



Migration in Austria

Günter Bischof, Dirk Rupnow (Eds.)

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
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Table of Contents

Preface	13
---------	----

I. INTRODUCTION

Heinz Tesarek, <i>Photo Essay: The Bakkar Family from Aleppo, Syria – Frontpage Refugees</i>	25
--	----

Dirk Rupnow, <i>The History and Memory of Migration in Post-War Austria: Current Trends and Future Challenges</i>	37
---	----

II. FROM THE LATE HABSBURG EMPIRE TO WORLD WAR II

Annemarie Steidl, <i>Migration Patterns in the Late Habsburg Empire</i>	69
---	----

III. POST-WORLD WAR II

Maximilian Graf/Sarah Knoll, <i>In Transit or Asylum Seekers? Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the Communist Bloc</i>	91
---	----

Vida Bakondy, <i>“Austria Attractive for Guest Workers?” Recruitment of Immigrant Labor in Austria in the 1960s and 1970s</i>	113
---	-----

Anne Unterwurzacher, <i>“The Other Colleagues” – Labor Migration at the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten from 1962 to 1975</i>	139
---	-----

Verena Lorber, *To Come into Focus: Female “Guest Workers” from Former Yugoslavia in Austria (1960-1980)* 161

Eva Tamara Asboth/Silvia Nadjivan, 187
*Neither Here Nor There – Ni ovdje, ni tamo:
Religiously Connoted Social Media Self-Representations
of “Generation In-Between”*

IV. THE “REFUGEE CRISIS” TODAY AND ITS REFLECTION IN SOCIETY AND THE ARTS

Andreas Th. Müller/Andreas Oberprantacher, 217
*Austria Bordering Europe: Blocking and Brokering Routes
Amid a Manifold Crisis*

Christiane Hintermann, *Marginalized Memories: The (In)visibility of Migration History in Public Space in Austria* 243

Manfred Kohler, *Austrian Public Opinion in the “Refugee Crisis”* 257

Book Reviews

Annemarie Steidl: Elisabeth Röhrlich 275
(assisted by Agnes Meisinger), ed.,
*Migration und Innovation um 1900:
Perspektiven auf das Wien der Jahrhundertwende* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2016)

Sarah Cramsey: Tara Zahra, *The Great Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World* (W.W. Norton & Co.: 2016) 279

- James Weingartner: Marco Büchl, 287
Dogface Soldiers: Die Frontsoldaten der US-Infanterie und der Krieg gegen Hitlers Wehrmacht im Mittelmeerraum und in Nordwesteuropa (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2016);
 Peter Karsten, *Understanding World War 2 Combat Infantrymen in the European Theater: Testing the Sufficiency of Army Research Branch Surveys and Infantry Combatant Recollections against the Insights of Credible War Correspondents, Combat Photographers, and Army Cartoonists* (Bennington, Vermont: Merriam Press, 2016)
- Winfried Garscha: Hellmut Butterweck, 291
Nationalsozialisten vor dem Volksgericht Wien: Österreichs Ringen um Gerechtigkeit 1945-1955 in der zeitgenössischen öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2016)
- Günter Bischof: Florian Traussnig, 297
Militärischer Widerstand von Außen: Österreicher in der US-Armee und Kriegsgeheimdienst im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015);
 Georg Hoffmann, *Fliegerjustiz: Gewalt gegen abgeschossene alliierte Flugzeugbesatzungen 1943-1945* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015)
- Robert Mark Spaulding: Maximilian Graf, 305
Österreich und die DDR 1949-1990: Politik und Wirtschaft im Schatten der deutschen Teilung (Vienna: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften 2016)
- Dirk Rupnow: Cornelia Wilhelm, ed., 309
Migration, Memory, and Diversity: Germany from 1945 to the Present (New York: Berghahn 2017)
- List of Authors** 315

Migration in Austria

Preface

Günter Bischof/Dirk Rupnow

At the height of the so-called “refugee crisis” during the summer of 2015, the Austrian Student Organization *Österreichische Hochschülerschaft* organized a demonstration outside the main Austrian government’s refugee camp, Traiskirchen, in Lower Austria. The students, supported by the NGO *Neue Linkswende*, protested under the heading, “United We Stand for Refugee Rights in Traiskirchen.” Traiskirchen Refugee Camp, located 20 kilometers south of Vienna, was formerly used for military barracks and an officer training center that had been re-opened in the 1950s to accommodate refugees coming to Austria during Cold War crises in the Communist Bloc (Hungary in 1956/57, Czechoslovakia in 1968/69, Poland in 1981/82, GDR and Romania in 1989/90). In the summer of 2015, Traiskirchen was overcrowded with refugees who had made it through the Balkans and eventually arrived in Austria. The iconic refugee camp was in the Austrian news all summer. The demands of the protesters gathering outside that camp on July 26, 2015 are clearly outlined in the banners they carried in the picture on the cover of this volume. Refugees were asking for their basic human needs being met: passports and the right to transfer through Austria to places beyond (Germany, Sweden), and decent food and living conditions. One poster also said, “Muslims and Refugees are Welcome Here!” referencing what became known that summer as the “culture of welcome” (*Willkommenskultur*). This, interestingly, was the Austrian “word of the year” in 2015; the “ugly phrase of the year,” on the opposite side, was “I am not a racist, but ...”. In Germany, it was “*Flüchtlinge*” (“refugees”), while the “sentence of the year” was Angela Merkel’s phrase “*Wir haben so viele geschafft—wir schaffen das!*” (“We have managed again and again—we can do it!”).

Austria, of course, did not become a “migration society” overnight in 2015. Austrians have long ignored the fact that the country has been changing enormously after World War II as a result of a continuous influx of migrants. The turning point in postwar Austrian history came in the 1960s, with the beginning of organized recruitment of foreign laborers from Turkey and Yugoslavia. But a longer history needs to be kept in mind

to understand and contextualize these postwar Austrian developments. There is the complex history of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire and its internal migration: millions of people moved from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Galicia to the expanding capital city of Vienna. This internal migration segued into overseas emigration, mostly to the United States. In the four decades before World War I, as many as four to five million people left the Habsburg Empire. As in today's Vienna, as early as 1840, the population was composed of 40% "foreigners." The discussion after the end of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire revolved around who to admit as citizens to the newly formed Republic of Austria and who to exclude.

An Austrian history of migration also needs to consider the grim chapter of forced labor ("*Zwangsarbeit*") during the Nazi period. The Nazis put to work 15 million slave laborers in Germany and all over occupied Europe during World War II; around three million of them perished. In the fall of 1944, around one million slave laborers worked on the territory that is Austria today. The history of millions of Displaced Persons (DPs), refugees, and German ethnic expellees ("*Vertriebene*") has been also part and parcel of Austrian migration history after the end of World War II. And there are also hundreds of thousands of Cold War refugees from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland that mostly used Austria as a transfer point (only a few thousand stayed) who need to be considered.

In 2015 Austria had an all-time high in-migration of ca. 110,000 people—more than in the early 1990s when Austria accepted tens of thousands of refugees from "the Yugoslav Wars." 88,340 applications for asylum ("international protection") were filed in 2015. Austria was the third largest recipient of asylum seekers in the European Union and allowed more than 800,000 refugees to transit the country. It was civil society and its "welcoming culture" that managed the so-called "refugee crisis," much more so than an apathetic political class. Pressured by a xenophobic and nativist popular press, Austrian politicians reacted by pondering a cap for asylum applications, including the proclamation of a state of emergency for the whole country. Some Austrian politicians, following the example of Australia, where refugees are put into camps on offshore islands, have been suggesting "concentration camps" on Greek islands, North Africa, or the Caucasus for people on the move to Europe.

Similar to other countries in the European Union (and the United States), the ongoing "refugee crisis" has produced a populist political backlash. Ever since the 1990s, the nativist Austrian "Freedom Party" (FPÖ) has been dictating the domestic agenda on limiting the number of immigrants/

asylum seekers with its xenophobic, anti-immigrant discourse. During the recent Austrian Presidential election, FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer ran a strong second with 47 percent of the vote. In the past few years, the FPÖ has consistently been the strongest party in public opinion polls all over Austria. A national federal election is scheduled for the fall of 2017. The governing Socialist-Conservative SPÖ-ÖVP “grand coalition” has tried to coopt the anti-immigrant public mood to stay competitive in this shrill nativist national public discourse. It remains to be seen how these migration and societal diversity issues will be addressed in the next national election. It would be a surprise if they did not dominate the political landscape, given the staunch anti-Muslim racism that has been proffered and introduced into the public discourse by the populist right-wing FPÖ.

Austria is not alone in the Western world in facing such a growing anti-immigrant consensus. This comes at a time when, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency, an astounding 65.3 million refugees are on the move worldwide, leaving their troubled home countries behind. 1.3 million applied for asylum in the European Union in 2015. In the United States, some eleven million undocumented immigrants defined the 2016 presidential election campaign. The new populist administration of President Donald Trump is trying to remove these undocumented immigrants from the U.S. and is stirring up fears about “radical Islamic terrorism,” suggesting to the American people a strong linkage between what some people call “illegal migrants,” terrorism, and national security, while also proffering openly anti-Muslim sentiments.

Given this populist, xenophobic, and highly emotionalized anti-immigration political environment in the West, it is hard to make the rational voices of scholars heard when it comes to migration and diversity issues. Scholars do not pretend to have easy answers and quick fixes at hand. They insist on measured and differentiated approaches to migration, including the complex and deep historical contexts of the continuous movement of people due to political (conflicts and wars), economic (globalization), and increasingly environmental changes. Dealing with and accepting immigration as a continuous historical force means embracing diversity in our societies. Making migrants visible in our historical master narratives is a prerequisite for recognizing social diversity in society and giving newcomers opportunities to participate. Migration research and scholarship must therefore guard itself against accepting the prevailing public discourses that are deeply mired in highly problematic presumptions about “integration” of migrants and imagined images of refugees always “drowning” in metaphors of water, natural disasters, and threats (“flood,” “tsunami,” etc.).

This interdisciplinary volume offers methodologically innovative approaches to Austria's coping with issues of migration past and present. These essays show Austria's long history as a migration country. Austrians themselves had been on the move for the past 150 years to find new homes and build better lives. After World War II, the economy improved and prosperity set in, so Austrians tended to stay at home. Austria's growing prosperity made the country attractive to potential immigrants. After the war, tens of thousands of "ethnic Germans" expelled from Eastern Europe settled in Austria. Starting in the 1950s "victims of the Cold War" (Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks) began looking for political asylum in Austria. Since the 1960s, Austria has been recruiting a growing number of "guest workers" from Turkey and Yugoslavia to make up for the labor missing in the industrial and service economies. Recently, refugees from the arc of crisis from Afghanistan to Syria to Somalia have braved perilous journeys to build new lives in a more peaceful and prosperous Europe.

With Heinz Tesarek's photo essay, *Contemporary Austrian Studies* enters uncharted territory. We have always tried to illustrate our volumes, but we have never before invited a photo artist to contribute a photographic essay to illuminate the emotional depth of the ongoing migration issues captivating Europeans and Austrians. Tesarek has followed the Bakkar family of Aleppo, Syria, over three days from Hungary, via Austria to Germany, on September 5 to 7 in the summer of 2015. Like thousands of Austrian families seeking refuge from political turmoil and a better life during the World War II era all over the world, Syrian, Iraqi, Afghani, Somali, Sudanese, and Nigerian families have been seeking to escape the (civil) war-torn regions of their homelands and build better lives in Europe (and America).

Historian and co-editor Dirk Rupnow's introductory essay shows how the history of migration during the Second Austrian Republic has been orphaned by historians and is non-present in the grand narratives of twentieth-century Austrian history. Discussing recent trends and delving more deeply in the history of the 1960s and 1970s labor migrations, he also analyzes some of the current challenges for historical research, grappling with the issues of migration and diversity in contemporary Austrian history. He also presents projects that deal with the documentation and archiving of migration.

Annemarie Steidl's essay provides a deeper historical contextualization of migratory patterns in the late Habsburg Monarchy, wherein people from the Monarchy's impoverished peripheries moved to the capital Vienna to contribute to the expansion of the city. These migratory movements continued into neighboring European areas, where migrants went to look for work

and eventually across the Atlantic to the United States and the Americas. While desperate poverty often pushed them out of their native regions, work, as well as political and religious freedom, attracted them to America.

Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll question the post-World War II Austrian myth that refugees from neighboring Communist Bloc countries were always warmly welcomed in Austria. Austria built an admirable record in serving as a transfer point for tens of thousands of Cold War refugees leaving “communist paradise” in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1981), and GDR and Romania (1989). Yet Graf and Knoll demonstrate how during each of these Cold War crises, the influx of refugees produced nativist backlashes. Austrians felt they could not afford to accommodate so many, nor did they want refugees to stay and integrate into Austrian society.

Historian Vida Bakondy and sociologist Anne Unterwurzacher explore Austrian labor recruitment from Turkey and Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s. While Bakondy deals with the overall structure and legal framework of the recruitment of foreign workers in Austria, Unterwurzacher focuses on one specific company in Lower Austria and its “guest workers.”

In her contribution, Verena Lorber presents a case study of female Yugoslav migrant workers’ difficulties in making a living in Styria and integrating into local societies. Based on oral history interviews, the gender perspective illuminates how difficult it was for female migrant workers to find decent jobs to raise children in Austria and take care of loved ones back in Yugoslavia with remittances.

Eva Asboth and Silvia Nadjivan follow the social media discourses of both the grandchildren of the “guest workers” from Yugoslavia and young refugee children from the 1990s Balkans Wars growing up in Austria. Their research has grown out of a larger project on social media discourses of what they call “Generation In-Between,” headed by Erhard Busek (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe) and Rainer Gries (Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies, University of Vienna). Such a discursive sociological approach opens up new windows into integration studies.

Legal scholar Andreas Müller and philosopher Andreas Oberprantacher offer new approaches and old concerns to migration studies. Looking at the borders and “border regimes” from a broad theoretical perspective, they then apply that perspective to the current migration issues in the European Union. They narrow in on the dis-functioning “Dublin regime,” assigning the responsibility of conducting asylum proceedings to the EU member state (most often Greece, Italy, and Malta) whose borders the asylum seekers

“irregularly crossed” from a third country, as well as the lack of solidarity within the EU; Germany, Sweden, and Austria have been most affected by refugees. As for meaningful redistribution among the 28 EU member states, the “Visegrad group” (i.e. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) have resisted such redistribution mechanisms within the EU and have shown a lack of solidarity.

The geographer Christiane Hintermann follows the memory of the Nigerian refugee Markus Omofuma, who was denied asylum and deported in 1998. Accompanied by three policemen on his flight home, he resisted, his mouth was taped, and he choked to death. With her case study, Hintermann shows how Austrians tried to silence the memory of Omofuma’s death (and their own racism). Were it not for civil society and a brave artist constructing a commemorative sculpture, eventually placed in a busy Viennese location, the silencing of Omofuma’s memory would have succeeded.

The political scientist Manfred Kohler analyzes recent Austrian opinion polls and what they tell us about the public’s view of the ongoing migration situation. While people noted that local authorities (mayors and state governments) have handled the “refugee crisis” well, they found the federal government and the EU authorities to have mismanaged it; the further away a government institution is situated, the less Austrians value its performance. Only 25 percent of respondents were angry about the presence of refugees, and about a third felt positively about assisting and integrating them. Two thirds of Austrians were even shocked about the hatred expressed by some of their co-nationals about refugees. Surprisingly, in a survey of mayors of communities affected by refugees, 23 percent felt there were opportunities in hosting refugees, while 22 percent saw more risks; 55 percent were neutral and wanted to see the situation develop. Civil society trusted faith-based organizations like the Catholic CARITAS to take care of refugees better than the federal government. It was civil society that overwhelmingly welcomed refugees. Public opinion surveys thus seem to be more embracing of refugees on the local governmental and civil societal level than the populist mass daily *Kronen Zeitung* makes us believe. How this will translate in future national elections remains to be seen. All these different approaches show how migration and diversity are the defining issues in our time of globalization and mass flights.

* * *

A number of people have been instrumental in making the completion of this volume possible. We have conceptualized this volume while Günter

Bischof was a visiting professor at the Institute of Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck in the spring of 2016. We are sincerely thankful to all the contributing authors for submitting their essays in a timely fashion, responding favorably to all editing suggestions from our production team. Tobias Auböck, the 2016/17 Austrian Ministry of Economics, Science, and Research Dissertation Fellow at UNO and PhD student in American Studies at the University of Innsbruck, has done a superb job in tracking every manuscript through both the copyediting and proofreading processes and toward final publication. He also has been relentless in correcting and aligning footnotes with our style sheet and humoring authors toward completion of their manuscripts. At the final stages of the project, Hans Petschar from the Picture Archives of the Austrian National Library contacted the Vienna photojournalist Hans Tesarek about contributing a photo essay to this volume. Tesarek had been documenting refugees in Central Europe over the past three years. We are grateful to him for submitting the photo essay and providing the picture for the cover of this volume.

An important framework for this edited volume has also been the research project “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Migration and the Transnational Challenges to National Historiographies (ca. 1960–today),” at the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck, headed by Dirk Rupnow. It has been generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (P 24468-G18). We would also like to thank our anonymous outside peer reviewers for their thorough and timely assessments.

Katie Pfalzgraff at UNO Press put her customary enthusiasm into the final round of copyediting the individual manuscripts; Alex Dimeff skillfully typeset the final text of the volume and designed the cover. G.K. Darby and Abram Himmelstein, the leadership team at UNO Press, have been hugely supportive to spirit this volume through to final publication. At Center Austria: The Austrian Marshall Plan Center for European Studies, Gertraud Griessner conducted the Center’s daily business with superb efficiency to allow the coeditor to work on managing the completion of this volume. Without the dedicated teams at Center Austria and the UNO Press there would be no CAS series. At *innsbruck university press*, Birgit Holzner was helpful with the production of the cover, the final round of proofreading, and then producing the volume for the European market. Cooperating with her has become a big bonus in the production of these volumes.

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possible at all, not a small matter in the age of diminishing budgets for higher education in general and the social sciences and humanities in particular. At the Universities of Innsbruck and New Orleans, our thanks go to Vice *Rektor* for Research Sabine Schindler for a grant towards the printing of this volume, Matthias Schennach, Barbara Tasser, Gerhard Rampl, Christina Antenhofer, Marion Wieser, and Eva-Maria Fink in the New Orleans Office. At UNO, Kim Long, the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Education and Human Development, and Robert Dupont, the chair of the History Department, have given us green lights and much support whenever needed. We are also grateful to *Rektor* Tilmann Märk and President John Niklow for their support of the entire UNO-University of Innsbruck partnership agenda, including its publication series. Ambassador Wolfgang Waldner, the Austrian Ambassador to the United States, has been supportive as has his staff member Hannes Richter. In the Federal Ministry of Economics, Science, and Research and its student exchange office *Österreichischer Auslandsdienst* (ÖAD), we are grateful to Barbara Weitgruber, Christoph Ramoser, Felix Wilcek, Josef Leidenfrost, and Florian Gerhardus. Markus Schweiger, the executive secretary, Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, the chairman of the board, as well as the board members of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation have been our strongest supporters for more than a decade now. It is a great pleasure and privilege to work with them all and acknowledge their unwavering support of Center Austria: The Austrian Marshall Plan Center of European Studies at UNO and its activities and publications.

New Orleans/Palo Alto, March 2017

Introduction

The Bakkar Family from Aleppo, Syria: Frontpage Refugees

A Photo Essay by Heinz Tesarek¹

I took the pictures in this photo essay in Hungary, Austria, and Germany at the height of the refugee crisis during the summer of 2015, between September 5 and 7. On September 5, 2015, Austria's Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann agreed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel: "Refugees coming from Hungary are allowed to enter Austria and Germany." The Austrian Press Agency (APA) published these vital news stories the same day (pic 1).

At the time, tens of thousands of refugees from the Syrian war zones were stuck in Hungary, waiting to get to Germany. Among them were the Bakkar Family: Mohamed, his wife Samia, and their eight-month-old son Husam (pics 3 & 4).

The picture of a Reuters News Agency photographer, showing the Syrian family huddled on railroad tracks and surrounded by Hungarian policemen, was seen around the world (pic 2).

The German mass daily *Bild Zeitung* featured the story on their front page: "Hungarian Police are Beating Up Refugees." Newspapers and magazines around the world had similar cover stories. Soon thereafter, a video made the rounds showing Mohamed Bakkar tossing his family and himself onto the railroad tracks. Mohamed explained in an interview to have acted out of desperation: "The Hungarian police threatened to send us back to Syria. For us it became clear: either we live or die together."

Only a few days later, the news of open Austrian and German borders spread like wildfire. In the vast trek of people moving toward the West were

¹ Heinz Tesarek is a prize-winning Vienna photojournalist and documentary photographer. He has worked as a photographer with the Austrian magazine *News* since 1999. He has been documenting upheavals in crisis regions around the world for the past 20 years, including the implosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Russia and Eastern Europe (2001-2005), and "the war against terror" in Afghanistan, the Caucasus and Europe. In the past three years, he has been documenting the "refugee crisis." His photos have been exhibited in shows, and he published the book *Zwischenzeit (Interim)* in 2013. This photo essay originated in a cooperative project with Saskia Wolfesberger, a journalist for the Austrian magazine *News*.

the Bakkar family. Their destination was Germany. Like hundreds of other refugees, they managed to secure a spot in one of the trains moving toward Austria (pics 5 & 6). The same day, they reached Vienna's Western Railroad Station and found provisional shelter in emergency sleeping quarters (pics 7 & 8 & 9).

The next morning, they continued on their journey toward Germany (pics 10 & 11). The refugees were registered for the first time in Munich. They also had their first health check-up. Samira discovered that she was four months pregnant.

The Bakkar family was transferred from Munich to the small town of Wiesau in the Upper Palatinate. Here their flight came to an end in a gymnasium converted into a temporary refugee camp (pics 12 & 13).

A year later, the family lives in Mayen in the Rhineland-Palatinate region. The family receives the quasi-asylum status of being "beneficiaries of subsidiary protection" from the German government, initially made out for a year. A number of local people and institutions are working on integrating the Bakkars into their community, among them the Richters, a retired couple (pic 14). Walter Richter concludes from the experience: "The refugees take care of themselves, not only in the good sense. It is hopeless to expect these people ever to become Germans. But everybody is hoping to draw closer to each other."



















The History and Memory of Migration in Post-War Austria: Current Trends and Future Challenges¹

Dirk Rupnow

Without a doubt, migration counts among the most important issues of the present and the future. With the all-encompassing demand for integration levied against migrants, which is generally understood as their complete assimilation into an ostensibly clearly delineated “indigenous” culture, conceived of as static and homogeneous, migration is however fatally understood as a purely contemporary phenomenon, something ahistorical, as though migration had no history and as though migrants had no history, as though migration has not been altering society and culture since ever before. This has only been exacerbated with the recent rise in the number of migrants on their way to Europe, which is perceived as a crisis.

The term *Flüchtlingskrise* (refugee crisis) to describe the events of the summer of 2015 alone demonstrates how perceptions in Austria, as in many other European countries, are distorted in a European frame and limited to the present. This is not to say that there is no problem or challenge that must be addressed, but to emphasize that people in Europe only began to perceive a “crisis” when a greater number of refugees successfully arrived in the European Union and when they began to die right in the middle of Europe, for example in late August 2015, when 71 refugees, among them four children, were found suffocated in the back of a truck on a highway in Austria near the Hungarian border. People in Europe did not perceive a “crisis” when the majority of refugees died somewhere in the Mediterranean Sea, or when Turkey was confronted with more than three million Syrian refugees.

In the summer of 2016, the Austrian government even pondered possibilities to declare a state of emergency in order to suspend the right

1 This paper emerged as part of the FWF Austrian Science Fund Project P 24468-G18, “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Migration and the transnational challenges to national historiographies (ca. 1960-today),” which is based at the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck (11/2012-10/2017) and headed by Dirk Rupnow.

of asylum. Public order and internal security were seen to be in danger and threatened if more than 37,500 refugees entered the country.² Also here, the self-centeredness of the European discussion becomes visible: The state of emergency is given when refugees try to find a safe haven but not when people are in danger and flee from their homes. A state of emergency is, of course, a performative act, a self-fulfilling prophecy: it exists when it is formally declared – or even only contemplated. But it is completely incalculable what the ramifications are for a society to live in a permanent (perceived) state of emergency, except that it caters to right-wing populist and racist politicians.

I

Alfred Schütz (1899-1959), the Austrian emigrant and sociologist, in 1944 defined “the stranger” (immigrant, newcomer) as a “man without history,” to whom exoticism is attributed but nothing more: “Seen from the point of view of the approached group, he [the stranger] is a man without history.”³ And as long as “he” – “she” obviously remains completely out of consideration here – is not afforded his own history by mainstream society (the “approached group”), so one could deduce from Schütz’s line of thinking, “the stranger” will remain foreign.

At present, migrants are often expected not only to learn the language of the majority, along with an ostensibly generally recognized value system, but also to learn the history of the respective mainstream society as a symbol of their willingness to integrate.⁴ The citizenship tests in Austria and Germany reflect this very clearly: aside from the democratic constitutional order, these are concerned above all with

2 “Österreich bereitet sich auf Notstand vor,” *n-tv.de*, June 2, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017, <http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Oesterreich-bereitet-sich-auf-Notstand-vor-article17840401.html>; “Österreich bereitet Notstand wegen Flüchtlingen vor,” *Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten*, Aug. 21, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017 <https://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2016/08/21/oesterreich-bereitet-notstand-wegen-fluechtlingen-vor/>; “Warum Flüchtlinge angeblich die innere Ordnung gefährden,” *Welt.de*, Sept. 1, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017, <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157918938/Warum-Fluechtlinge-angeblich-die-innere-Ordnung-gefahrdeten.html>.

3 Alfred Schütz, “The Stranger,” in *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 91-105, 97.

4 On the nexus of language and identity as well as the underlying exclusionary agenda, and the demand for monolingualism in current debates but also historical perspectives, see Heinrich C. Seeba, “The Rhetoric of Origin: Language and Exclusion in Historical Perspective,” in *Transit* 1, no. 1 (2004), accessed June 22, 2012, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0357t86n>.

historical dates and facts.⁵ Meanwhile, an engagement by the mainstream society with the migrants' past, their historical experiences and memories, is completely lacking. Obviously, this paternalistic stance towards migrants, which demands of them an engagement with "our" history while their own history, including the history of their migration, remains almost entirely invisible and shielded, is deeply problematic. The history of migration and migrants is a blank space in hegemonic memory, and this holds true to varying degrees for all European countries of immigration.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Austria became a country of immigration. Up until then, emigration was statistically predominant, despite the immigration that did take place, as was internal migration. This reality remained unacknowledged for a long time, and it is still contested in the Austrian political arena. Structured worker migration was introduced in Austria later than in Germany, at the end of December 1961, with the Raab-Olah Agreement, which constituted one of the foundation stones for the institutionalization of Social Partnership, as well as the resulting recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964), and Yugoslavia (1966). The European refugee movements after World War II also played an important role in this context (such as the expulsion of ethnic Germans in 1945 and refugee movements from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in the 1980s, and ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s). The Second Austrian Republic has seen 4.5 million people migrate through its borders. Of those, 1.3 million stayed.⁶ At present, more than 20% of the residential population have a so-called "migration background" (1.8 million of 8.4 million Austrian citizens); in Vienna, the proportion is over 40%.⁷ The largest groups of (non-EU) migrants are people from ex-Yugoslavia (almost half a million) and Turks (more than a quarter million). On January 1, 2016,

5 For the Austrian test, see "Mein Österreich," Bundesministerium für Inneres, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, <http://www.staatsbuergerschaft.gv.at>; or "Österreichischer Einbürgerungstest," *Einbürgerungstest.at*, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, <http://www.einbuengerungstest.at>; for the German test, see "Einbürgerungstest in Deutschland," *Bundesausländerbeauftragte.de*, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, <http://www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de/einbuengerungstest.html>; or "Alle 300 Fragen und Antworten zum Einbürgerungstest der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Einbürgerungstest-online.eu*, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, <http://www.einbuengerungstest-online.eu/fragen/>.

6 Andreas Weigl, *Migration und Integration: Eine widersprüchliche Geschichte*, Österreich – Zweite Republik 20 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2009), especially 14–15.

7 "Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund nach Bundesländern (Jahresdurchschnitt 2015)" [population with a migration background by federal state (annual average 2015)], Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/index.html.

almost 15% of the resident population of the country held non-Austrian citizenship, in Vienna accounting for almost 30% of the resident population.⁸ The largest group of these by origin were people from ex-Yugoslavia, followed by Germans, and then Turks. In this respect, Austria has arrived at the top of the European list, with the Austrian news magazine *profil* stating: “Austria has become what it never wanted to be: one of the leading countries of immigration in the world.”⁹ (The largest ethnic group amongst the foreigners, the Germans, naturally enjoy a special status in Austria and are accordingly usually left out of discussions about migration and integration, although conflicts of memory and other issues between Austrians and Germans are notorious.)

Especially in the case of migration and diversity, statistics – with their supposedly clear categorizations – are more confusing than enlightening. Not only do they necessarily reduce the complexity and diversity of reality, but the objects that they count and the definitions behind the numbers constantly change.¹⁰ Nevertheless, they still seem to be necessary in order to demonstrate what should already be beyond discussion but what has still not been fully accepted in the political arena: that Austria has long been a “migration society” and is not only just becoming such due to the impact of the current “refugee crisis.” Although the refugee movements to Austria during the Cold War (especially Hungary in 1956) command a fixed place in the collective memory of the country and count as evidence for the openness and solidarity of the Austrian population, they were less demographically incisive. In these cases, Austria acted far more as a transit country than as

8 “Bevölkerung am 1.1.2016 nach detaillierter Staatsbürgerschaft und Bundesland” [population on January 1, 2016, according to citizenship and country of birth], Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_staatsangehoerigkeit_geburtsland/index.html.

9 Clemens Neuhold, “Lebenslüge der Nation,” *Profil*, 31 Oct. 2016, 14–21.

10 See for example the various definitions of what constitutes a “migration background” by *Statistik Austria* (both parents born abroad, further subdivided in migrants of the first generation who were born abroad and migrants of the second generation, or children of migrants who, however, were born locally); by Statistik Wien (people who either do not hold Austrian citizenship or were born outside of Austria); and by the German Federal Statistical Office (not personally born with German citizenship or having at least one parent who was born without German citizenship). See: “Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund,” Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/index.html; “Definitionen zur Bevölkerungstatistik,” *Wien.at*, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, <https://www.wien.gv.at/statistik/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstand/definitionen.html>; “Migrationshintergrund,” Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Glossar/Migrationshintergrund.html>.

a country of immigration.¹¹ The initial willingness to welcome and help refugees in these situations, moreover, exhausted itself very quickly, a fact that is happily forgotten in the dominant narratives.

While in 1961 the proportion of persons with foreign citizenship in Austria stood at 1.4%, the acquisition of so-called “guest workers” from Yugoslavia and Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s led to a preliminary peak at 4.1% in 1974 (over 310,000 persons among a total population of about 7.6 million). Not until the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s did another significant increase occur, resulting in over 8% by 1993, and another after the turn of the millennium, with the 10% barrier surpassed for the first time in 2008 (some 845,000 persons among a total population of about 8.3 million).¹² In 2015, over 88,000 asylum applications were filed, predominantly by people from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq (the total across the EU was over 1.3 million).¹³ Austria thereby attained the second-highest rate of asylum applications per capita in Europe (10 asylum seekers per 1,000 residents), following Sweden (17 per 1,000).

To date, the history of migration and the experiences of migrants have not been integrated into the hegemonic version of Austrian history. With few exceptions, they are not visible in school textbooks or in the mainstream representations of the history of the Second Republic, neither in museums nor in public spaces such as memorials or street names. It is hardly surprising, then, that the current heated debates on migration, refugees, and integration still deny the obvious: that Austria has long been a country of immigration, and is not just becoming so now; that it is already diverse and pluralistic, as it has always been; and that it has already been changed by migration and migrants. In the public arena, it seems to be easily forgotten that the presence of so-called “people with a migration background” has a fifty-year history, with specific actors, each with their own particular interests, taking place in an equally specific regulatory, societal, and political framework. Despite the relatively intensive research activity on the very different migrations that took place in the late Habsburg era, and on the refugee movements to Austria during the Cold War, the misleading impression is often created that there has never been any state-sponsored and structured immigration in post-war

11 Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2005), 49–52. See also Gernot Heiß, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im europäischen Kontext seit 1914*, Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (Vienna: J & V Edition, 1995).

12 “Fact Sheet 24: Staatsbürgerschaft und Einbürgerung,” Österreichischer Integrationsfond, Oct. 2016, accessed October 25, 2016, <http://www.integrationsfonds.at/themen/publikationen/oeif-fact-sheets/>.

13 “Integrationsbericht 2016,” Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, accessed October 25, 2016, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/integration/integrationsbericht/>.

Austria, as though it came out of nowhere and did not develop out of the needs of the Austrian economy and society. Yet it should be obvious that the economic rise of the Second Republic would have been impossible without immigration. By contrast to the original “guest worker” concept of the 1950s and 1960s, which was based on the assumption of a purely temporary, demand-based migration and a continuous rotation of workers, people ended up settling, thus permanently changing the immigration societies, not least of all because of the enduring transnational links with the countries from which they emigrated.

Audibility and visibility have hitherto not been granted to everyone equally in our society. This is by no means a purely academic problem, and it speaks rather to a fundamental condition for belonging, recognition, and equality in society.¹⁴ The burgeoning nation states of the nineteenth century legitimized and secured themselves through homogeneous conceptions of peoplehood, territory, and history. The writing of history was an important instrument in this process, while archives and museums were its decisive institutions. Historiography served to invent a national past and a communal culture, which was then visualized in museums. Not only were clear borders thereby drawn towards the outside, homogeneity was also produced on the inside: population, culture, and territory were tied together as something quasi-naturally belonging together. Whatever counted as “other” was pushed to the margins, written out of history, made invisible. This was also true in society: the mass violence of the twentieth century was not the least of all the consequences of this drive toward homogenization. Often no difference was made between nation and peoplehood, and conceptions of nation have time and again been contaminated with ethnicity. This has hampered the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity as well as of different historical entanglements within nations to this day.

The classical national memories, which have always been more riven and heterogeneous than omnipresent notions such as that of “collective memory” would have one believe, are currently undergoing massive changes as a result of migration, which is, so to speak, bringing globalization into the front yard and transforming it into an everyday occurrence.¹⁵ For the most part, migrants do not relate well to either the history of the majority population, nor to the established practices of engagement with this history. They have a different perspective on a thoroughly shared past, which represents an unusual

14 See among others Paul Mecheril, *Prekäre Verhältnisse: Über natio-ethno-kulturelle (Mehrfach-)Zugehörigkeit* (Münster: Waxmann, 2003), especially 28.

15 Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1923), 509-512; Erol Yildiz, *Die weltoffene Stadt: Wie Migration Globalisierung zum urbanen Alltag macht*, Kultur und soziale Praxis (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011).

one for mainstream society, or they have no relationship to the history of mainstream society at all. Simultaneously, they bring other historical experiences and memories in their wake, which were hitherto alien to mainstream society.¹⁶ The memory of the mass atrocities of National Socialism in the primary perpetrator countries of Germany and Austria, for example, have a divisive, rather than an integrating, effect. Originating from a marginalized position, it has by now become a state memory, a governmentally asserted and instrumentalized hegemonic memory that is in turn accused of covering up and suppressing other memories.¹⁷ Memory, however, can and should not be a zero-sum game, as it is often repeatedly and fatally presented in historical political debates. Michael Rothberg, the American literary scholar, attempted to make this point in his 2009 book “Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization,” in which he traced historical connections between anti-colonial and anti-Nazi positions.¹⁸

16 Viola B. Georgi, *Entliehene Erinnerung: Geschichtsbilder junger Migranten in Deutschland* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); Viola B. Georgi, and Rainer Ohliger, eds., *Crossover Geschichte: Historisches Bewusstsein Jugendlicher in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Hamburg: Ed. Körber Stiftung, 2009); Astrid Messerschmidt, *Weltbilder und Selbstbilder: Bildungsprozesse im Umgang mit Globalisierung, Migration und Zeitgeschichte*, Wissen und Praxis 151 (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2009). See also the project conducted by myself and trafo.K., a Viennese office for research and education, from 2009–2011: “Und was hat das mit mir zu tun?” Transnationale Geschichtsbilder zur NS-Vergangenheit,” in the framework of the BMWF/“Sparkling Science” program, “Transnationale Geschichtsbilder,” Sparkling Science, accessed Oct. 19, 2016, <http://www.sparkling-science.at/de/projekte/312-transnationale-geschichtsbilder>; as well as Nora Sternfeld, *Kontaktzonen der Geschichtsvermittlung: Transnationales Lernen über den Holocaust in der postnazistischen Migrationsgesellschaft* (PhD thesis, Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, 2012).

17 Dirk Moses, “Der nichtdeutsche Deutsche und der deutsche Deutsche: Stigma und Opfer-Erlösung in der Berliner Republik,” in *Demokratie im Schatten der Gewalt: Geschichten des Privaten im deutschen Nachkrieg*, ed. Daniel Fulda, Dagmar Herzog, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, and Till van Rahden (Göttingen: Wallstein 2010), 353–378; Jan Löfström, “Historical Apologies as Acts of Symbolic Inclusion – and Exclusion? Reflections on Institutional Apologies as Politics of Cultural Citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies* 15, no. 1 (2011), 93–108.

18 Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009). In this context, see also Michael Rothberg’s new project (together with Yasemin Yildiz and Andrés Nader) on Holocaust memory and migration in Germany, Michael Rothberg and Yasemin Yildiz, “Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance in Contemporary Germany,” *Parallax* 17, no. 4 (2011), 32–48. On the discussion surrounding colonialism and the Holocaust, see for example A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of Indigenous People and the Holocaust,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 36, no. 4 (2002), 7–36; Jürgen Zimmerer, “Annihilation in Africa: The ‘Race War’ in German Southwest Africa (1904–1908) and its Significance for a Global History of Genocide,” *GHI Bulletin* 37 (Fall 2005), 51–57; Birth Kundrus, “From the Herero to the Holocaust? Some Remarks on the Current Debate,” *Africa spectrum* 40, no. 2 (2005), 299–308; Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz,” *Central European History* 42 (2009), 279–300.

The reality of migratory societies has by now become an everyday occurrence and visible in many countries and can no longer be denied. A pluralistic society, however, requires a polyphonic history from multiple perspectives in order to come to terms with itself, with its development through the past, but also with its future. The hegemonic format of history, which is still primarily framed in national terms, is fundamentally and lastingly challenged by migration as a genuine transnational phenomenon, which traverses, transgresses, or perforates borders. Migration irritates conceptions of unambiguous belongings and homogeneous identity constructions based on clear delineations, of fixed, intraversable borders as well as equally unchanging, clearly delineated cultures. Writing migration and migrants into national history therefore constitutes a great challenge.

The urgency of addressing this challenge is underlined by various studies: Turkish and ex-Yugoslav migrants feel far less belonging in Austria than they do, for example, in Germany; “hyphenated identities” as have by now become commonplace in Germany are practically never formulated in Austria because domestic discourse is still strongly exclusionary and racist. Even when they are in possession of Austrian citizenship, migrants of the second generation are time and again told that they are not “real Austrians.”¹⁹

II

The last few years have seen some changes. A new survey reveals that three quarters of Austrians today see their country as a country of immigration: 33% say this is “very surely” true, 43% say it is “rather” true, while 14% say it is “rather not” true and 8% believe Austria is “very surely not” a country of immigration.²⁰

19 Delna Antia, *Eins, zwei, keins oder beides: Warum Migranten der zweiten Generation eine hybride Identität wählen – wenn sie dürften: Ein empirischer Vergleich nationaler Selbstpositionierung in Deutschland und Österreich* (M.E.S. thesis, Vienna University, 2016); Delna Antia, “Dann bin ich eben nicht Österreicher!,” *Biber*, November 2016, 19-25; Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider, and Frans Lelie, “The European Second Generation Compared: Does the Integration Context Matter?,” TIES-project, Amsterdam 2012.

20 “Umfrage: 76% sehen Österreich als Einwanderungsland,” *Profil*, 31 Oct. 2016, accessed Oct. 31, 2016, <http://www.profil.at/oesterreich/umfrage-oesterreich-einwanderungsland-7663079>. The 2011 party program of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), entitled “Österreich zuerst” [Austria First], nevertheless continues to insist that “Austria is not a country of immigration.” (“Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (FPÖ),” *FPOE.at*, accessed Nov. 2, 2016, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_web.pdf). The Austrian People’s Party

The fixation of the media and the public on historic anniversaries and celebrations is a blessing and a curse at once: It runs counter to logic and scholarly research, and yet it offers the opportunity to snatch certain topics from oblivion and to discuss them broadly. This opportunity, however, is not always seized upon. So for example, in 2012 the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the first Austrian recruiting agreement with Spain in 1962 passed, like that of the Raab-Olah Agreement before it, without either having received any significant public or media attentions in Austria.²¹ To be fair, only few Spanish “guest workers” came to Austria as the country was less attractive to them than France or Germany, but nevertheless the (secret) agreement between the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and Austrian Trade Union Federation in December 1961 and the consequent balance of interests between employers and employees created the very conditions for the acquisition of foreign labor (and moreover laid the foundations for the institutionalization of Social Partnership).

The anniversary of the signing of the 1964 recruiting agreement between Austria and Turkey in 2014 was nevertheless commemorated, this commemoration moreover effected by numerous parties: The Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA) organized a scholarly symposium in May entitled *50 Jahre türkische Migration nach Österreich – Gestern, heute und in der Zukunft* (50 years of Turkish Migration to Austria – Yesterday, Today, and in the Future) which took place at the Austrian embassy in Ankara, with a follow-up held in June at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. The date of the signing in May was also accompanied by dense media coverage.²² In September, the City of Vienna invited 1,000 former Turkish and Yugoslav “guest workers” for a

(ÖVP) meanwhile declared itself in its 2015 program in favor of qualified immigration and the maintenance of a “Leitkultur” (dominant culture) (“Die Partei,” *OEVP.at*, accessed Nov. 2, 2016, <https://www.oevp.at/die-partei/Die-OeVP.psp>). The 1998 program of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party takes a position against xenophobia, racism, and antisemitism, and argues for a coexistence based on solidarity (“Das Grundsatzprogramm,” *SPOE.at*, accessed Nov. 2, 2016, https://spoe.at/sites/default/files/das_spoe_parteiprogramm.pdf). The party program of the Green Party from 2001 alone made the statement: “Despite the acquisition of foreign labor since the beginning of the sixties, it has to date not been recognized that Austria is a country of immigration. Quite on the contrary, Austria has to this day simply ignored the fact that immigrants have become a part of this society and are here for the long haul, and treated those affected as ‘guest workers’.” (“Parteiprogramm,” *Gruene.at*, accessed Nov. 2, 2016, <https://www.gruene.at/partei/programm/partieiprogramm>).

