The Changing Tide of Immigration and Emigration During the Last Three Centuries

Edited by Ingrid Muenstermann

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Meet the editor

Dr. Ingrid Muenstermann is a sociologist at heart. She is a migrant from Germany to Australia where she established her academic career. Presently, she is a casual academic at Flinders University of South Australia and a teacher of German at the School for the German Language, Adelaide, Australia. Dr. Muenstermann began her lifelong career as a secretary in Germany, then as an office assistant in Australia, and then worked in different secretarial positions in the healthcare industry and studied part-time until receiving a scholarship to complete a Ph.D. Since 1996, she has been teaching/tutoring different topics of migration and health at Adelaide University, Charles Sturt University, and Flinders University, Australia. She has published several articles and edited books on migration and health and the environment and ageing.

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Preface

Human migration has occurred since time immemorial; it is the movement of people from one place to another with the intention to achieve change. People may voluntarily change location to find improved living or working conditions or to be closer to a loved one. Or, they may wish to explore a new territory to conduct research or simply out of curiosity. Alternatively, involuntary or forced migration is being forced to leave one's home country because of war or a territorial dispute. Forced migration plays an important part in the movement of people today: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees[1] (2023) stated that in 2022 at least 108 million people around the world were forced to flee their homes. In comparison, in 2016, there were 65 million people around the world who had been forced to leave their home country. These figures mean increasing changes and challenges, not only for those who are forced to leave but also for those countries that accommodate them.

To make sense of any society, we need to know something about its development, members, laws, and boundaries. This book provides an overview of the changing tide of immigration and emigration. European countries that had sent people to colonize America, Africa, Asia, and Australia in the last 200–300 years today face an influx of regular and irregular immigrants (the latter being refugees or asylum seekers)[2] from these 'colonies'. These are people who are looking for a better life, just as the 'colonizers' had been. While categories like regular and irregular migrants previously did not exist, for developed, industrialized countries these groupings are important in relation to whether a person is allowed to cross an international order and to enter a country of which it is not a citizen. Border control plays an important role in controlling the influx, either stopping, turning back, or directing people to be 'assessed'. An important point of reference is the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This book's underlying focus is the outcome of leaving one's home country to settle in another country to establish a new life.

When this book was started, a look at human migration during the last 300 years was anticipated. While several chapters mention the colonial past, most chapters deal with the more recent history, that is, people's movement in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The book is divided into five sections: 'Critical Reflections About Migration, Safety Zones for Asylum Seekers and Children', 'A Brief Look at Australia', 'Africa on the Move', 'Some Thoughts Relating to the United States of America', and 'A Glance at Europe'. All chapters are written by experts and demonstrate change, both wanted and forced. The contributions deal with government policies, describe experiences of how groups of people fit into their adoptive country, and consider successful and not-so-successful migration; there is popular entrepreneurship but there are also the failures of some groups in reaching their destined country and/or settling

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[1] UNHCR.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/figures-glance (2023).

[2] Other classifications are authorized / unauthorized, documented / undocumented migrants.

in. Overall, the chapters provide current and relevant information about immigration and emigration and how the system has changed over time.

Critical Reflections about Migration, Safety Zones for Aylum Seekers, and Children

Chapter 1 explores historical transitions and influences on mobility in Japan and Europe. It discusses the distinctions between settled and nomadic peoples, including those who move for professional or religious reasons, and those who choose to remain. The chapter also delves into mobility in the Middle Ages, such as pilgrimages for religious and leisure purposes, which later evolved into opportunities for 'diversion'. In Europe during the Industrial Revolution, notions of working hours, holidays, and vacations emerged, contributing to the popularity of travel – a trend that persists today. The chapter presents a Web-based survey of nearly 20,000 Japanese participants that examined correlations between mobility and well-being. The results showed that 'diversion' and 'adaptability to situational changes' significantly impacted mobility and well-being. However, life space and subjective happiness did not directly correlate in this study. 'Diversion' refers to shifting one's consciousness from present concerns, often employed in emotion-focused coping. 'Adaptability to situational changes' was also explored, with findings suggesting increased subjective happiness when physical health improves, ego resiliency increases, and individuals feel good due to diversions related to mobility achievements. Interestingly, while increased mobility achievements do not directly lead to improved happiness, mobility potential does influence well-being. The authors conclude that venturing to new places outside the daily life environment provides a release from rigid rules and social norms. Many people travel to experience a different life, but when travel becomes routine, it loses its transformative power, requiring the pursuit of new possibilities.

Chapter 2 looks critically at safety zones for asylum seekers. This research uses a qualitative framework, surveys as well as interviews, and ethnography and anthropology as the underlying methodologies. Safety zones are geographically designated areas intended to protect civilians during wartime. Mostly they are a temporary camp in a special geographical area within the borders of the refugee-producing state, enforced by a third state or by an international organization. The constant decline of political enthusiasm to receive refugees, restrain influx, and exclude applicants from protection provides strong criticism of safety zones. Safety zones legitimize repatriation programs. To assess whether safety zones represent a pragmatic complementary policy to international protection or are a threat to the institution of asylum, the author assessed three safety zones: Iraq (1991), Bosnia/Screbrenica (1995), and Syria (2020). Arguments in favour of in-country protection found inadequate reception conditions for asylum seekers, not meeting the standards spelled out in human rights law. Those who are awarded refugee status receive very little state assistance, while those who await status determination are frequently placed in detention centers, inhibiting their right to freedom of movement. The three studies presented in the chapter demonstrated that while the Iraqi safety zones departed from the recommended model of a safety zone, the zone was accessible, free from original risk of persecution and persecution without a Convention nexus. However, this success could not be demonstrated in the cases of Bosnia/Screbrenica and Syria. Both these studies failed to satisfy the three baseline conditions of a legal International Protective Alternative (IPA). The chapter concludes that safety zones should be used as a complementary strategy to the institution of asylum and not as its alternative,

and that safety zones must (a) be clearly established, (b) be in towns with livelihood opportunities, and (c) not be in contested territory, and (d) laws must address the problem of unclear accountability for human rights violations.

Chapter 3 asks a fundamental question: what happened to the children? It looks at the importance of protection and prevention of harm to migrating children. It explores the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, demonstrating gaps and non-compliance with the ratified treaty during the last three decades.[3] It came into force in September 1990, and as of 5 September 2022, 196 countries were State Parties. The chapter also considers international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination, and return, including the lifetime impact on children's health. The authors cite the *International Organization for Migration's Report* and discuss how during the last two decades 60,000 migrants lost their lives. They also take note of the *Fatal Journey's* report, which specifies that of the 32,000 deceased migrants between 2014 and 2018, 1,600 were children younger than the age of 18. The chapter explores the consequences of irregular migration on the health of children in relation to vaccination, education, oral health, and mental health, as well as funding and policies. Empirical evidence in relation to migration and child health is insufficient in most Western countries, but children from less developed countries may face incomplete immunization and poor nutrition, and there is an increased possibility of infectious disease outbreaks because of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. Contradictory findings are also discussed. Some research indicates that migrants and refugees experience higher rates of vaccine-preventable hospitalizations, morbidity, and mortality compared to the host society, while other epidemiological studies show that most infectious diseases affect migrants after entry into the host country, as most refugees are young and were previously healthy. Between 2015 and 2017, an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 children were seeking asylum each year in EU/EEA countries. It is not quite clear how many made it, but the authors argue that changes are urgently needed and that Western countries should implement strict policies, preventives, and treatment strategies to protect children.

A Brief Look at Australia

Chapter 4 considers differences in individual responses to migration-related challenges, that is, migration, settlement, and resilience of Iranian immigrants and refugees in Australia. This is a mixed-method study, consisting of an online questionnaire and twelve semi-structured interviews. Data was collected from 182 Iranian immigrants and refugees living in Australia, who were older than 18 years and able to communicate in English or Farsi. The open-ended, semi-structured interview questions were informed by the findings of the questionnaires, allowing participants to talk freely about their experiences. SPSS-22 was used for the analysis of the survey data, and Pearson's correlations, independent-samples t-test, one-way ANOVAs, and Post Hoc analyses were used to test the bivariate associations between resilience and each migration and socio-demographic variables. The mixed-method design provided insight into the processes that influence resilience in relation to migration. The results demonstrated protective and risk factors. The findings also highlighted the connection between socio-demographic and migration variables and resilience. Resilience was higher among immigrants than refugees; supportive relationships are essential

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[3] Ratified by all states except the United States.

to reinforce positive concepts. The findings also demonstrated a connection between resilience and employment; resilient people are more eager to find employment and not give up seeking a job. Higher education assists immigrants and refugees in self-confidence and flexibility; however, unmet expectations in relation to expected employment opportunities are a source of stress. The qualitative component revealed how Australia's social and cultural flexibility serves Iranian immigrants and refugees well in the process of adapting to life in Australia; however, the survey and the interviews demonstrated that almost all participants experienced discrimination and prejudices, particularly in relation to their religion and nationality. Suggested activities to combat these misfortunes are spending time with friends, listening to music, seeking family support, and pursuing social support.

Africa on the Move

Chapter 5 is another chapter looking at Australia as a receiving country. The Australian 2020 Census indicated that more than 400,000 people living in Australia recorded African origin. This represents 1.6% of the Australian population and 5.1% of Australia's overseas-born population. Most (58%) are white South Africans, but 42% are Black Africans from Sub-Saharan countries. Some people within these African populations have not adjusted effectively because of Australia's predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture. African people began to migrate to Australia after 1976 when the White Australia Policy was abolished. This allowed the influx of colored immigrants and refugees, but it also created responsibility for the Australian government to engage new migrants in the workforce; it should have provided sport as a pathway to help them integrate into mainstream Australian society. The chapter focuses on experiences of being refugees in their home country and in refugee camps, and why people left. It also explores Australian policies of protection and settlement of refugees. There has been discussion in recent years that young people from African communities (e.g., the South Sudanese community) have not settled well in schools because of bullying and discrimination. The author looks at integration and at a missing sense of belonging in people of African background. Some individuals and families have found settlement difficult; there were challenges to finding employment as well as a lack of workforce skills, but there was also racism, discrimination, and language barriers. Discrimination is related to some politicians' resentment towards African groups, who have called these groups 'failed community groups' and 'African gangs'. The chapter mentions the three pillars of multiculturalism: cultural identity, social justice, and economic efficiency. The author points out that 'with the multicultural society in mind, refugee community groups are disadvantaged and deserve special consideration in relation to inclusion'. Since Australia is a signatory to the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and to the subsequent 1967 Protocol, the country's care of refugees needs to be improved and more possibilities to integrate African people need to be provided.

Chapter 6 examines global processes of African migration, beginning with a historical background. Between 1990 and 2020, an estimated 40 million people moved, but almost 70% moved to another African nation state, 15% settled in Europe, and others settled in the United States and in countries of the Persian Gulf. Migration to Europe has increased during the discussed period. The chapter examines the different routes to Europe and the risks of moving as an irregular or unauthorized migrant. It also considers the dilemma of African people settled in France. Gender, age, faith,

and settlement location are important. There is an increase of young African women migrating to France; most of them maintain the religion of their home country (Muslim). Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are mainly centered around Paris. Their standard of living is generally low, they have more children than other immigrant populations, and there are high instances of single-parent households. Sub-Saharan Africans are mostly employed as non-qualified workers, as service personnel. Their education and employment status are below that of the average French workers, and unemployment rates are about 20%. Participation in professional occupations is slightly below the average ratio, but in the intermediate professions, participation is of average proportion. Almost 40,000 asylum seekers are in France, but only about 2,500 enjoy humanitarian protection. Since the 1990s, only a few have obtained the official status of refugee, but many could legalize their situation and avoid being expelled. Today a new generation is taking root, and it is anticipated that they will be well integrated into French society, not claiming 'black identity' but fighting discrimination and racism without becoming a specific group like Afro-Americans. The author anticipates that the emigration of Sub-Saharan Africans will continue to grow, that the personal costs to them will remain high, and that those who will make it to and in France will be people economically well off and better educated than the immigrants of the preceding decades.

Chapter 7 takes a close look at emigration and immigration in Ethiopia. A great deal of statistical data is provided, as are reasons for leaving Ethiopia and/or seeking refuge in Ethiopia. The overthrow of the monarch in 1974 by a socialist military junta led to hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians leaving the country in the late 1970s and 1980s, mainly settling in neighbouring countries. Leaving the socialist regime was dominated by economic emigrants, a rise in the labour force, and declining opportunities. The author argues that the recent shift from refugee-led to economic emigration opened new destinations in Africa, such as South Africa, Sudan, Kenya, and in countries of the Middle East. After the downfall of the socialist military regime in 1991, 970,000 Ethiopians returned from the neighbouring countries. The author also finds that international emigration from Ethiopia is dominated by women. Overall, Ethiopia is not only a country that people leave but also a country that accommodates large numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries; it is the second largest refugee-hosting country in Africa. Main destinations of Ethiopians leaving their home country are the United States and Canada, but also Sweden, Germany, Italy, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

Chapter 8 considers the reasons people leave their home country Nigeria, the irregular Mediterranean migration route, and consequences of drug use and drug trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2017 the unemployment rate in Nigeria was almost 19%. Of concern is the connection between high unemployment rates of Nigerians aged between 18 and 30 years, and high rates of poverty and social discontent. The authors find that young men and women are misinformed about job opportunities in foreign countries. Europe has become one of the major continents with high rates of irregular migrants from Nigeria. This is a mixed-method study, including statistical data, a survey, as well as personal interviews and group discussions with returned migrants (from Libyan detention centres). The overall number of participants is 382, including 10 anonymous interviews of persons who use or used drugs or are or were drug traffickers, providing some revealing stories. The study population is made up of 60% males and 40% females aged between 25 and 30 years and with various levels of

education. The different routes of migration are described, as are anticipated countries of transit and destination. It seems that none of the returned migrants had legal travel documents but were smuggled and/or trafficked into different countries. Those smuggled were migrants for whom their network recruiter illegally facilitated their entry into another country, while those trafficked were exploited by traffickers for the purpose of forced labour or commercial exploitation. Most of the returned migrants are of the opinion that drug use/abuse is the consequence of irregular migration and that irregular migrants are at high risk of drug use/abuse; but there was also a small proportion of the returned migrants who had used drugs before leaving their home country Nigeria. Criminal activities performed by Nigerians to get to their destination in Libya included illicit drug dealing, prostitution, and kidnapping in cooperation with Libyans and negotiating a ransom. The study recommends urgent attention to the issue of drug trafficking and related issues among irregular migrants.

Chapter 9, as previous chapters, also concentrates on the reasons for leaving one's home country. It argues that the motives have not changed during the last 200 years. Today, Africans emigrate because of political persecution, violence, political instability, and economic opportunities, which are similar to the reasons Europeans left their home country in the nineteenth century. The chapter starts with conceptualizing and theorizing migration, using Wallerstein's world systems theory and Piore's segmented labour market theory. The chapter includes the current emigration trends from Africa to other parts of the world. Importantly, it explores the migration myths that influence EU policies in relation to African migrants: regular versus irregular migration, African migrants as pests, migration as a zero-sum game, economic status in Africa, and European response. There is a reflection on the facts of African migration (moral exclusion, epistemic exclusion, deterrence). Important points are that the population in European countries is ageing and that African immigrants provide valuable services in the health- and age-care industries. Migration is linked to economic and social transformation in the sending as well as in the receiving countries. The author challenges European and other receiving countries, if their myths persist that African people emigrate mainly because of in-country instability and poverty, then the only way to halt the mass movement is to help African governments to reduce poverty. The conclusion is that African immigration to Europe will remain emotive in the foreseeable future, but the reasons that drove millions of people out of Europe in the nineteenth century are experienced by African people today; the present response of European countries may stop the influx of African people in the short run, but it will not stop people's movements in the long run.

Some Thoughts Relating to the United States of America

Chapter 10 considers the US settlement of people from Slovenia and starts with a clarification of an ethnic settlement. The authors argue that since the Mayflower Pilgrims, ethnic communities were inappropriately called colonies, but the immigrants were not conquerors of territory on behalf of some power; an ethnic community wanted to survive socially and economically and preserve the characteristics of their original community. The authors conclude that overall, Slovenian communities have been preserved, not only in the form of inscriptions in churches and cemeteries but also by maintaining community languages and customs. There are 800 cities, towns, and villages where Slovene settlements were established more than 170 years ago. It is estimated that in 2010 around 500,000 Slovenians or people of Slovenian

descent lived in the United States. Fraternal benefit societies represented the basic form of organization of Slovenians in the United States. Insurance companies were created in a period when the US did not know 'Obamacare'. The profits of these organizations supported the cultural and publishing activities of Slovene Americans. The chapter explores different organizations, the benefits they provided, difficulties they encountered, as well as religious organizations and their influence on the community. Parish schools were created, teaching first in Slovene but then in Slovene and in English to maintain the consciousness of ancestors but also the sense of belonging to the United States. During the early twentieth century, so-called Slovene national homes[4] emerged, fulfilling the need for cultural, social, and political events for Slovene Americans. Sixty-nine of these institutions still operate today. In relation to newspapers or newsletters in Slovenian language, it is pointed out that these represented one of the most important expressions of the life of an ethnic community. Today, online forms of newspapers have begun to emerge. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the acculturation of Slovene people into American society; the first and following generations have established themselves successfully in all sorts of trades and professions as well as in the political sphere.

Chapter 11 investigates a collaborative approach to develop a youth violence preventive/intervention programme. The authors link the serious problems of youth violence in the United States to a larger epidemic of youth violence in Latin and Central America. They argue that the violence has its roots (a) in a century of US resource extraction and intervention, and (b) in internal economic and political strain. They determined that US youth violence and migration require multi-systematic prevention programmes and developed a programme entitled Miles de Manos (MdM; 'Thousands of Hands'). This programme addresses families, schools, and communities from Central America in the United States. It is a multi-modal, culturally specific, and community-based violence prevention programme for elementary-school-aged children, their families, teachers, and school staff. Across a five-year period, the US-based research team worked with partners in Central America and Germany to develop MdM. It was designed for Latin American origin communities and school staff and is informed by the process and content of programmes identified as 'effective' by the National Institute of Justice; linking the Interests of families and teachers to achieve positive behavioural interventions. The authors point out that this programme is routinely cited as one of the few empirically supported, efficacious preventive interventions for US Latin adolescents' behaviours. The development, testing, and refinement of MdM is informed by five feasibility trials conducted between 2012 and 2016. Outcomes of the MdM for youth, parents, caregivers, and teachers are presently examined in a randomized controlled trial in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Results of a pilot study demonstrated positive results; teachers' and parents' conduct encouraged prosocial behaviour and reduced problem behaviours in young people.

A Glance at Europe

Chapter 12 studies forced migration and identity in Polish-German borderlands. It looks at routes of migration during and after World War II and resettlement processes.

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[4] Compatible with 'clubs', i.e., Australia has a great number of 'German Clubs'. These institutions provided a buffer zone for new settlers but have lately lost their importance because the Germans are well acculturated into Australian society.

The authors find that the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam agreements created many changes in European borders: the Soviet Union took over the Baltic states, western Ukraine and western Belarus including large areas that before the war belonged to Poland. Germany lost its eastern provinces, which the new communist-dominated Polish state obtained as compensation for the lands lost in the East. Because of the border changes, the entire German population, which lived in the pre-war eastern regions of Germany and in the Sudenten Mountains of Czechoslovakia, was forced to move to Germany. In Poland, expulsion took place. At the same time, Poles, who before the war lived in the east of their country (areas which were to be appropriated by the Soviet Union), were allowed to emigrate, they were not forced. The right to leave was granted to Poles and Jews who in 1939 had lived within the Polish borders. They were allowed to take their possessions, including livestock and equipment, as well as two tons of luggage per family. Legally they could stay and become Soviet citizens, but only a small proportion remained. The authors discuss the ethnic composition of people pre– and post–World War II and the challenges Polish settlers experienced during the process of establishing a new life in the 'western lands', in Lower Silesia. Their culture was different from that of the local German/Silesian one, the architecture, the farming, and inscriptions in churches, on houses, at cemeteries and statues. The German material culture was also alien to them. All of this made the settlement process difficult for that generation of Poles. Communist ideology supported non-material ideas, and communication with Germany on the other side of the border was restricted by the political regime. There was not much attitudinal change in the second generation, but the 1990s brought a strong sense of entrepreneurship to the 'western lands'. Today there is the Europeanization of identity. As the third generation emerges, the space is redefined as a place of belonging; new stories are being told, integrating different pasts and identities. The authors conclude that the past still plays an important role in the 'western lands', shaping the dynamics of the identity of the territories.

Chapter 13 examines how the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict of 1948 influenced organized Jewish emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel. The Yugoslav state and the Federation of Jewish religious communities organized Jewish migration to Israel, a conflict entrenched in the decision of individual members of the Jewish community to leave Yugoslavia for Israel.[5] The chapter discusses the different stages of Jewish people leaving their home country and/or transiting through Yugoslavia. Yugoslav authorities cooperated with international Jewish organizations and the first transports for Palestine left in 1946. Some restrictions by the British government were in place, but after Israel was proclaimed an independent state in 1948, all existing limitations became void. The author claims that 7,739 Jewish inhabitants of Yugoslavia made Israel their home, being part of five waves of organized emigration that had left the country between 1948 and 1952. The chapter explores details about the cooperation between Yugoslavia and international Jewish organizations. Firstly, there were the perspectives and actions of the Yugoslav state: organized migration to Israel is considered an important push factor that has a greater impact than a traditional approach to

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[5] Some thoughts on the background are important. The Yugoslav–Soviet Split was the result of the conflict between political leaderships; Yugoslavia was led by Josip Broz Tito and the Soviet Union by Joseph Stalin. Both sides presented it as an ideological dispute; however, the conflict was as much the product of a geopolitical struggle in the Balkans that also involved Albania, Bulgaria, and the communist insurgency in Greece, which Tito's Yugoslavia supported and the Soviet Union secretly opposed (Banac, I. (1988) *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)..

or support of people when leaving a country. All participating parties viewed this as something positive. Secondly, there were the perspectives of the Federation of Jewish religious communities: the overall conflict motivated the organizations to develop ways to participate in the process. Although policies were generally applied to emigration, Yugoslav Jews settling in Israel was a perfect opportunity for placement and crucial to the Yugoslav political reality post-1948. Thirdly, there was the desire of the individual migrant to leave Yugoslavia; individuals approached the conflict in a very pragmatic way (i.e., escaping potentially harmful situations).

Whatever the reasons for people to leave their home country, by choice or by force, an important aspect is a sense of hope. So, this preface will conclude with a poem entitled 'Hope', written by a Polish immigrant to Australia, a sociology lecturer, and a mentor of mine at Flinders University, Adam Jamrozik. Adam never talked about his experiences of fitting into Australian society – I wish I had asked him some questions.

<div align="center">

Hope
26 October 1963
Adam Jamrozik

There is always tomorrow,
there is always another day;
another hour
to redeem
errors of today.

There is always another strike;
another green light
to cross the road
to new dimensions;
to new delight.

There is always another sound,
there is always another life;
another world
where tomorrow
and today
are one
together bound.

(Because the good earth
will keep turning around)

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<div align="right">

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Section 1

Critical Reflections about Migration, Safety Zones for Aylum Seekers, and Children

Chapter 1

What is Migration for Humans? Historical Transitions and Factors Influencing Mobility

Toshihisa Sato and Motoyuki Akamatsu

Abstract

Humans have built stable systems for their social lives, although they are animals in motion. Whether people want to settle or move might depend on their characteristics, such as personality and social psychology. This chapter outlines the historical transition of mobility in Japan and Europe, including mobility away from daily life in the middle ages and mobility for pleasure in the early modern period. Then, we introduce a web-based questionnaire survey that examined human characteristics influencing life space mobility, and the relationship between mobility characteristics and their well-being. Several factors influencing either the life space mobility or the subscale of well-being were obtained from the large-scale web-based survey. Ego-resiliency is the ability to cope with and adapt to situations, and it can be said that humans were migrating from place to place because they possessed this ability. The results of this survey showed that ego-resiliency affects both mobility and well-being, and the essentiality of this ability was reaffirmed. "Diversion," in which people try to get away from their daily routines, was a key factor influencing both mobility and well-being. Finally, we describe the importance of diversion based on the outline of mobility and diversion in the modern period.

Keywords: mobility, well-being, diversion, questionnaire survey, migration

1. Introduction

1.1 Movement of humans

Early humans were migrating from place to place; therefore, they can be called Homo Mobilitas. According to the "Out of Africa" theory, humans first evolved in Africa and emigrated from Africa about 70,000 years ago. Then, they moved to the European continent and Eurasia. Approximately 15,000 years ago, they moved from Eurasia to the Americas through Alaska when Alaska was contiguous with Eurasia. Finally, they moved south and spread all across the globe. Their ability to stand upright and their large brain might have enabled humans to leave their birthplace in Africa and move to new environments. They could acquire a distant perspective by standing upright and developing the ability to anticipate new things. The brain is a neural network that is a learning machine, and humans can acquire a high ability to

learn through their large brains, which improves their adaptability to new environments. Humans might have desired to move to distant and novel environments to utilize the adaptability of their larger brains. In other words, their brain might have wanted them to move.

Human settlers came to Japan from Eurasia *via* three routes, approximately 40,000 years ago: north through Sakhalin, west *via* the Korean Peninsula, and later from the south to the Ryukyus. The two latter routes were across the sea, suggesting that humans had acquired the art of navigation [1]. Unlike the present, Japan was a single land mass from Hokkaido to Kyushu at the time, and humans could spread throughout Japan and settle. Approximately 12,000 years ago, the stone age changed to the era of earthenware. Japanese pottery of that period displayed rope patterns. Therefore, this period was named the Jomon (which means rope pattern) Period. People in the Jomon Period hunted mammoth, boar, and deer, among others, and gathered shellfish and nuts to eat. As the population increased, people formed villages and started to trade approximately 5000 years ago. The typical trading goods were obsidian, the material for making stone tools, accessories, and ritual goods, such as jade and amber. The origin of jade was the Itoi River, located in the middle of the Japanese Archipelago. A large-scale jade processing plant was built at a site in Sannai Maruyama in Aomori Prefecture, about 500 km on a straight line from the Itoi River. Rough Jade stones might have been conveyed to the north by the sea route. However, processed jade was distributed using land routes because of the danger posed by ocean currents [2]. Traders selling jade moved around without settling. Therefore, not all the people at that time settled, and some continued to move.

1.2 Settled and nomadic people

People continued to maintain their hunter-gatherer lifestyles for a while after settling. However, they gradually started crop and livestock farming, which developed social groups because it was inefficient to farm alone. When agriculture ensured a stable supply of food, people needed to save and protect the food from enemies outside the village, which led to the development of territories. Life environments within the territories became stable because of the reduced influence from the outside, which resulted in environments being a closed system. The brain learns and acquires the optimal cognitive-behavioral patterns for a given environment, and people can live without difficulties when they behave according to these optimal patterns, leading to an orderly and stable life. Learning was completed after the brain learned the cognitive-behavioral patterns suitable for the given environment. The group's common optimal behavior patterns became rules for maintaining the social order, and the society can stabilize when all its members behave according to the rules.

People can live in society easily if they live according to the optimal behavioral patterns they learned. However, the brain has a learning ability and cannot demonstrate its full potential just by reproducing learned behavior patterns. In evolution, the functions unused by living things sometimes become lost due to natural selection, such as monkeys, losing their tails when they evolved into humans. Similarly, the large brain would become unnecessary if it became unnecessary to learn new things. As a result, humans had to move to new, unfamiliar environments to learn new things and maintain their brain's capability. People become bored when they repeat fixed behavior patterns and desire to do different things. When they live following rules, they gradually feel bound by the rules and want to escape from them, that is, get away from daily life, which could result in the inner motivation of humans to move away.

Itinerant merchants have kept moving without accepting the social order and choosing a stable life, even after societies were founded. They survived and traded in unimaginably harsh environments and might have had extraordinarily high environmental adaptability and the ability to endure these harsh environments. Mountain ascetics also have left their comfortable social life and trained in the mountains. Marginal people, such as itinerant performers, bards, and psychics, have kept moving without becoming a part of society. Furthermore, mountain nomads and mountain peoples have avoided contact with permanent residents [3]. These people have sometimes been treated as criminals because they stole crops; however, they might not even have the idea of private possession.

1.3 Factors dividing settlers and nomadic people

In contemporary Japan, it is customary to permanently own a house, live in it, and earn an income by interacting with society. That is, individuals in contemporary Japan live in a closed system. However, their mobility preferences and acceptance of mobility differ depending on the person. Some people are willing to move long distances to earn an income, whereas others are not. Some people want to travel to new places on holidays, whereas others prefer to stay at home. Specific personal characteristics, such as personality and social psychological, might affect these differences. Moreover, individuals' well-being, defined as comfort, health, and happiness, might differ based on their mobility characteristics, including the preference to live in a closed environment, attempting to leave that environment from boredom, and acting to get out.

In the second section of this chapter, we introduced the historical transition of mobility in Japan and Europe. The third section of this chapter describes a large-scale, web-based questionnaire survey. We collected data from 10,000 to 20,000 participants and examined correlations between mobility and well-being and the personality and psychosocial characteristics affecting this correlation. The results indicated that "diversion" and "adaptability to situational changes" affect mobility and well-being. Adaptability to situational changes corresponds to "adaptability to new environments," which is the initial trigger that causes humans to move. In contrast, "diversion" is to leave the stable system built by humans temporally. Adaptability includes the abilities humans have acquired through biological evolution, whereas diversion is an aspect of adaptation humans have developed in response to social rules and norms. Finally, we describe the importance of finding and experiencing diversions.

2. Moving in the middle ages and in the early modern period

2.1 Why people moved in the middle ages

Some people move even after becoming a part of society; some governmental officers move for administrative purposes, whereas others travel because of their religious faith. The Tosa Diary (AD 935), a very early Japanese travel literature, describes events during a trip to Kyoto from an official's original posting. The Sarashina Diary (AD 1059) also describes travel in ancient Japan. At the time, the imperial court was in Kyoto or Nara at different periods and governed by the emperor or court nobles. In AD 1192, the samurai established a shogunate government in Kamakura, 500 km away from Kyoto, because they desired to decrease the Imperial Court's influence by

placing the government's seat far away from Kyoto. As a result, the number of people traveling between Kyoto and Kamakura increased. For example, the "Izayoi Diary" is a woman's travel record from Kyoto to Kamakura to make a petition. The authors of this travel literature composed wakas (Japanese poems) about what they saw during their travel and described their impressions of places admired by the people at the time. European people started to enjoy natural sceneries after the seventeenth century [4], whereas Japanese people enjoyed different landscapes during trips from ancient times and composed wakas.

In medieval Europe, pilgrims, itinerant artisans, knights-errant, and peregrine students left their roots in society and moved across the county to develop their skills or themselves. Peregrine students are today's international students. It became common for economically prosperous English families to allow their children to study in various European universities, which they named the grand tour. The children not only studied, but also learned the manners of fashionable society, and the tour gradually became a kind of enjoyment. Pilgrimages became popular after the middle ages. Pilgrimages to Santiago de Compostela in Spain, for example, were very popular. When they arrived at holy places, they celebrated their arrival and spent a pleasant time. People undertook these pilgrimages for religious reasons and pleasure, which provided them with opportunities for diversion.

2.2 Moving as an entertainment in the early modern period

In Japan, "the pilgrimage to Ise" became very popular around the middle of the Edo Period, after AD 1700. Villagers chipped in money, and their representatives went to the Ise Grand Shrine when they accumulated enough savings. During the Edo period, people were allowed to travel on pilgrimages, although they were not otherwise allowed to move freely. The "Douchuuki," which reports the events during a pilgrimage to Ise, became a travel guidebook to help to travel. In addition, tour guides for pilgrims called "Onshi" appeared in Ise. They greeted the pilgrims after receiving their arrival letter, led them to inns, and guided them to the shrine and famous places. Thus, travel guides were born. The pilgrims were entertained with various delicacies to celebrate their safe arrival and the visit to the shrine. As a result, travel became entertainment.

The Industrial Revolution in England, during the middle of the eighteenth century, gave birth to factory workers. The idea of working hours had not existed until that time. Therefore, the Industrial Revolution caused overwork and health problems, which created the discipline of occupational health. The notion of holidays and vacations developed from the idea of working hours [5]. However, workers did not know how to spend their free time drinking all day at public houses. In 1841, Thomas Cook, a Baptist concerned about this situation, proposed group trips to prevent workers from drinking on holidays as a part of the campaign against drinking. Traveling in large groups became possible due to the invention of the railway. Thomas Cook planned the London International Exhibition tours in 1851, which gained popularity. Then, he started a travel agency to plan and conduct travel. As a result, people could travel easily, and travel became tours.

Travel provided people leading difficult lives with opportunities for diversion by leaving their houses and workplaces, enjoying scenery they would not usually see, and eating different types of food they would not usually eat. The development of transportation, travel agencies, and wealth enabled people to travel. People acquired diversions by moving, in addition to pastimes in daily life, including sports, hunting,

and festivals. They acquired hedonic well-being by traveling, through which they could find new things different from their daily life offerings. Tourist spots appeared here and there, including historic architecture, excellent and exotic views, and artificial amusement facilities, which offered people opportunities for diversion. We can feel different and escape from our monotonous life bound by rules when we travel. Today, moving and visiting new places give people typical opportunities for diversion.

3. Web-based questionnaire survey: achieving mobility, mobility potential, and factors affecting the well-being

3.1 Study 1: methods

We administered a web-based questionnaire twice to the same participants and surveyed the traits of contemporary Japanese people affecting the range and frequency of movement, the ability to move, well-being, and the feeling of happiness in daily life. The purposes of study 1 included the following:

1. To investigate correlations between achieving mobility (the range and frequency of moving and the presence of assistance) and subjective well-being.

2. To investigate personal factors (personality and psychosocial characteristics) that affect achieving mobility and subjective well-being.

Participants (N = 13,000 men and women aged 18−89 years) took part in the web-based questionnaire survey. They were living in the following areas of Japan.
  Kitahiroshima-city, Hokkaido,
  Minamisoma-city, Namie-city, and Futaba-machi in Fukushima Pref.,
  Aizu Region in Fukushima Pref. (including Hitachi-city, Ibaraki Pref.),
  Niigata-city, Niigata Pref.,
  Tsukuba-city, Ibaraki Pref.,
  Machida-city, Tokyo,
  Shiojiri-city, Nagano Pref.,
  Shizuoka-city, Shizuoka Pref.,
  Kosai-city, Shizuoka Pref.,
  Bisan Region in Aichi Pref. (Miyoshi-city, Nisshin-city, Tougou-city, Toyoake-city, Nagakute-city),
  Eiheiji-Cho, Fukui Pref.,
  Yabu-city, Hyogo Pref.,
  Shoubara-city, Hiroshima Pref.,
  Mitoyo-city, Kagawa Pref.
These areas are advanced pilot regions of the smart mobility challenge project (METI) [6]. The municipalities in these areas had reported that the areas had experienced social problems related to residents' mobility and the survival of public transportation. These municipalities were trying to solve these problems by introducing new mobility services, such as on-demand transportation.
  Variables assessed and questionnaires used in study 1.

• Demographic characteristics: age, gender, and having a driver's license, among others.

- Life-space assessment: University of Alabama life-space sssessment [LSA] [7].

- Subjective happiness: subjective happiness scale [SHS] [8].

- Subjective well-being: subjective well-being inventory Japanese edition (general happiness, inadequate mental mastery, social support, physical ill-health, family group support, deficiency in social contacts, confidence in coping) [9].

- Personality: big-five personality (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience) [10].

- Social status: MacArthur scale of subjective social status [11].

- Response styles: expanded response styles questionnaire (evasion, facing the fact, negative introspection, and diversion) [12].

- Ego-resiliency: ego-resiliency scale [ER89] [13].

- COVID-19 worries and behavior changes [14].

We used LSA to measure achieving mobility. Moreover, we assessed the subjective happiness of the participants using the SHS. LSA is an index assessing the spread of an individual's life space based on a questionnaire. LSA expressed the life space as the distance and the frequency of going out during the preceding 4 weeks and the assistance necessary for going out. The SHS consists of four items, including "I think I am happy in general" and "I can enjoy my life and be happy in any condition," among others. We used the Japanese versions of LSA and SHS. The survey period was from January 23rd to February 1st, 2021. We analyzed the data of 12,508 participants who responded, "I am not infected with COVID-19."

3.2 Study 1: results

We examined the correlations among variables using path analysis and developed the model displayed in **Figure 1**. This model fitted the data very well and indicated the following:

I. Factors affecting LSA included having a driver's license or not, age, physical ill-health, ego-resiliency scale score, and diversions.

II. Factors affecting SHS included cooperativeness, inadequate mental mastery, physical ill-health, ego-resiliency scale score, and diversions.

III. Factors affecting LSA and SHS included physical ill-health, ego-resiliency scale score, and diversions.

IV. There was no direct correlation between LSA and SHS, suggesting that subjective happiness might increase when physical ill-health improves, ego-resiliency (adaptability to situational changes) increases, and an individual feels good because of diversions when mobility achievement increases.

Figure 1.
Correlations among items based on path analysis.

3.3 Study 2: methods

Study 2 focused on two aspects of well-being, that is, eudaimonic and hedonic well-being [15], related to mobility achievement and mobility potential, including mobility capability. Aristotle first identified eudaimonic and hedonic well-being. eudaimonic well-being is the humanistic happiness created by maintaining and increasing a person's abilities and positive human relationships [16]. In contrast, hedonic well-being is a pleasant condition produced by positive feelings, mental and physical health, and maintaining or increasing motivation [16].

We conducted a web-based survey using a questionnaire, assessing eudaimonic and hedonic well-being [17], to verify the following hypotheses based on the results of study 1.

1. Increased mobility achievements will not directly lead to an improvement in happiness, but increasing mobility potential will increase well-being factors.

2. Mobility achievement and well-being are not directly correlated.

3. Specific subscales of mobility potential will affect mobility achievement.

We conducted study 2 from February 2nd to 21st, 2022 and analyzed the data of 19,268 participants that responded, "I am not infected with COVID-19." Participants (N = 20,480 men and women aged 18–89 years) participated in study 2. The

participants were living in the following areas of Japan, which included areas in the advanced pilot regions of the smart mobility challenge project (METI) [6].

Obihiro-city, Muroran-city, and Kitahiroshima-city in Hokkaido,
Sendai-city, Miyagi Pref.,
Niigata-city, Niigata Pref.,
Tsukuba-city, Ibaraki Pref.,
Iruma-city, Saitama Pref.,
Machida-city, Tokyo, 23 Wards of Tokyo,
Shiojiri-city, Nagano Pref.,
Shizuoka-city, Kosai-city, and Hamamatsu-city in Shizuoka Pref.,
Kasugai-city, Aichi Pref.,
Eiheiji-cho, Fukui Pref.,
Osaka-city, Osaka,
Yabu-city, Hyogo Pref.,
Shoubara-city, Hiroshima Pref.,
Misato-cho, Shimane Pref.,
Mitoyo-city, Kagawa Pref.,
Kiyama-cho, Saga Pref.,
Chatan-cho, Okinawa Pref.

We used the motility assessment scale to assess the mobility potential [18]. This scale comprises five sub-scales; mobility skills, residential access qualities, neighborhood mobility quality, openness to new people and places, and travel self-confidence. The residential access qualities and neighborhood mobility qualities assess not only physical accessibility and availability of neighborhood transportation but also the significance of accessibility and neighborhood transportation (i.e., whether participants perceive accessibility and transportation are indispensable for moving). We used the following question items to assess these variables.

Residential access qualities.
<Accessibility>

• I can easily reach public transportation facilities from my house.

• I can easily reach my workplace from my house.

• I can easily reach the supermarket from my house on foot to buy commodities and groceries.

• I can easily reach my elementary or junior high school from my house on foot.

The participants responded to these questions using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Yes) to 5 (No).
<Significance of residential access qualities>

• I think quickly reaching public transportation facilities from my house is essential.

• I think quickly reaching my workplace from my house is essential.

• I think quickly reaching the supermarket from my house on foot to buy commodities and groceries is essential.

- I think quickly reaching my elementary or junior high school from my house on foot is essential.

The participants responded to these questions using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Agree) to 5 (Disagree).
Neighborhood mobility qualities
<Accessibility>

- I can easily reach the highway from my house.

- There are streets around my house to enjoy going for walks.

- I can quickly drive around my house.

- There are streets with bicycle lanes around my house.

The participants responded to these questions using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Yes) to 5 (No).
<Significance of neighborhood mobility qualities>

- I think quickly reaching the highway from my house is essential.

- I think walking streets around my house is essential.

- I think the ability to drive around my house is essential.

- I think having bicycle lanes around my house is essential.

The participants responded to these questions using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Agree) to 5 (Disagree).
We used the questions (translated to Japanese) listed in the Ref. [18] to assess mobility skills, openness to new people and places, and travel self-confidence. The participants responded to these questions using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Yes) to 5 (No).
We assessed eudaimonic and hedonic well-being using the Japanese version of the Hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities scale (HEMA) [19]. Hedonic well-being is classified into seeking enjoyment and seeking relaxation, which is assessed by "seeking happiness," "seeking enjoyment," and "seeking relaxation" subscales of HEMA.

3.4 Study 2: results

Figure 2 shows that the model developed by path analysis has an adequately high goodness of fit to the data. The model suggested the following:

I. Similar to the results of study 1, there was no direct correlation between LSA and sub-categories of well-being.

II. The results indicated that mobility potential and well-being were directly correlated, which supported this study's hypothesis based on Study 1. Moreover,

Figure 2.
The second survey's path analysis results.

openness to new people and places, mobility skills, the significance of residential access qualities, and the significance of neighborhood mobility qualities directly affect well-being.

III. Openness to new people and places correlated with all three well-being factors.

IV. Mobility skills affected eudaimonic well-being, whereas the significance of residential access qualities and the significance of neighborhood mobility qualities affected Hedonic well-being.

V. The age correlated with openness to new people and places, mobility skills, travel self-confidence, and LSA.

VI. Having a car was correlated with residential access qualities, neighborhood mobility qualities, the significance of residential access qualities, the significance of neighborhood mobility qualities, and LSA.

VII. Travel self-confidence and residential access qualities affected mobility achievement.

VIII. Ego-resiliency affected nearly all possible mobility factors, suggesting that it might be an essential factor in mobility possibility and eudaimonic well-being.

IX. Diversion correlated with seeking enjoyment and seeking relaxation (hedonic well-being).

Openness to new people and places and diversion affected eudaimonic and hedonic well-being. Together with the results of study 1, diversion might be strongly correlated with mobility and well-being.

4. Moving and diversions

Michel de Montaigne, the sixteenth century French philosopher, stated in the "essays" that "diversion" is a way to live a better life. Moreover, Blaise Pascal, a seventeenth century French philosopher, repeatedly described the usefulness of diversions in "the thoughts." He stated, "Even the king, who has much money, is unhappy without diversions." The word "diversion" means "to divert," that is, "divert the consciousness from thing right before the eyes." Today, stress-coping measures are known as stress-coping strategies. Diversion is one strategy used in emotion-focused coping or coping strategies by changing feelings. People who constantly settle and live within the bounds of the established social order do not fully use their brain's ability to move to unknown places. Therefore, they might want to leave their social life bounded by rules because the brain needs diversions.

Going to new places by leaving the daily life environment, including the workplace or home, is a release from rules and order. Many people go traveling to experience a different life. However, when traveling becomes repetitious, it becomes a part of ordinary life. Blaise Pascal stated, "Hunters hunt to get rabbits. However, if I tell them to stop hunting because I will give them rabbits, they would say no." This statement suggests that not only the goals but also the activities to gain the goals are meaningful. People might not be traveling just to spend time at their destinations. People find new things that stimulate them at their destinations. However, when they visit the same places repeatedly, they stop finding new things. Then, the brain would have completed the learning and adaptation process, and people become bored and seek new destinations. On the other hand, the environment keeps changing when moving, and landscapes continue to change, which provides a diversion.

The means of transportation also affect how successful diversion can be. The view from the window keeps changing in trains, whereas passengers on an airplane cannot see much change. Also, people must conform to social manners and cannot freely behave when sharing a cabin with other passengers on trains or airplanes. Travel time becomes boring for people who often use trains or airplanes because it becomes a part of ordinary life, and they must distract themselves with books, videos, or games while traveling. Transportation itself is no longer a diversion. On the other hand, when driving a car, the view, the roads, and the traffic situation continue to change, and drivers must perform their driving capability to different demands every minute. Therefore, driving is a good diversion because drivers do not have time to think about unnecessary things while driving a car. From this point of view, driving a car is a good way to divert.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 2

Perspective Chapter: Are Safety Zones a Threat to the Institution of Asylum?

M.A. Natalia Gierowska

Abstract

Safe zones emerged as a new form of humanitarian space during the 1990s. Safe zones take various forms; however, they most often assume the shape of a temporal camp in a specified geographical area within the borders of the refugee-producing state. Nevertheless, safe zones are not protected from criticism. The increasingly common practice of States rejecting asylum claims based on the existence of safe zones is in conflict with the notion of asylum as a tool for the international protection of refugees, a human right enshrined in Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To establish the risks associated with safety zones vis-à-vis refugees, attention will be drawn to the scale of permissibility in refugee law in its recognition of safety zones as a ground to restrict access to asylum. Particular attention will be drawn to the notion of Internal Protection Alternatives (IPA), as if the applicant is possibly safely relocating within his or her country of origin, they will not be accorded refugee status. To establish whether safe zones can represent a pragmatic complementary policy to international protection or a threat to the institution of asylum, this chapter will critically assess the performance of three safety zones: Iraq (1991), Bosnia and, more specifically, Srebrenica (1995) and Syria (2020).

Keywords: safety zones, internal migration, Syrian war, involuntary migration, human rights abuses

1. Introduction

Safety Zones emerged as a new form of humanitarian space during the 1990 [1]. No single terminology or universal definition has yet been agreed for 'safety zones' (the term employed in this thesis). At the most fundamental level, safety zones represent a geographically designated area intended to protect civilian populations during wartime. Safety zones take various forms; however, they most often assume the shape of a temporal camp in a specified geographical area, within the borders of the refugee-producing state and are enforced by a third State or international organisation. Such zones represent the only realistic option for countries at war in the context of closed borders, or for those who do not wish to, or do not have the

financial ability to, leave their native country, whilst facilitating the repatriation of those who left. As such, they are painted as a relatively low-cost remedy to the limitations of the contemporary asylum regime. However, safety zones are not free from criticism. The gradual erosion of political appetite to receive refugees has created a context where safety zones are used to curtail refugee influxes, in fact excluding applicants from protection. The existence of safety zones may legitimise repatriation programmes, which would otherwise be considered an abdication from international law obligations, and more specifically, the norm of *non-refoulement*. This increases safety zones' chances of delivering sub-optimal results in their efforts to protect civilians.

To establish the risks associated with safety zones *vis-à-vis* refugees, attention will be drawn to the scale of permissibility in refugee law in its recognition of safety zones as a ground to restrict access to asylum. Particular attention will be drawn to the notion of Internal Protection Alternatives (IPA), as if there is a possibility of the applicant safely relocating within his or her country of origin, they will not be accorded refugee status. During status-determination hearings minimum conditions must be met to invoke a legal IPA which, based on the legal scholarship, this paper discerns as: (a) accessibility (both legal and physical) to the region proposed as an IPA, (b) protection from the original risk of persecution in the proposed IPA, (c) no new risks of persecution and indirect *refoulement* in the proposed IPA. The assessment of an IPA permits an open-ended humanitarian evaluation of the relevant factors in a cumulative manner, of a kind not occasioned by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the Geneva Convention or the 1951 Refugee Convention [2]. That said, the increasingly frequent invocation of an IPA during status determination hearings raises fears of lowering the threshold for invoking an IPA in order to revoke refugee status. The IPA analysis has incorrectly become tied to concept of 'well-founded fear', central to the Convention's definition of refugee. The increasingly common practice of States rejecting asylum claims based on the existence of safety zones is in conflict with the notion of asylum as a tool for the international protection of refugees, a human right enshrined in Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): 'Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum' [3]. Furthermore, this legal development carries the risk of concealing the degree of protection offered in the established safety zones, enabling States to abrogate from the principle of asylum by distancing themselves from accountability for the conditions on the ground in such areas.

In order to assess whether safety zones can represent a pragmatic complementary policy to international protection or a threat to the institution of asylum, this paper will critically assess the performance of three safety zones: Iraq (1991), Bosnia and more specifically, Srebrenica (1995) and Syria (2020). The safety zones' effectiveness will be evaluated against their ultimate ambition, that is, meaningful protection. 'Protection' is approached from the legal perspective and is understood as the entitlement of individuals under Refugee Law. The establishment and the legality of these safety zones has been made possible by a retrospective application of the IPA standard to these three case studies. Whereas the legality of the former two case studies has been assessed by engaging with secondary and primary sources, the examination of the newly carved Syrian safety zones has been supported by primary research. This paper argues that while is it theoretically possible to establish safety zones based on international humanitarian law, in practice their implementation is often impacted by geopolitical considerations of nation-states, as can be seen in all three case studies-Bosnia, Iraq and especially in Syria.

