany unleashed and the complicity of ordinary Germans in them. It also had much more transactional tendencies, as contrition coupled with half-hearted compensation was a military, political, and economic necessity for West Germany during the Cold War and in many ways still is for Germany today.[11] Similar transactional tendencies can also be observed in how Germany atones for other atrocities today. Though Germany now recognizes its earlier colonial genocide in modern-day Namibia, it argues that the UN Genocide Convention cannot be applied retroactively to a genocide committed before its writing. This renders compensation claims arising from Germany's recognition of the genocide obsolete.[12] Such a disingenuous argument to avoid reparation payments suggests that there just is too little pressure and reward for such action. Just as comparison to concentration camps is not a yardstick to gauge today's horror, German efforts to master the past are not the measure of redemption.

What if we took to heart Kerenji's call to compare without suggesting sameness? Instead of creating benchmarks of horror and atonement, we might compare our own responses to current crises to those of earlier societal breakdowns that led to genocide and the need to atone for them. Rereading Detlef Peukert's *Weimar as Crisis of Classical Modernity*, first published in 1987, it is clear that Germany's first republic did not fall because of the lure of far-right ideologies or the charisma of Hitler.[13] Instead, it collapsed because of widespread perception of crisis caused by Weimar's and the global order's instability. Crisis eroded societal bonds, compounded by myriad smaller cracks in a rapidly changing economy and society. Hitler stoked and benefited from this sense of crisis. The ensuing political fragmentation opened a void that Nazi racial ideology filled, and a highly volatile electorate started to embrace such beliefs. Today, American democracy is deteriorating too, and the January 6, 2021, storming of the Capitol to overturn an election epitomizes this. Yet it is worth noting that Trump's power has been checked in profound ways. The public in the streets, part of the media, the courts, the military, and a majority of voters thwarted Trump's authoritarian impulses. Congress, even after a mob had invaded its halls, voted to certify the election on that very day. Washington is not Weimar, even as we observe similar processes destabilizing democracy and a toxic fabric of ideas on space, time, and memory that is behind these processes.

These toxic ideas on space, time, and memory exacerbate the pressing and interlinked crises of today: the coronavirus pandemic, migration, climate change, racism, conspiracy theories, and rising violence. Our ability to overcome fragmentation to address such problems is diminishing, as fault lines between winners and losers of globalization are increasingly obvious. Worse still, our ability to disagree civilly about the past has been brutally stunted by violent far-right white supremacists in Charlottesville.

A pressing concern for the Biden administration and the country more generally is to strengthen societal bonds and overcome the many cracks that gross and increasing inequality have caused while restoring civil discourse about the past. That is on us, not on history. No yardstick of horror and no measure of redemption can help with that task. Yet seeing so many Americans peacefully voicing support for what might be the largest civil rights movement in American history and Confederate monuments come down is a clear indication that the processes that lead to our division can be halted.[14]

NOTES

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