21 See “50 Jahre Gastarbeiter in Österreich: Von Anwerbeabkommen und Integration,” *ORF.at*, Dec. 27, 2011, accessed Sept. 2, 2014, <http://www.orf.at/stories/2090725/2090744>.

22 See for example the numerous contributions in: *Die Presse*, May 11, 2014, and in: *Der Standard*, May 15, 2014.

celebration at the city hall under the motto *Gerufen und gekommen* ([We] Called and [They] Came), where Federal President Heinz Fischer, Mayor Michael Häupl, and City Councilor for Integration Sandra Frauenberger expressed their recognition and gratitude. However, a statewide symbolic act remained conspicuously absent.²³ Nevertheless, a range of local projects occurred, principally exhibitions (for example in St. Pölten, Salzburg, Hall in Tyrol, and Telfs, as well as traveling exhibitions), but also performances and other events that emerged from various contexts (ranging from universities and research institutions to NGOs and associations to local museums). Ultimately, however, these were not connected to major cultural institutions.²⁴

The anniversary of the agreement with Yugoslavia in 2016 was not publicly marked by official polity with any events, commemorations, or projects. A conference of the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck, which took place in Vienna in cooperation with the Austrian NGO *Initiative Minderheiten* (Initiative for Minorities), the working group *Archiv der Migration* (Migration Archive), and the Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB), dealt with the coming into effect of the agreement, accompanied by an exhibition on Yugoslav associations in Austria in the

23 On research in the framework of the Vienna conference of the BMEIA, see Sylvia Hahn and Georg Stöger, *50 Jahre österreichisch-türkisches Anwerbeabkommen* (Salzburg 2014), https://www.uni-salzburg.at/fileadmin/multimedia/Geschichte/documents/Studie_Anwerbeabkommen_-_Uni_Salzburg.pdf.

24 City Museum of St. Pölten, Center for Migration Research at the Institute of Rural History and the Lower Austrian State Archive, Bernhard Gamsjäger, Austrian-Turkish Friendship Association (Österreichisch-Türkischer Freundschaftsverein), and Pastoral Care for Working People in Traisental (Betriebsseelsorge Traisental), “Angeworben! Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. Pölten” [Recruited! Remained! 50 Years of ‘Guest Work’ in the Region of St. Pölten]; City Archive of Salzburg and University of Salzburg, “Kommen – Gehen – Bleiben: Migrationsstadt Salzburg 1960-1990” [Coming – Going – Staying: Salzburg, City of Migration 1960-1990]; Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck and City Museum and Archive of Hall in Tyrol, “Hall in Bewegung: Spuren der Migration in Tirol” [Hall in Motion: Traces of Migration in Tyrol]; Commissioner for Integration in the market town of Telfs and Migration Archive in Telfs, “Alte Neue TelferInnen” [Old New Telfers]; Association Jukus for the Promotion of Youth, Culture, and Sport (Verein Jukus zur Förderung von Jugend, Kultur und Sport), “Avusturya! Österreich – 50 Jahre türkische Gastarbeit in Österreich” [Avusturya [Turkish, Austria]! Austria – 50 Years of Turkish Guest Work in Austria]; Migrare, Volkshilfe, and University of Linz, “Gekommen und geblieben: 50 Jahre Arbeitsmigration” [They Came and Stayed: 50 Years of Labor Migration]; Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation and Wienwoche, “Gaygusuz gegen Österreich oder von der Nützlichkeit der ‘Gast’-arbeiter_innen” [Gaygusuz versus Austria, or the Usefulness of ‘Guest’ Workers]. A further scholarly conference was organized by Christiane Hintermann and the author, together with the Karl Renner Institute, the Educational Workshop of the Green Party, and the NGO Initiative Minderheiten: “Orte, Räume und das Gedächtnis der Migration” [Places, Spaces, and the Memory of Migration].

1980s and by video interventions at the Hauptbahnhof and Westbahnhof train stations in Vienna. In the meantime, the BMEIA and the Austrian Integration Fund supported an art exhibition on the theme of *Gastarbeit in Österreich* (guest work in Austria) in the Museumsquartier in Vienna entitled *Ajnhajtclub* (Unity Club, the German word *Einheit* being humorously rendered in pseudo-Yugoslav phonetic spelling), conceptualized by the Belgrade-born, Amsterdam-based artist and curator Bogomir Doring. The Graz-based association *Jukus* once again stepped forward with an exhibition, which was at first presented in the Austrian Museum of Folk Life and Folk Art (*Österreichisches Museum für Volkskunde*) in Vienna, entitled *Unter fremdem Himmel: Aus dem Leben jugoslawischer GastarbeiterInnen* (Under Foreign Skies: From the Lives of Yugoslav Guest Workers). The fragmentation of the community since the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s seem in any case to have influenced the treatment of the anniversary.

It would be totally false to credit the recruitment agreements with too much significance and to posit them as the starting point of (labor) migration to Austria. They were only intended to regulate what had already long since begun and many people migrated to Austria by other means than the recruitment agreements. They are nevertheless reminders of the fact that Austria became a country of immigration in the second half of the twentieth century, and that it was in Austria's interest to bring foreign labor into the country that contributed significantly to the creation and maintenance of prosperity.²⁵ State regulation and the involved institutions certainly failed repeatedly to completely control and regulate migration.²⁶ The rapid succession of anniversaries of the recruitment agreements, however, does not only bring the history of so-called "labor migration" to the fore, but also

25 This was already referred to early on in the introduction to an important edited collection by the historians Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb: Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb, Vorwort der Herausgeber, in: *Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im europäischen Kontext seit 1914*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb, Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institutes für Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (Vienna: J & V Edition, 1995), 7-17, here: 13. In this context, see also Weigl, *Migration*, especially: 14-15; Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, *Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen* (Vienna: Jugend & Volk, 1995). On the recruitment agreements generally, see Christoph Rass, *Institutionalisierungsprozesse auf einem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt: Bilaterale Wanderungsverträge in Europa zwischen 1919 und 1974*, Studien zur historischen Migrationsforschung 19 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), 121-128, 380-383 (on Austria).

26 In this context, consider the concept of the "Autonomy of Migration" [Autonomie der Migration] which has established itself in so-called Critical Migration Studies: Manuela Bojadžijev and Serhat Karakayali, "Autonomie der Migration: 10 Thesen zu einer Methode," in *Turbulente Ränder: Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas*, ed. Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 203-209.

the present-day plurality of Austrian society which is an undeniable part of everyday reality. In the political arena, this is notoriously not universally recognized or uncontested, with a homogeneous nation – which of course never previously existed – being frequently imagined or even promoted with force.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the history of labor migration has not yet arrived in Austrian collective memory.²⁷ This blank space is self-evident. The long-established term of the “guest worker” – derived, incidentally and against common assumptions, from the National Socialist era and not from the post-war era, in opposition to Nazi terminology – who was supposed to leave the country as soon as his/her labor was no longer needed, is an expression of this fact as well one of the causes of this present circumstance.²⁸ Aside from a few (in themselves remarkable) exceptions, the history of labor migration has also not been written yet.

Institutionalized Austrian contemporary history has hardly picked up this topic.²⁹ Oliver Rathkolb is the only one among contemporary historians who has granted it ample attention, for example in his history of the “paradoxical” Second Republic.³⁰ Subsequently, in 2005 Rathkolb established a working area in migration and memory, supervised by the geographer and migration researcher Christiane Hintermann, at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, which Rathkolb had founded and developed, but which unfortunately shut down in 2013.³¹

The neglect of Austria’s history as a society of migration can probably be explained in large part by the general reservedness of Austrian

27 Christiane Hintermann, “Gedächtnislücke Migration? Betrachtungen über eine nationale Amnesie,” *Zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 3 (2013), 149–165; Dirk Rupnow, “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Plädoyer für eine transnationale Geschichte Österreichs als Migrationsgesellschaft,” *Zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 1 (2013), 5–21.

28 Thomas Schiller, *NS-Propaganda für den Arbeitseinsatz* (Hamburg: Lit, 1997), 6.

29 See for example the brief references in Karl Vocelka, *Geschichte Österreichs: Kultur – Gesellschaft – Politik* (Munich: Heyne, ³2004), 345–347, as well as Peter Berger, *Kurze Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna: Facultas.wuv, ²2008), 294, 347. Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994), 448, discusses exclusively the refugee migration from Hungary.

30 Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 und 2005* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2005), 40–41, 44, 49–52, 207, 415–416.

31 See the edited collections which emerged from this: Stefanie Mayer, and Mikael Spang, eds., *Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration in Historical Perspective*, Studies in European History and Public Spheres 1 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2009); Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson, eds., *Migration and Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960*, Studies in European History and Public Spheres 3 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2010).

contemporary history, especially of the Viennese variety, toward the history of the Second Republic since the 1960s.³² Thomas Angerer at the History Department of the University of Vienna referred to this “historiographic vacuum” as early as in the mid-1990s in his criticism of the temporal and topical confinedness of Austrian contemporary history research and the absence of a “recent history of Austrian immigration – from the call for foreign man power in the 1960s to the actual quasi-closing of the borders,” with a view to contemporary debates about immigration, especially the so-called “anti-foreigner referendum” officially known as *Österreich zuerst* (Austria First) initiated by Jörg Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 1992/93, which demanded that the constitution incorporates the dictum that Austria is not a country of immigration.³³

In the context of this “historiographical vacuum,” public discourse continues to be dominated by—aside from polemics and racism—social science analyses, and much less by historical knowledge and (hi)stories, not least of all because the basis for the latter are broadly lacking. The research landscape in Austria may be witnessing an increasingly rapid and nuanced expansion in the field of migration, yet the topic continues to be left primarily to geographers and demographers, sociologists and political scientists.³⁴ Therefore, normative and quantitative approaches

32 Ernst Hanisch, “Die Dominanz des Staates: Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Drehkreuz von Politik und Wissenschaft,” in *Zeitgeschichte als Problem: Nationale Traditionen und Perspektiven der Forschung in Europa*, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 20, ed. Alexander Nützenadel and Wolfgang Schieder (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 54–77, here: 70. Simultaneously, contemporary history is witnessing an opening up going backwards, into the long nineteenth century, in order to analyze the conflicts of the short twentieth century against this background. See Oliver Rathkolb, “Zeitgeschichte im Krebsgang ins 19. Jahrhundert zurückschreiben: Am Beispiel der Demokratie-Diktatur-Debatte,” *Die Universitaet-online*, January 28, 2009; as well as Oliver Rathkolb, “Zeitgeschichte im Krebsgang ins 19. Jahrhundert zurückschreiben: Am Beispiel der Demokratie-Diktatur-Debatte” (lecture at the University of Vienna) accessed Sept. 3, 2014, http://stream.univie.ac.at/media/geschichte/2008WS/vranitzky/070113_090113?res=320.

33 Thomas Angerer, “An Incomplete Discipline: Austrian Zeitgeschichte and Recent History,” in *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 3, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1995), 207–251, here: 227. See also Thomas Angerer, “Gegenwartsgeschichte? Für eine Zeitgeschichte ohne Ausflüchte,” in *Zeitgeschichte im Wandel. 3. österreichische Zeitgeschichtetage 1997*, ed. Gertraud Diendorfer, Gerhard Jagschitz, and Oliver Rathkolb (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 1998), 46–53.

34 See for example in newer literature: Mayer and Späng, *Debating Migration*; Ferdinand Karlhofer and Günther Pallaver, eds., *Jahrbuch 2011: Zuwanderung – Herausforderung für Gesellschaft und Politik*, Politik in Tirol (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2011); Julia Dahlvik, Heinz Fassmann, and Wiebke Sievers, eds., *Migration und Integration – wissenschaftliche Perspektiven aus Österreich: Jahrbuch 1/2011*; *Migrations- und Integrationsforschung 2* (Vienna: V&R, 2012).

are foregrounded, with the emphasis lying on migration movements and their legalistic parameters. The intention of the bulk of this research is to prepare knowledge that can be employed in political consulting and social organization. Economic aspects and the migrant as a source of labor are frequently foregrounded. Migration is here, as in media discourses, often—if only implicitly—brought up in relationship to “problems” or as a “problem” (“guest worker problem” or “foreigner problem”), complete with problematic categorizations and characterizations as well as reductions of the reality of migration.³⁵ Individual experiences are mostly concealed while questions and approaches of everyday history are only slowly establishing themselves.³⁶ By contrast, minority histories, including from an activist perspective, form an important basis and point of comparison.³⁷ These, however, are often highly compartmentalized, posing a challenge to their contextualization and integration into general political, social, and cultural history.³⁸

There have nevertheless been hints in recent years, propelled by the anniversaries discussed above, of an increasing trend toward the historicization of “guest worker migration.” The media reports of May 2014 alone suggest this tendency. Most of the above-named exhibitions and

35 See for example Peter Zuser, *Die Konstruktion der Ausländerfrage in Österreich: Eine Analyse des öffentlichen Diskurses 1990*, Politikwissenschaft 35 (Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien, 1996).

36 See for example Peter Payer, “Gehen Sie an die Arbeit’: Zur Geschichte der ‘Gastarbeiter’ in Wien 1964-1989,” *Wiener Geschichtsblätter* 59, no. 1 (2004), 1-19.

37 See for example the important works of Ljubomir Bratić, “Soziopolitische Organisationen der MigrantInnen in Österreich,” *Kurswechsel*, no. 1 (2000), 6-20; Ljubomir Bratić, “Soziopolitische Netzwerke der MigrantInnen aus der ehemaligen Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien (SFRJ) in Österreich,” in *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen – sozioökonomische Strukturen – rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen*, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2003), 395-409.

38 On the state of the field in Austrian migration studies, see Bernhard Perchinig, “Migration Studies in Austria – Research at the Margins?” Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung (KMI) Working Paper 4 (Vienna n.d. [2002]); Heinz Fassmann, “Migrations- und Integrationsforschung in Österreich: Institutionelle Verankerung, Fragestellungen und Finanzierungen,” KMI Working Paper 15 (Vienna n.d. [2009]); Sabine Strasser, “Migrationsforschung in Österreich, ein [KriMi]? Kommentar zur Kritischen Migrationsforschung,” *Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten* 75 (Summer 2010), 22-23. The Viennese social historian Josef Ehmer recently claimed once again that established contemporary history focuses on the National Socialist era and its consequences while neglecting other more recent topics and aspects, which are then left to the social sciences: Josef Ehmer, “Sozialwissenschaftler/innen oder Zeithistoriker/innen: Wer schreibt die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts?,” in *Politische Gewalt und Machtausübung im 20. Jahrhundert: Zeitgeschichte, Zeitgeschehen und Kontroversen; Festschrift für Gerhard Botz*, ed. Heinrich Berger, Melanie Dejnega, Regina Fritz, and Alexander Prenninger (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 59-71, especially: 64.

events have also, in the face of these anniversaries, centered on a historical approach. The trend can be seen above all in the increased archiving of migration.

III

To date, the histories of migration and migrants are insufficiently represented in established archives. There has been practically no systematic collection of materials on this topic, and important materials remain scattered and widely unknown or—whether intentionally or not—have already been destroyed. Experienced historical knowledge and privately transmitted knowledge are in danger of getting lost in generational shifts. It is an important and fundamental prerequisite for a new historical approach that the histories and experiences of migration are first collected in an archive, the most basic infrastructure of “collective memory.” Finally, it cannot be overlooked that state archives simply reproduce the hegemonic structures in society, or even produce and safeguard them: They do not merely collect but also constitute power machines of the state which produce knowledge and erase traces. This insight, which was formulated by the American anthropologist and historian Laura Ann Stoler in her work on colonial archives, is also relevant here.³⁹

As early as September 2012, in reference to the signing of the recruitment agreement with Spain, Arif Akkılıç und Ljubomir Bratić conducted a poster campaign in the framework of the *Wienwoche*, which brought three central demands into the public sphere: *50 Jahre Arbeitsmigration – Geschichtsschreibung jetzt / Gleichheit jetzt / Archiv jetzt* (50 Years of Labor Migration – Historiography Now / Equality Now / Archive Now).⁴⁰ The working group “Archiv der Migration,” which was founded in its wake, drew up a blueprint for an archive of migration

39 Laura Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” *Archival Science* 2 (2002), 87–109.

40 See “Wienwoche 2012,” Verein zur Förderung der Stadtbenutzung, accessed Apr. 10, 2013, www.wienwoche.org; as well as “Arbeitskreis Archiv der Migration,” accessed Sept. 8, 2016, www.archivdermigration.at. The posters were designed by Toledo i Dertschei (Eva Dertschei, Carlos Toledo), Vienna. See also Arif Akkılıç and Ljubomir Bratić, “Aufruf für ein Archiv der Migration,” *Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten* 84 (Fall 2012), 27; as well as Wladimir Fischer, “Warum Österreich endlich ein Archiv der Migration braucht,” *Die Presse*, Oct. 3, 2012; Monika Mokre, “Was nicht in den Akten ist, ist nicht in der Welt: zum Projekt eines Archivs der Migration,” *Kulturrisse: Zeitschrift für radikaldemokratische Kulturpolitik* 3 (2012); Dirk Rupnow, “Migration braucht ein Archiv – aber was für eines?,” *Wiener Zeitung*, October 3, 2012; “Die verdrängte Migration: Experten wollen Archiv der Migration,” *ORF.at*, accessed Sept. 23, 2012, www.orf.at/stories/2140709.

in Austria.⁴¹ A renewed poster campaign with the demand for historicization and an archive of migration, entitled *50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen Österreich-Türkei, 15. Mai 1964–15. Mai 2014* (50 Years of the Recruitment Agreement Austria-Turkey, May 15, 1964 – May 15, 2014), was conducted in May 2014 in cooperation with *Initiative Minderheiten*: Some of the central aspects of the recruitment of so-called “guest workers” were thematized with historical quotations (for example the initially diminished attractiveness of Austria for foreign laborers by contrast to other countries of recruitment such as Germany and Switzerland, especially due to bad wage conditions, the living conditions of migrants of the first generation, or the interests of Austrian businesses). The logical conclusion was set by a poster with a quote from an interview from 2012 with a migrant who came to Austria as a “guest worker” in 1967: “Whether Turks or Yugoslavs, the guest workers built this country. This should be celebrated! After all, this is the history of Austria.”⁴²

In 2012, a *Zentrum für Migrationsforschung* (Center for Migration Studies) was established at the Institute of Rural History of the Lower Austrian State Archive in St. Pölten, which has acted as an independent association since 2015.⁴³ It began its activities with an exhibition on the German-speaking displaced persons from Czechoslovakia in Lower Austria, but by now is dedicated to a broad and general migration history. In July, 2013, a complementary regional initiative was founded in Vorarlberg, namely the *Vielfaltensarchiv – Dokumentationsstelle zur Migrationsgeschichte Vorarlbergs* (Diversity Archive – Documentation Site for Migration History in Vorarlberg) in Dornbirn, a development of the previous collection and exhibition projects of the *Bodensee Amateur Fotografen* (Amateur Photographers

41 The working group consists of Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, Wladimir Fischer, Li Gerhalter, and Dirk Rupnow. For a while, it also included Belinda Kazeem. See www.archivdermigration.at. See also the contributions by Natalie Bayer, Ljubomir Bratić, Li Gerhalter, Zara Pfeiffer, and Hannes Sulzenbacher, as well as the interview by Gerd Valchars with Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, and Dirk Rupnow, in *Kulturrisse: Zeitschrift für radikaldemokratische Kulturpolitik* 4 (2013): “¡Archiv der Migration, jetzt!,” as well as Dirk Rupnow, “Beschäftigung mit Geschichte ist kein Luxus: Wieso Österreich ein ‘Archiv der Migration’ braucht,” *Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten* 89 (Winter 2013), 8–9 (as well as the further contributions in *ibid.* by Vida Bakondy, Wladimir Fischer, Vladimir Ivanović, Dirk Rupnow, Verena Sauermaun/Veronika Settele, and Theresa Weitzhofer-Yurtişik) and “... Prozesse und Logiken, die vor allem die privilegierte Mehrheit verlernen muss: Gespräch mit Marissa Löbo und Dirk Rupnow,” *Bildpunkt: Zeitschrift der IG Bildende Kunst* (Spring 2014), 10–12.

42 The posters are also available under www.archivdermigration.at. They were designed by Beatrix Bakondy, Vienna. They were printed in *Der Standard*, May 15, 2014.

43 See www.migrationsforschung.at (accessed September 8, 2014).

of the Bodensee, BAF).⁴⁴ Initiated and run by a group of post-migratory Vorarlberg citizens from Turkish families, its aim is “the documentation, research, and dissemination of migration history in Austria, especially in Vorarlberg, with a particular focus on labor migration since industrialization.” Through cooperation with communal archives and educational or cultural institutes it intends to “document and disseminate a significant part of Austrian and especially Vorarlberg history.” It places special importance on its cooperation with the Vorarlberg state museum.

The City of Salzburg also announced its intentions in the anniversary year of 2014 to collect photos and documents of migrants and to begin an interview collection in the city archive, in cooperation with the University of Salzburg.⁴⁵ Aside from labor migration to Salzburg, this will also address internal migration within Salzburg, Austria, and Europe, as well as emigration from Salzburg. Finally, the Municipal Department for Integration and Diversity (MA17) of the City of Vienna put out a call in September 2014 together with the *Wien Museum* (Vienna City Museum) for a project entitled *Migration Sammeln* (Collecting Migration). This secured objects relevant to the history of the so-called “guest worker migration,” albeit only temporarily until the summer of 2016, which are now housed in the collections of the *Wien Museum*.⁴⁶

Whether a federal institution or further regional institutions is/are required is still an open question. What remains decisive and should not be forgotten is that this task concerns not only the federal capital Vienna, but also the provinces. Moreover, it requires a general transition in consciousness and a rethinking of existing institutions (archives, museums, and so forth) —as in society as a whole—and a critical evaluation as well as, if necessary, an expansion or change in existing practices of collecting.

The new Vorarlberg state museum has already taken an important step in this direction: In the exhibitions organized for its re-opening in 2013, entitled *buchstäblich vorarlberg* (literally Vorarlberg), *vorarlberg. ein making-of* (Vorarlberg: a making-of), and *Sein & Mein. Ein Land als akustische*

44 See www.vielfaltenarchiv.at and www.bafart.com (accessed September 8, 2014) as well as the exhibition “Arbeyter: Bodensee Amateur Fotografen, Fotografen,” Emsiana 2013, Hohenems. See also Fatih Özcelik and Dirk Rupnow, “Migration – Geschichte – Archiv: Aktuelle Herausforderungen und Projekte aus Anlass von 50 Jahren Anwerbeabkommen Österreich – Türkei 1964, in *museums verein jahrbuch: Jahrbuch des Vorarlberger Landesmuseumsvereins 2014*, ed. Brigitte Truschnegg (Bregenz: Bertolini, 2014), 148–169.

45 Aussendung der Stadt Salzburg: *Kommen – Geben – Bleiben: Migrationsstadt Salzburg 1960–1990*, Pressegespräch Stadt & Uni zur Ausstellung am Makartsteg vom 23. Mai bis 6. Juli (May 22, 2014).

46 Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, and Regina Wonisch, eds., *Schere Topf Papier: Objekte zur Migrationsgeschichte* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2016).

Passage (His & Mine: A State as an Acoustic Passage), which approach regional history in a variety of ways while thereby focusing strongly on its most recent history, the experiences and histories of migration become an integral part of the narrative. This has set a new standard, which other institutions in the country will have to take into account in the future. A problem here, however, is that contemporary history is generally profoundly under-represented in Austria's state museums.

A still exemplary and benchmark-setting exhibition, conceptualized by *Initiative Minderheiten* and shown in 2004 in the *Wien Museum*, is *Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration* (*Gastarbajteri* [Yugoslav, derived from the German *Gastarbeiter*—guest worker]: 40 Years of Labor Migration). It aimed, in the face of the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the recruitment agreement with Turkey, “to view the lives of the immigrants, who have since the sixties and seventies become an increasingly relevant part of the population of this country, as an equally important part of the social history of this country.”⁴⁷ *Gastarbajteri* represented a first impetus for the collection and presentation of the history of labor migration in Austria. It was trailblazing not least of all as a bottom-up initiative of *Initiative Minderheiten*, which also involved migrant actors, but it unfortunately did not have a lasting effect since it did not succeed in securing the collected materials and making them accessible at a suitable location.

The new trend toward the historicization of migration is, in any case, obvious, even if not in all projects historians and/or academic institutions are involved, but often NGOs, associations, and activists.⁴⁸ The 2013 petition by the National Council representative of the Green party Alev Korun for the establishment of a museum of migration also points in this direction. Korun argued, among other things, that “a museum of migration with permanent and changing exhibitions” could contribute “much [...] to social enlightenment about national and European histories of migration, mobility in the age of globalization, as well as to the emergence and change of identities and inclusion and exclusion.” She pointed out that the establishment of a “critical museum of migration” would also enable “an engagement with the blank spaces in the memory of societies and in the official writing of history.”⁴⁹ Reactions to this petition have, however, so far been minimal. To what extent the *Haus der Geschichte Österreich* (House of

47 See Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Matzl, eds., *Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), exhibition catalog, 23. See also the online version, <http://www.gastarbajteri.at> (accessed June 22, 2012).

48 Ljubomir Bratić, *Politischer Antirassismus: Selbstorganisation, Historisierung als Strategie und diskursive Interventionen* (Vienna: Löcker, 2010), especially: 137-139.

49 2244/A(E) XXIV. GP – Entschließungsantrag, March 21, 2013.

History Austria), which was greenlit by the National Council in April 2016 after a long and extremely complex prehistory and is currently being established, will take on this function remains to be seen. In the proposals of the international academic advisory board, migration was named explicitly as an issue that cuts across all areas of content.⁵⁰

This opens a new working field for contemporary history, which moreover corresponds to the current need for transnational European and global histories, in which the regional and the local nevertheless remains visible.⁵¹ This can also connect to a whole range of traditions and discussions, such as about a social history from the margins, emanating from minorities and the marginalized.⁵² The acquisition of new source materials—which has ever been a central task of contemporary history⁵³—is in any case of central importance to the examination of this topic. Relevant materials will not only have to be discovered in existing archives, it will be important above all to search for and to secure potential inventories (for example in consulting centers, migrant associations, and so forth).⁵⁴ Beyond this, it will be necessary to generate interviews with contemporary witnesses in order to preserve their experiences and memories. Without them, a new, multi-perspective view of Austrian history will be impossible.

Archiving will certainly not be the end result, but collecting and preserving is nevertheless a first and decisive foundational step, a precondition

50 Oliver Rathkolb, ed., *Umsetzungsstrategie für das Haus der Geschichte Österreich: Ideen und Entwürfe des Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Beirates*, Sept. 4, 2015, accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.hdgoe.at/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/HGOE_Strategie_Download.pdf. In the framework of the international academic advisory board of the Haus der Geschichte, a working group on migration was created consisting of Dirk Rupnow, Maria Stassinopoulou (Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies/University of Vienna), and Werner Hanak-Lettner (Jewish Museum Vienna). On the origins of the Haus der Geschichte, see Dirk Rupnow, “Nation ohne Museum? Diskussionen, Konzepte und Projekte,” in *Zeitgeschichte ausstellen in Österreich: Museen – Gedenkstätten – Ausstellungen*, ed. Dirk Rupnow and Heidemarie Uhl (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 417–463.

51 See Michael Gehler, *Zeitgeschichte im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem: Zwischen Regionalisierung, Nationalstaat, Europäisierung, internationaler Arena und Globalisierung*, Herausforderungen 12 (Bochum: Winkler, 2001), as well as Hanisch, “Dominanz des Staates,” 76.

52 Ingrid Bauer, “Von den Autobahnen der Erkenntnis – und versäumten Ausfahrten,” *L’Homme* 7 (1996), 206–211.

53 On the significance of the acquisition of source materials, see Hans Rothfels, “Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (1953), 1–8, here: 3–4, as well as the earlier contribution by Justus Hashagen, *Das Studium der Zeitgeschichte* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1915), 25–32.

54 In this context, it is problematic that the central actors in the “guest worker employment” in Austria—the Federal Economic Chamber and the Trade Union Federation—as associations are not obliged to preserve documentation. This has already led to the destruction of many important materials, while others are accessible only with great difficulty.

for all else; without an archive there is no writing of history. Finally, this is not only about writing the history of migration, but also, writing migration and migrants into history; this is about changing general perceptions: to see migration and migrants as a self-evident, visible, and audible part of the present and the past.

IV

This opens up a range of questions which are fundamental to every engagement with history, but are often not explicitly addressed: Whose (hi)stories are being told? Who is telling (hi)stories? Who is allowed to tell (hi)stories? Whose (hi)stories are being heard? Migration must be told as a lived reality, not only as an exception and a problem; the marginalized must be centered. Migrants must themselves tell this history and (co-)author it. Finally, this is not about a segregated (ghetto-)history of migration and migrants, but about an inclusive history that does justice to the everyday plurality and the shifts in contemporary Austria. A history of migration and migrants is here an indispensable prerequisite. The concept of a migration history can simultaneously only be an aiding term, because this is about significantly more than just the process of migration in the narrower sense; rather, it is about the representation of plurality and social change. This goes hand-in-hand with the discussion surrounding the *Entmigrantisierung* (demigrantization) of migration studies and simultaneously the *Migrantisierung* (migrantization) of social studies currently taking place in the field of migration studies.⁵⁵ As ever, the terms we use to describe the objects of our research are of central importance and by no means only peripherally relevant. It will be decisive not to create further invisibilities while simultaneously not encouraging the construction of an “other” in the course of the development of a “migrantology.”⁵⁶

The traditional, implicit, ethnically-formulated national history of the Second Republic, with its established narratives of prosperity and the welfare state or neutrality and the path into the EU, but also of the “first victim” or of (co-)perpetrators of the crimes of the Third Reich and the resulting

55 Manuela Bojadžijev and Regina Römhild, “Was kommt nach dem ‘transnational turn’? Perspektiven für eine kritische Migrationsforschung,” in *Vom Rand ins Zentrum: Perspektiven einer kritischen Migrationsforschung*, ed. Labor Migration, Berliner Blätter 65 (Berlin: Panama, 2014), 10-24.

56 In this context, see also Stephan Lanz, *Berlin aufgemischt: Abendländisch – multikulturell – kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 86-96, and his description and criticism of “Ausländerforschung” (the study of foreigners).

memory cultures and/or history-political distortions cannot contribute anything here.⁵⁷ This, of course, does not mean that these core narratives have lost their meaning. However, they are not merely augmented, but moreover transformed, through the focus on migration and the perspectives of migrants.

Beyond this, the broader historical context naturally has to be taken into account. Migration is by no means a phenomenon new to the Second Republic. Above all, it is not possible to speak of foreignness and constructions of foreignness in the second half of the twentieth century in Austria as in Germany without thereby taking into account that these countries have a catastrophic history of racism, persecution, expulsion, and genocide. This includes also colonial experiences of racism and violence. This is evident for example in the development of terms such as *Ausländer*- and *Fremdenfeindlichkeit* (both meaning xenophobia) in the 1970s as terms of substitution, since (structural) racism in our society has since the Holocaust not been perceived as such or been systematically blanked out.⁵⁸ Equally, habitual references to “prejudices” reduce racism and antisemitism to individual errors while thereby masking the fact that these are not exceptional phenomena but rather a dominant conception of the members of a society about their society, a complex of “racist knowledge.”⁵⁹

Furthermore, one cannot speak about “guest workers” without a view toward the history of forced labor and foreign laborers in World War II. Aside from this history, which is shared by Austria and Germany, it is of course necessary not to forget the Austrian prehistory of Habsburg interior migration, especially from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Galicia to the

57 See Verena Saueremann, “‘doing difference’: Zur Repräsentation von Migration und Migrant_innen in historischen Gesamtdarstellungen, Museen und Ausstellungen,” (diploma thesis, Universität Innsbruck, 2011).

58 See Mark Terkessidis, *Psychologie des Rassismus* (Opladen: Westdt. Verlag, 1998); Mark Terkessidis, *Die Banalität des Rassismus: Migranten zweiter Generation entwickeln eine neue Perspektive*, Kultur und soziale Praxis (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2004). In this context, see also David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993); David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Oxford: Wiley, 2002). The inability of post-Nazi German society of perceiving its own racism as such is also evident in the treatment of the murders of migrants by a neo-Nazi terror cell: These were for a long time presented as crimes taking place within a “criminal milieu of foreigners,” while a racist motive was—intentionally or not—completely dismissed. See for example Michael Rothberg, “Neo-Nazi Terror and Germany’s Racism Problem,” *openDemocracy*, December 16, 2011, accessed June 22, 2012, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/michael-rothberg/neo-nazi-terror-and-germany%E2%80%99s-racism-problem>.

59 See Mark Terkessidis, “Woven into the texture of things: Rassismus als praktische Einheit von Wissen und Institution,” in *Evidenzen im Fluß: Demokratieverlust in Deutschland*, ed. Andreas DisseInkötter, Siegfried Jäger, Helmut Kellershohn, and Susanne Slobodzian (Duisburg: DISS, 1997), 172-187.

metropolis Vienna, which in 1840 was composed of up to 40% of “foreigners” who lived and worked in the city, where “colonial attitudes” toward the immigrants from the provinces were omnipresent, as Moritz Csáky recently explicated.⁶⁰

Migration is an originally transnational phenomenon. The traditional frame of the nation state is here preserved, not least of all due to the significance of various national legal systems, but it is thereby simultaneously and continually also breached and subverted. Other levels—the local and regional—are enhanced since it is here that the new society is practiced every day. Migration systems and migrant biographies and networks simultaneously connect spaces to Austrian history which do not classically belong; above all, migrants’ places, regions, and countries of origin with their respective histories which led to their migration, as well as the places to which they – themselves transformed – migrate onward or return.⁶¹ Migration not only opens complex spaces but also complex temporal connections through their manifold associations in memory. Transnationality should therefore be understood as an analytical perspective in which the nation remains an important frame of reference but where the established logic of the national is repeatedly and fundamentally challenged and put to the test. Transnational and national developments take place in a complicated interrelationship with each other, just as various transnational processes, which are referred to, for example, as Europeanization or globalization, influence each other, overlap with each other, and compete with each other. The national frame is here not simply dissolved, but very much influenced and crisscrossed by transnational streams. The global and local/regional are thereby mixed, a process of hybridization known as “glocalization.”⁶²

Migration radically and pervasively challenges the format of national history and its established grand narratives. Therefore to name it and to

60 Moritz Csáky, *Das Gedächtnis der Städte: Kulturelle Verflechtungen – Wien und die urbanen Milieus in Zentraleuropa* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 222–230, 345–356. Csáky also speaks in this context of an “inner colonization.”

61 See Regina Römhild, “Global Heimat Germany: Migration and the Transnationalization of the Nation-State,” *Transit* 1, no. 1 (2004) accessed June 22, 2012, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/57z2470p>. On the paradigm of transnationalism, see Sabine Strasser, “Über Grenzen verbinden: Rezente Debatten zur Migrationsforschung in der Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie,” in *Rezente Debatten zur Migrationsforschung*, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Julia Dahlvik (Göttingen: V&R, 2011), 33–56 (here 41–51); Maria do Mar Castro Varela and Paul Mecheril, “Migration,” in *Integration, Rassismen und Weltwirtschaftskrise*, ed. Gerhard Hetfleisch and Manfred Oberlechner (Wien: Braumüller, 2010), 385–411 (here 394–396).

62 Roland Robertson, “Glokalisierung: Homogenität und Heterogenität in Raum und Zeit,” in *Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft*, ed. Ulrich Beck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1998), 192–220.

focus on it clearly as such has a strategic function. This is a transnational history par excellence: globalization takes place daily in situ, the transgression and subversion of boundaries is constantly practiced.⁶³ This is in the best sense a “divided history,” in the sense of “divided” and “shared” at once, an “entangled history” and *histoire croisée* (crossed history), as in fact every history always is, with all the ambivalences which bring exchange and interaction in their wake, including the ever-repeatedly produced inclusions and exclusion.⁶⁴ History can therefore only henceforth be understood as transnational in the true sense of the word, undermining and perforating borders, without entirely abrogating them.⁶⁵ However, the nationalism of the humanities, which is not only methodological, largely prevents this from being appropriately taken on board.

As with any history, this (new) history will also never be told in full, but at best in extracts and fragments. Most historical representations of course like to conceal this fact and attempt to awaken the impression of a rounded and closed “history.” Here, the “nation” above all else offered the frame and scope of reference, but also the legitimacy. Whatever did not fit neatly and without problems was and is happily erased and “written out.” In reality, beyond historiography, this closedness and purity was often attempted to be realized by force, including through the participation of historians and often employing history as an argument.

With a view toward migration, there was to finally be a departure from the fallacious imagining of a complete and closed history. A fragmented history would also be a more honest history, which unravels not only at the

63 Yildiz, *Stadt*; Römhild, “Heimat.”

64 Shalini Randeria, “Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne,” in *Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, ed. Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb, and Norbert Jegelka (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 87–96; Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, “Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt,” in *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichte- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), 9–49 (here: 17).

65 From the wealth of literature, see for example—with fundamentally different positions and accentuation—Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Christina Szanton Blanc, “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (1995), 48–63; Ludger Pries, “Migration and Integration in Zeiten der Transnationalisierung; oder, Warum braucht Deutschland eine ‘Kulturrevolution?’,” *iza: Zeitschrift für Migration und soziale Arbeit* 23, no. 1 (2001), 14–19; Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003), 576–610; Michael Bommes, “Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes; oder, Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung,” in *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*, ed. Dietrich Thränhardt and Uwe Hunger, *Leviathan Sonderhefte* 22 (Wiesbaden: Westdt. Verlag, 2003), 90–116; Michael Bommes, “Transnationalism or Assimilation,” *Journal of Social Science Education* 4, no. 1 (2005), 14–30.

edges but on every level. It would also be immune to becoming legitimizing history for new and always exclusionary projects, whether on a national or—ever more frequently—on the international level. An understanding of history, however, remains equally strategically important. With a perspective on the past, conceptions of possibility and change can develop. Critical remembrance is a necessary instrument to displace ossified perspectives and to “unlearn” them.⁶⁶ The demand is, of course, for a history that realized its potential for inclusion and does not always buy this with a simultaneous and new exclusion.

The field of contemporary history is today – as it always has been, but now perhaps to a greater degree – confronted with a range of challenges: the temporal delineation of its jurisdiction is becoming ever less clear; a multitude of narrators and actors, not least of all contemporary witnesses, stand in public competition with the professional historian; simultaneously, an increasing range of media and genres are competing over the presentation of the most recent past, including even fictionalized approaches to history; being part of the culture of memory as well as its critical counterpart at the same time, produces a complex entanglement which demands constant reflection.⁶⁷ To this is added the fact that the reality of the society of migration cannot just be an object of contemporary history, but also necessarily its precondition and its frame. Contemporary history still needs to come to terms with this fact and all of its consequences. Thereby the normative-homogeneous concept of a “collective memory” is once again challenged. More plural and heterogeneous “collected memories” should be put in the place of “collective memories”; these collected memories should moreover be exchanged, shared, and recognized.⁶⁸

66 María do Mar Castro Varely, “Interkulturelle Kompetenz, Integration und Ausgrenzung,” in *Interkulturelle Kompetenz im Wandel*, ed. Matthias Otten, Alexander Scheitza, and Andrea Cnyrim, vol. 1, *Grundlegungen, Konzepte und Diskurse*, SIETAR Deutschland – Beiträge zur interkulturellen Zusammenarbeit 1 (Frankfurt am Main: IKO, 2007), 155-169 (here: 167).

67 See Martin Sabrow, *Zeitgeschichte schreiben: Von der Verständigung über die Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), especially: 133-146.

68 Michele Barricelli, “Collected Memories statt kollektives Gedächtnis: Zeitgeschichte in der Migrationsgesellschaft,” in *Handbuch Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht*, ed. Markus Furrer and Kurt Messmer (Schwalbach am Taunus: Wochenschau, 2013), 89-118.

V

In Germany, the topic of migration has already been adopted by contemporary history, even if not to the desirable extent.⁶⁹ Germany, as a country of immigration, is in any case the focus of a whole range of new English-language studies. These examine not least of all the continuities between racism in the Nazi era and in post-war Germany, as also between the treatment of “foreign” or forced laborers in the Nazi era and “foreign” or “guest laborers” in the Federal Republic.⁷⁰ The field is obviously booming and becoming ever more nuanced, not least of all through the multilateral cultural research questions and approaches. Historians seem to be playing something of a secondary role, however, even though historical perspectives are increasingly discernible.⁷¹

69 See for example Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter* (Berlin: Dietz, 1986); Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001); Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück...”: *Die Geschichte der türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der Bundesrepublik*, *Moderne Zeit* 11 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005); Karen Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren* (Essen: Klartext, 2001); Manuela Bojadžijev and Massimo Perinelli, “Die Herausforderung der Migration: Migrantische Lebenswelten in der Bundesrepublik in den siebziger Jahren,” in *Das Alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil und linke Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968–1983*, ed. Sven Reichardt and Detlef Siegfried, *Hamburger Beiträge zur Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte* 47 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 131–145; Oliver Janz, and Roberto Sala, eds., *Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen Migranten in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011). See also the seminal works of the Osnabrück-based historian and migration researcher Klaus Bade: *Population, Labour and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany*, *German Historical Perspectives* (Leamington Spa: Bloomsbury Academic, 1987); *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, *Europa bauen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000); *Sozialhistorische Migrationsforschung*, *Studien zur Historischen Migrationsforschung* 13 (Göttingen: V&R, 2004); and co-edited with Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer: *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007).

70 See for example Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007); Rita Chin et al., *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2009); Ruth Mandel, *Cosmopolitan Anxieties, Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany* (Durham: Duke UP, 2008); as well as the helpful reader: Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration 1955–2005*, *Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism* (Berkeley: U of California P, 2007). The conference “Good-bye Germany? Migration, Culture, and the Nation-State” also took place at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2004. Some of the contributions were published in *Transit* 1, no. 1 (2004), accessed June 22, 2012, <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4pf6t335?display=all>. See there for example: Werner Sollors, “Good-bye Germany,” accessed June 22, 2012, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nm7g8vt>.