1.1 Literature review

1.1.1 Safety zones: History

To understand the contemporary issues this paper explores; it is important to take note of the genesis of safety zones. Whilst historically civilians in countries engulfed in war sought refuge in places of worship where sanctity was a deterrent, 'safety zone' as a concept was developed during the Franco-Prussian war (1870–1871), by Henri Dunant, the founding father of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [4]. Dunant's advocacy for safety zones bore fruit in the twentieth century- in 1937 general Franco designated Madrid a safety zone amid the brutalities of the Spanish Civil War [5], In 1937, the Sino-Japanese War welcomed a Shanghai Safety Zone [6], but efforts to establish safety zones during World War II were futile [5]. In 1948, however, populations found temporary protection from armed attacked in ICRC-administered safety zones in Jerusalem, leading to the codification of 'neutralised zones' in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Long [7] argues that these early examples were all provisional measures inaugurated with the consent of all of the parties to the conflict, within the framework of war laws, intended to offer temporary havens from hostile acts, rather than an alternative for national protection.

This framework mapped out the silhouette of safety zones as seen in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and became a component of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) [8]. Under IHL and its treaties, safety zones are traditionally be referred to as 'protected zones' and are consensually established demilitarised areas in military conflicts [5]. Article 23 in the First Geneva Convention instructs to 'protect the wounded and sick', Article 14 in the Fourth Geneva Convention extends the protection in 'hospitals and safety zones' to 'wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven', whereas the succeeding Article 15 foresees the establishment of consensually recognised neutralised zones where its protected status is subject to the agreement between the Parties to the conflict [9]. Since the endorsement of the Geneva Conventions, six such zones have been established: Bangladesh (1971), Cyprus (1974), Vietnam (1975), Cambodia (1975), Nicaragua (1979), Croatia (1992) and Brinie et al. [10]. These provisions represented the only explicit protections from violence to be enjoyed by civilians under IHL [8]. However, these protections were not codified until the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1977, which further expanded the concept of safety zones to cover the entire civilian population, as opposed to carving out specific categories of beneficiaries [8].

1.1.2 Can safety zones offer an alternative to asylum?

In 1994, Sandoz, the Director for International Law and Communications at ICRC, indicated conditions, which are likely to contribute to the success of safety zones. A model safety zone was envisioned as 'carefully defined geographically, fully demilitarised and with concrete assurances that they cannot be used as a base from which to pose risks to any belligerent party' [11]. However, lessons drawn from history show that a safety zone's recognition by all sides of the conflict is 'indispensable' [5] to its success [1, 4, 12, 13]. Consent may take two forms- tactical consent by combatants, or an official consent granted by the State itself agreeing to an international presence. Acknowledging the importance of recognised safety zones from the operational angle, Brinie et al. [10] draw further attention to the normative significance of consent-based zones. Their argument is drawn from IHL and international normative

theory, where consent minimises the forced imposition of values by aliens and instead becomes a manifestation of sovereignty and self-determination [10]. However, Outram [14] underscores, that even this fundamental condition of consent under IHL is rarely satisfied and respected.

Due to different forms of warfare in the twentieth century, protecting civilians became increasingly difficult. Wars drew both state and non-state actors where most violence directly targeted civilians- a reality, which was conceptualised by Koldor as 'New Wars' ([15]: 8). In the post-Cold War era, conflicts became increasingly internal, aiming to eliminate communal or competing ethnic groups [5]. Paradoxically, it was against this backdrop that response to humanitarian crises were respatialised in the 1990s [12] with a sudden rhetorical shift by both UNHCR and host states away from 'the right to leave' towards the 'right to remain' [1].

During the twentieth century, safety zones became the manifestation of this new approach, as they are intended to bring 'safety to people rather than people to safety' ([12], p. 169). Posen [16] explained that this resulted in the intensification of coercive strategies by international actors to erect safety zones. Birnie et al. [10] show that the post-Cold War period brought a proliferation of enforced safety zones, citing the examples of designated protected areas in Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1993–1995), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), which Orchard [1] refers to as 'credible presence safety zones'. Interventions by politically and military robust States prompted Landgren [5] to remark that such action further obfuscates the need for humanitarian efforts with the protection of international peace and security.

Arguments in favour of in-country protection point to inadequate reception conditions for asylum seekers, which do not meet the standards spelt out in human rights law and thus further complicate the process of seeking asylum [17]. Those who are awarded refugee status receive very little state assistance, while those who await status determination are frequently placed in detention centres, which inhibit their right to freedom of movement [18]. Most importantly, however, Edwards [19] points out that asylum is unattainable to those who are unable or unwilling to leave their country of origin to seek refuge abroad. Further, the right to stay and the right to return is not protected under the institution of asylum [19]. As a consequence, those who remain in their country of origin are seen as unworthy of asylum, even though they often suffer the type of persecution which would qualify for political asylum [20]. Responsibility for the protection of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) rests with national authorities [21]. Since the Geneva Convention's mandate does not extend to IPDs, and the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* published by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1998 is a non-binding instrument, the internally uprooted populations habitually find themselves in a situation whereby their own State is unable or unwilling to avail them with protection against persecution [10].

Scholars such as Gilbert and Rüsch [22], Hyndman [12], Recchia [13] or Orchard [1] are more cautious in their advocacy for safety zones, Birnie et al. [10] recapitulate that in the light of the inflexible legal framework of asylum and the changing nature of warfare, limited forms of intervention like safety zones, are the most suitable policy option to contemporary refugee emergencies. While safe zones address the procedural shortcomings of status determination, a significant body of literature views such areas with scepticism. Birnie et al. [10] point out that the invocation of safe zones allows for states to abrogate from their international obligations to refugees. While safety zones may offer a degree of safety and protection (given that access to humanitarian relief is secured), legal scholars such as Edwards [19, 23] or Clark [24] agree that such restrictive refugee policies result in the 'denial of some of the important social, economic

and cultural rights guaranteed by the 1951 Convention' [23]. Long [7] argues that while providing assistance and protection to the civilian population is an ineliminable component of humanitarian relief, the inception of safety zones reduces the right to be a refugee simply to finding the minimum 'safety' [7], which prompts Landgren [5] to appeal to Agamben's terminology of 'bare life'. It is crucial, as noted by Birnie et al. [10], not to accept this refugee policy as a surrogate for asylum.

Chimni [25], however, argues that safety zones do precisely that - provide a potential alternative to asylum. The concern is shared by Ghrainne [26], who recognises a pattern of States applying an increasingly narrow interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention to accommodate their national interests. States can prematurely repatriate refugees and asylum seekers, as well as exclude applicants from protection by invoking safety zones as an IPA [5, 25, 27]. Under Refugee Law, such actions amount to *refoulement,* however, Ghrainne [26] correctly notes that the creation of safety zones allow States to argue that applicants are not refugees and are therefore excluded from the principle of *non-refoulement*. Birnie et al. [10] show that this is not simply a theoretical probability, as the scholars cite historical examples of safety zones, which were established as an alternative to asylum and a refugee containment strategy: Rwanda, Northern Iraq and Bosnia.

Ghrainne [26] raises an important point: refugee policy is motivated by two conflicting objectives, compassion and State interest. When analysing a safety zones suitability for delivering protection, it is crucial to embark on a wide-ranging analysis, which incorporates broader political considerations of 'refugee containment, deterrence, and deflection' [26]. Safety zones should be treated favourably if seen as a complementary mechanism of protection provision but should not be used as a replacement and thus a potential threat to asylum. To adequately address this issue, this paper has implemented a research framework with several research methods to adequately address the previously identified issues.

2. Methodology

A qualitative research framework has been applied to the question, following Frederick's [28] argument, that this method is most suited for refugee-related research, due to its close relationship with sociology, ethnology and anthropology. The depth of the information could not be reproduced by quantitative research where participants are expected to fit their responses into a set of limited options supplied by the researcher. The majority of the participants are Internally Displaced Persons, and some are former refugees who have experienced the brutality of war and forced migration as its by-product.

2.1 Methods

The interviewees are Syrian nationals currently in Turkish safety zones, researchers, non-governmental organisations and journalists and Syrian nationals outside of Turkish safe zones. The questions address issues raised during a status determination hearing and IPA tests, which would invoke the 'Reasonableness' analytical framework for the IPA test. For the Turkish safety zone to be a relevant relocation alternative, the proposed IPA must satisfy four baseline criteria's: accessibility of the IPA to the applicant, protection from the original risk of persecution, absence of new risk of persecution and indirect refoulement. Aside from surveys, the paper also analysed the

existing sources, particularly articles from peer-reviewed journals, as well as relevant documents such as UN resolutions. The paper will synthesise information from secondary and primary sources to draw relevant conclusions on the research question.

2.2 Surveys

Data from Syrian nationals currently residing in Turkish controlled Safety Zones was collected from semi-structured interviews, which permit for the incorporation of the respondent' opinion about what they think is *ad rem*. The interviewer was instructed to skip sensitive questions and themes if necessary, allowing to adapt the interview to the respondent's readiness to reveal particular information, preserving the underlying ethical dimension of this research. Clear communication was ensured by the interviewer's fluency in the Syrian interviewees' native language, Arabic, which also facilitated the establishment of a trustworthy relationship with the interviewee.

Fixed response interviews were used to gather data from Syrian nationals settled in territories which fall outside of the Turkish control, to evaluate the relative safety of Turkish safety zones as compared to the rest of the country. This model was also used when collecting data from journalists, researchers and academics. This helped maintain the focus of the interview on the current political and socio-economic conditions in the safety zones of interest.

2.3 Selection of sites and groups

The research sites were selected based on both the levels of accessibility to researchers as well as the current dominant faction in power in respective Syrian governates. Thus, 19 interviews were conducted in three Turkish controlled cities: Tal Abyad (2), Jarabulus (8) and Al Bab (9). The interviews will be referenced in the following manner- the interviews from Tal Abyad will be referred to as interviews 1 and 2; the interviews from Jarabulus will be referred to as interviews 3-10; the interviews from Al Bab will be referred to as interviews 11-19. As a point of contrast, 10 additional interviews were collected from Syrian cities where Turkish presence is not established, among them Tal Rifaat (2), Dayr az Zawr (2), Al-Qamishli (2), As-Suwayda(1), Damascus (1) and Al-Hasakah (2). Interviews from Tal Rifaat will be referred to as interviews 20-21; interviews from Dayr az Zawr will be referred to as interviews 22-23; interviews from Al-Qamishli will be referred to as 24-25; interview from As-Suwayda will be referred to as interview 26, interview from Damascus will be referred to as 27 and finally interviews from Al-Hasakah as interviews 28 and 29. Additionally, this thesis will make reference to an interview with Kourdi (Eyad Kourdi, freelance journalist working with media outlets such as CNN), Kayyali (Sara Kayali, Syria researcher at Human Rights Watch) and Professor David Keen, Professor of Complex Emergencies at London School of Economics (LSE) and a specialist in the field of Safety Zones (**Figure 1**).

2.3.1 Research strengths

Interviews with Syrian nationals currently residing within the Turkish administered territories humanised the subjects and elicited valuable data regarding the present conditions of safety as well as additional information on the areas socio-economic realities. Interviewing enabled the researcher access to primary sources which could be compared with relevant secondary sources.

Figure 1.
Numbers indicate number of interviews collected from a given city.

2.3.2 Research constraints

This paper may encounter several research constraints. Firstly, unconscious personal biases may impact the format of the research framework and hypothesis. Due to the complexity of the Syrian war and the diverse array of factions involved in the conflict, responses collected may be influenced by the respondent's personal biases. The interviewee's political allegiance and beliefs may influence the tone of the interview and their willingness to share a truthful account of their experiences or controversial opinions, for which one can be persecuted during war. Furthermore, the interviewees knowledge and ability to accurately and honestly reconstruct (often traumatic) events may also constitute a research constraint.

Lastly, conducting research during the COVID-19 pandemic meant that interviews were collected by a Syrian volunteer on behalf of the researcher. This has placed significant constraints on the ability to navigate the semi-structured interviews towards the needs of the research. Aside from understanding these research constraints the paper needs to investigate the relevant legal framework underlying this issue.

2.4 Legal framework

2.4.1 The internal protection alternative and the notion's nexus to the 1951 Geneva convention

The 1951 Geneva Convention does not explicitly refer to 'internal flight alternative' and the definition does not establish whether an applicant must establish a fear of persecution countrywide [29]. Instead, independently from the Convention, the IPA was born out of State practice, governmental policy recommendations and academic investigation of more than three decades [30]. In response to these developments, UNHCR revised its stance on the IPA framework and, in a 1995 publication, officially confirmed its recognition of the IPA test as an essential element of the Convention [29].

The presumption that inadequate domestic protection precipitates international protection is the underlying reasoning informing refugee law and is implied in Article 1(A)(2), which defines a refugee as a person who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion is outside their country of origin and is unwilling or unable to avail him or herself of the protection of that country (*Geneva Convention 1951,* art. 1(A)(2)) [31]. It is not much of a leap to recognise the relationship between IPA and Article 1(A)(2)- the assessment of the availability of an IPA is an essential element in determining whether an applicant is a Convention refugee [32]. Thus, while 1951 Convention does not explicitly refer to the IPA test, it is nevertheless grounded in the notion of 'surrogate international refugee protection', a departure from the cornerstone presumption of international law, which associates protection with the obligation of the country of origin [33, 34]. While IPAs are broadly accepted within the status determination procedure, their lack of fixed juridical interpretation has resulted in inconsistent application [29, 32, 35].

Associated with this terminological inconsistency is growing apprehensiveness about the risk of the IPA test placing too high of an evidentiary burden on the applicant [27, 29, 32]. Given that establishing reasonable fear of persecution in a localised area is already challenging, having to provide evidence of persecution countrywide would place too high an evidentiary burden on the applicant. The often-stringent application of the IPA test has been used in Western countries to deny refugee status to an asylum seeker who is unable to present sufficient evidence, advocating for them to seek refuge within the borders of their country of origin [34]. This ultimately contributes to a narrowing interpretation of the definition of 'refugee', as seen in the Convention [36]. Given that designated safety zones are often legally rendered, serious concerns arise as to safety zone's capacity to threaten the institution of asylum.

2.4.2 The IPA test in the refugee status determination procedure

Two main competing analytical frameworks for evaluating the availability of an IPA have emerged in refugee law as a result of State practice- the 'Reasonableness' framework (which is the dominant practice) and the 'Internal Protection' framework. However, in-depth discussion and comparison of the two competing frameworks are beyond this paper's scope. Instead, given that, apart from New Zealand, no state has been identified by legal commentators to have adopted the Internal Protection Framework [30], four baseline criteria's will be derived from the 'Reasonableness' framework and discussed. According to the UNHCR Handbook from 1979, the

'Reasonableness' framework demands two sets of analysis to establish the availability of the IPA: the relevance analysis and the reasonableness analysis ([37], p. 92). Whereas the former enquires into accessibility and protection from the original cause of persecution, or other forms of equivalent harm, the latter questions the reasonableness of the expectation for a claimant to relocate. Evaluation of the IPA criteria will allow for critical evaluation of the conditions using the historical examples of Srebrenica safety zones, Iraqi Kurdish safety zones, and the safety zones in northeastern Syria.

2.4.3 Accessibility of the IPA to the applicant

The key issue when assessing the efficacy of an IPA is whether the individual whose claim is under consideration can realistically access the designated region. The IPA must be an achievable alternative, not a speculative option [29], and 'practically, safely and legally' accessible to the applicant. Thus, physical barriers, visa and transit regulations, as well as transportation facilities, are to be taken into consideration. Since it is broadly agreed that the refugee definition is forward-looking, the IPA examination should focus on current country conditions [35]. Similarly, the IPA should not be applied where there is a possibility of the applicant being exposed to undue hardship or compelled to hide within it. Where the political situation of the intermediate State changes to satisfy the requirements of Article 1 C(5)-(6) of the Refugee Convention, refugee status may be revoked. The IPA, however, should not apply where the intermediate State makes the IPA inaccessible to the claimant [32].

2.4.4 Protection from the original risk of persecution

Once the availability of access is established, there must exist an IPA where the applicant's well-founded fear of persecution will be dissipated [27, 29, 32, 35]. The panel must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no risk of the applicant's original fear of persecution in that area. The 'well-founded fear' test, which measures the 'reasonable possibility' of persecution is used to establish the threat within the IPA [21]. Establishing that the original agent of persecution has not *yet* reached the designated territories for an IPA does not meet the requirements of the test [27]. Instead, it must be found that the fear of persecution is localised and does not extend to the IPA area. A question not resolved in international jurisprudence is whether an IPA can be invoked if the agent of persecution is the government itself. On one hand, the existence of government as the persecutor precludes the relevance of an IPA [38]. This is the same reasoning as the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture, which held that it is unlikely to find an IPA where the police have targeted the applicant [32] and is consistent with the position in international human rights law [27]. The UNHCR's recommendations also raise the possibility of the intermediate State's inability to act throughout the entire territory; allowing for the creation of an internal protection alternative, given that other requirements are satisfied [37]. The least logically consistent application of the IPA is where the State is both the persecutor and can act anywhere within its jurisdiction, a view maintained by the UNHCR [35]. The superior aptitude for a State to inflict harm, as compared to local governments and non-State actors means that, even in times of non-persecution and in a different location, the effectiveness of an IPA as an antidote is diminished [27].

2.4.5 No new risk of persecution and indirect refoulement

Simply because an applicant will not be confronted with harm from the original cause of persecution is insufficient evidence to presume an IPA exists. The inquiry into a possibility of persecution must be complemented by an inquiry on whether the protected area would be safe from persecution without a nexus to the Convention grounds [27, 32, 35]. This requirement has been supported by many courts and legal commentators [32, 35]. Broadening the relevant criteria for a lawful IPA beyond persecution for the protected Convention grounds, which gives entitlement to refugee status, might appear counter-intuitive. However, establishing a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention refugee reason precedes the evaluation of the relevance of an IPA and relocation. The IPA framework of analysis demands a more contextualised assessment of persecution, which is often captured by the reasonableness standard [29]. The *reasonableness* criterion ultimately poses the question of whether it would be reasonable for an applicant to relocate to the proposed site, and thereby expands the elements in the inquiry to factors such as the applicant's age, gender, family status and employment experience. If the Court finds that there are serious reasons to believe that the applicant would be exposed to forms of harm equivalent in intensity and gravity to those which prompted him to flee and which were not present in his native region at the time of the flight, the IPA may be denied and refugee status invoked instead. Threats to physical security in the suggested IPA, which would compel an applicant to return to his region of origin where he or she is exposed to the original risk of persecution, amounts to '*indirect refoulement*' [27, 32]. Storey [29] explains that this notion refers to *direct* state action*,* which, directly or indirectly, culminates in the breach of the Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, in which the principle of *non-refoulement* is enshrined. All of these findings illustrate that the protection approach to IPA analysis requires for a more precise legal framework, as the lack of modern regulation allows for interpretation in a manner consistent with their national interests. This can be seen in the examples of several safety zones, particularly those established in Turkey.

3. Safety zones: Case studies

3.1 Safety zones in Iraq: Operation provide comfort

In 1991, against the background of the Iraq uprisings and following the First Gulf War, approximately 400,000 Iraqi Kurds fled towards Iran and Turkey [17]. Due to the historical political tension between the Turkish government and the Kurds, Ankara responded by closing borders to the influx of Kurdish refugees [39] and referring to its geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which means it only recognises refugees fleeing persecution from European events [40]. At this point, over 200,000 Kurds were stuck in miserable conditions in the mountainous border region separating Iraq from Turkey [41]. Turkey's strategic importance as a member of NATO deflected any potential internarial pressure to receive Iraqi Kurds against its will [5, 42]. Instead, on 5 April 1991, the US-led coalition passed the UN Security Council's Resolution 688 and moved to protect Kurds by carving out a 'safety zone' in northern Iraq [13], justifying it by the danger a 'massive' refugee movements 'across international frontiers and cross border incursions' represented to 'international peace and security'. ([43], p. 31). However, since the Resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII, it did not sanction the use of force [5].

The Resolution reaffirmed Iraq's 'sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence', to alleviate the fear that this intervention would advance the Kurdish quest for self-determination. It was a win-win for the allied powers- it prevented the mass *refoulement* of refugees at Turkey's border, which reinforced their commitments to human rights norms and simultaneously weakened Saddam Hussein through the creation of a self-ruling militarised unit within Iraq [42]. Protected by a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel, six Iraqi Kurdish camps were located across 10,000 square kilometres [40] with troops on the ground to ward off further aggression. Thus, the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) became the first UN-endorsed international intervention into a sovereign state [12].

The literature generally agrees on the success of the Iraqi safety zones [13, 26, 39, 44, 45]. However, the OPC deviates from the traditional model of safety zones where all parties to the conflict agree that a designated location will be exempt from violence ([43], p. 32). The OPC-established zones were accessible to the internally displaced Iraqi Kurds in the northern mountainous border territories. A leading Refugee law scholar, Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway have suggested that sending back refugee applicants to these designated areas is consistent with the 1951 Geneva Convention, whereas Ghiranne's [26] research points to the conclusion that these territories were free from the persecution linked to the Convention grounds or any new persecution, which would be comparable in intensity.

It must be considered that, potentially, Iraqi safety zones pass the IPA test in jurisdictions with a broader interpretation of the Convention and thus seldom turn to IPA. Some jurisdictions apply the presumption that an IPA is not viable where the persecutor is the State. In OPC that, of course, is the case. Kurdish Iraqi's fled the systemic violence directed at them by the centralised apparatus of the Iraqi government. However, in this case there is sufficient evidence of the capacity to protect within the suggested IPA. The presence of the coalition forces represented a successful deterrent to Iraqi aggression, signalling the international community's commitment to ensuring Iraqi Kurds' safety. What cemented the OCP's sufficient safety conditions without the Iraqi government's official recognition was the two parallel, although unassociated, settlements with the Iraqi military leaders. On 18th April 1991b, the UN and the government of Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) whereby Bagdad attested to several provisions preserving the rights of its citizens, simultaneously sanctioning the UN's presence on Iraqi territory and its 'efforts to promote the voluntary return home of Iraqi displaced persons' (para 2) [46, 47]. This MOU was superseded by an agreement on the 25th May, which allowed for the deployment of 500 UN Guards (UNGCI) to the UN Humanitarian Centres [4]. Although McQueen [4] correctly points out that the arrangements secured by the MOU were substituted for the provision of the safety zones, it was found to be significant on 15 July when coalition troops departed Iraq. After the coalition withdrew on 15th July, continued deterrence was ensured by the no-fly zone over Iraq's northern territories [13].

However, whilst the OPC has met the criteria for an IPA, citing OPC as a precedent for safety zones should be done with discretion, due to the exceptional circumstances which accompanied its creation. First of all, the decision to establish safety zones was taken against the background of Iraq's military defeat during the Gulf War, making the coalition's warnings a credible and effective deterrent. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the role of state interests, which ensured OPC's successful enforcement. In the aftermath of the *Desert Storm* bombing campaign, which forced Iraq to end the occupation of Kuwait, the US was unwilling to diminish this victory by providing inadequate protection to the Iraqi Kurds, a situation, which attracted broad media

attention internationally. Put together, this exceptional constellation of factors contributed to the success of the Iraqi safety zones.

3.2 Safety zones in Bosnia and herzegovina

On 29 February 1992 Bosnia held a referendum for independence, with 99.4% voters in favour of breaking away from Yugoslavia [4], plunging Bosnia into a three-way ethnic conflict between Muslim Bosnians and Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs [13]. By October 1993, there were 800,000 refugees outside of Bosnia, and 1.2 million internally displaced within the country (United States Department of State, 1994). The encirclement of numerous Muslim-majority towns in western Bosnia and Eastern Serbia by Bosnian Serbs finally provoked a reaction from the UN Security Council, who selected six towns and cities, deployed their military personnel and declared them 'safe areas', beginning with Srebrenica [16].

Srebrenica proved a disastrous endeavour [17, 26] (Regueiro, 2017) and failed to meet the baseline criteria for a lawful IPA on several grounds. Firstly, it did not satisfy the accessibility criteria, as enemy forces surrounded Srebrenica. UN documents reported about the 'Serb obstruction of the passage through the UN-protected areas of convoys for humanitarian relief and the United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) resupply'. This is supported by evidence that armed conflict prevailed in Srebrenica's surrounding areas from mid-1993 to mid-1995 [26]. Furthermore, the Srebrenica safety zone did not successfully preclude persecution based on Convention grounds or risk of *refoulement*. The execution of approximately 7336 Bosnian Muslims 'by Bosnian Serbs outside the enclave' during the 6–11 July 1995 offensive is the manifestation of persecution in its purest form.

Safety zones are evaluated against their ability to protect and it is undeniable that Srebrenica fails this test. However, there were several political decisions, as well as deviation from the UN's safety zone enforcement guidelines on the ground, which paved the way for this failure. Firstly, the designation of Srebrenica as a safety zone was not recognised by all of the parties to the conflict [48]. The possibility of Bosnian Serbs having an aggressive reaction to this was recognised by the UNCHR as it implored the UN to turn to safety zones 'as the last option'. However, Bosnia's low strategic importance to the international community, and the strong national security incentives to stem refugees flows from the Balkans, meant this advice was discounted. The geographical proximity meant that European MSs experienced the highest flows of refugees since WWII [26] and created an urgency in the European states to reduce net migration. Thus, during the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia on 29 July 1992, the Slovenian delegation proposed 'safe havens' in Bosnia 'to avert new flows of refugees and displaced persons' [49]. The idea was met with broad enthusiasm [50] and was even endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki [51]. Parallel to this, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata alluded to 'the right to remain' [52]. This 'preventing protection' is informed by the logic that protecting the basic right of the individuals 'not to become a refugee' [52] and not to be forced into exile would discourage refugee flows. To shift the attention from the fundamental human rights principle of the 'right to leave' (UDHR, 1949, art.13(2)) towards a 'right to remain' in a war-torn environment is to weaken the ground for seeking refuge abroad. Thus, it becomes obvious, that Bosnian safety zones served the purpose of an asylum substitute [5, 26, 50, 53] and a threat to the institution of asylum. In practice, this threat

was quickly manifested as refugee status was refused due to the availability of a 'safe haven' i.e. IPA within Bosnia. States justified their overall unwillingness to accept refugees based on the 'right to remain'.

In a situation where not all of the parties to the conflict recognise proposed 'safety zones', international law prescribes the protection of such areas on the ground [54]. In contrast to Iraq, where national troops and the Iraqi Kurdish *peshmerga* forces protected the zones [17], the power imbalance between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnians Serbs was a direct result of Security Council's Resolution 713 which led to the imposition of an arms embargo over the entire of former Yugoslavia for the duration of the conflict [4]. This, along with the NATO no-fly zone, prevented Croatia and Bosnia from exercising their right to self-defence.

In Bosnia, these designated areas were under the protection of the UN and UNPROFOR. However, effective coordination was undermined by the fact that the Security Council's political decisions were taken in New York [4]. This ensured, that the UN troops in Bosnia were slow to react to the developments in Srebrenica. Weak response capacity of UNPROFOR was exacerbated by its inadequate numbers. The UN Security Council decided to ignore the Secretary-General's and UN Force Commander's demand for 34,000 troops, opting for the 'light option' of 7600 troops (Security Council, 1993). Although, in theory, authorisation to turn to airpower for defence purposes was granted by the UN Security Council, these were considered incompatible with peacekeeping mission by the Force Commanders in Bosnia [1]. Eventually, UNPROFOR's mandate was extended, allowing it to 'act in self-defence' and taking 'the necessary measures including the use of force' (para 9.). However, enforcement measures were not provided [26], as UNPROFOR meant to simply 'deter attacks' (para 5) directed at the safety zones. Some scholars, such as Posen [16] find it astounding that only two out of six safety zones were taken by the Serbs, given the limited NATO support in these territories.

Other than designating Srebrenica as 'safe', the resolution did not elucidate on how to enforce that objective [55]. Instead, the resolution was left open for interpretation by the UNPROFOR who pushed for a demilitarisation agreement in Srebrenica [56] and left the responsibility to ensure the area was 'safe' on the shoulders of Serbs and the Muslims [57]. However, while Srebrenica was demilitarised, against the UN's recommendations, the remaining five Bosnian safe areas were not [58]. The continued military activity within the safety zones meant that the demilitarisation agreement was rendered meaningless immediately. Landgren [5] argues that these unprovoked attacks not only defeated the inherent purpose of 'safety zones' but made the Bosnian Serb retaliation and offensive inevitable. Many similar underlying issues detected in Bosnia, particularly underling geopolitical interests, can be seen in the case of Turkish safety zones.

3.2.1 The creation of Turkish safety zones in Syria's northern territories: Context

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in March 2011, Turkey has been the leading advocate for the establishment of a 'safety zone' in northern Syria [59], calling for 'United Nations [...] IDP camps within Syria', which should have 'full protection', and reminding the Council members of 'the cost of procrastination' citing Srebrenica, Halabja and Gaza [60]. However, the divided Security Council did not act upon Turkey's request. In the US Senator McCain proposed a non-binding resolution for safety zones in Syria (S.Res.4242012), but then-president Barack Obama refused to act upon it. Meanwhile, the then-presidential candidate Donald Trump committed himself to the establishment of a 'beautiful safe zone' on a 'big piece of land' in Syria [61],

however, upon his election, his proposed solution failed to materialise. The idea was quietly shelved by the international community, until the concept of safety zones took the form of a 'de-escalation zone' agreement, a fruit of the Astana talks on 4th May 2017 between Turkey, Russia and Iran, which sought to curtail the flow of Syrian refugees [62]. However, although de-escalation zones aim to halt hostilities in designated areas, they cannot be equalised with safety zones, due to their lack of protective framework.

Instead, a new safety zone scheme was promogulated by President Erdogan, who presented the earliest official draft during the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2019 [63]. The safety zone, as initially envisioned by Erdogan, was to be a 480-kilometre long and 30-kilometre deep strip of land spreading from the Syrian-Iraq border to the city of Manjib in the west, enclosing governates of Aleppo, Hassakah and al-Raqqa within it [64]. However, with little enthusiasm from the international community, Turkey resorted to threats. In September 2019 Erdogan stated that in the light of 'handling this burden alone', Turkey 'will be forced to open the gates' [65]. Eventually, blaming the US for delaying the proposal's execution, Ankara launched a cross-border offensive [66]. On October 9th, 2019, 3 days after President Trump (2019) announced on Twitter that 'it is time for the US to get out of these ridiculous endless wars', Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched Operation Peace Spring (OPS) targeting the American-supported SDF [67]. The fighting between the Turks and the SDF culminated in a ceasefire agreement between Ankara and Washington on October 18th.

The ambitious scale of the project first proposed was moderated under a MOU between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 22nd October 2019 [68]. Following the principles spelt out in the Sochi Agreement, Turkey successfully added 120 kilometres of territory connecting the towns of Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad to the pockets of northern Syria it has seized from the Kurdish fighters and the Islamic State (IS) in military operations between 2016 and 2018 [69]. The agreement was hailed as 'historic' by Erdogan [70]. It allowed Russia to fill the power vacuum left after the withdrawal of American troops, thereby placing Moscow as a regional power broker in the Middle East. It also ended the Kurds' domination over a 440-kilometre border as Syrian border guards and Russian military police acquired most of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) frontier posts [71], securing Turkish long-term interest in the region. The joint efforts of Turkey and Syria to assist in the voluntary return of Syrian refugees was sanctioned under Article 8 of the agreement [72].

Until now, Turkey's interventions have successfully established four safety zones, each named after an armed operation during which Ankara annexed tracts of land. The Euphrates Shield Operation between 2016 and 2017 concluded with the Turkish army seizing the northern areas of Aleppo Governate (Al [62]). A year later, Olive Branch Operation secured Turkish control over north-western Aleppo Governate [73]. In 2019, territories east of the Euphrates River were added to the Turkish sphere of influence with the Peace Spring Operation (PSO) [74]. During the final series of cross-border operations in 2020, Turkey expanded the safety zones by sections of Idlib through the Spring Shield Operation [75]. This paper further explores some reasons why Turkish national interests may have been involved in the country's decision to develop these safety zones.

4. Findings and discussion

The Turkish governed safety zones in northern Syria, similarly to the safety zones in Srebrenica, have been unsuccessful in meeting the minimum criteria for a legal

IPA on numerous counts. Several factors contribute to the inaccessibility of the safety zones. At the logistical level, the journey to northern Syria is seriously obstructed by the 'financial and logical cost of navigating checkpoints under the control of different groups' (Kayali, 2020). The financial challenge of reaching the safety zone due to financial reasons is reflected in the interviews collected in Al Bab, where two out of seven respondents emphasised the 'difficult' (interview 15 2020) and 'hard' (interview 16 2020) nature of the flight, citing inflated transport costs as one of the reasons. Whereas respondents in Tal Abyad did not speak of the financial barrier of reaching the designated territories, the statement of an interviewee in Al Bab illustrates the degree of costs in question: 'I paid everything I had to get here. I had two cars when I was in Maskana, now I have none' (interview 11 2020). Travel may also be impeded by the quality of roads, due to the underdevelopment of these territories (Kayali, 2020) and their 'marginal' importance prior to the establishment of the IDP camps (interview 16 2020). The deserted geography of Jarabulus is well encapsulated by this quote: 'you have to wait five hours to find a car to take you from here' (interview 16 2020). Most importantly, however, a journey to Turkish safety zones may prove physically perilous. Out of 19 IDPs interviewed in three different cities falling within the parameters of the Turkish safety zones, 13 respondents revealed that they travelled to safety zones amid bombing. Respondents would recall 'helicopters throwing bombs' (interview 13 2020) and 'gaols, tortures' (interview 12 2020) on the way to the safe areas. The 'airstrikes over the road' (interview 11 2020) would elongate the passage to safety zones, as one respondent recalled that it took him 2 days (interview 2, 2020). The collected data indicates that entering the zones through the eastern border requires passage through the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which is met with the possibility of being stranded at the Iraqi/Syrian border, due to the month-long border closures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Kourdi, 2020). This falls short of the requirement to be 'practically, safely and legally' [76] accessible to the claimant, both internally and from the outside [21] and thus do not meet the requirement of IPA's 'accessibility' standard.

The Syrian safety zones have also failed to extinguish a reasonable chance of persecution for a Convention refugee reason. Out of 19 respondents, seven described the Turkish zones as 'safe', while three respondents reflected that their relocation to the safety areas resulted in a marginal improvement in safety, and nine respondents did not engage in the safety evaluation of the territories. A closer analysis of the primary data displays evidence of persecution enumerated in the Geneva Convention. The collected interviews revealed that expressing political opinion that are critical of the political current status quo in Turkish safety zones carries the risk of arrest and potential torture, regardless of the 'margin of freedom' to one's opinions, which exists in these areas (Kourdi, 2020). Furthermore, as previously mentioned in the Iraqi safety zone case, numerous jurisdictions have a strong presumption against finding an IPA where the State is the actor of persecution [77]. The interviews collected from the Turkish safety zones indicate that the respondents fear the retaliation of the State, as opposed to the other Parties to the conflict. In the words of one of the interviewees: 'We are afraid of the regime only, there are new arrangements we do not know about' (interview 11 2020). This fear is supported by Kourdi (2020): 'the regime has nothing to lose and will continue its advancement until they regain the last meter of the country'. However, this presumption is rebuttable if compelling evidence exists to suggest that meaningful protection can be found within the proposed IPA. In the Syrian case, the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces and/or the Turkish-backed military groups such as the Syrian National Army (FSA) (Kourdi, 2020) may in theory deter potential attacks and thus preserve the safety of the IDPs within the zones. However, primary findings

suggest that the Turkish military threat has insufficiently prevented aggression. Turkish controlled safety zones are exposed to continuous attacks by both the Kurdish-led forced seeking to re-establish their control over the Turkish annexed land or by the Syrian-Russian military alliance (Kayali, 2020). The on-going contestation over the northern territories, a result how Turkey established dominance over them, lead to a situation whereby Syrian nationals are 'at risk both inside them and outside the safety zone' (Kayali, 2020). Considering these findings, it is hard to argue that the Turkish administered safety zones have been established consensually. Thus, the Turkish safety zones have been unsuccessful in ensuring that the underlying cause of flight has been eliminated, contributing further to the assessment that an IPA does not exist.

The safety zones in Syria fail to meet yet another qualification in the IPA test, that is, protection from persecution without a nexus to the Convention grounds. The political instability amid which the safe areas were erected, the territorial struggle which ensued in the aftermath of their creation and the inability to secure their recognition by the central government and the remaining sides to the war, made the safety zones particularly vulnerable to hostilities. Against this backdrop, the Turkish safety zones perform particularly poorly in the previously discussed 'reasonable-ness criterion', which expands the analysis to the provision of basic political, socio-economic and civil human rights and the subjective circumstances of the individual [76]. The on-going in-fighting gives strong grounds to believe that Syrians are re-exposed to other forms of harm of equivalent adversity to those which prompted them to leave the native region. On-going displacement occasioned by violence has been raised as a concern among the respondents. A Syrian proverb has been quoted to capture the ingrained apprehension of future forced migration: 'the one whose mouth has been burnt by hot milk even blows on yoghurt when eating it'. The interviewee explained the maxim's relevance: 'whenever they say armistices are over, we know that we will be displaced again' (interview 12 2020). All 19 respondents presented a history of displacement, while one interviewee testified that he has been uprooted 50 times (interview 11 2020). It is also important to illuminate the relationship between displacement and penury. Six respondents (interview 3 2020; Interview 3 2020; interview 18 2020; 16 Jarubulus, 2020; interview 17 2020; interview 9 2020) stated that bombing forced them to leave everything they owned behind 'to survive' (interview 18 2020) forcing a group of interviewees to abandon their 'car full of our luggage and [...] walk on feet' (interview 17 2020).

The impoverishment of the Syrian IDPs and the destruction of infrastructure, which accompanied the development of these safety zones (Kayali, 2020) restricts access to livelihood opportunities for those living in protracted displacement- a concern mentioned by all respondents. The state of malaise in the safety zones is broadly reflected in the collected data, as the word 'nothing' and 'bad' has been used 11 and 8 times respectively to describe the state of services, access to education, humanitarian activity and healthcare in the safety zones. Furthermore, interviewees 3, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17 (2020) state that neither food nor water wells are provided, whereas one barrel of water costs approximately 1200 Syrian pounds (SYP), and one bag of bread 600 SYP (interview 12 2020). One interviewee commented on this dire situation: 'those who do not get a job, die from hunger' (interview 15 2020). However, this is a problematic finding, as in the three cities in which interviews were conducted, jobs appear to be extremely scarce, 'almost non-existent' (interview 18 2020), a reality confirmed by all 19 respondents. In Al-Bab it was stated in an interview that a job can be secured 2-3 times in a whole month, for which one would be rewarded circa 10,000 SYP (equivalent of 3,50 GBP), until the surfacing of the next job in 3 months

(Interview 11 2020). Due to the absence of employment, children in Al Bab and Jarubulus sell plastic found in waste containers for which they purchase food for the family (Interview 16 in Jarubulus 2020; interview 18 2020). Respondents associated the poor conditions within the safety zones with their lack of recognition in the eyes of their respective local councils (interview 5 in Jarabulus 2020), as one interviewee concluded that Syrian IDPs are seen as 'ugly ducklings' (interview 15 2020).

There is little hope for improvement in the near future given that the Security Council failed to adopt two draft resolutions sanctioning cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid in northern Syria [43]. The numerous examples of the lack of decent means of subsistence have been indicated, as they are of relevance to the IPA test when evaluating the possibility of *indirect refoulement.* Socio-economic destitution may compel IDPs to return an area where he or she would be re-exposed to persecution. An interview with Kourdi (2020) confirms the sporadic occurrence of indirect refoulement, citing an example of a man returning to the Government- controlled areas from the Turkish controlled part of Idleb, where he was subjected to State-inflicted tortures (two broken legs). Looking at these findings, it may be concluded that the current conditions in Al Bab, Jarabulus and Tal Abyad amount to an existence below a bare subsistence level (*Existenzminium*). The Turkish safety zones, whether in north-western or north-eastern Syria do not satisfy the reasonableness criterion of the IPA inquiry, as it would be 'unduly harsh' to relocate there and thus, unreasonable and illegal.

4.1 Key findings—A critical analysis of Turkey's motives

On October 31st, 2019, President Erdogan applauded Turkey's 'lengthy efforts', which bore the fruits of the 'most peaceful and liveable places in Syria'- the safety zones [78]. The primary findings enclosed in the above section, however, suggest that Erdogan's assessment of the zones is Panglossian and evidence to the contrary: they are hardly peaceful or liveable. In fact, the collected data from As-Suwayda, Al-Qamishli, Damascus, Dayr Al Zawr, Al-Hasakah, Tal Rifaat suggest that livelihood opportunities (apart from Dayr Al Zawr), are notably higher than in the Turkish safety zones analysed (with the exception of the more central territories of Al-Bab [Kourdi, 2020]). This assessment is based on collected information on the availability of education and jobs (8/10 respondents indicated unrestricted access to education for children, and 4/10 were unemployed where two respondents being current students and one was a retired military man). However, the evaluation of safety varied across the cities. In Damascus, Al-Hasakah, As-Suwayda and Al-Qamishli 10 respondents unanimously declared the areas as 'safe' (interview 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 2020) both respondents from Dayr Al Zawr described feeling 'unsafe' (interview 22 and 23 2020) and two respondents in Tal Rifaat expressed fear of possible war and the danger represented by a potential Turkish invasion (interview 20 and 21 2020). It appears, therefore, that even the territories, which permit financing life at levels of minimum subsistence would fail an IPA test. As such, the 2019 Danish Immigration's Service's decision to revoke the temporary protection status of three Syrian applicants from Damascus [79] which appealed to the IPA language of Damascus as a 'safe' relocation alternative, sets a dangerous precedent in the EU and shows the potential of an incorrectly applied IPA notion in restricting access to asylum. The question, which begs attention, therefore, is if Turkey was truly motivated by altruistic aspirations to help 'Syrian brothers and sisters' [80] what explains the geographical designation for the safety zones in northern Syria, which hardly allow for social and economic existence?

Sinem [59] argues that the incentives for the invocation of such zones in fact shifted to match Ankara's political priorities. Between 2011 and 2014, Turkey's vision of protected areas south of its borders was primary actuated by its desire to see the demise of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, as Ankara encouraged anti-Assad rebels to settle in these territories [81]. The expectation of Bash al-Assad's prompt defeat compelled Turkey to announce an open-border policy for those fleeing the Syrian civil war. However, this decision quickly proved to be a miscalculated strategic move, which created unforeseen ramifications for Turkey. The paralysis of the Western asylum system and the endurance of Assad's regime proved to impede a fair international burden sharing in the light of the Syrian refugee crisis. This realisation was reflected in the speech of the then-Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu during a Security Council meeting in August 2012: "we feel that the open-door policy of Turkey [...] is in fact absorbing any potential international reaction' [82]. By mid-2018, Turkey hosted 3,584,179 Syrian refugees [18], becoming the largest recipient of Syrian asylum seekers in the world.

The appeal of safety zones as an alternative solution to the unfolding refugee crisis on Turkey's borders was further fuelled by Ankara's overstretched reception capacity and the existing legal framework for refugees and asylum seekers. Turkish legal frame emanates from the Settlement Law (1934), the Geneva Convention (1951) and its subsequent Additional Protocol (1967) 81]. However, Turkey retained a geographical limitation to its ratification of the 1951 Convention, whereby in accordance with article 1/3 of the 1967 Protocol only those fleeing events occurring in Europe can be awarded refugee status [83]. Thus, non-European asylum applicants are not permitted to stay, regardless of their successful status determination outcome through UNHCR [81]. Since a category of 'guest' is without precedence in international refugee law and in 2011 Turkey devised novel legal and administrative documents including 'temporary protection regime' [84] and cemented by the adaptation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2013 (UN, 2013). Based on the EU Council Directive 2001/55/EC [61, 85], it offers temporary protections to foreigners, and thus Syrians, for those who seek temporary asylum until resettlement. The scale of the exodus towards Turkey added a degree of urgency to finding an alternative solution for the refugee crisis unfolding on its borders was added.

Kourdi (2020) provides a more nuanced and multifaced explanation of Turkey's political agenda regarding safety zones, which complements the argument derived from the stretched national capacity argument. During the interview, three types of safety zones were discriminated, each with a precise purpose. Type 1 safety zones, encompassing Idlib and northern countryside of Aleppo, is where Turkey would like to implement enforced resettlement programs for IDPs and refugees. However, at the time of writing, the territories hold a strong presence of Syrian rebels and are thus exclusively aspirational. Type 2 zones were inaugurated by Peace Spring Operation, stretching from Tal Abyad to Ras al Ayn and where Ankara intends to complement Type 1 resettlement schemes for Syrian refugees and IDPs, however, its current commitment the execution of this plan is weak, judging by the levels of their development efforts directed at this strip of land (as compared to north-western Turkish controlled cities). Type 3 zones extend from Ad Darbasiyah to Kobani (and excluding the city of Qamishli) with the foremost intent of eliminating Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), elements from the areas, coming into force with the 2019 Sochi Agreement and scaled down in size from being 30-km to 10-km deep). However, Type 3 zones can be more fittingly described as 'safety zones' for Turkish national security concerns, intended to shield Turkey from the SDF, led by the People's Protection Units

(YPG), which Ankara regards as an extension of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), rather than 'safety zones' as a humanitarian form of protection- the focus of this thesis. Thus, 'buffer zones' would be a more fitting category for Type 3 zones, as Kourdi (2020) holds that suppression of the growing Kurdish political ambition of the SDF, which risked energising the repressed self-determination aspirations of the Turkish branch, PKK, left other considerations subordinate to this goal- an argument, which finds support in the available literature [86–88].

Overall, the argument made in this thesis is that humanitarian considerations find little place in the safety zones discussion. Thus, Syrian safety zone realised a number of Ankara's national interests: it allowed to absorb future waves of Syrian asylum seekers and for a permanent relocation of those already in Turkey, eliminated the threat that ISIS represented to its borders, impede the Kurdish separatism and finally augment Turkey's influence in the region by offering a logical site for moderate rebel groups. These aspirations represent a clear departure from Turkey's previously dominant Kemalist identity geared towards a policy of regional non-involvement, towards a Neo-Ottoman vision, characterised by the return of Turkey's inclination to play an important and active regional role [89]. The establishment of Turkish unsafe safety zones is a dangerous development, an opinion shared by Professor David Keen [17] during an interview, due to the significant leeway the EU grants Ankara in return for its cooperation to curtail the refugee flows into the Union. Thus, although from the outset of the Syrian war, Turkey underscored the ethical and moral facet informing the need for safety zones, it appears that Turkey is cloaking political ambitions under a humanitarian cover [59]. As such it appears that Turkey's safety zones are not only represent a restrictive refugee policy instrument, but also a geopolitical one and thus, a threat to the institution of asylum.

5. Conclusion

This paper considered whether safety zones represent a complementary policy to international protection or a threat to the institution of asylum. On one hand, safety zones are a relatively low-cost panacea for the shortcomings of contemporary asylum regime. Since those who are unable or unwilling to leave their country of origin in search of asylum are excluded from protection in Refugee Law, it is customarily argued that safety zones correct this lacuna in law by providing immediate in-country protection of civilians from bodily harm. On the other hand, however, pursuing the establishment of safety zones is associated with the risk of impeding refugee protection. The belief in safety zones' capacity to provide meaningful protection, comparable to that of refugee law, provides justification for host states to tighten their borders and seek their creation without ensuring that all conditions specified in international law are created prior to their inauguration. This, in turn, may result in the provision of inadequate levels of safety to those who are often exposed to persecution for a Convention refugee reason and thus diluting the right to asylum.

Firstly, it has been shown that safety zones may be established in accordance with international law and most importantly, the IPA notion. While the Iraqi safety zones departed from the recommended model of a safety zone as envisioned by international law, due to OPCs inability to secure recognition from all the parties to the conflict, the Iraqi safety zone was accessible, free from the original risk of persecution and persecution without a Convention nexus and facilitated the safe repatriation of Iraqi Kurds. However, it was also shown that OPC was erected amid exceptional circumstances, which conditioned its ability to fulfil its protection objective. However, the success of the

Iraqi safety zone has not been reproduced in the case of Bosnia and Syria, both of which failed to satisfy all three baseline conditions of a legal IPA. Furthermore, all three case studies revealed that the creation of safety zones in each of the respective countries was informed by geopolitical interests, as well as the desire to curb migratory movements.

However, former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, noted that IDPs are 'among the most vulnerable of the human family' [90] and thus safety zones should not be prematurely disqualified as an instrument for their protection. This paper has identified a number of conditions, which have to be met for a safety zones to be effective identified through historical and primary data analysis. That is, safety zones (a) have to be clearly established (b) be in towns with livelihood opportunities (c) not be a contested territory (d) law should be revised to address the problem of unclear accountability for human rights violations that may take place within the safety zones. However, it appears that the most important condition is that safety zones are used as a complementary policy to the institution of asylum and not its alternative.

Interviews

Interview with Sara Kayyali, Syria researcher in the Middle East and North Africa Division in Human Rights Watch (HRW). 9 August 2020

Interview with Eyad Kourdi, Freelance journalist specialising in the Middle East and working with multiple media outlets such as CNN. 20 August 2020

Interview with Dr. David Keen, Professor of Complex Emergencies at London School Economics and a specialist in the field of Safety Zones. 28 July 2020

Interview with Interviewee 1, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Tal Abyad, 30 July 2020

Interview with Interviewee 2, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi,Tal Abyad, 30 July 2020

Interview with Interviewee 3, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 4, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 5, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 6, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 7, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 8, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 9, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 10, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi Jarabulus, 4 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 10, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 11, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 12, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 13, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 14, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 15, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 16, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 17, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 18, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 19, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Bab, 10 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 20, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Tal Rifaat, 13 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 21, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Tal Rifaat, 13 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 22, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Dayr az Zawr, 14 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 23, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Dayr az Zawr, 14 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 24, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Qamishli, 17 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 25, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Qamishli, 17 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 26, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Suwayda, 18 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 27, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Damascus, 20 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 28, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Hasakah, 21 August 2020

Interview with Interviewee 29, conducted by Nour El-Deen Hammadi, Al-Hasakah, 21 August 2020

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Chapter 3

After Three Centuries of Migration, What Happened to the Children?

Tanya F.P. Herring and Victory Ezeofor

Abstract

Migration within the last three centuries centres on economics, shifts in government policies, and general concepts surrounding migrating children. However, this chapter asks a fundamental question, 'what happened to the children? Over the last three centuries, children have been born along the journey. Accompanied and unaccompanied children have been and continue to be the forgotten collateral damage. The chapter explores the critical role of protection, prevention, and harm to migrating children. It addresses gaps and noncompliance with the ratified treaty, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child over the last three decades, international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination, and return, to include the lifetime of impact on their health.

Keywords: accompanied and unaccompanied children, forced migration, oral health, mental health, migration, UN convention on the rights of the child, vaccinations

1. Introduction

The chapter brings together discourse and information on: (a) the scale and nature of the forced migration, its adverse impact on children, and their likely fatalities during migration; (b) the role of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child over the last three decades, the gaps in State responsibility for the migrating refugee and asylum-seeking child; (c) how children have been the migratory collateral damage, often overlooked in situations of forced migration, and the lifetime impact on health.

Structured to serve as the focal human rights instrument for children, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), its Optional Protocols, coupled with General Comments is the most widely ratified human rights treaties across the globe [1]. The CRC is ratified by all states with the exception of the United States and came into force on 2 September 1990. Subsequently, as of 5 September 2022, 196 countries are State Parties with two Optional Protocols adopted on 25 May 2000.

Three centuries ago, the CRC was a far-reaching hope in both the home, workplace, and communities with little to no legal standing for protection of their human rights. However, Article 22:

> *'State Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refuge status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of appliable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties' [2].*

The CRC's tenets set out the general principles of children's rights and the law holding a position as a global universal instrument. Noting that deaths and atrocities usually occur far from public eye and any record keeping processes, gaps in prevention, protection measures are absent. Subsequently, the question remains 'what happened to the children?' This chapter investigates societies most vulnerable, children, from an international platform. Each section is guided by the three decades of children's rights law that dissects dangerous areas encountered during migration and the duty of States.

Much of what has been written about border matters centre on adult deaths, the volumes of numbers, border breaches, and gaps in border control – the "mathematics" of irregular arrivals [3]. Worldwide, children and adults caught up in poverty and conflict lack official identification. Consequently, in October 2013 when over 380 migrants drowned near the shores of Lampedusa while attempting to cross the Mediterranean, there is no true record of who were children and their names [4, 5]. This situation is used as an exemplar of what did not happen by the State Parties, their responsibility gaps, and sets an optical of what likely has occurred over the last three centuries during forced migrations.

2. Irregular migration

For centuries migrants have been making land and sea journeys across varying regions of the world. High migration occurs usually when people are escaping conflict, dire poverty situation. Until these extreme situations are addressed, there will continue to be little record of how many children are engaged in migration and the disposition of children. Migration across the Mediterranean, and perils of the Indian Ocean between Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia, the rugged terrain at the United States-Mexico border, Central America, across the untamed weather conditions of the northern and sub-Saharan Africa is daunting and unconscionable to the layman.

The study of involuntary migration is often referenced as forced migration or involuntary placement under the international umbrella of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a host of other organizations such as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). Research supports the premise that causation ranges from natural to manmade disasters of conflict, famine, extreme weather conditions that ravage regions where people depend upon crops, farm animals for their survival.

Under the provisions of General Comment (GC) 6, the CRC addresses the legal definition of a refugee by referring to the 1951 Refugee Convention,

> *'must be interpreted in an age and gender-sensitive manner, taking into account the particular motives for, and forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by children [GC6]' [1].*

Subsequently, State Parties can refer to the refugee status as the basis of a child-specific manner of persecution which is inclusive of 'persecution of kind; under-age recruitment, trafficking of children for prostitution; and sexual exploitation or subjection to female genital mutilation [1]. Yet, there is extensive debate in the usage of terminology of migrant in lieu of refugee to separate and distinguish those deserving of international protection. Joint GC 4 of the CMW Committee and GC 23 of the CRC calls on State Parties to provide

> *'free, quality legal advice and representation for migrant, asylum-seeking and refugee children, including equal access for unaccompanied and separated children in local authority care and undocumented children' [6].*

The *Fatal Journeys Report* is published by the United Nations International Organization for Migration's (IOM) and is just one of very few UN agencies questioning the status of missing migrants. Since 2014, IOMs reports have focused on adult missing migrants [7]. Prior to 2014, statistics on missing migrants has been sporadic, difficult to compile, and validate. Deferring to reliable research from the IOM, the publication provides situational geographic snapshots that span across the Canaries and beyond, including the Central Mediterranean route to reach Europe, among others.

The Central Mediterranean route has been deemed by researchers to be the most fatal in the world where reports reflect that 17,900 lives have been lost between 2014 and 2018 [8]. The *Fatal Journey's* report further described that of the 32,000 deceased migrants during the same 2014 to 2018 period, 1600 were children under the age of 18 [8]. These figures likely pale in comparison to the three centuries of migratory global moments captured in this textbook. However, if just a portion of the IOM research suggests that over 60,000 migrants have lost their lives is an indicator for the past two decades, the volume for the last three centuries can reach the tens of thousands lost lives during efforts to reach migratory destinations [3].

3. Article 22. Asylum seeking and refugee child

Article 22 of the CRC sets out the responsibility for child refugees or asylum-seeking children to States Parties. When a child refugee seeks refugee status under international human rights and humanitarian law, States Parties are responsible for three elements under the provisions of Article 22:

1. adequate protection and humanitarian assistance,

2. cooperation with organisations linked to the UN when providing protection and assistance, and

3. the establishment of an adequate environment of care for children, either by reunification with their family or by finding alternative State protection.

Further GC 23 establishes a situation where all children, regardless of the race or gender in the context of international migration regardless of the distinction between refugee or asylum status. In the horrific events of the investigations following the highly publicized shipwrecks off Lampedusa in October 2013 [9], there is no record to reflect that the children received the State's responsible provisions of the CRC's Article 22.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has multiple cases where it has addressed the issue of state obligations for accompanied and unaccompanied refugee and asylum-seeking children. Article 22 of the CRC was noted in the ECtHR's case of *Muskhadzhiyeva and others v Belgium* [10], and *Popov v France*, where the obligation for an asylum-seeking child 'enjoys protection and humanitarian assistance, whether the child is alone or accompanied by his or her parents'. In the case of *Muskhadzhiyeva and others v Belgium*, the four children were as young as 7 months and the oldest only 7 years, where the petition before the court was on behalf of a single mother living in a refugee camp seeking asylum. Similarly, in the case of the *Popov v France*, parents sought asylum based upon religious persecution [11].

The ship sailing from Libya to Italy sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Thought to include migrants from Eritrea, Somalia, and Ghana, there is no record that any of these States either carried out rescue missions, claimed or sought for

Figure 1.
Global trends of Total force displacement (end of 2011 – end of 2020).

family members after the incident. Italy ratified the CRC on 26 January 1990; Eritrea ratified on 3 August 1994; Ghana ratified on 5 February 1991; but Somalia did not ratify the CRC until 1 October 2015. No record can be referenced to show whether the passengers were seeking asylum, had made applications for asylum, or received any State assistance.

Instead, families, such as the ones from the Lampedusa incident are left missing and unknown whether they are alive, dead, or whether they were buried. The Lampedusa situation may likely be an indicator of how many other assumptions that the protection of the CRC should have provided. The CMW and CRC Committee, Joint General Comment 4 and 23 on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration while in transit appear to remain unaddressed. As the children were in transit and as the textbook reflects back over the last three centuries, one could conclude that many other situations such as that of Lampedusa has occurred, the situation was not made public, or may simply be unknown. Reflecting on **Figure 1** and the global trends of total forced displacement for the periods of 2011 to 2022 provides an optic to align with the volume of migrations [12]. Again, no delineation of children to adults can said to provide an illusiveness that children's rights are collateral to situations where their parents are found to be in an irregular migration situation.

4. Health of the migrant child

With the many reasons for migration, continuous growth in the number of refugees and migrants are inevitable. This comes with various challenges for both the migrant, the country of migration and its citizens. In the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, some of the challenges facing child migrants are addressed [13];

> "**Article 24** *(health and health services)*
>
> *Every child has the right to the best possible health. Governments must provide good quality health care, clean water, nutritious food, and a clean environment and education on health and well-being so that children can stay healthy. Richer countries must help poorer countries achieve this.*"

One of the most prominent challenges raised in Article 24 is the health of the migrant child and this has a huge impact on the health risk to the populace coming in contact with the migrant. New migrants to the EU/EEA, as well as other migrant groups in the region, might be under-immunized and lack documentation of previous vaccinations, putting them at increased risk of vaccine-preventable diseases circulating in that country [14]. There is an increased health risk when the migrant is particularly vulnerable such as a child. To enable decision-makers to make the right choice and develop the right system to tackle these child migrant health issues, health economic evaluation analyses are mandatory. In health economic evaluation, one of the major questions addressed is distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA). Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis is a general umbrella term that covers all economic evaluation studies that provide information about equity in the distribution of costs and effects as well as efficiency in terms of aggregate costs and effects. DCEA can provide distributional breakdowns of who gains most and who bears the largest

burdens by equity-relevant social variables (such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and location) and disease categories. DCEA can also use various forms of "equity weighting" to analyze trade-offs between equity and efficiency [15]. The health of the child is of intrinsic interest, both as a current measure of health and well-being and as a source of future human capital.

There is insufficient empirical evidence on the relation between migration and child health in most western countries, and this evidence is further reduced especially in comparison to the population size of the child migrants in terms of health economic evaluations that look at health interventions focused on child migrants or this population as a subgroup. In some longitudinal studies that investigate the health difference between migrant children and non-migrant children, the results do not align or have the same conclusions.

Children who migrate from less developed countries may face health issues such as incomplete immunization and poor nutrition. In a study by Cousins et al., one of the major causes of death due to the Syrian crisis was non-communicable diseases with half of the displaced populace being children [16]. The possibility that these communicable diseases are carried into the migrant's new country of residence is very high. There is an increased possibility of infectious disease outbreaks occurring due to the transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs), such as polio and measles, across national borders. Other studies indicate that migrants and refugees experience higher rates of VPD-associated hospitalization, morbidity, and mortality compared to the host population [17–19]. While other studies suggest that contrary to lay misconceptions, epidemiological studies show that the majority of infectious diseases affect migrants after entry into the recipient country, as most refugees are young and previously healthy [20, 21]. The spread of such diseases is avoidable if treated appropriately in a suitably resourced shelter system with medicines, vaccines, and specialized medical personnel who can provide health services including counseling [22].

4.1 Vaccination

A 2006 to 2015 retrospective cohort study that linked de-identified data was conducted from government sources using Statistic NZ's Integrated Data Infrastructure. The VPD-related hospitalisations were compared between three cohorts of children below the ages of five (5) years old: foreign-born children who migrated to NZ, children born in NZ of recent migrant mothers, and a comparator group of children born in NZ without a recent migration background [23]. The VPD-related hospitalization rates were higher among NZ-born non-migrant children compared to NZ-born migrant and foreign-born children for all of the diseases of interest [23]. In a study by Cebotari et al., the migration and child health in Moldova and Georgia two post-Soviet countries with large out-migration flows in the region showed that, regardless of the transnational family setting, children of migrants have overall positive or no differing health compared to children in non-migrant households. However, significant gender differences are found in both countries. More often than not, Moldovan and Georgian girls are more at risk of having poorer health when living transnationally [24].

One of the most infectious diseases is tuberculosis, in a study by Kamper-Jørgensen et al., an evaluation of tuberculosis transmission between the Danish national population and migrants in Demark was conducted. The study population consisted of 904 Danes and 785 migrants, which consisted of 183 children and adolescence aged below 20 years of age and 60 children below 10 years. The result showed

that up to 7.9% (95% CI 7.0–8.9) of migrants were infected by Danes. The corresponding figure was 5.8% (95% CI 4.8–7.0) for Danes. Thus, transmission from Danes to migrants occurred up to 2.5 (95% CI 1.8–3.5) times more frequently than vice versa (OR = 1). A dominant strain, Cluster-2, was almost exclusively found in Danes, particularly younger-middle-aged males. The study also showed that TB-control efforts should focus on continuous micro-epidemics, for example with Cluster-2 in Danes, prevention of reactivation of TB in high-risk migrants, and outbreaks in socially marginalized migrants, such as Somalis and Greenlanders [25].

It is very important that some type of screening is carried out to prevent progression to active tuberculosis. A study by Usemann et al. conducted a school-based TB screening programme targeting migrant children and showed that it was cost-effective if populations with a relatively increased Latent Tuberculosis Infection (LTBI) prevalence and/or high progression rates are included [26]. It was also suggested that diagnostic and treatment strategies for migrants be focused on young subjects from high-incidence countries [27].

Another VPD is Hepatitis B which spreads through blood, saliva, or other bodily fluids. The most common way children become infected with hepatitis B is if they are born to a mother with the virus. Older children can become infected through injection drug use or unprotected sex. Many children are able to rid their bodies of HBV and do not have long-term infections. However, some children never get rid of HBV. This is called chronic hepatitis B infection. Younger children are more prone to chronic hepatitis B. These children do not feel sick and live a relatively healthy life. However, over time, they may develop symptoms of long-term (chronic) liver damage. Globally, there has been a recent increase in children who have hepatitis. While still rare, hepatitis cases have been reported in 35 countries and nearly 200 children have now been admitted to hospitals in the UK. Several of these children have required emergency liver transplants for rapid liver deterioration [28]. Migrants from hepatitis B virus (HBV) endemic countries to the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) comprise 5.1% of the total EU/EEA population but account for 25% of total chronic Hepatitis B (CHB) infection. Migrants from high HBV prevalence regions are at the highest risk for CHB morbidity. Screening of high-risk children and vaccination of susceptible children, combined with treatment of Hepatitis infection in migrants, are promising and cost-effective interventions, but the linkage to treatment requires more attention [29, 30].

4.2 Education

Voluntary migrants moving from a developing to a developed country generally experience different types of challenges. Economic migrants experience large gains in income and increased access to health care and clean water, thus they are potentially introduced unhealthy lifestyle patterns, such as increases in fat and refined sugar-rich diets and decreases in regular physical activity [31–33]. This can lead to obesity in young migrants or children of migrants. Thus, migration may potentially have negative impacts on health, particularly for still-growing children who are most affected by environmental and dietary changes. The best way to tackle this type of health-related quality of life is through better education of the child migrant or parent/carer of the child.

4.3 Oral health

Untreated tooth decay (dental caries) in children is the tenth most prevalent disease worldwide, affecting 621 million children globally [34]. Decayed, missing

teeth due to cavities, and Filled Teeth in the permanent teeth (DMFT) values, caries prevalence, and unmet restorative treatment needs index among migrant children is higher than that of not migrant children. In order to reduce inequalities in dental caries experience, there is a need to design policies aimed at primary prevention through health promotion programmes [35, 36]. In a dental study by Ezeofor et al., the result showed that an educative goal-setting proactive talking intervention provided better health-related quality-of-life gains in dental care. The low-cost intervention was cost savings with a dominant incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) even with a 200% increase in the cost of intervention. The NHS will be providing better oral health for children at a better net monetary benefit-to-risk ratio by adopting proactive intervention in preventing the reoccurrence of caries [37].

For some diseases or illnesses, the educative and informative approach will provide a more effective and cost-effective result in migrant children. Thus, the importance of more economic evaluations of different types of healthcare interventions to compare the costs and outcomes. This will provide a measurement of economic efficiency and health-related quality of life (HRQoL).

4.4 Mental health

There is no doubt that in addition to these health risks, children migrating from an unstable environment may also have to endure violence and trauma that may predispose them to mental health problems including depression and posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSD) [38, 39]. Heptinstall et al. found that premigration trauma such as the violent death of a family member correlated significantly with the children's current scores for PTSD [38]. Such children may experience physical violence or sexual exploitation, such children may be particularly vulnerable to self-inflicted harm and depression postmigration [40]. These experiences may be substantial barriers (fear, withdrawal syndrome, etc) for refugee children or migrant children with mental health problems to access healthcare. This why consistent screening, check-ups and affordable healthcare systems must be put in place by the government as stipulated in Article 39 of the UNICEF United Kingdom, A summary of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child [13].

> "**Article 39** *(recovery from trauma and reintegration)*
>
> *Children who have experienced neglect, abuse, exploitation, torture or who are victims of war must receive special support to help them recover their health, dignity, self-respect and social life.*"

4.5 Funding and policies

Migration is a complex social process that often subjects individuals and families to social factors and stressors that can result in mental health problems. There are many types of migration, and each type of migration is associated with different health risks. The health experiences of migrating individuals and subgroups vary tremendously among transnational and internal migration, legal and illegal migration, and voluntary and involuntary migration [41]. Children, as a population subgroup, are vulnerable in the migration process. Children in many countries due to their lack of legal, socioeconomic and financial status, as well as cultural and language barriers are often neglected within the healthcare system [42].

"**Article 4** *(implementation of the Convention)*

Governments must do all they can to make sure every child can enjoy their rights by creating systems and passing laws that promote and protect children's rights."

In Canada, the USA, and Australia, pediatricians are guided by national recommendations for the care of migrant children [43–45]. In Europe, the European Commission has issued a handbook for health professionals on the health assessment of refugees and migrants in the EU/EAA [46]. This protocol has been tailored for the early health assessment at reception centres or organized hotspots to identify significant medical conditions that impact on placement in hosting institutions and fitness for travel. Only a few European countries have national guidelines for primary care for migrant children. The United Kingdom provides guidelines that help to protect and promote the health and well-being of migrant children [47]. Though the UK has prescribed suitable systems to support the healthcare of migrant children, Charges for NHS services in the UK prevent and deter migrant children and their families from accessing healthcare. This has adverse effects on child health and the wider public health of the population [48]. It is estimated that around 200,000 children currently live in the UK who lack formal immigration status and most likely have to be charged for NHS secondary care [49].

5. Conclusion

Most studies that have examined the cost-effectiveness of vaccination uptake among migrants conclude that the data suggest social mobilization, vaccine programs, and education campaigns are promising strategies for migrants, but more research is needed.

To be a health economic evaluation study one must have two essential features: Both costs and outcomes must be analyzed, and measures such as the CHU-9D, EQ-5D-Y, and PedsQL which are specifically targeted at children will be very helpful [50–52] as outcome measures. Health economics is used to promote healthy lifestyles and positive health outcomes through the study of health care providers, hospitals and clinics, managed care, and public health promotion activities. There are generally four types of economic evaluation: Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Cost-Minimization Analysis (CMA), Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), and Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) [53]. Economic evaluation contributes to evidence-based decision-making by helping the public health community identify, measure, and compare activities with the necessary impact, scalability, and sustainability to optimize population health [54]. Research should also study the cost-effectiveness of strategies. Vaccination of migrants should continue to be a public health priority in the EU/EEA.

Between 2015 and 2017, an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 children were seeking asylum each year in EU/EEA countries, and in 2019, 6% (896,000) of children under age 18 were born abroad, and 8% (1,082,000) were non-UK/Irish citizens; Access to high-quality health care is important [55, 56]. We do suggest the Policy, Preventive, and Treatment (PPT) strategy be implemented. It is very important that the right *policies* which comprise of adequate funding and appropriate guidelines and documentation are put in place to help navigate through this complexity of healthcare for migrant children. The *preventive* phase encompasses giving the necessary education

Figure 2.
Pictorial representation of steps involved to tackle Children's migration health challenges.

and information, regular screening exercises, and vaccinations are carried out, and third of all adequate and timely *treatment* should be put in place to tackle cases that need to be addressed (**Figure 2**).

Conflict of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Section 2

A Brief Look at Australia

Chapter 4

Resilience and Migration: Iranians Living in Australia

Ashraf Hosseini, Melanie Davern, William P. Evans,
Mehdi Ghazinour, Ritsuko Kakuma and Harry Minas

Abstract

Migration is often a challenging and stressful experience but there is significant variation in the response of individuals to migration-related challenges. This study investigated factors that contribute to resilience among Iranians living in Australia and the relationship between resilience, migration, and socio-demographic variables. Data was collected from 182 Iranian immigrants and refugees. This study used a mixed-method design comprised of an online questionnaire and 12 semi-structured interviews. Lower levels of resilience were found among individuals who had experienced higher levels of discrimination compared to those who had experienced moderate levels (p < 0.05). Refugees reported lower levels of resilience and a higher experience of discrimination than immigrants (p < 0.05). Interview findings reveal the two main themes that contributed to resilience, which were protective factors including personal and social competencies, social and family support, and longer duration in Australia and risk factors such as unemployment, discrimination, and loneliness. Several possible approaches to assist immigrants and refugees are suggested, including strategies that could lessen the challenges of the migration process and enhance protective factors associated with resilience.

Keywords: resilience, migration and socio-demographic variables, Iranian immigrants and refugees, mixed methods, discrimination

1. Introduction

The experience of migration is often an active process of changes and challenges with significant variation in the response of individuals to migration. The challenges of migration might result in poor outcomes for individuals who with lower resilience respond to change in passive or inflexible ways [1, 2], while for people with high resilience, migration might result in a positive outcome as they see this experience as an opportunity for growth [3, 4]. Although there is a lack of consensus about the definition and measurement of resilience, most researchers agree that it is a dynamic, complex, and multidimensional and that it is associated with positive developmental pathways [5]. Because of this lack of consensus any study of resilience needs to define how the concept is being used. In the context of migration, resilience can be seen as "a process of reinforcement of emotion, sociability and liveliness that reflects elastic

integration within a new environment of networks and collaborations" ([6], p. 8). A framework has previously been developed to understand resilience within the process of migration, highlighting the importance of challenges to prepare immigrants to deal with stressors of the migration journey. Since both the migration experience and resilience are multidimensional and dynamic, a conceptual focus on features of the process that facilitate adaptation to adverse experiences is needed [7–11].

Although extensive research on immigrants and refugees has been conducted across a broad range of disciplines [2, 12], there has been limited study of the factors that contribute to resilience among Iranian populations in Australia, which is the focus of the present study. Specifically, this paper first explores the challenges experienced by Iranian immigrants and refugees living in Australia and the strategies they employ to maintain their mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual health and well-being. An examination of the relationship between resilience and migration among members of this immigrant community follows, including English language proficiency, migration expectation, migration category, duration of residence in Australia, discrimination experiences, and socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education and occupation). Elucidating the resiliency processes that aid Iranians in Australia can inform social and personal adjustment, transition and support services, and policy.

2. Method

This study used a mixed methods design: an online survey and semi-structured interviews to examine the relationship between migration experience and resilience, and to generate a clearer understanding of the context and the processes that influence resilience and migration of Iranians living in Australia.

Survey questionnaires are reliant on the scales comprising them [13] and the particular social and cultural norms of Iranian culture might not be captured from the survey. Moreover, although the survey provides evidence of patterns of resilience influences of Iranian populations in Australia, interviews deliver additional insight into the migration process and offer the flexibility to explore factors related to migration processes of Iranians in Australia that the researchers might not have thought of when developing the questionnaire. This present study is a component of a larger project with approval obtained for all data collection activities from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Melbourne (Ethics approved number, 1137189).

3. Data collection

3.1 Online survey

Iranian immigrants and refugees living in Australia over 18 years of age and able to communicate in English or Farsi were invited to participate in the study. In 2012–2013, approximately 900 invitations to participate in the online survey were sent by 17 Iranian non-government organisations across Australia that were recognised through professional networks, an online search, and snowballing.

Participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire which included questions about resilience and their migration experience. Participation was voluntary, and the survey was available in both English and Farsi. Participants were free to respond in their preferred language.

3.2 In-depth interviews

A subset of 12 individuals (six men and six women) who completed the online survey also agreed to be re-contacted later for an interview. These participants were chosen for semi-structured interviews based on a range of different factors, including age, gender, and the duration of their residence in Australia. All interviews were completed in 2013, with nine interviews administered in Farsi and three interviews in English. All interviews conducted in Farsi were translated into English and checked for consistency by an Iranian volunteer. Eight interviews were completed face to face at the University of Melbourne or in the participants' home, while four interviews were completed by phone because participants either lived in a city other than Melbourne or preferred to be interviewed in this way. Eight interviews were tape recorded with participants' permission and manually transcribed immediately after interviewing, with the transcripts checked against the tapes for accuracy. Four interviewees did not agree to be taped during the interview because of political and cultural sensitivities; thus, interview data was collected using note taking.

4. Measurement

4.1 Online survey

This study utilised two measures: the Migration and Settlement Questionnaire (MASQ), and the Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA). The Migration and Settlement Questionnaire [14] was translated into Farsi language for this study and has two main parts: socio-demographic variables and migration variables. The MASQ questions were translated by the principal researcher, who is a native Farsi speaker, and back-translated by a volunteer, who is fluent in Farsi. The MASQ translations also were checked for consistency by another volunteer who is fluent in Farsi. The MASQ is easy to understand and written in everyday language. However, the MASQ had not previously been validated in Iranian populations [15].

The Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA) is a validated self-report scale (33 items) that measures resilience factors in adults [16]. It includes five subscales of resilience: Personal Competency, 10 items ($\alpha = 0.79$) that measure self-confidence and particularly the ability to plan; Structured Style, four items ($\alpha = 0.74$) that measure preference for having and following routines; Social Competence, six items ($\alpha = 0.84$) that measure the level of social skill, warmth, and flexibility; Family Cohesion, six items ($\alpha = 0.77$) that measure the degree to which values are shared with the participant's family; and Social Resources, seven items ($\alpha = 0.69$) that measure the availability of social support [16]. The RSA items are rated using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The RSA was previously translated and validated into Farsi and has shown good internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.93$) with an Iranian sample [17]. Cronbach's Alpha values of the full scale (Total Resilience) and its subscales in this study ($N = 182$) were Personal Competency ($\alpha = 0.93$), Structured Style ($\alpha = 0.79$), Social Competence ($\alpha = 0.89$), Family Cohesion ($\alpha = 0.88$), Social Resources ($\alpha = 0.90$), and Total Resilience ($\alpha = 0.84$).

4.2 In-depth interviews

The two measures (RSA and MASQ) used in the online survey formed the basic framework for the interview questions including which guided the qualitative

component of the study and included two sets of questions and probes (See [6] for more details). The questions were open-ended semi-structured enabling participants to share their migration experience and re-settling in Australia. After a brief acknowledgment and conversation about the study, the interviews began with an overall question - Would you like to tell me any surprising or unexpected things about Australia? This general question let the participants to frame their migration experience from their perspective, allowing for follow-up queries and probes that expanded upon their experience.

5. Analytic procedures

5.1 Online survey

SPSS-22 was used for the analysis of survey data. Pearson's correlations, independent-samples t-test, one-way ANOVAs, and Post Hoc analyses were utilised to test for bivariate associations between resilience and each migration and socio-demographic variables.

5.2 In-depth interviews

Interviews were converted to rich-text files and imported into NVivo (version 10), a computer-based qualitative data analysis program. Consistent with the recommendations of the data were analysed using a theoretical approach to explore codes central to the research hypotheses and to complement and extend the quantitative findings. To generate themes, all codes that emerged from the analysis were checked against each other and were studied to determine the ways in which they were related and to form sub-themes, with some themes created from these sub-themes. Again, final themes were verified for consistency. The process continued and led to the identification of main themes [6].

6. Results

6.1 Online survey

Iranians living across Australia completed the online survey (n = 182); 54% males and 46% females, with a mean age of 37 years (*SD* = 9.23; range: 19–62 years). The mean duration of residence in Australia was 8 years (*SD* = 6.40: range: 1–40 years), and 20% of participants were refugees. **Table 1** provides details on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Findings suggest higher levels of resilience in the domain of personal competency among study participants. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Confidence Interval for resilience domains are presented in **Table 2**.

When the mean scores of the resilience domains were compared to an Iranian sample [373 of undergraduate Iranian university students (232 females and 141 males, between 19 and 26 years, *M* = 20.6, *SD* = 1.4) [17], there were significant differences between mean scores of family cohesion domain (**Figure 1**). This outcome might be clarified by the extensive family closeness as a feature of Iranian study, which is much less prevalent in the post-immigration context.

Variables	Total N (%)	Immigrant n (%)	Refuge n (%)	M(SD)
Age (range 19–62)				
≤24	13 (7)	10 (7)	3 (8)	37.00 (9.23)
25–31	41 (23)	35 (24)	6 (16)	
32–38	56 (31)	49 (34)	7 (19)	
39–45	37 (20)	30 (21)	7 (19)	
46+	35 (19)	21 (14)	14 (38)	
Year live in Australia (range 1–40)	*Mdn* = 6			
<5 years	75 (41)	67 (46)	8 (22)	8.00 (6.40)
5–11 years	67 (37)	54 (37)	13 (35)	
11-16 years	25 (14)	15 (10)	10 (27)	
>16 years	15 (8)	9 (6)	6 (16)	
Gender				
Male	99 (54)	75 (65)	24 (52)	
Female	83 (46)	70 (35)	13 (48)	
Marital status				
Married/Defacto	122 (67)	109 (75)	13 (35)	
Unmarried	49 (27)	32 (22)	17 (46)	
Divorced/Widowed	11 (6)	4 (3)	7 (19)	
Migration category				
Immigrant	145 (80)			
Refugee[a]	37 (20)			
Education				
Tertiary complete	121 (66)	109 (76)	11 (29)	
Tertiary incomplete	45 (25)	31 (21)	15 (41)	
School qualification[b]	16 (9)	5 (3)	11 (30)	
Occupation				
Employed	108 (59)	85 (59)	23 (63)	
Unemployed	43 (24)	35 (24)	8 (22)	
Student	31 (17)	25 (17)	25 (15)	

[a]*Their reason for being refugee was political, social, or family reunion.*
[b]*High school completed (n = 13), high school not completed (n = 3).*

Table 1.
Socio-demographic characteristics of the Participants (N = 182).

Total resilience score was significantly higher among immigrants (M = 3.79, SD = 0.46) than refugees (M = 3.53, SD = 0.56; t (180) = −2.98, p = 0.003). Statistically significant correlations were found between resilience and marital status (r = −0.15, p < 0.05) using the Tukey HSD test, while there were no significant differences among marital status categories of married, never married and divorced (**Table 3**).

	Personal competency (10 items)	Structured style (4 items)	Social competence (6 items)	Family cohesion (6 items)	Social resource (7 items)
Mean	37.37	14.69	22.25	23.24	26.00
Std. Deviation	5.72	2.40	4.06	3.65	4.68
Confidence interval for the mean	36.54, 38.20	14.34, 15.04	21.66, 22.84	22.71, 23.77	25.32, 26.68

Table 2.
Mean, standard deviation and confidence interval for resilience domains, Where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree.

Figure 1.
Mean scores for the domains of resilience in this present study, an Iranian sample in Australia, compared to an Iranian sample in Iran [17], where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree.

There was a small but significant correlation between the total resilience and education scores (r = 0.17, p < 0.05). Using the Tukey HSD test, there were no significant differences between the education categories of tertiary complete, tertiary incomplete, and school qualification.

There was slightly significant negative association between total resilience and discrimination (r = −0.17, p = 0.019). Applying the Tukey HSD test, participants who suffered higher levels of discrimination reported lower scores in total resilience compared to participants who felt moderate levels of discrimination (MD = 0.19, p = 0.3; [−0.38, 0.01]). In addition, refugees reported higher levels of discrimination than immigrants (t_{180} = 2.39, p = 0.18). Relationships between resilience domains and migration variables are presented in **Table 4**.

6.2 In-depth interviews

Four participants were refugees; with half of the interviewees having lived in Australia for more than 10 years. Seven of the interviewees were married and lived

Socio-demographic and migration variables	Resilience
	r
Age	0.00
Gender	0.04
Duration of residence in Australia	0.00
Migration category	
Refugee$_1$	0.22^{**}
Immigrant$_2$	
Marital status	
Married/Defacto$_1$	-0.15^{*}
Divorced/Widowed$_2$	
Unmarried$_3$	
Education	
School qualification$_1$	0.17^{*}
Tertiary incomplete$_2$	
Tertiary complete$_3$	
Employment	0.14
Migration expectation	0.08
Discrimination	-0.19^{**}
English language proficiency	0.06

$^{**}P < 0.01, {}^{*}P < 0.05, {}^{*}P < 0.05, {}^{**}P < 0.001.$

Table 3.
Individual correlations between socio-demographic and migration variables and resilience.

Age group	Gender	Having child	Language speaks at home	Marital status	Migration category	Occupation	Years living in Australia	Methods of interviewing
46+	Male	No	Persian/ English	Single	Refugee	Employed	10–40	Face to face interview[*]
39–45	Male	Yes	Persian/ English	Married	Immigrant	Unemployed	1–10	Face to face interview[*]
<24	Female	No	Persian/ English	Single	Immigrant	Student	1–10	Face to face interview[*]
39–45	Male	Yes	Persian/ English/ Turkish	Married	Immigrant	Employed	10–40	Phone interview[**]
32–38	Male	Yes	Persian/ English	Married	Immigrant	Employed	1–10	Phone interview[**]
46+	Male	Yes	Persian/ English/ Turkish	Married	Immigrant	Employed	10–40	Face to face interview[**]
32–38	Female	Yes	Persian/ English	Married	Immigrant	Employed	1–10	Phone interview[**]

Age group	Gender	Having child	Language speaks at home	Marital status	Migration category	Occupation	Years living in Australia	Methods of interviewing
46+	Female	Yes	Persian/ English/ Turkish	Married	Immigrant	Unemployed	10–40	Face to face interview[**]
46+	Male	Yes	Persian/ English/ Turkish	Married	Refugee	Employed	10–40	Face to face interview[**]
39–45	Female	Yes	Persian/ English/ Kurdish	Divorced	Refugee	Employed	10–40	Face to face interview[*]
<24	Female	Yes	Persian/ English	Divorced	Refugee	Unemployed	1–10	Face to face interview[**]

[*]*Note writing because interviewees did not agree to tape recording of the interview due to political and cultural sensitivities.*
[**]*Audio record.*

Table 4.
Characteristics of Interviewees (N = 11).

with their spouse and children, while two were divorced, and two were single. Although three interviewees were unemployed, all were concerned about their job security (**Table 4**).

Interview findings are structured in this section to reflect the broad domains of Immigration Category, Education, and Discrimination as the significant outcome from the online survey.

7. Immigration

All immigrants and refugees interviewed in this study revealed that while they were contented with their life in Australia, their separation from family members, friends, and even country (mainly for refugees) influence their identity, psychosocial life, and experience. The physical and geographical distance from relatives had a negative impact with the grief of separation and emotional suffering. Moreover, unmarried and young interviewees reported how the absence of relatives and family led to profound feelings of loneliness:

> "I am far from my extended family, friends; my childhood place [came to tears]. It is not easy to forget my country. All my values are there. My identity is there. Sometimes I feel my body is out of blood. I talk to my self why I am here. I am searching for my identity."

> *Male, Refugee*

> "It is very hard…it is because my family are not here. I think the only challenge that I have is my loneliness. I feel so lonely."

> *Young Male, Refugee*

> *"The relationship that you could have with your family, you could not find with anybody else..."*

<div align="right">Female, Refugee</div>

Though, married individuals who live with their family in Australia experience much higher levels of satisfaction than unmarried participants or those whose family (nuclear and extended) live in Iran. The presence of family was consistently reported as an important source of support and stability:

> *"If I have any issues my family are the first ones who will support and help me. Knowing that my family is in Australia makes me feel more confident and comfortable."*

<div align="right">Female, Immigrant</div>

Issues of social isolation were reported by interviewees, particularly younger participants.

> *"I have become a little more isolated from society. I used to talk with my friends nearly every day in Iran, but here, I am not able to find somebody who I can confide in. My parents have also become lonely here."*

<div align="right">Young female, Immigrant</div>

Feelings of frustration and a profound feeling of discontent in Australia after several negative post-migration experiences were revealed by interviewees.

> *"Some Australians and most Iranians look at me in a bad way, especially when I have my Hijab on. When I was wearing the Hijab, I was struggling. I tried my best to be nice and friendly to everyone, but I could still feel that people were judging me because I wore a Hijab..."*

<div align="right">Female, Immigrant</div>

A common challenge for younger participants reflects the concerns of Iranian parents around social and cultural differences and impact on their communication with their children:

> *"...communication with my kids is a major issue for us [in Australia] as the social and cultural situation is very different from the situation in Iran. I understand that in the modern world we need to let kids decide for themselves, but in reality, it is not as easy as they do not have enough experience. I am worried about the future of my kids in Australia. This country gave children lots of freedom and I do not have a good feeling about that...I am really worried about the future of my kids."*

<div align="right">Male, Immigrant</div>

Iranian parent interviewees were more concern for the challenges faced by their young daughters who might be more vulnerable:

> *"My daughter is a social person. She always wants to go out, and because I came from a different culture ... I am very upset about it and worry ..."*

> *Male, Immigrant*

One young woman provided insight into her experience of these issues and her parents have adapted and are becoming more flexible in their approach.

> *"They [my parents] used to be very strict with me, especially my dad. However, they have become a little easier..."*

> *Female, Immigrant*

Finding themselves away from extended family care nets, Iranian parents who both were working and were not always emotionally and/or physically available to their children revealed worries over proper supervision of their offspring. They declared feeling of guilt about the relationship with their children and that they had less time available for parenting, social activities with their children and social life due to working longer hours since moving to Australia:

> *"Unfortunately, when we came here with nothing, we were busy with our life, job and other things ... if I were back 20 years ago I probably would cut some of the activities that I had before and I would sacrifice that and spend more time with my kids..."*

> *Male, Refugee*

Younger age at the time of immigration revealed to be helpful in adjusting to the post-migration challenges by a few participants.

> *"I think the age of coming [to Australia] ... is important. If you come at a younger age, even after finishing high school, it is still faster to adapt. I can see this in my network."*

> *Male, Immigrant*

8. Education

Survey results identified that participants who had completed tertiary educational qualifications had a higher level of resilience than those who had not completed tertiary education. Interviewees discussed their many difficulties focusing on the lack of recognition of their qualifications. Higher levels of education pre-migration did not guarantee suitable employment, and this was a common challenge.

> *"I have friends, who are engineers with years of experience and who are here working as cleaners and mopping floors. This is a person's maximum waste of time, energy, capabilities and experience. Ultimately, they will not be able to settle down in Australia. After years of continuous labour work, they will either have to return to their country or stay here and struggle. In some circumstances, they will even face psychological issues."*

> *Male, Immigrant*

Feelings of regret and disgrace for not completing their university education or achieving qualifications revealed by a few interviewees:

> *"After seven years, I am embarrassed to tell my family and friends back in Iran that I was not able to finish my study. I must hide this issue from them. My parents will be upset with me and others might laugh at me."*

Male, Immigrant

9. Discrimination

The survey results revealed that participants experienced some discrimination, particularly about religion and nationality while living in Australia. Interviewees also described how experiences of discrimination in Australia impacted their emotional states:

> *"I contacted a company for their advertisement...he asked me where you are from...I am from Iran, and he replied oh, my God f... terrorist... I was shocked... but I considered that as a joke and we laugh together... he asked me to call him later in 10 minutes... so I called him three times after 10 minutes, and he did not reply.... at that stage, I felt heavy and disappointed... I only wanted to tell him that I am not a terrorist but certainly, you are, as you destroyed my spirit ..."*

Male, Immigrant

> *"An Australian gentleman tried to help me with the pram. Unexpectedly his wife yelled why are you helping her? Do not you see she wears a Hijab? Do not you see? She is a Muslim. I found that quite outrageous and painful. I was shocked to such an extent that I did not know what to do... I got off..., I cried... at that moment, I really felt disheartened..."*

Female, Immigrant

Several participants reported feelings of unease after various negative post-migration experiences about their Hijab and particularly discrimination against women who wear the Hijab by Iranian community in Australia which pointed out by both male and female interviewees:

> *"Iranians are sensitive to Hijab because for some Iranians it represents a social, religious and political symbol... They combine Hijab, religion, politics and everything and at the end they come to a negative conclusion. From Australians; however, I do not think there is as much pressure as the individual feels."*

Male, Immigrant

> *"Here at my school, when I had Hijab on, Muslim girls from other countries did not like me because my hair was showing..."*

Female, Refugee

> *"Some Australians and most Iranians look at me in a bad way, especially when I have my Hijab on. When I was wearing Hijab, I was struggling. I tried my best to be nice and friendly to everyone, but I could still feel that people were judging me because I wore a Hijab..."*

> *Young female, Immigrant*

One interviewee described how observing the discrimination experiences of others negatively impacted upon her own emotions:

> *"I witnessed that someone being treated differently... these types of incidents made me feel unaccepted and unloved..." [Came to tears].*

> *Young female, Immigrant*

Young female immigrant also highlighted how a negative experience at school could have a profound impact on her emotional well-being:

> *"I had a high positive view about school environments in Australia before I came here from a standard high school in Iran. However, I received a worse welcome from staff in my school... I felt alone and isolated most of the time...my school manager was so rude to me... a few months after, a German girl and a Japanese girl joined our school. They were at the centre of attention and were treated completely different from the other kids and me ... my school manager was very nice to them ... I was totally upset..." [Came to tears].*

A few interviewees were frustrated with how the law and rights of citizens were applied differently:

> *"I am a citizen of this country; however, my rights as a citizen are sometimes uncertain...the dual politics with regards to issuing visitor's visa for our families are quite confusing and unfair. For example, as a citizen, I cannot bring my family here except for emergency or serious circumstances."*

> *Male, Immigrant*

10. Discussion

Migration for any reason is often a challenging and life-changing experience. However, the experience can provide opportunities for growth and resilience [18]. There are challenges but there are also emotional, social and cultural resources that can have a positive impact on the process of adaptation [7, 12, 19–23]. The mixed methods design (in which the survey was administered first, followed by the interviews) provides insight into the processes that influence resilience related to the migration of Iranian immigrants and refugees in Australia. There were some survey results that required additional explanation. For example, more detail was needed on issues that relate to the discrimination following post-migration.

These results reveal both protective and risk factors associated with resilience of Iranian immigrants and refugees in Australia. These are derived from the impact of

the process and pre- and post- experiences of migration and its related challenges. Findings also highlight the association between socio-demographic and migration variables and resilience. The results demonstrate that Iranian immigrants and refugees struggle with many emotional, cultural and economic challenges in Australia, leading to a range of outcomes from prolonged difficulties to increased levels of resilience [24–27].

Notably, resilience was higher among immigrants than refugees. This needs to be further explored in future research with the current findings limited due to the small number of refugee participants in this study. However, this pattern might be due to the traumatic experiences and situations that forced the migration of refugees, and the inability to return to their country of origin. Approximately four in every 10 refugee and humanitarian arrivals in Australia have suffered torture and trauma before arrival [28–30]. Studies have found that the freedom to choose to migrate provides adequate time for immigrants to plan their migration [9, 12, 31, 32]. The grief of separation or other distressing experiences, such as a poorly planned migration process [33], or discrimination and a lack of welcome from their local community, can influence the well-being of immigrants in general, and refugees in particular, as was highlighted in this study. Furthermore, for many, if not most, refugees this is compounded with waiting many months and sometimes years in detention centres in Australia or United Nations refugees' camps. It has been well documented that extreme distress can have an adverse influence on resilience [34, 35]. Ongoing issues of uncertainty over refugee status could add more stress to the lives of refugees. Research indicates that repeated experiences of uncontrollable or overwhelming stress in some people might lead to feelings of vulnerability and helplessness, and a belief that it is impossible to change an adverse situation [36]. However, individual variability in how to respond to stressful situations depends on numerous psychological, social and cultural risk and protective factors [37].

Though some people who constantly experience challenges can maintain their well-being, others are more vulnerable to their life circumstances and might be more inclined to experience unpleasant consequences because of their environments and living conditions and/or genetic predisposition [38–43].

This situation can arise from traumatic pre-migration experiences and unpleasant post-migration experiences, such as experiencing higher levels of discrimination and being unemployed.

A number of researchers have shown that some refugees suffer from migration-related stress and problems in adapting to a new community, while others have found that the mental health of some refugees was improved after being in Australia for a number of years, even if they had experienced significant trauma [44]. Living in a secure environment, in which one may receive support and have the opportunity to achieve lifetime aspirations and goals are two forms of experience that have a powerful influence on the establishment of self-esteem and self-efficacy [45].

Supportive individual relationships are essential for strengthening positive concepts and providing individuals with the confidence to enable successful coping with adversity. Consistent with previous research this study found that the support of family in the form of marriage is one of the most important social resources for people, considering that they can rely on others care if needed [12, 46]. The results of this study show a significant difference between the mean scores of family cohesion resilience in comparison with the Iranian sample (Jowkar et al. [17]. A possible explanation might be the proximity of the extended family as a feature of the Iranian study, which is much less common in post-immigration conditions. In Iranian culture

family support seems to be a protective factor throughout life [47, 48]. Social support in the form of family support is one of the most important supports post-migration for Iranian immigrants and refugees in Australia.

Results also reveal a bi-directional relationship between resilience factors and employment in which resilient people appear to be more eager to find employment and not give up seeking a job, which makes them more likely to engage in a suitable occupation. In turn, this increases an individual's ability to establish strong social support networks that encourage them to be more involved in social activities and enjoy their life, thereby enhancing their resilience to migration distress. This finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating the protective role of employment on people's well-being [49, 50]. The level of education and occupational background might also be a risk factor affecting immigrants. This study showed that the qualifications of many Iranians were not recognised in Australia, which is one of the critical reasons why the rate of unemployment is high in this population compared to the general population in Australia [51]. Interviewees reveal that immigrants who are highly qualified, as well as those without any employment experience or sufficient education, encounter more difficulties in gaining suitable employment. This finding is similar to other research demonstrating the problems in obtaining adequate work for this group of immigrants [52].

Consistent with other research, this study reveals that higher education by advancing flexibility and self-confidence helps Iranians in the process of migration and settlement [9, 53, 54]. Though, higher education attainment linked to unmet expectations was stressful for Iranians post-migration. They expected to get a suitable work tailored to their educational background, but for many this was not the case. This was highlighted by most interviewees, as noted by one participant: "... *it was emotionally tough... to forget all of my qualification*". Likewise, for Iranians with higher educational background, the loss of the social status they enjoyed in Iran is significant. Reciprocally, for some Iranian immigrants and refugees continuing to study at a higher level in Australia and increasing your education brings more benefits. These provide opportunities for individuals to build active social networks, advance their English language proficiency, learn about Australian law and rights, and understand their rights and status in the new society.

This seems to be a supportive factor for Iranian refugees and immigrants in Australia and is consistent with other studies [19, 20, 55–57]. However, an investigation into these issues is limited by the cross-sectional nature of this study. Further longitudinal research is necessary to gain a better understanding of these relationships.