71 See for example the contributions in Şeyda Ozil, Michael Hofmann, and Yasemin Dayıoğlu-Yücel, eds., *50 Jahre türkische Arbeitsmigration in Deutschland*, *Türkisch-deutsche Studien – Jahrbuch 2011* (Göttingen: V&R, 2011).

In Germany, a public debate has also been on-going for several years now on the necessary musealization of the history of migrants.⁷² As early as 1990, the DOMiT, *Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration aus der Türkei e.V.* (The Documentation Center and Museum of Migration from Turkey), was founded as an independent organization of Turkish migrants in order to preserve their historical heritage for future generations. The initiative went public with a number of exhibitions and Internet projects, such as in 1998 with the exhibition *Fremde Heimat. Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei* (Foreign Homeland: A History of Immigration from Turkey), which took place at the *Ruhrlandmuseum* in Essen. This was followed in 2005/06 by a large social history and art exhibition in several locations in Cologne entitled *Projekt Migration*, which was realized in cooperation with the Cologne *Kunstverein*, the Institute for Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology at the University of Frankfurt am Main, and the Institute for Theory of Design and Art at the School of Design and Art in Zurich, and was supported by the German Federal Foundation for Culture. The social and cultural historical collection of the association was here augmented with materials on migration from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, Ex-Yugoslavia, South Korea, Vietnam, Mozambique, and Angola, which led in 2005 to the changing of its name to DOMiD, *Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration in Deutschland e.V.* (Documentation Center and Museum of Migration in Germany).⁷³ In 2007, it fused with the association *Migrationsmuseum in Deutschland e.V.*, thus bringing together migrants of various backgrounds with Germans without a migration background.

The demand for an independent museum has, however, by no means fallen silent in Germany: Aytaç Eryılmaz, until 2012 the managing director of DOMiD in Cologne, is continually calling for a “museum of migration as a center for the history, art, and culture of migration” and as “a key to a more encompassing social history,” “a place at which Germany can learn

72 See Jan Motte, and Rainer Ohliger, eds., *Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Essen: Klartext, 2004). See also Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson, eds., *Migration and Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960*, Studies in European History and Public Spheres 3 (Innsbruck: Transaction, 2010).

73 See Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration in Deutschland e.V., <http://www.domid.org>, as well as Aytaç Eryılmaz, and Mathilde Jamin, eds., *Fremde Heimat: Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei / Yaban, Silan olur: Türkiye'den Almanya'ya Göçün Tarihi* (Essen: Klartext, 1999); Cologne Kunstverein, DOMiT, Institute for Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main, and Institute for Theory of Design and Art at the School of Design and Art in Zurich, eds., *Projekt Migration*, (Cologne: DuMont, 2005).

to discover and understand itself as a country of immigration.”⁷⁴ In 2015, Rita Süßmuth, as patron of the project DOMiD, which by then was under new direction with the former president of the Bundestag, had begun a new attempt at realizing a central museum of migration in Germany.

The national German integration plan, *Neue Wege – Neue Chancen* (New Paths – New Opportunities), of 2007 dedicated a chapter to the topic *Kultur und Integration* (Culture and Integration). This claimed, for example, that “immigration and integration [...] are a part of our history.” The cultural achievements of migrants was to be given more space and the history of migration to be made more visible, but above all the focus was to lie on “successful historical integration processes as a part of our own cultural heritage”: not migration, but “integration should be the cross-cutting theme for cultural institutions.”⁷⁵ The issue here is, very pragmatically, winning over migrants as a target group for cultural institutions. Traditional conceptions of integration, however, remain dominant, above all the notion of achievement(s) that migrants are supposed to produce, “us” and “them,” culture and values, and so forth.

In response, the German Museums Association published a *Handreichung für die Museumsarbeit* (Handout for Museum Work) in 2015 on the topic “Museums, Migration, and Cultural Diversity.”⁷⁶ This made suggestions for all levels of museum work: collections (to survey existing collections anew, to develop new strategies for collecting, to identify previously overlooked materials), exhibitions (migration is to be regarded in an appropriate form as a cross-cutting theme in permanent exhibitions, while changing exhibitions should increasingly implement intercultural perspectives), and dissemination (with the goal of overcoming the distinction between persons “with and without a migration background”), all the way to the demand for increasing the proportion of those persons “with migration background” working in all sectors of the museums in the long term. Participation here becomes the key to preserving and making visible the history of migration: “In the documentation and presentation of the history of migration, museums are dependent on individuals, associations, and organizations as advisors and participants. Without these people and

74 Aytaç Eryılmaz, “Migrationsgeschichte und die nationalstaatliche Perspektive in Archiven und Museen, in *Museum und Migration: Konzepte – Kontexte – Kontroversen*,” ed. Regina Wonisch and Thomas Hübel (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012), 33–48, 47–48.

75 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, and Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, eds., *Der nationale Integrationsplan: Neue Wege – Neue Chance* (2007), 127–136.

76 Deutscher Museumsbund, ed., *Museen, Migration und kulturelle Vielfalt: Handreichungen für die Museumsarbeit* (Berlin: BGZ, 2015).

their experiences, there can neither be new potential questions asked of existing collections nor new perspectives developed.”⁷⁷

Internationally, the discussion surrounding migration and museums has advanced greatly. The classic countries of immigration have already long dedicated themselves to the issue in a range of special institutions: So for example the Ellis Island National Museum of Immigration in New York City (since 1990), the Immigration Museum in Melbourne (since 1998), or the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 in Halifax (since 1999). Since 2007, France also has an immigration museum, the *Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration* (The National Center for the History of Immigration) in Paris, surprisingly housed in the building that was created for the Paris Colonial Exposition of 1931.⁷⁸

International examples of migration archives are by contrast not too numerous, but they do exist. A leading role in this regard is played, for example, by the Immigration History Research Center Archives at the University of Minnesota, and by the French NGO *Génériques*, which has since 1992 worked on the collection, documentation, and preservation of materials relevant to the history of migration in the framework of a partnership with the French National Archives.⁷⁹ The collections of DoMiD in Cologne, finally, comprise over 100,000 books, gray literature, newspapers, journals, original documents, photographs, films, audio documents, flyers, posters, and material artifacts.⁸⁰

VI

Turning migration and migrants into an integral part of Austrian history in order to understand it as pluralistic and transnational and to narrate anew is by no means an easy task when on the outside—in reality—racism is on the rise, clean-cut oppositions between different cultures are seen as beyond dispute, and borders are becoming fortified again, thereby establishing and presenting them as controllable and impermeable, even

77 Museumsbund, *Museen*, 29.

78 On their (controversial) origins, collection practices, and presentation principles and forms, there exists a range of analyses and studies and a relatively expansive literature: Joachim Baur, *Die Musealisierung der Migration: Einwanderungsmuseen und die Inszenierung der multikulturellen Nation* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009); Laurence Gouriévidis, ed., *Museums and Migration: History, Memory and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2014); Wonisch and Hübel, *Museum und Migration*.

79 Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, <http://cla.umn.edu/ihrac>; Génériques, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, www.generiques.org.

80 DOMiD, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, www.domid.org.

if ultimately total control and total impermeability are impossible, unless fundamental human rights are ignored and states resort to violence.

The current situation in Austria is extremely complex: in the emerging engagement with Austria's recent history of migration within the last three or four years, there has been an obvious focus on the so-called guest worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s. Simultaneously, the so-called "refugee crisis" has since last year absorbed so much attention it almost delegitimizes any engagement with history when it comes to migration by contrast to the immediate needs of the present and concrete plans for the future. It also seems to delegitimize a focus on structured labor migration by contrast to the specifics of refugee movements.

First, the recent focus on labor migration is more than understandable due to the anniversaries, and the attention they attract, which we as historians can and should use, and the fact that the first generation of labor migrants from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia in Austria is dying off. There is a pressing need for a systematic examination and preservation of information, materials, and documents to counteract the continuing danger of their disappearance.

Second, it definitely makes sense to start with labor migration, even if we want to draw conclusions relevant to the present day. The differences between labor migration and refugee movements seem obvious, but both phenomena have always been interconnected and are not easily separable. The historic cases of refugee movements to post-war Austria – refugees from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981, or Jews from the Soviet Union through many years – are part of the established hegemonic narrative of the Second Republic but pose no lasting challenge to Austria as a nation: most of these refugees left the country after a short time, using Austria only to "pass through" but not to stay. They had a very small effect on Austria's demographics, yet they nevertheless occupy a significant place in the collective memory of the country as examples of its readiness to help and its solidarity.

If we want to understand diversity and plurality in Austria today, the history of labor migration in the 1960s and 1970s seems a good place to start. All those who share this new interest in a historical approach to migration know that this can only be a starting point for rethinking and reconfiguring the history of post-war Austria as an inclusive history. Since we have not processed those stories and histories yet, we have been totally unprepared for what has been happening since last year. This is the failure of the historians, and it is still the biggest challenge of our profession to realize history's great potential for inclusion without producing new marginalizations and exclusions.

From the Late Habsburg Empire to World War II

Migration Patterns in the Late Habsburg Empire

Annemarie Steidl

Regional mobility took many different forms. People moved shorter and longer distances, passed over administrative, geographical, or cultural borders, went back and forth between rural and urban areas, migrated to a neighboring country, or even crossed oceans. While some migrations consisted of a one-time move from one place of residence to another, other movements, even across national borders, were temporary, circular, or repeated. Even if a move may have been permanent from the perspective of the migrant, she or he may have left only the home country permanently, but remained, for some stretches of time, in more than one host region. Migrations are omnipresent characteristics of all human societies, yet they could differ considerably in terms of purpose, distance, intended duration, or types of migrants involved. Various migration patterns emerged, were transformed, and also disappeared according to changing social, demographic, economic, and political circumstances. Regional mobility within the vast empires of nineteenth-century Europe proved particularly difficult to classify as internal or international. Significant movements could take place within the territories of single empires, yet other migrations, which seemed strictly local or regional, crossed imperial borders.¹

Transatlantic moves were important phenomena during the second half of the nineteenth century; however, four times as many people migrated from Eastern and Southern to Central and Western Europe. Most countries that have been sources of large-scale out-migration have also experienced significant levels of migration within their borders. The massive overseas movement of nearly 60 million Europeans before World War I was itself part of a still much larger migration within Europe during the same period. In the decades preceding the war, multidirectional labor migration swept

1 See Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder, "Editor's Introduction," in *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, ed. Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1-11.

through Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of accelerated urbanization and industrialization.² Research on migration patterns in Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary has come to similar conclusions, with internal migration rates about three times as large as international ones in 1910 (either within Europe or overseas); a minority of the highly mobile people left for the United States.³ As a contemporary Hungarian statistician, Imre Ferenczi, emphasized in a paper given in the 1930s:

Die verschiedenen, aus dem freien Willen der Einzelnen, entstandenen inneren und äußeren Wanderungsströme gingen bis zum Weltkriege kaum behindert ineinander über, ergänzten und ersetzten einander nach dem Gesetz des geringsten Druckes. Die hunderttausend Slowaken, die jährlich aus ihren Bergen in die reiche ungarische Tiefebene zum Schnitt herabstiegen, wurden oft von den noch ärmeren Ruthenen ersetzt, während die Ungarn, von den höheren Löhnen angezogen, vielfach zur Saison nach Deutschland und nach Niederösterreich zogen. Hier haben sie oft die Tschechen verdrängt, die sich dann nach Amerika wandten. So mündeten oft die von einem kleinen festländischen Wanderungsbächlein ausgehenden Wellen irgendwo in den großen Ozean der interkontinentalen Wanderung.⁴

Until 1918, Austria-Hungary was one of the vast European empires. As a multinational state, it displayed high levels of social and cultural diversity, especially with the steady growth of national consciousness since the 1870s. In addition, the empire's institutional diversity should not be underestimated. Its two major units, Imperial

2 Julianna Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States* (New York: Holmes & Meir, 2000), 303.

3 Heinz Fassmann, "Emigration, Immigration and Internal Migration in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1910," in *Roots of the Transplanted: Volume One; Late 19th Century East Central and Southeastern Europe*, ed. Dirk Hoerder and Inge Blank (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994), 253–308 (here 276–277).

4 Imre Ferenczi, *Kontinentale Wanderungen und die Annäherung der Völker: Ein geschichtlicher Überblick* (Jena: Fischer, 1930), 18; "Before the World War, different voluntary internal and international migration patterns did not interfere but instead complemented and replaced each other, according to the law of lowest pressure. Even poorer Ruthenians (Ukrainians) replaced hundred thousand Slovaks, who moved annually from their mountains to the rich Hungarian central plains for the harvest, while Hungarians, attracted by higher wages, migrated seasonally to the German Reich and to Lower Austria. There they often displaced Czechs, who then turned to America. This way, migration waves, which mostly started as small continental streamlets, often flowed into the big ocean of intercontinental moves."

Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, were quasi-states with considerable autonomy, and within each, especially in Imperial Austria, local and regional political institutions exercised greater flexibility in contrast to the central government.⁵ The vast territories of Austria-Hungary, populated by more than 51 million people in 1910, were no nation states. Inhabitants spoke at least ten official languages, followed various religious denominations, of which Roman-Catholic, Protestant, Serbian-Orthodox, or Jewish were only the most dominant, and were characterized by a broad socio-economic and cultural diversity. Multifaceted migration patterns of people living in the Habsburg territories provide, therefore, an excellent research field.⁶

The Habsburg provinces and lands constituted a highly heterogeneous European empire circa 1900 and revealed a broad range of economic development. Regional processes strongly determined its economic growth, both in industrial and agricultural sectors. A large gap distinguished the most advanced, western regions from the less developed areas to the east and southeast. Levels of income and industrialization in the Alpine provinces and Bohemian lands were one and a half times those of the southern lands, and twice those of the Hungarian territories.⁷ While some Habsburg territories ranked among the most highly industrialized regions of continental Europe, others, such as Galicia and Bukovina, were still rather agricultural and hardly touched by industry or manufacturing. The partial nature of industrialization and its late introduction resulted in a disparity between supply and demand of male and female laborers and created even more movement within the country, but also resulted in the arrival of other European labor migrants. In the 1900s, no less than one third of the adult agrarian population of vast Central European territories that included Hungary proper, the Slovak territories, Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia, as well as Galicia, Bukovina, and the Mediterranean provinces (Carniola, Littoral, and Dalmatia) had lived or worked in places different from those of their birth.⁸

5 David F. Good, "The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates for the Habsburg Successor States, 1870–1910," *The Journal of Economic History* 54, no. 4 (1994): 869–91 (here 880); Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide*, 3–17.

6 For a more detailed study on migration patterns in Austria-Hungary, see Annemarie Steidl, "On Many Roads: Internal, European, and Transatlantic Migration in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1850 – 1914" (Habilitation manuscript, Vienna University, 2014).

7 See David F. Good, "Modern Economic Growth in the Habsburg Monarchy," *East Central Europe* 7 (1980): 248–68.

8 Ewa Morawska, *For Bread with Butter: Life-Worlds of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890 – 1940* (Cambridge: Lerner Publications Company, 1985), 28.

Internal Migration within Austria-Hungary

Most people moved over relatively short distances in nineteenth-century Central Europe. They often went to and from long established urban areas and newly developing industrial centers, but people migrated among agrarian regions and rural communities as well. Migrants were not longing, necessarily, for alien urban environments. Many moved within the same community, walked to a nearby place or to a settlement with similar features farther afield. They left villages for other villages or for a nearby small town, thus often moving back and forth between rural and urban areas. And, not uncommonly, any one of these movements could take migrants across district, provincial, or state borders. Contrary to popular assumptions that the road overseas was the dominant pattern before World War I,⁹ Gustav Thirring, a leading contemporary Hungarian statistician and demographer, showed that just the opposite was the case for the Hungarian Kingdom. Based on census records, he calculated that exactly 1,034,203 Hungarian inhabitants had left their place of birth between 1881 and 1900, of which nearly two thirds, or 654,228 people, had migrated internally.¹⁰

Josef Ehmer and Hermann Zeitlhofer's study on rural migration in the Bohemian lands presents a new approach in migration research.¹¹ In comparison to other Habsburg territories, internal migration rates were exceptionally high in late nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia. The authors identified several internal and international migration patterns: over shorter and longer distances, seasonal or permanent, from the countryside to towns and back, and among various urban regions. Bohemians would not move either to Prague or to heavily industrialized Plzeň/Pilsen;¹² instead, internal migration patterns were rather more complex. Along with movements to industrialized cities, destinations in neighboring agricultural districts were usually the most important. Nearly a third of all 104 Bohemian districts had migration rates to rural areas of at least 20 percent; in ten districts, over

9 "The number of external emigrants is two and one-half times greater than the number of migrants to internal industry"; Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide*, 21.

10 Gustav Thirring, "Die Auswanderung aus Ungarn: Beiträge zur Statistik und topographischen Verteilung der Auswanderung," *Bulletin de la Société Hongroise de Géographie* XXX (1902): 1-29 (here 4).

11 Josef Ehmer and Hermann Zeitlhofer, "Ländliche Migration in Böhmen vor dem 1. Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 53, no.1 (2005): 40-58.

12 Between 1843 and 1910 Plzeň's population grew 10-fold. For more information on that, see Ronald Smelser, "German-Czech Relations in Bohemian Frontier Towns: the Industrialization/Urbanization Process," in *Studies in East European Social History*, ed. Keith Hitchins (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 2:62-87.

40 percent of the mobile population made its way to an agricultural region within Imperial Austria.¹³

Migrations within Central Europe over short as well as long distances were common phenomena in the mid-nineteenth century, and all regions of Austria-Hungary show a long tradition of various migration patterns. Large numbers of people were involved in regular and less visible everyday migrations. Since the early modern period, men and women moved as agricultural laborers, either as male or female servants on larger farmsteads or as seasonal workers to sow and harvest crops or to take care of livestock. Smallholders and cottagers from Switzerland, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg walked as mowers, harvesters or as fruit pickers to Bavarian and Swabian grain fields;¹⁴ day laborers from Carniola moved seasonally to harvest wine in Vipavska dolina/Wippachtal/Valle del Vipacco, to cut the wheat in the region around Postojna/Postumia/Adelsberg, to pick hops in Styria in the summer months, and to make lumber in the Tolmin/Tolmino/Tolmein district during the winter.¹⁵ With an increasing intensity of cultivation and a growing demand for seasonal labor, the harvest migrations from the hills to the plains added to the mobility.¹⁶

Since the early modern period, Austrians and Hungarians developed migration strategies that linked them to specific labor markets in other regions and countries. Quite a few people from Alpine areas made their living as migrant laborers in different professions or as peddlers by travelling through vast parts of Central Europe. Mobile traders were part of local and village economies and responded to growing demands for merchandise and special services. Up to 80 percent of the male population of Ticino villages were temporarily absent as travelling vendors or mobile laborers in the early nineteenth century.¹⁷ Another characteristic feature of Alpine peddling was its specialization in certain products or services by local valleys, such as mobile oil and herbs dealers from the Zillertal.¹⁸ A more profitable example

13 Ehmer/Zeitlhofer, "Ländliche Migration," 40-58.

14 Manfred Scheuch, *Geschichte der Arbeiterschaft Vorarlbergs bis 1918*, 2nd ed. (Feldkirch: Verl. d. Österr. Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1978), 19.

15 Marina Cattaruzza, "Die Migration nach Triest von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg," in *Gesellschaft, Politik und Verwaltung in der Habsburgermonarchie 1830-1918*, ed. Ferenc Glatz and Ralph Melville (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987), 273-304 (here 284).

16 Dirk Hoerder, *People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic Interaction in Europe and North America* (Providence: Berg, 1993), 11.

17 Raffaello Ceschi, *Geschichte des Kanton Tessin* (Frauenfeld: Huber, 2003), 110-116.

18 An excellent overview of various labor migrants in Central Europe can be found in Hanns Haas, "Wandergewerbe und Wanderhandel aus und in den Alpen: Ein wirtschaftlicher Funktionstypus im sozialen Umfeld," in *Vor- und frühindustrielle Arbeitsmigration: Massenmigrationen in Zentraleuropa im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Josef Ehmer (Gütersloh: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, forthcoming).

for mobile merchants were Bohemian glass dealers, who founded branches of their trade in all-important European cities.¹⁹ Tramping artisans were a common feature up to the nineteenth century; around three quarters of the journeymen and most of the masters and apprentices in Central European towns were migrants.²⁰ Mobile journeymen even increased in volume and retained many of its traditional structures and functions during the nineteenth century.²¹ The labor force of certain trades developed special connections to their geographical origin, such as silk weavers from Lombardy or chimney sweeps from the Swiss cantons of Grisons and Ticino.²²

The expansion of a bourgeois lifestyle in European towns and cities since the eighteenth century brought about a growing demand for female and male servants. At the end of the nineteenth century, domestic service was overall a domain for women only: between 80 and 98 percent of the domestic servants were female in almost all European urban areas.²³ Domestic service in urban households was the most important occupation for young women from the Habsburg Monarchy. In Carniola and the Littoral, many young Slovenian women moved to Trieste and Gorizia/Gorica for employment as maids, housekeepers, or nurses. Other women from Slovenian villages delivered bread to Trieste or worked as seamstresses for urban dwellers. In Transylvania, meanwhile, young unmarried girls and widows moved to nearby towns and to București/Bucharest in the Kingdom of Romania to make a living as domestic servants.²⁴ After the end of the Napoleonic wars, enormous building sites for expansion and

19 Klaus Weber, "Böhmische Glashändler in Europa vom 17. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert," in *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus J. Bade, et al. (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 413-5.

20 Reinhold Reith, "Arbeitsmigration und Technologietransfer in der Habsburgermonarchie in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts: Die Gesellenwanderung aus der Sicht der Kommerzienkassette," *Blätter für Technikgeschichte* 56 (1994), 9-33; Annemarie Steidl, *Auf nach Wien! Die Mobilität des mitteleuropäischen Handwerks im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert am Beispiel der Haupt- und Residenzstadt* (Wien: Verlag f. Geschichte u. Politik, 2003).

21 Josef Ehmer, "Tramping Artisans in Nineteenth Century Vienna," in *Migration, Mobility, and Modernisation*, ed. David Siddle (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2000), 164-85 (here 183).

22 Annemarie Steidl, "Rege Kommunikation zwischen den Alpen und Wien: Die regionale Mobilität Wiener Rauchfangkehrer," *Histoire des Alpes – Storia delle Alpi – Geschichte der Alpen* 14 (2009): 25-40.

23 Raffaella Sarti, "Who are Servants? Defining Domestic Service in Western Europe (16th –21st Centuries)," in *Proceedings of the Servant Project*, ed. Suzy Pasleau and Isabelle Schopp (with Raffaella Sarti) (Liège: Éditions de l'Université de Liège, 2006), 2:3-59; Sylvia Hahn, *Historische Migrationsforschung* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012), 113-114.

24 Marta Verginella, *Ekonomija odresenja in preživetja: Odnos do življenja in smrti na Tržanskem podvezelju* [Economy of Salvation and Survival: The Relationship to Life and Death in the Region of Tržanska] (Koper: Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, 1996); Johann Hintz, *Das wandernde Siebenbürgen: Eine statistische Studie* (Kronstadt, 1876), 9.

industrialization of urban agglomerations created demand for hundreds of thousands of labor migrants all over Europe. Up to 13 percent of Northern Italy's population, which included parts of Imperial Austria, moved seasonally, mainly as construction workers. According to René Del Fabbro, about 454,000 labor migrants from Friuli found temporary employment in the German Reich, and the number of seasonal laborers from that area was nearly twice as high in Imperial Austria (about 895,000 from 1872 to 1915).²⁵ Industrialization created new jobs for female labor migrants as well; many women found employment in textile factories.²⁶

According to the 1910 census of Imperial Austria, 37.6 percent of all inhabitants had at least left their home municipalities, and nearly 25 percent had crossed the borders of a political district, but only 8.6 percent moved over provincial borders and an even smaller ratio, 2.2 percent, had left the country.²⁷ On average, spatial mobility of Imperial Austria's inhabitants was high, but the rates varied across different regions. Nearly 80 percent of the Galician people lived within municipal boundaries of their birthplaces, while the ratio of sedentariness was much lower in more industrialized parts, such as Lower Austria (47 percent) or Bohemia (55 percent).²⁸ According to the official numbers, Hungarian inhabitants were less mobile than Imperial Austrians; the proportion of people with a different place of residence than place of birth was only 30 percent in the Kingdom of Hungary.²⁹

Seasonal laborers and permanent migrants also moved regularly back and forth between Imperial Austria and the Hungarian Kingdom. According to census records, the number of Hungarian citizens crossing over to Imperial Austria was always higher than the other way around. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungarian-born people were leading the list of "international foreigners" in Austrian provinces. Already in 1869, the Austrian census listed about 91,000 Hungarian migrants, while the Hungarian census of 1870 recorded about 68,000 people who had moved east and south from Imperial Austria. An even higher number

25 René Del Fabbro, *Transalpini: Italienische Arbeitswanderung nach Süddeutschland im Kaiserreich 1870–1918* (Osnabrück: Rasch, 1996), 40.

26 Sylvia Hahn, "Nowhere at Home? Female Migrants in the Nineteenth-Century Habsburg Monarchy," in *Women, Gender and Labour Migration: Historical and Global Perspectives*, ed. Pamela Sharpe (London: Routledge, 2002), 108–26.

27 K. K. statistische Central-Commission, ed., *1912–15, Österreichische Statistik N.F. 1, 2, 3, Vienna*.

28 *Ibid.*

29 *A magyar szent korona országában 1910: Évi népszámlálása; Ötödik rész, Részletes Demografia* [Volkszählung in den Ländern der Ungarischen Heiligen Krone im Jahre 1910: Fünfter Teil; Detaillierte Beschreibung der Bevölkerung] (Budapest, 1913).

of people from the Hungarian territories moved west and north before World War I, since Imperial Austria provided better-paying jobs in more advanced industries. In 1910, about half of all “international” migrants living in Imperial Austria were born in the Kingdom of Hungary.³⁰

Crossing Borders inside Europe

Before World War I, Central and Eastern Europe formed the greatest reservoir of cheap laborers for the growing industrial sectors of western and northern Europe as well as for commercialized agriculture. The territories of Austria-Hungary, especially, were the most important regions of origin for seasonal workers who found employment all over Europe. Even if it were mainly the neighboring countries, namely the German Reich, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Italy, the Russian Empire, and the Kingdom of Romania, that attracted most Austro-Hungarians, some of them moved as far as Sweden, France, Denmark, and various other European countries in search of work. In 1910, approximately 1.5 million people from Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary made their living in other European countries, while at the same time about 860,000 foreigners lived and worked in Austro-Hungary (approximately 583,000 of them in Imperial Austria).³¹

Temporary labor migrations from Northern Bohemia, predominantly, to Saxony and Prussia (*Sachsengängerei*) have a long-standing tradition throughout the early modern period, whereas seasonal movements from Austrian Galicia to Prussia and other German territories only culminated at the beginning of the twentieth century.³² In the second half of the nineteenth century, Imperial Austria was the most important origin for labor migration, providing more than 42 percent of all foreigners in the German Reich in 1885. Mining, industry and building trades were primary employments for Austrians, with more than half of them in these

30 The Hungarian census of 1910 counted 235,475 Austrian migrants, which was nearly 100,000 fewer than the 324,495 Hungarian-born people that Austrian statistics recorded in their territory in the same year. *Ibid.*

31 Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Willcox, *International Migrations*, vol. 2 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929); see also Donna R. Gabaccia and Elizabeth Zaroni, “Transitions in Gender Ratios among International Migrants, 1820–1930,” *Social Science History* 36, no. 2 (2012): 197–221.

32 Manuela Obermeier, *Die Sachsengänger: Wanderarbeiter im Rübenbau 1850–1915* (Berlin: Bartens 1999); Hermann Zeitlhofer, “Zwei Zentren temporärer kontinentaler Arbeitsmigration im Vergleich: der Böhmerwald und das Friaul um 1900,” in *Übergänge und Schnittmengen: Arbeit, Migration, Bevölkerung und Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Diskussion*, ed. Annemarie Steidl et al. (Wien: Böhlau, 2008), 45–75.

professions. Not surprisingly, the majority of domestic servants working in the German Reich were women, originating mainly from the Czech lands. Female migrants worked on German fields as well, while only 15 percent of them found employment in industry.³³ About half of Polish agricultural workers were women, who cultivated and harvested root crops, mainly sugar beets and potatoes. Usually, these women worked in gangs under the supervision of male foremen who most often spoke Polish and German. Similar systems of organizing seasonal work could be found in southern Sweden and Denmark as well.³⁴

Since the 1890s, the German Reich was facing a rapid increase in laborers arriving from Eastern Europe.³⁵ Broad changes in agricultural production had resulted in rising demand for seasonal day laborers in western, northern, and central Europe. Changes from mere growing of cereals to growing sugar beets promised considerably higher profits. Modernizations, the mass cultivation of sugar beets, as well as intensified use of machines, raised the need for short-term laborers during sowing and harvest periods. By 1910, six times more people had crossed the borders than in 1871, their numbers growing from 75,702 to 667,159. German labor markets mostly attracted people from Western Galicia, while the number of labor migrants from the Hungarian Kingdom was rather small.³⁶ On the eve of World War I, the German Reich had a foreign population of 1.5 million, Prussia alone accommodating 900,000 of them. In 1914, a lot more people from the Russian Empire and Imperial Austria moved as seasonal labor migrants to German industry and fields than went overseas.³⁷ Migrants from the

33 Heinrich Rauchberg, "Die österreichischen Staatsangehörigen im Deutschen Reich unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Österreicher im Preussischen Staate," *Statistische Monatschrift* 15 (1889): 301-31 (here 321).

34 Klaus J. Bade and Jochen Oltmer, "Polnische landwirtschaftliche Arbeitskräfte in Preußen-Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Enzyklopädie*, ed. Bade et al., 879-885 (here 881-882).

35 Anton Knoke, *Ausländische Wanderarbeiter in Deutschland* (Leipzig: Universität Leipzig, 1911), 3; Ferenczi, *Kontinentale Wanderungen*; Ludwig, *Die polnischen Sachsengänger*; see also Klaus J. Bade, "'Preussengänger' und 'Abwehrpolitik': Ausländerbeschäftigung, Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerkontrolle auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in Preussen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 24 (1984): 91-162; Josef Ehmer, *Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Historische Demographie 1800-2000* (München: Oldenbourg, 2004), 19-33.

36 According to the census of the German Reich, 32,107 Hungarian-born people were counted in 1910, see "Auswanderung und Rückwanderung der Länder der Ungarischen Heiligen Krone in den Jahren 1899-1913," *Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen*, 67, n.s. (Budapest, 1918), 110-111.

37 Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880-1980* (Berlin: Colloquium-Verlag, 1983), 29-51; Ewa Kepińska and Oded Stark, "The Evolution and Sustainability of Seasonal Migration from Poland to Germany: From the Dusk of the 19th Century to the Dawn of the 21st Century," *International Review of Economics and Finance* 28 (2013): 3-18.

Hungarian Kingdom moved to various European countries, but only in the case of the German Reich, the Kingdoms of Romania and Serbia, and the other Balkan states were instances of regional mobility significantly numerous.³⁸

After the turn of the century, in response to intensified xenophobia against Polish-speaking migrants and to meet simultaneously growing demands for cheap laborers, the German government started to stimulate movements of other Europeans. They invited, in particular, Ukrainians from Galicia to take up jobs in German industry and agriculture.³⁹ The number of Ukrainian-speaking labor migrants rose from nearly zero in the 1890s to about 7,000 at the turn of the century and more than 100,000 people before World War I. By 1914, Ukrainians from Galicia were the second largest group of foreign Slavic-speaking workers in German industry and agriculture after Austrian and Russian Poles.⁴⁰

During the same period that the German Reich was hiring Galician seasonal migrants, large numbers of foreign population entered many other countries of western and northern Europe. France, Denmark, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and even Romania competed for agricultural workers from central and eastern Europe.⁴¹ Already in the 1880s, 1.2 million of 38 million French inhabitants were international migrants who spoke Italian, Polish, Flemish, Spanish, Russian, Czech, and several other languages.⁴² By the 1890s, Danish beet growers and sugar producers had begun hiring people from Russian Poland and Galicia; their numbers rose to 18,000 Polish labor migrants in 1913.⁴³ In 1900, Swedish and Swiss sugar producers as well as French beet growers began to compete for seasonal workers. Imre Ferenczi estimated that the number of Galician seasonal workers in France was 40,000, while in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway another 80,000 Polish and Ukrainian laborers from

38 Gustav Thirring, *Hungarian Migration of Modern Times* (New York, 1931), 430.

39 See Jochen Oltmer, "Grenzüberschreitende Arbeitsmigration von und nach Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in *Perspektiven in der Fremde? Arbeitsmarkt und Migration von der Frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Dittmar Dahlmann and Margit Schule Beerbühl (Oldenbourg: Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2011), 25-48 (here 31-32).

40 Armin Mitter, "Die ukrainische Erwerbsmigration nach Preußen (1900-1914)," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte* 34 (1987), 147-78.

41 Lars Olsson, "Labor Migration as a Prelude to World War I," *International Migration Review* 33 (1996), 875-900; Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers - Forced Laborers - Guest Workers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

42 Hoerder, *People on the Move*, 22.

43 Andrzej Brożek, "Polish Immigrant Workers in Europe and the Labor Movement," *Polish American Studies* 46, no. 1 (1989): 61-73 (here 63); Morawska, *For Bread with Butter*, 67.

Austria-Hungary found employment.⁴⁴ Within Europe, international competition for migrant workers grew notably, and recruitment was increasingly directed to areas on the outskirts of agrarian capitalist centers. By 1910, even the Hungarian Kingdom competed with the German Reich for Galician seasonal laborers, and smaller numbers settled permanently in Bukovina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

From Austria-Hungary to the United States

From 1890 to 1914, more than fifteen million people left Europe for the United States, the vast majority of whom had been born in eastern and southern Europe. Records of United States immigration authorities show people from Habsburg territories to be the largest group from one single country among new arrivals during the period from 1902 to 1911, at 27.9 percent of all migrants.⁴⁵ The great transatlantic movements of central, southern, and southeastern Europeans declined sharply with the beginning of World War I and, due to new United States immigration laws, never regained the same strength after the war. Nineteenth-century industrialization, new developments in traffic (railways and steamships), and political and economic liberalization made massive and voluntary transatlantic movements possible. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, more and more jobs in mines, factories, construction, and urban services attracted Europeans as the American economy was more labor-intensive, and even urban service jobs and factories relied heavily on mostly temporary employments.⁴⁶ These were perfect conditions for the growing mobile labor force from southern and eastern Europe: "For most Europeans around 1900, the economic advantages of working in America were, on average, quite high compared to staying at home, the costs of moving were proportionately quite low, and yet the overwhelming majority did not leave Europe."⁴⁷

44 Ferenczi, *Kontinentale Wanderungen*, 79; Olsson, "Labor Migration as a Prelude," 892-893.

45 Karl Englisch, "Die österreichische Auswanderungsstatistik," *Statistische Monatsschrift* 39 (1913): 65-167; Johann Chmelar, "The Austrian Emigration, 1900-1914," *Perspectives in American History* 7 (1973): 289; Michael John, "Push and Pull Factors for Overseas Migrants from Austria-Hungary in the 19th and 20th Centuries," in *Austrian Immigration to Canada: Selected Essays*, ed. Franz A. J. Szabo (Carleton: McGill-Queen's Press, 1996), 55-81 (here 59).

46 See Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

47 Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914: Mass Migration as a Transnational Business in Long Distance Travel* (Zürich: Chronos, 2013), 33 and 22.

In comparison with other European regions, such as western German lands or Scandinavian countries, Habsburg inhabitants were latecomers to transatlantic migration. Although various migration patterns within, from, and to Austria-Hungary had a long-standing history, transatlantic movements were not a characteristic feature of mass mobility prior to the 1880s. By the end of the century, transatlantic migrations itself had become easier, due to the circulation of knowledge about the wider world. Although some people from Austrian territories had moved overseas as early as the eighteenth century,⁴⁸ a new type of international movement did not emerge before the end of the nineteenth century. According to official surveys, only 14,255 people left Austrian provinces for destinations overseas between 1821 and 1830; from 1831 to 1840, the total was a mere 7,536 people.⁴⁹ Numbers for overseas migrants were even smaller from the Hungarian Kingdom and Croatia-Slavonia, at only a few hundred persons per year. American statistics listed 138,125 arrivals from the Hungarian Kingdom until the 1890s.⁵⁰ Overseas movements were still low in the 1870s, but grew apace in the following decade. A first peak was reached at the beginning of the 1890s, with people from Imperial Austria in the lead, and declined sharply from 1893 to 1895, when the next economic recession created unemployment and labor unrest in the United States.⁵¹ The end of the 1890s saw a more modest increase and then a quadrupling in the years leading up to World War I, when a new type of long distance migration emerged. Even if necessary preconditions for significant overseas traffic had developed relatively late, these migrations had now become a generally accepted practice to improve an individual's, as well as a family's, living situation. It was a positively marked instrument for social advancement, and the rise in the number of people who moved over longer distances increased the information available concerning potential destinations. Overall, up to 3.5 million people from Austria-Hungary arrived in the United States during the nineteenth century.⁵²

Even if the United States had become the preferred destination for a fast increasing number of migrants from Austria-Hungary, their regions of origin changed dramatically. While in the second half of the nineteenth

48 See for example William O'Reilly, "Emigration from the Habsburg Monarchy and Salzburg to the New World, 1700 – 1848," in "Österreich und die Amerikas," ed. Thomas Fröschl and Ursula Prutsch, special issue, *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* 1 (2005): 7-20.

49 John, "Push and Pull Factors," 55.

50 Chmelar, "The Austrian Emigration," 310; Julianna Puskás, *From Hungary to the US (1880–1914)* (Budapest: Akad. Kiadó, 1982), 18.

51 Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 62.

52 Ernő Deak, *Die Auswanderung aus Österreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Ein Überblick* (Wien: Institut für Österreichkunde, 1974), 34.

century, German-, Czech-, and Yiddish-speaking people from the Bohemian lands and from Vorarlberg accounted for more than 80 percent of all international migrants, at the end of the century, new arrivals were primarily Poles, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Romanians, and Rusyns: groups counted as parts of the so-called “New Immigration.”⁵³ Therefore, Austro-Hungarian transatlantic migrations should not be reduced to only one type of mass movement. Divergent overseas mobility patterns emerged along various regional, ethnic, and cultural lines and during different stages of economic development. Migrants’ social status, gender, and religious and ethnic affiliations linked them closely to certain mobility patterns. While in some parts of Imperial Austria people started to move overseas quite early, the knowledge of a United States labor market in search of foreigners did not spread to other areas until the first decade of the twentieth century. Many moved as family groups, such as Czechs in search of free land in the 1870s and 1880s, while others left their families in Europe with intentions of returning. Most transatlantic travelers were young men and women in their prime employment age, many of them single and hoping for a profitable job or a suitable marriage partner.⁵⁴ Especially since the end of the nineteenth century, most Austro-Hungarians moved within well-developed transatlantic communication and migration networks of family and friends, but one should not forget about the adventurous pioneers who made their way to still scarcely-populated areas in the western and southern United States.⁵⁵

Once Europeans started to settle in the Americas, some of them returned to their country of origin.⁵⁶ An increase in globalizing processes of

53 Heinz Fassmann, “Auswanderung aus der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie,” in *Auswanderung aus Österreich: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Traude Horvath and Gerda Neyer (Wien: Böhlau, 1996), 33-55 (here 39-40).

54 Annemarie Steidl, “Young, Unwed, Mobile, and Female: Women on their Way from the Habsburg Monarchy to the United States of America,” *Przegląd Polonijny* 4 (2005): 55-76; Annemarie Steidl, “Transatlantic Migration from the Late Austrian Empire and its Relation to Rural-Urban Stage Migration,” in *European Mobility: Internal, International, and Transatlantic Moves in the 19th and early 20th Centuries*, ed. Annemarie Steidl et al. (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2009), 207-228; Annemarie Steidl and Wladimir Fischer-Nebmaier, “Transatlantischer Heiratsmarkt und Heiratpolitik von MigrantInnen aus Österreich-Ungarn in den USA, 1870–1930,” in “Heiraten nach Übersee,” ed. Margareth Lanzinger and Annemarie Steidl, special issue, *L’Homme: Zeitschrift für feministische Geschichtswissenschaft* 1 (2014): 51-68.

55 That not all European transatlantic migrants moved within migration chains is convincingly demonstrated by Jochen Krebber for people from Wurttemberg at the end of the nineteenth century; see Jochen Krebber, “Creed, Class, and Skills: Three Structural Limitations of Chain Migration,” in *European Mobility*, ed. Steidl et al., 69-77.

56 Mark Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9.

labor markets modified transcontinental migration patterns from exclusively lifelong commitments to temporary employment.⁵⁷ Before World War I, most people did not leave Austria-Hungary with intentions of settling in the United States for good. Wages were considerably higher in heavy industry, mining, and construction, and the main goal was to save as much money as possible and to return after two to five years.⁵⁸ Thus the mainly work-related moves all over the globe had high return rates both because there was little intention of permanent settlement and because new travel possibilities made return much easier. Based on official data from the U.S. government and shipping company statistics, nearly half of all Europeans crossed the Atlantic more than once during the first decades of the twentieth century. The official return rate to Imperial Austria was 39.5 percent; the percentage of those going back to the Hungarian Kingdom was slightly lower (37.9 percent).⁵⁹

A Regional Approach – Migration Patterns in Vorarlberg

From the 1840s to the 1860s, at least thirty-six Vorarlbergers had left the small village of Schoppernau in the Bregenzer Wald (in 1869, the village had less than 500 inhabitants): seventeen of them moved northwest to France, five mobile laborers crossed the border to Switzerland, four migrated to the German Rhineland, and two of them went on the long transatlantic trip to the United States; another six tried their luck in the capital and found employment in Vienna, and one each took the path to Bavaria and the Kingdom of Hungary. Meinrad Pichler completed this list by including another four transatlantic migrants and concluded that the Montafon region in Vorarlberg shows similar migration patterns as well.⁶⁰

57 See Dirk Hoerder, "Immigration and the Working Class: The Remigration Factor," *International Labor and Work Class History* 21 (1982): 28-41; Walter Kamphoefner, "Volume and Composition of German-American Return Migration," in *A Century of European Migrations, 1830-1930*, ed. Rudolph J. Vecoli and Suzanne M. Sinke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 293-312.