Moreover, the qualitative component of this study reveals how Australia's social and cultural flexibility serves Iranian immigrants and refugees well in the process of adapting to life in Australia, and how being able to communicate in English, which is a central requirement for a better settlement and meaningful employment in Australia was associated with resilience. Interviewees highlight the importance of having a good knowledge of the English language for successfully adapting in Australia, especially for their employment prospects. Results suggest that the ability to communicate in English assists immigrants and refugees in enhancing their relationship with the new community, recreating social ties, seeking social support, and finding suitable and meaningful employment. This in turn improves confidence and self-esteem that is crucial for the development of personal and social competencies as significant factors that contribute to resilience, as demonstrated by this study.

Present findings indicate that experiencing high levels of discrimination was associated with reduced levels of resilience among Iranian immigrants and refugees. This

outcome extends previous refugee research to immigrant samples, and is consistent with other immigrant communities research [33, 34, 58, 59]. It is well documented that exposure to multiple sources of stress and discomfort, for instance high levels of discrimination, can negatively affect self-esteem and lead to decreased well-being, which can impair resilience [34, 35]. It should be acknowledged that individuals have diverse reactions to stressful situations, which is dependent on numerous emotional, social and cultural factors. Individuals also evaluate situations in a different way based on their belief systems, expectations, personalities, and earlier experiences. For instance, a similar event of discrimination might harm one and not the other, although for some individuals even witnessing discrimination might affect their well-being, as emphasised in this research and revealed by the following interviewee's notes: *"I saw that somebody being treated differently…I felt unloved and so worthless… thinking that Australians in no way would like me"*.

Both survey and interview findings reveal that almost all participants in this study experienced discrimination in Australia, particularly in terms of their nationality and religion. Some participants revealed unfairness experience from their local community, which profoundly impacted upon their well-being. Such experiences could damage personal and social relationships and confidence, and lead to social isolation through unpredictability, ambiguity, and fear of ridicule by members of one's community [60, 61]. Nevertheless, findings of this study show that in cases where there is a risk of discrimination, there are also social and personal resources that could protect Iranians from these prejudices, such as a sense of humour, spirituality, social competency, supportive familial relationships and friendships, and personal growth through previous experience of discrimination. Studies have shown that individuals need some life challenges to cope more efficiently [45, 62]. Most participants in this study felt responsible to take steps to advance their coping strategies by using existing support networks and expanding their strengths to respond to the stress of discrimination. Though this study focuses on the impact of the experience of discrimination after Iranian immigration, it looks like personal growth due to earlier experiences of discrimination in their home country has served them post-migration.

It has been well documented that challenging situations offer a prospect for change and growth.

Wald, Taylor, Asmundson, Jang, & Stapleton [63] and that exposure to moderate levels of stress could enhance a person's resilience and thus prepare them for better dealing with the next challenges they might face during life [7, 8, 11, 21, 23, 45, 64–67]. Nonetheless, while personal growth through previous experience of discrimination appears to aide Iranian refugees to deal with the post-migration challenges, experiencing quite high levels of discrimination clearly damages their social and personal relationships, and leads to distrust and social isolation, which in turn leads to declining levels of resilience. This was found in both the survey and interview data from this study.

11. Limitations

This study has limitations that should be reflected on when interpreting the findings. Causality cannot be assumed due to the cross-sectional nature of the study design as well as the small number of interviewees. Thus, the present study design limits a complete understanding of the dynamic mechanisms of migration and resilience over time. Also, the cross-sectional data limits the understanding of resilience as a vigorous process that functions at neurobiological, genetic, individual and social

levels [9]. Thus, further research is needed to investigate the topic comprehensively. However, although the study was cross-sectional, the mixed-method design helped validate and endorse the study findings.

The methods employed to recruit participants relied on the active involvement of Iranian community organisations and the interest of Iranians in Australia voluntarily participate in the study. The use of convenience sampling also limits generalizability to the population at large. In addition, as we only had a small number of refugees who participated (20%), findings regarding this group of immigrants need further replication. Participants responded in English and Farsi, and although we believe this did not result in any significant differences that would influence the findings, there is always the possibility that some of the interpretations of questions/concepts might be different depending upon the language of participants.

12. Conclusion

Since both migration and resilience are intertwined with change and challenges, and are multidimensional and active processes, understanding factors that enhance resilience within the context of migration processes is vital for successful adaption. Features such as level of education in combination with the ability to communicate in English, preparation for migration, family support, and personal growth through previous experience of discrimination, all assist Iranian immigrants and refugees in shaping their relationship with the new community. Seeking social support and recreating social ties, as well as finding meaningful employment are important strategic activities which develop confidence that is vital for improving social and personal competencies. Together, these significant factors contribute to resilience and were endorsed by both survey and interview results in this study. Although migration is a challenging and stressful experience, interviewees reveal that Iranians integrate and adjust better by utilising their resources such as spirituality, sense of humour, social support, understanding of the Australian culture, and engaging in Iranian cultural and Australian multicultural practices. Thus, suggested activities that interviewees cited to help them cope with the migration experience such as spending time with friends, listening to music, seeking family support, and pursuing social support might promote resilience among this population. Other researchers are encouraged to pursue these themes through additional research. Also, since research on resilience among immigrants and refugees is scant, additional research needs to be conducted to further explore the resilience factors among refugees and younger family members. This study highlights the need for further research to assess whether interventions that strengthen resilience can reduce migration distress and promote positive outcomes for Iranians as well as other immigrant communities living in Australia.

Acknowledgements

Deceleration of interest

This study is a part of the author's PhD thesis, which was completed at The University of Melbourne [6].

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Section 3

Africa on the Move

Chapter 5

Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia

William Abur

Abstract

Australia is a country that hosts millions of migrants from different countries and continents. This chapter presents the migration history of African Australians and the settlement challenges encountered by these families and individuals. In the last two decades, there has been a growing number of African communities in Australia. African people migrate to Australia for many reasons, including job-seeking and civil wars caused by race, religion, nationality, and membership in particular social or political groups. In the 2020 census, over 400,000 people living in Australia recorded they were of African origin. This represents 1.6% of the Australian population and 5.1% of Australia's overseas-born population. Most (58%) are white South Africans, but 42% are black Africans from sub-Saharan countries. Some people within these African populations did not settle well or adjust effectively to Australian society due to Australia's predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture. Therefore, this chapter discusses migration and settlement issues faced by African community groups in Australia.

Keywords: migration, settlement, African community, Australia, refugees

1. Introduction

African people began migrating to Australia from America before 1976 as former slaves, from Britain as convicts, and from Africa after the abolition of the White Australia Policy. However, the decision to migrate and resettle is something that can be exciting and daunting for families and individuals [1]. People choose to migrate to second or even third countries for many reasons including fleeing conflict, seeking jobs, reuniting with family members, and so on. Deciding to migrate often involves consideration of where to settle and how to seek connection with local community groups. In other words, "settlement" involves engagement or participation in local communities. It is also about seeking to belong within the local community. This chapter presents migration and settlement challenges faced by African people in Australia. Ultimately, the Australian Government has a responsibility to engage new migrants in the workforce as one of the pathways to help them settle more effectively and integrate into mainstream Australian society. Assisting migrants and refugees to participate in important social dimensions such as employment and sport has a substantial impact and positive outcome on settlement. Engagement in employment and sport brings benefits in well-being, health, social networks, and positive family

relationships/parenting which is good for society and people that are involved in such activities. On the opposite side, a lack of engagement for people from refugee backgrounds in positive activities can come with negative consequences such as mental health problems, domestic violence, and dysfunctional families. However, supporting people to obtain meaningful employment can improve their well-being and the well-being of their families as they become autonomous from welfare which gives them self-esteem and financial benefits [1, 2].

2. The migration and settlement of African people in Australia

African migrants first arrived in Australia as former slaves from America, as convicts from Britain, and more recently as refugees. This sets the scene for the current challenges African migrants face settling in Australia [2, 3]. However, before 1976, many of the migrants coming from Africa to Australia were white South Africans and White Zimbabweans. This was because of the White Australian Policy that allowed only white people to come to Australia during that time. The abandonment of the White Australian Policy allowed many African people to migrate to Australia through the humanitarian program because of civil war and ethnic cleansing in Africa to seek protection and a better place to live [1–3]. However, settlement was quite challenging for some individuals and families due to many reasons such as unemployment, racism and discrimination, language barriers, and lack of workforce skills required in Australia.

In recent years, young people from African community groups in Melbourne, for example, have not been settling well in schools due to bullying and discrimination. This raises the question of belonging and integration of people from African backgrounds. These concerns create anxiety among families and individuals as well as generate debates in the community about the future of migration for people from Africa, particularly those from refugee camps. This is because some politicians expressed their resentment toward African groups, calling them failed community groups that cannot integrate well into Australian society [2]. This kind of resentment was also labeled as racist and discriminatory by the African community leaders and community members, who argued many young people from different community groups and walks of life engage in anti-social behaviors and criminal activities [1].

Having worked with African-Australian community groups as a social worker, there have been many success stories and contributions made by African−Australians that were not captured by the media. For instance, African−Australians have made contributions in different fields such as sports, community services, law firms, academics, business, and many other fields. This is something that must be acknowledged and recognized as part of successful migration and settlement.

3. Resettlement and protection of refugees

The concept of refugee protection emerged during World War II, resulting in the Convention on Refugees and subsequently the establishment of the UNHCR [4–6]. Refugees are people who have fled their homeland, often due to political instability, repression, and violent conflict. They leave to escape oppressive discrimination or severe physical and mental harm [4]. Such sudden departures generally mean refugees do not have the opportunity to pack their belongings or say farewell to loved ones

[7–9]. It is fundamentally important to know that journey of refugees is always full of uncertain feelings and danger with unforeseen issues. It is a secret journey with fear of persecution, trauma, and hopelessness without knowing the future clearly and if they will return or not ever return to their homeland [8].

We know that the term "refugee resettlement" is a positive concept to remove people from difficult situations to a better place. It is a term commonly used to explain the relocation of refugees from second country of asylum to a third country with the idea that third country is for permanent resettlement and integration in host community. The aim is that third country is responsible for providing settlement support services for refugees and helping them to integrate with society and system of the host society as a way of their needs. Refugee resettlement and integration is a very complex process. However, it is generally considered a durable solution to refugee problems [see [10–12]]. Refugees are assessed and accepted for resettlement when they meet the criteria set out by the UN Convention [1, 3, 5]. The challenges that refugee people experience are significant and multi-faceted [7, 13]. Large numbers of refugees who are waiting to be assessed and resettled currently live in refugee and displacement camps worldwide, such as the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, where many African-Australians have lived before migrating to Australia. Some also come from other refugee camps in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt. These camps are characterized by shortages of food, inadequate medical services, and lack of sanitation [14–16].

Furthermore, these refugees encountered some additional issues such as hardships and physical deprivations, some of the vulnerable refugees experienced a high level of traumatic events before their arrival in the refugee camps. Some had witnessed execution, death of loved ones, and busses such as rape, torture, psychological deprivation, looting, and destruction. These challenges and lived experiences can have overwhelming psychological and emotional impacts on individuals and families. Some researchers have already recognized these difficulties and suffering of refugees from divergent degrees of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) [4, 12, 15, 16]. The complexity of refugees' pre-settlement experiences and the impact of these experiences on individuals and families place pressure on countries to ensure that they can adequately support arriving refugees at both a policy and service level [9, 15]. Host countries are providing resettlement and settlement programs as part of their contributions and global commitment to humanity by taking a share in protection of refugees. They provided resettlement and settlement support services voluntarily. Protection and resettlement of refugees is a responsible idea to do in face of humanity and it is a durable solution for refugees who cannot return to their countries of origin [6]. The role of host countries included, but was not limited to providing access to resources, facilitation of integration, and provision of support services [1, 2, 6, 17]. These issues critical for the South Sudanese community in Australia and in the context of this study. Families and individuals are struggling with resettlement and may need support services to overcome settlement issues.

4. Policy and practice: refugee settlement in Australia

Australia has a history of resettling refugees and migrants via humanitarian programs. Australia is a signatory to the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and to the subsequent 1967 Protocol [18, 19]. This means that Australia agrees to protect refugees and is one of the countries that accepts refugees for resettlement. The 1951 Convention clearly defined a refugee as a person

who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" [6]. The Humanitarian Resettlement Program in Australia began in 1947, with the resettlement of European Displaced Persons (DPs) who were displaced by World War II (31) and resettled to Australia under the auspices and accommodation of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the immediate precursor of the UNHCR. Australia started resettling refugees in 1947 and more than 800,000 refugees from different countries and nationalities have been resettled. They rebuilt their lives in Australia and called Australia home [4, 11, 20, 21]. Between 1933 and 1939, for example, more than 7000 Jews fleeing Nazi Germany were settled [22]. In 1937, the Australian Jewish Welfare Society pioneered the first refugee settlement support services, with financial assistance from the Australian government [23]. However, Australia also has a history of discriminating against certain ethnicities. The Restriction Act 1901, which became known as the White Australia Policy, limited immigration to Australia on the basis of ethnicity [11, 20]. When this White Australia Policy ended in 1975, the Racial Discrimination Act was introduced. The agenda of multicultural debate started to grow strongly politically. However, it took time for the federal government to put this multicultural agenda into the National Policy for Multicultural Australia. The aim of multicultural policy is to achieve a harmonious and friendly society based on Australian values by recognizing diversity as a positive contribution to the workforce within Australian culture [23, 24]. This was the time when first Vietnamese refugees came in 1975 by boat. As a result, many refugees started arriving from Asia, Middle East, and Africa. In the recent decade, many refugees have come to countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Bhutan, Somalia, Burma, Iraq, Sudan, Burundi, Congo, and other countries [1, 2, 4, 11, 20].

The idea of multiculturalism embraced diversity and differences as a public policy designed by the government in response to the expectation of society with nationalities with different cultural practices. There are three main dimensions of multicultural policy identified by the government. First dimension is a cultural identity as a right of all Australians to express their cultural heritage including language and celebration of religion. The second dimension is social justice as a right of all Australians to equal treatment, opportunity, and the elimination of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender, or place of birth. The third dimension is economic efficiency, the need to maintain, develop, and effectively utilize the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background [1, 2, 25].

With this multicultural society in mind, refugee community groups are considered disadvantaged and thus deserving of special consideration under social inclusion services [24]. Social inclusion has become an important policy initiative for state governments, and it often generates debate about which groups are socially excluded and why [23, 24]. Social exclusion is viewed as a significant social cost, since it pushes new arrivals to the edge of society and prevents them from participating fully in society due to their poverty, lack of basic competencies, limited lifelong learning opportunities, and ongoing discrimination [1, 2, 4]. People from refugee backgrounds often experienced poverty in displaced camps, refugee camps, their home countries, and in their interim countries before their resettlement. The poverty experienced is additional to war, conflict, disruption of life, and basic

activities such as education, farming, and business. This is one of the reasons why formal education is absent from some refugees. However, some refugees are well-educated or literate in their own language and English. These are people who have attended formal education in their countries before the war displaced them. Some also attended education in refugee camps [1, 2]. Many refugees in Australia do face problems in workforce due to lack of experience in workforce and institutional discrimination. Australian workforce can be more complex compared to their previous work experiences in their countries. Also, life in refugee camps denied them to get work experience in big institutions such as banks, hospitals, schools, and hotels prior to their arrival in Australia [7]. The combination of unfamiliarity with systems and lack of confidence and ability to communicate effectively in English created a struggle to access meaningful employment opportunities. Lack of participation or limited participation in society denied refugees the power and make relevant decisions for their lives. They often feel powerless, confused, and unable to control their lives, their families, and their children [1, 2, 4, 26]. On the other hand, young people from African community want to be free citizens like other young people in Australian mainstream community groups. They want to be viewed as young people that want to participate in a multicultural society without many expectations of them. They see the idea of inclusive society as something that not working sometimes for them when they are extremely judgmental by the media and politicians who want to promote their politics in a negative way. Some of these politicians that are promoting negative debates about minority community groups in Australia as "African Gang" are clearly violating the multicultural and social inclusion policy. One of the principles of social inclusion policy is a promotion of harmony that allows all Australians to feel valued and welcome to participate freely without discrimination and exclusion. Social policy promotes the idea of diversity and celebration of diversity regardless of status and cultural background. It is also about celebrating the benefits of diversity in a multicultural society with the commitment to social cohesion [4, 25].

The Australian Government's concept of social policy and the principles of multiculturalism are particularly relevant to the African community groups that are faced some barriers to participation in employment and sport as well as many other areas. Benefits of participation are very clear and highly needed by the vulnerable community groups and families that are struggling with isolation. This study demonstrates general experiences of African community groups in Australia and these experiences are contradicting the social inclusion policy and the principles of multiculturalism in areas of employment, participation in sports, and other important decisions or powers. People from African community groups are more likely to experience some subtle and explicit forms of racism and discrimination in different fields including workplace and sports [1, 2, 4].

5. Settlement of refugees: a challenging process

Settlement support services are provided by the Australia humanitarian program. This program manages and provides settlement support services to newly arrived families and individuals. However, these support services are delivered by non-governmental originations that are funded to provide settlement support services.

While general resettlement issues for refugees have been discussed above, this section discusses settlement issues that are of particular significance to the South

Sudanese community in Australia. "Refugee settlement" is a term used when refugees arrive in Australia and require a range of support services to establish themselves and become independent in a new cultural and social context [see [4, 27]]. Settlement is a complex process that requires support from the host community, government, and non-government agencies to address different challenges [4, 7, 28].

Refugees have sometimes been perceived as a burden on receiving countries. This notion of burden has been central to both policy and research debates about displacement and protection [29]. Such political and community concerns are indicative of the global challenge of refugee resettlement amidst decreasing numbers of refugees being able to return voluntarily to their countries [30]. The difficulty of settlement is exaggerated by their connection to place and creation of a sense of belonging in local place. Having a sense of belonging can assist in feeling safe and connected to local community activities. This increases interest in participation in upcoming community activities or events with confidence [2, 31]. Host community can assist in navigating connections and access to community activities if refugees are not received as troublesome to host community groups. According to the 1951 Convention, protection of refugees was a responsible action for countries to protect and resettle refugees in non-discriminatory way. Countries are also responsible for ensuring that participation of refugees in host society is fully participated by the government of the country hosting refugees [1, 2, 4, 6]. Settlement of refugees in host communities is a two-way process in relation in term of cultural understanding and expectations of integration. There is a great need for partnership between organizations that are supporting refugees and the host community. Settlement of refugees can be made better by the host community by welcoming and engaging refugees in meaningful programs or activities that make them feel welcome with the spirit of hospitality and not an environment where they are viewed as "other" or people with problems [1, 2].

As already discussed above, refugee settlement is a final phase, and are meant to be integrated into their host communities. It is time when individuals and families required some support to be connected in community groups and activities to participate in meaningful activities such as sports for young people. They also required some support and connection to develop and build their social and economic independence [1, 2, 32, 33]. However, we know that from the research, settlement is an ongoing process for people from refugee backgrounds. It is not something that can be achieved overnight as it is a process that involved many challenges such as adapting to a new place and a new community with a new language cannot be an easy task to overcome in short period of time [1, 2, 28]. Settlement challenges include lack of social capital and language acquisition to assist in navigating systems and integration processes. This can be daunting task for individuals and families if they are not well supported regardless of the level of education they obtained in their previous countries. These challenges can overshadow some benefits for refugees during the settlement period [1, 2, 4, 7]. The impact of integrating into a new society can cause high levels of stress and anxiety [11, 21]. Refugees often experience intense homesickness and isolation which are aggravated by culture shock that further hinders their ability to begin a new life in Australia [4]. To reduce these challenges, there is a need to promote optimal well-being strategies to help people to manage stress and adjustments to settlement issues. Settlement programs should be funded to support emotional and personal well-being of people from refugee backgrounds. It is important to assist people with prevention of mental health issues are they are more likely to be developed by individuals and families. Refugee people need support to rebuild their lives from what they lost or missed in their lives. This should be

seen as part of the settlement package for refugees [1, 2, 34]. The studies in this area of refugee settlement have generated enough evidence globally. Some of the critical themes are discussed in the context of this chapter in terms of understanding forced migration, displacement, and settlement of migrants in Australia. Prominent themes of relevance include drivers of displacement and forced migration, legal and moral frameworks, and experiences in refugee camps and countries of resettlement [see, for example [3–5]]. Some positive factors identified in this research that are useful in helping refugee people overcome settlement issues and contribute better include feeling safe from discrimination and racism, getting secure and well-paid employment, participation in local community meetings without encountering prejudices or negative judgments, feeling supported at school and in community, buying home raise family and many others [1, 2, 4, 11, 14]. These studies have discussed general challenges faced by refugees in Australia but have not critiqued policies and ways forward to address issues on a broader level as African people are still experiencing unemployment issues and discrimination in Australia. In some cases, the treatment of refugees and their access to meaningful resources is something that is influenced by the politics in Australia. When some politicians choose to use negative language calling young people from Africa as "African gang" level of racism and discrimination increases in community against people of African heritage [1, 2, 35]. This was because of some politicians and media promoting fearmongering and exposing African Australians as a desirable group in Australia. Levels of abuse and racial attacks were noticed in community and at schools by children. In Australia, there is interesting culture and attitude toward newly arrived groups. Newly arrived groups often generated debates in public about who is responsible when there is something wrong. There is often a blame game about why they are in first place or why they are not deported back to where they came from. This was a case with African community or "African gang" debates with some blaming that they are not able to integrate in Australia according to the Australian values. This happened with the group that came by boat to asylum in Australia. They were managed by the federal government in detention centers, but public debate increased with some calling for deportation [1, 2, 4, 36, 37]. Many of these recent debates in the media have attempted to distinguish between "good" and "bad" refugees. "Bad" refugees are those who "jump the queue", meaning they arrive by boat and not through the formal UNHCR channels [4, 37]. The majority of African people in Australia who arrived via UNHCR work in refugee camps. Despite this, they are often still labeled as "undesirable" refugees in political and media discourse because of their settlement-related challenges in Australia, which have been both exaggerated and widely misreported by the mainstream media [4, 36, 37]. Therefore, understanding this history and these challenges facing people from refugee and migrant backgrounds in Australia, including people from African community groups, is vital in policy and practice contexts.

6. Conclusion

This chapter discussed migration and settlement challenges faced by families and individuals from African backgrounds during migration and settlement. The majority of African migrants in Australia came because of war and other challenges including political prosecution. However, people from minority community groups appear to find settlement challenging due to a lack of support services available to community groups or families/individuals. Families and young people from African community

groups often find themselves in trouble with many settlement issues in Australia. The settlement of African community groups has been negatively publicized in the media and African community groups are thus often viewed negatively.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 6

Sub-Saharan Migrations to Europe during the Three Last Decades

Jacques Barou

Abstract

Migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe are recent. Slave trade organized by Europeans to the America created some possibilities of settlement in Europe between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries for Black African persons, but the phenomenon was marginal. Migratory flow really begins in the twentieth century. Colonial troops arrived in France to take part in the battles of the First World War. After this first experience, voluntary migrations were organized by some communities of West Africa to some harbors in France. In the sixties, the phenomenon increased but concerned only men whose purpose was to come back rapidly at home with their savings. Little by little, different European countries were concerned by the immigration of women and families coming from all parts of Africa. This article aims to describe and analyze the transformations of the migratory flows and the ways of integration in the receiving societies with cases concerning mainly France and the UK.

1. Introduction

In this text, we will examine the global processes of African migration during the three last decades (from 1990 to 2020). We will start with a historical background concerning migrations in the south of the Sahara. The internal migrations in this region have always been very important and today almost 70% of the estimated 40,000,000 Sub-Saharan migrants are living in a foreign country of this area [1]. Only 15% of them are settled in Europe and the others are in North America and in the countries of the Persian Gulf. However, the fluxes of migrants toward Europe have strongly increased during the three last decades. After a presentation of the migrations in the Sub-Saharan area, we describe the different routes to Europe by land and sea, and the risks encountered by the migrants.

Then we analyze the particularities of migration in France, the European country the most concerned by this migration. We will also examine the demographics of African migration, including migration pathways, work, education, living conditions, familial, gender, faith, and settlement patterns. These trends in African migration will be analyzed alongside broader global trends within African diasporas. In this chapter, we use a methodology based on comparisons between quantitative data collected in

different periods. This let appears the main changes in the fluxes of migrants and their profiles. The most relevant sources of data at a global level are produced by the IOM (International Organization of Migrations), depending on the UNO. Concerning France, the INED (National Institute for Demographic studies) realizes regularly important surveys about the different aspects of migratory fluxes and processes of integration. We complete this approach with references to qualitative research.

After his analysis of the evolution of the Sub-Saharan migrations in Europe, we will explore their future. Some arguments let think they will grow irresistibly. The reproduction rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is very high, while in Europe it is lower. Does it mean we will see in the next decades a rush of young African migrants toward old Europe? Will the people originated from Sub-Saharan represent 25% of the French population in 2050, as some statistic projections let foresee it [2]. However, if we consider different historical cases, we can conclude the growth of the population of a country did not provoke systematically a growth of the migrations outside. Europe remains far from Sub-Saharan Africa and difficult to reach because of the cost and the danger of the travel, and the administrative closing of the countries of the U.E. Besides, African continent gives large possibilities to migrate from a poor country to a more developed one. So, we will first analyze the evolution of internal migrations in the south of the Sahara.

2. Migrations in the south of Sahara

The history of African people living in the south of the Sahara is above all a history of migrations. A process of desertification in the Sahara began around 2000 years B.C.E and provoked the departure of black peasants living there for numerous centuries toward the grand rivers of Western Africa: Senegal, Niger, Volta…. At the same time, wandering groups of cows or camel breeders began to run over this immense desert and its surrounding regions.

From the Benoué tableland, in the border region of Cameroon and Nigeria, the ancestors of the Bantu rushed across the equatorial forest and arrived in the Australia savannah at a period corresponding to the European middle age. In Eastern Africa, we can also observe different flows of populations toward the high tablelands of Rwanda and Burundi and the regions of the grand lakes. Bantu agriculturists settled there around the eleventh century A.D.E and Ethiopian shepherds followed them some decades later.

These migrations populating little by little the different spaces of the continent continued until the twentieth century. Many ethnic groups of Sub-Saharan Africa have myths or legends telling precisely their arrival in their actual territory, underlining their relatively recent presence there. Different reasons explain the importance of migrations in Africa up to the contemporary era: the existence of vast under-inhabited places, the climate hazards, and the lack of agricultural techniques as fallow, allowing the regeneration of the fields, which let people leave lands quickly run dry and look for new soils to plow. The slave trade has also influenced the moving of the populations. The trade practiced by the Arabic countries and their African suppliers, such as the Kabaka and the King of Uganda, captured and sold around 17 million people in North Africa and in the Arabic peninsula from the middle age to the beginning of the twentieth century. During two centuries, the European traders transferred around 12 million Sub-Saharan persons to the America. In order to escape capture, many people might abandon their village and looked for refuge in mountains or in

forests and other places difficult to reach. These forced migrations stopped in the first part of the twentieth century [3].

During the colonial period, migrations increased because of different reasons. Military troops were recruited among local populations and were moved from one country to another, in order to conquer new lands or to maintain the authority of colonial power. Economic migrations were organized by the administration from poor and overcrowded regions to plantations and mines, as in the case of the migration of Mossi people from poor Burkina to the rich plantations of Ivory Coast or from the villages of the former Northern Rhodesia to the mining towns of the "copper belt" [4].

During the years following the independence of African countries from the early to mid-1960s, the migrations became more controlled because of policies aiming to protect the national workers against the rivalry of foreigners. The rare countries, which had chosen a liberal way of development, continued to receive numerous migrants coming from the neighboring countries. It was particularly the case of South Africa in the period of apartheid which encouraged the arrival of foreign workers in order to develop mining and industrial activities and the case of the Ivory Coast which continued to receive workers coming from its poor surrounding countries, such as Mali and Burkina. But the majority of the governments preferred to close the frontiers and expel sometimes violently foreign residents who settled there during the colonial period.

During the 1960s, Marshall Mobutu evicted from Zaire thousands of Malian and Senegalese who were settled there in the time of Belgian Congo. Instead of going back to their countries of origin, these people preferred to join some of their fellow citizens working in France and this event amplified the flow toward this country [5].

In the 1980s, we can observe a general rerun of internal migrations and growing flows toward other continents. During this decade most African countries had a negative rate of economic growth. The Gross National Product remained low, while the global population increased by 3% in a year and the working population by 2,7% in a year. The individual middle income decreased by 25%. The economists used to name this period "the lost decade." During the following decade, economic growth came back in certain regions. However, the global situation was still difficult. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, many African governments reduced strongly the number of public jobs. Many young graduates had no hope of finding employment. This fact influenced the behavior of younger pupils who abandoned studying and tried to work in order to survive. Their quest for jobs led them to move from their villages to the nearest towns, from little towns to important urban areas, from their home country to a less poor one, and from Africa to the outside.

3. The real beginning of migrations out of Africa

In the 1990s, political problems added to economic difficulties, provoking insecurity. Violent conflicts bursting in some countries caused a chain of dramatic consequences in the whole surrounding zone. From 1960 to 1990 Africa has already known 17 civil wars among the 43 registered in the world. In and after the 1990s, internal conflicts have been on the increase. In total, 27 countries among the 53 existing in the continent have known political violence between 1993 and 2002. The civil wars in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone added to those already existing for a long time in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan.

The surrounding countries must receive populations running away from the struggles and the frontier zones become sometimes a place of folding back for troops of militants fighting against the neighboring government. Countries, such as Chad or the Central African Republic, suffer troubles linked to the civil conflicts devastating their neighbors Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Some states, such as Somalia, completely collapsed, giving the place to anarchy and insecurity. As a consequence of these conflicts, one can register today six million refugees in Africa and seventeen million displaced persons knowing very difficult conditions of life. So, the global situation in Africa can push many people to move to more peaceful and less poor places.

In spite of the high number of conflicts, the refugees represent only 13% of all the migrants in Africa (six million in 2020, according to Eurostat) [6]. The inside migrations are caused above all by economic factors. In this early twenty-first century, almost 17 million citizens of different countries in the south of the Sahara are living in a foreign land. It represents 3% of the global population of the continent, a rate slightly higher than the percentage of migrants referring to the whole world population. But the largest majority of them are living in a foreign African country. According to the world report about human development, dedicated in 2009 to migrations, only 2% of the migrants coming from the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are living in a country member of the OECD. 1% of them are living in Europe. A country, such as Mali, which appears as a typical country of emigration, registers 92% of its migrants in other African countries, 5% in a European country, and 3% in an Asian country (UNO, 2009).

However, we can identify a key period explaining the development of Sub-Saharan migratory movements toward Europe. From the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, fluxes intensified were renewed and diversified. Meanwhile, the member-states of the European Union undertook a legislative race to control the entry and residence of foreigners.

From the 1990s, demand for highly skilled workers from poor to rich countries has become a new dynamic, assisted by globalization and aging populations. Even women, who in the past remained at home, now take advantage of their better education and skills to migrate independently of men. Thus, female doctors, nurses, and teachers from Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya, for example, have been recruited to work in Britain and Australia, quite often leaving their spouses and children behind (Koket & alii).

Migrants usually intend to return home on retirement and be buried among their ancestors. Thus, for example, many refugees voluntarily choose repatriation as soon as conditions back home return to normal. As part of the important process of keeping in contact with home, migrants regularly send money either to help sustain family members or pay for the building of a new house, purchase land for themselves or their relatives, or the education of family members. The formation of diasporas and home improvement associations together with the related individual or group financial remittances is another common feature of migrants. In this manner, migrants are able to keep alive links between themselves and their home country.

Probably the number of migrants inside Africa will continue to increase in the future. The statistic previsions expect that the African population being of an age to work will have an increase of 125% in 2050. At the same time, the evolutions would be + 26% in Latin America, +22% in Asia, and - 23% in Europe. So, the migrations to Europe that nowadays represent a little part of all the migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa will consequently continue to increase. However, a certain number of factors

contribute to limit the growth of Sub-Saharan migration in Europe. One of the most important is linked to the difficulties to reach the European continent. Few Sub-Saharan citizens enjoy a Schengen visa, allowing them a legal arrival in a country belonging to this space. The majority of migrants often have to use an illegal way to enter Europe.

4. The routes to Europe

The routes leading from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, by land and sea, are all dangerous and the travel is expensive.

Indeed, the undocumented migration routes are highly relevant in the context of African migration systems to the EU. The following map shows the routes used by illegal African migrants to enter in the EU [7]. They are still active today.

The main departure points are:

- **West coast of Africa:** Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara, and southern Morocco from where most head for the Canary Islands.

- **Northern Morocco** to cross into Ceuta and Melilla or cross the straits to Spain.

- **Tunisia and Libya** for boats heading for Italy's islands of Lampedusa, Sicily, and Malta (BBC, 2007).

Since the death of Colonel Kadhafi in 2011, a big disorder exists in Libya and some migrants have been kidnapped by criminal groups and reduced to slavery [8]. According to the HCR, in 2021, 123000 persons tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Among them, 3231 died or disappeared.

It is difficult to know precisely the number of persons who died by crossing the desert and the sea to join Europe during the three last decades. According to the French NGO SOS Méditerranée, hundreds of thousands of migrants would be dead or disappeared since the creation of the Schengen system.

The policy of EU concerning migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa is above all repressive. The Frontex Agency intercept the boats loaded by illegal migrants and send them back to North Africa. Some North African countries, such as Morocco or Libya, are paid by EU to restrain the fluxes coming from the Sub-Saharan area. It is more difficult to expel undocumented migrants settled in Europe a long time ago. The question is politically sensitive. The fear of an invasion of Black African migrants is the favorite argument of many extreme-right-wing parties in the different European countries. However, the number of Sub-Saharan migrants in Europe increased slowly but constantly during the three last decades, and Black African diasporas are nowadays existing in Europe. It is particularly the case in France, the most concerned country by the Sub-Saharan migrations.

5. Sub-Saharan migrants in France

Migration to France from the African continent has been influenced by the ties linked during the colonial period. Today around 85% of the Sub-Saharan migrants settled in France come from a former French colony. The first important migration flows took place during the colonial period. At that time, the African countries ruled by France were organized into three federations: French Western Africa, French Central Africa, and the French territories in the Indian Ocean. Some sailors employed by the French merchant navy had the opportunity to come and work in Marseille and other harbors, but the main flows were organized by public authorities because of military motives.

During the First World War, 161000 men from the French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa were enlisted in infantry in order to come and fight in Europe. 30000 of them died on the battle fields or in military hospitals, often because of tuberculosis. Some of these soldiers remained in France after the war and created associations and news-papers to claim French citizenship and racial equality because of the "blood debt" contracted by France toward the natives of the colonies. They were joined by students and intellectuals, such as Leopold Senghor from Senegal and Aimé Césaire from Martinique, who developed the concept of "negritude," affirming both the originality of the black civilizations and a desire for political equality inside the French Republic. After the Second World War, the number of African students in France increased. Those supporting independence become more numerous than those claiming political assimilation. The main part of African politicians who came into power in the sixties had studied and militated in Paris before [9].

After the independence, in the 1960s, migration of workers began to grow in the harbors of Marseille and Le Havre and in the Paris region. Most of them came from the Senegal River Valley and were citizens of Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. Belonging to ethnic groups, such as Peul and Soninké, they were often illiterate and unskilled. One other group came from the Comoros archipelago in the Indian Ocean. In Paris, they worked as street cleaners and garbage men and in the ports; they were dock workers. They organized them as communities of single men living often in old and damaged housing or in homes for celibates managed by humanitarian asso-ciations [10]. The main causes of this migration were economic. On one hand, the Senegal River Valley was a particularly poor area affected by dryness. On the other hand, during these years of exceptional prosperity, the French economy had impor-tant needs for unskilled workers and the African migrants were welcome. A system of rotation was organized by the communities allowing a certain number of men to be in

their native countries dealing with their domestic problems, while their parents were in France, earning money and sending important sums to the villages [11].

This system was thwarted by a decision of the French government taken in 1974. Economic immigration was suspended with a few exceptions concerning some specific sectors of activity. So, the immigrants could not spend more than two months in their countries of origin else they risked to lose their right to stay in France. The increase in unemployment pushed also them to abandon the rotation system and the long time stays in their villages among their families. Many men decided consequently to let their wives and children join them in France.

6. Main changes in the fluxes during the 1990s

The profile of the Sub-Saharan population in France began to change at the end of the 1970s. The families became more numerous than single men. They encountered also many problems. Polygamy was frequent and the number of children was often very high, provoking difficulties in housing and scholarship. The pursuit in France of some traditions, such as excision, contributes to let these people appear as very difficult to integrate. Different laws were promoted in the 1990s to discourage this migration, without real success. The flows continued illegally.

At the same time, we assist in the development of migration of asylum seekers coming above all from central Africa, Angola, Congo, and Zaire (actually the Democratic Republic of Congo). These countries were concerned by civil wars, such as Angola, for a long time. Others, as the Former French Congo, were concerned by brief but violent troubles during the 1990s. The former Zaïre after the end of the dictatorship of Marshall Mobutu was affected by important disorders in its eastern provinces because of the rivalry between uncontrolled militias terrorizing civil populations.

A large number of people tried to flee these countries and organize illegal travels toward Europe, wherein they hope to obtain asylum. Some of these asylum seekers were really victims of political prosecution but many of them used this procedure because the other legal means to enter France became more and more restricted. Finally, a relatively low percentage of Sub-Saharan asylum seekers obtained the status of political refugee. For instance, in 2009, among 5780 asylum seekers coming from Africa were registered by the French Office for Refugees and stateless persons, 1952 (33%) have gained the status of political refugee. Many asylum seekers who have been dismissed stay in France illegally. Today, many African migrants are undocumented in France since a relatively long time. Some of them have finally obtained legal documents according to different reasons: illness, familial links, and prove of integration. It is impossible to know exactly how many African migrants are illegal but their number is probably significant. At the end of the 1990s, the number of Sub-Saharan migrants considerably increased; mainly because of the arrival of women and families. They were 393 289 according to the census of 1999, while they were 182 479 in 1990. In 2010 they were 705 388, and in 2019 they were 1 031749. So, the growth of the migrants coming from this area essentially took place during the three last decades. They appear nowadays as a young population with a high percentage of children and young persons. Children under 15 years represent 56,8% of the Sub-Saharan group versus 32,5% of all migrants. Young persons from 15 to 24 represent 21,5% of this group versus 15,1% of all the migrants. One counts also an important number of grandchildren born in France and enjoying French citizenship: 929000 [12]. The question of their integration into European society is an important one.

7. Main characteristics of Sub-Saharan migration in France

It should be noted that despite their recent increase, immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa only represent 11.63% of the total immigrant population. No country in sub-Saharan Africa has reached 100 000 citizens. The nation with the largest figure, Senegal, comes far behind the various nations of North Africa, Europe, and Asia [13].

7.1 Gender

The immigrant population of sub-Saharan Africans in France is notable for feminization and for becoming younger. The arrival of families after 1975 has contributed to a rapid rise in natives of African nations present in France. The clearest sign of the establishment of the kind of family patterns typical among African immigrants is the increase in the number of women, in total number, and as a percentage. Until 1975, the number of women was very low. In 1982, they numbered 62 172, 36.17% of the population. In 1990, this number had reached 117 382, 42.66% of the total Sub-Saharan African population. By 1999, they numbered 187 444 or 46.7%, and in 2019 they are 523340 representing 50,7%. Concerning African nations formerly under French rule, for whom there are more detailed figures, more women came to France than men between 1990 and 1999: 45648 women compared to 36129 men. The available figures also attest to the importance of young people. 21 326 people under the age of 19 came to France between 1990 and 1999, 26% of the total arriving in this period. Under 15s numbered 13 016, 15.9% of the total. The importance lies with adolescents rather than children. There have also been a lot of young adults, including many women: 12049 people aged 20–24 entering the country, of whom 7 098 were women, 15 499 people aged 25–29, 9 468 of them women, and 14 138 people aged 30–34, of whom 8 102 were women. Beyond these age brackets, the figures are less significant. The increase in the African population of France is therefore due mainly to the arrival of young people who give immigration a more family-oriented profile. People entering under family reunion laws are not of much significance: 1000–2000 per year on average since 1990. Most new arrivals are therefore either newly-arrived families, or most often adults or children and adolescents arriving individually. Thus, the recent increase in African immigrants is due principally to the arrival of young adults and adolescents, many of whom are women. We are looking mainly then at a new population, one that was under-represented until now and which is changing the face of African immigration. The feminization of Sub-Saharan African immigration reflects the wider progression of the immigrant population which is marked by its equal numbers of men and women in 2019.

7.2 Nationalities

All nations of the African continent are represented in France today. This is not new, as the range has always been very wide. What is new, is the considerable increase in numbers coming from countries previously very underrepresented. People coming from the Congo, who numbered 8 492 in 1982, numbered 35 449 in 1999, and in the third position just after Mali. People coming from the Ivory Coast went from 12 072 in 1982 to 29 885 in 1999. Natives of Madagascar numbered 10 940 in 1982. This number rose to 28 220 in 1999. These three countries have experienced

very difficult situations in recent years. The Congo has suffered two civil wars, in 1993 and 1997. Its geographical proximity to two countries with long-term troubled histories, Angola and Zaire, has also had an effect on the flow of departures. The Ivory Coast, despite a satisfactory economic situation, has for some years seen an increase in tensions between the populations of the north and the south, and hardening of antagonism between "authentic" Ivorians and descendants of immigrants. Madagascar, whose economy has been battered by Didier Ratsiraka's collectivizing experiments, has known political tensions for a long time, which threaten to slide the country into civil war.

The proportion of people who have acquired French nationality is higher in four groups: 26.65% from the Congo, 33.86% of people from Cameroon, 35.78% for people from the Ivory Coast, and 65.09% of people from Madagascar. For the total immigrant population from the African continent, the percentage of French people "by acquisition" is 30.16%. We find a higher percentage of people who gained French nationality amongst the groups where women are more numerous. This coincidence is particularly clear amongst people from Madagascar.

What are the factors that explain the similarities between these diverse populations? All of them come from countries that have known or are currently in conflict situations. They also come from countries where the French used to have a strong presence, which explains the strong tendency for people to acquire French nationality. Finally, from a cultural perspective, all these countries of origin are notable for systems of family organization that attribute an important economic role to women. Given the fairly high levels of schooling that you find in these countries, it is probable that a certain number of men and women have student status or held one on arrival in France.

7.3 Faith

France being a secular state, no sociodemographic survey can ask people about their religion. It is, therefore, not possible to know precisely the religions of African immigrants in France. All the same, we can attribute religions based on the dominant religion in their country of origin. The majority of people from West Africa are Muslim. We can regard a near totality of Malians and Mauritanians to be Muslim. In Senegal, we have counted an ethnic minority, the Manjak, as Catholic. Comorians are all Muslim. The majority of people from central Africa; Congo, ex-Zaire, and Cameroon, are Christian. The same goes for the Ivory Coast, Benin, and Togo. It is of course a matter of "sociological" membership of these religions. We have no way of measuring conviction or regularity of practice. Muslims from Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean are represented in the CFCM (Muslim Council of France) but only play a limited role due to their numerical inferiority to North Africans and Turks.

Amongst Christians, we have seen the vibrant success of evangelical churches and social networks based around places of worship. The belonging to Catholicism, still the main religion present in France, does not appear as a factor facilitating integration [14]. French Catholics are generally old persons with conservative opinions, while African believers are young and open-minded. In Africa, people like music and create a joyful atmosphere during the masses. In France, they think the ambiance of the mass is sad and mournful.

So, they rarely pray with French believers in the same church.

7.4 Location and way of life

Despite the changes that they have been concerned with over the last decade, the immigrant population of Sub-Saharan Africa remains massively centered around the Paris region at a rate of 65.4%, (percentage of the whole immigrant population in this region: 39.6%). Their presence in other regions is low: 4.88% in PACA (Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur), 4.31% in Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes, and 3.69% in Haute Normandie. The vast majority of African immigrants live in urban areas, and 160 118, 58% of the total, live in Greater Paris, that is to say, inner Paris itself and the three surrounding urban departments making up the "little crown": Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne. On a national level, the proportion of people living in suburbs is greater than that living in city centers (56.96% over 43.04%). The strong representation of African immigrants in city centers is not synonymous with affluence though. They often occupy the most run-down buildings that still exist in city centers, in particular in Paris. Because of their high numbers in heavily urbanized areas, African immigrants live in communal buildings in very large numbers. Households living in makeshift abodes are now a rarity. However, many are still badly housed: 4 085 households, 3.46% of the total, live in places with no mod cons, and 1.29% of homes have a very low standard of conveniences. All the national groups are affected by these problems at a fairly similar level. The percentage of owned properties is very low: 10.13% (31.88% overall for immigrant homes). There is a different distribution of owned properties according to country of origin. Mauritians, Malagasies, and Cameroonians are much more often owners of their own property than Malians and ex-Zaireans. The majority of tenants are in the private sector (55.93%). This varies according to the country of origin. Malians, Senegalese, and Congolese are more likely to live in HLMs (council blocks) than in privately rented properties. For all other national groups, it is the other way around.

In general, Sub-Saharan African immigrants live in conditions below the average for immigrant homes.

7.5 Education and employment

Families of African immigrants have more children than the average for the wider immigrant population. They stand out for their high instances of single-parent families: 11% over 7.5% of all immigrant homes, and 6.6% for all homes in France. According to the 2019 census, 30% of the Sub-Saharan households are headed by a single parent, a woman generally. Polygamous homes are most common amongst the population of Mali and Senegal. Since the passing of laws on family regrouping in 1993, it is forbidden for heads of polygamous families to live in France with more than one of their wives. In reality, polygamy persists, but the number of polygamous homes is difficult to evaluate.

According to the last census, Sub-Saharan Africans are employed mostly as non-qualified workers, particularly service personnel. They fall slightly below the average amongst manual workers, and well below average amongst shopkeepers/business owners. We see slightly below average proportions amongst the higher, intellectual professions, and average proportions in the intermediate professions. This suggests a relatively higher level of education. However, the levels of unemployment amongst Sub-Saharan Africans is in the order of 20%, below average for the total immigrant population, but higher than the average for most non-European groups [13].

7.6 Asylum seekers and forced migration

Actually, 39271 persons coming from Africa are considered in France as political refugees and 2665 enjoy humanitarian protection. The African refugees represent 26% of all the refugees living in France today. The most numerous come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaïre). They are 10673. The flows have been almost permanent since the end of the eighties until today. The Mauritanians are 4325. They came above all after the ethnic conflicts between Arabic and black people. Refugees from Angola (2968) came during the long civil war, which took place in this country from 1975 to 2002. Today, their country is considered secure and they obtain more rarely the status of refugee (OFPRA, report 20019). The number of demands is nowadays still high. According to the last report of OFPRA, in 2021, 40656 demands for protection concerning people from Sub-Saharan Africa have been registered. It represents 45,5% of all the demands [15]. The asylum seekers from Africa come mainly from the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Eritrea. The reasons for their demands are more linked to societal problems than to political prosecutions. They mention the fear of sexual mutilations of young girls, forced weddings, prosecutions against homosexuals, and witchcraft. So, they are few to obtain the status of refugee. In 2021, around 2000 persons obtain subsidiary protection, giving them the possibility to stay legally in France for one year. It means OFPRA considers they risk prosecution if they are expelled from their country of origin. Among them, we find 292 boys and girls under 18 who entered France without being accompanied by adults. They can stay in France until to be of age. The asylum seekers are an important part of the fluxes arrived in France since the beginning of the 1990s. Few of them obtained the status of refugee but many could finally regularize their administrative situation and avoid being expelled. In spite of the importance of illegal situations, Sub-Saharan migrants are more and more numerous to be settled in France for a long time. A new generation is nowadays present and a process of taking root is at work. The question of identity is relatively complex. The first generation of migrants is still linked to their countries of origin. They have a deep feeling of belonging to their ethnic group or their nation. Things are different with the young generations. They are not particularly interested in Africa. They consider they are French with an African ascent. So, they are much more sensitive than their parents to the discrimination. However, they do not claim a "black identity." They want to have a good place in French society by fighting discrimination and racism if necessary, but they do not want to become a specific group, such as the Afro-American people, in the United States. Some little groups of intellectuals develop an ideology funded by a radical separation between Black and Withes. This thesis is much discussed and has few influences on Sub-Saharan migrants and their children and grandchildren [16]. These ones look for social success in France above all. The policy of integration made by the different governments tried to promote some models of success among black Africans, such as the actor Omar Sy or the academic Pap Ndiaye, appointed Minister of education in 2022.

8. Conclusion

In spite of the links created in the past between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe by colonialism, the number of migrants coming from this area is a long time remained unimportant. It did not mean the Black African people were a fixed population. On the

contrary, migrations were particularly important in this area from antiquity to the beginning of the twentieth century. The migrations in Europe really begin during the 1990s and continue to go on until today, leading to the building of an important diaspora. This is the result of the migratory fluxes of the three last decades. In the case of France, the migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa were around 100 000 persons in the 1970s, mainly single men and unskilled workers. According to the census of 2019, they are more than a million, with an important part of women and children, asylum seekers, refugees, students, skilled workers, and so on. In the future, migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa will probably continue to grow. However, the cost of migration will remain very high and those who will be able to arrive in France will be probably people more rich and educated than the migrants of the preceding decades. That will give them more possibilities for integration but they will also demand much more. Will the traditional French model of progressive assimilation remain still efficient?