58 See Christian Dustmann and Yorma Weiss, "Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 42, no. 2 (2007): 236-56.

59 Gerda Neyer, "Auswanderungen aus Österreich: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart," *Demographische Informationen* (1995/96): 60-70; Ferenczi and Willcox, *International Migrations*, 91; Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 43.

60 Maria Katharina Strolz, "Umwelt und Persönlichkeit Franz Michael Felders (1839-1869): Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des Hinterbregenzerwaldes," (phil. diss., Vienna University, 1976), 343-347; Meinrad Pichler, *Auswanderer: Von Vorarlberg in die USA 1800 - 1938* (Bregenz: Vorarlberger Autoren Ges., 1993), 20.

In Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, various migration patterns—traditional routes and new ones, within a country and beyond administrative borders, to other continents, in one direction or circular—were highly entangled and related to each other. To understand the connectedness and complexity of these patterns, a regional approach is necessary. As Leslie Page Moch emphasized, such an approach is best suited to migration studies because the majority of human movements occurred within regions, and regions varied enormously from one another.⁶¹ As people moved among villages and towns and to neighboring countries, they established links within these areas and a system of shared knowledge. The province of Vorarlberg, which was part of a much larger migration region—stretching across state borders from the Swiss textile area surrounding St. Gallen, to the Grand Duchy of Baden and the later Kingdom of Württemberg, to Italian-speaking regions in Switzerland, the Veneto in the Kingdom of Italy, and the Habsburg region of Trentino—is well-suited for such a regional approach.

Seasonal movements of laborers from Vorarlberg to other European regions have a long tradition. Since the late sixteenth century, mostly men moved as masons and construction workers to Switzerland, France (for example, Alsace), and smaller German territories nearby (for example, Swabia). Until the nineteenth century, construction workers from Vorarlberg and the district of Trento/Trient (today a self-governing Italian province) were among the best-known labor migrants in all of Europe. More than 1,000 construction workers, master builders, and artists from the narrow area of Bregenzer Wald moved to all parts of Europe, especially to the southwestern parts of Germany and to France, to build churches, monasteries, and palaces.⁶² Even children found seasonal employment as shepherds and agricultural servants in southwestern German regions. From the seventeenth up to the nineteenth century, many families in the Austrian western provinces sent their children as farm laborers for a few months over the border to the German territories of Württemberg, Ravensburg, Baden, Bavaria, or Swabia.⁶³

In the nineteenth century, Vorarlberg was, besides Lower Austria, the most industrialized region of the Alpine provinces and it was leading—in

61 Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2003), 9.

62 Pichler, *Auswanderer*, 45; Hannelore Berchtold, "... in Frankreich ihr Fortkommen zu gründen ...": Die Arbeitsmigration von Vorarlberg nach Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert," (phil. diss., Innsbruck University 2001); Michael C. Maurer and Anton Schindling, "Italienische, Graubündner, Tessiner und Vorarlberger Baumeister und bildende Künstler im barocken Europa," in *Enzyklopädie*, ed. Bade et al., 683-689 (here 687).

63 Josef Märk, *Schwabekinder aus Rankweil* (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Ges., 1981); Roman Spiss, *Saisonwanderer, Schwabekinder und Landfabrer* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993).

1910, at least—in regard to the share of international migrants. Less than half of Vorarlberg's population was making a living in agriculture in 1890 and, until 1910, this already low level fell under 30 percent.⁶⁴ Especially in the Rhine valley, a thriving textile industry progressed, which offered many jobs for men and women. Vorarlbergers and Tyrolians who dealt with textiles produced in those new enterprises went as far as Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In some cases, the next generation continued these European movements over the Atlantic to America, and it is no surprise that early intercontinental migrants took the route overseas via French harbors.⁶⁵ When information of new opportunities in the United States spread inside existing networks, Vorarlbergers were interested, and some started to move overseas before the middle of the nineteenth century.

Since regional mobility had a long tradition in families of Vorarlberger artisans and industrial laborers, the new continent seems to have been a lot closer for them than for people from the east of Austria-Hungary. In his study, Markus Hämmerle describes migration to the United States as part of continuous regional mobility, which existed already at the start of the nineteenth century. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of transatlantic migrants were skilled workers, mostly from the building trades; in the 1850s, most of them gave their occupation as quarrymen, masons, or carpenters.⁶⁶ From 1851 to 1860, 565 Vorarlbergers left in the direction of the United States. According to shipping records, between 1848 and 1880, about 2,000 adults, accompanied by up to 300 children, made their way to North America. This was about 2 percent of Vorarlberg's population, which had grown from 103,036 people in 1869 to 107,373 in 1880.⁶⁷ Contrary to traditional paradigms that transatlantic migrations were caused by crisis scenarios such as crop failure or the recession in rural textile industries, early transatlantic voyagers who left Imperial Austria were overwhelmingly skilled people who originated in more industrialized regions, where the economy was in full swing, as in Vorarlberg.⁶⁸

64 Rupert Pichler, *Italiener in Österreich – Österreicher in Italien: Einführung in Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Verfassung 1800–1914* (Wien: Eichbauer, 2000), 158–60.

65 Othmar Aschauer, "Tirolerische Wander-Bauhandwerker aus dem Außerfern im 17. – 19. Jahrhundert," in *Künstler, Händler, Handwerker: Tiroler Schwaben in Europa*, ed. Tiroler Landesmuseum (Innsbruck: Tiroler Landesmus. Ferdinandeum 1989), 190–203 (here 204); according to Meinrad Pichler, all known U.S. migrants who left Vorarlberg before the middle of the nineteenth century chose a French harbor for their move; see Pichler, *Auswanderer*, 45–63.

66 Markus Hämmerle, *Glück in der Fremde: Vorarlberger Auswanderer im 19. Jahrhundert* (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Gesellschaft, 1990), 216.

67 *Ibid.*, 51; Österreichische Statistik, vol. 1, ed. K. K. Statistische Central-Commission (Wien, 1882).

68 For an approach of agricultural crises and industrial reorganizations, see Fassmann, "Auswanderung aus der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie," 47–48.

Later in the century, people from the most developed industrial textile centers in the Rhine Valley tried overseas opportunities in the neighborhood of New York and in New Jersey. The most industrialized communities, Dornbirn, Hohenems, Wolfurt, Bregenz, Bludenz, and Frastanz, were centers of transatlantic migration in the second half of the century. From 1890 to 1914, textile workers, many of them embroiderers, were the next most important overseas migrants besides artisans in the building sector. About 600 people, many from the communities of Lustenau and Höchst in the political district of Feldkirch, crossed the Atlantic and settled overwhelmingly in New Jersey to go on with their work as embroiderers. This pattern continued after World War I and about 10,000 people left Vorarlberg in the direction of the Americas from 1800 to 1938.⁶⁹

Given the long tradition of various migration patterns, it would be easy to describe Vorarlberg as a province of emigration. While these people tried their luck abroad, Italian-speaking migrants from Trentino, Grisons in Switzerland, and Veneto in the Kingdom of Italy arrived as laborers throughout the nineteenth century. Before 1850, seasonal migrants, who mostly spoke Rhaeto-Romance, arrived with their families from Grisons. From 1870 to 1914, due to a labor shortage in the textile industries, Vorarlberg's entrepreneurs started to recruit foreigners, many of them women from Trento.⁷⁰ The fact that Vorarlberg is, up to today, an active migration region demonstrates the long lifespan of these patterns. According to data from the *Statistik Austria* for 2015, with more than 17 percent foreign-born inhabitants, the province is second only to Vienna (34.5 percent) in this regard, and Vorarlbergers are also second on the list of people leaving the Republic of Austria (1.4 percent of the average population in 2015, only topped by Vienna with 2.4 percent).⁷¹

As this study on the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary shows, various migration patterns—traditional and new roads, within a country and beyond administrative borders, in one direction or circular—were highly entangled and related to each other. Internal movements of Habsburg inhabitants

69 Meinrad Pichler, *Aus dem Montafon an den Mississippi: Amerika-AuswandererInnen aus dem Montafon* (Schruns: Heimatschutzverein Montafon, 2013).

70 Reinhard Johler, *Mir parlen Italiano und spreggen Dütsch piano: Italienische Arbeiter in Vorarlberg, 1870 – 1914* (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Ges., 1987), 12; Robert Rollinger, "Die trentinisch-italienische Einwanderung nach Vorarlberg: Ein Überblick," in *Auswanderung aus dem Trentino – Einwanderung nach Vorarlberg: Die Geschichte einer Migrationsbewegung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von 1870/80 bis 1919*, ed. Karl Heinz Burmeister und Robert Rollinger (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1995), 27–100 (here 27).

71 See "Bevölkerung," Statistik Austria, accessed Jan. 28, 2017, https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/index.html.

might sometimes lead to international migration, while in other cases the sequences may be reversed or other complex combinations may arise. Central Europeans had a matrix of opportunities to migrate, and the selection of internal instead of international or vice versa can be seen as either competing or complementary strategies. As Dirk Hoerder wrote, there was always a “range of destinations from which potential migrants selected the one that best suited their aspirations.”⁷² Only considering one type of migration and ignoring other paths, as has often been done in past studies, is to focus on only one part of the whole story, and mostly has resulted in a partial and unbalanced interpretation.⁷³

72 Dirk Hoerder, “Introduction,” in *People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820–1930*, ed. Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1–16 (here 5).

73 Russell King, Ronald Skeldon, and Julie Vullnetari, “Internal and International Migration: Bridging the Theoretical Divide,” Working Paper No. 52, Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex (December 2008), accessed Jan. 29, 2017, <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mwp52.pdf&site=252>.

Post-World War II

In Transit or Asylum Seekers? Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the Communist Bloc

Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll¹

Introduction: Myths and Exposition²

Austrian politicians and media have explicitly referenced a positive memory of the Austrian response to the various “waves of refugees” from neighboring communist countries on the occasion of the recent “refugee crisis.” The master narrative of these historical episodes, however, is weighed down by myth making and is waiting to be investigated critically.³ In addition, the historiographies on the various “waves of refugees” differ greatly in quality and depth and are waiting to be analyzed in a broad synthesis.⁴ This essay will present a general introduction to the topic of Cold War refugees and then look at the vast movement of refugees into Austria in 1956 (Hungary), 1968/69 (Czechoslovakia), 1981/82 (Poland), 1989/90 (Eastern Europe in the course of the collapse of Communism). In each of these case studies, rebellions in the Soviet bloc led to the mass flight of refugees. Within a few weeks on each of these occasions, thousands of refugees came to Austria and/or transited to the West through Austria. State-sponsored movements of refugees, such as Jews from the Soviet Union, will not be covered in this essay.⁵

1 Günter Bischof translated this essay from German into English.

2 This contribution is a revised and expanded version of Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll, “Das Ende eines Mythos? Österreich und die Kommunismusflüchtlinge,” in *Flüchtlingskrisen: Nichts Neues in Österreich*, ed. Bóris Kuzmány and Rita Garstenaucr (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2017).

3 For a recent introduction to Cold War scholarship in Austria, see Maximilian Graf and Agnes Meisinger, “Österreich im Kalten Krieg: Forschungsstand und Desiderata,” in *Österreich im Kalten Krieg: Neue Forschungen im internationalen Kontext*, ed. Maximilian Graf and Agnes Meisinger (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016), 9–48.

4 For a good introduction, short of providing a synthesis, see Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im europäischen Kontext seit 1914* (Vienna: Dachs, 1995).

5 For a summary of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, see Wolfgang Mueller, *Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955–1991* (Vienna: ÖAW, 2011), 225–230; see also Ruth Orli Moshkovitz, “Wien als Transitstadt sowjetisch-jüdischer Migration,” *GEDENKDIENTST* 76, no. 1 (2016): 3–4.

Flight from communist regimes was a frequent Cold War phenomenon. Lowering the Iron Curtain at the end of the 1940s, however, cut off this flight.⁶ This barrier was designed to stop further attempts at flight by increasing the risk of a deadly outcome to refugees from the communist world. Still, in the 1950s, thousands of people escaped to Austria from the neighboring communist countries Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The exact number of refugees from the communist world has never been established and, if it were, could never be verified. Compared to the 1.5 million Germans and Austrians expelled from Eastern Europe, and the Displaced Persons (DPs) stranded in Austria after World War II, their numbers are relatively small.⁷ There was also much overlap between these groups. People tried to escape communist regimes for political, economic, and personal motives. In the first years after World War II, people felt that the new political order in east-central Europe infringed both upon their personal rights and economic wellbeing. On top of that, the newly established communist regimes launched repressive policies particularly targeting those people who did not want to adjust to the new order and opposed their governments. As soon as legal means to emigrate were cut off, an escape across the sealed borders came at a high personal risk. We do not know the exact numbers of escapees.

Many people were expelled from Hungary in 1945, and more fled across the border into Austria after the Communist takeover in 1947. Next to “German ethnics” (*Volksdeutsche*) and Hungarian Jews, Hungarian nationals (among them deserters from the Army) left the country. Lowering the Iron Curtain along the Austro-Hungarian border, starting in 1948, cut off their escape routes. Border guards shot the refugees, who tried to cross the border anyway. From the Soviet-occupied zone in Austria bordering onto Hungary, the Soviets often transported refugees back across the border, if the Hungarians insisted.⁸

6 Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–1956* (New York: Anchor, 2012).

7 On the DPs, see Peter Wassertheuer, “‘Volksdeutsche,’ Fremdarbeiter und Displaced Persons (DPs),” in *“Österreich ist frei!” Der Österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955*, ed. Stefan Karner (Vienna: Berger, 2005), 47–50; Thomas Albrich, “Asylland wider Willen: Die Problematik der Displaced Persons in Österreich 1945–1948,” in *Die bevormundete Nation: Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949*, ed. Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1988), 217–244; Gabriela Stieber, “Volksdeutsche und Displaced Persons,” in *Asylland wider Willen*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna: Dachs, 1995), 140–153; on the Jewish DPs, see Thomas Albrich, “Jüdische Displaced Persons und Flüchtlinge nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *Asylland wider Willen*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna: Dachs, 1995), 122–139; see also Thomas Albrich, eds., *Flucht nach Eretz Israel: Die Bricha und der jüdische Exodus durch Österreich nach 1945* (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 1998).

8 Andreas Gémes, *“Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute”: Österreichisch-ungarische Beziehungen in den 1950er Jahren* (Graz: Uni-Press, 2010), 19 and 23–24.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, as well, the first refugees leaving after 1945 cannot be separated easily from the much larger group of ethnic Germans expelled after the war. After the communist seizure of power in February 1948, the stream of refugees out of Czechoslovakia grew again. Only the advent of the Iron Curtain along the Austro-Czechoslovak border after 1948 stopped potential refugees from exiting and kept the people confined in their own country.⁹ In spite of the tight sealing of the Austrian borders with Hungary and Czechoslovakia—apart from some more liberal phases in the border regimes—people fled these countries continuously until 1989.

Austria's border with Yugoslavia happened to be the bloodiest one in the early Cold War. Here too, we do not have firm figures on refugees and victims from the 1940s. Thousands of refugees crossed the border between Slovenia and Styria in the 1950s.¹⁰ After Tito's break with Stalin and the beginning of better relations with the West, Austria's relations with Yugoslavia also improved dramatically. Bilateral conflicts over borders and reparations had dominated relations after the war and became less prominent after 1948. Since the 1950s, Austro-Yugoslav relations were normalized and tensions along the border subsided.¹¹ With the easing of the border regime, more Yugoslav citizens were permitted to cross the border with greater ease. Many Yugoslavs came to Austria to work. There was no longer any need to become a refugee, since the option to legally leave the country provided another escape route.¹²

9 Concentrating more on the Slovak part of the country, see David Schriffel, *Tote Grenze oder lebendige Nachbarschaft? Österreichisch-slowakische Beziehungen 1945-1968* (Vienna: ÖAW, 2012), 353-379. Schriffel shows how the various groups of refugees after 1945 cannot be separated from each other. Their flight since 1947/48 became continuous. Even before the Czechoslovak Communists seized power in 1948, almost 2,000 refugees crossed the border into Austria. Schriffel also takes note of Jewish refugees from the Slovak part of the country in the 1940s and 1950s.

10 Edda Engelke, "Jeder Flüchtling ist eine Schwächung der Volksdemokratie": *Die illegalen Überschreitungen am jugoslawisch-steirischen Grenzabschnitt in den Fünfzigerjahren* (Vienna: LIT, 2008).

11 Arnold Suppan, "Jugoslawien und der österreichische Staatsvertrag," in *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag/The Austrian State Treaty 1955: Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität/International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity*, ed. Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (Vienna: ÖAW, 2005), 431-447; Petar Dragišić, "Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen 1945-1955" (PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2007); Petar Dragišić, *Odnosi Jugoslavije i Austrije 1945-1955* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2013).

12 Otmar Höll, ed., *Österreich - Jugoslawien: Determinanten und Perspektiven ihrer Beziehungen* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1988); on "guest workers," see Vladimir Ivanović "Die Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren," *Zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 1 (2013): 35-48; Verena Lorber, "Arbeitskräfte wurden gebraucht ...": Steirische Arbeitsmigration von 1961 bis 1975 - ein mikrogeschichtlicher Blick auf ein transnationales Migrationssystem," in *Tagungsbericht des 26. Österreichischen Historikertages (Krems/Stein, 24. bis 28. September 2012)* (St. Pölten: NÖ Institut für Landeskunde, 2015), 699-708; see also Lorber's chapter in this volume.

On the one hand, there are the sensationalized stories of refugees successfully crossing the borders into Austria or being stopped—at times violently—by border guards. On the other hand, there are successive migration movements unfolding over longer periods of time. During the Cold War, Austria tended to practice a liberal policy of granting asylum to refugees from the communist bloc, granting political asylum to each and every refugee whatever their motives may have been for leaving their country.¹³ The first major group of Hungarian refugees entered Austria in 1956, at the very moment when the Hungarian government had eased travel restrictions for their citizens.

Austria and the Hungarian Refugees 1956: “Freedom Fighters” in Transit?

Even though the cohorts of ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) and DPs coming through Austria in the first postwar decade were more significant, the master narrative is focused on Austrian humanitarian aid for refugees from Hungary in 1956. This success story is questionable.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Hungarian government only unevenly, and with considerable delay, began a process of “de-Stalinization” and reforms. Progress was insufficient, however, to calm the growing discontent in vast swaths of the population in the communist one-party state. Khrushchev’s famous “secret speech” attacking the cult of personality around Stalin accelerated the reform process in the communist bloc. Changing the leadership in the Communist Party and reforms did not satisfy the population. Beginning the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist purges only revealed abusive affairs of state in the previous years. This onset of reforms produced a climate that allowed open opposition against the communist regime. These developments during the summer of 1956 culminated in late October in mass protests demanding an end of the one-party state and democratization. The growing protest movement ended in open insurrection. Refusing to tolerate the Hungarian party and state giving in to the demands of the protesters, the Soviet Union decided on November 4 to send the Red Army into Hungary to suppress the

13 Between 1956 and 1968 Austria granted asylum collectively to refugee cohorts, see Patrik-Paul Volf, “Der politische Flüchtling als Symbol der Zweiten Republik: Zur Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik seit 1945,” *Zeitgeschichte* 22, no. 11/12 (1995): 415-436 (here 430-432).

rebellion, no matter what the cost in blood. The result was the massive flight of Hungarians across the border into Austria.¹⁴

Ironically, the Hungarian regime made this mass flight possible, since it had started to dismantle the Iron Curtain on the Austrian border in the spring of 1956 as part of its post-Stalinist reforms. The border fences and minefields had been removed. On top of that, during the days of rebellion, regular border controls broke down.¹⁵ Soon after the Soviet occupation forces withdrew from Austria in the course of the summer and fall of 1955, the number of refugees fleeing Hungary increased. During the spring and summer 1956, the post-Stalinist “thaw” led to the new border regime and a further increase in refugees. Starting in May 1956, 200 refugees crossed the border into Austria every month; they were considered to be “economic migrants” (migrants leaving for economic reasons to improve their lives) and were not welcomed by Austrians.¹⁶ During the fall of 1956, this perception changed, though only for a short time.

Austrians sympathized with Hungarians during their insurrection, for Austrians themselves only a year before had managed to get rid of the Soviet occupiers. The protagonists of the rebellion and the initial masses of refugees were warmly welcomed by the Austrian population as heroic “freedom fighters.” They were offered quick help, first by Austrian civil society and then by the Red Cross and the Austrian Army. As new cohorts of Hungarian refugees crossed the border, they began to risk their lives. In early November, the Hungarian government tightened border security and began to brutally stop the exodus. Still, within the short period of two months, 180,000 refugees came to Austria.¹⁷

Austria was caught unprepared for such numbers of refugees and quickly ran out of space to house them. They were crammed into temporary

14 Andreas Gémes, *Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Between Solidarity and Neutrality* (Pisa: Univ. Press, 2008); Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy, eds., *Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956* (Vienna: Czernin, 2006); Erwin A Schmidl, ed., *Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Spätherbst 1956: Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand* (Vienna: ÖBV, 1981).

15 The Hungarian Politburo had decided on March 9 to remove the “technical obstacles” along the border against the opposition of the socialist states. Hungary began to remove these border installations on May 11. In the future border troops and new technical signal installations were supposed to guard the border. However, installing this new signal system was not completed yet by October/November 1956; see Bettina Hofmann, “Grenze zu Ungarn 1956: Der Stacheldraht fällt,” in *Das Burgenland als internationale Grenzregion im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert*, ed. Maximilian Graf, Alexander Lass, and Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler (Vienna: Neue Welt, 2012), 86–97 (here 92–97).

16 Gémes, “*Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute*,” 19 and 43–51.

17 For the number of refugees, see Ibolya Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” in *Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956*, ed. Murber and Fónagy (Vienna: Czernin, 2006), 335–386 (here 336, 343, and 351).

camps. The Hungarian refugee crisis also marked the beginning of the old artillery barracks in Traiskirchen being utilized as a temporary refugee camp. Traiskirchen since has become synonymous with Austrian refugee politics.¹⁸ Both the buildings used for temporary refugee accommodations and the barracks in Traiskirchen were in desolate condition. Most of these temporary accommodations had been left in shambles by wartime destruction and the recent evacuation of the Soviet occupation element. The bathroom facilities were hardly functioning, and the onset of winter temperatures left inmates freezing. After a few days of initial chaos, aid organizations and the Austrian Red Cross assisted the Austrian government in improving the accommodation and support of this mass of refugees. In spite of these improvements, camp life hardly met the refugees' expectations about life in the "Golden West." During the initial phase of the crisis, the Austrian population was very supportive of refugees with donations,¹⁹ and refugees were distributed without any problem throughout Austria.²⁰

International refugee aid took time to be organized. So the initial welcoming of refugees fueled by Austrian anti-communism quickly wore out by the end of November 1956 and turned into the opposite. For the Austrian government and population, the transit of these refugees could not happen quickly enough. Media reports and public opinion turned hostile by the end of the year.²¹ Hungarian refugees were soon denounced as "ungrateful" and "parasitical." From the beginning of 1957, the Austrian government began to argue that the refugees also had "responsibilities." Now "the latent prejudices vis-à-vis Hungarian refugees [...] were voiced openly." Brigitta Zierer has noted: "As the Hungarian refugees stayed in the country beyond their initial welcome, the demand that they return to their homeland became louder. Austrians' initial willingness to be helpful quickly subsided as these 'victims of communism' began to compete for jobs and accommodations." She added: "Only those should receive help who

18 Leopoldine Götz, *Volksaufstand in Ungarn 1956: Ein Jahr der Bewährung für die Stadt Traiskirchen* (Schwarzach: Heimat-Verlag, 2006), 38.

19 Peter Eppel, "Wo viele helfen, ist viel geholfen: Ungarn-Hilfe 1956/57 in Österreich," in Murber and Fónagy, *Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956*, 431-464 (here 433-435).

20 Studies of the regional accommodation of refugees in various Austrian states are available now, see Alexandra Haas, *Ungarn in Tirol: Flüchtlingsschicksale 1945-1956* (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2008); Edda Engelke, "Einem besseren Leben entgegen?": *Ungarische Flüchtlinge 1956 in der Steiermark* (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2006); Ibolya Murber, *Flucht in den Westen 1956: Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich (Vorarlberg) und Liechtenstein: Magyar menekültek Ausztriában (Vorarlberg) és Liechtensteinben 1956* (Feldkirch: Rheticus Gesellschaft, 2002).

21 For a recent discussion of Austrian treatment of the Hungarian refugees, see Gémes, *Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 65-83.

contributed to the rebuilding of the country as Austrians had done in the postwar era.”²²

The international community was very receptive of Hungarian refugees. Between November 1956 and January 1957, some 153,000 refugees left Austria;²³ only 25,000 to 30,000 stayed. This number probably reflects the refugees of 1956 and those Hungarians who came before them. Most of the refugees found new homes in the United States and Canada. In Europe, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Switzerland also offered them new homes.²⁴ Given their high levels of education, the integration of these refugees into Austrian society was smooth. Among them were later luminaries of postwar Austrian life, such as the journalist Paul Lendvai. Still, Austrian and Hungarian bureaucrats negotiated the “hot potato” of repatriating refugees, especially minors. Austrian officials hoped that those refugees left in the country at the beginning of 1958 might return to Hungary.²⁵ Among the Hungarian refugees who fled to Austria in 1956/57, a total of 11,800 returned to their homeland.²⁶

During this time, the Austrian government began to view refugee organizations disapprovingly. As Austrian–Hungarian relations were improving during the 1960s, NGOs were seen as burdening bilateral relations and their range of activities were reduced. Paradoxically, Austrian – Hungarian Cold War relations became the “paragon of European détente.” The Iron Curtain along their border became increasingly porous. In 1989, this border once again became the site of mass flight.²⁷ In 1956, Austria gained a considerable international reputation for both their firm stance on the border during the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian insurrection and its welcome of, and aid for, the refugees. Austrian neutrality, still untested, passed its first test in this crisis. Even though the crisis of 1956 demonstrated very clearly that Austria did not consider itself a permanent haven for refugees, the country successfully cultivated its public image of acting in an exceptional humanitarian fashion regarding refugees.

22 Brigitta Zierer, “Willkommen Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956?,” in Heiss and Rathkolb, *Asylland wider Willen*, 157–171 (here 169–170).

23 Friedrich Kern, Österreich: Offene Grenze der Menschlichkeit; Die Bewältigung des ungarischen Flüchtlingsproblems im Geiste internationaler Solidarität (Vienna: BMI, 1959), 54.

24 Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” 351 and 362; on the U.S., see Irwin F. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 348–359.

25 Gémes, “Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute,” 144–161.

26 Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” 366.

27 Tamás Baranyi, Maximilian Graf, Melinda Krajczar, and Isabella Lehner, “A Masterpiece of European Détente? Austrian–Hungarian Relations from 1964 until the Peaceful End of the Cold War,” *Zeitgeschichte* 41, no. 5 (2014): 311–338 (here 313–323).

The End of the “Prague Spring” and Czechoslovak “Tourist Refugees” in 1968/69

On August 21/22, 1968, the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia to stop the reforms of the “Prague Spring,” unleashing a second wave of Cold War refugees from the communist East. The reforms of the “Prague Spring” aimed at democratizing life in Czechoslovakia; the monopoly of power of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was not questioned during the initial phase of the reform era.²⁸ With regard to refugees, one of the reforms envisioned liberalizing foreign travel, even permitting travelling to the West. The leadership in the Kremlin had agreed before the intervention to not use violence in stopping people from leaving the country. The Austrian government responded to the invasion of Czechoslovakia with great restraint. Yet it announced publically that it would accept refugees as part of its humanitarian responsibility.²⁹ In spite of this public gesture, prodded by the Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna directed the Austrian Legation in Prague not to issue any more visas for Czechoslovak citizens. However, Rudolf Kirchschräger, the Austrian Minister in Prague, ignored these orders from Vienna and continued to issue visas, thus allowing Czechoslovak citizens to legally enter Austria during and after the crisis. In the course of the fall of 1968, the Austrian Legation issued more than 100,000 visas, about twice as many as it had issued before routinely.³⁰ Whoever did not have a visa might also cross the border and apply for asylum in Austria.

Austria again became the first country in the non-communist West to accept tens of thousands of Czech and Slovak refugees. The country was ill prepared for such a massive influx of refugees. Add to those refugees, who directly crossed the border from Czechoslovakia into Austria, thousands of Czechs and Slovaks who were vacationing in Yugoslavia during

28 Stefan Karner et al., eds., *Prager Frühling: Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008); Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968* (Lanham: Lexington, 2010); see also Florentine Kastner et al. eds., “*Prager Frühling*” und “*Ära Kreisky*”: *Zwischen Reformwillen und Reformverwirklichung; Untersuchungen zu den europäischen Nachbarn Tschechoslowakei und Österreich* (Prague: Institut Mezinárodních Studií, 2009).

29 Silke Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration: Österreich als Erstaufnahme- und Asylland,” in Karner et al., eds., *Prager Frühling*, 1025-1043 (here 1026-1028).

30 Klaus Eisterer, “The Austrian Legation in Prague and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, eds., *Neutrality in Austria*, *Contemporary Austrian Studies* 9 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 214-235; Karl Peterlik, “Tausende Visa Pro Tag ausgestellt,” in Karner et al., eds., *Prager Frühling*, 1163-1166.

the Warsaw Pact invasion. Due to the closing of the Warsaw Pact borders, these vacationers no longer could return home via Hungary. Some 50,000 Czechoslovak “tourists” were stuck and came to Austria to observe the unfolding of the situation in their native Czechoslovakia. Many returned home later that fall. Both the exact numbers of refugees coming to Austria and those returning home is not known. We know that between August and late October 1968, some 162,000 persons, refugees, and “tourists” came to Austria. A second major influx of refugees from Czechoslovakia into Austria followed in the spring and summer of 1969. As a result of the Stalinist regime “normalizing” life in the country, the “Prague Spring” reforms were rolled back and the “reform communists” lost their power in the party and government. Thousands left the country for fear of political persecution or to improve their lives economically. Only when the borders were finally closed down on October 9, 1969 did this renewed exodus of refugees stop.³¹

Again, housing and feeding this vast number of refugees became a problem, especially in Vienna, as most of the refugees came to the capital. The Austrian government soon ran out of funds to take care of the refugees and called upon the international community for support.³² The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided considerable financial support, relieving the Austrian budget woes in the short term. The UNHCR, however, was only in a position to help those people recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention. Only a small number of refugees qualified for this status. As a consequence, 4,176 Czechs and Slovaks applied for political asylum in Austria in 1968, and another 6,529 in 1969.³³ In the end, it is estimated that only 2,000 to 3,000 refugees stayed in Austria. For most refugees, Austria only served as a temporary haven. The Austrian government wanted them to leave anyway, since it faced severe bottlenecks in taking care of them and housing them. At the time, a number of western European countries experienced a time of economic boom. Many businesses were looking for well-trained laborers and found them among the refugees. Switzerland accepted many of them in Europe, and the United States, Canada, and Australia accepted them overseas.³⁴

31 Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration,” 1030-1037 and 1040-1041.

32 The Austrian Cabinet decided as early as Sept. 10, 1968 to ask the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support to take care of the refugees and evacuate them out of Austria, see Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), Bundeskanzleramt, Ministerratsprotokolle, 2. Republik Klaus II Nr. 92, Sept, 10, 1968, Box 275.

33 Vlasta Valeš, “Die tschechoslowakischen Flüchtlinge 1968–1989,” in Heiss and Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen*, 172–182 (here 178).

34 Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration,” 1038-1042.

Again, those refugees who stayed were quickly integrated into Austrian society. They formed exile organizations, which played an important role in supporting the emigration of dissidents after the 1977 proclamation of *Charta 77*.³⁵

Most of Czech and Slovak refugees in 1968, then, transited through Austria and most of the “tourists” returned to their native land. The Austrian media covered them as “transients,” and therefore the Austrian population responded positively and less critically than vis-à-vis the Hungarian refugees in 1956/57. Austrians continued to show solidarity throughout the crisis of 1968. The Austrians’ perception of the “Prague Spring” was governed by their anti-communist stance. The population was highly critical of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by their Warsaw Pact allies. The image of “vacationing” refugees waiting to return to their homeland continued until April 1969, when Alexander Dubček, one of the leading protagonists of the “Prague Spring,” was finally stripped of his position in government and additional Czechoslovak refugees crossed the border into Austria.³⁶ When, more than ten years later, Austria encountered a new massive influx of refugees from Communist Poland, many Austrians reacted with hostility.

***Solidarność*, Martial Law in Poland, and Polish “Economic Refugees,” 1981/82**

In Poland, the independent labor union *Solidarność* led by Lech Wałęsa had pushed the communist government close to collapse by 1981. In the end, the communist regime only survived as a result of the imposition of martial law in the country on December 13, 1981. The new communist government led by General Jaruzelski jailed the leadership of *Solidarność* and prohibited the existence of labor unions.³⁷ During the initial phase of the Polish protest movement, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and most Austrian officials were supportive of the labor movement *Solidarność*; however,

35 Přemysl Janýř, “Tschechoslowakei 1968 – Charta 77,” in Heiss and Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen*, 182–188; see also Benjamin Gilde, *Österreich im KSZE-Prozess 1969–1983: Neutraler Vermittler in humanitärer Mission* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 297–304; for a recent synthesis, see Ondřej Haváč, “Czech Refugees in Austria 1968–1985,” in *Prague Papers on the History of the International Relations* 1 (2016), 82–97.

36 *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, Apr. 19, 1969, 3.

37 Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–1981; A Documentary History* (Budapest: Central European Univ. Press, 2007).

caution was in place. As the “crisis in Poland” was escalating over the course of 1981, Kreisky’s stance became more restrained and the debate in Austria became more contentious. When Polish coal deliveries to Austria ceased, Kreisky became upset and called upon the Polish miners to return and do their jobs. The labor strikes turned a bad economic situation in the country worse.³⁸

Berthold Molden has correctly noted that, “the beginning Polish labor migration to Austria in 1980 turned into a refugee movement in the course of the deteriorating political situation in Poland.” The desperate state of the Polish economy pushed many Polish citizens in 1981 “to flee to Austria or transit through the country,” even though they were not politically persecuted.³⁹ In the context of Cold War refugee discourses after 1945, these Polish citizens represent a special case. Here was the first substantial cohort of Cold War refugees coming to Austria whose homeland did not have a common border with Austria. Their coming to Austria was made possible by a 1972 agreement allowing for travel without visas. People with a passport could travel between the two countries without restrictions.⁴⁰ Polish refugees therefore might travel to Austria legally without a visa as tourists and then apply for political asylum once they arrived. In the course of the spring 1981, the number of asylum applicants of previous years had increased substantially. In June 1981, 2,000 additional asylum-seekers were recorded. By September, the number had risen to 4,000 every month. By October 1981, “almost 22,000 Poles had applied for asylum in Austria.” In addition, another approximately 5,000 “unrecorded tourists” from Poland lived in Austria. Only 10 percent of those refugees applying for asylum were given the status according to the Geneva Convention. The rest only received permission to stay. When the refugee camps were filled, the government housed people in inns and bed & breakfast accommodations. The

38 On the Austrian labor unions’ and political parties’ “ambivalent” position vis-à-vis *Solidarność*, see Oliver Rathkolb, “Austria: An Ambivalent Attitude of Trade Unions and Political Parties,” in *Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982*, ed. Idesbald Goddeeris (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 269–288.

39 Berthold Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe: Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg,” in *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich*, ed. Manfred Rauchensteiner (Vienna: Böhlau 2010), 687–774 (here 762).

40 Maximilian Graf, “Kreisky und Polen: Schlaglichter auf einen vernachlässigten Aspekt der österreichischen ‘Ostpolitik,’” in *Bananen, Cola, Zeitgeschichte: Oliver Rathkolb und das lange 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Lucile Dreidemy et al. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015), 692–706 (here 703–706); Maximilian Graf and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Polnisch-Österreichische Beziehungen im Kalten Krieg,” in *Österreich im polnischen öffentlichen Diskurs nach 1945*, ed. Agnieszka Kisztełińska-Węgrzyńska (Krakow: Universitas, 2016), 31–66.

Interior Ministry forked out 90 million Austrian Schillings monthly to pay for these refugees.⁴¹

The extent of these financial burdens led the Austrian government to apply for aid from the international community to master the “refugee crisis.” The international response was minimal. The Poles who had come to Austria were perceived as “migrants seeking work” (“*Arbeitsmigranten*”) by both the international community and domestic politics. The majority of the Austrian population rejected these Polish asylum-seekers, who had entered the country as tourists, but in effect were regarded as “economic migrants.” The Austrian yellow press fueled this perception. The Kreisky government experienced growing domestic pressure. Chancellor Kreisky’s concerns are reflected in the Cabinet meeting of December 1, 1981: “Kreisky noted that there was a growing aversion in the Austrian population about the Polish refugees and that the government had to consider demanding visas again.”⁴² The idea of suspending the agreement on visa-free travel had been first raised in the Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1981.⁴³ Starting December 7, 1981, Polish citizens needed a visa again to enter Austria. The reasons given publically were overcrowded refugee camps and the massive cost of housing and taking care of refugees. In reality, it was a concession to public opinion, namely the “general aversion towards refugees” in the population. It also became harder for bona fide Polish dissidents to receive Austrian visas.⁴⁴ While in previous months thousands of refugees had entered Austria, only 59 visas were issued in the week between December 9 and 14.⁴⁵ On December 13, martial law was imposed in Poland after the dialogue with the Solidarity Labor Union hit a dead end. By fall 1981, *Solidarność* had registered more than 10 million members and had become 5 times as strong as the Polish Communist Party.

In the morning of December 13, Kreisky announced on Austrian National Radio: “We always have accepted political refugees [...] and have viewed refugees generously. We are against economic refugees because we

41 Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Offizieller Besuch des polnischen Aussenministers, Jozef Czyrek, in Österreich vom 9. bis 11. November 1981; Medienecho, Programm und Informationsmappe, genehmigt von Ullmann, Wien, Nov. 20, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.18.14/34-II.3/81, Box 33/81.

42 Recorded by the Minister of Trade in his diary, see Staribacher-Tagebücher, Dec. 1, 1981, Kreisky-Archiv.

43 Einsichtsbemerkung von Hietsch, Vienna, July 29, 1981; allfällige Kündigung des Sichtvermerksabkommens, gez. Daublebsky, Wien, Aug. 17, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/8-II.3/81, Box 31/81.

44 Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehseibe,” 763-765.

45 Tagesmeldung der Botschaft Warschau, Dec. 14, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40.

simply cannot support them.”⁴⁶ In case the asylum seekers were in “immediate danger,” however, visas had to be issued “without delay.”⁴⁷ However, during the days after the imposition of martial law, the Austrian Embassy in Warsaw only issued 1 to 4 visas per day.⁴⁸ On December 17, the Council for Foreign Affairs (*Rat für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten*) issued an urgent appeal “to all states concerned to aid Austria in mastering the problem of Polish refugees.”⁴⁹ The situation had improved for Polish refugees after the imposition of martial law. There were first agreements to take refugees from third party states. Moreover, the UNHCR at last became active since “there was no doubt any longer that this group qualified for political refugee status.” Austria had stopped the influx of refugees coming into the country and was determined to see them transit quickly to third countries.⁵⁰ The Austrian government therefore pressed third countries to accept Polish refugees and also continued to ask the international community for financial support to take care of them.⁵¹ However, international community support and acceptance of refugees only arrived slowly, from the Austrian perspective, and a large number of refugees stayed in the country. During Christmas 1981 – after the imposition of martial law – a wave of solidarity swept the country and private donations increased by leaps and bounds.

Austrian public opinion and the national and local media continued to voice their discontent during 1982. Many Austrians brought their personal dislike for these refugees to Kreisky’s attention in no uncertain terms. Some letters to the Chancellor stated, “Austrians do not care for Poles in our land” (*Wir Österreicher wollen die Polen nicht in unserem Land*), and “Send the Poles home!!!” (*Schickt die Polen nach Hause!!!*). Some letters characterized the Polish refugees as “a dirty pack of lazies” (*Dreckiges/Faules Gesindel*).⁵²

The worst tensions in the refugee situation in Austria had subsided by June of 1982 as a result of both the reinstatement of visa requirements and a rise

46 ORF-transcript: Hörfunk-Sonderjournal (9 Uhr) vom 13. 12. 81: BK Kreisky zur Entwicklung in Polen, in: Polen; Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes. Information für den Herrn Bundesminister, Vienna, Nov. 14, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.03.00/355-II.3/81, Box 32/81.

47 Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Polen; Visum-Anträge freigelassener Internierter, Wien, Mar. 1, 1982, Kreisky-Archiv, country box Polen 1.

48 See the daily bulletins until the end of December in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, Zl. 166.02.40.

49 Erklärung des Rates für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Vienna, Dec. 17, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, GZ. 166.03.00/408-II.3/81.

50 Amtsvermerk über das Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des BMAA mit Direktor Homann-Herimberg, Vienna, [n.d., probably Dec. 23, 1981], ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/53-II.3/81, Box 31/81.

51 For the correspondence with the UNHCR, see Kreisky-Archiv, country box Polen 2.

52 See the extensive file in Kreisky-Archiv, country box Polen 1.

in international aid. In the beginning of 1982, the number of asylum-seekers had dropped from 29,000 to 18,000. Hundreds of Polish tourists were still applying for political asylum. Austrian appeals to the international community were beginning to show results. The United States, Canada, and Australia all agreed to accept sizable contingents of Polish refugees. Switzerland accepted 1,000 refugees, and other countries smaller contingents. The number of Poles returning to their country is not known. Austria continued to plead for emigration of refugees, "since Austria would not be able to take tens of thousands of refugees, due to its size and economic strength," argued the Foreign Ministry officials, and added: "Our country can only continue its humanitarian role, if the international community will help us master this difficult task."⁵³ Like in 1956 and 1968, Austria only agreed to serve as a port of transit for the refugees of 1981/82. What was different in the Polish crisis was the negativity of the refugee discourse from the beginning. The public at large only became more accepting of refugees after martial law was imposed. However, the public only showed solidarity with the refugees as long as they did not outstay their welcome in the country. The sooner they left, and the sooner the international situation eased, the better.