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Chapter 7

The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia

Abel Yonas Zekarias

Abstract

International migration of Ethiopia is as old as the country itself. However, it only gained momentum in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The forceful overthrow of the long-lasting monarch in 1974 by a socialist military junta led to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in the late 1970s and 1980s, mainly to neighboring countries. The emigration during the post-socialist regimes is dominated by economic emigrants due to political stability, a rise in the volume of the labor force, and declining livelihood opportunities in the country. The recent shift from refugee-led to economic emigration shows its momentum to create new emigration destinations in Africa, such as South Africa and Middle East countries, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. Unlike international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the global level, the emigration of Ethiopia is dominated by women migrants. Women outnumber international migrants originating from Ethiopia in the Middle East, North America, and Europe. Ethiopian international migration is characterized by irregular migration to several destinations via eastern, southern, and northern migration routes. On the other hand, immigration in Ethiopia is dominated by refugees from neighboring countries which makes the country one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in Africa. Gambella, Somali, and Tigray are the regions that host three fourth of refugees living in Ethiopia.

Keywords: emigrants, immigrants, migration route, refugees, women migrants

1. Introduction

The international migratory flow from and to Ethiopia is not a new phenomenon. Both have gained momentum only in the recent five decades. Notably, large-scale international emigration from Ethiopia has tended to occur during periods of political repression and changes of government. The 1974 Ethiopian political revolution can be considered as defining event in the international migration of Ethiopia. This is mainly because it forced at least hundreds of thousands to flee the country and triggered continuous political instability in the country that brought a more repressive socialist military government to power which further forced millions to flee the country. The 1990s has slightly changed the drivers of international migration of Ethiopia from dominant refugee driven to economic ones because of relative stability in the country and faster growth of the labor force.

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The immigration of Ethiopia could be dated back to the Sabaean (ancient people of South Arabia) migration and their settlement between the fourth and fifth century BC into the earliest kingdom of Damon latter Axumite kingdom (present-day Northern Ethiopia). It was one of the considerable migrations into the Ethiopian empire [1]. Following this unprecedented immigration, the migration of Israeli to Ethiopia also dates back more than 2000 years, following the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BC [2]. And immigration of Muhammad's first followers (the *Sahabah*) in the seventh century from Mecca, present-day Saudi Arabia [3], and the immigration of Portuguese missionaries, lay Christians, and military personnel in the seventeenth century [4] are the earliest migrations into Ethiopia. Nevertheless, recent international migration in the context of Ethiopia is dominated by its regional migration flows within the African continent and the Middle East. At the same time, international migration beyond the regional destination is reaching its climax in recent years. In this chapter, I elaborate on the recent international migration trends of Ethiopia by discussing emigration from Ethiopia, its migration routes and main destinations, and immigration and the sources of immigrants living in Ethiopia.

2. Recent emigration of Ethiopian migrants

The 1974 Ethiopian revolution resulted in the downfall of the long-lasting Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974) 1974 [5]. The trend of emigration before the downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie was insignificant in the volume of emigrants. For instance, according to [6] only 35 Ethiopians went to live in the west between 1876 and 1922. Between 1922 and 1935, 144 individuals were sent by the imperial regime to study abroad in western world universities with the mission of modernization of administration [7, 8]. Between 1941 and 1974, the volume of emigration had a slight gain, and an estimated 20,000 Ethiopians of an estimated population of 22 million left to complete their higher educations and fulfill diplomatic missions [6]. Interestingly, the rate of return of Western-educated migrants during this period was high, often because these returnees came back to fill important government positions. Comparatively, the number of refugees and asylum seekers was negligible, as the country was generally stable despite the emperor's political repression and limited freedom [9]. However, pre-1974 emigration was not only limited to western countries rather, but it had also been directed towards neighboring African countries such as Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and Middle Eastern countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia as the main destinations in the 1960s and 1970s [10]. However, the exact number of emigrants during the imperial regime is beyond known figures due to the higher informal emigration. The patterns of emigration of Ethiopia in the 1960 and 1970s show that slightly 50% of Ethiopian emigrants' destinations were within the African continents. The main drivers of pre-1974 revolution emigrations are either economic and cultural factors or state-sponsored educational factors. The economic factors could include centuries-old trade, commerce, and cultural as well as religious relations with countries in the horn of Africa and the Middle East dominated by temporary emigration. On the other hand, state-sponsored educational emigrations targeted modernizing the country by sending young scholars who would serve the country upon the completion of their studies. The main destination for such emigrations were the United States and other developed western countries.

In 17 years of rules of the socialist military junta, the emigration of Ethiopians reached the registered peak in modern history. During this period, 1974–1991, 1 in

20 Ethiopians left the country because of political turmoil and wide-scale drought [11]. The two prominent events that resulted in mass emigration during this period were the Ethio-Somalia war (1977–1978) and the 1984 drought. The Ethio-Somali war (1977–1978) alone resulted in 2.5 million of Ethiopia's 30 million citizens fleeing the country, mainly to neighboring Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. By the summer of 1980, nearly 750,000 migrated to Somalia [6]. The 1984 drought, and subsequent famine, displaced many hundreds of thousands within Ethiopia and sent many others into neighboring countries. As a result of the drought, an estimated 100,000 individuals migrated to Somalia as refugees, 10,000 to Djibouti, and more than 300,000 to Sudan as refugees [12]. Between the 1970s and 1980s, the conflicts and droughts in Ethiopia made the country the largest refugee sender in the horn of Africa. For instance, the Ethiopian refugees living in other Horn of Africa countries were 89.2% in 1977 and 83.5% in 1987 of the refugees residing in these regions. In early 1972 and 1982, more than 99% of refugees in the Horn of African region originated from Ethiopia [13]. However, the emigration during this period was not only taken place because of conflicts and drought. Other factors, such as the American passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which was the first formal policy the United States adopted toward African refugees, increased the number of Ethiopians emigration to the United States. About 25,000–40,000 Ethiopians left for the United States early in the 1980s that making Ethiopian immigrants in the United States the largest voluntary African immigration group after the slave trade [14]. At the end of the socialist military regime in 1991, the number of Ethiopian migrants to the United States rose by an estimated 50,000–75,000 [15]. Another voluntary emigration that took place during this period was the emigration of Ethiopian Jewish decedents to the Israeli state. For instance, about 55,000 Ethiopian Jews, locally known as (Beta Israel) were airlifted to Israel in 1984 and 1991 [11]. During these periods, the destination of Ethiopian migrants was dominated by neighboring African countries, the Middle East, and the United States.

The downfall of the socialist military regime in 1991 resulted in two important events in the last decade of the last century in Ethiopian international migration. First, the return of more than 970,000 Ethiopian refugees who fled to nearby countries under the socialist dictatorship. And secondly, continuous outmigration due to political repression, ethnic violence, and the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998–2000) [16]. Emigration in the 2000s and 2010s shows a shift from refugee-driven migration of the 1980s to different forms of labor migration, mainly due to the relative political stability and growing demands to change in livelihood situations [4]. Post-1990 resulted in an influx of both skilled and unskilled migrants to different destinations [16].

3. Destinations of Ethiopian emigrants

Although some sources estimate Ethiopian emigrants to be about three million, the latest reports of the UN Population Division estimate only one million. The primary destinations for Ethiopian emigrants are countries in North America, the Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Europe. From North American emigration, the United States remains the biggest historic destination for Ethiopian emigrants for the last five decades. The bulk of voluntary emigrants to the United States came after 1974, when a repressive regime toppled the ancient monarchy and took control of the Ethiopian government. Many refugees initially fled to settlement camps in neighboring Sudan before moving on to the United States [17]. The American passage of the 1980 Refugee

Act, which was the first formal policy the United States adopted toward African refugees, increased the number of Ethiopians emigration to the United States; for instance, according to [18], in 1991, an estimated 50,000–75,000 Ethiopians migrated to the United States (see to **Figure 1** for details). The emigration of Ethiopians to the United States has grown rapidly in the last 40 years. It has grown from only 10,000 in the 1980s to over 251,000 by the 2010s [19].

Most Ethiopian migrants (about 60%) living in the United States arrived during or after 2000. By comparison, 36% of the overall United States foreign-born population arrived during this period. Most of the Ethiopian immigrants in the United States are productive young generations, i.e., 86% of first-generation Ethiopian immigrants were of working age (18–64), and 11% were under the age of 18. Although Ethiopian-born immigrants in the United States are the second biggest immigrant group from the Sub-Saharan Africa region, it only accounts for 0.5% of the total United States foreign-born population [19, 20]. The Washington region is home to the largest concentration of Ethiopians outside of Africa [21]. Other large communities are in Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Seattle, and Atlanta. In the context of migration to the United States, most Ethiopian immigrants come to the United States for educational purposes as part of the African country's immigration policy, the Diversity Visa Lottery—an immigration agreement with countries that have low immigration rates to the United States. The female population of Ethiopian immigrants in the United States has grown substantially since the 1990s, with the female population at 49.5% by 2007, only slightly outnumbered by the male population at 50.5% [18].

Canada is the second largest destination for Ethiopian emigrants in North America, next to the United States. However, the volume of Ethiopian immigrants in Canada is much smaller than in the United States, even though immigration in both countries has demonstrated the highest picks since the 1980s due to the political


Figure 1.
Ethiopian emigration to the United States increased from 1930 to 2008. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008.

revolution and instability in Ethiopia since 1974. The 2016 census of Canada indicates that about 44,065 Ethiopian immigrants live in Canada. The 1976 Canadian *Immigration Act*, which recognizes Canada's international obligation to refugees, the displaced, and the persecuted, has played a key role in the high number of Ethiopian immigrants in the country [22]. The same source indicates that the largest group of Ethiopians in Canada is that of Toronto. As of 2016, approximately 15,990 people of Ethiopian descent live in Toronto, followed by Calgary (6355 immigrants), Edmonton (5210 immigrants), and Ottawa (2850 immigrants) in the same period. Census data of Canada also indicates that the volume of Ethiopian women immigrants outnumbers males in Canada.

Migration to European countries is not significant compared to destinations in North America, the Middle East, or the African continent. For example, according to [23], in 2016, about 15% of all Ethiopian emigrants (753,492) left for Europe and roughly one-third to Northern America, particularly the United States. According to [24], the top three destinations of Ethiopian migrants in the EU in 2016 were Sweden (17,944), Germany (18,425), and Italy (7772). According to [25], as of 2020, about 20,465 Ethiopian-born immigrants are living in Germany, which was only 10,980 seven years back in 2013 (see **Figure 2** for details). The 2020 report of the German statistical office shows that more slightly 75% of total Ethiopian immigrants living

Number of Ethiopian immigrants residing in Germany from 2013 to 2020			
Year	Total number of immigrant	Number of male Immigrant	Number of female immigrant	Share of women immigrants in percent
2013	10980	5211	5769	*52.5*
2014	11927	5820	6107	*51.2*
2015	14510	7550	6960	*48*
2016	18425	10210	8215	*44.6*
2017	19075	10420	8655	*45.4*
2018	19765	10670	9095	*46.0*
2019	20195	10705	9490	*47.0*
2020	20465	10705	9760	*47.7*
Source: (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2021)			

Figure 2.
Number of Ethiopian immigrants residing in Germany, 2013–2020.

Ethiopians in Italy from 2006-2016			
Year	Residents in Italy	Males%	Female %
2006	6,656	37.3%	62.7%
2007	7,331	39.6%	60.4%
2008	7978	40.7%	59.3%
2009	8,350	40.0%	60%
2010	8,593	39.5%	60.5%
2011	6,299	37.1%	62.9%
2012	6,933	37.4%	63.6%
2013	8,093	38.9%	61.1%
2014	6,751	38.8%	59.2%
2015	8,000	38.7%	61.3%
2016	7,772	38.9%	61.1%

Source: (Istat data, 2020)

Figure 3.
Ethiopian immigrants in Italy.

in Germany are aged between 15 and 65 years [25]. Male immigrants have slightly started to dominate females since 2015 though women were larger in volume from 2007 to 2014 [26].

Ethiopian immigrants in Italy are slightly less than immigrants living in Germany. However, when comparing the share of female migrants to male migrants, Italy attracted more female migrants than Germany. Rome, Milano, and Parma are the Italian cities with the highest number of Ethiopian residents. But the size of Ethiopian immigrants living in Rome greatly outnumbers the size of immigrants in Milano and Parma combined. Nearly 30% of the Ethiopians residing in Italy live in Rome (**Figure 3**) [27].

Another top destination for Ethiopian migrants in Europe is Sweden. In 2016 about 17,944 Ethiopian migrants reached Sweden, and the average share of women immigrants was approximately 49% between (2006 and 2016) (**Figure 4**).

The Middle East, particularly oil-reach gulf countries and Israel, are growing and very significant destinations for Ethiopian migrants. The emigration to Israel can be understood as a special one as it has been widely sponsored by the state of Israel with the aim of taking Ethiopian Jews to the state of Israel since the establishment of the country in 1948. Since the state formation of Israel in 1948, the Israeli state-sponsored emigration of the Ethiopian Jew community, who are usually known as 'Beta Israel,' the descendant of Jews who immigrated and lived in ancient Ethiopia. between 1948 and 2017, about 92,199 Ethiopian Jews emigrated mainly by Israeli Government sponsorship (see **Figure 5**) [28]. However, these figures only capture formally registered migrants. Emigrations to the state of Israel are also known for unofficial arrivals through migration assisted by human traffickers via northern migration roots, particularly via the Sinai route.

Year	Sex		Total number of immigrants
	Male	female	
2006	5957	5470	11427
2007	6125	5658	11783
2008	6333	5890	12223
2009	6786	6266	13052
2010	7192	6630	13822
2011	7380	6934	14314
2012	7570	7274	14844
2013	7829	7665	15494
2014	8133	8012	16145
2015	8378	8326	16704
2016	9122	8822	17944

Source: (SCB, 2020)

Figure 4.
Ethiopian immigrants in Sweden.

State-sponsored emigration from Ethiopia to Israel since 1948	
Up to Operation Moses (1948-1984)	6,720
Operation Moses (1985)	~ 7,500
Operation Joshua (1985)	~ 550
Operation Solomon (1991)	14,300
1992 – 1997	10,092
Falasha Mura immigrants (1998-2017)	~ 38,242
Immigrants from Quara (1999)	2,173
Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020)	

Figure 5.
State-sponsored emigration from Ethiopia to Israel since 1948.

The Ethiopian Jews community's emigration to the state of Israel continued, which increased the volume of Ethiopian immigrants in the country. The data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statics (CBS) indicate that at the end of 2020, the immigrants of Ethiopian origin in Israel numbered 159,500 residents. Of which approximately 88,500 were born in Ethiopia, and the remaining 71,000 were children of immigrants born in Israel whose fathers were born in Ethiopia. This number also includes 1080 immigrants who arrived in Israel from Ethiopia in 2020 [29]. The official data from the CBS also shows that approximately 63% of the population of Ethiopian origin lives in two major districts: about 38% live in the Central District, and roughly 25% live in the Southern District. At the end of 2020, the urban locality with the highest number of residents of Ethiopian origin was Netanya (approximately 12,200 persons). However, the highest percentage of residents of Ethiopian origin out of the total population in a locality was found in Qiryat Mal'akhi (15.8%).

Emigration to Middle East countries from Ethiopia is the largest by volume and has shown unprecedented growth in the last two decades. The region attracts low-skilled migrants and dominantly domestic female workers from Ethiopia. The primary motive behind migration is to move out of poverty and to improve family living standards through remittances. Migration to Arab countries has intensified due to social networks, the expansion of illegal agencies, and the cheaper (compared to other destinations such as Europe) migration costs [30]. The geographic proximity of the region has also contributed to the higher volume of the Ethio-Middle East migration corridor. Yemen is the country that serves as a transit for emigrants from Ethiopia and neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. As Yemen is economically a poor country, it attracts fewer migrants, but it is very crucial to channel migration from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. For instance, about 334,000 migrants arrived in Yemen from Ethiopia between 2006 and 2013 [31]. The recent data from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals that more than 750,000 Ethiopians are living in Saudi Arabia, of which more than half (450,000) is without proper documents [32]. Nevertheless, migration to the Middle East encounters recurrent mass deportation of undocumented migrants by Saudi authorities. For instance, in 2013/14, more than 165,000 Ethiopians were deported over the course of only 4 months [33]. Similarly, in 2021, IOM registered 79,498 Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia, more than double the number of returns recorded in 2020 (36,632). The same source shows that over 425,000 migrants were returned to Ethiopia between May 2017 and December 2021 [34].

South Africa is among the top destinations for Ethiopian migrants on the African continent. The migration to South Africa from Ethiopia is attached to strong ethnic networks. While Ethiopia has more than 80 diversified ethnic groups, migration to South Africa is highly dominated by Kembata and Hadiya ethnic groups. This has made the Ethiopian–South African migration corridor dominated by these two ethnic groups, which only constitute 2.4 million of the more than 100 million Ethiopian population [35]. The idea of chain migration being started by a single event in 2000 has expanded and continued over a massive scale in the past two decades. Emigration to South Africa from these areas started with a single event when the Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa, originally from areas of these ethnic groups, formally took laborers from these areas to South Africa, which later triggered continuous emigration [36]. Of the estimated 120,000 Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa, more than 90% of Ethiopian arrivals in South Africa are irregular migrants, officially known as undocumented migrants. Irregular migration to South Africa involves crossing several African countries and entails high risks, including physical

and emotional stress, being imprisoned, deportation, and death [35]. Such irregular migration to South Africa is undertaken by the chain of smugglers stretched from source areas to the destination [36, 37].

Emigration from Ethiopia to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia remains flexible due to instability in the region. It rises when man-made or natural disaster occurs in the region. The political instability and its associated armed conflicts change the volume and destination of emigrants who mainly seek refuge in neighboring countries. For instance, the armed conflict in northern Ethiopia from the end of November 2020 to May 2022 triggered the emigration of more than 73,000 individuals, mainly from conflict-affected areas of northern Ethiopia to Sudan [38].

However, the exact figure of emigrants originating from Ethiopia is unknown and expected to be more than official figures. This often results in conflicting figures on the volume of migrants originating from Ethiopia. This is mainly because of poor documentation of nationals leaving the country, the existence of large informal emigrational and cross-border mobilities, and the difficulty of documentation of Ethiopian emigrants at destinations due to "illegal" entries. Some authors estimate current Ethiopian emigrants are more than three million, which is more than double the official figures of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) [39]. Similar to the official figures for total emigration figures, there is also a huge difference in particular migration corridors. For instance, in 2020, UNDESA figures show only 44,000 Ethiopian emigrants in South Africa, while other studies such as [35] estimate about 120 thousand emigrants of Ethiopia in South Africa, which is almost 5 times greater than the official estimates of UNDESA figures. Some authors, for instance, [40] estimate that as much as 60–70% of labor migration from Ethiopia is irregular.

4. Nature of Ethiopian emigration

According to [41], the number of Ethiopian international migrants reached 1.3 million, which constitutes more than 1.1% of the total population of the country in 2019. This share of international migration of the native population was lower than the share of Sub-Saharan Africa international migrants to the population of the region, which was 2.2%, and the share of international migrants to the world population (3.5%) in 2019 [41, 42]. The Data of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UNDESA) indicate that nearly half, about 49.1% of Ethiopian emigrants were women migrants, which is greater than the women migrant share in Sub-Saharan Africa (47.5%) and women migrant at international level (47.9%) in 2019. Some Sources show that earlier out-migration of Ethiopia was dominated by males. For instance, according to the 1992 Office of Refugee Resettlement data, most Ethiopians that were admitted to the United States were males (62%). The primary reason males far outnumber females pertains to the patriarchal social structure that exists in many African countries [18]. However, in the recent trend in Ethiopian emigration, women emigrants have dominated in some destinations due to gender-sensitive labor opportunities. The feminization of migration is also highly evident in Ethiopia, as 60% of total migrants are female. Migration to the Middle East is most significantly a female phenomenon and is motivated by gender-specific domestic work opportunities in the region [41].

Some authors, for example, [43] argue that existing migration frameworks often fail to capture the nature of migration in today's world, particularly precarious forms

of migration where migrants knowingly subject themselves to great risk in pursuit of a better future. Women's out-migration in Ethiopia is strongly related to this notion as many women risk themselves to various inhuman cases of abuse on their migration journey, mainly to the Middle East, hoping to change their inferior livelihood at home. The Ethiopian women migration is highly dominated by domestic work in Arab countries. This migration to Arab countries has intensified due to social networks, the expansion of illegal agencies, and the relative fall in migration costs. This movement, according to [44], is also the result of a shift in demand away from Asian domestic workers who tend to seek higher wages to cheap labor sources in countries such as Ethiopia. Some reports like [45] estimate that roughly 1000 Ethiopian women were leaving the country each day to seek domestic work abroad in 2013. In addition to the economic factors, illegal smugglers also play a key role in motivating women to emigrate to Arab countries with deceptive promises. A study by [46] on Ethiopian returnees from Arab counties found that about 60% of women migrants indicated that they had used smugglers once they departed for their migration. The same study found that the business of smuggling Ethiopian women along the Eastern Route from Ethiopia to Yemen was worth more than USD 15 million in 2019.

According to figures from Ethiopia's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), in 2012, around 200,000 Ethiopian women migrated to the Middle East seeking employment in the domestic work industry using regular routes. The number of women migrating using irregular routes is estimated to double that figure. The top destination countries in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Lebanon, and, more recently, Sudan, which is usually used as a transit country [47]. Studies found that women migrants face different challenges than male ones during their precarious migration trips and their stay at their esteemed destination. For instance, in Arab countries, Ethiopian women migrants are reportedly being exploited at the hands of their employers. Passport confiscation and inadequate wage, physical, sexual, various forms of racialized, gendered, and economic exploitation, as well as emotional abuse, are common challenges faced by Ethiopian migrants in the region [45, 48].

The rise in female emigration occurs mainly because of the rise in domestic job opportunities in Middle Eastern countries, which is the largest destination for Ethiopian emigrants. The Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs issued 21,256 employment contracts for Ethiopians to work in the Middle East from July 2008 to July 2009 [49]. Eighty-two percent of these work permits were for females. The primary countries for the work permits were Saudi Arabia (61.9%), Kuwait (33.16%), and Bahrain (3.22%). In an attempt to regularize irregular or undocumented migration flows to the Middle East, employment agencies involved officially require a license issued by the MOLSA to provide employment contracts. However, most of the migration to the Middle East remains dominantly irregular. The UNDP estimates that up to half a million females migrate from Ethiopia to the Middle East each year [50]. Like the Middle East, the number of female Ethiopian emigrants dominates their male counterparts in main destinations in the European Union [27].

5. Migration routes and Ethiopians emigrants

Migration routes are a crucial factor that determines trends of Ethiopian migration as much of the migration takes place in an irregular manner. Migration routes in the context of Ethiopian emigrants relate to the destinations of the migrants. Emigration,

apart from formal means, mostly takes place on three active migration routes. These include the eastern route, southern route, and northern route.

5.1 Eastern route

Migration from Ethiopia to the Middle East has been ongoing at a high rate since the early 1990s. This route is the busiest route for channeling large irregular or undocumented migrants who aim to reach Middle East countries. For instance, approximately 1.5 million Ethiopians traveled to the Middle East via irregular channels between the years 2008 and 2014 [16]. Despite the unknown figures on the scale of the migration flow in this route, the migration is dominated by women emigrants. [51] estimate that up to half a million women emigrate annually to this region. Djibouti and Yemen are the main transit countries in the eastern route for Ethiopians and horn of African emigrants that aim to reach oil-rich gulf countries. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and strict border restrictions, migration to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seems to continue from Ethiopia via this route [52].

5.2 Northern route

The Northern Route has two branches 'Central Mediterranean Route,' which is used by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa and other parts of Africa to get to Europe, crossing the Mediterranean Sea via Libya. There is also the Sinai route which is utilized by migrants aimed to reach Israel as their main destination via Egypt. In this migration route, migrants from Ethiopia and other countries from the Horn of Africa use the Sudan, Egypt, and Libya as transit countries [53]. Since 2012 the number of migrants using the Sinai Route route has significantly decreased, to the point of it being almost inoperative. This is the result of restrictive migration policies by both Egypt and Israel [16].

The northern migration route has received significant media and political attention, partly because of the harsh conditions in Libya, the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean, and restrictive policies in Europe. For instance, some 3500 Ethiopians irregularly submitted to Europe in 2015, mostly via this route [54].

5.3 Southern route

This migration route broadly connects the East and Horn of Africa to South Africa, with Kenya as one of the main transit countries. Other transit countries on the route include Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. The route is predominantly used by Ethiopian and Somali emigrants who wish to reach South Africa. For instance, by 2009 estimated 17,000–20,000 migrants, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, entered South Africa; more recent estimates show that it is now between 13,400 and 14,050 individuals annually [55].

6. Recent immigration into Ethiopia

Ethiopia is known for hosting immigrants for centuries from several foreign nations. Following the ancient time's immigration of Israeli Jew people in the sixth century BC and seventh century, early Islamic followers from Mecca, the percent day Saudi Arabia, the early modern time immigration of Portuguese lay people and

missionary into the Ethiopian kingdom in the sixteenth century was prominent in immigration history of foreign nationals to Ethiopia. In the early modern ages, the negotiation for an alliance between Ethiopia and Portugal (1508–1526) resulted in the immigration of Portuguese missionaries and military personnel who later settled in different parts of the country [56]. The number of Portuguese immigrants was estimated between 1000 and 3000, which was a combination of Jesuit missionaries, lay Christians, and military personnel in the seventeenth century [4].

Another important migration history in Ethiopia that occurred in the modern period includes Somali migration into Ethiopia in the 1540s due to the occupation of parts of the Ethiopian Empire by Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi "the Conqueror" (the Imam and General of the Adal Sultanate1527–1543) [57]. End of the nineteenth century, many foreigners were already living in Ethiopia; for instance, in 1887, according to [58], out of 60,000 residents of Addis Ababa City, some 1905 were immigrants who came from different Asian and European countries, including 334 Greeks, 227 Arabs, 149 Indians, 146 Armenians, 63 French, 42 Italians, 20 Germans, 13 Hungarians, 15 Turks, 13 Swedes, 13 English, 11 Egyptians, 10 Syrians and Lebanese, 8 Afghanis, 7 Portuguese, 6 Russians and Bulgarians, 6 Cawkas, 5 Americans, 3 Australians, 2 Belgians and 1 Georgian. According to Ruiz [12], estimated 205,000 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia; and 15,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia. The latest report of UNHCR shows that Ethiopia shelters about 785,322 registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 30 June 2021, which makes Ethiopia the third biggest refugee host country in Africa in the same period. The overwhelming majority originate from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan (see **Figure 6** for details, UNHCR, 2022).

The refugees and asylum seekers are mainly sheltered in 24 refugee camps established in five regional states. But there is a sizeable group of refugees and asylum seekers living out of camp, including over 50,000 people in the capital Addis Ababa. The refugees are concentered in UNHCR-managed refugee camps predominately located in regions like Gambella, Somali, and Tigray, which comprise more than three fourth of refugees living in Ethiopia. The rest of the refugees are dispersed in almost all regions of Ethiopia (see **Figure** 7) [60].


Figure 6.
*Immigrants in Ethiopia. Source: [59].*

Figure 7.
Refugees and Refugee-Hosting Regions in Ethiopia (number and percentage of the total, as of 30 March 2020).
Source: UNHCR's "Operational Portal Ethiopia" at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/eth.

Unlike the recent emigration of Ethiopians, which is based on escaping poverty and finding employment, immigration into Ethiopia is mostly undertaken in search of protection from political instability and conflicts in the region. The main cause for the immigration into Ethiopia from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea was the armed conflicts within and across the cross border of these countries. Ethiopia attracts low economic international migrants due to its low economic performance and its own political instability, which often triggers armed conflicts in the country. Nevertheless, it is assumed that economic immigrants live in the country despite the lack of data in this regard. Unlike refugees, economic migrants such as seasonal or temporary migrants across borders are under-studied in the context of Ethiopia. The strong ethnic and social bonds between communities living at borders such as Ethio-Kenya, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Sudan are very strong and believed to result in cross-border livelihood activities despite the existence of national borders. This could outnumber the formally registered refugee volume in Ethiopia, which makes Ethiopia one of the top immigration countries in the Horn and the African continent.

7. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I elaborated on the emigration of Ethiopians in recent decades. I also highlighted historic emigration, and I focused on the emigration since the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, which has triggered waves of emigration. In the chapter, I indicated the United States and Canada as the main destinations for Ethiopian

migrants in North America; Sweden, Germany, and Italy as the top three destinations in Europe; Israel and Saudi Arabia as major destinations in the Middle East; and Sudan, Kenya, and South Africa as the main destination of the African continent. I also showed that women emigrants outnumber males, opposing the international migration trends in the region and at the international level. In the chapter, I also discussed the main migration routes in which most irregular or undocumented emigration takes place. In the last section, I discussed immigration into Ethiopia. In this section, I showed that immigration into Ethiopia is refugee driven and dominated by refugees from neighboring countries.

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Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria

Molobe Ikenna Daniel, Odukoya Oluwakemi and Yesufu Victoria Oluwasola

Abstract

Background: This study examined the context of drug use and trafficking in irregular migration among identified Nigerian-returned migrants from Libyan detention centers in the transit or destination along the Mediterranean irregular migratory route. Method: Population of study utilized sample size of 382 (238 males and 144 females). Participants' recruitment employed the use of snowballing and judgmental sampling. Data were collected with interviewer-administered question-naire, and supplemented through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and case study. Result: The summary of the findings revealed that most participants were smuggled (97.9%) and trafficked (96.6%). Drug use in migration was 61.3% prevalent among the participants. Frustration and trauma were the leading cause of drug use among migrants. About 15.7% of the participants trafficked drugs on migration and 28% among those that trafficked drugs had experience of arrest for drug trafficking (in Libya). The study also discovered that some of the migrants who got into drug trafficking were to raise money for survival, while some were compelled into the busi-ness. Conclusion: Drug use and drug trafficking are prevalent in irregular migration. The findings of this study draw attention to evaluate interventions to reduce drug use and trafficking among irregular migrants.

Keywords: irregular migration, drug use, drug trafficking, Libya, Nigeria

1. Introduction

The increasing rate of unemployment, political instability and conflicts in Nigeria resulting to irregular migration of both young men and women has become a worrying concern. Unemployment rate in Nigeria increased to 18.80% in the third quarter of 2017 from 16.20% in the second quarter of 2017. Unemployment rate in Nigeria averaged 10.63% from 2006 until 2017 [1, 2]. Of concern is the linkage between the high unemployment rate of Nigerians between

the ages of 18–30 and the high rate of poverty and social malaise presently affecting the nation.

Young men and women are misinformed for opportunity of getting better job outside the country. These young people end up in the wrong hands of organized recruiters who facilitate their business outside the country [3]. In Nigeria, irregular migrants heading north were overwhelmingly male and in the 20 to 30 year age bracket. Although the proportion of women is generally considerable (about 40% female/60% male), most were single, and some had completed secondary schooling, while about 12.5% were college graduates [3]. Faced with limited channels to migrate regularly, migrants and asylum seekers often embark on irregular and dangerous journeys, during which they often become extremely vulnerable [3, 4]. Some of these migrants are introduced into drug trafficking while most of them face hardship in transit or final destination [5–8].

Europe has become one of the major continents with high rate of irregular migrants from Nigeria [7, 8]. The reasons for which these migrants enter the European Union are various and complex: to flee conflict, political instability, violence and/or persecution; poverty; in search of study or work opportunities; or out of a desire to reunite with family members who are already in the European Union [3].

Based on the International Organization for Migration (IOM) report [3], over 1 million migrants entered Europe in 2015 through the Mediterranean Sea and the journey has been far from safe, and there are reports of worsening exploitation and abuse during migrant journeys, particularly in Libya which also informed this research to address return-migration from Libya. The demographics of migrant flows to Europe are also changing, with a greater representation of more vulnerable groups such as women and children [3].

Irregular migrants may be at risk for substance use for reasons including coping with traumatic experiences, pre-and post-migration stress, co-morbid mental health disorders, acculturation challenges, and social and economic inequality [9, 10].

In transnational migration, irregular migrants and drug trafficking organizations are contributing to a growing drug problem in the society. Irregular migrants including the returning immigrants can be introduced to drugs and drug use practices, and contributes to the creation of a drug use culture within these communities. The drug cartels have aggressively targeted these communities because of availability of money, existing drug use, a drug use culture, and the breakdown of traditional deterrents to substance abuse [6].

This study assessed the returned migrants from Edo and Delta states of Nigeria who have returned from Libya. and their irregular migration experiences, involvement in drug use and drug trafficking, and the prevalence of drug use and drug trafficking among this community.

2. Study method

2.1 Description of the study population

This study is a cross-sectional descriptive study which was conducted among identified returned migrants residing in Edo and Delta states of Nigeria. The study population is restricted and limited to returned migrants from Libya. Thus, Libyan

returnees were the main subject and focus of the study, and these are returned migrants from Libyan detention centers and urban areas in the transit or destination along the Central Mediterranean irregular migratory route. The participants selected were those who returned from Libya to Nigeria between May 2017 and April 2018, and have had reunion with their families or undergone reintegration program.

2.2 Sampling technique

The research sampling technique adopted the use of judgemental sampling and snowball sampling method. The participants were recruited in Edo and Delta State where there are high populations of returned migrants according to International Organization for Migration (IOM) [11] report. The questionnaire was administered to 382 subjects derived from sample size estimation of this study.

2.3 Data collection and procedure

The study employed mixed method of quantitative and qualitative data collection. The participants were interviewed for quantitative data with a structured anonymous questionnaire designed by the author for collection of information which was administered directly by trained enumerators. Through non-probabilistic purposeful sampling, 10 volunteer returned migrants who have been involved in drug use/trafficking were interviewed and it was ensured that important elements were selected to participate in the interview. Attention was focused in selecting participants from diverse groups that represent the community, such as irregular migrants, smuggled migrants, and trafficked persons. Case study was conducted where the study examined 10 cases of selected irregular migrant victims (anonymous volunteers) who have diverse and deeper revealing stories and experiences as a person who uses drugs and is or was a drug trafficker/peddler. Snowball technique was employed in selection of the subjects (5 volunteers for drug trafficking and 5 volunteers for drug use). For this study, the definition of a case is "any migrant returnee who has been a victim of irregular migration with drug trafficking or drug use during their migration period". However, stories that were best fitted and relevant to the objectives of the study were selected for this report. Focus group discussions were conducted for selected identified returned migrants who are or have been victims of drug use and drug trafficking in irregular migration. A total of four focus group discussion sessions were conducted; two male sessions and two female sessions in the Edo and Delta states.

3. Study results

3.1 Socio-demographics of the study participants

Male persons constitute the highest of the study participants representing 62.3%. In other words, most of the migrant participants in the study were males while 37.7% participants were female returned migrants. Educationally most of the participants (67.8%) had only secondary school level education. It is of interest to know that those with higher educational level account for 14.9% of the study population of which 5% were graduates. Marital status shows that most of the returned migrants (59.2%) were single while others were married (28%), separated (9.4%), divorced (2.1%) or widowed (1.3%). The average age of the returned migrants (participants) for this

survey is approximately 30 years with a standard deviation of 5.973 while the age group 26–30 years was the most dominant among the study population.

4. Irregular migration context

4.1 Route of migration

As the study revealed, the road was the main route of migration by all of the participants. Forty percent (40.1%) had already entered the Mediterranean Sea but were either stranded or caught on the sea and consequently could not cross to Europe or conclude their journey to their anticipated country of destination. None of the participants used air as a means in their travel.

4.2 Participants anticipated country of destination

In terms of the country to which the participants anticipated to migrate for a new living, this study revealed several countries in Europe and a few countries in North Africa. Italy was the most frequent with 36.9% among the participants followed by Libya (23.6%). Germany (18.1%) and France (11.3%) also recorded high response among the participants.

4.3 Transit countries

It was observed that Niger was a major route and transit country for illegal migration. All of the study participants passed through the Niger boarder and also had a stopover in Niger. The major stopover cities in Niger were Agadez and Zinder along the desert area. Other major transit country discovered in the study was Chad (35.1%). Libya (78%) was the major transit for those traveling to Europe.

Citation from in-depth interview;

I traveled for the first time through Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali to Morocco and was caught in Morocco when I wanted to cross to Europe, and I came back and passed through Niger to Libya and was caught in Libya before I was brought back to Nigeria – female respondent.

4.4 Migration status of the study participants

Most of the study participants (96.3%) did not possess legal travel documents while crossing the boarders illegally. Most were smuggled (97.9%) and trafficked (96.6%) into other countries during the migration: as the study participants revealed, most of those smuggled from one country to another were also trafficked at some point during their migration. Those smuggled were migrants for whom their network recruiters illegally facilitated their entry into another country, while those trafficked were exploited by traffickers for the purpose of force labor or commercial exploitation.

Citation from in-depth interview;

I do not have the legal papers to travel, we were subjected to all kinds of hardship because we were not properly prepared for the travels because there was no document – male participant.

5. Migrants and drug use

The study participants' views were assessed to know if they believe that irregular migrants can get involved in drug use during their migration. Most of the participants (370) (96.9%) had the belief that migration circumstances and settings can influence someone to use and abuse drugs. In other words, most of the returned migrants are of the opinion that drug use and abuse could be consequences emanated from conditions of irregular migration and irregular migrants can be at high risk of drugs or substance use. The study further revealed that 234 (61.3%) of the respondents have used drugs during their migration while 38.7% were not involved in any drug use on their migration. Drug use was predominant among migrants in the age group (26–30) accounting for 24.9% of the total study participants. Of the total 234 respondents (61.3%) who reported to have engaged in drug use during migration, about 35 (15%) of them were reported to have been engaged in drug use before leaving the shores of Nigeria. This indicates that a high percentage of the migrants used drugs during their migration.

In terms of educational level, the findings from the study showed that among the total 61.3% of the study participants that engaged in drug use, the majority of them (43%) had secondary education. Only 10% are reported to have primary education, while about 8% of them have tertiary education. The test of significance provides enough statistical evidence to conclude that the level of education is not significantly associated with drug use among participants. (χ^2 = 9.621, df = 4, p-value = 0.522).

Among the participants 234 (61.3%) that use drugs, 124 (52.99%) responded that they became problematic drug users or drug dependent. Only 38 of these 124 persons (30.64%) obtained help in Libya. 10.49% sought professional treatment/psychotherapy while 20.15% discussed their drug use problem with their friends. On further probe the respondents were of the view that addiction help or treatment seeking could not be easy for the irregular migrants and most were held hostage in the transit countries.

5.1 Gender and drug use

The study revealed that among male participants, more than three quarter (71%) of them are involved in drug use, while about 44% among female participants also engaged in drug use. The study further revealed that about 29% of female participants that engaged in drug use are single while their married counterparts accounted for just 6% among the total female participants. Another 9% is reported to be those separated/divorced from their spouses.

5.2 Reasons for drug use in migration

The participants when asked the reason for their drug use during migration, among the 234 respondents that have used drugs, most (49.5%) mentioned 'frustration' as the leading cause of their drug use followed by being 'stranded' which account for 28.5% response and 'trauma' accounting for 24.9% among the participants. Few of the respondents revealed that eagerness to continue the journey (9.4%), peer pressure (6.5%), no employment in the country of migration (3.7%), and introduction to drug business (3.4%) as the factors that led to their drug use. Some participants who shared their experiences stated that they use drugs to make them feel less hungry while some were compelled to use these drugs. Access to drugs was noted to also contribute to the

reason for the drug use among the participants. Complementary information from the focus group discussion revealed that these drugs are sold in the camp or prison in Libya. Examples of these drugs include marijuana, hashish, shisha and tramadol.

Case Study 1: We had a lot of family problems, my father was afflicted with sickness, I had nobody to help me, my mother gave birth to seven children, of whom I am the second. I did not go further with my education; I stopped in primary 6 against all odds and hardship. So owing to the dearth of help I took a decision. I sold my mother's big land so that I could use the proceeds from it to travel. I first traveled to Burkina Faso, but things did not work well for me in that country, so I came back home to meet my family, with nothing to show for my journey. The house my parents lived in collapsed, so we went to live with a family friend, during which we were subjected to all kinds of insults from them. So bad was it that even feeding became a problem. So I decided to migrate to Libya, and from there I embarked on another journey to Italy. It was on top of the Mediterranean Sea that they brought me back to Libya. I was even shot at in Libya by the Arab people, that is why you see me limping. I still feel the pain on my legs, but it is gradually healing. When I was repatriated from the Mediterranean Sea, I was put in prison for 4 months, people were dying, suffering in the prison, no good condition, no good water, nothing. Because of these challenges, they came to help me by bringing me back to Nigeria. In response to my use of drugs, I was not born into the world to start smoking or taking drugs, but it was because of the situation I saw my mother, she is currently blind. In Libya, I smoked different things, from Cigar, to hashish, to marijuana. I was mixing magi (marijuana) with cigar in Libya, to give me inspiration because of the hardship I had been through. I got into drugs because I was frustrated, no good condition, no money and I have children, no house of my own, and no good job. I sold all my things before I went to Libya. I sold my mother's land, and after everything, I have nothing to show for it. So because of too much thinking I take marijuana to cool off all the time. I came back to Nigeria on January 7th 2018, I still take hard drugs such as marijuana because I have no job. I am currently squatting with a friend, I sleep on their chair, despite that I still receive insults from him. My mother is living with one of my in-laws and he is the one paying for my children's school fees, so anytime I remember all these, I indulge more in drugs, but I cannot kill or steal from someone. I cannot allow the influence of the drugs to make me misbehave. Before I left for Libya, I smoked only cigarettes, but I started taking hard drugs when I got to Niger and Libya - [Case Study male participants].

Case Study 2: Right now as I talk to you, I still feel some pain in my chest because of the drugs and smoking and everything. I was frustrated in Nigeria, so I decided to travel to Germany for greener pasture. I began to take drugs from Agadez, these drugs included marijuana, hashish and codeine. After about 1 month and 2 weeks in Agadez, I was taken to Libya. When I got to Libya, I continued taking drugs because I was thinking about so many things in respect of my life, each time I took these drugs I forgot my problems for about 2 hours, but the thinking always returned after a while: I thought about not having money, because I do not want to live in poverty, that was why I decided to leave my country for Germany in search of money, so that I could set up a good business upon my return to Nigeria. Unfortunately, I could not get to Germany, rather I was kidnapped in Libya for 4 months before my family had to look for money and sent to me in Libya. Up till now, we have not been able to pay back that money. After I was released, I started hustling before I entered the Mediterranean Sea. After 14 hours on the Sea, no Italian or German Rescue Team came, but the

Libyan Rescue Team came and took us back to deportation camp; this happened in January 2015. In camp they were bringing drugs like codeine for us to take because of the cold. I became addicted to these drugs after my return to Nigeria, and I still go to buy them whenever I want. Sometimes when I take these drugs I do not get to know where I am, I may even sleep on the road. When I remember all these things, the time wasted, money spent, I become frustrated the more. I came back to Nigeria on February 1st 2018. I do not know who made the arrangement; whether IOM or Federal Government of Nigeria, all I know is that they picked my name in Port Harcourt. I entered Port Harcourt on February 1st and entered Edo on February 4th. I still use these drugs in Nigeria because I cannot do without them. I do not have the money to start up a new business; I am totally frustrated as I am talking to you now. In Nigeria, I take weed, codeine, tramadol. Nobody involved me into drug use, it's just the situation I found myself that made me use drugs. Since I started using these drugs, if I do not take tramadol 500 mg a day, I will not be able to sleep. – [Case Study male participants].

5.3 Migration and illegal activities

Analysis on illegal activities during migration shows that 129 (33.8%) of the participants among the 382 study population were involved in illegal activities during their journey or in the transit countries. Further probe revealed various illegal activities or crime engaged by the participants during migration. Among this, drug business accounts for 50.8% which is the highest in frequency among the illegal activities by the participants, prostitution (among women) and stealing account for 40.7 and 8.5% respectively. Other information gathered during the focus group discussion reavealed that some migrants were involved in kidnapping in cooperation with the Libyans and negotiating a ransom with the captives. Most illegal business actitivies were performed in Libya by the Nigerian migrants. While some engaged in these activities as a means of survival, some were forced into it through trafficking. A respondent said, "As a result of these drugs migrant are recalcitrant, hostile to people, they send us on a mission like to go and rob, but because of the influence of these drugs, we don't see going to rob or other kinds of criminal act as anything because we are on drugs" (*FGD, male participant*). Among the participants involved in illegal business activities or crime during migration, 22% of the participants' illegal businesses have a link to drug use. It should be noted that not all migrant returnees involved in drug business also use drugs as large number of them were forced into drug business and some only do this to raise money and have no interest in taking drugs. On further exploration, the participants talk about drugs being given to them by the traffickers before they embark on stealing or prostitution. But overall there can be no doubt that drug business led some into drug use while possessing the drugs.

Case Study 3: Actually, after finishing school for 4 years in the National Teacher's Institute, I could not get a good job, but I had to be patient with the one I had. I was being paid N5,000 ($13) and there was nothing to show for it. I have younger ones, I am the second in a family of 8, my mother had just one boy and because I am their elder, I had to assist in the schooling of my younger ones. My father is a tailor, while my mother is a tomato seller. Since I was able to finish, they were hoping for me to assist them but that was not forthcoming, so I had to look for a way to make sure my family was stable, When I went to look for work they asked me to pay N200,000 ($555) to fix me in a Government job, but I did not have such money so they asked

me to sleep with them, but I said to myself I rather travel out of the country than do that. That was how I left the country. I had an ECOWAS passport that was given to us to get out of Niger, the name on the passport wasn't ours, we had to bear the name on the passport, which was retrieved from us, so it was a false document. I traveled by road and sea. Actually my plan was to travel to Europe either Germany or Italy, but I was captured on the Blue Sea, we had not gotten to the main sea, the boat was leaking, we had no option on whether to continue or to go back because the boat was just floating and expanding, though nobody died. When we called the rescue team it was the Libyan team that came and I was taken to prison in Libya, because the place was not looking like a deportation camp. At night when the leaders were not there, the Libyan guards would ask us to follow them, of course we could not disobey, and over there they do not use protective materials such as condom, so they had sex with us unprotected. My drug use started when I got to Tripoli, because my connection man (migrant smuggler) whom I was living in his house handed me over to some people and he was no longer in control of me. When we got to Sabratha, a fight broke out. During the gun duel, they killed a Gambian man. I was lucky the bullet did not hit me. I escaped and ran to another ghetto, but I did not know it was a connection house (smuggler's camp). They refused to let me go, and said that I was going to be of great importance to them. I was beaten up until I did what they asked me to do. So I started working there as a prostitute. They put drugs even in the food they gave me. I took such drugs as Magi (marijuana), Hashish and Tramadol. I got addicted to these drugs, so that there were times when if I had not taken them, it would seem as though I was shivering, but I hid it from my parents when I came back to Nigeria. I do go to buy these drugs and once I take them, I will just take tom-tom (candy). I still use drugs after my reintegration in Nigeria. I have not been involved in a treatment program specifically related to my drug use. When my neighbors found out I was taking drugs, they began to make mockery of me, threatening to tell my parents and they looked at me like a prostitute because I came back from Libya, I had to relocate to stay with someone. I am just praying that I overcome my addiction problem, because as a woman I am not supposed to be taking drugs so that my children do not develop a bad impression about me when I get married. In addition, if the Government can give us something tangible to do, then we will not like to go back, but Nigeria is very frustrating. I feel like going back to Libya, that country is good, but it is Nigerians who spoilt it because of their selfish benefits. So I prefer going back because since I came back I have not been able to get a job. – [Case Study female participant].

6. Migrants and drug trafficking

The result of this analysis shows that larger percentage (93%) of the returned migrants that participated in the survey are aware that drug trafficking/peddling is illegal and a crime punishable under the law. Out of the total population of 382 that participated in the survey only 60 (15.7%) of the participants claimed that they trafficked drug during their migration (in Libya or other transit countries) and among them were 40 (10.5%) that also carry these drugs on their way through the journey. In further analysis, it was revealed that 6.3% of the total participants who are in the age group 26–30 years where the most involved in drug trafficking. However, least (1.0%) of the total participants in the age group (41–50 years) are reported to be involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is prevalent among those with secondary

educational level (11%). Though, the test of significance provides enough statistical evidence to conclude that level of education is not significantly associated with drug trafficking among study participants (χ^2 = 2.149, df = 4, p-value = 0.684). Further probes looked into how the migrant trafficked this illegal product across boarder, the participants revealed that the majors ways of doing this is to boycott boarder check through alternative (secret) route or to hide it in a secret place in the migrant luggage, cloths, underwear or bread as many of the participants also claim that they kept this in their body by swallowing the drug while others said they settle for bribing the officer.

Citation from in-depth interview;

Someone that took me from Nigeria to Agadez, the drug he was carrying was too much for him, so he asked me to help him, the drug was wrapped and he asked me to swallow it, which I did, we traveled with it along the way. Until we got to Libya, from time to time if I want to defecate, he will follow me to the toilet and the wrapped drug will come out with my excreta, which he will wash and I will swallow it again, it actually gave me problems in my body system until we got to Libya, I gave the drugs back to him, he did not even compensate me. After spending some weeks with him, he handed me to someone else to continue my journey because he is not traveling to Europe, he only sells drugs in Libya - male participant.

6.1 Gender and drug trafficking

The result shows that among female participants, 4% of them are reported to be involved in drug trafficking, while 23% among their male counterparts are reported to be involved in drug trafficking. The analysis of percentage of female in drug trafficking by marital status revealed that about 1% of total married female participants engaged in drug trafficking. Findings also revealed that not less than 4% of the total female participants that engaged in drug trafficking are separated with their spouses.

Case study 4: In the year 2015, I met a friend who introduced me into drugs, so I started selling Indian hemp and I saw huge profit from the sale of the Indian hemp here in Benin, Nigeria. From there I gathered money to travel to Europe. When I got to Libya, I did not have any more money, I was stranded, so I started selling drugs again through my friend with whom I traveled. But I was caught and deported back to Nigeria. When I came back to Nigeria, I did not quit the business, but I was arrested last month and I had to bail myself. Up till now, I still sell drugs and I also use the drugs. I am looking for a way to do another business that will make me stop the drug business, because I know that drug business is dangerous, I do not know how I can get help to quit selling drugs. I sell Indian hemp, Rophynol, Tramadol and codeine. In Libya, I took these drugs to different ghettos, different camps, and they readily bought them. I stayed in Libya for 1 year and 8 months, before the Government of Nigeria brought me back in February 2018. In Nigeria, whenever they need the drug, they call me on phone and I deliver the drugs for them or they come to my house. My friend who introduced me to drugs traveled to Ghana 3 months ago. Since I came back to Nigeria, I do not know what to do, so I started drug business again, because there are no jobs yet I have to survive.- [Case study male participants].

Case study 5: First of all, my journey to Libya was a case of a friend who introduced me into the idea. While I was in Nigeria he told me his friends went through that route and they succeeded in getting to Europe. I am a father of three children, but I lost one of my sons when I embarked on my journey because of hardship and no job. In

Nigeria, I was trying to get an education and during my National Diploma in 2007 my father died, so I intended to raise money for my education, but that proved abortive, so I could not further my education. So, when my friend came up with the idea of going to Europe, I embraced it, not knowing the risk that was involved. Eventually, I embarked on the journey. When I got to Niger, we were told that a vehicle was coming to take us to Agadez. When I got to Agadez, which took about 2 days, because sometimes we would be in the bush for hours and days. After about 1 week in Agadez, some persons were talking about drugs, so I asked what it was about and they told me it was expensive in Libya when sold. Though I was not interested, but in the desert they told us to get hold of the drugs, and that while the traffickers would be suspected, there would be no security checks for we the passengers. We were told that if we do not do it, we would be left in the desert to die. I had to embrace it because I was not okay financially, so I told myself that if I get involved in the drug business I would be able to raise money to continue my journey, also because of my family that I left at home, at least to put a smile on their faces, give my children a good education and take care of my wife. In the place I found myself in Libya, if you do not sell drugs for the man, you will be in trouble. When I was in the desert, they gave me tramadol and amphetamine to hold inside my bag, and when I got to Libya, I was kept in an uncompleted building for 2 days, no food, and was told that somebody was coming to carry me and collect those drugs from me, without knowing the penalty. When the person came, he was an Arab man, he came with someone who speaks English, so I gave the drugs to him, he told me I would be staying with him for some time until my burger (migrant smuggler) representative comes to take me. I spent about 6 months with him, and nobody came. So, it became a routine, he would give me hashish, tramadol, ogogoro (local gin) to take to a particular spot where people would come and buy. I tried to learn the Arab language at the time so as to communicate well. Sometimes some hoodlums would come and create confusion in the place. On one occasion, I was caught, got terribly beaten and had my ribs dislocated. I still feel pains in my ribs because the injuries have not been properly treated. I trafficked drugs in Libya for about 9 months under duress because I had no money to take care for my needs like: feeding, sending money down to Nigeria, etc. I spent 1 year and 8 months in Libya. It was when my son died that my wife started crying, complaining that I should come back if I cannot get to Europe, but I said to myself if I went back what will I fall back on? I did not have anything. Some of my friends then told me about IOM, that they had a package to help migrants, but I ignored that and gathered some money and went for pushing to Europe, that is crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and this required the sum of about 170,000 Naira, which I paid. After the payment my burger abandoned me and refused to refund my money. I was one of the two people he was supposed to smuggle and the total sum we gave him was about 1.5 million Naira. I am still waiting for him to return my money. When I was pushed to cross the Mediterranean Sea, I spent about 11 hours on the sea before the Libyan Coast Guards came to arrest us as we were waiting for the European Rescue Team, because we were told that when we get into the Mediterranean Sea, the European Rescue Team would come, but we do not know why they did not come after spending 11 hours on the sea. The floater we were using was already weak, but thank God the Libyan Coast Guard came to our rescue and took us to prison. I was in the prison for 3 months and my illegal drug business was still going on. The guy for whom I was selling before I went to the Mediterranean Sea told me he was coming to bail me, but he did not come. So I was neglected, abandoned, until IOM came and asked us if we were willing to go back to our country. I have passed

through pain and hell. I lost my son and I lost the interest of going to Europe. I was missing my family so I had to come back, but here, even the money the government promised us since the 4th of May has not been given to us. It was even my wife who gave me transport this morning. I thank God she is a graduate and doing a menial job. One of my friends died as a result of no proper medical care. My wife and I quarrel everyday because I have no money to run the home. So I am begging the authority to come to my aid, if they do not want to give me the money they promised, they should hand it to my wife, because I do not want to go into any crime. I do not traffick drugs since my return but I take drugs. I can finish two or three packs of marijuana and alcohol in a day, though I know these drugs are harmful to my health but what will I do? I have no option. People died in my presence. - [Case study male participant].

6.2 Reasons for migrants in drug business

The reasons for being involved in illicit drug business during migration were mentioned by the participants in the study who were directly involved in drug business, the most reason stated was to raise money (33%) for their journey followed by compulsion or being forced into drug business (32%) as this was supported by information gotten from the focused group discussion in which many of the migrant claimed that their camp officers and human traffickers put them under threats and compulsion to the drug business. Other major reason for the participants' engagement in drug business was as a result of frustration (3%) and solely for survival i.e. to earn a living (15%). The other remaining participants (17%) involved in the drug business did not give any tangible reasons for their involvement in drug business.

Citation from focus group discussions;

Some of this network recruiters will approach you that they can help you go to Europe, they will charge you 700,000 Naira and you will pay them, but once you get to Agadez in Niger, there will be a disconnect, these recruiters phone numbers will be switched off, then other recruiters will come in and approach you to carry drugs for them, since you do not have money with you, you will agree to do it, poverty, frustration are responsible for drug trafficking, sometimes these recruiters force it on you – male participant.

I deal on drugs, I sell drug to gather money, to travel to Libya, when I got to Libya I continued selling drugs to survive, even after returning to Nigeria, I still deal on drugs even now, just for me to survive - male participant.

6.3 Migrants and category of drug business

In the analysis of the study participants who were involved in illicit drug business, 68% were drug retailers and operate as a small business, 7% were wholesaler and 25% were just carrier in drug business. Most of the participants (70%) do drug business for other people and only get commissions on sales they made and those fall under any of the three category of business (carrier, wholesaler or retailer) while 30% were participants well established in the drug business as owners and make their money for themselves during their migration.

Citation from in-depth interview;

Some of these illegal migrants, their intention is not to cross to Libya but to carry these drugs and get to Libya, sell them and return back to Nigeria. They also recruit boys that want to travel to Europe, but these ones do not know they are into drug business – male participants.

Name of drug	Quantity	Price range (Libyan Dinar)	Euro equivalent
Harshish	0.25 g	10–30 dinar	6.32–18.95 Euro
	1.00 g	50–200 dinar	31.59–126.34 Euro
Marijuana	0.25 g	10–40 dinar	6.32–25.27 Euro
	1.00 g	100–500 dinar	63.17–315.86 Euro
Tramadol	800 mg	10–30 dinar	6.32–18.95 Euro

Table 1.
Price of identified drugs in the illicit market.

6.4 Involvement of law enforcement agents or migrant smugglers/human traffickers in the illicit drug business

Among the study population (382 participants); the analysis of the participants' opinion on the involvement of law enforcement agents in illicit drug trafficking shows that 194 (50.8%) participants were of the opinion that some law enforcement agents (of Nigeria, Niger and Libya) were involved in illicit drug trafficking, while involved in the network recruiters/migrant smugglers/human traffickers in drug 179 (46.9%) participants were of the opinion that network recruiters/human traffickers are involved in drug trafficking. Based on the responses from the focus group discussion the majority of the participants who testify on the involvement of the law enforcement agents in drug trafficking claimed that this was made possible through connection with drug dealers and bribery most especially at the border. However, some of the returned migrants interviewed claimed that they were introduced to drugs by human traffickers and that this was the reason why they disclosed the information while others attest that migrant smuggler are the main people behind drug trafficking. The information gathered from participants portrays that some network recruiters/migrant smugglers/human traffickers bribe law enforcement agents, boycott border check, make use of charm or connection with powerful people in government.

The above table shows the identified prices of the drugs in the illicit market. The price depends on the available market which is within the range as reported in the **Table 1** above.

7. Discussion

The broad objective of this research was to assess drug use and trafficking among returned migrants from Libyan detention centers in the transit or destination along the Mediterranean irregular migratory route. In terms of socio-demographics, this study identified the age bracket 26–30 to constitute the bulk number of participants observed in the study population who also account for most that involved in drug use and drug trafficking in irregular migration. The International Organization for Migration also perceived same age bracket among the irregular migrants population from Nigeria and also identified unemployment and poverty among the push factors in irregular migration of these young persons [3]. The report of the Trade Economics [2] and National Bureau of Statistics [1] established that young people age 18–30 are most affected in unemployment rate of Nigerians and as such, creating social malaise affecting the nation [2].

The findings on drug use in irregular migration indicate that the migrants most of the time get involved into drug use due to frustration and traumatic experience. The findings of Horynaiak et al. [9] and Kennedy [10] buttress on the fact that irregular migrants are vulnerable and thereby may be at risk for drugs and substance use for reasons including coping with traumatic experiences, pre-and post-migration stress, acculturation challenges, and social and economic inequality. In addition, irregular migrants usually witnessed or personally experienced torture, loss of livelihoods and depression [12] which could lead to frustration and trauma, as revealed in this study. As such, the above factors make them vulnerable to drugs and substance abuse, and it is no surprise that the prevalence of drug use is high among this population. As identified in most social research, drug use and drug seeking behaviors could be developed in individuals exposed to frustration and adversity [13] same as faced by irregular migrants. In the perspective of vulnerability, these migrants are undocumented and most were trafficked victims which exposed them to adversity and migration challenges. García [14] and Cook [15] identified in their migration studies that drug trafficking organizations and networks also target at-risk young migrant population turning them into drug consumers, as this study also discovered that some of the migrants got into drug use through involvement in drug business of which they revealed that their recruiters, human traffickers and migrant smugglers were those that introduce them into drug business and these groups also constitute the drug network in the transnational organize crime business.

In relation to the findings on drug trafficking in irregular migration, this study discovered that the migrants also get involved into trafficking or peddling as well as other related crimes during their migration as this occurs through exposure and socialization with fellow migrants who are already used to it before their migration and a large number of the migrant engage in drugs to survive during their mysterious journey. Our findings on returned migrants' involvement in drug peddling or trafficking compliment past researchers' findings indicating relational significance for victims of irregular migration involvement in drug peddling or trafficking. Of particular concern, we found some of the migrants trafficked drug either because of threat or for survival. Findings from our study compliment Palacios [16] in his research work titled 'from victims of trafficking to felons' who identify that people who engaged in irregular migration and human trafficking also abuse drug and they are highly involved in drug peddling through the migrant smuggling network. The high poverty level and low standard of living in Nigeria are among the causes resulting in young people to embark on the illegal migration in searching for greener pastures as findings of this research identified. Our results are similar to the findings of past research by the International Organization for Migration [17] entitled 'Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2009' as well as research paper of Li, Liddell and Nickelson [18] in their research titled 'Relationship between post-migration stress and psychological disorder in refugee and asylum seeker', and the research work of Halili and Ibrahim [19] in their research work titled 'Causes of irregular migration crises, who all have one thing in common as to the causes of irregular migration which are a failure in economic and legal reform, that is the desire for a better standard of living among migrant, to alleviate unemployment and poverty. The finding in this research compliment the findings of past researchers who worked on UNODC [7, 8] research paper titled 'The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrant from west Africa to the European Union', as they concluded that fostering of socio-economic development in the countries experiencing irregular migration such as Nigeria would

help to further reduce demand for smuggling service. Improved border securities and cooperation with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and international border control to reduce security threat and corruption, as well as adopting sustainable measures to amend the lapses on borders such as bribery and smuggling. Overall, emphasis should be to promote regular legal migration. Supporting legal entry into any country ensures safety, worthy livelihood and entitles health benefits or coverage to migrants.

8. Conclusion

In summary, findings from this study show high prevalence of drug use among the irregular migrant population which draws attention to the need to understand the epidemiology of drugs and substance use particularly among persons who fall victim to deception, coercion, human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Experience of migration stress, trauma and frustration were among the factors that contribute to drug use. The study also discovered that some of the migrants get in to the drug business mainly to raise money for survival while some are forced in to the business. Findings shows that most persons involved in drug business were either introduced or influenced either by the migrant smuggler or the human trafficker as most of the returned irregular migrants operated as a retailer or carrier in the drug business which means that they are doing business for other strong stakeholders. Some of the returned irregular migrants also claimed the involvement of human recruiter, human trafficker and law enforcement agent in illicit drug peddling/trafficking and drug business. Efforts to develop and evaluate interventions to reduce drug trafficking and related issues among irregular migrants within the study route should be of priority importance.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 9

Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries

Dulo Nyaoro

Abstract

The current migration of Africans to Europe and North America evokes trepidation and fear among citizens of European countries and their counter parts in the Americas. Despite clear lack of objectivity the migration discourses, continue to frame and condition migration policy responses and governance. What Landau calls "moral panic" at the foundation of this discourse. While it is true, a sizable number of Africans are fleeing political persecution and violence in their home countries, a big proportion is perceived to be looking for economic opportunities (greener pastures) to better their lives and that of their kin. The dominant narratives of failed states and debilitating poverty as the drivers of migration ignore the possibilities that it could be similar economic and social transformations that caused European migration to Africa and other parts of the World in the 19th Century. Here in we argue that a simplistic conclusion about poverty as the main driver of African migration does not reflect the complete reality, that socio-economic transformation and not poverty per se are the main drivers of African emigration not dissimilar to what Europe went through in the 19th Century.

Keywords: migration, Africans, Europe, transformations, policies

1. Introduction

1.1 Conceptualizing migration

While there is a general consensus that migration involves movement and crossing of borders there is no agreement on the time frame which marks the end of migration. For this reason, migration is conceptualized from different lenses depending on the dominant interests. International Organization for Migration (IOM) contends that migration refers to the movement of a person or people from their place of usual residence whether within a country or across international borders, either temporarily or permanently for various reasons. This definition of course opens many avenues for contentious debates. It assumes that we agree on what international borders are and whether they can be readily identified which is not often the case. The other doubtful assertion is the place of usual residence. In our transnational existence it has become debatable to what one would define as usual residence. Again when we examine

reasons for migration, some people would object that some reasons and not ground for migration ([1], ([2], p. 4), [3], ([4], p. 167)).

Migration can be conceptualized and analyzed from different perspective. First it seen as a human mobility that transcends some forms of boundaries whether such boundaries are political, administrative or even ethnic. We can choose to look at migration from the causes and drivers of migration in which case there will be economic and labour migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, expatriates and others. From a legal perspective we would have legal and illegal migrants. That is people whose movement is approved by the state and those whose movement is not accepted. In our present world there are so many cleavages when conceptualizing migration that we cannot fit all of them in any assay [5]. For our purposes here, we look at African-European migration nexus from both a historical perspective and as a function of past and present political economy of different states. Of necessity such a discussion will privilege the role of the state without ignoring salient issues of nationalism, race and religion.

2. Theorizing international migration

For better understanding of international migration generally and Africa migration to Europe we will refer to the world systems theory as espoused by [6] which views migrations as obvious consequences of agricultural economic globalization driven by capitalism and segmented labour market theory [7].

2.1 World systems theory

This theory is attributed to Wallerstein [6] and offers a macro level-analysis and explanation of international migration based on agricultural capitalism. Wallerstein viewed the globe as an economic system. His major concern is with the unequal political and economic distributions which results in stratified economic system. The world systems theory holds that the penetration of capitalist agricultural economy fundamentally transforms non-capitalist agricultural economies in several ways.

The system divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries and the periphery countries. Core countries are characterized by capital intensive production and the rest of the world focus on low capital and labour production and extraction of raw material. Because of the inequality in the global economic systems poor countries are trapped in their disadvantaged positions within unequal geopolitical structure which compounds their poverty. The forces of globalization have exacerbated underdevelopment within the countries in the periphery.

The penetration of capitalist economic relations into non capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate. Motivated by the need for higher profits and greater wealth, owners of capital in core countries venture into poorer nations in the periphery of the world economy in search of land, raw materials, labour, and consumer markets. During the mercantile and industrial capitalism colonial administrations aided these ventures.

The expansion of commercial agriculture requires land consolidation and different land tenure system which entails displacement of population. Agricultural production requires labour inputs such as fertilizers and pesticide, such a system displace people and transform established forms of subsistence forms of economic production and social relationships. Introduction of cash crops destroys social and economic

relations based on subsistence. Instead of reciprocity, collective labour and social trust, transactional relationship are established and social ties severed which results in uprooted population who are likely to move in search of wage employment because core countries encourage private capital to invest in these developing countries they seek to protect such capital through deploying of military forces resulting into proxy wars and displacement, these often triggers migration into different directions.

The same logic applies to extraction of raw materials that requires industrial methods that rely on paid labour. This creates labour markets based on new conceptions of individualism, private gain and social change. Establishment of foreign owned factories triggers rural urban migration as it undermines locally produced goods. The displaced labour becomes mobile and likely to move in search of employment. The same process economic processes attract workers to migrate to developed economies. The migration of Europeans to other parts of the World can be partially explained by the transformation that took place when common lands were consolidated and privatized. The same case applies to the economic transformations in Africa and the subsequent deployment of global economic structure.

2.2 Segmented labour market theory

This theory was propounded by Michael Piore [7] who unlike the systems theory and neoclassical theorist sought to explain the pull rather than push factors of migration. He argues that international migration actual stems from the internal labour demands of modern industrial societies. While acknowledging that there may be push factors such as low wages and high unemployment in sending countries, Piore points out that migration is only possible because of pull factors such as the need for low wage workers in receiving countries which is attributed to four related reasons, including structural inflation, structural motivation, duality of labour and ethnic economic enclaves.

2.2.1 Structural inflation

It is argued that wages not only reflect condition of supply and demand but confers status and social prestige. There are perceptions of social qualities that exist in jobs that wages are attached. In different social and labour context people tend to believe that wages should reflect social status, meaning that a majority of people there is a correlation between occupational status and wages or salaries. As a result, wages paid by employers are not entirely free to respond to fluctuations in the supply of labour. A combination of domestic social expectations and formal institutions such as labour unions, civil societies, labour laws and job classifications ensure that pay corresponds to the social status that people perceive and expect. Belaid and Slany [8] have discussed structural transformations in Africa and migration [9].

Employers for example cannot simply raise wages in order to attract unskilled workers at the bottom of occupational hierarchy. This due to the fact that raising wages would upset socially defined relationships between status and remuneration. It therefore follows that increasing wages for those at the bottom of the employment ladder would also entail increasing wages proportionately for those above to maintain this relationship which is Piore [7] calls *structural inflation*. This is costly and disruptive for employers and often they are unwilling to do it. Cheaper alternative is therefore to import or accept migrant workers who may be willing to accept low wages.

2.2.2 Structural motivation

Structural motivation concept is related to structural inflation because of social construction of jobs and wages. People not only work to get income but also to achieve certain degree of social status. The unskilled jobs at the bottom of job hierarchies result into motivational problems because there is no social status to be accumulated or maintained. The fact that the motivation problem cannot be removed makes a structural issue because even mechanization which may eliminate the lowest and least desirable class of jobs simply creates another bottom class. This then compels employers to look for workers who are looking for jobs to get income rather than accumulate social status. Migrants who are mostly target earners meet employers' requirement for lower wages. Given the difference in living standards in developed and developing countries, low wages in developed countries are often significant income in home countries and make social and economic difference. Because migrant workers are not socially embedded in the host countries they are willing to take these low paying jobs. As members of their own communities back at home remittances sent carry honor and prestige [7]. This argument applies to African migrants as much as it applies to migrants from other developing countries to Western Europe, the Oil rich Gulf States and North America.

2.2.3 Duality of labour and capital

The duality of labour and capital is attributed to the fact that capital is a fixed factor of production that can be idled during lower demands but cannot be laid off which compels owners of capital to bear the cost of idleness [7, 10]. Labour on the other hand is a variable factor which can be laid off when demand declines. Workers are ultimately forced to bear the cost of their own idleness. In economic terms, this means that capital intensive methods of production are used to meet basic demands while labour intensive methods are used to meet fluctuating demands [11].

Piore opines that this duality creates distinction among workers because those in the capital intensive primary sector get stable and skilled jobs, working with best technology and tools. Employers often consider such cadre of workers as part of capital because of their skill and knowledge. Furthermore, such workers tend to belong to labour unions or have contracts that compel employers to meet the cost of idleness. It is therefore expensive to lay them off. In the labour intensive sector, workers occupy unstable and unskilled jobs with low wages. These are the jobs that are often referred to as triple 'D' jobs (Dirty, Degrading and Dangerous). Such workers can be laid off any time with minimal or no cost at all. This results in a segmented labour market where you have native workers who are drawn to the capital intensive sector where there are better wages, secure terms of employment and social status. The secondary segment has low wages, unstable conditions and lack of mobility that do not attract native workers. Meet the short fall created in the secondary sector; employers often turn to migrant workers.

2.3 Ethnic enclave economies

Ethnic enclaves are economic zones created by pioneer migrants, which are often in the secondary sector of labour market. They are characterized low status jobs, low pay, instability and wretched working conditions. Such jobs are avoided by native workers but provide immigrants with much needed economic returns, education,

experience and entry into the labour market. Enclave economies are likely to grow if pioneer migrants have significant financial, social and cultural capital. If their businesses are successful they are likely to attract immigrants from their home countries who do not mind engaging in low paying jobs. In addition, it is observed that concentration of co-ethnics creates demand for specialized cultural products and ethnic migrants are often in a better position to provide such products and services.

Initially the duality of labour and capital, structural inflation and structural motivation was off-set by the employment of teenagers, women and newly arrived rural–urban migrants. This is because for a long time women were not viewed as primary bread winners so their social status was not based on the jobs they had but that of their families. However, this has changed and now many women are employed on their own rights. Teenagers took such jobs because they were considered temporary employment. They expected to get better jobs after finishing school or college. Moreover, teenagers derive their social status from their parents. Four interrelated factors have all but wiped away this supply of labour in developed countries. First urbanization has eliminated rural urban migration, decline in birth rates and the rise in female labour. This has significantly created demand for immigrant labour in developed countries.

These theories speak to some of the drivers of migration all though not single one can completely explain the complex phenomenon of migration. While world system theory is a macro explanation of economic transformation that takes place in the cause of expansion of capitalism, it fails to explain individual choices that people make when migrating. It also does not explain the pull factors of migration. Segmented labour market theory is quite strong on pull factors but is sketchy on push factors that enable migration. For these reasons, this chapter make use of both the theories to explain the different aspect of international migration.

3. Major migration epochs

When discussing current migration trends, commentators both in the academy and policy circles, present it as a new phenomenon that the need new and creative ways to manage. Yet migration is as old as human beings [12]. Humans have come to populate different parts of the world simply because of the ability to migrate from time to time and to adapt to new geographical and climatic conditions. While European migration to Africa during colonial period was different, historical accounts show that it was not new and that Europeans migrated to North Africa running away from poverty, overcrowding and conflicts. North Africa and the Maghreb offered sanctuary where they lived and traded for many years long before colonial capitalism [13].

The mercantile and colonial related migration of Europeans was however different. European migration to Africa and Africans forced migration to America and Europe from the 16th century was purely function of various forms of capitalism ranging from plantation/agrarian to post-industrial capitalism. Authors notably Douglas Massey [10], Castles et al. [14] have pointed out that modern history of international migration can be divided into four discernible periods including: The mercantile period (1500–1800); Industrial revolution period (1845–1924) Economic globalization (1800–1929), Post-industrial migration 1960s. An analysis of each of these periods supports the claims we make here that capitalism was and is still central to migration trends and the attempts at managing and governing international migration.

3.1 The mercantile period

This period lasted for about 300 years was characterized by out flows of migrants from Europe and Africa related to processes of colonization and economic growths under mercantile capitalism [15]. Mercantilism was based on the idea that a nation's prosperity and was best served by increasing by increasing export and reducing imports. The underlying assumption was that the global wealth is static and a nation's strength will be based on the ability to supply capital [16]. Because of the nationalistic nature of mercantilism nations frequently used military interventions to further their own interests. Given the long period of mercantile capitalism and development in maritime transport, Europeans managed to occupy large parts of Americas. Although accurate number does not exist, the outflows was signification enough to allow European to establish domination over large parts of the world. At this time, European migrants were composed of agrarian settlers, administrators, artisans and entrepreneurs who founded plantations as well as convicts sent to penal colonies [10].

These entrepreneurs founded plantations which had profound impact of Africa's migration out of the Africa continent. This because the most important source of plantation labour was the forced migration of Africa slaves [17, 18]. It is estimated that in excess of 10million African slaves were transported to different parts of Americas to provide labour.

The point to be made here is that economic and social transformation was driving the emigration of European. Changing land tenure and usucruf which caused the enclosure protests was part of the reason people were leaving. The disruptions caused by these transformations account for crop production failures and the concomitant search for new lands and economic opportunities by European peasants. For example, over 1 million Irish moved out of Ireland during the potato famine. Social relations and people relations with property were breeding a new class of people (land barons) while disenfranchising others. Of course this is characteristic of capital accumulation. However, for those who ventured outside Europe and founded plantations in the Americas, they were compelled to search for cheap labour that could only be provided by the crudest form of capitalism, the forced enslavement of Africans while disseminating native population.

3.2 The industrial revolution period

Massey [10] estimates that at the beginning of industrial revolution which overlapped with mercantile period (1846–1924) 48 million people moved out of Europe with Britain alone sending 41% of its population out followed by Norway at 36%, and Portugal30%. Lucassen [19] estimates that about 60 million people left Europe during this period. It is noteworthy that among the European countries with highest economic growth sent 41% of its population. Emigration was therefore not necessarily a negative process. Industrialization changed modes of production, previous relationships that were structure around land owners and tenants and motivated young people to move to urban areas and to coal mines. People who could not adjust to the quickly transforming modes of production sought to replicate what they knew else. In part of East and Southern Africa, Europeans were actively encouraged to transfer their farming knowledge, thus a sizable number of European settlers occupied Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia.

3.3 First phase of economic globalization

The period from around 1800 to 1929, marked the first phase of economic globalization whose central features was the massive flows of capital, raw materials and goods between different continents including Europe, the Americas and Asia [10]. The incorporation of nations in this expanding global economy also created structures and motivation for large scale human movement. Although many European migrants did not come to Africa, but the very economic transformation caused them to emigrate to the America, Australia, Canada and Argentina.

Three events disrupted this European emigration. The First World War that continued up to 1920, followed by the great depression of 1929/30 and finally the outbreak of WWII. These events had profound effect on economic globalization and nationalism. For example the WWII split the world into two competing ideological and economic spheres.

3.4 Post industrial migration

This phase of international migration is different from the above three. Beginning in the 1960s Europeans no longer dominated international migration as reverse flows commenced with migrants coming from developing countries to industrialized countries of European, people were moving from less industrialized and less populated areas into industrialized and highly derange spaces ([10], p. 5) even though there were cases of people fleeing conflicts international migrants was dominated by migrants from rapidly developing countries including Mexico, China, Pakistan and the Philippines.

3.5 Second globalization phase

Currently the world has witnessed extensive flows of capital goods, raw materials and formats permitted by the end of the cold war and the integration of a significant segment of world population in the global market place, this is particularly true of china Russia and African countries: the later having been embroiled in cold war contests as satellite status. However as will be explained later globalization under pined by capitalism and supported by deliberation had a structural effect on internal migration on very restrictive terms.

4. African migration, myths versus facts

As we mentioned at the beginning African migration is coached in myths, sensationalism which also serves to criminalize and degrade migration which in our argument is a very normal human process [12]. The first myth that characterizes the present African migration to Europe is that there is mass movement of Africans swamping Europe. In reality this is not the position. First; the global migration trend has not shown any considerable hike in the period 1990–2020 in global migration leave alone that of Africans. The population of migrants only increased from 2.9% to 3.6% as share of world population of 7 billion people. This translates to just about 270 million people while African population estimated at 1.2 billion. It is also estimated that only 3.0% of African population live outside their home countries compared to 8.5% of European population [20]. This is no way paints the picture of mass migration as claimed by the media and hysterical right wing politicians in Europe.

While there is an increase of migration by Africans, much of it is dominated by intra-Africa migration. It is recorded that since 2010 Intra African migration has increased by 43.6% compared to 26% of Africans migrating to Europe. The total number of African migrants by 2020 is estimated to be 40.6 million which is only 14.5% of the global migrants' population. Asia for example accounts for 41% of global migrant population while Europeans accounts for 22.5% much higher than African migrants [20].

Just like many European migrants in the earlier part of the 19th century who migrated for search of better economic prospects, most African moving to Europe are looking for better economic opportunities, they are not looking for welfare as is widely believed. The profile of those Africans reaching Europe attests to this reality. They are young people educated and skilled looking for jobs not handouts. It is estimated that 50% of such migrants from Africa are young educated women.

The perception that all African refugees and asylum seekers are headed to Europe is also not true. Only 27% of the world refugees arrive in Europe and Africans constitute only 7.2% of this figure. Most African migrants actually tend to remain in their regions; this is why Uganda Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan hosts almost 3.5 million refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi [21].

4.1 Irregular verses regular migration

It is worth noting that unlike most European citizens believe, 80% of African migrant population to Europe use regular means. Even though diminishing regular migration channels drive some Africans to undertake dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, most migrations from Africa to Europe remain regular and safe. Froatex, the European border agency recorded 40,000 irregular migrants from Africa in 2019–2020 but this contributed less than 10% of regular migration to Europe during the same period. This contradicts the perception that most Africans reaching Europe use only irregular means. This also implies that there are good reasons which permit African migrants to get visas and other migration documents from European governments.

4.2 Africans migrants as pests

It is widely perceived that African migrants are a burden to social services in their host countries such as health care and housing. Facts do not confirm this position, going back to our earlier explanation on segmented labour; African migrants provide critical labour to some of the important sector. European aging population and social perception above certain jobs create room for migrant labour. In many European countries for example African migrants constitute significant proportion of health care work force as well as in the service industry.

4.3 Migration as a zero-sum game

In popular discourse, migration of Africans to Europe is presented as a zero sum game where Africans stand to gain while Europeans have everything to lose. Emotive issues such socio-social welfare benefits, jobs, housing, education opportunities are fronted as those that Africans will gain from. But subjective matters such as race, identity and diversity and cultural preferences are never far away. However, reality

is not that linear. There are losses and gains on both sides. Given that many African migrants reaching Europe are young, educated and skilled, there is a problem of brain-drain in sending countries even if such people tend to send significant sums of money as remittances back home. Study of data from 50 African countries by Belaid and Slany [8] confirms that skilled labour contributes to the development of hosting and receiving countries.

The case of health care in Germany is illustrative of how receiving countries gain. In 2020 (13.7%) of all doctors in Germany were migrants with Africans accounting for (8%). African migrants are therefore not just a burden to social services but active contributors. What sending countries forgo in human resources is also replaced in terms of remittances. For example, in countries such as Cote-de Voire, Rwanda and South Africa, migrants contribute over 10% to the GDP, with Cote de Voire (19%) Rwanda (13%) and South Africa (10%). This underscores the point that given opportunities to migrate formally migrants can contribute even more towards the host country economy and that of the country of origin.

4.4 Economic status in Africa

Africa has a very young population which is not matched by employment opportunities and better economic prospects. The neo liberal global economic systems constrain economic growth in many African countries. Africa still remains producer of raw materials and it is no wonder the youth are following these raw, materials to participate in the processing in European capitals [22, 23].

It is estimated that around 60% of Africa's population is younger than 25 years of age, a scenario to that UNDESA projects is likely to contribute for above 30 years on the other hang European youth are declining by 24.7% which means European will require migrant labour to fill this gap [24].

5. European response

Because of the 'moral panic' about Africans migration to Europe, European governments have developed an array of responses including moral exclusion, externalization of European boundaries, sponsoring containment programmes including attempts to economic development countries that are perceived to major senders. However, there is no evidence that all these actions are bearing fruits.

5.1 Moral exclusion

European countries have adopted both soft and hard forms of exclusion. Moral exclusion is the most potent of all of them where African migrants. Moral exclusion starts by the development of exclusive moral economies which entails the 'production, distribution, circulation and use of moral sentiments, emotions and values and norms and obligations in the social space' ([25] in [26], p. 5).

Within the moral economy framework, rules of fairness condition the general conduct of people towards each other [26, 27]. On the basis of the prevailing moral economy there are those included and those excluded. In moral economy, moral inclusion those who are inside and are therefore deserving of just and fair treatment [27]. This then frames how those included should be treated and those excluded should fair.

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Moral exclusion on the other hand connotes those who are outside the boundaries of fairness and considerate treatment. Those excluded from fair treatment are therefore outside everyday moral concerns and can be subjected to deprivation, exploitation, harassment and other inhuman and degrading treatment. When such treatments are meted to outsiders are seen as justified as normal and can either be ignored or tolerated [26]. African migrants in Europe largely belong to the people who are actively being excluded from the moral economy of inclusion. First, they are labeled as people fleeing poverty or failed states who only have their governments to blame and not seek sanctuary in Europe. Terms such as bogus asylum seekers, illegal migrants and economic migrants are used to justify exclusion. This is then fortified by actions such as denial of visas, refugee status or deportation which then completes the exclusion.

5.2 Epistemic exclusion

Related to the above moral exclusion there is an on-going epistemic exclusion of African migrants from. Epistemic framing of Africans in Europe has acquired exclusionary undertones both public domain and policy domains. According to Landau [4] there is epistemological reorientation which portrays African as migratory threat to European and African states sovereignty and control. While African states meekly accept this situation, their European counter parts has responded by adopting strategies that that disconnect Africans from global imagination while localizing their desires ([4], p. 170). Development in Africa has now assumed new meaning. Rather than development to be seen as a bettering people's lives it is now seen as deterrence to migration to Europe. Due to the desire by Europeans states to exclude Africans from global mobility, they are in effect excluding Africans from global membership and political freedoms. This has allowed European governments to externalize migration policies without facing any political backlash at home.

5.3 Deterrence development

Since there is widespread belief that it is poverty that is the root cause of Africans migration to Europe, the only way to halt the mass movement is to help African governments to reduce poverty. This can only be done by developing those poor African countries. So instead of Africans being attracted to Europe which is already developed, development should be taken to the potential African migrants are [4]. Landau opines that this deterrence development which includes now frames how the two continents relate [4]. Joint initiatives including cooperation agreements, new funding instruments and conditionalities are spearheaded and financed by European Union geared towards stopping Africans from going to Europe. The containment initiative has three parts. First is the direct conditionalities given to African governments if they collaborate in stopping irregular migration. The second part is the redefinition of what successful development is. Success of development is not measured in terms of GDP or per capita income but addressing the causes of migration to Europe. Thirdly assistance to African is now premised on stopping all mobility from the continent. This thinking is grossly misplaced. Countries that contribute the highest number of African migrants such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana South Africa are relatively developed. Indeed, Nigeria and South Africa are the two biggest economy in the continent while Kenya and Ghana are considered low middle income countries. These countries also top the continent in terms of education and skills training.

6. Conclusion

Past migration accounts demonstrate how migration is largely linked to economic and social transformations in both sending and receiving countries. While European economies are developed and able to meet most of the basic needs of her citizens, the aging population has to be complemented by migrant labour but this could create both racial and cultural composition of European countries. Although international migration will remain emotive for the foreseeable future, this piece contends that it will likely continue given the propensity of human beings to move for economic reasons or for leisure or simply to run away from life threatening circumstances. Migration theories have attempted to explain the pull and push factors the frame migration, yet we still do not really understand the complexities and consideration that go into migration decision making. Finally, we have tried to demonstrate here that African migration to Europe is not unique or new. The reasons that drove millions out of Europe are being experienced by African countries. The response by European countries may stem migration in the short run but in the long run it will not stop population movement.

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Section 4

Some Thoughts Relating to the United States of America

Slovenian Settlements in the USA since 1870s till Present

Matjaž Klemenčič and Milan Mrđenović

Abstract

Ethnic settlements represent cities or parts of them where one of the ethnic organizations are or were present, i.e., ethnic parish, national homes, or at least one fraternal organization. This is a result of the long historic processes which took place after a certain group immigrated. It normally took more than 10 years before a settlement is established and they lasted until another group prevailed or the members of community assimilated. Nevertheless, the traces of the remnants of these communities can be found also more than a century after these settlements were established. There were 800 cities, towns, and villages where Slovene settlements were established. The first was Ebeneser in Georgia. It was erased in the civil war. St. Stephen was established 150 years ago and there are still people who know their ancestry. We recently discovered that a Slovene flag was flown at the cemetery. The second largest Slovenian city worldwide after World War 1 was Cleveland, OH and the city with the largest percentage of Slovenian population in the USA is Ely, MN where more than half of the population has Slovene ancestors. Slovenian Americans were successful also in professional life and in politics.

Keywords: ethnicity, settlement, ethnic parishes, national homes, fraternal organizations

1. Introduction

An ethnic settlement represents a part of a settlement with a concentrated settlement core of an ethnic community, in which at least one of the ethnic organizational structures existed: a lodge of fraternal benefit society, a Slovene or a national home of another ethnic group, a Slovene or of another ethnic group's or mixed Catholic or Evangelical ethnic parish or a mosque and/or the editorial office of an ethnic newspaper. Of course, we distinguish between larger and smaller ethnic settlements, and this definition is very broad and also allows us to classify as places of ethnic settlements of a certain ethnic community also places that have only a single lodge or publish an ethnic newspaper in it, which sometimes depends on the place of the issuer of the print publication or online publication ([1], pp. 613–622).

This is a result of the long historic process which took place after a certain group immigrated. It normally took more than 10 years before a settlement is established and it lasted until another group prevailed or the members of the community

assimilated. This applies to virtually all communities that have settled in the United States since the Mayflower Pilgrims. Even the first settlers in the United States had to deal with similar problems as emigrants from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. Thus, all ethnic communities had to be organized into an ethnic settlement. In the social sciences, they have been called colonies, but I think the term is not appropriate for immigrants who were not at the same time conquerors of territory on behalf of some power. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, we can talk about ethnic communities that settled in an already organized society in which, as individuals, members of an ethnic community wanted to survive socially and economically, but at the same time they wanted to preserve the characteristics of their community and individuals wanted to preserve also the awareness on where they and their ancestors came from.

We can conclude in general that the remains of these communities have been preserved until today in the form of inscriptions in churches and cemeteries, in the languages of the communities, regardless of whether they were Protestant or Catholic, or Orthodox ([2], pp. 169–180). After many years, descendants will also find for example material remains, of Bosniak community in St. Louis, Missouri, where over 30,000 Bosniaks settled after the Dayton Agreement. This agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995. As it is today, the great Catholic churches of New York can be said to be part of the Irish heritage. This also applies to Slovenes. Nevertheless, the traces of the remnants of these communities can be found also more than a century after these settlements were established. There were 800 cities, towns, and villages where Slovene settlements were established more than 170 years ago. The first was Ebeneser in Georgia. It was erased in the civil war. St. Stephen 60 miles NW of Twin Cities, MN was established 150 years ago and there are still people who know their ancestry who live there. We recently discovered that a Slovene flag was flown at the cemetery. The second largest Slovene city worldwide after World War 1 was Cleveland, OH and the city with the largest percentage of Slovene population is Ely, MN where more than a half of the population has Slovene ancestors.

As far as methodology is concerned, we used the methodology of historical science as well as methodology of ethnic studies. It means that we gathered data based on historical sources i.e., archival sources of Slovene organizations, ethnic newspapers, structured interviews, literature, and data of US censuses of population. We also compared Slovene organizational structures with the structures of other ethnic groups.

2. The historic settlement of Slovenes in the USA and their geographical distribution

Slovene immigrants in the United States settled mainly in compact Slovene settlements, in many of them they still live today. Most of them immigrated to the USA in the period between 1870 and 1924 ([3], pp. 1–71). Before this period, mainly Slovenian adventurers and missionaries settled there [4]. The period of the main Slovene settlement coincides with the strong development of industry and mining in the USA, which saw a great boom, especially after the end of the civil war. When prof. Matjaž Klemenčič showed a map of Slovene settlements in the USA to Prof John Bodnar, the famous researcher of the so-called new ethnic communities in the USA and the author of the book The Transplanted [5] he said that on the one hand, it is a

map showing the settlements of virtually all immigrant communities which immigrated to the USA in the same period, as Slovenes and on the other hand kt shows a map of the industrial and mining establishments of the time (Interview with John Bodnar 2011).

According to the data of the US population census, which are also recognized by the profession, in 1910 there were 183,431 Slovene immigrants and their children (according to their mother tongue) living in the USA, and in 1920, according to these data, there were already 208,552 of them ([6], pp. 595–1019; [7], pp. 967–1007). For the year 2010, American statisticians calculated, based on a 5% sample, that 185,645 people of Slovene descent lived in the USA in 2010 [8]. Considering the objective measure of ethnic origin, this number seems a bit too low, so the estimates of those researchers who estimate the number of people of Slovenian origin in the USA at around 500,000 are more likely, although this number also includes those who have only a quarter or even only an eighth of Slovenian ancestry. In this regard, it should be added that American statistics allow for a subjective measure. For the years 1910 to 1930, when it was possible to examine the primary materials of the population censuses, on the one hand, in addition to the Slovene mother tongue, we also have found the "Carniolian language" recorded among the Slovenes, and between the two wars, also the "Yugoslav or Austrian language" ([9], pp. 150–159). Similar findings could be made for the periods after 1980 when the ancestry of the population was determined. In doing so, they often confused ethnic ancestry with national origin (i.e., from which country they came) so that, for example, Slovenes wrote that their ancestry is "Yugoslav", which of course means mixing of pears and apples.

On the already mentioned map "Places of Slovene settlements in the USA" ([9], p. 122), we can see areas of Slovene settlement in the USA. Thus, it is worth mentioning in first place the industrially developed Northeast with the metropolis of New York and Bethlehem (eastern Pennsylvania), and Bridgeport (Connecticut). In addition to Bethlehem, there are a few places with larger Slovene settlements also in eastern Pennsylvania (Forest City is the most important), there are many places with Slovene settlements in western Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh, Johnstown, Cannonsburgh, etc.), the northern part of West Virginia (e.g., Triladelphia) and in Southeast (Lorrain, Akron) and Northeast Ohio (Barberton, Cleveland, Euclid, Lorain, etc.). The places where Slovene immigrants formed their settlements are also in southern Michigan (Detroit) and in the so-called Copper district on Michigan Peninsula (Calumet). In central Wisconsin, the farming settlement of Willard should be mentioned in particular. The majority of Slovene settlements in this state are located in the cities along the shores of Lake Michigan (Milwaukee, Sheboygan, West Allis, etc.). The area of Slovene settlements continues south to the state of Illinois, where Chicago and Waukegan are located on the shores of Lake Michigan. Joliet, south of Chicago, and La Salle, west of Chicago, deserve special mention. In the central and southern parts of this US state, Springfield should be mentioned along with the many other Slovenian settlements. East of the Mississippi River, it is also worth mentioning the concentrated area of places with Slovene settlements in Minnesota, especially on the so-called "iron range" (Ely, Tower, Eveleth, Hibbing, Chisholm, etc.), and St. Stephen in central Minnesota, which is considered one of the oldest Slovene settlements in the USA. In the Mississippi lowlands, there are several places with Slovene settlements in the extreme southeast of Kansas (Kansas City, Frontenac, and Pittsburgh) and in the northwest of the state of Arkansas (Jenny Lind). In the extreme southeast of the USA, there is a noteworthy place in southeast Florida, where the Slovene settlement of Samsula was founded by Slovenian farmers.

From the Mississippi River to the Pacific coast, most places with Slovene settlements are located in the mining areas of the Rocky Mountains. In the state of Colorado, Pueblo, Denver, Leadville, Trinidad, Walsenburg, Aspen, and Crested Butte are particularly noteworthy. There are also a few places with Slovene settlements in neighboring Utah (Sunnyside, Helper) and Wyoming. (Rock Springs, Diamondville), while in mountainous Montana, Anaconda, East Helena, Butte, and Bear Creek are particularly noteworthy. In the northwest of the USA, there are also places with Slovene settlements in the states of Washington (Enumclaw, Black Diamond) and Oregon (Oregon City, Portland). Slovene immigrants also settled in California, with the Slovene settlements in Fontana and San Francisco being particularly noteworthy. Slovenian immigrants also settled in other areas of the United States, which are not specifically mentioned in this short review, but those are mainly scattered settlements (especially in agriculturally developed areas).

In the following text, we will show the organizational forms that are typical or were typical of ethnic communities that settled in the United States, especially from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.

3. Slovene fraternal benefit societies

Fraternal benefit societies represented the basic form of organization for Slovene as well as other immigrants in the USA. These are insurance companies that were created in a period when the United States did not yet know any form of health insurance and have basically remained as such until today. First, such organizations among Slovene immigrants were organized already at the beginning of the 1880s. It concerns the insurance of workers in the event of accidents at work or in the event of illness, as well as attempts at pension insurance. The introduction of so-called "Obama care" was the first step in the right direction toward universal healthcare European style and it took till March 2010 to implement in the USA as a whole.

With the profits of ethnic fraternal benefit societies, these organizations supported the cultural and publishing activities of immigrants in the US in general and Slovene Americans in particular. The majority of these are centralized organizations consisting of individual lodges that operated or are still operating in Slovene settlements. Among the most important was the American Fraternal Union based in Ely (Minnesota), which had around 15,000 members at the time of its merger with Catholic United Financial ([9], p. 255). The American Mutual Life Association with headquarters in Cleveland (Ohio) with around 30,000 members still operates today, and the Slovene National Benefit Society/with headquarters in Imperial (Pennsylvania), and more than 50,000 members operates even today. Zapadna Slovenska zveza/Western Slavonic Association (WSA) with headquarters in Denver (Colorado) and 6500 members, which still operates today, and American-Slovenian Catholic Union with headquarters in Joliet (Illinois) and with around 30,000 members, which still operates today. The relatively large number of umbrella organizations is the result of the dispersion of Slovenian settlement in the USA, as well as ideological differences, which were partly brought from the old homeland and partly stimulated by the conditions in the new homeland. The American-Slovenian Catholic Union once called the Carnelian-Slovenian Catholic Union, required its members to be active Catholics, while the Slovene National Benefit Society has the loyalty or disloyalty of individual members to the Catholic Church for their private matters. Although the

Slovenian National Benefit Society was liberally oriented, its members were active in the socialist labor movement in the United States ([10], pp. 21–44).