The situation in Poland began to improve in 1982/83. Yet the seeming return of political stability was only short-lived. Even though the Jaruzelski-government outlawed *Solidarność*, the popular labor union continued to survive underground. The country lived on the brink throughout the 1980s. When labor strikes were unleashed in 1988, their demands turned political. One of their principal goals was to permit the existence of *Solidarność* again.

Austro-Polish bilateral relations, too, began to improve in the course of the 1980s. Regular mutual visits took place between political delegations and relations were as solid as in the early 1980s. Beginning of 1988, an agreement was reached once more to allow visa-free travel. When the domestic political situation in Poland deteriorated again in the late 1980s, and the outcome of the renewed political turmoil was uncertain, once again a high number of Polish refugees entered Austria. Between January and October 1988, "5,833 poles applied for political asylum in Austria." Only 7 percent of them were granted asylum status. By mid-November 1988, the Austrian government once again took care of 4,000 Polish citizens.⁵⁴

53 Dienstzettel an die Sektion II, gez. Hietsch (Abt. IV.2) Vienna, June 30, 1982, Zl. 0.07.01/180-IV.2/82, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1982, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/79-II.3/82.

54 Flüchtlingssituation, Ges. Dr. Hack, Abteilung IV.2, 16. November 1988, in Mappe "Besuch Premierminister Rakowski; Nov. 24-26, 1988," Kreisky-Archiv, Depositum Franz Vranitzky, AP, Box "MP Grosz Ungarn Nov. 88; MP Rakowski (Polen) Nov. 88; AM Johannes CSSR."

This new wave of refugees, however, relied on Polish exile networks and did not receive much public attention or cause resentment. Yet given the dramatic changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the Austrian Foreign Ministry began to fear and prepare for more drastic scenarios at the end of 1988. In case of a deteriorating domestic situation in Eastern Europe, “suddenly growing streams of refugees” seemed likely, and Austria needed to be prepared this time.⁵⁵

“Welcomed Refugees” and “Security Risks”: East German and Romanian Refugees 1989/90

Unrest in the population in Poland was clearly palpable in the late 1980s, and not only in Communist Poland, but in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as well. The causes of this discontent rested in these communist regimes not being able to take care of the basic needs of their populations. Moreover, East Germans demanded freedom to travel and resented the repressiveness of the regime of the Socialist Unity Party, SED. By the summer of 1989, 125,000 East Germans had applied for exit visas.⁵⁶ On top of it, “communal elections” had taken place in May 1989, and the election results had been manipulated. When evidence was revealed for the purloined results, people began to protest. Peaceful demonstrations were violently dispersed. East Germans also openly protested against these massacres at Tiananmen Square in Beijing by the Chinese Communist regime on June 4, 1989. The SED party leadership found excuses for the crackdown by the Chinese Communists. Consequently, East Germans were afraid that a “Chinese solution” might be possible in the GDR too.⁵⁷ These factors, next to the models of peaceful transformation and democratization unfolding in Poland and Hungary, contributed to the decision of many East Germans to leave the GDR in the summer of 1989.

The initial motivation, however, came from the apparent opening of the Iron Curtain along the Austro-Hungarian border. It has been noted above

55 Information “Osteuropa im Wandel? Zur innenpolitischen Bewegung in den WP-Staaten und Jugoslawien,” Gesandter Ernst Sucharipa, Vienna, Nov. 11, 1988, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1988, GZ. 701.03/19-II-3/88.

56 Anja Hanisch, *Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972-1985: Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, Westabgrenzung und Ausreisebewegung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 373-374.

57 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, *Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2009), 318-343; see also Bernd Schäfer, “Die DDR und die ‘chinesische Lösung.’ Gewalt in der Volksrepublik China im Sommer 1989,” in *1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt*, ed. Martin Sabrow (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), 153-172.

that relations between Austria and Hungary had been improving dramatically ever since the 1960s. Due to both Austrian pressure and domestic changes in Hungary, the border between the two countries had become porous. The Hungarian government had begun to remove deadly mine fields along the border with Austria in 1971. This led to increased contacts across the border zone and regional cooperation. In 1979, visa free travel had been introduced, which greatly increased border crossings.⁵⁸ In 1988, Hungary introduced a passport valid throughout the world (“*Weltpass*”), and Hungarians took advantage of the new opportunities to travel in the West. In the spring of 1989, the rest of the border installations between Austria and Hungary were removed. In the summer of 1989 dramatic pictures from the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border were seen around the world. The last remnants of the Iron Curtain were removed in May. In an iconic “photo op” the Austrian and Hungarian Foreign Ministers Alois Mock and Gyula Horn were cutting the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain. And in August, the “Pan European Picnic” was organized on the border. These instances all served as invitations for East Germans to flee their country.⁵⁹ Most citizens of the GDR exited their country and the communist bloc either through the opened Austro-Hungarian border, or by occupying West German embassies in Eastern Europe, as in Prague and Warsaw.⁶⁰

The number of attempts to leave the GDR dramatically increased by mid-June 1989. The GDR regime expressed growing concern about fellow communist regimes, such as the one in Hungary, and their handling of border crossings. They no longer handed over such refugees to the East German Security Service “STASI” as they had done in the past. The Austro-Hungarian border no longer was an area where access was prohibited (“*Sperrzone*”). Starting in August, upon the request of the Bonn government, the Austrian government no longer made public the numbers of East German refugees that were transiting to the Federal Republic through Austria.⁶¹ In the course of the “Pan-European Picnic” on August 19, some 600 GDR citizens crossed the Austrian border in one day. In terms of numbers, this represented the largest group of refugees escaping

58 Maximilian Graf, “Eine neue Geschichte des ‘Falls’ des Eisernen Vorhangs: Die Öffnung der österreichisch-ungarischen Grenze 1989 in Langzeitperspektive und ihre unmittelbaren Folgen für die DDR,” in *Jahrbuch für Mitteleuropäische Studien 2014/2015* (Vienna: new academic press, 2016), 349-373.

59 The best account of the border opening Andreas Oplatka, *Der erste Riss in der Mauer: September 1989 – Ungarn öffnet die Grenze* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2009).

60 Katarzyna Stokłosa, “Die letzte Fluchtwelle aus der DDR im Jahr 1989: Aus den Berichten der westdeutschen Botschaften in Budapest, Prag und Warschau,” *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 64, no. 1 (2015): 40-80.

61 Oplatka, *Der erste Riss in der Mauer*, 115-120 and 129.

the GDR since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. East Germans vacationing in Hungary had been receiving detailed information about the picnic and the opportunity to cross the border with flyers. Vast publicity on this one-day exodus encouraged East Germans waiting in Hungary to try it themselves. The day after the picnic, 40-50 GDR citizens managed to cross the border at Szengotthárd (St. Gotthard) in spite of border guards trying to stop them. More than 600 escapees registered as refugees on August 20 at the West German Embassy in Vienna.⁶²

The weeks between the picnic and the opening of the border on September 11 were the “hour of the *Burgenländers*.” Local civil society on the Austrian side of the border took care of the initial groups of East German refugees. Then the Burgenland Red Cross organized holding camps and cared for refugees before they were directed towards the West German Embassy in Vienna. Red Cross support service centers sprung up in a number of small Burgenland border communities. The work of the Red Cross was also supported by armies of volunteers. For many locals, memories of 1956 sprang up vividly. Some even got involved in organizing the flight of the refugees. Gawkers on the border unsettled the refugees. The international community was impressed with the spontaneous Austrian aid efforts. The Austrian media once again beat the drum of Austria as the model nation for refugees: shades of the past.⁶³

When two incidents of deaths occurred – clearly due to accidents – a solution needed to be found to this “refugee crisis.” The decision to allow citizens of the GDR to exit the communist bloc through Hungary was made in Budapest, in agreement with the governments in Vienna and Bonn. Austria agreed to accept these refugees for humanitarian reasons. Austria actually would have been bound by treaties with the GDR to not allow entry into the country to GDR-citizens without a visa and did not want to risk breaking international treaties as a neutral country. So “a typically Austrian solution” was found: the names of refugees were noted down and loose pieces of paper with a visa stamp were inserted in their passports to allow them entry into the country. This piece of paper was removed from passports when refugees crossed the border to the Federal Republic, and so the treaty with the GDR that its citizens needed visas to enter Austria

62 Maximilian Graf, “Das Paneuropäische Picknick im Kontext: Wie Österreich zum Tor in die Freiheit werden konnte und welche Folgen dies hatte,” in *Der erste Stein aus der Berliner Mauer: Das paneuropäische Picknick 1989*, ed. Stefan Karner and Philipp Lesiak (Graz, 2016).

63 Maximilian Graf, “Die Welt blickt auf das Burgenland. 1989 – Die Grenze wird zum Abbild der Veränderung,” in Graf, Lass and Ruzicic-Kessler, eds., *Das Burgenland als internationale Grenzregion*, 135-179 (here 162-179).

was satisfied.⁶⁴ Opening the Austro-Hungarian border on September 11 produced further waves of refugees. This time, however, the authorities were ready when mass migration occurred.

The government tasked the Austrian Red Cross to take care of the refugee movements, which brought considerable experience to the job. Since it was a humanitarian mission, Austrian neutrality law was respected too. On September 10, the Red Cross had already set up welcome centers on the border. When thousands of refugees began crossing the border the next day, they received food and medical care, if needed. Those refugees arriving in a car received road maps that directed them through Austria to the West German border and, on top of it, 700 Austrian Schillings for fuel costs. A considerable number of East German refugees were picked up in busses in Hungary and shipped through Austria directly to the border of West Germany. During the first few days after the border opening, more than 10,000 GDR citizens transited from Hungary through Austria into the Federal Republic of Germany. Sources differ: as few as 20,000 or as many as 50,000 East Germans may have crossed Austria from Hungary to the FRG in the fall of 1989. The Embassy of the FRG in Austria reimbursed the Austrian Red Cross 1.5 million German Marks for its refugee expenses.⁶⁵ The refugees crossing Austria from Hungary to the FRG received a warm welcome in Austria as “transiting refugees.”

In the course of the fall 1989, concerns grew again in Austria with regard to growing numbers of refugees coming to the country as a result of turmoil and the political transitions in the rest of Eastern Europe. When the removals of the Iron Curtain began, the issue of how to secure the Eastern borders became more urgent. Austrians feared an “invasion” of Romanian and GDR citizens; this anxiety waxed in the course of the fall. As the Hungarian “refugee crisis” became more serious, Peter Martos, the Budapest correspondent of the Austrian daily *Die Presse*, stressed “the commitment by the FRG to treat all Germans as citizens,” sparking the quick transit of East German refugees through Austria. But he also asked the question what would happen if “Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians” would seek freedom in Austria by exiting through Hungary. This surely would create a “difficult situation” in Austria. If Austria were “abandoned by those

64 Michael Gehler, “Bonn – Budapest – Wien: Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische Zusammenspiel als Katalysator für die Erosion des SED-Regimes 1989/90,” in *Grenzöffnung 1989: Innen- und Außenperspektiven und die Folgen für Österreich*, ed. Andrea Brait and Michael Gehler (Vienna: Böhlau 2014), 135-162.

65 Tobias Mindler and Johannes Steiner, *Grenzenlose Menschlichkeit: Wie das Rote Kreuz Burgenland 1989 den DDR-Flüchtlingen half* (Eisenstadt: Österr. Rotes Kreuz, Landesverband Burgenland, 2014), 28-29.

countries that traditionally have accepted refugees,” Austria quickly would be overwhelmed by large numbers of refugees.⁶⁶

As a result of the spillover of political upheaval in Eastern Europe to Romania at the end of 1989, refugees began arriving in Austria from there. Austrian media intensified their critical discussion of “refugee crises.” Now the traditional Austrian Cold War discourses about refugees intensified, rejecting additional refugees. The bloody revolution in Romania shocked Austrians and produced an abundance of donations for the stricken country. Austrians, however, showed little empathy for those refugees who came to Austria when the upheaval was over and applied for political asylum. The political and economic situation dramatically changed at the end of the Cold War and so did the old “enemy image” about the communist threat. The demonstrations of solidarity for refugees in Austria and elsewhere in the West quickly subsided. Transiting to Western countries from Austria for Romanian refugees became more difficult, and so they stayed in the country and expected support. In 1990, 12,199 Romanian refugees applied for political asylum in Austria in accordance with the Geneva Convention.⁶⁷ Media and popular discourses narrowed in on “economic refugees” who were overstaying their welcome in Austria.⁶⁸ In addition, Romanian refugees were suspected of being “agents” of the Romanian Security Agency *Securitate*, criminals, or worse “potential sexual predators,” constituting “security risks” for the country. These debates spilled out into the streets in February/March 1990. In the small village of Kaisersteinbruch in Burgenland, public protesters gathered in the streets opposing the housing of 800 male Rumanian refugees in their local Austrian Army barracks.⁶⁹ As a consequence, Austria began to demand visas from Romanian citizens wanting to enter the country on March 15, 1990. This quickly stopped the numbers of refugees entering the country.⁷⁰ No historical research has been done about the fate of these Romanian refugees in Austria, whether they transited to other countries, returned to Romanian, or stayed and were integrated in Austria.

66 Martos quoted in Graf, “Die Welt blickt auf das Burgenland,” 157 and 170–171.

67 Brigitta Zierer, *Politische Flüchtlinge in österreichischen Printmedien* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1998), 65.

68 Bernd Matouschek and Ruth Wodak, “‘Rumänen, Roma... und andere Fremde’: Historisch-kritische Diskursanalyse zur Rede von den ‘Anderen,’” in Heiss and Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen*, 210–238 (here 215).

69 Hubert Speckner, *Von drüben ...: Die Flüchtlingshilfe des Österreichischen Bundesbeeres in den Jahren 1956 bis 1999* (Vienna: BLV, 2006), 43–50.

70 Brigitta Zierer, “Politische Flüchtlinge in österreichischen Printmedien: Dargestellt am Vergleich des Ungarischen Volksaufstand 1956 und der Revolution in Rumänien 1989” (PhD diss., University of Vienna 1995), 503–505 and 514–517.

Conclusion

During the Cold War, Austria tended to grant asylum to those “waves of refugees” who were perceived as political refugees. Austrian officialdom and civil society did their best to take care of refugees during crisis situations. This is true for the large numbers of refugees from Communist Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968. Based on the welcoming of these refugees, Austria claimed to pursue a long-standing humanitarian tradition. Yet in both these cases, it became quickly apparent that Austria only wanted to offer transit to refugees, not a new home. This response became clearly visible in the case of Hungarian refugees in 1956, even though the international community offered to help and accept refugees from Austria. This response repeated itself in 1968/69 when few Czechs and Slovaks applied for political asylum in Austria. Surely, the Austrian government had considerable expenses taking care of “tourist-refugees” in 1968. The situation with refugees from Poland in 1981/82 was different again. It became clear very quickly that the Poles who entered Austria were perceived as “economic refugees” who wanted to stay in Austria permanently. The international community initially showed little interest in helping Austria, or agreeing to accept Polish refugees. This changed briefly with the imposition of martial law in Poland and the persecution of Polish dissidents. Now the international community demonstrated solidarity and agreed to accept Polish refugees coming through Austria.

The GDR citizens coming through Austria in 1989 were welcomed. They were only transiting through Austria from Hungary into the Federal Republic of Germany and the Bonn government generously paid for the expenses incurred in taking care of them. Refugees coming from Romania in 1989/90 were seen as the Polish refugees had been perceived in 1981/82. These political “refugees from communism” were quickly seen as “working migrants” looking to improve their lives economically. These Poles and Romanians arrived at a time of deteriorating economic conditions in Austria and the West and the end of the full employment era. Open borders and the people transiting them in 1989 and thereafter – like the Romanians – were increasingly seen as security risks.

Austrian discourses about Poles in 1981/82 and Romanians in 1989/90 were quite similar. Public discourses were negative and critical and politicians chose the path of least resistance by stopping the influx of refugees entering the country by cutting legal immigration with visas. This was made easier by the fact that Austria did not have common borders with Poland and Romania. In 1956 and 1968, the masses of refugees entering

Austria could not be interrupted so easily due to the common borders with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In each case it was the Austrian yellow press (especially the *Kronen Zeitung*) inciting public opinion. In most of these case studies, Austrians started out welcoming refugees, only to turn against them in the course of these “refugee crises” unfolding. Austrians saw themselves not as a country of immigrants but as a place granting asylum to people transiting. Public and media discourses quickly turned negative during these Cold War refugee crises. People were worried about the large numbers of refugees entering the country and regularly changed the political responses to refugees.

In spite of the critiques voiced in the analysis of this paper, Austria tended to respond with great alacrity to these Cold War refugee crises. Austrians were welcoming to refugees and the government supported them by offering food and shelter. Yet the traditional image of Austria’s great humanitarian record on behalf of Cold War refugees also needs to be demythologized. Austrians can learn how to deal with refugee “waves” and “crises” by taking a closer look at their ambivalent responses in the past.

“Austria Attractive for Guest Workers?” Recruitment of Immigrant Labor in Austria in the 1960s and 1970s

*Vida Bakondy*¹

In 1947, Austria faced an acute shortage of male labor that was supposed to help in the “reconstruction” after the end of World War II and the Nazi regime. In this context, a draft for an agreement between Italy and Austria for the “Recruitment and Employment of Italian Seasonal Laborers in 1947” was drawn up.² According to the tasks described in the draft, 8,400 male seasonal laborers were desired. They were to be employed in logging and construction, as well as in brick making and in mining. The brick-making industry above all complained at the time of the shortage in labor and pointed to historical continuity in the employment of Italian brick-makers.³ It was feared, however, that “the enticement of the really qualified Italian seasonal laborers to other countries” had already begun.⁴ No other sources indicate that the agreement was signed in 1947. Nevertheless, this is testimony of historical relevance, as it documents the early demand for immigrant labor in the immediate post-war period and the simultaneous awareness of historical continuity with regard to their employment. In public debates and political discussions surrounding labor migration in the following decades, however, there was an evident tendency toward a lack of historical perspective. The immigrant labor of earlier decades, as well as Nazi forced labor (which in the first half of the 1940s had led to a massive

1 This paper emerged as part of the FWF Austrian Science Fund Project P 24468-G18, “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Migration and the transnational challenges to national historiographies (ca. 1960–today),” which is based at the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck (11/2012–10/2017) and headed by Dirk Rupnow. This essay and all quotations from German sources have been translated by Tim Corbett, unless otherwise noted.

2 Übereinkommen zwischen Österreich und Italien zur Anwerbung und Beschäftigung italienischer Ziegelerbeiter im Jahr 1947, Geschäftszahl Sp 2595/1947, MF 680, RZ 6621, Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Archive of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, hereafter Archiv WKÖ).

3 A letter from the Association of the Stone-working and Ceramics Industry to the Federal Ministry for Social Administration of May 14, 1947 for example states that above all the federal provinces of Carinthia, Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg “have always been dependent on the employment of Italian bricklayers.” Ibid.

4 Ibid.

forced deployment of foreign labor in Austria),⁵ were often disregarded. Rather, immigration was much discussed as a contemporary phenomenon while a veil was drawn over its history as well as its causes and reasons.

Austria's desire for time limits on recruitment agreements and the related belief in a temporal restriction of immigrant labor was to endure over the years, as did the competition with other Western European countries over the recruitment of foreign labor and the related concern about not being able to recruit enough qualified laborers. This is also testified to in the headlines of contemporary media reports in the early 1960s, when negotiations over the conclusion of recruitment agreements were taken up once more: "40,000 foreign workers are allowed to come to Austria. But there will hardly be that many available," ran a title in the *Arbeiterzeitung* on January 9, 1962; "Austria attractive for guest workers? Economy fears the magnetic effect of Germany and Switzerland," ran the headline in the *Presse* on February 6, 1962. The newspaper reports cited here also referenced the two dominant terms – "*Fremdarbeiter*" (foreign worker) and "*Gastarbeiter*" (guest worker) – which were used for labor migrants above all from Yugoslavia and Turkey right into the 1980s.⁶

Societal Contexts

Austria entered the European competition over migrant workers relatively late.⁷ The first recruitment agreement was signed with Spain on May 2, 1962;

5 At the height of World War II, there were "about 80,000 civilian foreigners, prisoners of war, concentration camp inmates, and Hungarian Jews [employed] in the economy of the 'Ostmark,'" according to the historians Bertrand Perz and Florian Freund. Florian Freund and Bertrand Perz, "Zwangsarbeit von zivilen AusländerInnen, Kriegsgefangenen, KZ-Häftlingen und ungarischen Juden in Österreich," in *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer, and Reinhard Sieder, 2nd ed. (Vienna: öbv & hpt, 2000), 644-695 (here 684).

6 The term "guest worker" was here connoted positively and was also seen as a dissociation from the term "foreign worker" associated with the Nazi era and forced labor. The fact that the term "guest worker" is by no means an empty and ahistorical term is evident from the efforts of the Nazi regime to introduce it in the 1940s as a descriptor for those workers who came to Germany in the context of official recruitment agreements. Christoph Rass, "Die Internationalisierung des Faktors Arbeit in Europa vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zum Ölpreisschock 1973," in *Projekt Migration*, ed. Kölnischer Kunstverein et al. (Cologne: Dumont, 2005), 354-365 (here 362).

7 Switzerland had already begun recruiting Italian workers in 1948, and the Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement with Italy in 1955. Eveline Wollner, "Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei zur Regulierung der Arbeitsmigration während der 1960 Jahre," in *Good Luck! Migration Today – Vienna, Belgrade, Zagreb, Istanbul*, ed. Vida Bakondy et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 80-87 (here 80).

an agreement with Turkey followed in 1964 and with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1965. Ultimately, immigrant labor from Turkey and Yugoslavia was to become historically significant. From 1962 to 1973, the year that marked the provisional heyday of the “employment of foreigners” in Austria, the proportion of migrant employees had risen from about 17,700 to about 250,000, with Yugoslav citizens making up the largest proportion at 78.5 percent, followed by Turkish citizens at 11.8 percent.⁸ The proportion of women among the migrant workers, meanwhile, also increased notably in the same time period, from 19 percent to 31 percent.⁹ Negotiations over recruitment agreements with Italy, Greece, and Tunisia, which were conducted in the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, ended up failing. Nevertheless, migrants from these countries were also employed in Austria, albeit in much smaller numbers.¹⁰ In the case of Tunisia, a provisional protocol between Austria and Tunisia was signed in 1970, which regulated to bring in a “test group” of Tunisian workers; in 1971 the number was raised from 100 to 400.¹¹

The attractiveness of Austria as a destination for immigrant labor from the countries mentioned was not present in the professions in which foreigners were to be employed, which for the most part promised neither good pay nor prospects for advancement.¹² Immigrants were above all in demand for less prestigious jobs, for which ever fewer Austrian workers could be found. These jobs were characterized by low pay, unpleasant and unhealthy working conditions (for example noise, dirt, damp), shift and contract work, as well as a notably higher risk of seasonal and cyclical unemployment.¹³ This included work in the leather, textile, and construction industries, as well as in the service sector (such as tourism).¹⁴

In comparison to other industrialized Western European countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or Switzerland, a phase

8 Helga Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985: Der Kampf um und gegen die ausländischen Arbeitskräfte,” *Journal für Sozialforschung* 25, no. 2 (1985): 159–194 (here 173).

9 *Ibid.*, 174.

10 *Ibid.*, 173.

11 Copy of a memorandum of the Working Group for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor (AGA) from April 14, 1970, concerning the employment of Tunisian labor forces in Austria, Sektionszahl 1082/70, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer Wien (Archive of the Vienna Economic Chamber, hereafter WKW).

12 Bernhard Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration? Migrations- und Integrationspolitik in Österreich nach 1945,” in *Good Luck! Migration Today*, ed. Vida Bakondy et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 142–158 (here 144).

13 Georg Fischer, Hans Steiner, and Georg Wallner, *Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich*, Forschungsberichte aus Sozial- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik 9 (Vienna: Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung, 1985), 72–75; Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 174.

14 Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 174.

of increased economic growth only began in Austria from the middle of the 1950s. Until then, Austria had mainly been a country of emigration.¹⁵ Moreover, internal migrants from economically underdeveloped regions and the integration of refugees (in 1952, for example, the basic opening of the labor market to the group of so-called *Volksdeutsche*, refugees perceived as co-ethnics, took place), constituted a large reservoir of labor.¹⁶ Following the growth of the economy, the unemployment rate in Austria sank from 5.5 percent in 1955 to 2.9 percent in 1961.¹⁷ This development was encouraged by the "expansion of the welfare state, state investment in construction and other infrastructure programs, the extension of the average time in education, and the reduction of the working life and working hours."¹⁸ As early as the late 1950s, the Austrian economy had therefore been suffering an increasing shortage in labor in certain regions and industries. Various attempts to limit the labor migration of Austrians into neighboring countries, especially into Switzerland or the FRG, remained unsuccessful.¹⁹

Employers therefore demanded liberalization of labor market policies and, related to this, easier access for immigrants to the Austrian labor market.²⁰ The legal framework exacerbated the ability of businesses to respond flexibly to the demand for labor. Until the passing of the *Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz* (Foreign Nationals Employment Law) in 1975, the *Deutsche Reichsverordnung über ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (German Reich's Decree on Foreign Labor) of 1933, which had been in force in Austria since 1941 and replaced the *Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz* (National Workers Protection Act) of 1925, had formed the juridical foundation for the employment of migrants.²¹ This was based on a "complicated admittance procedure" and was not only dependent on the economic situation and that of the domestic labor market, but also on companies' ability to prove that no Austrian labor was available.²² However, the demands of the economy

15 August Gächter, "Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Assimilation und Ausgrenzung," in *Österreich: Kultur und Identität – heute und vor 100 Jahren*, ed. Flemming Talbo Stubkjaer (Odense: Odense Univ. Press, 2000), 107-127 (here 109).

16 Perchinig, "Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?," 144.

17 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 159.

18 Kenneth Horvath, *Die Logik der Entrechtung: Sicherheits- und Nutzendiskurse im österreichischen Migrationsregime* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014), 148.

19 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 161.

20 *Ibid.*, 159-160.

21 Eveline Wollner, "Auf dem Weg zur sozialpartnerschaftlich regulierten Ausländerbeschäftigung in Österreich: Die Reform der Ausländerbeschäftigung und der Anwerbung bis Ende der 1960er Jahre" (diploma thesis, University of Vienna, 1996), 23. However, three decrees issued after 1945 led to the law not being applied in Austria "in this form." *Ibid.*

22 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 161.

for a liberal management of the employment of foreigners initially met with vehement opposition from the workers' representative organizations. They by contrast demanded an "active labor-market policy," in the sense of a redeployment and better qualification of Austrian workers.²³ In 1955, the union of construction workers and loggers threatened a strike if foreign labor was brought in for the construction industry.²⁴

The basic agreement on the increased admission of foreign labor into the Austrian labor market was achieved in the context of the Raab-Olah Agreement,²⁵ following the failure of negotiations over a new law on the employment of foreigners in the early 1960s.²⁶ The Raab-Olah Agreement was concluded in 1961 between the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (BWK),²⁷ the principal interest groups of employees and employers in Austria. As an interim solution, the expanded employment of immigrants in the framework of agreements on contingents (*Kontingentvereinbarungen*) was arranged, which were concluded between the ÖGB and BWK anew each year. A maximum number of foreign laborers for which the complicated individual admissions procedure could be waived was fixed for each federal province/region and industry.²⁸ The agreements on contingents were passed on as "recommendations" to the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, which was responsible for the employment of foreigners in Austria, and which in turn implemented these in the framework of decrees which were supposed to regulate the practice of the employment of foreigners.²⁹ Until the Foreign Nationals Employment Law of 1975, Austrian immigration policies thus opted for an "extra-parliamentary path" without a legal foundation.³⁰ The

23 Ibid., 162.

24 Gewerkschaftlicher Nachrichtendienst Nr. 590, 5.5.1955, Geschäftszahl SP 2224/1955, MF 680, RZ 6621, Archiv WKÖ.

25 Named after the President of the Federal Economic Chamber at the time, Julius Raab, and the President of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, Franz Olah.

26 The passing of a new Law on the Employment of Foreigners not only aimed to take account of the need for an "expansion and simultaneously a continuation of state control of the employment of foreigners" (Wollner, "Auf dem Weg," 23), it had also become necessary because the constitutional court had annulled three decrees as unlawful that had been issued after 1945 and which had simplified the process of admission for the employment of immigrants; Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 163. For details on the negotiations, see Wollner, "Auf dem Weg."

27 Today: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ)

28 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 166.

29 Stefanie Mayer, "Migration & Labor Markets: Political Discourse in Austria," in *Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration in Historical Perspective*, ed. Stefanie Mayer and Mikael Spang (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009), 25–73 (here 32).

30 For more detail, see Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985"; Wollner, "Auf dem Weg"; Horvath, "Die Logik der Entrechtung," 156.

social scientist Helga Matuschek explained the initial reservation of state institutions in this area as follows: "Since the protection and the supremacy of domestic workers had been secured, the government and/or other state institutions have been able to leave this field to the social partners without endangering the basis of legitimation toward the citizens."³¹ Beyond this – according to the migration researcher Bernhard Perchinig – the domestic political significance of the Raab-Olah Agreement lay in the establishment of the institution of social partnership "as a specifically Austrian form of corporatist cooperation between the government and the interest groups and their domination of labor and social policy."³²

The ÖGB linked its agreement to a number of conditions. These included, for example, compulsory medical examination before arrival in Austria, the limitation of employment of foreigners to a maximum of one year, the "*Inländerprimat*" (domestic primacy, according to which immigrants were to be laid off before Austrians), the prohibition of employment of immigrants in place of striking Austrian workers, immigrant workers being subject to the same collective agreements as Austrian workers, but also the fixation of maximum numbers of immigrant laborers according to the branch of the economy and the federal province.³³ Significant features of the agreements on contingents already contained these conditions, which were to be incorporated into the Foreign Nationals Employment Law in 1975.³⁴ The immigration policies of the Second Republic thus relied on historical continuities. The basis was offered by the National Workers Protection Act of 1925, which, as social scientist Kenneth Horvath demonstrated, not only distinguished "explicitly between domestic and foreign labor" and legally anchored the "*Inländerprimat*," but also fundamentally subjugated labor migration to reorganization, as it was made into the "*direct* object of negotiation processes between business associations and labor representatives."³⁵ The fundamental premise of Austrian migration policies was rotation and the eventual return of immigrants to their country of origin.³⁶ For this reason, Austria's first recruitment agreement with Spain was at first limited to one year.³⁷ Simultaneously, however, the countries of origin and the immigrants themselves initially believed in the temporary character of labor migration.

31 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985," 180.

32 Perchinig, "Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?," 145.

33 Mayer, "Migration & Labor Market," 31–32.

34 Ibid.

35 Horvath, "Die Logik der Entrechtung," 165–166 (emphasis in the original).

36 Perchinig, "Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?," 145.

37 Spanien-Anwerbeabkommen und Sozialversicherungsabkommen, Information für den Herrn Sektionsleiter, Grundzahl 201 042, Geschäftszeichen 31, BMHGI, AdR, ÖStA [Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Austrian State Archive].

The Formalization of Immigrant Labor in the Recruitment Contracts

While the Raab-Olah Agreement and the quota solution marked the domestic political cornerstone for immigrant labor from Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to Austria, the conclusion of intergovernmental recruitment contracts and social security agreements provided the necessary foreign policy cornerstone.³⁸ The signing of the agreements was sometimes preceded by years of protracted domestic as well as foreign negotiations. The recruitment agreements – which were mostly modeled on existing contracts of the countries of origin with other states³⁹ – regulated the procedure of recruitment through to the organization of travel and the respective responsibilities of the contractual partners. The formalization of immigrant labor through the recruitment contracts and the labor and salary equalization of immigrants with the resident workers stipulated in them was intended to serve as protection for both groups. The granting of equal rights, however, was consistently subverted; for example, through the limitation of work permits for immigrants to one year, which was moreover bound to a specific business, as well as the “domestic primacy” that had been structurally anchored in the Austrian labor market since 1925.

The countries of origin in many cases opposed direct recruitment by foreign businesses and therefore demanded the establishment of an official recruitment center, which was to cooperate with the respective national authorities on site; moreover, employment services were a state monopoly at this point in time.⁴⁰ The countries of origin thereby tried to control the labor migration of their citizens.⁴¹ The degree of attempted control and

38 Spain initially declined to conclude a social security agreement with Austria. Due to the time limit on the validity of the recruitment agreement until December 31, 1962, renewed negotiations were already necessary in 1963, and a new agreement was finally signed in 1964. As a result, a social security agreement was concluded—on the express wish of Spain—which entered into force in 1966. (Grundzahl 137/63, Sektion II, BMSV, AdR, ÖStA) Austria concluded a social security agreement with Turkey in 1969. In the case of Yugoslavia, the agreement was concluded at the same time as the recruitment agreement. See *Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und dem Spanischen Staat über Soziale Sicherheit samt Zusatzprotokoll*, Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette, hereafter BGBl.] 8/66; *Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und der Türkischen Republik über Soziale Sicherheit samt Zusatzprotokoll*, BGBl. 337/69; *Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawiens über Soziale Sicherheit*, BGBl. 289/66.

39 Negotiations over the recruitment agreement with Spain were based on the Swiss-Spanish agreement; in the case of Turkey it was the German-Turkish agreement.

40 Eveline Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei,” 80–87 (here 82).

41 Monika Mattes, “*Gastarbeiterinnen*” in *der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 64; see also Wollner, “Auf dem Weg” and Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei.”

influence varied from country to country and was subject to the interests of the economy and labor-market policies. The possibility of control on the part of the countries of origin extended, for example, to the limitation of selection to certain regions or groups, the restriction of the recruitment of specific individuals, up to the curtailing of the recruitment of qualified workers and the prohibition of individual recruitment by companies.⁴² This "pre-selection" of workers and the concurrent limitation of recruitment opportunities, however, led to conflicts with the recruiting states and to the exploitation of "alternative channels of migration."⁴³ According to the social scientist Eveline Wollner, Austria's recruitment institutions may have lost their importance over the course of the 1960s, "but they were of great significance for the willingness of the sending countries to permit recruitment."⁴⁴

The first recruitment agreement between Austria and Spain, which was signed in May 1962, did not result in any noteworthy or lasting labor migration to Austria. Austria was not an attractive destination for Spanish workers. Kurt Büchlmann, the head of the Austrian recruitment office in Madrid at the time, recalled that the salaries offered by Austrian businesses were 25% less than those offered by German, French, and Swiss businesses, and the success of recruitment altogether remained very modest.⁴⁵ Moreover, Austrian companies hardly made use of the recruitment opportunities in Spain. A statement by the Federal Economic Chamber in 1966 stated that "the employment of Spanish labor in Austria is only of secondary importance."⁴⁶ Within the next year, the Austrian recruitment office in Madrid was closed, with any subsequent recruitment being handled by the Austrian external trading office of the Economic Chamber in Madrid.⁴⁷

42 For details, see Wollner "Auf dem Weg" and Wollner, "Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei," which analyze this question with regard to the cases of Turkish and Yugoslav migration policies.

43 Christoph Rass, *Institutionalisierungsprozesse auf einem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt: Bilaterale Wanderungsverträge in Europa zwischen 1919 und 1974* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 301.

44 Wollner, "Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei," 83.

45 Kurt Büchelmann, in discussion with Christina Hollomey and the author, Innsbruck, May 7, 2014. Various strategies, such as the targeted use of Austrian tourist advertising or the search for Austrian businesses that were prepared to pay higher salaries, were nevertheless employed to win over Spanish labor for work in Austria.

46 Schreiben der BWK an das Bundesministerium für Handel und Wiederaufbau vom 4. Mai 1966 betreffend Arbeitsvertrag für spanische Arbeitskräfte, Grundzahl 201 042/67, Geschäftszeichen 31, BMHGI, AdR, ÖStA.

47 Abkommen zwischen Österreich u. Spanien über die Anwerbung span. Arbeitskräfte und deren Beschäftigung in Österreich, BGBl. Nr. 26/1969; Frage der Wiedererrichtung der 1967 aufgelösten österr. Anwerbekommission in Madrid, Grundzahl 204 903-Sekt. IV/71, Geschäftszeichen Spanien V/5P, Abteilung 12, Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (*Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs*) [hereafter BmaA].

By contrast, the conclusion of the recruitment agreement with Turkey in 1964 constituted the intergovernmental formalization of a “de facto status.”⁴⁸ As early as 1962, representatives of the Turkish labor-market administration, the BWK, and the Austrian trade delegate in Turkey had concluded a provisional agreement, which was to regulate the recruitment of Turkish workers until the conclusion of a final agreement. Until the establishment of a commission in Istanbul in 1964, recruitment was handled by the Austrian foreign trade office in Istanbul in cooperation with the Turkish labor market authorities.⁴⁹ However the planned recruitment agreement with Turkey, which was welcomed by the BWK due to the as-yet unexhausted labor reservoir in the country,⁵⁰ was at first met with domestic political opposition by the labor unions and individual ministries, above all by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. The latter, for example, feared a considerable cost arising from the deportation or repatriation of unwanted migrants to Turkey.⁵¹ The Ministry of Social Affairs, by contrast, argued with cultural and racist reservations: “There is no particular interest in the employment of Turkish labor in Austria due to the unusual working and living customs and due to linguistic reasons,” as expressed in a statement in May 1961.⁵² While the trope of the ostensible “otherness” of Turkish workers was to maintain itself stubbornly in the following years and decades, the initial domestic political opposition to a recruitment agreement with Turkey was quickly dropped, especially since negotiations over recruitment agreements with Italy, Greece, and

48 Information für den Herrn Sektionsleiter betreffend Unterzeichnung des österr.-türkischen Fremdarbeiterabkommens vom 10.2.1964, Grundzahl 200 360-12/64, Geschäftszeichen Türkei V/5P, Abteilung 12, BmaA.

49 Bericht des österreichischen Handelsdelegierten in der Türkei an die Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte vom 16.7.1962, Grundzahl 205 930-12/62, Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst-Türkei, BmaA.

50 See Abschrift eines Berichtes des österreichischen Handelsdelegierten in der Türkei an die Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (AGA) vom 9.1.1963, Grundzahl 300 965-12/63, Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst (Türkei), BmaA. It is noted right at the beginning here that “[e]ven in the case of an increased recruitment of labor by several developed countries, the supply will not be depleted and there will be no shortage of healthy labor forces, from whom one should however not expect any particular technical expertise.”

51 Schreiben des Bundesministeriums für Inneres, Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit an das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten betreffend Anwerbung von türkischen Arbeitskräften nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und nach Österreich vom 6.6. 1961, Grundzahl 117 552-12/61, Geschäftszeichen AK-Türkei II, BmaA.

52 Schreiben des Bundesministeriums für soziale Verwaltung an das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten betreffend Anwerbung von türkischen Arbeitskräften nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und nach Österreich vom 9.5.1961, Grundzahl 117 552-12/61, Geschäftszeichen AK-Türkei II, BmaA.

Yugoslavia in 1962 had not led to positive results. The Austrian-Turkish recruitment agreement was signed on May 15, 1964.⁵³

The negotiations over an agreement with Yugoslavia turned out to be more protracted and difficult. Negotiations had begun in 1962,⁵⁴ were resumed in 1964, and resulted in the signing in 1965 of the "Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Concerning the Regulation of Employment of Yugoslav Employees in Austria."⁵⁵ For ideological and political reasons, Yugoslavia had rejected the promotion of transnational labor migration to Western European countries well into the 1960s. A restrictive passport law and the punishment of "illegal emigration" aimed at preventing the efforts of its citizens to emigrate – albeit unsuccessfully.⁵⁶ The Yugoslav economic reforms of 1965, however, resulted in an immediate rise in unemployment and thus sealed the final reversal of Yugoslav migration politics toward the promotion of temporary labor migration.⁵⁷ This reversal had in part already taken place at the beginning of the 1960s with the easing of the restrictive emigration regulations and a liberalization of the passport regime.⁵⁸

The demand in the Austrian economy for Yugoslav labor, however, had already been partially slaked before the conclusion of the Austrian-Yugoslav recruitment agreement. This was possible due to, among other things, employment contracts with smaller groups,⁵⁹ to regional agreements with

53 BGBl. 164/1964.

54 While the ÖGB generally left the intergovernmental negotiations over recruitment to the BWK and the responsible ministries, in the case of Yugoslavia (the ÖGB favored recruitment from Austria's neighboring countries), it became active of its own accord. So, for example, in 1962 a meeting took place between the president of the ÖGB, Franz Olah, and the president of the Yugoslav Association of Trade Unions, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, during which the Austrian trade union president proclaimed the interest of "wanting to employ at least 10,000 Yugoslav workers in Austria." Fernschreiben der Österreichischen Botschaft in Belgrad an das BmaA vom 19.4.1962, Grundzahl 205930-12/62, Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst (Jugosl.), BmaA.

55 BGBl. 42/1965.

56 Rass, *Institutionalisierungsprozesse*, 192-193. The first agreement was signed with France in January 1965.

57 Ibid; Wollner, "Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei," 85. The belief in the temporary nature of labor migration was also underlined in the Yugoslav term for immigrant labor as "privremeno u inostranstvu zaposleni" (those employed abroad temporarily).

58 Rass, *Institutionalisierungsprozesse*, 193. Not only was the Amnesty Law passed in 1962, which was intended to categorically exempt Yugoslav citizens who had previously been working abroad illegally, but a first "Decree Concerning the Treatment of the Employment of Labor Abroad" was issued, which came into force in 1963. Vladimir Ivanović, "Die Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren," *zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 1 (2013): 35-48 (here 37).

59 Fernschreiben der Österreichischen Botschaft in Belgrad an das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten vom 19.4.1962, Grundzahl 205930-12/62, Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst (Jugosl.), BmaA.

employment agencies of individual republics (Zagreb and Sarajevo),⁶⁰ as well as to the liberal dispensation of work visas by the Austrian diplomatic representation authorities in Yugoslavia.⁶¹ It should be noted, however, that not all Yugoslav citizens were equally desirable as workers for the Austrian authorities. Historical sources indicate that, owing to their supposed lack of a work ethic, Yugoslav Roma were not to be given work visas.⁶²

The great significance of Yugoslav workers for the Austrian economy was also underlined by a statement by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1964: “From the perspective of Austria, the conclusion of a recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia is nevertheless [...] very important since [...] the domestic economy relies heavily on Yugoslav labor, which is pouring into Austria more or less unregulated, resulting in not inconsiderable difficulties.”⁶³ With the conclusion of a recruitment agreement, both the Austrian and Yugoslav parties sought a formalization, and thereby a stricter regulation, of labor migration of Yugoslav citizens to Austria. Yugoslavia, moreover, also hoped for increased protection for its citizens working abroad and attempted to assert this in the recruitment negotiations. To cite two examples: the text of the agreement granted Yugoslav employees the right to “agree on a new contract with their Austrian employer” during the course of their stay in Austria. Additionally, the contract also included the demand brought forward by Yugoslavia during negotiations in 1964, “that the Yugoslav employee, should he lose his employment, must be secured accommodation and provisions by an Austrian body until he finds new employment.”⁶⁴ Beyond this, Yugoslavia assumed direct influence over the process of recruitment, since a mixed Austrian-Yugoslav commission decided “whether the selected labor forces suit the requirements of health and other requirements of the available workplaces.”⁶⁵ In contrast, the final

60 Jahresbericht der Bundeswirtschaftskammer, 1966; Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962-1985,” 170; Ivanović, “Die Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte,” 38.