4. Slovenian ethnic parishes

A special form of organization of immigrants in general, as well as Slovene Americans, are ethnic parishes, the creation of which dates to the end of the nineteenth century. Since the problem of apostasy among emigrants in America was becoming more and more urgent, the Catholic Church in Europe organized a meeting of the Catholic Congress on December 9 and 10, 1890 in Lucerne, Switzerland, which was actually a gathering of European national societies of St. Raphael. The result of the wishes of this meeting was the so-called "Lucerne memorandum", which the general secretary of the German Society of St. Raphael Paul Cahensly presented to Pope Leo XIII on April 16, 1891. In it, they proposed to the Pope the establishment of ethnic parishes for each ethnic community, with the condition that their priests must be members of the same ethnic community and religious instruction must also be conducted in the language of the ethnic community. They also proposed the establishment of parish schools for each ethnic community separately and a guarantee of equal rights for all priests, regardless of ethnicity. They also advocated the establishment of Catholic fraternal beneficial organizations and demanded that American bishops should be members of different ethnic communities ([9], pp. 180–181). Let us emphasize that the members of the Catholic church hierarchy at that time were mostly Irish. Among the members of the Slovenian ethnic community before the First World War, we can count as many as five bishops who were of Slovene origin. These were Frederick Baraga, Ignatius Mraks ˛John Vertin, James Trobec, and John Stariha ([9], p. 186; [4]). The first three bishops were in Baraga's diocese, while the other two were appointed by John Ireland, who liked Slovenes because they were not Germans but knew German. In the Lucerne Memorandum, some more incentives were proposed to the Pope. They advocated the establishment of branches of the Society of St. Raphael in all European countries. In Lucerne, they also advocated the equalization of the rights of priests of ethnic parishes and priests of territorial parishes. Ethnic parishes were established exclusively for members of certain ethnic communities, while territorial parishes were bound to a certain territory. Given that immigrants from individual ethnic communities initially settled in a certain territory, they easily mixed both types of parishes. At the same time, individual ethnic communities were tied to ethnic settlements. The development later led to ethnic parishes becoming territorial parishes, and then the former ethnic parish served all the communities in a certain territory with its buildings. For example, today, the formerly exclusively Slovenian parish in Joliet today serves mainly the Spanish-speaking community, but they also have masses in the Slovene language. The once entirely Slovene church of St. Stephen's in Chicago today serves primarily Spanish-speaking immigrants.

In the USA, the demands written in the Lucerne Memorandum sparked a lot of debate in the 1890s, especially the fact that the European St. Raphael Societies addressed their demands directly to the Pope and not to the American bishops. That this action was not acceptable to the American church authorities is shown by the case at the investiture of Archbishop Frederick Katzer in Milwaukee, when Cardinal James Gibbons also spoke about the need for "... American Catholics to take into account the fact that they are American citizens and as such owe loyalty only to America...". In the

continuation of the speech, he mentioned that "...Catholics must live in harmony with the American political institutions...". ([9], p. 181) Despite these objections, it was the "Lucerne memorandum" that most stimulated the movement, the result of which was the establishment of ethnic parishes in the USA, including many Slovenian parishes.

Thus, with the support of the Catholic Church, 40 Slovene or Slovene-mixed ethnic parishes were established in the USA alone in the period from 1871 to 1923. Among these, the history of ethnically mixed parishes is particularly interesting, but with a few exceptions, they soon split into several ethnic parishes. Within the framework of ethnic parishes, where a sufficient number of believers allowed for this, parish schools were also organized. At first, the language of the liturgy was only Slovene, but later masses were held in Slovene as well as in English. In the parish schools, the language of education was English, and Slovene was often a subject of study in these schools. Priests and teachers in these schools were usually of Slovene ethnic background. So, attending schools and organizing ethnic parishes had a positive effect on preserving ethnic consciousness among Slovene immigrants and their descendants ([9], pp. 167–234; [11], pp. 131–177; [12], pp. 279–315; [13], pp. 203–257).

Regarding consciousness, researchers must be aware that this is the consciousness of ancestors or ethnicity, which is always accompanied by the consciousness of belonging to the country in which the immigrants lived, in this case the USA. Thus, we are talking about Slovene Americans who, in terms of awareness of their belonging, have developed from American Slovenians, who were usually members of the first generation or immigrants themselves, while the children of immigrants, i.e., the second generation of immigrants and beyond, developed into Slovene Americans ([14], pp. 899–922).

5. Slovene national homes

A special form of organization for Sloven immigrants in the USA is represented in Slovene national homes. In 1990, according to data from the Slovenian National Directory, 69 Slovenian national homes were operating in the USA. They began to appear at the beginning of the twentieth century, before the First World War, when it was already clear to many Slovene-Americans that they would permanently stay in the United States. The establishment of the first Slovene national homes coincided with the establishment of the first fraternal benefit societies, reading rooms, libraries, music groups, and sports clubs. There was a natural need for a meeting place for Slovene immigrants, where various cultural, social, and also political events of Slovene Americans would be held. Many activities and events took place in the national homes, which with their events attracted many members of the Slovene ethnic community in the settlement, where the national homes operated, and also from other nearby settlements.

They were mostly built with contributions from community members or the for-profit activities of fraternal benefit societies. If it was not a rented or old building, they voluntarily helped to build it themselves, as was the case, for example. in Collinwood, in what is now a suburb of Cleveland. The national homes were mostly made of bricks or were simple wooden buildings. They were mostly two-story buildings that had their own central space, a hall with a stage, and a kitchen for preparing food. There were rooms where various activities of the societies took place. The larger the homes were, the greater number of smaller rooms they occupied. The most important events were dances and entertainment events, which attracted many

visitors. Concerts, especially of choirs, also attracted many listeners. In parallel with parties and cultural events, political manifestations and collection of contributions for various humanitarian activities were also carried out.

The peak of the building of national homes was the period after the First World War. At that time, due to the changed political situation in Europe (establishment of the new Yugoslav state) and the active political participation of Slovene Americans in the local community, awareness of their ethnic belonging increased among the members of the Slovene ethnic community. In 1924, in Cleveland on St. Clair Avenue, with a big celebration and a street parade, the largest Slovenian national home that still exists today was opened. It has an auditorium that seats 1000 with an additional 324 seats in the balcony. In it, many Slovene associations found their premises, and important political manifestations and conventions of the Democratic Party took place at the same time as local and national elections were held. It should be mentioned that in the St. Clair Slovene National Home two extremely important political events took place. The first was in 1942 when the Slovene National Congress was held and established the organization Slovene American National Council. It endeavored for Political Assistance and Reconstruction of the Old Homeland in connection with the events in the old homeland during World War II. The second was the meetings of the organization United Americans for Slovenia, which between June 1991 and April 1992 sent appeals to American politicians, including President George Bush, on behalf of all Slovene Americans, in which they demanded that the USA recognize the independence of Slovenia, which at that time had gained independence from Yugoslavia, as soon as possible.

In addition to the national homes in the already mentioned Cleveland, national homes also appeared in other Slovenian settlements in the USA. This happened most often in mining settlements, such as in Rock Springs, Wyoming (1913), Ely, Minnesota (1911). Frontenac in Kansas (1910), Herminie in Pennsylvania (1908), and elsewhere. It is worth noting that the establishment of national homes was opposed by some Slovene Catholic priests who led Slovene ethnic parishes. They believed that the money for building national homes could be used for the maintenance of churches and the construction of new schools that would nurture the Slovene language and culture. In addition, church halls could also be used for the purposes for which homes were built. Thus, the national homes became gathering places for liberal-oriented Slovenian Americans, as they were mostly built by societies with a more liberal and socialist-oriented Slovene Americans. An exception to this rule is the Slovene National Home no. 2 on East 80th Street in Cleveland. After the First World War, ethnic communities from the Yugoslav territories began to unite in some places. This is how national homes were created, which were built by Slovene, Croatian and Serbian Americans together. Thus, for example, the American-Yugoslav Center in Euclid (Ohio) and the Slovenian-Croatian Club in Escanaba (Michigan) were created. It often happened that Slovene national homes were rented out to associations of other ethnic communities and locals who organized their own events, parties, and cultural events.

In the 1960s, when the members of the community of Slovene Americans began to slowly move from the once compact settlements to the suburbs and other places, due to the decline in the number of events and people, the Slovene national homes began to decay or simply close their doors. By this time, the younger generations had mostly already assimilated, so they did not need special spaces and gathering places for members of the Slovene ethnic community to socialize. During these times, in Cleveland, the national homes began to join together in a federation so that they could operate

smoothly. It is interesting that in the 1970s two new Slovene were built national homes in Florida for the needs of Slovenian retirees who moved there because of the favorable climate. Thus, the Slovene national homes in New Smyrna Beach and Miami were created. At the end of the twentieth century, after 1991, new national homes were also opened in Detroit, Michigan and Imperial, Pennsylvania, where the headquarters of the Slovene National Benedit Society was opened and the Slovene Cultural Center was built in Lemont near Joliet, Illinois. National homes represent an important Slovenian cultural heritage. Thus, in all national homes, pictures of Bled and the island of Bled are painted on the walls, as a kind of symbol of Slovenes in the USA. Some national homes, however, have very rich objects of cultural heritage. In the Slovene National Home in Cleveland a painting of Slovene cultural figures painted by Maksim Gaspari hangs on the wall. Even today the Slovene National Homes fulfill their mission of bringing together people who are aware of their ethnic affiliation and Slovenian origin. ([11], pp. 219–263; [12], pp. 336–337, pp. 362–365; [13], pp. 269–272; [9], pp. 278–290; [15], pp. 26–28).

6. Slovenian ethnic newspapers in the USA

In the definition of ethnic settlement, we also mentioned the seat of the newspaper publisher or newsletters as a possible element for the formation of an ethnic settlement. Newspapers and newsletters, which were aimed at the local needs of Slovenian-Americans in the settlement or were sent by the editors to members of Slovenian organizations in some or even most of the states of the USA, also contributed significantly to the preservation of ethnic consciousness among Slovene immigrants in the USA. Newspapers and periodicals represented one of the most important expressions of the life of an ethnic community. In order to publish a newspaper, certain basic conditions had to be met: an editor had to be appointed, reporters and other writers had to be chosen, an agreement had to be made with a printer and a distribution system had to be provided. Nevertheless, this was usually not enough to publish newspapers. Another "important condition" had to be fulfilled - the Slovenian community had to be "full of life", something worth writing about had to be constantly happening in it. Slovenian newspapers usually began to be published in the USA about 10 years after the beginnings of the formation of the Slovene ethnic community in a certain place. This is how much time passed before the Slovene immigrants gathered and ensured the existence of the (previously mentioned) basic conditions for the publication of the newspaper. Of course, this was not a completely smooth process, as the need for spiritual food (and also the press) among Slovene immigrants, especially after the Second World War, was greater, and their educational level was also higher. The technical possibilities were also better, so many started publishing a newspaper immediately after settling. ([16], pp. 112–126) In the twenty-first century, the conditions for publishing a newspaper, and even an ethnic newspaper in general, are easier, as there are so-called newspapers that are only accessible online or in digital form. It does not require a lot of money or a lot of infrastructures. Therefore, for example, after the cessation of publication of Ameriška domovina in 2008 in Cleveland, which is still today the largest Slovene settlement outside the Slovene ethnic territory, very quickly started publishing online form of the newspaper "Slovenian Times", which took over certain elements published by "Ameriška domovina" such as a. "Rooster of Slovenian organizations".

Slovene newspapers in the USA played a leading and leadership role among Slovene immigrants. It not only recorded events in the Slovene community but also promoted political and economic developments among Slovene immigrants. We can claim that the mentioned newspapers are not only an excellent source for the historian of Slovene immigration to the USA, but also that the editors of these newspapers encouraged Slovene Americans to active and passive political participation.

During the century (1891–1991), individual newspapers began to be published in a wide variety of places across America (the places mostly also represent the main settlements of Slovenes in the USA). The place of publication also (sometimes) depended on the editor's place of residence. Nevertheless, we can conclude that newspapers were not only read in the places where they were printed but were often read throughout almost all of the United States. This is especially true if it was a newspaper that represented the newsletter of a certain fraternal benefit society [17].

Some newspapers were still published in the USA in the twenty-first century. Among them, it is worth mentioning in the first place Ameriška domovina, a local newspaper aimed at Slovenians in Cleveland. It served also as an organ of political emigree organizations after World War 2. It was published in 2008. Today, the Slovene ethnic newspapers are published primarily as newsletters of fraternal benefit societies: Amerikanski Slovenec—Glasilo Kranjska-Slovenska katolikške jednote as the successor of the first Slovenian newspaper, which was published in the USA since 1891, and as a newsletter of the American-Slovenian Catholic Union, Glas/Voice as a newsletter of the American Mutual life association, newsletter of the WSA, and Prosveta/Enlightment as a newsletter of the Slovene National Benefit Society. Many stopped publishing. Among them, Glas Naroda is particularly noteworthy, which at its peak, just before the First World War, had over 10,000 subscribers and was published in New York until 1957 ([18], pp. 98–117).

7. Professional careers and political participation of Slovenians and their descendants

Slovenian Americans were also relatively successful in liberal professions (lawyers, doctors) and as entrepreneurs and managers. They established themselves both as small entrepreneurs (shoemakers, tailors, innkeepers, grocers, etc.) and also in somewhat larger companies such as the hotel industry, banking, and funeral services. ([11], pp. 108–130; [9], pp. 93–109; [12], pp. 259–278; [13], pp. 176–203).

Together with the organizations of Slovene immigrants in their settlements, this also represented the basis for the inclusion of individuals from the ranks of the Slovene community in politics—first at the level of city districts, and then at the level of cities, counties, US states, and the entire United States. It is worth noting that members of the Slovene community and their descendants even became members of the US Congress (both the House of Representatives and the US Senate). In almost all settlements that historians have researched so far (Cleveland, Leadville, Rock Springs, Ely, Pueblo, Calumet), the degree of political participation of Slovene immigrants was always greater than the numerical strength or share of members of the Sloven community in the city or district. Until the twenty first century, Slovene-Americans mostly voted for Democrats. The exception was George Voinovich in Cleveland as well as Chuck Novak in Ely, Minnesota. Since 2020 Democrat Roger Skraba is the mayor of Ely.

In Ely in northern Minnesota, in which Slovene Americans were the relatively largest ethnic community from the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Thus, shortly before the First World War, when the secret ballot was established in Minnesota, the first Slovene Americans were already elected. City councilors the first Slovene American to become the mayor of Ely, was George L. Brozich. He was elected on the ticket of the Democratic Party during the First World War. From this period onward and into the twenty-first century, Slovene-Americans as democrats have played an important role in city politics to the present day, as they have held the office of mayor for more than half of the time since the First World War. They were mostly elected on the ticket of the Democratic Party. The most important Slovene-American local politician in Ely was Jack P. Grahek, who served as mayor of Ely for 27 years on and off. The fact that he was on friendly terms with Congressman John Blatnik is not unimportant, as the latter helped him obtain federal funds for many projects. As the mayor of the city with the largest percentage of the Slovene population, Grahek attended the funeral of the president of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito, in 1980. Of course, John Blatnik also played an important role in this. At the turn from the first to the second decade of the twenty-first century, Republican Roger Skraba, who served as mayor from 2008 to 2012 and from 2020 to 2022, won the battle for mayor. In 2020, 50% of Slovene-Americans also voted for Donald Trump in the presidential election in Ely. In this, the fact that Trump is married to the Slovene Melanija Knaus also played an important role ([19], pp. 104–197).

In Cleveland, for example, Slovenes and their descendants have been actively present in the city's political life since the beginning of the twentieth century (before the First World War, Doctor Frank Javh Kern was almost elected, running on the ticket of the Socialist Party), and in 1925 John L. Mihelich was finally elected to the city council as the first Slovene-American in Cleveland. Slovene Americans remained actively present in city politics until today. It is worth noting that in the 1930s Slovene Americans of the first generation, and their descendants, had as many as four members out of 25 in the city council, and in the period from 1941 to 1944, the mayor of the city was Frank Lausche. George Voinovich, whose mother was of Slovene descent was also elected mayor of the city at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Both Lausche and Voinovich continued their political careers and became governors of the state of Ohio and US senators from Ohio (Lausche from 1957 to 1969, Voinovich from 1999 to 2011) ([19], pp. 362–373). Amy Klobuchar who became a member of the US senate in (2007 is still a member of the US Senate.), was one of the six candidates for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party, later Joe Biden had shortlisted her for the vice-presidential position, but he chose Kamala Harris. Among the members of the House of Representatives, we should also mention John Blatnik from northern Minnesota (from 1947 to 1974), [19], pp. 198–215) Joe Skubitz from Kansas (1963–1979) and Phillip Edward Ruppe from Michigan (1967–1979), in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as three members of the American Congress of Slovenian origin in 1980s: Cleveland's Dennis Eckart ([11], pp. 341–344) (1981–1993), Colorado's Ray Kogovsek (1979–1985) ([13], pp. 280–281), Minnesota's James Oberstar ([19], pp. 205–210) (1975–2011). To this day, Paul Gosar (2011 - present), a member of the Republican Party and a staunch supporter of Donald Trump, is a member of the House of Representatives US Congress. [20].

8. Conclusion

The majority of Slovenian immigrants in the USA settled in areas where they continue to live today. During two decades of research, the author has developed a

map of Slovenian settlements that he uses as the basis for his discussion of the geographic distribution of Slovenian immigrants in the USA. The paper also discusses the 1910 and 1920 U.S. census reports. In 1910, there were 183,431 immigrants and their children in the USA who defined Slovene as their mother tongue; in 1920, there were 208,552 Slovenes according to the U.S. census figures.

Organizations of Slovenian immigrants in the USA played an important role in maintaining Slovene ethnic consciousness among them. The organizations, which are discussed in detail in this work, were comprised of fraternal benefit societies, Slovenian national homes, and Slovenian ethnic parishes. Slovenian Americans were actually over-represented in the political life of the United States; election results on municipal, county, state, and national levels are also discussed. There were half of dozen members of Congress and two US senators who were and claim they were of Slovenian descent. Currently, Amy Klobuchar serves in US Senate and Paul Gosar serves in the US House of Representatives.

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Chapter 11

Addressing US Youth Violence and Central American Migration through Fortifying Children, Families, and Educators in Central America: A Collaborative Approach to the Development and Testing of a Youth Violence Preventive Intervention

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Abstract

Youth violence is a pressing problem in the United States (US) with multiple contributors. Some violence involving US youth can be linked to a larger global epidemic of youth violence in Latin America and in Central America, specifically. Hemispheric histories of violence fueled by a century of US resource extraction and intervention, and other factors such as internal economic and political strain, contribute to present-day migration from Central America to the US. Addressing the intricate problems of US youth violence and migration requires multi-systemic prevention programs to address youth violence in families, schools, and communities in Central America. One such example is *Miles de Manos (MdM; "Thousands of Hands")*. MdM is intended to target risk and protective factors related to migration from Central America to the US. It is a multi-modal, culturally-specified and community-based violence prevention intervention for elementary-school aged children, their families, and children's teachers and school staff. Data collected during pilot trials indicate promise in terms of MdM increasing positive teacher and parent behaviors that promote prosocial behaviors and reduce problem behaviors in youth. Outcomes due to MdM for youth, parents and other caregivers, and teachers are currently being examined in a randomized controlled trial in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

Keywords: United States, youth violence, central American migration, preventive intervention, program development, community-based, cultural adaptation

1. Introduction

Violence in the United States (US) is the third leading cause of death for young people (aged 10 to 24 years) and has widespread costs for individuals, families, and communities [1]. Each day in the US, about 12 young people are victims of homicide and almost 1400 are treated in emergency departments for nonfatal physical assault-related injuries [2]. Further, one in five high school students report being bullied at school or engaging in a physical fight in the past year [2]. Losses from violence against US youth in a single year include approximately 1.3 million years of life and $18.2 billion in combined medical and lost productivity costs [2]. Amidst these brutal statistics there is cause for hope; mounting evidence demonstrates that youth violence is preventable [3]. Though contributors to youth violence are multi-sectoral and multi-modal, few interventions engage stakeholders across key contexts of young people's lives, including home and school [4]. Further, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institute of Justice recommend that, in addition to addressing common risk factors for youth violence—i.e., delinquent peers, poor family functioning, and school disengagement [4, 5]—youth violence programs may be more effective if they are racially, ethnically, and culturally sensitive and address stresses associated with discrimination and immigration [6, 7].

One of the contributors to youth violence in the US is deviant peer association, including gang involvement, typically beginning after age 10 and peaking at age 14 [8]. One in three US local law enforcement agencies reported youth gang problems in their jurisdiction [6]. In the same year, 45% of high school students and 35% of middle school students said that there were gangs—or students who considered themselves part of a gang—in their school [7]. Two-thirds of gangs are located in larger US cities and suburban counties and account for the majority of gang-related violence and more than 96% of all gang homicides [9]. In Chicago and Los Angeles, nearly half of all homicides were attributed to gang violence [6]. Contrary to popular perception, girls join gangs in large numbers [4].

Violence poses unique challenges for US Latine (a linguistically and gender inclusive term) youth, particularly those who live in communities that are under-served and shaped by histories of discrimination, exclusion, and erasure [10, 11]. Long-standing US histories of racism, xenophobia, and the use of violence by state actors (e.g., the over policing of low income Black and Latine neighborhoods, institutional corruption, and a legal system that disproportionately punishes Black and Latine urban residents [12–14]) create conditions within which US gang members are much more likely to be Latine than any other race or ethnicity [2], with attendant risks to Latine families and communities. For some Latine youth living in immigrant origin neighborhoods, gang-related risks can be potentially far-reaching. US youth violence is linked to a larger global epidemic of youth violence [3] and can be fueled by connections to gang crime and the trafficking of people and drugs to the US from Central America, and of guns from the US to Central America [15]. For US youth who are touched in some way by these gangs, seemingly distant connections can directly and often profoundly impact their individual well-being, as well as that of their families and compatriots both in the US and in countries of origin [16]. Indeed, when transnational gangs influence schools and communities, the health and safety of all youth and community members are at risk [17–19], in the US as well as throughout Central America. Here we describe our work to collaboratively develop a youth violence preventive intervention in Central America, which we currently are testing in Honduras, as one response

to complex conditions that give rise to the ongoing and dangerous migration of children and families from Central America to the United States.

2. Central American migration to the United States

As the US is home to millions of people who immigrated from all over the world, global social conditions have implications for the health and well-being of US populations. In recent years, a significant number of immigrants have hailed from countries in Latin America. Central to US immigration policy conversations are spikes in the numbers of families and unaccompanied minors who seek safe haven in the US having fled perilous conditions in the Northern Triangle (i.e., Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador). Central American regional instability resulted, in part, from decades of US resource extraction and military and corporate intervention, which, in the present day, are exacerbated by US demands for workers and drugs, and the profitable export of firearms.

Within the past 10 years, unaccompanied children (UACs) from the Northern Triangle have fled violence and entered the US in unprecedented numbers. After reaching record high levels during the spring and summer of 2014 (51,705 UACs apprehended), the number of UACs from Northern Triangle countries arriving at the US-Mexico border declined sharply to 28,387 apprehensions in 2015 [20]. By 2016, however, UAC arrivals from these nations once again began to increase (to 46,893 UACs apprehended), with 113,576 UACs apprehended by July 2022, over three-quarters of whom were from Northern Triangle nations and one-quarter of whom were Honduran [21]. During FY2022, family unit apprehensions totaled 356,174, a level slightly below that for all family unit apprehensions in FY2012 (394,762), the first year that US Customs and Border Protection published family unit apprehension figures [20]. These high numbers of UACs as well as families from Central America apprehended at the US border are testament to the dramatically worsening social conditions in the Central American region, especially related to violence [18, 22, 23].

Despite coordinated efforts involving Central and North American governments to step up enforcement and prosecute migrant smugglers, powerful push factors, including high levels of violence, appear to have overwhelmed these efforts [24]. Violence is perpetrated by drug trafficking and organized crime networks as well as by domestic abusers [18, 19, 24] at rates so momentous they have led Honduras and El Salvador to vie annually (until 2019) for the title as the world's most dangerous peacetime country [25]. The ripple effects of citizen insecurity in Central America are readily felt in the US—witness, for example, the increasing number of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees arriving at the US border—and have spurred the US to collaborate with countries in the region to implement and refine security efforts. Between 2008 and March 2019, the US government supported the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which provided the nations of the isthmus with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement operations and to strengthen the long-term capacities of Central American governments to address the underlying social and political factors that contribute to persistent security challenges [26, 27]. In March 2019, the Trump administration announced its intention to end US foreign assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle [26]. Despite this policy decision, Congress continued to

appropriate nearly $2.6 billion over the four years of the Trump administration and the Biden administration pledged $4 billion in support to Central America [23, 27].

Congressional appropriations of over $1.2 billion to CARSI provided little evidence that CARSI supported programs, and particularly those that endorsed a *Mano Dura* (tough on crime) approach, contributed to improved security conditions, with overall country-level security indicators remaining poor in several Central America nations [26, 27]. Encouragingly, however, several community-based violence prevention programs supported through CARSI funding have demonstrated positive impacts on reduced levels of violence and increased community cohesion [26]. Unfortunately, the information available on these programs is scant—few scientifically rigorous studies have been conducted on community-based violence prevention programs in Central America.

3. Elements of successful community-based violence prevention programs

Key elements of successful youth violence programs include emphases on early intervention in terms of decreasing risk for and increasing protection against the development of antisocial behaviors during the pre-K and elementary school ages in both the school and the home settings [28]. Key skills that parents, other caregivers, and teachers are often taught include the ability to support children's behavioral self-regulation, to encourage the positive resolution of conflict, and to enhance the development of prosocial relationships [29]. Further, promising programs tend to embrace a social-ecological approach that addresses individual and relationship level factors (e.g., protective factors include cultural assets of families), while simultaneously teaching parents, other caregivers, and teachers about the community (school and neighborhood-based) and societal level factors (e.g., risk factors include poverty, discrimination) that may contribute to youth violence. Adults are the primary target of such programs with the goal being that they provide consistent modeling, support and encouragement of children who then can develop skills that are key to violence prevention, including positive communication, problem-solving, conflict resolution and management, empathy, impulse control, and emotion regulation [29, 30]. Skill development interventions have an extensive and robust research base, which shows that building youth's interpersonal, emotional, and behavioral skills can help reduce both youth violence perpetration and victimization [30]. Enhancing these skills can also impact risk or protective factors that covary with youth violence, such as substance use and academic success [31–33]. Finally, through training parents and school staff in the social determinants of violence, they can be empowered to be de facto community health workers who engage more broadly with others to prevent violence.

Across a five-year period, our US-based research team worked with partners in Central America and Germany to develop *Miles de Manos* (*MdM;* "Thousands of Hands"), a universal, multi-modal, evidence-informed and community-based youth violence prevention intervention targeting elementary school-aged youth and their families and teachers. This culturally sensitive program was designed for Latin American origin communities and school staff and is informed by the process and content of two programs identified as "effective" by the National Institute of Justice: Linking the Interests of Families and Teachers (LIFT) and Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), as well as *Nuestras Familias* (NF; Our Families), a program that is routinely cited as one of the few empirically supported efficacious preventive interventions for US Latine adolescent externalizing behaviors [31, 34–37].

The development, testing and refinement of MdM was informed by five feasibility trials conducted between 2012 and 2016.

4. The development of *Miles de Manos*

MdM was developed through a collaborative process between practitioners, administrators, and researchers from within and outside of the Central American region. This process was launched in 2011 by the PREVENIR Team from the German international aid agency, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ). PREVENIR is a program intended to prevent youth violence through the application of four strategies: (1) the introduction of local multi-sectoral prevention councils, (2) improved and localized youth employability efforts, (3) the establishment of gender sensitive community police and attention to victims of violence, and (4) the installation of violence prevention programs in and out of school. While efforts were underway for the first three strategies, members of the PREVENIR Team began an international search to learn about evidence-based programs for youth violence prevention. This effort could have resulted in the adoption of the typical approach used by most international agencies in Central America: take an "evidence-based" program developed in a high-income country, translate the content into Spanish, train facilitators, and disseminate the program. Instead, the work of the PREVENIR team led to a much different outcome: the development of a new culturally and evidence-informed intervention by and for Central Americans that proceeded through seven phases. This international collaboration included consultants from four Central American countries, US university-based prevention scientists, leaders from the Central American Integration System, and Ministries or Secretaries of Education from each Northern Triangle country, as well as schools, community leaders, youth and families from the Northern Triangle and Nicaragua. The work was conducted through funding from the governments of Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands and involved a number of phases.

During **Phase 1**, GIZ invited US-based team members to Central America to meet with experts to gain a deeper understanding of the assets and needs of communities beset by violence. During this phase, we learned about programs and initiatives already in place. This phase also involved building the MdM development team of Central Americans and strengthening relationships between the MdM team and key stakeholders across the four countries.

During **Phase 2**, US team members, at the request of GIZ, presented three evidence-based programs, PBIS [34], LIFT [31], and Nuestras Familias (NF) [36] as the starting place for the content and process of MdM. GIZ was interested in these three programs due to the positive findings of each and due to the larger body of evidence on the positive effects of school-based cognitive-behavioral programs that are similar in content and process to these programs [38]. Specifically, positive impacts of LIFT on parent and youth behaviors have been found within the context of a longitudinal randomized controlled trial of 12 schools [31, 35]. Positive impacts of PBIS have been found in a wide variety of studies [39], including randomized controlled trials [40]. Positive impacts of NF on parent and youth behaviors have been found in two school-based randomized controlled trials, with NF routinely cited as one of the few empirically supported efficacious preventive interventions for Latine adolescent externalizing behaviors [36, 37, 41]. Discussions focused on training GIZ team members in the premises and practices of these programs and identifying how elements could be used to build on *Phase 1* findings.

During **Phase 3**, GIZ team members and curriculum and instruction consultants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua worked closely with the US team to adapt the programs to create culturally-grounded parent and teacher programs, as well as a "bridge" program involving both parents and teachers. The content was further revised based on feedback from key stakeholders, including groups in each country (e.g. representatives from Ministries or Secretaries of Education and leaders of local non-governmental organizations).

During **Phase 4**, a research design was developed, namely a multiple feasibility pilot strategy that included four planned tests to be conducted in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua [30]. **Phase 5** was the conduct of the feasibility pilots; following each of the tests, MdM was edited, ultimately undergoing substantive changes between its initial draft in 2013 and the final manualized version that was completed in December 2015. During **Phase 6**, feedback from all completed feasibility tests was used to finalize the process, content and design of MdM, and prepare for a rigorous test of program outcomes [42].

Phase 7 involved the dissemination of MdM through GIZ and key collaborators, principally in Honduras and El Salvador. In Honduras, the program has been adopted as part of the country's national education strategy. This phase included the creation of training, supervision, and fidelity monitoring systems.

Phase 8, currently underway, involves the conduct of a rigorous RCT of MdM in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. This study involves a collaboration of The University of Texas at Austin, the University of Oregon, and ChildFund International, in partnership with the Honduran Secretary of Education.

4.1 Program description

MdM comprises three components [43]: a cognitive-behavioral skills training component for parents (8 sessions), a cognitive-behavioral skills training component for teachers (8 sessions), and a "bridge" component that brings parents, teachers, and school administrators together to talk about how to support each other's efforts related to youth violence prevention (4 sessions plus a community-wide program launch event). Core elements of PBIS, LIFT, and NF were adapted, combined, and shaped through interaction of the program development team with Central American teachers, parents, and families over the course of the three years of development and piloting [44]. Seven key research evidence-based ideas from these three programs (also common to other cognitive-behavioral school-based preventive interventions) are presented in parent, teacher, and bridge components: effective communication, clear expectations, limits and consequences, positive reinforcement, adult supervision and monitoring, effective problem solving, and emotion regulation [44]. The program is highly interactive, and involves brief lectures, small and large group discussions, role-plays, and interactive exercises. The key theme throughout the components is that the "first step" in youth violence prevention and prosocial promotion is the ongoing, active, positive, and constructive communication between and among parents, teachers, and youth [44]. MdM is designed to help parents and teachers take such a step with each other and with the children who are in their care.

5. Preliminary studies of *Miles de Manos*

Throughout the development process, data were collected from parents, teachers, and youth on their perceptions of MdM as well as on outcomes related to the program.

To illustrate, findings from three of five data collections are overviewed here [30, 42]: the first pilot in Honduras, the fifth and last pilot in El Salvador, and an independent dissertation research study in El Salvador. Our goal with these pilots was to optimize the feasibility of the program as well as to refine assessment instruments and procedures to inform a later rigorous study, which is currently in progress.

5.1 First pilot

MdM was first piloted with adults connected to 4th grade classes in a school located in a Yamaranguila, a remote, mountainous community in Honduras. Parent recruitment initially focused on the members of a parent committee involved in the construction of a new school in Yamaranguila, and then expanded to all parents connected to the school. The primary facilitator of the parent groups was a local resident and a licensed primary school teacher who had extensive experience facilitating youth and parenting classes. One of the authors of the parent component co-facilitated the teacher and bridge components with the primary facilitator. The research team trained GIZ assessors on the administration of study instruments, and provided ongoing support and supervision. To attend MdM sessions, the 75 parents who attended reported travel times (typically on foot) that varied between 1 and 30 minutes (39%), 30 minutes and 1 hour (39%), 1 and 1 ½ hours (11%), and 1 ½ and 2 hours (11%). Despite these distances, and frequent, powerful rains that made travel difficult on the dirt roads and trails in the area, parent participation in weekly sessions remained high, with the number of parents increasing 50% by the end of the program. Based on feedback received by consultants and community leaders, each meeting included food or *meriendas* prepared by a community member and brought to share with others during session breaks and at the end of gatherings. Nearly all participants expressed enthusiasm for the program and for what they rated as high-quality facilitation and materials. Participants also reported having learned valuable knowledge and skills they thought would make a difference for the children in their lives. As about 40% of parents had a 3rd grade education or less, parents' high levels of involvement were important evidence of the program's accessibility. In keeping with studies of low-income marginalized families in the US [45, 46], Yamaranguila parents, despite tremendous odds, were dedicated to their children's education. Nearly all participants responded that they would recommend the program to others and described speaking frequently with other adults in their lives about lessons learned in the program. The pattern of written responses was uniform: in response to questions about suggestions for improvement and program areas of strength, most participants identified the program as extremely beneficial.

5.2 Last pilot

The last pilot was conducted in schools located within two municipalities in the state of San Miguel, El Salvador [42]. Two schools were selected in each town; one school in each town was chosen to receive MdM. Both schools were in "orange" zones in terms of level of risk, meaning that the incidence of youth violence in the local area was low relative to the rest of El Salvador, but would be considered high by international standards considering the extremely high level of violence in the country at the time of the pilot. A random process was used to determine which school would receive MdM (i.e, the Program School) and which would be a "services-as-usual" Control School. Selected teachers and administrators from the Program School were

trained as MdM facilitators by GIZ staff. The training lasted for five days. Facilitators delivered MdM to the other teachers and staff in their school as well as to the parents of students at their school. Additionally, staff members from the research team provided training in the collection of data to a group of nine undergraduate students who were supervised by a professor from the Universidad Nacional de El Salvador. Students in all classes in grades 4–6 in each school were recruited for data collection. Parents of all students in these grades were also invited to participate. In the Program School, parents were invited to register for the parent component sessions. Subsequently, teachers, students, and parents from these grades were assessed in both the Control and Program Schools at "baseline" (Time 1) before MdM was delivered in the Program School. MdM was then delivered across a five-month period. The teacher component was delivered during special sessions offered during the regular school week. The parent component was offered at a time when parents indicated they were available to participate. After MdM was delivered, students, parents, and teachers in all schools were assessed again (Time 2) via written questionnaires that were administered either to groups (i.e., parents, students) or were completed by teachers during their class preparation time. In a few cases, assessments were administered individually, for example if a parent had difficulty understanding the questions and needed assistance.

The total number of participants in the assessment included 43 teachers, 388 students, and 59 parents. Participating teachers represented 80% of all teachers in the schools; students we assessed represented approximately 95% of students in the 4th to 6th grades; approximately 16% of students in grades 4–6 had parents who participated in the program. GIZ staff regularly monitored the fidelity of implementation of the program, observing sessions and providing ongoing training and consultation with facilitators throughout the delivery of MdM. A GIZ staff member directly observed delivery at least once a week; in addition, three GIZ staff members observed 65% of the sessions. During these sessions, staff collected data on the content presented in order to provide feedback and training for facilitators as a mechanism to continually improve and monitor implementation.

Teacher participation was exceptional, with 98% of teachers in the Program School participating in at least part of the teacher component. All teachers (100%) who attended the first session continued until the end of the program. Due to a limited capacity for parents (only one sequence of the parent sessions was offered), parent involvement in the program was limited (16% of eligible parents participated though many more were interested in participating). The majority of parents (85%) who came to the first session continued until the end. Both parents and teachers were overwhelmingly positive about their experiences with MdM. Over 95% of both parents and teachers reported that they liked the sessions and over 95% said they would recommend the program to others.

Change was compared between participants in the Program School versus participants in the Control School. Using a general linear modeling approach, significant changes were found on problem behaviors that, over time, can lead to violence against others (e.g., fighting, stealing, disobedience). Changes were also found in teachers' ratings of their abilities to influence their students' prosocial skills and reduce their likelihood of behaving violently (e.g., improved problem solving, better emotion regulation, improved communication). Parents reported increased abilities to create respectful, caring, and attentive relationships with their children. Such relationships are key to effective monitoring and discipline that can reduce youth antisocial and

violent behavior. These effects are even more promising when placed within the negative social changes occurring in the neighborhood during the months of the pilot. Specifically, gang violence significantly increased, transforming the local community from an "orange" to a "red" zone (i.e., more than 90 homicides per 100,000 people within a year) [47, 48]. During the study, gang symbols appeared within the school, most notably within the boys' restroom. The lives of school staff were threatened should the symbols be removed. Despite this increase in risk, parents who took part in MdM reported their child was less likely to join a gang following the program than parents in the Control School.

5.3 Independent study

A staff member with USAID in El Salvador who was not connected with the MdM development process, completed in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with 10 parents in El Salvador who had recently participated in MdM at their child's school [49]. An interpretive phenomenological analysis approach was used to identify themes. Parents often entered the program with the expectation that they would be passive participants; however, this expectation changed through their involvement with the instructor, with other parents, and with teachers, most notably through the sharing of stories about their children and families and through engaging in role-plays. The active engagement of parents with each other and with teachers is a key part of the program and has been sustained even as the program is implemented on a broad scale.

5.4 Dissemination

Agreements between GIZ and the University of Oregon include provisions that MdM program materials would be made available for free for non-profit and gov-ernmental activities. Within Central America, GIZ provides program materials and training on MdM at no cost to interested schools. Since the completion of the development process in 2015, parents and teachers have been trained in MdM in multiple public schools throughout Central America, with the highest number of participants in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In El Salvador, from 2014 to 2020, the US Agency for International Development education project, Education for Children and Youth, included MdM as one resource for supporting schools [50]. In Honduras, the Secretary of Education has chosen to use MdM as one of their approved programs, including it as part of the Parent School (Escuela de Padres) program, which is obligatory in the 22,000 public schools in Honduras [51]. At last count, MdM has been delivered in 892 Honduran schools, with a total of 10,697 parents and 6888 teachers participating in the program. Combined, these parents and teachers affect a total of 160,650 students. To the best of our knowledge, this level of use eclipses any of the school-based violence prevention programs that were present in these countries when the MdM development process began. The unique grounding of the program in both evidence-based interventions and regional and local cultures to ensure its cultural specificity, the program development process that involved multiple stakeholders in the region, the positive preliminary findings, and the ongoing enthusiasm for the program by the Ministries of Education in Central America are key reasons we now are conducting a randomized controlled trial of the program to examine whether or not MdM is related to positive outcomes for youth.

6. Full-scale trial of *Miles de Manos* in Tegucigalpa, Honduras

We are presently conducting a randomized controlled trial of MdM with 30 public primary schools in urban and semi-urban areas in and around the capital city of Tegucigalpa. As schools in Honduras were closed until March of 2022, the trial was launched in July of 2022. Schools have been randomized into a MdM intervention condition or a services-as-usual control condition (15 schools per condition). The Secretary of Education identified potential study schools in violence prevention zones, or those yellow and orange zones in which homicide rates are not as high as those in red zones [50, 51]. In addition, selected schools had no prior experience fully implementing MdM. In each participating school, 3rd, 4th, and 5th grade students are invited to take part (approximate n = 50 students per school; 1500 total); one parent per student (n = 1500); and all 3rd, 4th, and 5th grade teachers (plus 6th grade teachers and other school staff) in each school (n = 8 per school; total n = 240). At each of three time points (i.e., baseline before intervention, intervention termination, and one-year post-termination), we will conduct assessments with all anticipated 3240 participants.

Facilitation of MdM classes is provided by four lead facilitators with prior facilitation experience (including with MdM), who train 2–3 staff per school to facilitate MdM classes involving parents and teachers. In this way, the study works to ensure that knowledge and skills are retained and sustained within each intervention school, thus sustaining the necessary "ingredients" for the success of the MdM program.

7. Conclusion

Migration from Central America to the United States, which can have catastrophic impacts upon families and communities, is exacerbated by youth violence across the Americas and the transnational networks that ferry people and drugs to the US, and guns to Central American nations. Our response to the complex problem of youth violence is a transnational collaboration of researchers and international development experts to create Miles de Manos, a multi-systemic prevention program to address the roots of youth violence in families, schools, and communities in Central America. Here we have reported persistently positive impacts of MdM on teacher and parent behaviors that promote prosocial behaviors and reduce problem behaviors in youth. As a result of the success of MdM, US researchers involved in the collaborative development team re-imported the program back to the US (Project *Juntos*/Together; PI: Martinez, Institute for Education Sciences, grant # R305A140290). It is our hope that Miles de Manos and similar programs, when implemented throughout Central America and the US with fidelity and in concert with other effective national and community development programs, can substantially reduce youth violence and ultimately contribute to greater hemispheric stability.

Acknowledgements

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Section 5

A Glance at Europe

Chapter 12

Forced Migration, Heritage and Identity in Polish-German Borderlands

Zdzisław Mach and Łucja Piekarska

Abstract

This chapter deals with a case of deportation and forced settlement in Central/Eastern Europe after WWII. After the borders of Poland have changed, all the Germans who lived in the Polish territories were deported to Germany, while at the same time, Poles who lived in what became the Ukrainian Soviet Republic were allowed to move to Poland. Most of them were encouraged to settle in the former German lands, where farms and houses were available, having just been abandoned by their German owners. The chapter describes the difficult process of deportation of the Germans and semi-forced migration of the Poles, their hostile attitudes to the new land, uncertainty due to the post-war political circumstances, and a very problematic process of adaptation to the new territory, abandoned but culturally organized by the Germans. The story also includes the dynamics of the post-migration society, including the new generation's attitude to the land and its culture, especially after the Polish accession to the EU. The process of construction of collective identity, as well as collective memory and heritage integrating both Polish and German elements, will be discussed.

1. Introduction

The end of WWII, and in particular the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, brought changes in borders and huge waves of migration in Central Europe. The Soviet Union took over the Baltic states, western Ukraine and western Belarus, including large territories that before the war belonged to Poland. Germany lost its eastern provinces, which the new communist-dominated Polish state obtained as compensation for the lands lost in the east. As a result of these border changes, and following the principle of ethnically-pure states, the entire German population which lived in the pre-war eastern regions of Germany, also in the Sudeten mountains in Czechoslovakia, was forced to emigrate to Germany.

In Poland, this process took a shape of expulsion. At the same time Poles who lived in the east of their country before the war, the parts which were to be annexed by the Soviet Union were allowed (though not exactly forced) to emigrate. The right to leave

was granted to Poles and Jews who in 1939 had lived within the Polish borders. They were allowed to take their possessions, including livestock and equipment as well as two tons of luggage per family. Legally they could stay and become Soviet citizens, but there were many reasons why only a very small minority of them remained.

This eastern land, around the cities of Lwów, Tarnopol, and Stanisławów in the south and Wilno in the north was in the Polish historical memory the essence of Polishness, their national identity. As far as the ethnic composition of the eastern lands of pre-WWII Poland is concerned, Poles were a minority, outnumbered by Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belorussians. However, in urban centres Poles and Jews constituted the majority. They were also dominating in the sense of social class, economically and politically, they were the middle class of the region ([1], p. 507). The Poles built their national identity around these lands, called "Kresy" roughly meaning "frontiers", the land where their ancestors had settled hundreds of years before, where they built the Polish culture, and which they had defended against enemies, such as Russians, Turks, Tartars. Religion played an important role in the construction of collective identity. The Poles were Roman Catholic, while all others were of a different religion (Jews, Orthodox Russians, Muslim Turks and Tartars). Therefore the eastern frontiers were also seen as frontiers of Roman Catholicism and the Latin, Western culture. A myth was created, which became central to the Polish national identity, of the land of a centuries-long struggle for Polishness and Christian Europe against barbarians. Shortly before WWII, the struggle happened again, when Poles fought against Ukrainian nationalists and then the Red Army, and once again won over the enemies. So when in 1945 the decision of the superpowers handed these "sacred" frontiers over to the Soviets, there was a sense of defeat and the ultimate loss. When emigration was suggested, most Poles took this opportunity, as they preferred to move to Poland, wherever it would then be, than to stay in their land which would be occupied and dominated by the enemies.

Those emigrants who had relatives in central Poland tried to settle there, but for the majority, there was no place in already overpopulated villages or in towns which had been heavily destroyed during the war. Therefore the only place where hundreds of thousands of people could go was the new land acquired by the Polish state as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam treaties. Altogether about one and a half million people were displaced from the east of the river Bug (the new Polish-Soviet border) to the new Polish western provinces.

Some of the migrants were the Polish middle class, educated and usually with a very strong sense of national identity shaped in their generation in the 1920s and 1930s by the Polish state recreated in 1918 after long decades of partitions. However, most of the emigrants were Polish peasants, who at that time lived a very simple, traditional life. Their small, poor farms were run in a traditional, autarkic way, which in the east, owing to the excellent quality of the soil, provided them with an adequate amount of food. Their houses were small, usually wooden with thatched roofs. Agriculture was not mechanized and the few existing tools and machines were very simple. Piped water, sewers, and most kinds of modern household equipment were practically unknown. The peasant culture contained folk customs and beliefs largely based on religion, elements of mythologized nationalism and a strong sense of locality. The local landscape and mythical history of the land were essential parts of their view of the world. The land, the mountains, forests, rivers, fields, animals, birds and plants, villages, churches, and cemeteries composed the frame of the feeling of belonging, the people's local identity. The land provided them with an adequate degree of security (also in the ontological sense) and opportunity. They were certainly not ready for

migration. And then the decision came from above to the effect that their land would no longer be Polish, and that their culture and identity would be in danger by the domination of "others" who would have power, and by the Soviet state which would impose their revolutionary changes, seen as completely incompatible with the traditional Polish way of life.

The new Polish western territories were, in some parts, particularly in the east, towards the pre-war German-Polish border inhabited by a mixed population, local Silesians whose regional culture bore many influences of both Polish and German language and traditions. The Poles, especially the peasant communities, maintained their local culture and identity despite the strong pressure of the German national culture, especially since Bismarck consolidated the German state and attempted to create one German nation within its borders. The local urban populations were largely germanised in the process of modernisation, taking advantage of the opportunities created by the German state, its education and other channels of upward mobility.

On the other hand, more western parts, in Lower Silesia, were before the war inhabited almost exclusively by Germans. In 1945 the region's population was around 3.5 million people. Among that number 1, 239,000 lived in the Sudeten mountains. According to the Potsdam agreement, all the Germans had to leave Poland and move to Germany within its new borders. In 1945 the Polish authorities who were responsible for the selection of those inhabitants who would have to leave and those who would be allowed to stay found only 7000 people who could be classified as Poles based on their culture and identity ([2, 3], p. 17; [4], p.173). During the first year of the Polish administration of the region, practically all the Germans were forced to leave. They had to abandon their homes and leave behind all their property except what they could carry in their personal luggage. The Polish authorities described the expulsion as humanitarian, peaceful and respecting human rights. The German reports though speak of many atrocities, looting, rape and violence [5–7]. It is clear that the actual process of expulsion varied from case to case, largely depending on a particular officer in charge. Sometimes transportation was provided, in other cases, people had to walk for hours with their suitcases. One thing is certain: within a year or so there were practically no Germans left in the region, except for a few cases of specialists necessary for some infrastructure to function or mixed Polish-German families.

2. The Settlers and the New Land

The following brief remarks primarily deal with the post-migration situation in rural communities in Lower Silesia. The story was in many ways similar throughout the Polish "western territories", but in the regions with a mixed Polish-German and local population and in big cities, like Wrocław, the situation was more complex. Small villages and towns in rural areas, where Polish immigrant peasants came to depopulated German places presented examples of particularly difficult cases of forced migration to places which were empty in the sense that there were no inhabitants, but which were culturally organized by their former owners.[1]

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[1] The material on which this story is based was collected during fieldwork carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. Some results of this research were published in Zdzisław Mach's "Symbols, Conflict and Identity", Albany NY: SUNY Press 1993 and "Niechciane miasta", Kraków: Universitas, 1998. The part which is devoted to the present developments uses material which comes from the recent fieldwork research carried out in 2021 and 2022 by the authors of this paper.