61 In an inter-ministerial meeting on May 7, 1962, including representatives of the Foreign, Interior, Social, Trade, and Reconstruction Ministries as well as representatives of the ÖGB and BWK, a “benevolent visa-granting practice” was agreed upon for the “promotion of the immigration of Yugoslav labor.” Grundzahl 250 019/62, Geschäftszeichen 35, BMHW, AdR, ÖStA.

62 Grundzahl 326 613-12/65, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien IX/2P, Abteilung 12, BmaA; Grundzahl 230 184-12/66, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien IX/2P, Abteilung 12, BmaA. On the discrimination of Yugoslav Roma, see Vida Bakondy, “Keine Arbeitsvisa an jugoslawische Roma,” *Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten* Nr. 93 (2014): 15-17.

63 Schreiben des BMSV an die Sektion II im Hause vom 17.2.1964, Grundzahl 176/64, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien-Abk, Sektion II, BMSV, AdR, ÖStA.

64 BGBl. 42/1966, Article 12. For details on Yugoslavia’s strong negotiating position, see Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei” and Rass, *Institutionalisierungsprozesse*.

65 BGBl. 42/1966.

selection of applicants in Spain and Turkey lay with the Austrian commission on site. As a result, the Yugoslav authorities repeatedly rejected the recruitment orders from Austrian businesses, for example because the wages offered were deemed too low.

The Austrian Recruitment Apparatus

In the course of the conclusion of intergovernmental recruitment agreements, a new administrative apparatus was also created in the 1960s that was intended to organize the recruitment of foreign labor. The Ministry of Social Affairs entrusted the Federal Economic Chamber with this task.⁶⁶ On the part of the employers, this was perceived not least as an opportunity not to leave the fields of employment services and immigration policy entirely to the "political opposition."⁶⁷ The costs of the recruitment apparatus were covered by the Federal Economic Chamber and its respective provincial chambers.⁶⁸ In February 1962, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte* (Working Group for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor, AGA) took up operations as the center of the Austrian recruitment apparatus, with its offices in Vienna.⁶⁹ After the conclusion of intergovernmental recruitment agreements, commissions or recruitment offices were established in Madrid (1962), Istanbul (1964), and Belgrade (1966). Before the conclusion of the contracts, the AGA worked with the Austrian external trading offices of the BWK in the various countries or directly with the local labor market authorities.

A central task of the AGA concerned the organization of the recruitment of foreign labor. It constituted the intersection between Austrian

66 A little later, the presidential conference of the Chamber of Agriculture was also tasked with the recruitment of labor for agriculture. This also established a recruitment organization. According to Edith Tschank, a former employee, all the documentation of the Working Group of the Central Union of Agriculture and Forestry was shredded in recent years; Edith Tschank, in discussion with the author, Vienna, Aug. 1, 2013.

67 This argument was still being made in the 1980s to justify the existence of the recruitment organizations: "It must also be mentioned that the Federal Chamber through the creation of the committee in 1962 succeeded in achieving an exception to the monopoly in employment services, which to this day the Chamber of Labor and the ÖGB describe as a grave mistake by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The workers' representatives are of the opinion that the placement of foreigners should be handed back to the Ministry of Social Affairs." See Dienstreisen des Leiters. Dreiseitiges Papier, undatiert, V2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

68 Schreiben der BWK bezüglich Errichtung einer Anwerbeorganisation vom 14.11.1961, Sektionszahl 1362/60, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, WKW.

69 Wollner, "Auf dem Weg," 85.

businesses and the commissions in the countries of origin. Interested companies could turn to the AGA with a recruitment order, who in turn forwarded this together with the necessary documentation to the commission, who in turn cooperated with the responsible labor market authorities on site. All steps, from the assignment of contracts through to the settlement of the fixed recruitment fees, ran through the AGA. Apart from the handling of the necessary recruitment steps in Austria, a further task of the AGA involved the ongoing provision of information to Austrian companies and the various chamber organizations.⁷⁰ The Austrian commissions in the countries of origin were responsible for the complete handling of recruitment on site; they corresponded and negotiated with local authorities and workers, organized the examinations of workers and their travel to Austria, and also supported Austrian companies that selected workers themselves on site. The staff of the Austrian commissions was composed of Austrian and local employees. The running of the commission was entrusted to young men, mostly graduates of (international) trade and law.⁷¹

Statistics on the number of employees in the commission in Istanbul in the 1960s and 1970s show that the number of year-round employees changed over the years and that additional local staff were sometimes hired provisionally or dismissed, depending the order situation.⁷² For medical examinations and examination of labor skills, either local professionals were employed on a freelance basis or in cooperation with local institutions, such as national health authorities or recruitment offices of the FRG. In comparison to the recruitment organizations of other Western European states, such as the FRG or France, the Austrian recruitment apparatus remained relatively small. If we believe a statistic from the early

70 Since its founding, the AGA regularly issued circulars on legal and practical questions concerning the recruitment and employment of migrants, and published memoranda and ads on this issue in various economic papers. In 1973, for example, more than fifty circulars were issued. The AGA was moreover a member of various councils and committees that dealt with issues of migrant policy; it also participated in meetings between the social partners and ministries regarding the employment of foreigners.

71 The first head of the Austrian commission in Madrid, for example, Kurt Büchlmann, was 24 years old when he took on the position in 1962. He had recently completed his studies at the Vienna University of Economics and Business: Kurt Büchlmann, in discussion with Christina Hollomey and the author, Innsbruck, May 7, 2014. Siegfried Pflegerl, born 1939, the long-term head of the commission in Istanbul, studied law and was also in his mid-20s when he took over the commission in 1965. Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an das Bundesministerium für Umwelt und Familie, Sektion II, Abteilung 2/3, vom 23.6.1988, A3-A12, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

72 Anlage Kontrollamtsbericht vom 1.9.1981, Selektion Vermittlungszahlen – Personalstand Kommission Istanbul 1965-1981, V3-5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

1970s, the West German commission in Istanbul employed more than 133 staff, and the French more than 17 staff, while the Austrian commission only employed five staff members. A comparison with the Yugoslav commissions paints a similar picture: 116 West German employees, 24 French, and six Austrian.⁷³

All the documentation produced and received over the decades by the center of the Austrian recruitment apparatus in Vienna was destroyed after its official closure in 1993.⁷⁴ The same is true of the documentation of the recruitment commissions in Madrid and Belgrade.⁷⁵ The archive of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber merely contains an incomplete collection from the commission in Istanbul. This comprises the period from the late 1960s to the closure of the commission in Istanbul in 1993.⁷⁶ Apart from this, the archive of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber contains recruitment orders from Austrian companies for Yugoslav and Turkish workers from the 1960s; those for Spanish workers are missing. The position and voices of those who came to Austria as workers are only rarely documented in the existing correspondence, as in cases where the workers applied for a workplace in Austria or where complaints about working conditions were recorded.

The Recruitment Process

The placement of labor through the recruitment organizations of the Federal Economic Chamber took the form of a bureaucratic process and was based on a multistage selection procedure. The recruitment process was based on the principle of recruiting the most effective labor for the Austrian economy. This followed the tendency of reifying migrants in the recruitment process as objects of labor, who were treated as commodities, examined for whether or not they ultimately suited the given professional and medical qualities. The tendency toward commodification and/or objectification was, in my estimation, also expressed in the correspondence: "*Lieferscheine*" (delivery notes) and

73 Anhang Unterlagen für Gespräche mit dem Kontrollamt, undatiert, vermutlich 1972 oder 1973, V4, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

74 Rita Tezzele, head of the Archiv WKÖ, in discussion with the author, Dec. 7, 2012.

75 Ibid.

76 With regard to this collection, it should be noted that not only is the entire documentation from the first four years of its existence (1964 to 1968) missing, but further material not deemed worthy of archiving was destroyed after being delivered to the archive; Rita Tezzele, in discussion with the author, Dec. 7, 2012. See also the index of the archive.

“*Transportbescheinigungen*” (transport confirmations) documented the journeys of the workers; “*Rest*” (the rest) or “*Restbestände*” (remainders) denoted the workers who had not yet arrived, while the term “*Stück*” (item) served as a unit of measurement for people. Simultaneously, there are numerous indications in historical sources that migrants resisted this objectification.⁷⁷

As a rule, the duration of recruitment, from the submission of the recruitment order to the arrival of the desired workers, took several weeks, if not months. In the mid-1960s, for example, the average recruitment period for unqualified workers in Yugoslavia was stipulated as four to six weeks and for qualified workers as up to eight weeks.⁷⁸ Generally speaking, a distinction was made between anonymous and person-specific recruitment, the recruitment of so-called “*Rückholer*” (workers who had already previously been employed by the company), and direct recruitment by companies. Person-specific recruitment and direct recruitment by companies in particular were subject to various regulations from the countries of origin, who – aiming to control emigration – continually changed these over the course of the years.⁷⁹

The recruitment procedure began with the submission of a company order to the AGA in Vienna. Apart from the order form, the company submitted completed employment contracts, valid for a maximum of one year, as well as the *Einzelzusicherung* (individual assurance) to the AGA. For each worker requested the company needed to receive a permit from the responsible labor market authority allowing it to employ an immigrant worker (*Einzelzusicherung*). Above and beyond this, the employer had to supply the immigrants with “accommodation customary for the location” (“*ortsübliche Unterkunft*”),⁸⁰ although the criterion “customary for the location” was a flexible concept, and complaints were repeatedly lodged – also from the countries of origin – about wretched housing conditions.⁸¹

77 See Vida Bakondy, “Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer: Eine Analyse von Anwerbeakten der österreichischen Wirtschaftskammer,” in *Good Luck*, 68–79.

78 Merkblatt für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW.

79 For more detail, see Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei.” Thus Yugoslavia fundamentally forbade individual recruitment by companies. Wollner, “Auf dem Weg,” 102.

80 Merkblatt für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW.

81 See for example the complaint of the regional employment agency in Sarajevo to the AGA of May 12, 1966, which was made after an inspection of the accommodation for forty Yugoslav workers employed by a Carinthian construction company. Jug 54/1966, MF 904, Archiv WKÖ.

After the companies had submitted all necessary documentation and paid the recruitment fees for each worker requested,⁸² the AGA forwarded the recruitment orders to the Austrian commissions.⁸³ The data given in the recruitment orders offered the basis for potential exclusionary criteria for recruitment in the countries of origin. Apart from information about salaries and working conditions, the duration of employment, and accommodation, they generally included details on the number of workers requested, the country of origin, sex, age, and technical qualifications – insofar as these were stipulated. Sometimes the companies specified workers by name, either because they had already worked at the company in the previous year, or because of suggestions by relatives or acquaintances who had worked at the company previously. In principle, workers between the ages of 18 to a maximum of 50 were sought after, with younger labor generally favored. With regard to the recruitment of women, the marital status "single" was preferred, since it promised more flexibility and adaptation. The immigration, or later bringing in of family members, was only promoted in the rarest of cases.⁸⁴ While some companies only submitted general specifications on the desired number, national origin, gender, and occupation, others offered a precise profile, by indicating regional wishes, or specifications regarding bodily constitution and character or personal qualities, among other requests: when asked for "specific wishes of the employer in selection of labor," a concrete factory answered, "strong, willing workers";⁸⁵ in the recruitment order for seven female spoolers from 1964, "single, nimble,

82 The fixed recruitment fee was intended to cover the costs for the issuance of visas, medical examination, travel to Austria, provisions for the journey, as well as "deportation costs following expulsion in the case of uncollectibility." Merkblatt für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW. In the case of recruitment in Turkey, however, applicants had to cover part of the technical and medical examinations themselves, leading to criticisms by the Turkish labor market authorities since this practice contradicted the regulations of the recruitment agreement. Bericht über eine Dienstreise des Kommissionsleiters Siegfried Pflegerl nach Ankara vom 3.3.1972, V1-V2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, V1-V2, Archiv WKÖ.

83 In practice, the AGA had to repeatedly demand payment of the fixed recruitment fees from the companies in the early years.

84 Only the recruitment agreement with Spain contained a clause concerning the subsequent immigration of next of kin. BGBl. 193/1962. Simultaneously, some companies expressed interest from an early stage in the long-term employment of immigrant workers and supported the subsequent immigration of next of kin, for example in the case of a Turkish tailor in a clothing company in Tyrol in 1963. In order to avoid losing the worker, the company attempted to recruit his wife who was to follow him to Austria together with their child. The files note: "We request that she at least be brought in, pending permission by the Turkish employment agency, as a relative (with the child) so that we can keep this good worker." T66/1963, MF 886, Archiv WKÖ.

85 Jug 23/1966, MF 904, Archiv WKÖ.

suitability for piecework” workers were requested;⁸⁶ in a 1967 profile of a recruitment order, a fish processing company sought workers who were, “female, 20-35 years old, if possible Slovenian (no Serbs).”⁸⁷

It is clear from the sources that businesses and employees of the recruitment organizations occasionally drew generalizing conclusions on personal characteristics and job performance on the basis of regional, national, and social origin. This is evident, for example, in the report of a company doctor in a Lower Austrian textile business from 1969 who had participated in the recruitment examinations in Banja Luka in Yugoslavia. His report, compiled for the management of the company, states that “illiterates” and “partial illiterates” were “downright predestined by fate for manual labor”; one would have to “accept a prolonged training period” with “labor deriving from agriculture” but could “afterwards reckon with all the more industriousness and greater loyalty to the company.” “One has to take into account that the labor forces in agriculture at home and abroad have been used to work from childhood onward and that precisely for such workers employment in a large factory signifies an unheard of improvement in their environment, which they will under no circumstances wish to jeopardize.”⁸⁸ In this understanding, economic disparities, structural disadvantages, and the resulting lack of options promised more willing workers. While illiteracy sometimes counted as grounds for exclusion,⁸⁹ a low level of education combined with a rural background in part augured a particular industriousness.⁹⁰ In some cases, German language skills were also demanded.⁹¹ For this reason, some businesses preferred immigrant workers from Yugoslavia, since these sometimes already had some command of German or were attributed a faster ability to learn German and quicker adaptation to living conditions in Austria.⁹²

The ethnic and cultural stereotypes – such as those about “the Turks”⁹³ – that were repeatedly expressed in the recruitment discourses were sometimes also interlaced with gendered stereotypes. So for example, in reference to the “sociological standing of the woman in Turkish society,” a statement by

86 Jug 7/1964, MF 899, Archiv WKÖ.

87 Jug 167/1967, MF 980, Archiv WKÖ. Emphasis in the original.

88 Jug 1968/1969, MF 979, Archiv WKÖ.

89 T 50/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.

90 Jug 167/1967, MF 980, Archiv WKÖ.

91 T 9/403, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.

92 T 16/1963, MF 885, Archiv WKÖ.

93 See for example the letter from the head of the commission in Istanbul, Siegfried Pfeferl, to the AGA in Vienna of October 22, 1971 in response to the requested “comparison” of the “differences between Austrians and Turks.” Unterlagen für die AGA-Ausschusssitzung 1971, V2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

the Austrian commission in Istanbul on the "efficient placement of women" in 1975 claimed that it constitutes "a significantly complicated and difficult step for a Turkish woman to take up employment abroad."⁹⁴ If Turkish workers were generally attributed a greater difficulty integrating into the "host country," this was all the more true for women, since "the Turkish woman, through her entanglement in authoritarian social structures" would be "even less able, when suddenly left to herself, to deal with the great psychological difficulties which arise from the integration problem."⁹⁵ The examples cited demonstrate clearly how hegemonic conceptions of ethnicity, in this case about "the Turks," were connected to gendered images in the recruitment discourses. In this context the "host society," or the recruiting country, functioned as a normative yardstick. Recruitment difficulties were culturalized and not – as formulated elsewhere – regarded as the result of competition between the various European recruiting countries as well as the workers' rational consideration of well-paying job offers.

In Situ: Recruitment Examinations in the Case of the Austrian Commission in Istanbul

After the submission of the company order, the Austrian commission forwarded the request to the responsible national or local labor market authorities. These in turn conducted a preliminary selection from a list of the people who had registered as seeking employment, and informed those selected of the offer. If the workers decided on a workplace in Austria, they appeared in person at the commission. Recruitment orders of Austrian companies were repeatedly rejected: either because the tendered salary and working conditions did not meet expectations and the applicants decided for a better offer, or because the selection criteria proved in reality to be unfulfillable. This is evident in the example of a Lower Austrian textile business, which submitted an order in Turkey for the recruitment of 40-70 textile workers "aged 18 to 24, over 1.50 meters tall, and no illiterates"; of these, "at least 20" were to be "trained textile workers."⁹⁶ As is evident in the sources, the order could not be completed due to "the delimiting factors stipulated by the company (qualification, minimum education, and minimum height)," but also due to the wages offered and competition from the

94 Schreiben von Siegfried Pfliegerl an die AGA vom 15.7.1975 betreffend effiziente Frauenvermittlung, B19, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

95 Ibid.

96 T50/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.

FRG.⁹⁷ In such cases, the commission recommended altering the selection criteria (higher wages, more flexibility regarding age, height, education etc.) in order to make a placement possible after all.

A central component of the on-site recruitment examinations was the examination of the physical and work suitability of the applicants for the workplace. These decided whether or not a worker would ultimately be selected for a workplace in Austria. In addition, immigrants had to submit a criminal record certificate from the police confirming their good conduct. In the case of recruitment of workers with specific qualifications, the AGA recommended that the companies be present on site during the selection. Presumably, companies planning to recruit a large number of workers would be the most likely to follow this suggestion.⁹⁸ Still, company representatives “rarely” went to Turkey.⁹⁹ The work skill tests were then administered either by staff from the commission or by local professionals.¹⁰⁰ In the design of the work skill tests for “construction technicians, textile and metal technicians, carpenters etc., the commission relied on the expertise of the German liaison office,” since the “Turkish labor market administration was not capable of conducting such technical preliminary examinations,” according to the former head of the Austrian commission in Istanbul, Siegfried Pfliegerl.¹⁰¹

The physical and mental health of the applicants ultimately constituted a crucial criterion in the selection process. This was not only to keep the cost to the Austrian welfare state as low as possible, but also to ensure the protection of the domestic population. The so-called “*Infektionsfreiheitsschein*” (Certificate of Freedom from Infection), which was issued by the commission in Istanbul after the final examination, was supposed to guarantee that upon entry immigrants were free from infections that were legally required to be disclosed. Immigrants were therefore construed from the outset as potential carriers of infectious diseases and thus a danger to public security and order in Austria.

97 Ibid.

98 See T50/1969 and T35/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ. Sometimes the company doctor also traveled to check medical suitability.

99 Die Verwaltungssagenden der Kommission, undatiert, 23, V5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

100 Schreiben von Siegfried Pfliegerl an den Leiter der Österreichischen Kommission in der SFRJ, Franz Koppensteiner, vom 3.8.1973 betreffend “Selektionsunterlagen,” V 6-8, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Regarding the examination of construction workers, the commission in Istanbul stated: “The examination of technical workers is conducted by a civil engineer, who is no longer integrated in the office, who conducts examinations as required. For small numbers, the necessary examination materials (construction materials and tools) are available to the commission, for larger company selections and larger orders the examination is conducted at construction sites.” Ibid.

101 Siegfried Pfliegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 29, 2013.

While the regulation of the medical examination was formulated rather generally in the intergovernmental recruitment agreements, in practice candidates had to undergo a comprehensive medical examination. During the recruitment process, not only was the medical or physical suitability for the requesting workplace generally tested, but "a general clinical examination including locomotor system, ears, eyes, and a neuro-psychiatric examination, pulse and blood pressure measurements, a urine analysis, [and] a full blood test" were also conducted.¹⁰² With women, the discovery of pregnancy also constituted a definite criterion for exclusion.¹⁰³ According to an internal memorandum of the Austrian commission in Istanbul from the late 1960s, the applicants for a workplace in Austria underwent the following mandatory examination steps: "1) full blood examination, 2) serial examination (height, weight, eyes, ears, venereal diseases etc.), 3) X-ray examination, 4) examination of stool, and 5) examination of suitability."¹⁰⁴ As a rule, the first three examination steps had to be completed at a Turkish medical authority even before appearing in person at the commission, the costs of which had to be borne by the applicants themselves. The fourth and fifth examination steps, by contrast, were conducted by the commission's medical officer. The issuance of the "Certificate of Freedom from Infection," which followed a positive final examination, was also the responsibility of the medical officer. A lack of faith in the Turkish medical authorities may have played a role in this deviation from the directives stipulated in the recruitment agreement.¹⁰⁵ The final examination of suitability comprised "the concluding medical evaluation of the X-ray and lab results and an individual general medical examination of the worker."¹⁰⁶ This examination focused once more on the general medical condition of the candidate and their physical and medical "suitability" for the requesting workplace in Austria.¹⁰⁷ Even "minor

102 Schreiben der Österreichischen Kommission in der Türkei vom 13.8.1990, C, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

103 According to Siegfried Pfelegerl, pregnancy tests with women were generally conducted. Siegfried Pfelegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 2, 2014. At least in the early years of the Austrian recruitment practice, this presumably only happened in cases where pregnancy was suspected, or in the case of the expressed wish of the company. See T2/1963, MF 885 und Jug 12/1964, MF 899, Archiv WKÖ.

104 Die Verwaltungsgangenden der Kommission, undatiert, 6, V5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

105 Schreiben von Siegfried Pfelegerl an die AGA vom 23.8.1990 betreffend Infektionsfreiheitsschein, C 4, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. The "Certificate of Freedom from Infection" was issued by national medical authorities in the cases of recruitment in Spain and Yugoslavia (here: "medical report"). These were valid for a period of fourteen days, but could be extended.

106 Siegfried Pfelegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 2, 2014.

107 On the criteria for exclusion, see Richtlinien für die Schlussuntersuchung vom 2.1.1973, C 5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

physical deficiencies” – including, for example, lower than average sight in one eye¹⁰⁸ – could constitute a criterion for exclusion. In such cases, the commission recommended inquiring with the AGA “whether the company wishes to recruit.”¹⁰⁹ In the placement of so-called “*Rückholer*” (workers who had already previously been employed by the company) and workers specified by name, the criteria were in part less strict, since the selection was based on a “given, specific interest of an Austrian company in the placement.”¹¹⁰ In some cases, decisions were made on an individual basis, for example dependent on the type of employment in Austria.¹¹¹

There are occasional references to the number of rejections for medical reasons: a memorandum from 1975, for example, states that 25-30% of applicants for a job in Austria had to undergo a follow-up appearance at the commission,¹¹² with the rate of rejection for medical reasons being “significantly higher” with women.¹¹³ However, there is no indication of the reasons for this gender difference. The fact that a verdict of “provisionally unsuitable” existed and a “follow-up appearance” at the commission following treatment was possible indicates that there was a certain leeway and that, depending on the diagnosis, workers were given the possibility of a second chance. The sources indicate that the medical examinations at the Austrian commission in Turkey followed stricter criteria than was commonplace in official medical examinations in Austria.¹¹⁴

A systematic analysis of the subjective experiences of migrants in the recruitment process has not been conducted to date. The few recorded memories indicate, however, that the medical examinations were above all experienced as unpleasant and demeaning.¹¹⁵ Simultaneously, there are indications that immigrants sought and found strategies to circumvent

108 Die Verwaltungsagenden der Kommission, undatiert, 25, V5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

109 Ibid.

110 Richtlinien für die Schlussuntersuchung vom 2.1.1973, C5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

111 These included anomalies of the skin, missing fingers, or limited flexibility of joints and extremities. Ibid.

112 Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 7.2.1975 betreffend Laboruntersuchungen, C2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

113 Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 15.7.1975 betreffend effiziente Frauenvermittlung, B19, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

114 Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 8.9.1986 betreffend Grundsätze der ärztlichen Untersuchungen, C5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. This also fundamentally concerned all examinations conducted abroad, which according to this letter was a result of the express wishes of the Austrian Social and Labor Ministries.

115 See for example the descriptions of Emin Erdoğan and Aslan Doğan, who came to Austria in the early 1970s, in *50 Jahre türkische Gast?Arbeit in Österreich*, ed. Ali Özbaş, Handan Özbaş, and Joachim Hainzl (Graz: Leykam, 2014), 287-288 and 307-308.

the strict recruitment criteria. This is also testified to in reports of the commission in Istanbul concerning bribery allegations against Turkish staff members and Turkish authorities in order to achieve positive test results.¹¹⁶ In 1974, there was talk of an "organization of fraudsters" who promised support, against payment, to "gullible workers," especially from rural regions, with the completion of the formalities and the attainment of a "favorable result."¹¹⁷ As demonstrated by Gamze Ongan and Dilman Muradoğlu, "a kind of 'niche economy'" emerged around the recruitment offices in Istanbul and the Turkish employment agency, which "consisted of street photographers, consultation and translation offices, restaurants, cafés, hotels, and so-called mediators who would take care of the formalities on behalf of the applicants, or at least claimed to."¹¹⁸

The final selection by the commission did not always meet the expectations of the companies, as documented in complaints about so-called "*Fehlanswerbungen*" (literally, "mis-recruitments"). These occurred when, for example, local labor-market authorities intervened for reasons of migration policy and placed other workers than those that had been specifically requested.¹¹⁹ Austrian companies moreover complained about missing workers, workers who changed their workplace (here we also find the figure of the "*Abwerber*," the poacher, in contrast to the "*Anwerber*," or recruiter), and cases where workers were categorized as "insufficient" due to illness, pregnancy, unsatisfactory work, or "refusal to work." In reaction, sanctions and compensation were demanded: the deportation of the person concerned, the reimbursement of the costs of recruitment, and the prohibition of further employment with a different company in Austria.¹²⁰ While in cases of "poaching" of labor by other companies, only complaints or recommendations for improvement could be submitted, the correspondence

116 Schreiben von Siegfried Pfliegerl an die AGA vom 16.12.1974 betreffend Röntgenuntersuchungen der Kommission, Schreiben von Siegfried Pfliegerl an die AGA vom 9.1.1975 betreffend Neue Laborregelung, C, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.

117 Schreiben von Siegfried Pfliegerl an die AGA vom 25.11.1974 betreffend Betrügerorganisationen, C2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Pfliegerl was here referring to examinations conducted by the West German commission in 1973.

118 Dilman Muradoğlu and Gamze Ongan, "1964 Anwerbestelle," in *Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration*, ed. Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Matzl (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), 122-124 (here 124).

119 Jug 23/1966, MF 904, Archiv WKÖ.

120 See Vida Bakondy, "(K)Ein Paradies versprochen...: Die Anfänge der Arbeitsmigration nach Österreich seit den 1960er Jahren," in *Der Onkel aus Amerika: Aufbruch in eine neue Welt*, ed. Verein Industriekultur und Alltagsgeschichte and Werner Koroschitz (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2006), 67-74; Vida Bakondy, "Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer," 68-79; and Vida Bakondy, "Die zwei Türken wollen nach Deutschland: Mobilität als Strategie des Aufbegehrens gegen die Arbeitsverhältnisse in den 1960er Jahren," *Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten* 89 (2013): 15-17.

regarding “insufficient” recruitments also included threats to refuse the mediation by the AGA in future. The costs arising for the respective business were repeatedly cited here.

The complaints point above all to the fact that immigrants to Austria occasionally did not find the working and living conditions that had been promised them. There is documentation of demands for improvement,¹²¹ strikes,¹²² or the changing of workplaces. To prevent the latter, a decree of the ÖGB and BWK in 1966 resulted in the introduction of the *Ausländer-Arbeitskarte* (Foreigner’s Work Card).¹²³ This noted the workplace and also the “medically certified harmlessness” of the worker. The card served as an ID, which migrants were required to carry with them at all times until the passing of the Foreign Nationals Employment Law in 1975. As a precautionary measure to prevent immigrants’ mobility, some companies held on to their personal documents: “The two Turks, for example, who wanted to leave my company for Germany, waited for two days from morning to evening at the office to effect the release of their papers, although they had been informed through the interpreter that this was pointless,” reported a Lower Austrian construction company in a memorandum to the AGA in 1963.¹²⁴

The desire for total control over the immigrants, as repeatedly demanded or imagined by Austrian companies and authorities, was ultimately not realizable. The economy’s demand for immigrants was too great, as was the competition between Austrian companies, and with companies in other Western European states. Mobility thus constituted a pivotal strategy of resistance for immigrants to defend themselves against working conditions, whether through changing their job, returning to their country of origin, or traveling on to another country that offered more attractive working conditions.

121 For example, the federal police in Innsbruck reported that on June 14, 1966, 36 Yugoslav workers at an Innsbruck construction company “in the period from 7am to 10am refused to work and demanded more pay, better food, and better accommodation.” Grundzahl 221 721-11/66, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien V/5P, Abteilung 12, BmaA.

122 These led in many cases to deportations back to the country of origin. To name one example: according to a report of the District Commission of Feldkirch, three Greek workers received an unlimited exclusion order in the summer of 1962 and were deported to Greece as a result, because they had “incited the other workers [...] employed at the factory to discontent, so that they had to be dismissed by the company.” Bericht der Bezirkshauptmannschaft Feldkirch vom 13.7.1962, Grundzahl 86 003-24/69, AdR, ÖStA.

123 Erlass des Bundesministeriums für soziale Verwaltung betreffend Vereinbarung über die Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte im Jahr 1966 (Kontingent-Vereinbarung 1966), Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW; Weisung an die Landesarbeitsämter. Renée Winter, “Migration kontrollieren?,” in *Gastarbeiteri*, 53-59 (here 54).

124 T 17/1963, MF 885, Archiv WKÖ.

The difficulties in recruitment outlined here—the associated costs, the relatively long waiting periods, as well as the criticism of “mis-recruitments”—led to the recruitment institutions increasingly losing significance for labor migration to Austria in the latter half of the 1960s. Increasing numbers of Austrian employers relied on private mediation of workers from among the circles of acquaintances and relatives of workers already employed in Austria.¹²⁵ The company would often reward this mediation with payment of a “bounty” per worker.¹²⁶ In the following years, the informal forms of migration and recruitment also included the employment of immigrant workers who had entered Austria as tourists (without work visas), known as “tourist employment.” The foundation for this was Austria’s conclusion of visa agreements with Turkey in 1955 and Yugoslavia in 1965.¹²⁷ These enabled Yugoslav and Turkish citizens to enter Austria as tourists with the right of stay (visa-free) for three months. To stay for the purposes of work and for employment in Austria, a permit was applied for after entering the country. “Most employment relationships at the time thus began with a legalization,” according to the migration researcher August Gächter.¹²⁸ How important the so-called tourist employment was to Austrian businesses is also testified to by the fact that in 1968 the employment of “immigrant foreign labor [...] without work visas” was listed as a third form of recruitment in a memorandum of the Economic Chamber (alongside recruitment through the AGA and individual recruitment by companies).¹²⁹

The beginning of the economic crisis in Austria in 1974 resulted in an end to the more or less unhindered immigration of labor migrants who had come “to and fro across the border seasonally and according to the

125 Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 146.

126 Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 173. See also the descriptions of Ružica Gavrić, who was also offered money by her company *Elin* for the private procurement of labor in Yugoslavia. Ružica Gavrić, in discussion with the author, Vienna, Sept. 9, 2015.

127 August Gächter, “Migrationspolitik in Österreich seit 1945,” *Arbeitspapiere Migration und soziale Realität* 12, no. 5 (2008), accessed Nov. 13, 2015, <https://www.zsi.at/attach/p1208vukovic.pdf>.

128 Ibid.

129 Merkblatt über die Anwerbung und Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte 1968, Sektionszahl 1082/68, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW. That same year, the abrogation of the Austrian recruitment organizations was discussed since the Austrian recruitment apparatus had come under fire within the chambers due to its lack of efficiency and the notable costs. This also resulted in the temporary dissolution of the commissions in Belgrade and Istanbul. Schreiben von S. Pflegerl an den Leiter der AGA, P. Binder, vom 18.12.1982 betreffend Liquidierungsvorschlag Anwerbeorganisation, V3-5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Schreiben der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte vom 25.7.1968, Sektionszahl 1082/68, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW.

availability of workplaces.”¹³⁰ The Austrian state reacted with limitations on access by forbidding “tourist employment” and introducing a new Foreign Nationals Employment Law in 1975.¹³¹ According to the migration researcher Bernhard Perchinig, this was a reaction “with clear restrictions to the economic crisis,” involving the intensification of “domestic primacy” in the Austrian labor market.¹³² During the economic crisis from 1974 to 1976, “some 55,000 foreign employees were deprived of their work permits and therefore also their residency permits, and another 33,000 between 1982 and 1984.”¹³³ These restrictive measures, however, did not lead to a reduction in immigration to Austria. Rather, they forced the subsequent immigration of family members, since labor migrants now had to choose between returning and settling.¹³⁴

130 Gächter, “Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 107.

131 August Gächter and research group, “Vom Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz bis Eurodac Abkommen,” in *Gastarbeiteri*, 31-45 (here 37). As early as the beginning of the 1970s, “tourist employment” had already come under fire from both the ÖGB and the Yugoslav state, who saw this as a fundamental breach of the recruitment agreements. This form of recruitment and employment therefore also became a central topic of discussion for the mixed Austrian-Yugoslav commission, which began to meet regularly from 1970 onward.

132 Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 146.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid., as well as Gächter, “Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 107.

“The Other Colleagues”: Labor Migration at the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten from 1962 to 1975

Anne Unterwurzacher¹

In July, 1962, the *Erste Österreichische Glanzstoff Fabrik AG* (First Austrian Synthetic Fiber Factory Inc.) submitted a recruitment order for thirty foreign workers to the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte* (Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor) in Vienna.² This first attempt at recruitment failed, however, due to a lack of suitable accommodation. It took another two years until the company management was able to employ the urgently required workers from Turkey. Aside from these Turkish “guest workers,” the company additionally brought workers from Tunisia to St. Pölten from 1971 onward. In 2008, some four decades later, the company finally closed its doors after a thoroughly checkered business history. In total, 327 people lost their jobs due to the closure. Many of those affected had roots in Turkey or Tunisia, having either immigrated themselves or having grown up in St. Pölten as the progeny of those people recruited from the mid-1960s onward.

The 1961 Raab-Olah Agreement laid the foundation for this recent history of labor migration. The social partners at the time agreed to the determination of sector quotas to be negotiated annually, through which foreign labor could be employed without the legally prescribed screening of individual cases. Austria thus entered the Western European system of recruitment politics relatively late. Austria modeled itself on the Federal Republic of Germany in order to get the intended labor migration toward the country going. Intergovernmental recruitment and social security agreements were concluded with the countries of origin, where appropriate recruitment institutions were then established.³

1 This essay has been translated by Tim Corbett.

2 Microfilm T 232/1963, BUKA – Anwerbeakten der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (BUKA – AGA), Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (hereafter WKÖ).

3 Eveline Wollner, “Auf dem Weg zur sozialpartnerschaftlich regulierten Ausländerbeschäftigung in Österreich: die Reform der Ausländerbeschäftigung und der Anwerbung bis Ende der 1969er Jahre” (diploma thesis, University of Vienna, 1996).

Against their original intentions, some of the men—and also some of the women—who were brought to Austria from the mid-1960s onward ended up settling in the country. Others returned to their countries of origin or tried their luck in other Western European countries. Those who stayed, like the migrants of prior phases of immigration, contributed to the pluralization of Austria. Labor migration to Austria also meant new experiences for the people from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Tunisia; the history of their settling in Austria is characterized by “hope, deprivation, longing, animosities.”⁴

This essay focuses on the early phase of this history of immigration, which is now more than half a century old. On the basis of the concrete example of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten, it demonstrates how the factory management practically implemented state-regulated recruitment, and how this business strategy of employment affected the lived realities of the people. An arc is traced here from the beginning of recruitment in the mid-1960s, to its peak in the early 1970s, and the first major crises in the post-war history of the company beginning in 1975.

This essay proceeds from the premise that the factory constituted a central place in the experience of the recruited workers formative of the lived realities of the immigrants, especially in the beginning. Work permits were originally tied to a specific business, which had to provide customary accommodations, later allotting company-owned apartments. Often, several family members worked in the same business. In the early phase, in any case, working life, private life, and living space were closely connected to each other. The specific challenges that arose from the employment of foreign labor had to be met locally. Businesses thus developed practical solutions that sometimes deviated substantially from political and administrative stipulations. The aim here is to fathom the spheres of action of the various migration actors as far as possible: of the businesses in relation to the political and administrative attempts at regulation on the one hand, and of the immigrants in relation to the given parameters on the other.

This essay mainly draws on the recruitment records of the Federal Economic Chamber and the business records from the archive of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten. As much as possible, the source-based analysis is complemented by the testimony of contemporary witnesses. The subjective experiences of the immigrants have, to date, only been documented through individual narrative interviews, which were conducted

4 Hakan Gürses, “Eine Geschichte zwischen Stille und Getöse,” in *Gastarbeiter: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration*, ed. Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Matzl (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), 24-27 (here 24).

for an exhibition on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the recruitment agreement with Turkey.⁵ The findings presented here are preliminary results of an on-going research project. Therefore, some of the following observations are formulated hypothetically and occasionally require further investigation. As part of a comprehensive research focus on labor migration at the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, however, they offer important indicators for a micro-historical reconstruction of individual patterns and processes of migration of employees recruited in Turkey or Tunisia. In the framework of a research project funded by the state of Lower Austria,⁶ the results presented here are, as of the autumn of 2016, being systematically augmented by a biographical/narrative component of investigation as well as through further archival research.

The first part of this essay presents the historical context of the state-regulated “recruitment of guest workers.” The second section sketches the checkered 104-year history of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten. The third section comprehensively examines the managerial recruitment practice of the factory and discusses this conclusively.

Historical Context: The State-Regulated “Guest Worker System”

Unlike in other Western European countries, labor migration only became a prominent political topic in Austria in the early 1960s. Belated industrialization, continuous economic growth, and the shrinking domestic labor pool⁷ led to an increased call for a liberalization of foreign recruitment. Regulations for the employment of foreigners were extremely restrictive at the time, being based on the German *Verordnung über ausländische Arbeitskräfte* (Act Concerning Foreign Employees) from 1933,

5 The exhibition “Angeworben! Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. Pölten” was displayed from June 13 to September 14, 2014, in the St. Pölten Stadtmuseum. For more detail, see Anne Unterwurzacher and Gertraud Pantucek, “Angeworben! Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. Pölten – Reflexion eines lokalen Erinnerungsprojektes,” *soziales_kapital: wissenschaftliches journal österreichischer fachhochschul-studiengänge soziale arbeit* 15 (2016): 249–259, accessed Oct. 29, 2016, <http://soziales-kapital.at/index.php/sozialeskapital/article/view/432>.

6 The state of Lower Austria funds two research networks in the field of Humanities, Social and Cultural Sciences: one on the topic of migration, the other on the insecurity of nourishment. Both research networks are connected to the *Forschungsnetzwerk Interdisziplinäre Regionalstudien* (Research Network for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies, FIRST), based at the Danube University Krems. FIRST, accessed Dec. 21, 2016, <http://first-research.ac.at/>.

7 See Christoph Reinprecht, *Nach der Gastarbeit: Prekäres Alter in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2006), 9.

which passed into the body of laws of the Second Republic due to the *Rechtsüberleitungsgesetz* (Law for the Transition of Legislation). The complicated process for individual approval legally stipulated a dual responsibility for obtaining a permit. The employer required an employment permit, while the employee required a work permit issued according to the demands of the immigration authorities. The approval of an employment permit was in any case subject to the specific inspection of economic needs and the situation in the labor market. Both permits were limited to one year and tied to a specific workplace. After a ten-year unlimited residence, it was possible to receive a so-called "*Befreiungsschein*," which was valid for two years and allowed for free access to the labor market during this period without being limited to a specific workplace.⁸ The German Act precluded the codetermination of trade unions, leaving the power of decision to the various state labor authorities.⁹

The German Act was, however, not implemented in the Second Republic as had been intended. Equality of codetermination in the process of approval was restored per decree in 1946, with a further decree in 1948 scrapping the work permits and *Befreiungsscheine*.¹⁰ Finally, in 1951, the activities and competences of workers' committees were defined and secured per decree.¹¹ All three decrees were repealed at the end of 1959 by the Constitutional Court, thus re-enacting the German Act Concerning Foreign Employees. This decision of the Constitutional Court raised the pressure to revise the legislation concerning the employment of foreigners in Austria.

What followed was a protracted political tug-of-war. Despite various suggestions, conflicts of interest at first prevented an agreement. A breakthrough only occurred with the 1961 Raab-Olah Agreement; the Chamber of Labor and the Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) agreed to the simplified employment of foreigners, and in turn they were able to institutionalize social partnership.¹² Sector quotas for the individual federal states were

8 Helga Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962 – 1985: Kampf um und gegen die ausländische Arbeitskraft," *Journal für Sozialforschung* 25, no. 2 (1985): 159–198 (here 161).

9 Equally represented committees for foreigners were merely able to lodge complaints against decisions of the state labor authorities. See Wollner, "Auf dem Weg," 28.

10 With the concentration of the process of approval falling on the employer, the foreign workers lost their position as a legal subject, since no legal means were possible against the disallowance of a work permit. The strategy of disempowerment pursued by the Chamber of Labor and the trade unions through the discontinuation of the work permits was legally upheld in the *Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz* (Law for the Employment of Foreigners) of March 20, 1975 (AuslBG 218/1975). See Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik," 185.

11 For more detail, see Wollner, "Auf dem Weg," 27–34.

12 The agreement on quotas was regarded at the time as temporary. However, fifteen years were to pass before the actual revision of the law on the employment of foreigners (AuslBG as per January 1, 1976). See Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik."

determined annually by the social partners, wherein the inspection of the labor market situation was omitted. This agreement provided for a temporary model of employment; the permits were limited to one year and tied to a specific business, with labor intended to rotate according to the Swiss model. Labor representatives were moreover able to ensure that foreign workers had to be employed under equal salary and working conditions. The recruited workers were not allowed to be employed as strikebreakers and, in the event of downsizing, they were to be made redundant before domestic workers (the principle of domestic primacy).¹³ The Raab-Olah Agreement thus created the parameters for the employment of foreigners. The specific institutional implementation of recruitment is examined more thoroughly below in the case study of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik. In significant respects, namely in equal codetermination, time-limited permits, and the principle of domestic primacy, the restrictive migration policy introduced by the *Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz* (Law for the Protection of Domestic Workers) in 1925 was continued in the Second Republic.¹⁴

History of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten

By the time it finally closed in 2008, the factory in St. Pölten could look back on a very colorful 104-year history. The *Erste Österreichische Glanzstoff Fabrik* (EÖG) was founded in 1904 as a subsidiary of the *Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken* (United Synthetic Fiber Factories, VGF) in Wuppertal-Elberfeld in Germany in order to bypass the customs restrictions introduced in 1903 in Austria-Hungary.¹⁵ Johann Urban was the director of the factory, who together with Max Fremery patented a process for the production of synthetic fibers. The conversion in the production of artificial silk through a new process based on viscose led to a significant expansion of the German parent company, above all through takeovers and mergers.

From 1917, during World War I, production in the EÖG was controlled by the army and geared toward the production of cartridge cases for grenade explosives.¹⁶ Following the economic slump after World War I and

¹³ See *ibid.*, 166.

¹⁴ For more details, see Kenneth Horvath, *Die Logik der Entrechtung: Sicherheits- und Nutzendiskurse im österreichischen Migrationsregime* (Vienna: V & R unipress, 2014).

¹⁵ Rudolf Büttner, *St. Pölten als Standort industrieller und großgewerblicher Produktion seit 1850* (Veröffentlichung des Kulturamtes der Stadt St. Pölten, 1972), 40.

¹⁶ "Glanzstoff Austria," Austria-Forum, accessed Oct. 30, 2016, http://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Glanzstoff_Austria.

the concurrent coal crisis, the factory in St. Pölten had to be decommissioned for half a year, with full production rates only being reached again in 1922. The years 1924 to 1928 witnessed an enormous upsurge in the artificial silk industry, with over 3,000 people being employed in St. Pölten in 1928.¹⁷ In 1929, the German corporation merged with the *Algemene Kunstzijde Unie* (General Artificial Silk Union, AKU) in Arnhem in the Netherlands due to financial difficulties. The majority of the shares thus passed over to Dutch control, and yet the EÖG continued to be administered by the German company. The Great Depression hit the EÖG with full force: production ceased completely starting in July 1930 and lasting for eighteen months. Following reorganization, production resumed in 1932 with 800 employees.¹⁸

During World War II, the factory once more became used for the armaments industry. In 1941, the site in St. Pölten passed once more into German hands due to an increase in capital and through the involuntary cession of the AKU shares to the German company.¹⁹ Hundreds of prisoners of war and forced laborers had to perform heavy work in the factory. The Glanzstoff-Fabrik ran two camps, one located directly on the factory grounds, the other outside in a nearby meadow. According to surviving construction plans, the camp located on the factory grounds was designed for 800 people.²⁰ Due to the change in ownership in 1941, the factory was confiscated in 1945 as "German property" by the Soviet occupying forces and run as a business of the USIA (Administration for Soviet Property in Austria).

After the withdrawal of occupying forces, the Austrian government temporarily took over the business before returning it to the Dutch AKU in 1956. Aside from fabrics, the factory began additionally producing technical yarns for the production of car tires in 1957.²¹ Then, in 1969, the AKU was thoroughly reorganized. Unlike the merger in 1929, in which the VGF and AKU remained relatively autonomous, the two companies were now economically and organizationally completely merged.²² The European

17 Büttner, *St. Pölten*, 58-9.

18 Ibid.

19 USACA - German External Assets Branch of the US Allied Commission for Austria» ... General Records » Erste Oesterr Glanzstoff Fabrik-St. Poelten A.G., St. Poelter [sic], Dokumentenportal fold3, accessed May 2, 2016, <https://www.fold3.com/image/271456078/?terms=Glanzstoff>.

20 Magistrat der Stadt St. Pölten, *St. Pölten 1945: Broschüre zur gleichnamigen Ausstellung* (St. Pölten, 2016), 72.

21 Büttner, *St. Pölten*, 103.

22 Christian Marx, "Die Manager und McKinsey: Der Aufstieg externer Beratung und die Vermarktlichung des Unternehmens am Beispiel Glanzstoff," in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom*, ed. Morten Reitmayer, Thomas Schlemmer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014), 66-77.

companies of the corporation were administered under the name *Enka-Glanzstoff N.V.* (Enka Synthetic Fiber Inc.). The new AKU N.V. moreover merged with the Dutch pharmaceutical corporation KZO, and the name was changed to AKZO.N.V. Following the economic crisis, reduced working hours and layoffs were implemented in 1975. The factory was thus able to stabilize itself in the short term; in the mid-term, however, the corporation planned to decommission the factory. After several turbulent years, the factory truly faced the end in late 1982.

A state bailout ensued, with the factory being taken over by the state holding *Gesellschaft zur Beteiligung von Industrieunternehmen* (Company for Equity Investment in Industrial Enterprises) in 1983, reorganized, and privatized again.²³ In 1988, the factory was taken over by the group of companies Lenzing AG. Glanzstoff-Austria AG was once again engulfed in a crisis at the end of 1993, announcing the layoff of its employees in early 1994. This closure was prevented by further state interventions, and the Glanzstoff-Fabrik was taken over by the CAG Holding of the industrialist Cornelius Grupp. Of the 950 employees, 450 were re-hired.²⁴ The production of textile yarns was resumed and the company even invested in a new exhaust system and new spinning machines. In 2008, a serious fire occurred in that exhaust system. This was followed by a tug-of-war over the factory that lasted for several months, in which above all the environmental regulations for a new exhaust system were discussed. In July 2008, the final closure of the factory was announced for the end of the year.

A Factory Seeking Workers

According to the former staff manager, the board of managers expended every effort in the 1960s to find new workers. The company tried to recruit people throughout the entire state of Lower Austria. However, despite payment of travel allowances for workers living far afield, the provision of bus transfers for travel to the factory, and the theoretical possibility of being awarded one of the approximately 300 company apartments, hardly any workers were found. Due to the difficult working conditions, the company did not enjoy the best reputation. The board of managers of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik therefore decided to recruit foreign laborers for the factory work. Research in the surviving documentation shows that the

23 "Glanzstoff Austria," Austria-Forum.

24 "Glanzstadt Geschichte," Die Konerei, accessed Oct. 30, 2016, <http://www.diekonerei.at/de/Geschichte>.

extent of recruitment of labor was considerable: 1,020 personnel records of Turkish workers survive for the period from 1964 to 1994 as well as of 140 Tunisians. The workers were mostly recruited through the official route, through the Federal Economic Chamber.

The Official Route to Recruitment through the Federal Economic Chamber²⁵

The Federal Economic Chamber (BWK) was tasked by the Federal Ministry of Social Administration with the creation of an organization for recruitment. To this end, the BWK founded the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte* (Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor, AGA) in 1961 with its headquarters in Vienna. Specific commissions were established in the countries of recruitment. The first recruitment agreement was already signed in 1962 with Spain. Due to the low level of pay, however, Austria was not an attractive destination for labor migrants from Spain. Instead of Spanish labor, businesses were able, from mid-1962 onward, to recruit people from Turkey and Yugoslavia. Recruitment in these countries was made possible by interim agreements off the record, which were later legitimized through the conclusion of inter-governmental agreements (with Turkey in 1964, and with Yugoslavia in 1966).

The official recruitment procedure is sketched in the following, with the help of documentation from the BWK,²⁶ as it illustrates clearly the logic of economic advantage through which recruitment took place. The primary function of the labor migrant as an "object of labor" prompts a comparison of the recruitment procedure with a trade in goods.²⁷ The official recruitment procedure, which is presented through the case study of Turkey, took place as follows: businesses could place recruitment

25 For a detailed presentation of recruitment politics, see the chapter "Austria Attractive for Guest Workers?": Recruitment of Immigrant Labor in Austria in the 1960s and 1970s" by Vida Bakondy in this volume.

26 For more detail, see Vida Bakondy, "Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer: Eine Analyse von Anwerbeakten der österreichischen Wirtschaftskammer," in *Viel Glück! Migration heute: Wien, Belgrad, Zagreb, Istanbul*, ed. Vida Bakondy et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 68-79.

27 Verena Lorber, "Wir brauchen Arbeitskräfte": Das 'Gastarbeitersystem' in Österreich als spezifische Form transnationaler Arbeitsmigration," in *Migration und Minderheiten in der Demokratie: Politische Grundlagen und soziale Grundlagen von Partizipation*, ed. Philipp Eigenmann, Thomas Geisen, and Tobias Studer (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2016), 221-239 (here 229).

orders with the AGA in Vienna; for every sought worker, a place had to be secured in the framework of the sector quotas determined annually by the social partners; this was confirmed by the state labor authorities through an *Einzelsicherungsbescheinigung* (individual work permit). These individual work permits were submitted to the AGA together with standardized employment contracts including all relevant information about the position, such as the type of work, payment, and information about accommodation.²⁸

The AGA forwarded the recruitment orders to the commission in Istanbul. The recruitment wishes of Austrian businesses were then relayed to the Turkish labor market administration on site, who, in cooperation with local employment agencies, earmarked workers for placement. The lists of earmarked workers were then referred to the foreign agencies, which aside from Austria also included West Germany and France.²⁹ These workers were invited to audition at the various commissions, which conducted medical examinations as well as, if the businesses so wished, technical examinations. In order to receive an immigration visa, the workers had to first present a so-called *Infektionsfreiheitsschein* (Certificate of Freedom from Infection) issued after the medical examination, as well as a criminal record certificate from the police confirming their good conduct. The commission procured these visas and then organized travel to Austria.

The businesses had to pay a recruitment fee for each worker to cover the costs of medical examination, travel, provisions, visa fees, as well as a contribution to a fund for deportations. In the 1960s, this recruitment fee consisted in the case of Turkey of 900 Schilling per worker, which was raised to 1,200 Schilling in the 1970s. If a recruited worker breached their contract within the first week, the recruitment was regarded as a *Fehlanwerbung* (literally: mis-recruitment) and the AGA refunded the recruitment fee.

Aside from this official route through the recruitment commission in Istanbul, there were two further routes to immigration, one being individual recruitment by businesses and the other being “tourist employment,” which became increasingly common over time. In individual recruitments, workers immigrated legally, mostly through mediation of relatives or acquaintances already working in the business, and with the permission of the foreign labor market authorities or of Austrian agencies (with valid immigration,

28 The employment contracts were issued in German as well as the language of the respective country.

29 See Siegfried Pflegerl, “50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen Türkei – Österreich: Ein korrekatives Narrativ,” unpublished report, Vienna 2014, accessed Nov. 3, 2016, 36, or-om.org/50JAAT.pdf.

residence, and work permits).³⁰ In the second case, people came to Austria from Turkey, and even more so from Yugoslavia, without a visa as "tourists" and searched for work on location.³¹ The necessary work permits were procured by the employers after the fact. Although tourist employment was politically regarded as controversial, it was handled liberally. In this context, it is interesting that the state employment agencies of Vienna and Lower Austria installed a guest worker support service at the Südbahnhof in Vienna in the summer of 1967 to place "tourists" with companies. This service was used especially by immigrants from Yugoslavia.³²

Turks instead of Spaniards?

Instead of the Spaniards envisaged by the company management in 1962, Turks were eventually recruited for the factory. It would have also been possible for the management at the time to acquire people from Yugoslavia. The management decided explicitly in favor of Turkey as a country of recruitment in 1964, however, because it did not want to bring people from a Communist country into the factory, considering that the workers' committee was already dominated by Communists. Such reservations toward Yugoslavs, who were socialized under Communism and were therefore allegedly more interested in employee organizations, were widespread at the time. In Vorarlberg, for example, some companies decided to recruit exclusively Turkish labor.³³

At the height of guest worker immigration, Turks were described lackadaisically in the milieu of the social partnership as the "more low maintenance" immigrants. For example, a study published by the social partners in 1973 claimed, "this moreover complements the general observation that Turks in many respects seem to adapt easier to the Austrian way of life. It is to their advantage that they tend more toward subordination, are more immune to excessive alcohol consumption, and due to their custom of ritual washing find it easier to achieve a high level of personal hygiene."³⁴

30 Matuschek, "Ausländerpolitik," 172.

31 Visa exemption for Turkish nationals had already been introduced in 1955, for Yugoslav nationals in 1965. See Pflegerl, "50 Jahre," 23.

32 Landesarbeitsamt Niederösterreich, *Jahresbericht 1967* (Vienna, 1968), 33.

33 Erika Thurner, *Der "Goldene Westen"? Arbeitszuwanderung nach Vorarlberg seit 1945* (Bregenz: Vorarlberger Autoren Gesellschaft, 1997), 98.

34 Arbeitskreis für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien, ed., *Gastarbeiter: wirtschaftliche und soziale Herausforderung* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1973), 56.

Such blatant (from today's perspective) stereotypes often referred to the ostensible obedience to authority of the Turks.³⁵ How far removed these generalizations were from reality is proven by my research into the Glanzstoff-Fabrik. In the early phase, the recruited Turks protested against the conditions on site; for example, a number of Turks who had according to their contracts been recruited for work in a department called *Druckwäsche* (literally: pressure washer) refused in August 1964 to work in the spinning mill of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, since working in this department was perceived as more hazardous to one's health.³⁶ In the beginning, the BWK and the Turkish embassy thus had to intervene numerous times.

Generally, however, the potential for protest was extremely limited, given the legal situation of the "guest workers"; due to their work permits, foreign workers were bound to a specific company. The permits, moreover, were only temporary. This became a means for the employer to exert pressure to prevent a change of workplace, even under bad conditions or discrimination.³⁷ Changing the workplace at that time constituted a breach of contract. The files of the Economic Chamber include many complaints about workers who had breached their contracts. Companies repeatedly sought compensation or sanctions in such cases, such as the reimbursement of the recruitment fee from the AGA or the new employer, or in other cases demanding the prohibition of further placement or even deportation of the person who breached their contract.³⁸

Difficulties Recruiting

It can generally be surmised from the files of the BWK that recruitment was beset by difficulties in its early stages. With the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, too, recruitment did not go off without a hitch. The company always attached a list to its official recruitment orders requesting that attention be paid during the examinations in Istanbul to certain injuries and illnesses that precluded working in a chemical factory. Nevertheless, the very first "Turk

35 See Elisabeth Röhrlich and Stefanie Mayer, "Konstruktionen des Anderen: Historische und kulturelle Bezüge in österreichischen Mediendebatten über den EU-Beitritt der Türkei," *Endbericht für den Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichischen Nationalbank* (Demokratiezentrum Vienna, 2009), 109-110.

36 Microfilm 0887, T232, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

37 See Sylvia Hahn and Georg Stöger, *50 Jahre österreichisch-türkisches Anwerbeabkommen*, research report (University of Salzburg, 2014), 26.

38 For an example of a breach of contract resulting in deportation, see the following recruitment order: Microfilm 0889, T361, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ. Further specific example from the recruitment files can be found in Bakondy, "Bitte um," 71-77.

transport" (as it was called in contemporary parlance) brought two Turks to the company whose medical condition did not permit them to work in the chemical factory. Presumably due to their special health demands, the factory management decided to travel to Turkey themselves in order to have workers examined by the company doctor on site. The company compiled lists of those workers they had preselected whom they then called upon as needed. The actual recruitment officially took place through the recruitment commission in the framework of the usual procedure, meaning that the labor migrants had to undergo another medical examination.

Several such trips are documented in the recruitment files, with recruitment initially taking place in western Turkey. Then, in 1968, eastern Turkey became a recruiting site for Glanzstoff. There was a specific plan to recruit in Tunceli, as a number of employees working at the company had come from this region and, according to statements of former employees, the company was very satisfied with the "work ethic" of these people. Glanzstoff was warned in advance by the commission that difficulties could arise in this region—in contrast to western Turkey—if the local employment agency were to invite one hundred workers, of whom only thirty would be chosen by the company since, in the opinion of the employment agency in Istanbul, "the population of this region is still rather uncultured."³⁹ As a compromise, it was suggested to invite only seventy individuals and to move the selection to the employment agency in Elazığ, located some 190 kilometers away and reachable from Istanbul by plane.

Glanzstoff agreed to this proposal, but nevertheless sent a list to the employment agency in Tunceli with the names of 22 relatives and acquaintances of workers already employed by the company. The employment agency in Tunceli treated this list of names with suspicion and reported this process to the general directorate of the labor market administration in Ankara. They insisted in turn that a placement of the named workers would only be possible upon request to the general directorate.⁴⁰ This distrust on the part of the Turkish government regarding recruitment in Tunceli had a historical background: Tunceli in eastern Anatolia—previously known as Dersim—was the site of a massacre by the Turkish army in 1937/38 against the local Alevi population.⁴¹ Thousands of people were murdered

39 Microfilm 0897, T34, 1968, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

40 Ibid.

41 The local population define themselves predominantly as Kurds; many of them speak the Zaza language. Martin van Bruinessen, "The Ethnic Identity of the Kurds in Turkey," in *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, ed. Peter Alford Andrews (Wiesbaden, 2002), 613–621 (here 613–14), accessed Nov. 5, 2016, http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_Ethnic_identity_Kurds.pdf.

or forcibly resettled. The exact scale of the massacre is unknown to this day. The area was a restricted zone until 1948, and is today an occupied territory with numerous military checkpoints.⁴²

Returning to the events of 1968: since the commission in Istanbul was unable to detach an interpreter for the company visit in Elazığ, the company representatives took a worker from Tunceli already employed at Glanzstoff along to Elazığ for the selection. Two Turkish colleagues denounced him to the Turkish Ministry of Labor because he would allegedly accept a placement percentage from every worker from Tunceli who was accepted. This claim, however, quickly proved to be a fabrication and the difficulties could be rectified together with the commission. The emigration of the workers from Tunceli was thereafter not blocked by the general directorate. Despite these difficulties, the company traveled to Elazığ for a second time that year to select labor.⁴³ In May 1969, the company delegation visited Erzincan in eastern Turkey, and in September of the same year the company selected labor in Çankırı and further north in Kastamonu.

If Glanzstoff allowed too much time to elapse before calling up the “preselected” workers, they were sometimes placed in other countries. This happened in 1969, when the men called up by Glanzstoff in Erzincan were placed in West Germany.⁴⁴ The workers preselected in Kastamonu in September 1969 were sent to the Netherlands that December. The local employment agency justified this with the five-year waiting period of these workers, who had already been recruited by the employment agency in 1964, and by the uncertain dismissals by the Glanzstoff-Fabrik.⁴⁵ The fact that there were very long waiting periods for work placement abroad also cast a different light on the rivalries that emerged within Glanzstoff as a result of the managerial practice of recruiting in specific parts of the country. For Turks who did not have personal relations to people already employed in the countries of recruitment, the possibility of recruitment by name proved to be disadvantageous and led to waiting periods, sometimes lasting years. For this reason, the Turkish labor market administration forbade the recruitment by name of male workers altogether in 1970; women, however, could still be recruited personally to counter the emergence of a “surplus of women.”⁴⁶ The

42 Frank Nordhausen, “Das Trauma der Aleviten: eine Reise nach Dersim,” *Gruß vom Bosphorus* (blog), Aug. 26, 2013, accessed Nov. 5, 2016, <http://gruss-vom-bosporus.berliner-zeitung.de/2013/08/26/das-trauma-der-aleviten-eine-reise-nach-dersim/>.

43 Microfilm 0897, T80, 1968, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

44 Microfilm 0898, T61, 1969, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

45 Microfilm 0898, T80, 1969, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

46 Eveline Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei zur Regulierung der Arbeitsmigration während der 1960er Jahre,” in *Viel Glück!*, ed. Bakondy, 80–87 (here 84).

Glanzstoff-Fabrik, however, did not recruit any women in the period before 1975; women would only be employed in the factory from the mid-1980s onward following subsequent immigration of family members.

The company's recruitment practice led through the subsequent process of settling in the area around the factory to a socially and politically nuanced self-organization: There are two Sunni mosque associations, an Alevi Cem association, as well as secular associations, such as an association for Austrian-Turkish friendship.

Not Only Unskilled Labor?

Unfortunately, the recruitment documentation from Turkey only survives from the period up to 1969, so later recruitment practices of the company cannot be examined directly. Surviving protocols of the recruitment commission, however, suggest that Glanzstoff also traveled to Turkey in the 1970s. Additional documentation of the company itself finally reveals surprising findings for the period after 1970. For example, internal company memoranda demonstrate that Turkish skilled laborers were also being employed in the second half of 1970. How many individuals were involved has not yet been ascertained; this would require a more precise examination of personnel files and further research. The documentation does demonstrate, however, that Turkish skilled laborers were offered German language courses every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday from 4:15pm to 6:15pm.⁴⁷ Generally, however, the employment of skilled laborers did not go off without a hitch, with reports of lacking qualifications and language problems. One of the company protocols, for example, states: "It is also difficult to demand of linguistically inexperienced people that they work according to drawings."⁴⁸ Skilled laborers who did not meet the qualifications may therefore have subsequently been employed in production as unskilled laborers.⁴⁹ For all of these reasons, the recruitment of skilled laborers may only have taken place for a limited time.

In any case, the vast majority of Turkish recruits were only employed for unskilled work. A part of the "guest workers" were housed in wooden

47 Protokoll Nr. 20/70 der Personalbesprechung am 07.10.1970, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

48 Protokoll Nr. 13/71 der Personalbesprechung am 13.05.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

49 At least there are suggestions to this effect in one of the meeting protocols: see Protokoll Nr. 15/71 der Personalbesprechung am 17.06.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

barracks on the factory grounds.⁵⁰ Others lived beyond the factory grounds in communal accommodation, which the factory management had acquired from a nearby company after it had moved away. According to the salary scale appended to the recruitment orders, the company granted each worker at the factory a monthly housing allowance of 30 Schilling. However, the “other colleagues,” as the immigrants were once called in the company newspaper *Reyon-Post*,⁵¹ had exactly this sum deducted from their salaries in exchange for the communal accommodation.⁵² The wooden barracks on the factory grounds had rooms shared by four people each, with one communal kitchen for dozens of workers. The crowded and paltry living conditions, the unaccustomed work (above all the shift work), the new environment, and the separation from home weighed on the men in the beginning. Many of them therefore left the factory after short periods, either returning home or searching for work in other Western European countries, especially in West Germany.

The fluctuation of staff at the factory was generally very high. According to an internal company investigation, 177 of 257 Turks employed at the factory left again within a year. At 68.9%, the fluctuation rate of the foreign workforce was double that of the domestic workforce, at 33.5%.⁵³ The reasons for this fluctuation varied. While more than half of the “guest workers” claimed to leave due to better salary and working conditions in Western Europe, and around a quarter returned to Turkey for familial or personal reasons, the Austrian workforce by and large rejected the working conditions at the factory.⁵⁴

Generally, it can be assumed that social provisions played an important part in the phase of active recruitment in order to achieve a stronger commitment from the recruited workers. For example, in late 1965, the factory management requested a cook from Turkey since the Turkish workforce did not take to the conventional canteen food.⁵⁵ However, according to the former staff cook, the Turks—who were recruited from completely different parts of the country—could not agree on a common menu. The company’s offer to employ a Turkish cook could therefore not be realized in practice.

50 According to a former personnel manager, these wooden barracks were erected specifically for the guest workers. What remains unknown is whether the barracks for forced laborers from World War II were also used.

51 *Reyon-Post*, Weihnachten 1971, Nr. 4, 11–12.

52 See for example Microfilm 0888, T304, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

53 Untersuchung über die Fluktuation im Zeitraum vom 1.7.1970 – 30.6.1971. This investigation was appended to a letter to the company headquarters in Arnhem from October 21, 1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

54 *Ibid.*

55 Microfilm 0891, T579, 1965, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.

In early 1970, the company erected a new brick-built communal accommodation in place of the old wooden barracks. On the basis of the internal investigation mentioned above, the company generally regarded the provision of cheap apartments as the best means to reduce fluctuation. The labor migrants were not excluded from such considerations, as a memo to the company headquarters shows: "The fluctuation of the guest workers could also be combated in this manner, since many of them are prepared to bring their families to Austria and would then of course stay with the company that provides them with cheap accommodation."⁵⁶ The company was thus considering the subsequent immigration of family members at a time when official Austrian polity was still clinging to the idea of labor rotation. Political regulations and managerial practice began thereafter to diverge at times. But from the 1970s onward, family immigration did increasingly take place. The difficulties of finding a place to live on the open housing market became a central theme in the interviews to date.

The Tunisians Arrive

When the first Turkish Glanzstoff workers began to leave the barracks, the company brought a second group of immigrants to the factory; about 70 people from Tunisia were more or less permanently employed at Glanzstoff. What moved the company to this decision is the subject of differing opinions. One contemporary witness from Turkey told me about a visit of the former Turkish Labor Minister to the factory in St. Pölten. He had been very unsatisfied with the salary and living conditions on site. According to the testimony of this contemporary witness, no more Turks were to be placed in this factory under those conditions. The files of the BWK document both the visit of the Turkish Labor Minister to the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in August 1970 as well as his dissatisfaction with the salary conditions, both in the chemical industry and in the textile industry.⁵⁷ According to surviving documentation, the Glanzstoff-Fabrik continued to recruit people from Turkey even after the visit of the Labor Minister, with one hundred Turks arriving at the factory alone in the period from January to April

56 Letter to the company headquarters in Arnhem from October 21, 1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

57 Report from August 24, 1970, about the visit to Austria of the Turkish Minister of Labor: Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul V, Vertraulich (V 2), WKÖ. Aside from the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, the Turkish Minister of Labor also visited another textile factory in Lower Austria.

1971.⁵⁸ The official Turkish visit did not, in any case, result in a moratorium on recruitment to the factory. The incident could rather be regarded as a passing disgruntlement on the part of the Turkish authorities. It is possible that the above-mentioned recruitment of skilled laborers in the second half of 1970 was a means to placate the Turkish authorities.

Company records paint a different picture to that of the contemporary witness regarding the recruitment of Tunisians. Apparently, problems with the Turkish workers were accumulating at the time, including increasing threats to strike on the part of the Turkish workforce, which the company blamed on the Communist workers' committee. The later personnel manager assumed that the company management did not want to be solely dependent on one country in its recruitment efforts. Moreover, an Egyptian, whom the company could use as an interpreter, was working at the factory at the time. This may have moved the company to travel to Tunisia for recruitment purposes.

This was made possible by a trial quota agreed with Tunisia in November 1970. Documentation of the BWK demonstrates that ultimately only a small part of the agreed quota with Tunisia was utilized, one reason being the exceedingly long processing time of the orders on the part of the Tunisian authorities.⁵⁹ Although the Tunisian government had strongly backed the conclusion of an official recruitment agreement, this never came to pass. Security and special branch considerations from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, as well as reservations about Tunisians (such as weak bodily constitutions, high rates of illiteracy, deficient work ethic and concomitantly high demands for remuneration, and problems in adaptation and comprehension) on the part of the Federal Ministry for Social Administration effectively prevented such an agreement.⁶⁰

A preliminary, superficial examination of the personnel files shows that the familial patterns of the Tunisian workers at Glanzstoff may have been thoroughly different from the Turkish immigrants. The bulk of the recruited Turks had, after the initial separation, gradually brought women and children to the country or started new families on site, although some of them left their children, especially the older ones, permanently with relatives in Turkey. The Tunisians, by contrast, often sent their children back

58 Protokoll Nr. 5/71 der Personalbesprechung am 3.3.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.

59 Tätigkeitsbericht 1973 als Vorlage für die Sitzung des Ausschusses der AGA am 21.02.1974, 4-5. Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul V, Vertraulich (V 2), WKÖ.

60 BM für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Sektion IV, 1972, Grundzahl 31.564, Geschäftszeichen Tunesien I/8P, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien/Archiv der Republik.

to Tunisia for schooling. This was probably due to various reasons about which I can only speculate at this point. The school system in Tunisia is generally well regarded. As a former colony of France, French continues to be an important language in Tunisia.⁶¹ The recruited Tunisians possibly did not see a possibility for their children to learn sufficient French in Austria. The heavy fragmentation of families may also have been connected to the time of their arrival: the Tunisians arrived at a time when only a few years later—for the first time in 1975—economic crises began to accumulate in the company. The possibility of a permanent stay in Austria may therefore have seemed slim.

Foreign Labor as an Economic Shock Absorber and the Question of Company Interests

What can generally not be overlooked is the fact that the employment of foreigners, despite the interests of the company in continuous employment, also and at all times performed the function of an economic shock absorber. The trade unions had ensured from the outset that, in the event of a crisis, foreign labor was to be made redundant before domestic labor. The *Betriebsratsgesetz* (Workers' Committee Law) of 1947 had only granted foreign workers passive electoral rights, thus effectively preventing any active union work by labor migrants on the company level.⁶² This also casts some light on the difficult chapter of trade unions and labor migration. The position of the ÖGB has already been illuminated rudimentarily.⁶³ What has hardly been considered in research to date is the question of how specific interests were implemented in the companies.

61 See, for example, Claudia Nowotny "Die Bedeutung des Nationenkonzepts im kolonialen und postkolonialen Kontext: Eine Analyse an Hand des ehemaligen französischen Protektorats Tunesien" (PhD thesis, University of Vienna, 2008), 256-263.

62 See Eugène Richard Sensenig-Dabbous, *Von Metternich bis EU-Beitritt: Reichsfremde, Staatsfremde und Drittstaaten. Immigration und Einwanderungspolitik in Österreich*, Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institut für Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte (Salzburg, 1998), accessed Nov. 6, 2016, http://www.ndu.edu.lb/lerc/publications/Von_Metternich_bis_EU_Beitritt.pdf. Foreign workers have only been permitted to run as worker representatives since 2006.

63 See Sensenig-Dabbous, "Von Metternich"; August Gächter, "Austria: Protecting Indigenous Workers from Immigrants," in *Trade Unions, Immigration, and Immigrants in Europe, 1960-1993: A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries*, ed. Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad (New York: Bergahn, 2001), 65-89. Jan Kreisky, "Migration und Gewerkschaft: Skizze einer widerspruchsvollen und wechselhaften Geschichte," in *Wissenschaft über Gewerkschaft: Analysen und Perspektiven*, ed. Brigitte Pellar (Vienna: ÖGB Verlag, 2013), 155-187.

The workers' committee of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik was dominated until the early 1980s by Communists.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the interviews conducted to date hardly contain any statements regarding the specific configuration of the representation of company interests of the "other colleagues." What is noteworthy, however, or at least deserving of analytical explanation, is the absence of the "guest worker" theme in the company newspaper *Neue Glanzstoffstimme* published by the Communist faction of the workers' committee. In the period from 1962 to 1974, the topic of "guest workers" was only directly addressed four times, in each case negatively. Three of the four articles raised the prospect of the corruptibility of the "guest workers," who were accused of accepting money or non-cash benefits like televisions from the Socialist faction of the workers' committee.⁶⁵

From 1975 onward, economic crises began to beset the Glanzstoff-Fabrik. In 1975, reduced working hours were implemented for four months and retraining measures introduced. Instead of the 35 planned dismissals of unskilled female employees, the workers' committee managed to have 128 women go on leave on rotation for six weeks, during which they received unemployment benefits. The crisis was especially detrimental to the foreign workers; more than half of the labor migrants were forced to spend several months of unpaid leave in their country of origin, with a part of them, forty women according to official documentation, being made redundant after this unpaid leave. The Communist workers' committee newspaper discussed these measures in the crisis-ridden year of 1975.⁶⁶ In this context, an article from 1977 is revealing. On the occasion of the workers' committee elections, the victories of the Leftist Bloc of the trade union in the latest period were enumerated: "Due to your support, we have managed to maintain the workplaces of all Austrian workers despite the opposing wishes of the company."⁶⁷ The dismissal of the labor migrants was not mentioned at all in the article. The Communist workers' committee of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik thus did not, at least in its official self-representation, question the politically motivated *Inländerprimat* (principle of domestic primacy) of the ÖGB. Whatever (alternative) forms of articulating their interests were developed by the immigrants is not immediately clear from

64 The faction *Gewerkschaftliche Einheit* (Unionist Unity, GE) in the ÖGB was founded by the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) in 1952; due to internal disputes and schisms the GE was renamed *Gewerkschaftlicher Linksbloc* (Unionist Leftist Bloc) in 1974. See Anton Pelinka, *Gewerkschaften im Parteienstaat: Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen und dem Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbund* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 101.

65 *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 2 (1964), 2-3. *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 6 (1968), unpaginated. *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 3 (1974), 5. *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 3 (1974), 6.

66 *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 3 (1975), 1-2.

67 *Neue Glanzstoffstimme*, no. 4 (1974), 1.

the archival materials or prior research; this requires deeper research and an augmented methodology.

Summary and Outlook

It can be concluded that neither the company employment policies toward labor migrants nor their individual methods of dealing with the concrete conditions on site can be neatly subordinated into traditional models of interpretation of migration history, which are predicated on clearly distinguishable and successive phases of migration.⁶⁸ It is commonly postulated that the first phase of "guest work," which was characterized by thoroughly temporary, circular patterns, was followed by a phase of permanent settlement including the subsequent immigration of family members, beginning in the mid-1970s.⁶⁹ These procedural models orient themselves predominantly toward migration policy regulations and/or rely on national averages in their description of migrant living conditions.

Even a cursory exploration of the Glanzstoff archive reveals a temporal coexistence of various patterns of migration: some stayed for a shorter period than agreed, some stayed longer than originally anticipated; some worked repeatedly on and off at the factory, while their colleagues worked at the factory permanently from the outset, sometimes even over successive generations. Others, by contrast, emigrated after a short stay in St. Pölten, above all to West Germany, where they could earn a higher salary and had to accept less cumbersome working conditions. Not all labor migrants silently quit the factory on the lookout for better conditions; various forms of protest have also been documented. The personnel files of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik reveal, in any case, a wide spectrum of individual forms of action. A concentration on one local employer allows for the process of migration to be described more densely and precisely than is usually the case. Migration thus becomes visible in various facets, between coming, staying, returning, or moving on.

The legal regulation of domestic primacy asserted by the trade unions and the Chamber of Labor, and the limited potential for participation in

68 On Germany, see Barbara Sonnenberger, *Nationale Migrationspolitik und regionale Erfahrung: Die Anfänge der Arbeitsmigration in Südbessen 1955-1967* (Darmstadt: Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, 2003).

69 See for example Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, "Österreich – Einwanderungsland wider Willen," in *Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklungen, aktuelle Trends und politische Reaktionen*, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1969), 209-222.

company management, in any case greatly limited the room for maneuvering of the recruited workers. Despite these discriminatory working and living conditions, the immigrants who stayed in St. Pölten appropriated their new environment over time. This active process of appropriation has hardly been investigated in contemporary historical research to date. For future research, it therefore seems relevant in this context to adopt an approach which goes beyond a merely functionalist understanding, according to which migration history is the story of a successful or failed adaptation (keyword “integration”) in the context of arrival. Despite existing asymmetries of power, the immigrants made use “actively of social norms, exploited existing rooms for maneuvering or created new ones, and through exchange, appropriation, subversion, refusal, or negotiation changed not only their own lives, but also the constitution of those societies which— through migration and the transfer of knowledge, money, and goods—they connected and interwove with each other.”⁷⁰

70 Sarah Vanessa Losego, *Fern von Afrika: Die Geschichte der nordafrikanischen “Gastarbeiter” im französischen Industrieviertel von Longwy (1945 – 1990)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), 22.

To Come into Focus

Female “Guest Workers” from Former Yugoslavia in Austria (1960-1980)

Verena Lorber

This article is concerned with the labor migration of women to Austria in the 1960s and 1970s. First, an overview of the research development in the area of gender and migration will be given. Additionally, the picture of the male labor migrant, which has long dominated historical migration research, will be called into question. There will also be a focus on the employment situation of female migrant workers in Austria and Styria, as well as the recruitment of women. Finally, the living worlds of those women from Yugoslavia, who decided to take up work in Styria from the time period of 1967-1976, will become the main point of interest. The intention here is to bring their work biographies and experiences to light.

Research on Gender and Migration¹

For a long time, gender specific aspects of migration and integration have not been taken into account in historical migration research. The male migration pioneer was considered to be the object of investigation relevant to research. It was assumed that migration movements were primarily economically motivated, and that for this reason it was almost without exception men who migrated for the purpose of work. A reason for the non-observance of female mobility can be found in the reproduction of prevailing gender coding since the Enlightenment. Traditional gender dichotomies and stereotypes and male thought patterns were hardly challenged in migration research, and were perpetuated until late into the twentieth century.²

1 Verena Lorber, *Angeworben: GastarbeiterInnen in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren*, Transkulturelle Perspektiven 14 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016), 39-45.

2 Sylvia Hahn, *Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht: Arbeitsmigration in Mitteleuropa vom 17. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Transkulturelle Perspektiven 5 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2008), 85-94; Sylvia Hahn, “Migration, Geschlecht und Familieneinkommen (18.-20. Jahrhundert),” in *Migration und Geschlechterverhältnisse: Kann die Migrantin sprechen?*, ed. Eva Hausbacher et al. (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 83-102 (here 83).

Between the sexes there was, therefore, a clear division of duty and labor. The man was responsible for earnings outside of the home, while the woman took care of the household and looked after the children. The allocation of the different social areas reflected the evolving bourgeois family ideology of the eighteenth century. This required a clear division of roles between the sexes, a factor that also mattered in the case of migration. According to this worldview, the man was viewed as the family's breadwinner, and he went abroad to earn money. In the migration process, women were commonly viewed as "wives, as dependent persons, who were often forced to follow, through the decision of the head of the household."³ They were not perceived as active participants with their own migration biographies. Research ascribed women a passive role in the migration process and they were primarily addressed in the context of going along with their husbands for family reasons.⁴

The first scholar to take into consideration female migration was the British statistician and geographer Ernest Ravenstein in his analysis of the population census of Great Britain from the years 1871 and 1881. In the resulting study, "Laws of Migration" (1885), he came to the conclusion that, while quantitatively women were involved in large numbers in the migration processes of the nineteenth century, their mobility was primarily limited to short distances. On the other hand, men made up the majority of those involved in long distance migration. The fact that women moved in with their husbands after marriage, and thus made up the majority of short distant migrants, was not taken into consideration.⁵

Ravenstein was one of the first in a long line of researchers who coined the image of the male long distance migrant, and accorded to men the function of migration decision-making. This is a perception that consequently dominated migration research: "This also made the long-distance male migrant most deserving of study; female migrants seemed interesting only when they outnumbered males or when they—like males—sought wage-earning work as unencumbered persons without families."⁶

Concerning the Habsburg Monarchy, Gustav Adolf Schimmer in 1872 came to the conclusion that the "male sex, according to his nature, is

3 Heberle Rudolf, "Zur Typologie der Wanderungen," in *Bevölkerungsgeschichte*, ed. Wolfgang Köllmann, Peter Marschalck (Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1972), 69-75 (here 72).

4 Hahn, *Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht*, 85-94; Hahn, "Migration, Geschlecht und Familieneinkommen (18.-20. Jahrhundert)," 83.

5 Katharine M. Donato and Donna Gabaccia, *Gender and International Migration: From the Slavery Era to the Global Age* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2015), 22-24.

6 *Ibid.*, 24.

far more suited to leaving his home country to look for work elsewhere.”⁷ When considering the statistical survey, it becomes clear that the proportional difference between migrating men and women is only very small. Numerous studies have shown that women were just as mobile as men.⁸ In her study “Moving Europeans,” Leslie Page Moch made reference to the fact that women were always a part of the migration movement and, for example, made up nearly half of the Irish and Jewish migrants to the USA from 1820 to 1928.⁹

However, in spite of the social history established in the 1970s and 1980s and the accompanying exploration of everyday life resulting from that, this picture hardly changed at all. The man as the main actor in migration flows remained unchallenged. In the Anglo-American and European area, an androcentric research perspective dominated.¹⁰ In this way, the image of the multiply oppressed woman often came into being in historical migration research. This perception took as its basis the idea that women from traditional societies migrated into the modern and had done no work outside of the home before their migration. In this context, they were shown to be victims who were forced to migrate due to tragic circumstances. Other reasons for migration, such as an unhappy marriage, illegitimate children, the desire for self-development, the aim of earning money independently, love, or the consequences of a divorce, were not taken into account. Thereby a form of threefold oppression was constantly attributed to female migrants: as a woman, a female worker, and a female migrant. In migration discourse, therefore, a stereotyped picture of the oppressed woman and the image of the female migrant as victim were the springboard for numerous investigations.¹¹

In time, it was possible to dismantle this stereotyping and take a deeper look in the migration processes with the help of detailed regional research and biographical interviews. This led to a wide-ranging understanding of migration flows, and also to the realization that this is by no means a mono-causal, linear, entirely economic process. It was the aim to include women as active participants in the analysis

7 Hahn, *Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht*, 86.

8 Ibid., 85–87.

9 Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).

10 Hahn, *Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht*, 90–94.

11 Christine Huth-Hildebrandt, *Das Bild von der Migrantin: Auf Spurensuche eines Konstrukts* (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2002), 76–83; Sylvia Hahn, “Wie Frauen in der Migrationsforschung verloren gingen,” in *Internationale Migration: Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?*, Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christof Parnreiter, and Irene Stacher (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 77–97, 89–90.

and to integrate gender as an analytical category in historical migration research.¹²

Women and gender research has, since the 1970s, delivered important impulses for the exploration of the female aspect of migration.¹³ Initially, it concerned showing the participation of women in migration flows and recording female migration patterns. Subsequently, the specific situation of the migration experience and the role of women in a migration context moved to the center of research interest. This research approach has been the most widespread until today. Since the 1980s, the power and gender relations that arise from migration have been increasingly focused on in research work. Along with the establishment of gender as a category of analysis,¹⁴ questions about the construction of masculinity and femininity, the influence of migration experience on relations between the sexes, as well as the power differences between migrant and non-migrant women have been discussed.¹⁵

Current research is additionally concerned with looking for new definitions of the category of ethnicity in terms of social positioning and characteristics of social differences. Here, gender is perceived as a constitutive element within migration processes: "This stage of gender and migration research has produced numerous and complex understandings

12 See: Marlou Schrover and Deirdre M. Moloney, "Introduction: Making a Difference," in *Gender, Migration and Categorisation: Making Distinctions between Migrants in Western Countries 1945-2010*, ed. Marlou Schrover and Deirdre M. Moloney (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 7-55.