The Polish migrants came to these new Polish provinces from different parts of the country. Some used to live in central Poland and they were looking for new opportunities in the new land. The majority came from pre-war eastern Poland, and their situation was particularly difficult, as they had no place to return to, while they were neither prepared for migration nor were looking forward to living in what in their understanding was German lands. Their attitude towards the land and the whole situation in which they found themselves was mostly negative. They lost the land to which they were usually strongly attached by their local and national identity. They had no reason to be positively disposed towards the German land and culture, especially just after the disastrous German occupation of Poland. Their culture was very different from the local German/Silesian one: the architecture, the farming, and the language which could be seen in many inscriptions in churches, houses, cemeteries and statues, all were alien, strange and hostile. Moreover, they had reasons to believe that their new situation was only temporary. There was a widespread belief that the new war, this time between the Soviets and the Western allies would soon break out or that the Germans would come back to reclaim their land. Such a belief was spread also by communist propaganda till at least 1970,[2] in order to justify the presence of the Soviet troops in Poland, allegedly to protect Poland from the danger of a German invasion. For the new settlers, such a feeling of uncertainty was an additional factor which generated a sense of rejection and hostility towards their new land. ([8], pp. 168–169; [9], p. 35; [10], pp. 17–37). Such an attitude did not make reconstruction of the settlers' identity in the new land easy. The land itself was seen as German—a property (also in the symbolic sense) of others, and enemies. The new inhabitants were not interested in the history of the region, its culture and its heritage. In the practical sense, they also had no possibility and no need to invest in the new land, houses and farms. Their resources were limited, and they did not see any reason why they should be invested there, with such an uncertain future. The local Polish communist authorities were not interested in mobilizing the community's energy or in any bottom-up initiatives. They preferred, as was the case everywhere in communist Poland, to rule from above in an authoritarian system of power, and made plans to build a new, centralized and disciplined communist society. Local, spontaneous initiatives were not welcome. Moreover, the German material culture was larger and richer than what the immigrants were used to and needed. The German houses were big and equipped with technical devices which the migrants did not understand. They would prefer much more simple and more modest traditional houses and farms. The German "abandoned" possessions came to them easily and there was plenty of it, so for example, if there was damage in the house it was easier to move to another, still empty one than to repair. This was also the advice frequently given by the local authorities. The German material culture was neither understood nor valued, and the non-tangible heritage of the land was not known to the new inhabitants. For them to develop their collective identity in the new land it would have been necessary to create conditions for all kinds of spontaneous activity, motivating people to maximize their efforts in order to make their life better and their new land more familiar and thus more acceptable. In fact, the opposite happened, as the communist authorities did not want to generate or support any such grassroots mobilization. The communist regime also tried to change the symbolic identity of the land in order to promote the view according to these lands had been Slavic, that is Polish, and the German presence

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[2] In 1970 Willy Brand, the German chancellor visited Poland and signed a treaty in which he recognized the post-war Polish-German borders.

(which in fact lasted for many centuries, since the Middle Ages, for most of the recorded history of the region) did not create anything of value. Therefore German material culture was not to be taken care of, it was meant to disappear either through deliberate destruction or through long negligence and lack of maintenance and be replaced by some new constructions which would be interpreted as Polish. In effect, spontaneous hostility and indifference towards the new land shown by the inhabitants were supported and strengthened by the authorities' destructive policy. The German inscriptions and emblems were removed from buildings, German cemeteries were neglected or destroyed (often with the participation of Polish Catholic priests, especially in case a local cemetery was protestant). Streets and squares were given names which were supposed to indicate the Polish character of the land. German monuments and memorials were removed and Polish ones were installed, commemorating either mythical ancient Polish history or the recent liberation from Germany by the Soviet army. Textbooks and guidebooks were written to tell the new Polish version of the region's past. The former German presence in the region was presented as historically unjust and quite unimportant regarding its contribution to the region.

The new, second-generation settlers did not change their attitude significantly. They were born in the former German land but were not interested in it, nor they could establish contacts with Germany on the other side of the border due to the policy of the communist regime which did not favor such relations. There was a prevailing feeling of impossibilism, apathy and indifference. Many young people left the region and emigrated to central Poland, encouraged to do so by their parents. Social apathy and passive attitude were stronger than in other parts of Poland. All sorts of pathology, especially alcoholism were widespread in local villages. However, with the political and economic change following the 1989 transformation, some symptoms of change began to be seen also in the rural parts of the region of Lower Silesia. The border with unified Germany was open and some contacts between the Germans and the Poles started to be formed.

An overall strong spirit of entrepreneurship, developing in Poland in the 90s reached also this area. The young generation, grandchildren of the settlers, distanced themselves both form their grandparents' apathy and hostility to the land and also from the "myth of the lost paradise" in the pre-war east. The young generation knows that their land used to belong to Germany and was culturally organized by the Germans, but they think about the region as having its own cultural identity, which may be neither Polish nor German, but local, and which may belong to the local inhabitants and constitute the basis for their identity. The German heritage began to be appreciated for its beauty and practical usefulness, while the local traditions were becoming interesting and learned.

3. The inheritance and processes of reclaiming memory

It needs to be said here that the "Western Lands" are defined as such from the Polish perspective. It is Poland and its capital that makes it possible to see them as "western", but of course, they would be seen differently from the German viewpoint, where they would be regarded as either concrete regions (for instance Sudeten Land) or the outskirts of Germany (however it needs to be said that they had not been the outskirts of Germany before the World War II). Still, when seen as "western" lands or domains, the space of what used to be German and as a result of historical changes became a part of the Polish state, should be seen as a hybrid area of unusual significance.

The Western Lands were once promoted by the communist regime as "Reclaimed Lands". It was a propaganda tool supposed to establish a sense of historical justice: Poles were there—allegedly—back again, eager to reconquest the space due to the fact that—to make a long story short—they suffered as a society from the cruelties of WWII. The sense of collective responsibility was a drive for the logic of historical imperative but at the same time the households, palaces, cemeteries churches, towns and villages were to be taken over by people who did not see any connection with these places. The feeling of disconnection was only made stronger by the fact that in contrast to the "historical" imperative of justice which is abstract and collective, all the places in which the Poles were to settle down were concrete—some real people had lived there before and led their lives there. But the simple truth that these were the homes that had belonged to someone before their owners and dwellers were expelled (as a part of the same collective sense of historical justice which allowed for repatriation of Poles who were to settle there) was not often admitted, as not useful and counter-effective for the political purposes of communist governments.

To somehow fill a gap between the new reality to which very many settlers could not adapt easily (if at all) the Polish state produced a historically false and structurally mythical narrative. The main storyline to illustrate "historical justice" for the lands to be taken by new incomers was then based on the idea of regaining and reclaiming what was supposed to have been Polish in ancient times. But whether or not this argumentation worked politically as a mobilization tool for newly formed local communities, it did not make the situation easier. Symbolically there might have been a sense of "reconquest", but the harm made to the original owners of the lands was never admitted nor mediated. In many cases, new settlers could not live up to the technologies and standards that had been introduced by the former inhabitants which led to the destruction of many historically valuable monuments.

The silent trauma of the expulsed Germans was not, however, the only one present in the Western Lands. The new settlers were given an impossible mission of new life in surroundings completely new to them, but unlike the pioneers of the American West, they did not have to build the new world from the scratch: on the contrary, the repatriates were expected to make use of what had been already there.

"Repatriation" remains to be another spell that did not work properly. To repatriate means to construct a new motherland/fatherland, outside of what used to be one's home. But the meaning of motherland/fatherland is closely connected with the ancestors, who are often buried in what would be called their land. Poles, who were supposed to settle down in what was not theirs, had left their territories and their ancestors far from their new homes. Would they inherit new ancestors together with the lands they would become hosts of? Would they take care of their remembrance? How would the situation evolve with the generations that came after—would the grandchildren of the settlers from the east forget about their roots or/and would they be ready to accept responsibility for the graves of the ancestors that were literally speaking someone else's?

The mythology of Western Lands was narrated in such a way that the Poles "deserved" to be settled there, but also that this was a return to what had been Polish a long time ago. Still, even the practicalities of everyday life made it challenging for many of them to use the equipment and devices abandoned by the former owners. It not only intensified immediate nostalgia for the ancient (simple) ways of life but also resulted in the destruction of German infrastructure. But what happened to the intangible heritage?

For the post-war settlers to survive there with or without trying to get well accommodated, new stories had to be told, new traditions had to be invented. As usually happens with all mythologies they originated from various scratches and fragments of whatever was available: some stories were brought by the migrants from their former homes, while others can be seen as attempts to "tame" the new spaces by finding new narratives for them.

One of the findings coming from the recent research is that in very many cases the German, as well as the local and regional heritages that had been silenced for decades, are now being recalled and eagerly used by the third generation of the post-war settlers. Not only the process of re-appropriation and valorisation of the—formerly—difficult past followed the situation of breaking the linear way of transition of traditions and identity. What also needs to be mentioned is another construct of the heritage of "in-between" which was born, namely the inheritance after the communist years. In such a way transforming the very recent and still remembered past of the communist years made it possible for the post-war period to become distant enough to be treated as "safer" content to be narrated. As a consequence of the gap that divided the "German past" and "the Polish present" by inserting the in-between, communist heritage, the pre-war past became a kind of mythical resource, while the heritage of the war itself started to represent yet another theme, represented today by a number of interesting sites and events.

The processes of Europeanization of identities also played an important part in the construction of identities [11], as both the Poles and the Germans found themselves as members of the same European community where national belonging is only one of many possible ways of self-definition and the new generations follow global lifestyles. It should be mentioned that the Europeanization of heritage should be understood not as limited to legal or organizational processes, but much more than this mirror some socially embedded ideas such as democratization with its focus on human stories and visitor's participation, or highlighting close and informal narratives as opposed to the formerly stiffening and monopolizing official narratives. It is often in such a way that the "post-German" heritage becomes re-appropriated and adopted in the twenty-first century: local legends and stories connected with specific sites gain significance, while the whole construct of homogenized "Regained"/"reclaimed" or even "Western" lands lose their meaning—no longer it is needed to maintain the collective image of the allegedly non-diverse domain that was presented as justly regained.

So after the communist years, which wrecked many of the buildings and other elements of material and intangible culture, the third generation of settlers entered the game. Many of them strive to redefine the space as their home and somewhere they belong. New stories have been invented and are being applied nowadays. Many of those stories can be found in tourism which not only rapidly develops in these highly attractive regions but also grows to be the domain of adopting heritage in such a way that it fits the current needs: of both the travelers' and hosts' ones.

4. The new storytelling in tourism

It can be said that tourism is a way of adopting local (and regional) symbolic resources so that the tourists (and local communities) can get an added value of authenticity, which itself is a social construct, but also acts as an argument to leave for a journey in person. Tourists travel to experience new things, face unknown

phenomena, get inspired and for reasons that often go beyond the simple need to relax or get entertained. To adjust to such needs, local hosts need to cater for different demands and expectations. In the Western Lands, the main resources to be reinterpreted and given access to are: picturesque landscapes and the beauty of nature, a diverse past which includes but cannot be limited to medieval and feudal history, WWII and—last but not least—the communist inheritance. In this paper, we want to argue that specifically, the communist past as it is currently transformed into heritage makes it feasible for tourism to adopt many diverse parts of the region. On one hand, it makes it easier to establish personal connections with such a recent past and many people still remember it: there are still many witnesses to the communist period in Poland who can explain and interpret much evidence of this era. On the other hand with very rapid social change, communism becomes included in history and the domain of heritage similarly to other "times". As a result heritage of the Western, Lands is very diverse and when transformed into tourism it can welcome even more stories that could be seen as exotic.

Secondly, we want to argue that such richness is in fact a manifestation of the symbolic versatility of the region that may be explained by the specific character of its history. The Western Lands, as we want to argue has been for a long time No Man's Land, not ready to belong to one community and not experienced as genuinely owned by its inhabitants. No man's land is the liminal space in between two defined areas, which makes it receptive to various uses but at the same does not permit for any solid identity to be constructed. In this sense tourist attractions appear to be perfect ways of organizing the symbolic resources as they are meant to cater only for the temporary needs of tourists, who do not settle for good but "just visit". No man's land is a space belonging to all and nobody, so many rather surprising and far from obvious ways of its adaptation are arranged. If the identity of the region was strictly formulated, many of the initiatives would probably be seen as some extravaganzas loosely connected with where they are located. With the loss of the Grand Narrative of regained/reclaimed Lands, the region is reinventing itself in the myriads of smaller narratives and phenomena, many of which operate in the domain of tourism.

To illustrate these reflections with an example one could have a look at the vicinity of Karpacz and Szklarska Poręba, two important (but small) cities located in the mountains. Tourists seeking local attractions there will be invited to the Museum of Sport; the Norwegian Wooden Temple "Wang"; the Japanese landscape gardens of "Siruvia. Little Japan"; The Museum: Family House of Gerard Hauptmann, a German romantic novelist; a glamping of Kalevala, a certified Finnish centre of Culture; the Western City of Ściegny (with rodeo shows) among many, genuinely diverse offers the region can boast of. There are gold mines, stunning waterfalls (advertised for having been filmed as scenography for the Chronicles of Narnia), Uranium mines, secret hideaways of the Nazis, numerous post-German palaces, chapels and churches and much, much more to discover. Inventing and developing such diverse attractions, as we want to argue, is possible due to the character of the Western Lands, specifically its heritage of migrations and expulsions. The new narratives are constructed with the use of available fragments of the past and present in both tangible and intangible manners.

Below several strategies for the symbolic conquest of the Lands will be presented. Due to the length of this article, a selection of the most significant ones was made and only those that are widely represented will be described below. Many of the trends and tendencies reflect those that are well known and observed in tourism through the last decades, for example, thematisation (organizing the diversity of possible tourist attractions according to specific themes), experience-based tourism or

democratization of heritage (with the inclusion of minority narratives and personal exhibits). Yet, in this, no man's land, which is both a space of possibilities and unmediated traumas, the interpretation of the resources for tourism seems to have a very specific character and consequences.

5. No-man's Land and some strategies for identity building

The first strategy presented here makes use of the potential which is both fundamental for tourism and civilizational processes, namely adaptation to the natural environment. Organized, landscape-oriented tourism has long traditions in Lower Silesia. It was well developed in the nineteenth century and as in many other places should be analyzed as a part of nation-making processes, where the attachment to the territory played an important role. The landscape was also romanticized and often regarded as an impulse for artistic illuminations. At the same time, human domination over challenging territories can be seen as a sign of progress and evidence for the accumulation and transfer of knowledge.

Soon after the war tourism, especially the mountain type of it, in Lower Silesia flourished with many events and a strong network of people and places. It can be said that the growth of tourism in the immediate after the war years could gain popularity among others as it was not very costly but most of all was a way of reinterpretation of nature, not culture, heritage or history. In other words, tourists were to discover and appreciate the beauty of nature which had no single national identity and as such was far less problematic.

Of course, all the German names were translated and/or adapted to the Polish language, which made it quite challenging in terms of maps and tourist routes, but the main valor of tourism was supposed to be disconnected from politics.

Nowadays nature-based tourism flourishes in Lower Silesia offering its organizers and travelers many interesting themes. Among them, the most evident is one of the treasures hidden underground and mining cultures that were attempts to explore what had been deeply hidden. This concept is very attractive for the purposes of any storytelling because it makes it possible to align the adventure with a structure of a treasure quest, which is a very popular mythical structure. It can be effectively used also in tourism because it logically organizes the experiences and events into a sequence ended up (hopefully) with a reward.

The use of this fairy tale model is by far not the only element of heritage-based tourism. In a number of various ways, Lower Silesia in its smaller parts (subregions) is presented as a land rich in gems and precious stones, gold, uranium and many minerals. One of the stories told in relation to this is a story of the Spirit of the Mountains, a legendary being known by all communities of the Giant Mountains (Karkonosze). Visitors can come across his legend in a number of places and his image was also adopted by a local brand created by a local cluster of producers and service providers. There is a museum in Karpacz (acknowledged by the voters of Polish National Geographic as one of Poland's treasures); a mechanical theater in Plawna Dolna where the legends are performed by giant puppets; a cookbook and many more.

The Spirit of the mountains is a very interesting figure.[3] First of all, he is transnational so cannot be inscribed to one national mythology, ruling (having ruled?) over the people who inhabit the lands of the Giant Mountains and vicinities without

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[3] The story of the Spirit was described and "archived" by Carl Hauptmann, who became a leading figure in romantic writing circles and who established a writers' colony in Szklarska Poreba.

regard to their national or ethnic belonging. Secondly, the Spirit represents superpowers which can interrupt the lives of ordinary people and in consequence provoke unexpected changes in their lives. This gives him and stories of him a universal character, but at the same time, many legends featuring him have very specific locations. There is even a small waterfall called the Spirit's tomb. Also, the stories of the superhero add some magic to the lands, an element of animism and supernatural powers that is usually desired in many stories. Especially the superpower of changing into other shapes is very intriguing and appreciated by numerous mythologies.

Employing the Spirit of the Mountains in heritage tourism is therefore a way of shifting interest into the domain of magic, legends and universal myths. As far as the stories go, the Spirit usually takes the side of the good but poor while punishing the evil ones, who are vane and corrupt by power. This gives him a powerful position of a superhero, the one who saves the world (or at least some part of it) and makes it a vivid place to live [12].

The figure of the Spirit of the Mountains is used as the axis for the interactive museum in Karpacz, where some of his adventures allow the audience to interact with local legends and learn about interesting facts from the past. The attraction is constructed as family-friendly, very precisely designed by artists and with the use of many high-end technologies. It is immersive, narrative and fun – edutainments at its best. It needs to be said, however, that the selection of topics for the Museum automatically excludes all other, more complex parts of local identity and the past. The difficult periods of the history of Lower Silesia are never mentioned, so the context for the story remains fully legendary and unreal giving a perfect setting for family time out.

Featuring the Spirit of the Mountains in other tourism-related situations and products may be also interpreted as referring to animistic beliefs—of course not very present in these regions, but more than welcome when any storytelling is needed. Magic in general, especially its unexplainable powers, is ubiquitous in the representations of the region encountered in the Western Lands. The most straightforward example is that of Plawna Dolna, a small village reinterpreted and animated by a local artist, who transformed it into Magiczna Plawna (Magical Plawna). The rather eccentric theme park which includes mechanical theater, ceramic workshops, the Troian horse or a merry-go-round and many more, makes use of legendary characters from the region mixing and melting them into a surreal situation where visitors navigate led by their curiosities and sometimes amazement. Not far from the castle of the theme park (of course there must be a castle in the theme park), tourists will also find a museum of Sacred Art, presented in Noah's Ark, but what is even more surprising they will be invited to the Museum of the Repatriated. The three attractions are to be found nearby and the tickets are also sold in packages.

Plawna Dolna could remain a forgotten place in the middle of nowhere, but due to its reinterpretation by Dariusz Milinski—an artist and local animator, who actually devoted himself to making his vision a tangible reality, it has become recognized for originality and fantasy. The whole place is arranged in a very interesting way but what is most important is it never becomes completely detached from history, although definitely the past is interpreted rather freely. Including the Museum of Refugees in the legendary theme park is specifically worthwhile, especially as in this case it becomes a part of a complex, integrated tourist product offering visitors insight into the more recent history of these lands. Milinski situates Plawna in a universal domain of legends, myths and fairy tales, but with his interpretation, he keeps coming back to the motifs which are closely connected to the region.

Focusing on locality instead of referring to the whole region is a very effective strategy for tourist product development and promotion. We understand it here as adapting microstories, which are connected with specific households, families or persons to narrate the sites in order to give the added value of authenticity. The point is that microstories, which may be biographies of people who used to live there, allow us to focus on the human side of the past, without generalizing it into political history. Often in the narratives, it is the proximity of the story, it is the setting in the site that is highlighted, while more complex historical processes are just mentioned as if they were already known by the guests to the lands of massive migration movements.

A good example of basing a tourist product on a human story can be found in the village of Dobkow in what is advertised as the Land of Extinct Volcanoes, not far from Jelenia Góra or Złotoryja. Villa Greta is a very good quality accommodation and restaurant serving rather sophisticated dishes in a nice, friendly environment of a "post-German" household. The site is managed by a family of descendants of Greta, a German woman who—as one of the very few—managed not to be expulsed from what became Polish territory. Greta was saved from expulsion by romantic love, and after many efforts from her fiancée (who had to get official permission from Warsaw), she got married to a Pole, with whom she started a family. The place was in a way rediscovered by her grandchildren, one of whom returned to the site (after years of traveling around the world) to settle, but also to start local activism, which evolved into building a brand of the Land of extinct volcanoes. The wedding portrait of Greta still decorates one of the walls of the restaurant, while sophisticated (and not cheap) menus demonstrate many local as well as global references. The place is very well received by urban lovers of good coffee, vegetarians and vegans, but also by families with children who love having comfort food meals, sometimes decorated with edible flowers. It is a lively place, with a story that connects the world with the locality. Villa Greta is a site that tells a unique story, offers good quality stays and food and does not stop to be a centre for local entrepreneurship.

The strategy of narrating sites by telling stories of very close proximity, namely by referring to the lives of builders or/and owners of the sites can be encountered in a number of places in the region. The easiest way to find them is to look closely at many of the names which recall not only the old days but also the actual people from the past—with their own dilemmas, sorrows and joys. In some places, the old cooking recipes are brought back to life, while in other places rooms are decorated with souvenirs from the past days. Interestingly enough old suitcases remain to be a very popular type of object to be found as a decoration in many bed and breakfasts and small hotels. The history of expulsions and settlers is no longer absent, but rather esthetically tuned to harmonize with "authentic" places.

Another way of approaching the complex past without emphasizing German-Polish relations is focusing on the quality of arts in heritage locations together with weaving stories of social classes. In Gorzanow, a splendid yet still ruined palace erected by Herbertstein Family and now brought back to life by a Pole, the national or ethnic elements seem not to matter much when narrated in a guided walk. What the guide (an owner himself) emphasizes is the value of the artwork, but also the wealth and eccentricity of the owners who—among others—kept a repertoire theater with an orchestra to stage performances in a baroque setting. The guide would also narrate the history of the place with a rather simple sense of humor, where the rich are portrayed as vane, corrupt and spoilt. It remains a fact, though that the ruins of the palace are being transformed into a fascinating monuments and the work is certainly very demanding.

Finally, the last element of heritage we want to briefly present here is the past of the communist times. The interesting thing is that the era is still remembered by many and can be easily recalled for example by making references to the objects exhibited locally. Especially the objects of everyday use impress many visitors, as they can remember them as items of use (not representation).

6. Happily ever after?

The changes observed in the domain of tourism and heritage reflect many identity processes which take place in what used to be the "Reclaimed Lands". While many of them can be interpreted as parts of globalization, others are ways of structuring the symbolic diversity of regional heritage or attempts to create interesting tourist attractions. The past still plays a significant part in the Western Lands, inviting new settlers and travelers but most of all shaping the dynamics of the identity of the territories.

The process of transformation of what used to be a German eastern province, a borderland between Poland and Germany, then a depopulated area from which its former inhabitants were deported and which was taken over by uprooted, Polish settlers, reluctant and unhappy owners of the strange land who rejected its heritage, into a land of opportunity for those who decided to give it a new meaning [13], is also a story of Europeanisation. The new, post-2004 European region with an open border between Poland and Germany, offers its rich nature and cultural heritage to people of imagination and an entrepreneurial spirit who are now free to build there their identity, individually constructed and integrating different components, German and Polish, incorporating in an original, often hybrid fusion various symbols and images in which national heritages are mixed with that of the region and individually interpreted, often quite "exotic" elements in a form of post-modern mosaic. Individually constructed identity, freedom of interpretation of the land and its cultural treasures, and its tangible and intangible heritage create a new identity of the land. A European frame of reference enables the new generation of inhabitants of the region to look at it from a new, broader perspective, as a part of Europe of the plurality of interconnected and interpenetrating heritage which can be interpreted in many different ways. A decentralized, dynamic process of giving new meaning to places allows creative individuals to build tourist attractions of a new type which is not identified exclusively with a particular national culture. This is a chance for all inhabitants of the region to live there and to identify with it in their own way. The unhappy past of the land is transformed into a promise to feel at home and to write a new chapter of its history.

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The Covert Push-Factor: How the Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict of 1948 Influenced Organized Jewish Emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel (1948–1952)

Milan Radovanović

Abstract

Organized Jewish emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel followed within a matter of months once an independent Jewish state was proclaimed. Between 1948 and 1952, more than half of the Yugoslav Jews who had survived the Holocaust decided to settle in the newly formed state of Israel. This emigration coincided with a tumultuous period in the post-World War II history of Yugoslavia. The conflict over ideological differences between Yugoslav and Soviet communism had peeked in June of 1948, resulting in what later turned out to be a permanent shift in relations. The chronological overlap alone secured that the conflict and its consequences would play a significant role in the process of organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel. However, as the subject could not be spoken about directly, its implications remain subtle throughout. This paper aims to define its potential as a push factor, by analyzing the way in which the conflict makes itself visible within the migration process. A difference is made between the way in which the conflict shaped the participation of Yugoslav authorities and the Federation of Jewish religious communities in the emigration and it acting as a basic push factor on the level of individuals leaving the country.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, USSR, Israel, Jewish migration, Yugoslav-Soviet conflict

1. Introduction

Yugoslav state participation in Jewish migration to Palestine and, as of 1948, the independent state of Israel can be viewed as consisting of several distinct stages, each defined by a unique combination of political circumstances. During the interwar period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was one of the main transit areas for Jewish refugees escaping the Third Reich and territorial expansion [1–5]. Part of the Jews escaping prosecution after 1933 attempted to illegally make their way to British-held Mandate Palestine. Although acting on distinctly different ideals, Yugoslavia assumed the same role in the first few post-war years. Yugoslav authorities allowed for the

transit of Jewish former concentration camp prisoners coming from Western and Central European countries [6]. With an independent state of Israel being proclaimed in May of 1948, Jewish immigration could continue on a large scale, with no legal restrictions [7].

Only solidified and expanded on after the NSDAP came to power in Germany in 1933, anti-Semitism was a mainstay of politics in Western and Central Europe during the interwar period [1]. Looking to escape ever more severe prosecution, most European Jews attempted to migrate to either the United States or the British mandate in Palestine. As American and British immigration policies grew to be more and more restrictive, the Balkans became an increasingly important part of the route for illegal immigration. Because of its geographical position, as of 1933, Yugoslavia became a transit area for approximately 50,000 Jewish refugees coming from territories within the Third Reich or suffering heavy political pressure from Nazi Germany [8]. The participation of Yugoslav Jews in migration to Palestine, although in no way prohibited by state authorities, was at this time limited to a small number of individuals. Local Jews viewed the threat of anti-Semitism as being a distant one.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Yugoslavia was re-established as a socialist country, following an authentic revolution conducted by the local communist party and liberation by partisan forces cooperating with the advancing Soviet army. Acting as part of the Eastern Block, with the goal of strengthening the Soviet position in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East in mind [9], Yugoslavia allowed the transit of Jews primarily coming from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania, on their way to British Palestine [6]. As a result of Yugoslav authorities cooperating with international Jewish organizations, the first transports for Palestine left Yugoslav harbors as early as 1946. Local Jews were, however, forbidden from joining these illegal transports so as to avoid further degrading the already strained relations between Yugoslavia and Great Britain. The only way Yugoslav citizens could migrate to Palestine at this time was by acquiring one of the few available migration certificates.

After the establishment of an independent State of Israel was proclaimed on May 14th 1948, all existing limitations on the immigration of Jews to Palestine, enacted by British mandate authorities, became void [10]. Over the next 4 years, approximately 700,000 members of Jewish communities from all over the world settled in the newly formed state [11]. A small part of this larger migration movement were 7739 Jewish inhabitants of Yugoslavia, making their way to Israel within one of five waves of organized emigration that had left the country between 1948 and 1952 [12]. Individual migration waves were repeatedly organized until the number of applications was too low to justify further persisting on this format.

The participation of Yugoslav state authorities in every stage of the migration process was defined by appropriately close cooperation with the Federation of Jewish religious communities (Savez jevrejskih veroispovednih opština Jugoslavije). Established in 1919, it was the chief representative organization of the Jewish community living in Yugoslavia. The Federation's position within the post-war state was reaffirmed as early as December of 1944, albeit with certain caveats to it [13]. Representatives of the Federation tacitly accepted that within the dominant ideology of Marxism-Leninism, they were limited to representing the Jewish community of Yugoslavia as a political and national entity, distancing themselves from any questions pertaining to the religious elements of Jewish identity. This was formalized by entrusting leading positions within the Federation to members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Beyond that, the Jewish community enjoyed a

somewhat privileged position in post-war Yugoslavia, as upwards of 4500 of its members took part in the National liberation movement (Narodnooslobodilačka borba) [14].

As Yugoslav state participation in the Jewish migration was predominantly defined by the current constellation of specific political circumstances, cooperation with the Federation of Jewish religious communities took on different forms within different stages of the process. The attitude of Yugoslav authorities towards Jewish migration between 1933 and 1938 can best be described as benevolent passivity. Concerned with bilateral relations with the new German regime, the Yugoslav government was not going to in any way openly provoke an unwanted reaction. In the meantime, the Federation [4] and, by proxy, the Ashkenazi Jewish religious community of Zagreb [15] were tasked with intercepting and taking care of waves of Jewish refugees coming to Yugoslavia.

State authorities and the Federation of Jewish religious communities somewhat reversed their positions during the first post-war years. Jewish refugees crossing Yugoslav territory between 1945 and 1948 were transported in closed trains to smaller Yugoslav ports, where ships ready to illegally take them to Palestine awaited them [6]. This basically meant that participation in what was illegal migration at this time was limited solely to state authorities. The Federation was limited to helping the few individuals who had secured an immigration certificate.

It was only with the proclamation of an independent state of Israel and free emigration that Yugoslav state authorities, together with the Federation of Jewish religious communities found themselves in a position to actively define the emigration process, as for the first time both parties were free to take part in it without being limited by circumstances outside of their control. Organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel coinciding with the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict of 1948 made this fact all the more significant.

Up until 1943, the Communist party of Yugoslavia was a section of the Comintern and had indoctrinated its members so as to view the Soviet Union as the 'sole socialist island in the world' [16]. It was these ideas that guided the effort to rebuild Yugoslav society after the war. Everything was to be done in accordance with the Soviet model. However, although they were still the most loyal Soviet supporters, Yugoslav communists also felt that they had earned the right to find their own model of socialism, by conducting an authentic revolution during the war [17, 18]. These kinds of notions were incompatible with Soviet plans of turning Eastern Europe into an ideologically homogeneous block directly controlled by Moscow. Although they had avoided directly questioning the ideological supremacy of the Soviet Union, it soon became apparent that Yugoslavia was determined to act independently of its ideological patron. This was especially noticeable in the way Yugoslav delegates voted in the United Nations [19]. Already tense relations with the Soviet Union culminated with Yugoslavia parting ways with the Cominform in June of 1948.

Although the scope and potential consequences of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict could not have been obvious to anyone, Yugoslav communists knew that a return to the Eastern block was not realistic, as the consequences of such an action would have been too dire [20]. This fact fundamentally reshaped the way in which Yugoslav communists perceived their own position in a world increasingly adopting a bi-polar model of division. Between 1949 and 1953, Yugoslav communists were actively looking to develop diplomatic activity by crossing the boundaries of the Eastern block [19]. This overarching goal would be pursued through every means available, with migration being one of the more prominent ones [21].

This paper sets out to answer two questions – in what way did the conflict of 1948. define the way in which the Yugoslav state and the Federation of Jewish religious communities positioned themselves within organized Jewish migration to Israel and how was the conflict mirrored in the decision of individual members of the Jewish community to leave Yugoslavia for Israel, that is how important was its role as a traditional push factor. The conflict is defined as being a covert push factor, as it is very rarely and only indirectly addressed in documents pertaining to the migration process. Therefore, the general significance of it can solely be assessed on the basis of scattered implications throughout different aspects of organized migration.

To better understand all of the different aspects of organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel, as well as the divergent perspectives of different participating sides, the process was deconstructed and the implications of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict of 1948 were analyzed on three separate, yet mutually interconnected levels [22]. The top level encompasses the perspective and the actions of the Yugoslav state. The lowest level is that of individual migrants looking to leave Yugoslavia for the newly established Jewish state. The second level encompasses the perspectives of the Federation individual Jewish religious communities. This level is the most complex, as the Federation regularly echoed the position of state officials, while local communities are primarily concerned with problems their own members are facing.

Deconstructing organized migration to Israel enables analyzing the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict as a push factor of greater scope than what a traditional approach would allow us to conclude. Limiting ourselves to the fact that the consequences of clashing ideologies were an additional encouragement for individuals to leave Yugoslavia would be underestimating the impact of this phenomenon. To better understand how all-encompassing the effect of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict was on organized emigration to Israel, we consider a push factor to be anything that all participating sides viewed as a potentially useful or positive result of the migration process being realized. This allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how the Yugoslav-Soviet, at least in part, drove the process of organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel forward.

2. Redefining an ideology

Conflicting with the Soviet Union and other Cominform members meant that Yugoslavia found itself in a position of diplomatic isolation. Searching for a means of escaping this new reality, Yugoslav authorities turned to, among other things, emigration as a way of popularizing the idea of Yugoslav socialism as an independent alternative to the monolithic Eastern block [21]. In this way the image of Yugoslavia as a progressive, politically, socially and economically well-developed state, whose driving force was a strong and independent Communist party was to be disseminated [23]. Organized emigration to Israel was perceived as being a particularly potent instrument for achieving such a goal. The process itself was of relatively small scale and, because of the way it was set up, almost completely defined by the Yugoslav state [24]. At the same time, solely because of the fact that within 24 hours of it being proclaimed, the independence of Israel was recognized by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the newly formed Jewish state became a unique and very much welcome exception to the dynamics of the post-war world [9, 10]. Yugoslavia, having recognized the independence of the Israeli state on the 18th of May, and

being in a position thought of as very similar to the one of Israel [25] seized this opportunity to repeatedly reaffirm its own sovereignty.

The special bond forged between Yugoslav state authorities and the Federation of Jewish Religious communities became increasingly obvious during organized emigration to Israel. Notions that the newly emancipated Yugoslav communists must have thought of as being crucial, albeit in a modified form, found their way into official notes sent by Federation executives to future émigrés. The two basic ideas put forth in these documents are always the same – Yugoslavia was among the first ones to recognize the independent state of Israel and Yugoslav authorities were generous in allowing for free and unconditioned emigration to Israel. The most systematic in laying out these notions were farewell notes addressed by the Federation to migrants leaving Yugoslavia within the first two waves of organized emigration in December 1948/January 1949 and June/July 1949 respectively:

> *"Never forget that the Federative Peoples republic of Yugoslavia was amongst the first to recognize the state of Israel and allow free emigration to all Jews who had volunteered for it, in this way demonstrating its most profound generosity and affability"* [26] *(translated from Serbian by the author).*

When observed within the context of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict of 1948, these two ideas become significantly more specific and poignant. Yugoslavia being 'among the first' to recognize the newly independent Israeli state was obviously indirectly putting it on the same level of participation in global politics as the United States and the Soviet Union. This was of course claiming a position realistically far beyond the reach of Yugoslavia, but well within what was thought of as being the role Yugoslav socialism should play as an ideology independent of that which was governing the Eastern block.

It was of the utmost importance to repeatedly point out that Yugoslav Jews were free to leave the country for Israel at any time, as this was an indirect critique of changes to Soviet migration policy that ensued not long after the USSR first recognized Israel [27]. Formally, every socialist government respected the individual's right to freely choose his place or residence and, in accordance, leave the country if he desires to do so. At first, taking a pro-Israel and pro-Zionist position, the Soviet Union had, over a period of only a few years, turned to discard Israel as 'part of the Western block' [9]. The breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries leads to an increasing number of Soviet Jews never getting the opportunity to migrate to Israel [28]. At the same time, the official position of every citizen being able to leave the country and freely choose his place of residence was never abandoned. This kind of contradiction between theory and practice became a staple of the migration models implemented by other communist countries also. In fact, it was local party officials who in most cases decided the fate of migration to Israel in accordance with current Soviet interests. Local Jews would be, more often than not, only allowed to emigrate under very harsh circumstances or not at all.

Permitting local Jews to freely migrate from Yugoslavia to Israel was interpreted as being an expression of not just the independence, but the superiority of Yugoslav over Soviet political practice. Ever present acknowledgements of the permission given to local Jews to emigrate to Israel as being an expression of Yugoslav authorities correctly understanding the problem of national emancipation in its entirety and especially in the case of the Jewish community must be understood in much the same way [25].

The independence of the Yugoslav state was also often asserted by drawing a parallel between the illegal migration of the first post-war years and organized emigration to Israel. After having participated in illegal Jewish migration in the first postwar years, organized emigration coinciding with the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict gave the process great symbolic importance [21]. While taking part in illegal migration to Palestine was a manifestation of ideological subordination, after an independent state of Israel was established and Yugoslav-Soviet diplomatic relations broke down, organized emigration was continuously defined as a way in which Yugoslavia was proving itself independent of any kind of outside influence.

All of the aforementioned ideas are called upon when the position Yugoslav émigrés were going to inhabit in Israeli society was discussed. Regularly tasked with 'defending the honour' of Yugoslavia, they are defined as messengers of an authentic revolution [23]. The most direct insistence of émigrés being assumed to participate in spreading the tradition of Yugoslav socialism is found in a telegram addressed to Josip Broz Tito from one of the ships leaving for Israel in October of 1952, within the fifth wave of organized emigration. The use of the term 'truth' alone implies Yugoslav authorities were dealing with the unfavorable position of being a former part of the Eastern block, attempting to prove its worth independently from it.

> *"Having witnessed the establishing of socialism and the fight for peace, national equality and independence, we consider it our duty to spread the truth about today's Yugoslavia, its strides and ways of developing socialism"* [28] *(translated from Serbian by the author).*

3. Redefining a community

While Yugoslav state authorities perceived organized emigration to Israel as a way of breaking through diplomatic isolation following the conflict of 1948, Federation executives saw the conflict as a circumstance which would potentially enable them to further solidify their own and the position of the Jewish community in post-war Yugoslav society. Ideas put forth were, however, much the same as the ones state officials insisted on, as the Federation was acting as a kind of mouthpiece to the Yugoslav regime.

The very beginning of preparations for members of the Jewish community to join in mass migration to the newly formed state of Israel was, in a way, imprinted on by the attempts of the Yugoslav regime to secure for itself a position of sovereignty in the post-war world. Any kind of valid reasoning for leaving Yugoslavia had to be ingrained in the political reality of the post-war state, as presenting the process as the realization of Zionist ideas was out of the question. Adopting the attitude of their Soviet role models, Yugoslav communists were intolerant toward the idea of Zionism which was viewed as being, in essence, treacherous to the state [9].

Federation executives, therefore, compared the ideological backgrounds of post-war Yugoslavia and the newly established state of Israel, in search of commonalities which could be used to justify mass migration. What stood out as a value shared by both sides was a struggle (borba) [29]. The authentic revolution Yugoslav communists were building their ideological sovereignty on was a product of the National liberation struggle (Narodnooslobodilačka borba), while Israel had to defend its newly attained freedom in a war with neighboring Arab countries [23]. The two were equated and, at times, conflated with each other:

> *"The state of Israel's heroic struggle for independence was already successful in ways that impress and provoke the admiration of all of the progressive world, in the way of a true national liberation struggle […] We have no doubts that you (migrants leaving Yugoslavia, authors note) will do your duty and help the struggle of those giving their lives for the future of the Jewish people, for an independent and free Israel, for the national liberation and antifascist struggle of Israel" [23] (translated from Serbian by the author).*

It could even be argued that this kind of rationalization lead to the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict of 1948 and organized emigration being viewed as having, in a formal sense, much the same ideological background. This basic idea had, of course, wide-ranging implications when applied to how the émigrés themselves were represented. When first proposing that a larger group of Jews be allowed to migrate to Israel, in accordance with the basic idea of a common struggle between the two states, Federation executives described future migrants as 'volunteers on their way to help the Jewish fighters in Palestine' [23]. This was just one of the many roles ascribed to migrants leaving Yugoslavia for Israel. All of these were, however, expressions of the Federation attempting to use the post-1948 circumstances to better define its own and the community's position within Yugoslav society and had almost no real value as far as Yugoslav political practice is concerned.

After asserting that the moment in which the organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel ensued is 'truly a historical one' and how the migrants are tasked with 'helping the struggle of Israel towards the realization of the historic destiny of the Jewish people'. Federation executives point out that the migrants will be representing Yugoslavia every step of the way.

> *"It is your sacred and never ending debt to remain faithful to your old home staid, our fatherland, the Federative people's republic of Yugoslavia, her states and her people. […] Knowing all that, you will continue to defend the interests of the Federative people's republic of Yugoslavia and her good name. You will faithfully present in your new surroundings the magnificent struggle of the Yugoslav people against fascism and the magnificent striving for socialism in our country" [26] (translated from Serbian by the author).*

Calling upon the migrants to defend the interests and good name of Yugoslavia abroad obviously has a symbolic meaning when the request is weighed against the backdrop of the 1948 conflict with the Soviet Union and especially against the diplomatic isolation of Yugoslavia which immediately followed it. Glorifying the people's struggle against fascism and their efforts for building a socialist society is, again, just indirectly asserting the originality of Yugoslav socialism outside of the boundaries of the Eastern block and Soviet influence.

4. Redefining oneself

While in a far more complex and abstract sense of the word a 'push' factor when it comes to the participation of the Yugoslav state and the Federation of Jewish religious communities in organized emigration, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict directly influenced the decision of individual members of the Jewish community in Yugoslavia to migrate to Israel. The main goal of every migrant is life in some regard better than

the one left behind. Finding themselves, in any sense of the word, on the wrong side of an event with consequences as far-reaching as the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict was, must have, therefore, be reason enough for any member of the Jewish community in Yugoslavia to take the opportunity afforded to them and leave the country.

It seems very unlikely that individuals migrating to Israel between 1948 and 1952 were fully aware of the complex diplomatic context surrounding Yugoslavia at the time. However, when the circumstances of the conflict with the Soviet Union and its possible consequences became public knowledge, it is safe to assume that individuals took organized emigration to Israel much more seriously. Although on a smaller scale, certain aspects of the conflict were just as potent as other, more all-encompassing, migration factors.

Splitting from the Cominform left the Communist party of Yugoslavia dealing with a significant number of its own members convinced that pursuing a course independent of the Soviet Union would be a mistake [30]. This faction was dealt with in a swift and decisive manner in a process of de-Stalinizing the party, which turned into de-Stalinizing Yugoslav society as a whole [31]. There are no recorded cases of Yugoslav Jews who officially came under scrutiny from Yugoslav authorities because of defecting from party lines and therefore decided that leaving the country was their best option. However, documents mention a number of convicts and persons under arrest or who were awaiting trial 'for reasons unknown' [32]. It appears that this was code used for subjects of 'ideological cleansing'. Their cases were presented to the Federation and the Ministry of internal affairs of Yugoslavia in hopes of securing a migration permit [32].

Andrija Sekelj from Belgrade was arrested at the beginning of August 1948. At the time he was employed as a department head with the 'Jugoslovenska knjiga' publishing company, his appeal stated that there was no clear reason for his arrest. However, his appeal also states that, after the war had ended, he returned from the Soviet Union, where he had spent time as an ex-inmate of a liberated concentration camp in Hungary. He had been 'active' while in the Soviet Union but returned to Yugoslavia 'full of love' for his homeland. This kind of insistence on patriotism and fidelity felt towards his country as well as his connection to the Soviet Union make it clear that the case of Andrija Sekelj was just one of many facets directly defined by the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict. His application was denied.

What remains implicit in the case of Andrija Sekelj, was stated in a far more unambiguous way by Đorđe Alpar from Belgrade. After having been arrested by the Administration of State Security (Uprava državne bezbednosti – UDB), Alpar found himself in prison at the time the second wave of organized emigration to Israel was announced. In his appeal, he states that 'after considering current events, he had realized the error of his ways and that in Israel he would do nothing to degrade the good name of Yugoslavia'. Again, this kind of language, as well as the fact that his arrest was handled by the Administration for State security points to the conclusion that Đorđe Alpar had been imprisoned because of Stalinist ideals. He was not granted permission to leave the country for Israel.

When Darinka Sefer addressed the Federation of Jewish religious communities in hopes of securing the early release of her husband from prison, she stated that he had been arrested because 'two malicious men had accused him of being an enemy of the current state of things in Yugoslavia'. She had previously addressed the Ministry of internal affairs on several occasions but had failed in her attempts to secure a place for her husband in the second wave of organized emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel, that had left in mid-1949.

Although migration to Israel was considered an ideal way of ideologically homogenizing the Jewish community in post-war Yugoslavia by allowing all kinds of groups not wanting to live in a socialist society to leave [23], it appears that individuals who were assumed to be Cominform supporters were shown no such leniency. This decision is even more peculiar when compared to the attitude of Yugoslav state authorities towards the second category of migrants directly influenced by the conflict - nationals of Cominform countries coming to Yugoslavia in the hope of making their way to Israel [33].

While acting as a push factor when it comes to local Jews deciding to leave Yugoslavia for Israel, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict had just the opposite effect when it comes to attracting political refugees from neighboring Cominform countries, of which a total of 7700 found their way across the border between 1948 and 1951 [34]. As getting to Israel from the Soviet Union and, therefore, other socialist countries, was proving to get ever more difficult, there seemed to be a small, but steady stream of Jewish refugees coming to Yugoslavia with the sole purpose of joining in organized emigration [33]. It is within this group that the only case is found in which the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict and its consequences were directly addressed in the context of organized emigration from Yugoslavia to the newly formed Jewish state in the Middle East.

The Jewish community of Pančevo received an inquiry in September of 1948 from Armin Lefkovic and Izidor Levezon, both residents of Satu Mare in Romania [33]. Lefkovic had arrived in Yugoslavia with his wife Rezika and children, Claudia and Daniel. As they had lost their luggage and money along the way, they asked the local Jewish community for help. Izidor Levenson found himself in Yugoslavia under similar circumstances. During the hearing organized by the Jewish community in Pančevo, both Lefkovic and Levezon stated that they had been forced to leave Romania because they were "close to the political orientation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia". The Lefkovic family left Yugoslavia for Israel within the first wave of organized emigration. The fate of Izidor Levenson remains unknown.

5. Conclusions

The overlap between five waves of organized emigration leaving Yugoslavia for Israel between 1948 and 1952 and the immediate aftermath of the breakdown in Yugoslav-Soviet relations lead to the conflict partially shaping the way in which this migration process was perceived. On the other hand, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict had strictly practical consequences.

On the part of Yugoslav authorities and the Federation of Jewish religious communities, the conflict was thought of as being a particularly potent means to a predetermined end. In that sense, although the two sides were not participants affected by push factors in the traditional sense of the word, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict motivated them to further develop the way in which they took part in the process. Although it was a policy applied to emigration in general, Yugoslav Jews settling in the newly established state of Israel was a perfect opportunity for the placement of concepts crucial to the Yugoslav political reality post-1948. In particular, the idea of Yugoslav socialism being a valid and, in many ways, superior alternative to the Soviet model weighs heavily on organized emigration to Israel. In insisting on the same basic idea, officials of the Federation of Jewish religious communities of Yugoslavia were pursuing a much different goal. In addressing the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict

and insisting on the same basic idea of the superiority of Yugoslav socialism, they were looking to secure the position of the Federation and the Jewish community in post-war Yugoslavia.

Individuals approached the conflict in a much more pragmatic way and its implications in the way they would a traditional push factor. Taking into account all of the many implications and consequences of Yugoslavia parting ways with the Soviet Union and the Eastern block, organized emigration was viewed as a way of escaping potentially harmful situations. In that sense, individuals who were accused of being ideologically close to the Soviet Union tended to apply for organized emigration obviously as a way of leaving an unwanted and potentially dangerous situation behind. Yugoslav authorities, however, were not understanding of these attempts. Most of these applicants were denied a chance to leave Yugoslavia. The opposite was true of migrants coming from Cominform countries to Yugoslavia, with the sole objective of joining in organized emigration. These were swiftly dispatched with the next transport going to Israel.

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Edited by Ingrid Muenstermann

This book demonstrates the tide of change of immigration and emigration. Societies of the northern part of the globe, which had previously sent people to developing countries in the southern hemisphere, are experiencing a never-ceasing influx of registered and unregistered people from the southern part of the globe. In thirteen chapters written by experts from all over the world, this book explores emigration and immigration during the last three centuries.