13 The studies exist primarily in the institutionally embedded immigration history of the United States of America. Most of the research concentrates on white middle class women, although in the USA further scientifically critical forms of research such as Queer Studies, Black Studies, and Critical Whiteness Studies or Postcolonial Studies have been established. These studies point out that life circumstances are not only to be captured through the category of gender and demand the consideration of further factors such as race, class, sexuality, level of education or religion. A new research perspective offers, in this case, the intersectional approach, which investigates the interactions and overlaps between differentiating categories of gender, class, race and sexuality, through which patterns of discrimination and privilege can be revealed.

14 At the current state, gender is conceptualized as a fluid, multi-level set of practices embedded in social relations and shaped by race/ethnicity, class, sexuality and nationality. Stephannie J. Nawyn, "Gender and Migration: Integrating Feminist Theory into Migration Studies," *Sociology Compass* 4, no. 9 (2010): 749-765 (here 749). See also Donna Gabaccia and Mary Jo Maynes, "Introduction: Gender History across Epistemologies," *Gender & History* 24, no. 3 (2012): 521-523; Prodolliet Simone, "Spezifisch weiblich: Geschlecht und Migration," *Zeitschrift für Frauenforschung* 17, no. 1+2 (1999): 26-42 (here 28-29).

15 This change from studying women to gender research was clearly expressed in the 1984 special issue of *International Migration Review*. "Morokvasic connects the decision to migrate and the postmigration experience with gendered system of inequality in households, labor markets and cultures." Nawyn, "Gender and Migration," 750.

of how gendered institutions and gender relations are reconstituted and transformed following migration through interactions of micro- and macro-level processes.¹⁶ Apart from this, interdisciplinary discussions have resulted in migration researchers understanding gender¹⁷ “as a structure that shapes power relations in families, communities and whole societies”¹⁸ These different basic directions exist in feminist migration research up to the present day.¹⁹

The focus on women in the migration process involves an examination of their life situations and experiences in a multi-dimensional and overlapping frame reference of sex, ethnicity, and social origin. In this way, the heterogeneity of female migrants and their family environments, the diversity of their ways and strategies of living, and their capacity to act, which they developed during the migration process, become visible. Showing these factors at play is the intention of this study.

Research has repeatedly shown that women, with their social and family networks, their work and their income, are responsible for the survival of their families in both their countries of origin and also in their countries of destination.²⁰ The focus in research work is also increasingly being placed on integration processes. The fact that female migration processes are not mirror images of male ones, and that gender relations have a substantial influence on who migrates, which employment opportunities come up, and how life looks like in the dichotomy

16 Ibid.

17 An expression of this new perspective is the *International Migration Review* special issue “Gender and Migration Revisited,” which appeared in the year 2006. *The International Migration Review* 40, no. 1 (2006).

18 Nawyn, “Gender and Migration,” 750, 751.

19 Cf. Elisabeth Aufhauser, “Geschlecht und Migration: Zur Konstruktion und Rekonstruktion von Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit in der internationalen Migration,” in *Internationale Migration: Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?*, Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christof Parnreiter and Irene Stacher (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 97-122 (here 99); Lutz Helma, “Differenz als Rechenaufgabe: Über die Relevanz der Kategorien Race, Class, Gender,” in *Unterschiedlich Verschieden: Differenz in der Erziehungswissenschaft*, ed. Helma Lutz and Norbert Wenning (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 215-230. See also Ilse Lenz, “Geschlecht, Herrschaft und internationale Ungleichheit,” in *Das Geschlechterverhältnis als Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaften*, ed. Regina Becker-Schmidt and Gudrun Knapp-Axeli (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1995), 19-46; Helma Lutz, “Differenz als Rechenaufgabe,” 215-230; Sabine Hess and Romana Lenz, *Geschlecht und Globalisierung: Ein kulturwissenschaftlicher Streifzug durch transnationale Räume* (Königstein/Taunus: Ulrike Helmer, 2001).

20 Important research about this topic was undertaken by Donna Gabaccia, Leslie Page Moch, Jackson James, Christiane Harzig, Marlou Schrover, and Edward Higgs.

between the countries of destination and origin, are moving into the frame of investigations.²¹

Research that connects the concept of transnationalism with a gender perspective has established a variety of agreements between the sexes in terms of transnational ways and strategies of living. In this context, new research questions have arisen regarding translocal ways of living. Intercultural encounters, transformed gender relations, and rules are becoming a more sharpened focus for researchers.²²

Research on Female Guest Workers

Until the 1990s, in German-speaking countries, research on women from other countries and female labor workers was primarily done in sociological and political science studies. The field of research was constantly brought into the focus of scientific discourses by those affected: the daughters of female migrants. Firstly, in the 1990s, a change of perspective in European, and especially German-speaking, migration research could be observed, and the category of gender was increasingly taken into account. Harzig's studies paved the way in Germany, and numerous empirical investigations focused on the topic of migration and gender.²³ However, as was the case before, there was a lack of research to determine the phases before and after migration. There is a lack of migration research in Austria too that needs to be addressed.

Concerning guest worker migration, the first female migrant workers were pooled into the category of guest workers. Women first came to be

21 Schrover and Moloney, "Introduction: Making a difference," 10-11; Antonia Ingelfinger, "Migration – Mobilität – Geschlecht: Eine Einleitung," in *Migration – Mobilität – Geschlecht*, Freiburger GeschlechterStudien 25, ed. Meike Penkwitt and Antonia Ingelfinger (Leverkusen: Budrich Unipress, 2011), 11-35 (here 16); Helma Lutz and Christine Huth-Hildebrandt, "Geschlecht im Migrationsdiskurs: Neue Gedanken über ein altes Thema," *Das Argument* 224, no. 1+2 (1998): 159-173; Helma Lutz, "Migrations- und Geschlechterforschung: Zur Genese einer komplizierten Beziehung," in *Handbuch Frauen- und Geschlechtergeschichte: Theorie, Methoden, Empirie*, ed. Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), 565-573 (here 570-571); Erna revise Appelt, "Frauen in der Migration – Lebensform und soziale Situation," in *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen – sozio-ökonomische Strukturen – rechtliche Bestimmungen*, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2003), 144-171 (here 145-147); Aufhauser, "Geschlecht und Migration," 97-122.

22 Appelt, "Frauen in der Migration," 145-147; Aufhauser, "Geschlecht und Migration," 97-122.

23 Helma Lutz, Monika Mattes, Saskia Sassen, Elisabeth Aufhauser, Lydia Potts, Brigitte Young, and Ilse Lenz are engaged in this research topic.

the focus of research when their economic relevance in European countries of destiny could no longer be overlooked. The non-consideration of female mobility at the start of the confrontation with the consequences of guest work resulted in a focus limited to non-employed married women and mothers. Pregnancy, birth, and childcare were the central perception of migrant women's lives. Investigations about the connection between employment and family activities, or the specific situation of female labor migrants on the job market were entirely missing. Emphasis was placed on the differences between female guest workers and German and Austrian women. The overriding depiction in public and scientific discourse was that of the uneducated and oppressed woman.²⁴

In spite of the fact that the relevance of the category *gender* for the purpose of research had been established, the cliché of the male "guest worker," who brought his wife and child over at a later point in time, was still assigned to new research work and exhibition projects. Therefore, the task of gender-sensitive migration research is to reveal every form of stereotyping and to reflect critically.²⁵

The depiction of the female migrant as dependent wife hindered a consideration of the high level of work activities of Yugoslavian and Turkish women in Austria for a long time. Female guest workers were first focused on in the year 1986, in an article by Gerda Neyer in a collection of essays entitled *Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich*.²⁶ Her starting point is that women's life situations are massively changed by migration, and that female migrants have far less time to proceed through the levels of industrial and cultural adaptability than women and men from the West, who have decades.²⁷ She claims that most women were not in employment before their migration. This is a presumption that does not reflect reality. In contrast to other countries of recruitment, Yugoslavia had an institutionalized equality of the sexes, which led to higher job activity amongst women. The strong participation of women on the job market can be observed through the fact that, in 1965, only 63% of the Yugoslavian unemployed were women.²⁸

24 Lorber, *Angeworben*, 39-45.

25 Appelt, "Frauen in der Migration," 145-147; Aufhauser, "Geschlecht und Migration," 97-122; Monika Mattes, *Gastarbeiterinnen in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren*, Geschichte und Geschlechter 48 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 18-20.

26 Gerda Neyer, "Jugoslawische und türkische Frauen in Österreich," in *Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich*, ed. Hannes Wimmer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1986), 433-459.

27 *Ibid.*, 455.

28 Huth-Hildebrandt, *Das Bild von der Migrantin*, 84.

Neyer's depiction of the female guest worker corresponds to a typical topos in the creation context: that of the multiply oppressed woman, who migrates from an under-developed region into a modern society. Twenty years later, in the framework of the exhibition "Gastarbajteri," female migration was taken into consideration by making visible women as actors in the migration process.²⁹ Hale Sahin, in her socio-psychological study, describes the life stories of eight female pioneer migrants from Turkey.³⁰ She shows that the biographies do not correspond to the prevailing public opinion of the non-self-sufficient, man-dependent migrant. In the year 2013, a study about guest workers in Carinthia was published, which described the heterogenic life and work realities of female labor migrants through the use of Carinthian media and by analyzing interviews with contemporary witnesses.³¹ It was the aim of the author to place female labor migrants as active participants at the center of the investigation. This research approach is also implemented in the author's dissertation.³² In the following section, the intention is to show that women shared an important part of the migration movement to Austria. The aim is to make their life realities and strategies visible. This is an approach that was also applied by the author in an exhibition project about the life situations of female Slovenian guest workers in Styria in 2015.³³

Employment of Female Guest Workers in Austria

The peak of guest worker employment in Austria was reached in 1973, with a total of 226,000 persons, nearly 80% of which came from Yugoslavia. Nearly half of these persons were employed in Vienna. In the rest of the Austrian states, the division was as follows: Upper Austria employed 11.9% of workers, Lower Austria 11.5%, Salzburg 8%, Vorarlberg 7.6%, Styria 6.9%, Tyrol 5.4%, Carinthia 1.6%, and Burgenland 0.5%. The majority of them, around 95%, were employed as unskilled workers in the leather industry (31.3%), the textile industry

29 Alev Korun, "Frauen in der Migration," in *Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration*, ed. Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Matl (Wien: Mandelbaum, 2004), 69-81 (here: 69).

30 Hale Şahin, *Unter unserem Seelenteppich: Lebensgeschichten türkischer Frauen in der Emigration*, Sozialpsychologische Studien 3 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006).

31 Elisabeth Koch et al., "Gastarbeiterinnen" in Kärnten: *Arbeitsmigration in Medien und persönlichen Erinnerungen* (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2013).

32 Lorber, *Angeworben*.

33 Elisabeth Arlt and Verena Lorber, *Lebenswege: Slowenische "Gastarbeiterinnen" in der Steiermark* (Laafeld: Pavelhaus, 2015).

(27.4%), the construction industry (22.5%), and in the tourism sector (17.4%). Characteristic for these branches are: a high degree of physical labor, a high degree of accident risk, working during bad weather conditions, jobs without clear working times and with limited free time, seasonal fluctuations, and high fluctuation in terms of the levels of employment. These factors were obstacles to the continued employment of guest workers and increased the risk of them losing their rights of residence through the loss of workplace.³⁴

In 1962, the proportion of women among foreign workers in Austria stood at 19%. By 1973, it had risen to 31%. Above all, this was caused by the increasing employment of women from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian census data confirms the high proportion of women involved in labor migration. In 1971, the proportion of women was 31.4%. This proportion rate corresponds to the employment rate of women in Yugoslavia.³⁵

Most men and women from Yugoslavia came from the following Republics: Serbia (17.3%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (16.8%), and the Vojvodina (13.3%).³⁶ Initially, people from urban areas were the ones who migrated. This involved mostly qualified male workers. After this followed the migration of young and unqualified workers, with an increasing proportion of women from countryside areas.³⁷ In regards to Croatia, however, it can be seen that “the integration of the woman in the working process increases with a higher level of development.” Migrating women, in contrast to Croatian men, of whom a significant proportion came from economically underdeveloped areas, did not leave the traditional areas from which people

34 Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, *Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen* (Wien: Jugend und Volk, 1995), 66; Gudrun Biffl, “Zuwanderung und Segmentierung des österreichischen Arbeitsmarktes: Ein Beitrag zur Insider-Outsider-Diskussion,” in *Internationale Migration: Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?*, Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christoph Parnreiter, and Irene Stacher (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 207–229 (here 213); Helga Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985: Der Kampf um und gegen die ausländische Arbeitskraft,” *Journal für Sozialforschung* 25, no. 2 (1985): 159–198 (here 175).

35 Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 175. Ivo Baučić, “Yugoslavia as a Country of Emigration,” *Options méditerranéennes* 22 (1973): 56–66 (here 59).

36 Ulf Brunnbauer, “Jugoslawische Geschichte als Migrationsgeschichte (19. und 20. Jahrhundert),” in *Schnittstellen: Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Holm Sundbaussen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 113, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer, Andreas Helmedach, and Stefan Tröbst (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 111–131 (here 120–121).

37 Pascal Goeke, “Jugoslawische Arbeitswanderer in West-, Mittel- und Nordeuropa seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs,” in *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 731–735 (here 731–733).

migrated. Croatian women first migrated from “urbanized areas” and secondarily from regions characterized by agricultural work.³⁸

Yugoslavian women came primarily from Vojvodina (42.7%), Slovenia (40.1%), Croatia (36.8%), and Serbia (34.1%).³⁹ In contrast, women from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia migrated in lesser numbers. The low proportion of women from Kosovo stands out. In this case, a direct connection between migration and household structure can be made. Ethnic Albanians were the group most strongly characterized by patriarchy. Usually, in a multi-generational household, one or two sons went abroad to secure the income of the family. Through the income derived from destination countries, it was possible to ensure that women were excluded from paid work. In this way, the multi-generational household could continue.⁴⁰

In spite of the male connotation of labor migration, women were needed for the Austrian job market, and strategies for their recruitment were developed. After the Second World War, the bourgeois ideal of the woman as housewife and mother became the model for family politics again. As a result of the economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, an increasing need for female workers arose. For this reason, the migration of female workers was encouraged over the integration of married women and mothers into the job market in order to uphold the bourgeois family ideal. Only in the 1970s did the constant increase of job market participation by Austrian women begin.⁴¹ The reasons for this are not only gender equality policies and the expansion of education, but also the transformation from an agrarian to a service society. Through this, more opportunities for women arose, particularly in administration, in the health and social services, trade, transport, or teaching and culture areas.⁴² Then as now, women’s work is

38 Othmar Nikola Haberl, *Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien: Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung*, Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas 13 (München: Oldenbourg, 1978), 60.

39 *Ibid.*, 286.

40 Brunnbauer pointed out that these structures had begun to disperse within the last decade, because the possibility to migrate was more restricted and therefore the remittances decreased. Ulf Brunnbauer, “Labor Emigration from the Yugoslav Area from the late 19th Century until the End of Socialism,” in *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics: Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Region 19th-21st Century*, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 114, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer (München: Oldenbourg, 2009), 17-51 (here 36-37).

41 In 1971 the percentage of female employees in Austria, including female labor migrants, was 30.4%, in 1981 34.6%, in 1991 37.7% and in 2001 42.7%. Bundeskanzleramt/BM für Frauen, Medien, öffentlichen Dienst, *Frauen und Männer in Österreich* (Wien: Bundeskanzleramt, 2007), 70.

42 In 1961 21% percent of women helped out in agriculture and forestry, 37.5% as self-employed workers and 25% as white collar workers and civil servants. In the following year the number of workers and employees in agriculture and forestry decreased and by 1981 more than half of Austrian women were employed as white collar workers or civil servants.

concentrated on typical “women’s professions,” which are traditionally less well paid.⁴³ Many female migrants contributed to an improvement of the situation for native women on the job market, since due to the gender hierarchies the employment possibilities for migrant women were limited to unqualified jobs at the lower end of the labor market. Thus, this was a process accompanied by marginalization and exploitation. As a result of this, native women got more opportunities to get a white-collar job.⁴⁴

How urgently foreign women were needed for the Austrian job market is expressed in the recruitment actions of the Chamber of Commerce, which was responsible for the recruitment of female migrants. In documents from the recruitment commission in Istanbul, there is reference to how challenging the recruitment of female workers was. Many of the submitted recruitment applications for women could only be dealt with partially and with a great deal of effort. The main reason for this was that Austrian employers were above all looking for women aged between 18 and 24 years. The Turkish employment offices, however, did not take the age of the female workers into consideration during the recruitment. A further reason for the low rate of placement was the required qualifications. Many employers only wanted to employ female migrant workers who could read and write. They explicitly sought “intelligent” women, who did not come from rural areas, as the level of education in urban areas was higher.⁴⁵

In 1979, the head of the Turkish recruitment commission, Dr. Pflegerl, said, regarding Turkish women, that it was a far more difficult time psychologically, and that it was substantially more complicated for them to take a job abroad, than for men.⁴⁶ He related this to the general social standing of women in Turkish society. For this reason, according to Pflegerl, many women changed their opinion about taking up employment in Austria

43 See Peter Penner and Elisabeth Scheibelhofer, *Qualifikation und Erwerbsarbeit von Frauen von 1970 bis 2000 in Österreich*, IHS-Reihe Soziologie 49 (Wien: IHS, 2000); Sonja Dörfer and Georg Wernhart, *Die Arbeit von Männern und Frauen: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte der geschlechtsspezifischen Rollenverteilung in Frankreich, Schweden und Österreich*, Österreichisches Institut für Familienforschung: Forschungsbericht Nr. 19 (Wien: OIF, 2016).

44 Huth-Hildebrandt, *Das Bild von der Migrantin*, 69-72; Leonie Herwartz-Emden, “Einleitung,” in *Einwandererfamilien: Geschlechterverhältnisse, Erziehung und Akkulturation*, ed. Leonie Herwartz-Emden (Osnabrück: Rasch, 2000), 9-53 (here 27); Maria do Mar Castro Varela, “Zur Skandalisierung und Re-Politisierung eines bekannten Themas: Migrantinnen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt,” in *Migration, Gender, Arbeitsmarkt: Neue Beiträge zu Frauen und Globalisierung*, ed. Maria do Mar Castro Varela and Dimitria Clayton (Königstein im Taunus: Ulrike Helmer, 2003), 8-30 (here 20-25).

45 WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Übersetzung türkische Botschaft Istanbul 11. 2. 1972.

46 WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Schreiben AKO an AGA 15. 7. 1975.

during the recruitment process. In his view, this was the cause of the delay in recruitment.⁴⁷

Apart from this, he was able to conclude that the health related default rate was higher among women due to pregnancy. Despite these difficulties, Dr. Pfliegerl pointed out that for the recruitment office it was easier to recruit women for Austrian companies that needed larger groups of women to work for them.⁴⁸ He found out that Turkish women, due to their integration into authoritarian social structures, were less able to cope with the psychological difficulties associated with the integration process. He assumed that women with a higher level of education could be better integrated and that successful integration also depended on whether the woman migrated to Austria alone or with a group.⁴⁹ For this reason, he proposed only to take on board recruitment assignments asking for higher levels of education and larger groups of women.⁵⁰

In contrast, a doctor who, from July 17-19, 1969, carried out the examination of 40 female workers for the recruitment commission in Banja Luka, suggested illiterate and partially illiterate women to enlist for the Austrian job market. He described it as being their destiny to end up doing what he considered to be primitive manual labor.⁵¹

This implementation of recruitment of women shows that there was a necessity for female labor migrants and that strategies were developed to push forward the recruitment of female workers. This means that women were indeed a fixed part of the transnational labor migration and disproves the cliché of the exclusively male guest worker in scientific and public perception. The typical description of Turkish women corresponds to that of being victims of, and disadvantaged in, the migration process. The reason for this is given as a lack of education and patriarchal

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid; WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Übersetzung türkische Botschaft Istanbul 11. 2. 1972.

49 WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Schreiben AKO an AGA 15. 7. 1975.

50 Ibid. The initial difficulties with the recruitment of female workers in Germany were attributed to southern women "being different." It was argued that reasons for this could be found in their vocations as mother and wife, and that they therefore had no interest in employment. This was how the low number of recruitments was explained away. As the number of female labor migrants increased significantly over time, the construct of the "exception migrant" was created, in order to maintain the picture of the female southerner. In particular, the reference to the gender relation in the country of origin was used to legitimize the attribution of being foreign and different. In this way the female labor migrant was considered as being a kind of "*sondertypus*" as compared to the "normal" female identity in the country of destiny. Huth-Hildebrandt, *Das Bild von der Migrantin*, 76-83.

51 WKÖ Archiv, BUKA – AGA, Mikrofilm JUG 125, 1969.

structures in Turkey. The conclusion is drawn that, because of this “disadvantage,” migration is a major psychological challenge for women, which leads to a situation that has further negative consequences on their integration process in countries of destination. Only the “group” can make assimilation to a new environment easier. Additionally, there is also the assignment of particular areas of activity for women with low levels of education. Through this representation, the self-sufficiency and individual ability of women to act within the migration process is not taken into consideration. It therefore corresponds to the dominant topos of the multiply oppressed woman, who migrates from an underdeveloped society into a modern one.⁵²

Situation in Styria

As is the case in the whole of Austria, the employment of female migrant workers in Styria can be traced back to the fact that in particular sectors of the economy there was a lack of workers. According to the population census of 1971, the main proportion of labor migrants in Styria (90.7%) were employed as blue-collar workers. Only a low percentage (4.7%) were in white collar jobs, namely women from Yugoslavia who were employed in the health sector.⁵³

Men from Yugoslavia were mostly employed in the construction sector, manufacturing, and industry. Women from Yugoslavia were mostly in the economic sectors of manufacturing and industry, tourism and public houses, personal, social, and public services, as well as housekeeping. But women also worked in trade and in storage, as well as agriculture and forestry sectors. This meant that men from Yugoslavia worked, above all, in construction and construction-related professions, manufacturing occupations, and in raw material production. Yugoslavian women were primarily in the service sector, in manufacturing occupations, and in raw material production. Men from Turkey were mainly in the commercial department of the manufacturing industry as well as in construction. Thereby, raw material production, construction, and construction-related jobs were at the fore, as well as manufacturing occupations. Turkish women were, without exception, in the manufacturing industry, above all in raw material production. It can be determined that the professions pursued by labor migrants in

52 Lorber, *Angeworben*, 107-111.

53 Statistik Austria, *Volkszählungsdaten 1971: Erwerbspersonen in der Steiermark nach NUTS-III-Regionen, Geschlecht, Staatsangehörigkeit, Berufs- und Wirtschaftsabteilung*.

Austria at this time reflected the dominant traditional attribution of male and female spheres of work.⁵⁴

Most Yugoslavian labor migrants worked in Graz (46.3%) and Eastern Styria (30.5%), regions in which the economic sectors mentioned above were dominant. Yugoslavian men worked, to a lesser degree, in Liezen. Women were to be found mostly in the area of Graz, as it was there where large numbers of workplace offers in the fields of personal service activities, private services and housekeeping services were available. But also in Upper Styria, the tourist industry offered numerous work opportunities for women from Yugoslavia. A lesser number worked in Southern, Western, and Eastern Styria. The majority of Turkish men worked in the industrial companies in Eastern Upper Styria (52.9%). Many also found employment in Graz (26.5%). Turkish women worked, without exception, in the state capital of Styria. Most of them worked in the cleaning sector.⁵⁵

Living Worlds

With the help of statistical records, it can be shown that the migration of women for the purpose of working in Styria did not represent an exception, but rather a fixed proportion, in the yearly labor migration. In addition, the dominant societal and scientific perception of labor migrants as exclusively male, which had existed for a long time, was not the case for Styria. Yet how did the living worlds of the women from Yugoslavia, who in the 1960s and 1970s decided to migrate to Styria for work purposes, look like? The following section will focus on the working experiences of female guest workers from Yugoslavia. The sources acting as a basis for this section are comprised of ten interviews with women from Yugoslavia, who migrated to Styria in the time period from 1967 to 1976.

Nearly all of the women interviewed came from poor family backgrounds and had a number of siblings. Better opportunities to earn money, a lack of school education, low expectations in Yugoslavia, desire for adventure, love, flight from the limitations of the community of origin, and individual exploitation of opportunities all played a part in these women's decision for labor migration. Transnational migration often followed internal migration. Migration biographies make clear that it was not an either/or decision. Connections to country of origin remained intact. There was cross-border integration in different family, economic, political, or

54 Lorber, *Angeworben*, 155-168.

55 *Ibid.*, 155-168.

cultural networks and organizations. Many female labor migrants lived a transnational life. Most of those interviewed postponed the date of their return. During the course of the migration process, permanent emigration emerged out of the plan for a temporary stay.⁵⁶

Motives

In looking at migration biographies, it becomes clear that there is no one single group of Yugoslavian female guest workers, and that the course of migration and the motives behind it were very different, although all women migrated to Styria for the purpose of working. Five of the women interviewed came to Styria alone, whereas two of them already had a family or friendship network available in Graz. One of the women interviewed came together with her husband, and four migrated some months, or in the case of one of the women, two years after the migration of her partner to Styria. Two couples married after gaining employment in Graz.

In the following, three examples of different migration biographies, based on three interviewees, will be considered: Ivanka S., who was born in 1954 in present day Slovenia, has lived in Graz since 1969. As a result of a lack of financial possibilities, she was not able to pursue an education in Slovenia. For this reason, she decided at the age of almost fifteen to take a job as a housekeeping assistant in Pula (Croatia). When she returned to Slovenia, after working for two years, an acquaintance asked her if she wanted to work in Graz. She explained:

And of course I said yes, because it isn't possible to get a job in Slovenia without education. I just wanted to get away. I didn't see any future for me in my home country. Although I couldn't imagine where Graz was, I went to Graz in 1969. But I had no idea what to expect.⁵⁷

She found a job in a confectionary factory near Graz. At the beginning, she lived in company accommodations. Ivanka S.'s course of migration is very typical. Often female labor migrants had been involved in internal migration beforehand, and the arrangement was set up through friends and relatives, who had already come to work in Austria.

56 Ibid., 192-204.

57 Ivanka S., in discussion with the author, Jan. 27, 2011.

The situation for Meka Z. was completely different. She was born in 1949 in present-day Serbia, attended a four-year training program to become a textile technician, and worked nearly five years in this profession. Her husband at the time wanted to work in Austria. Initially, he went to Graz alone. She stayed in Serbia with her two small children. He was able to convince her to follow. Meka Z. chose the following strategy: "The first six months I took unpaid holidays from the company. I thought, I'll take a look if I liked it there."⁵⁸ After six months she returned to Serbia, handed in her notice at work, and in 1973 she moved to Graz. She immediately found a job as a cleaner in a printing workshop, where her husband also had found a job as an unskilled worker. Until her retirement, the trained textile technician worked in different companies as a cleaner. This example makes clear that labor migration is often accompanied by professional disqualification.

Hilde L. on the other hand, was born in present day Slovenia, went to the primary school, and then worked in an iron factory immediately afterwards. She heard from an acquaintance that it was possible to earn more money abroad and made the decision to take part in labor migration. She decided to organize the journey and workplace officially through the Austrian Chamber of Commerce and the Yugoslavian employment office. First she registered with the Yugoslavian employment office and was recruited as a waitress for a restaurant in Rottenmann. She recounted:

I had to give my details and a photo to the employment office, and then I had to wait. A couple of weeks later they let me know the decision that a Mr. S., the son of my boss at the time, would come to pick me up. They gave me a room there and on the next day I started working in the restaurant with a bowling alley.⁵⁹

From the content of these interviews, it is clear how different the motivations for, and the course of, migration was for the women whose objectives were to improve their economic situation. Two of the women already had children before they left for labor migration. The others established families during the time of labor migration and had between two and three children. As women they worked, after the births of their children with only short interruptions until they retired. This was contrary to Austrian women, who, if they were employed at all, stayed at least one year at home after having a child, or then gave up their jobs. The interview with Meka Z. makes clear that even when women followed their husbands abroad,

58 Meka Z., in discussion with the author, April 12, 2014.

59 Hilde L., in discussion with the author, May 7, 2013.

they were actively involved in the decision making process. She firstly took a working vacation to check out the situation in Austria before she made a final decision. So, labor migration was a family decision. Additionally, the biographies illustrate the various pathways of their journeys, either as a tourist⁶⁰ or officially over the Chamber of Commerce.

The Working Day

Ljublica P., who entered Austria as a tourist, initially found a job in catering. She described her work duties: “I cleaned and worked in the kitchen. You could say I was a kitchen help. [...] I had to do what the boss said.”⁶¹ Katja J., who worked in Slovakia as a seamstress, described her working day in a Styrian guesthouse in the following way:

It was difficult. It wasn't easy. How did we work? When the children came, sometimes three buses at once, we had to get the breakfast ready and then we had to clear everything away. There were so many crumbs, I hadn't seen that before at home! So many children! Then we cleaned everything away and went on to prepare everything for the snacks and for lunch. In between we tidied all three floors. We also cleaned the rooms, then we washed the bed sheets upstairs in the laundry. It continued like that. And then serving food again. It wasn't easy for me.⁶²

Katja J. also did this work during her pregnancy. She explained: “Then I was pregnant. I can remember that I was serving twelve lettuces and I felt sick. I threw down these twelve lettuces. I'll never forget this sound. It was such a rattling noise.”⁶³ After the birth of her second daughter, Katja J. decided to work from home so that she could look after her children more easily but still earn a bit of money. She did sewing work for her family and friends and assembled pens for a Styrian company. But the situation did not work out as she had expected. Katja J. remembered: “I didn't earn anything [...], but I worked day and night. The entire Sunday. My husband cooked and everything at that time. He was really crazy. And at the end I earned

60 This was a very common way to migrate to Austria. Lorber, *Angeworben*, 65-67.

61 Ljublica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.

62 Katja J., in discussion with the author, April 12, 2011.

63 Ibid.

1,200 shillings.”⁶⁴ The electricity for the household had to be paid from this amount, so hardly anything was left over. She said that it became more difficult to feed the family when the second child came:

And then with the second child, when she was two years old, we said that one should go to the kindergarten and the second to the crèche, and I went sewing. At the end I saw that there was nothing left over for me after I paid the nursery school and crèche.⁶⁵

Ivanka G. earned more money as a nurse on the children’s ward in the state hospital. She said: “When they saw that you could work well, they kept you.”⁶⁶ She spent too much of her first salary. Ivanka G. added: “It was such a massive pleasure to earn so much money. I bought much too much.”⁶⁷

For Hilde L. the working conditions were entirely different. Unpaid overtime hours were common for her. She recounted her job as a waitress in a café in Upper Styria: “The boss said, ‘today, there’s a lot going on. You have to stay here.’ We worked all the way through, but I was never paid for it. I got something to eat but the hours were never paid. I had my fixed salary and that was it! That wasn’t just once, that was often the case.”⁶⁸ Despite the unpaid overtime hours, Hilde L. received a lot of support from her female boss at the time. Most of the female migrants interviewed had friendly relationships with their employers.

Jovanka R. had similar experiences. She had to work regular night shifts at the printers where she was initially employed. She explained: “Always from six o’clock in the evening until six o’clock in the morning. Normally it wasn’t allowed for women to do this, but we had to work.”⁶⁹

Heavy physical work was a hallmark of Ruza S.’s working day. Her first job in Graz was in the kitchen of a restaurant at the main station:

I was responsible for the washing up and the mugs were so big. That was really difficult for me. I washed up there for two months and there was a woman, like a boss, and she cooked. And she

64 Katja J., in discussion with the author, April 4, 2011. 1,200 shillings are 87 Euro.

65 Ibid.

66 Ivanka G., in discussion with the author, Jan. 11, 2011.

67 Ibid.

68 Hilde L., in discussion with the author, May 7, 2013.

69 Jovanka R., in discussion with the author, Sept. 15, 2011. For the rules about night work for women at that time see BGBl. Nr. 237/1969, “Nachtarbeit der Frauen.”

also came from Yugoslavia. And she asked the boss to give me something easier because I couldn't manage it. In the evenings I always had a backache and so on.⁷⁰

For Ruza S., it was easy to find a new job. She remembered: "At that time it was easy to find a job because they needed us." Anica M. had similar experiences. On her second day in Graz, she got a job as a cook in a big Graz hospital. Ruza S. subsequently found a job in a factory, later also at the tailor, where she had to do the piecework. She recounted the salary conditions at the time: "You got paid for the amount you worked. When you worked less you got less money. But when you worked more, you got more money. It was very nice in the company."⁷¹ After her maternity leave, she was employed for 13 years in the sanatorium, until she got a job as a cleaner with the Health Insurance Company of Styria, where she stayed until retiring in 2000. Ruza R. recalled her time at the sanatorium fondly: "Yes, for me the best time was in the sanatorium, where I took care of the patients. It was great for me to pep up the patients, talking and all that."⁷²

Ivanka G. signed up at an evening school shortly after her arrival in Graz and was able to obtain her matriculation. She then decided to take on a university education. She said that she had met a lot of new people through going to school; "a window began to open"⁷³ for her. Along with her work as a nurse at the hospital, she trained as an academically qualified translator for Serbo-Croatian. Finally, she finished the first part of the Study of Art History and completed the Diploma Study Translation for Slovenian and German at the Karl-Franzens-University in Graz. Ivanka G. worked in the General Hospital Graz until her retirement. Until the end of the 1980s, she was on the children's ward, and then she got a position in administration.⁷⁴ Ivanka S. also decided to enroll in professional training in order to improve her position on the job market. In 2000, she completed the training to be a kindergarten assistant and opened her own kindergarten the following year.

Becoming employed as a janitor offered many single and married women from Yugoslavia the possibility of a form of employment, which could be combined with looking after their children, and whereby they could avoid paying high rent for substandard housing. Although the housing possibilities linked to this employment were not always better, the financial aspects of this type of employment did make the lives of many

70 Ruza S., in discussion with the author, May 20, 2011.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ivanka G., in discussion with the author, Jan. 11, 2011.

74 Ibid.

female labor migrants easier. Slavica T. got most of her janitor and unofficial cleaning jobs through acquaintances or newspaper ads. A “basis of trust”⁷⁵ developed between her and her employers over the course of time. She remembered: “I even got a key. I could come and go when I wanted to. I could eat and drink. At the beginning it wasn’t like that.”⁷⁶ Slavica T. was always paid for her work on time, but she had to work, “very efficiently and a lot.”⁷⁷ Today she suffers the adverse effects of difficult physical work. She has numerous joint problems and her state of health is not the best. This is a fate that she shares with many guest workers.

For Veronika B., the position as janitor offered a possibility to combine employment with raising children. Through the additional income, she and her husband, who worked in the construction branch, were able to buy a piece of land near Graz in the 1980s, and to build their own house. She recalls:

So, after the birth of the first son, I took a janitor job. And I worked there. I was registered. And after the second son was here [...] we moved to another house. I was a janitor there too. And of course I did some additional work, which I did not declare. And after the third son had been born, I stayed at home with him for six years. And when he started the first class in school I started to work again.⁷⁸

An acquaintance also arranged a janitor job for Jovanka R. She was very happy about this position. As she recounted: “The flat was rent free, and I got 1,300 for cleaning the building. Then life immediately became easier. Then the children benefit, and then it was alright.”⁷⁹ After this she was employed as a member of the kitchen and cleaning staff in a restaurant in Graz. She received a great deal of support from her boss at the time. She explained:

I had such a good boss. Every Sunday morning, I also did his personal cleaning. He didn’t pay me for this, but he always said, ‘Take what you need for yourself and the children in the restaurant.’ And I was in agreement with this. I took ten eggs and

75 Slavica T., in discussion with the author, Oct. 27, 2011.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Veronika B., in discussion with the author, Feb. 27, 2012.

79 Jovanka R., in discussion with the author, Sept. 15, 2011.

a bit of ham for the weekend. Then I didn't have to buy it. And I haven't forgotten that until today. And when my children came to my workplace, we had pancakes and pizza and didn't have to pay for it.⁸⁰

Before this, Jovanka R. worked in a different guesthouse in Mariatrost, where she had to do heavy physical work. In the evenings her hands hurt due to the carrying and washing up of the heavy plates. Jovanka R., likewise through a friend, got a position as a cleaner in the Episcopal office. She worked there until she retired, and was responsible for cleaning the office rooms. When Jovanka R. was still young, she had to help out in her parents' farm. She considered her journey to Austria as being very positive. According to her, one aspect was that, as a woman, she had more possibilities for personal development here. Additionally, she recounted, with a twinkle in her eye, the following about her life in Austria, in comparison to Bosnia: "[Here], I had to work less and I had a bit of money. And at home with my father you couldn't get any money. He only shouted around and you had to work really hard. [...] Here, I go to work, earn money, and buy myself whatever I want to."⁸¹

Working Biographies of Single Mothers

Ivanka S. took up an acquaintance's offer and travelled with him to Graz. Her first workplace was in a confectionary factory near Graz, where, Ivanka S. recounts, many people from present day Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia were working. She described her first work experience as not being very good. She worked shifts and said that she

didn't feel so good, because there was a boss who was not keen on foreigners. So I just worked and worked. I did the packaging for bonbons, and this was just, quick, quick, quick into the packet and put the label on."⁸²

She continued: "I said, 'it doesn't matter to me. Ok, I just have to hang in there and that's the end of it.' The main thing was that I was working

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ivanka S., in discussion with the author, Jan. 27, 2011.

and earning money. Everything else was unimportant for me. I was alone all week and on Friday I went home to Slovenia.”⁸³ After Ivanka S. became pregnant, she was fired. She explained: “At that time I didn’t know what to do and didn’t know which rights I had.”⁸⁴

As a single mother, Ivanka S. saw no other option than to return to Slovenia, where she lived with her sister. She describes life as a single mother in the village community in Slovenia as being difficult. She recalls: “At that time in the place I come from, which was a small village, it was a catastrophe to be a single mother.”⁸⁵ Ivanka S. decided to leave her child with her mother in Slovenia and take up a new job in Styria in order to earn money. Through the support of a friend, she found a job in a sanatorium. She described the application process as follows: “And then she [her friend] rang up for me, and then I went for a job interview. I went in, three times back out and then the fourth time the secretary caught me [...], she said: ‘You’re coming with me.’ I understood this straight away.”⁸⁶ Ivanka S. was employed and was responsible for the kitchen service. She worked there for six years. On looking back, she saw her time at the sanatorium in a very positive light. As a result of a change in the management, Ivanka S. decided to look for a new job. She found a job with a cleaning company through an ad in a newspaper and worked there for ten years. She recalled: “The boss was really a very good one. So I told her how I got there, that I had two children and that I could work from 8 o’clock to 3 o’clock and not longer than that. And she completely accepted it.”⁸⁷

After this, Ivanka S. did various office jobs, until she found a position as a cook in a kindergarten. The bad experiences she had there, and her enthusiasm for working with kids, was the reason for her deciding to train as a kindergarten assistant and to open her own kindergarten. She has run this since 2001 and, according to Ivanka S. herself, is very happy and satisfied.

As a single mother in Yugoslavia, Slavica T. had similar experiences as Ivanka S. She explained: “I had a child and I was relatively young at the time. I was nineteen. And the man left me. He said it wasn’t his child. And this was a disgrace in the 1970s. In 1971, it was a disgrace to have a child without a father and without being married. And this was a small province, where I lived, and I had to go away. I was ashamed, people looked at me in a bad way.”⁸⁸

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Slavica T., in discussion with the author, Oct. 27, 2011.

Her mother suggested that she go abroad and leave the child with her. Due to her mother's good contacts in Vorarlberg, Slavica T. firstly migrated to Bregenz, before she came to Graz in 1970. In the mid-1970s she brought her son there. She said: "I worked a lot. I was a single parent [...]. I worked in chemical cleaning and had a lot of private janitor jobs [...]. Shoveling snow in the coldest of winter, cleaning the houses and doing everything [...]. You could never be ill. You needed the money."⁸⁹

Alongside her main employment as a cleaner, Ljubica P. did a lot of janitor jobs and a lot of unofficial cleaning and care work. She said: "I didn't care what I did. The main thing was the money, that I had work."⁹⁰ She hardly took any maternity leave. She recalled: "I worked up until the birth. After the birth of my daughter, I worked until the evenings. I worked until the evenings after the birth of my son. And three weeks later, I started to work again."⁹¹ She described her working day as single parent at a cleaning company as follows:

I did everything. In the early mornings, I cleaned at the university. I had to go to the University at four in the morning, and I worked there until six. And then I came home and woke up the children, prepared breakfast and then brought them to kindergarten and school. And then I went cleaning again. The children went from school to after school care, and I picked them up in the evenings.⁹²

She gave her children something to eat and put them to bed, and then often went to work again. She worked in a restaurant where she was sometimes busy until two in the morning. She continued: "Then I came home, could sleep a bit until three thirty, and then I had quickly walk to the university to clean."⁹³

The work experiences of the women depicted here show that the picture of the exclusively male labor migrant does not reflect reality. Women, as well as men, came to Styria for the purpose of employment. Many women also worked in private households alongside their full time employment.⁹⁴ Friendly relationships developed out of their employment relationships, and employers became important contact persons for the women and supported them in their problems. Ivanka S.'s employer helped her during her

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ljubica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ In this case it concerned above all informal work activities.

divorce and the custody battle for her children. Ljubica P. also reported that her employers, from the household where she worked, were always helpful to her:

On Saturdays, when I came to cook and clean, [my employer] took my children and went for a walk with them, and I could clean. It was like my own family. Or she went with me to the kindergarten or the after school care if I needed something.⁹⁵

Ljubica P. described her boss in the cleaning company as very nice and helpful.⁹⁶ She helped her the most at the beginning with translation and learning the language. But deep friendships between the female labor migrants also developed, and they supported one another in every situation they found themselves in. Private networks were of particular importance for the single mothers, not only for the arrangement of workplaces and assistance with legal issues, but also in terms of looking after the children and on an emotional level. They were there for one another and supported each other in order to cope with the challenges of a life in Styria.

Summary

In scientific discourse, the presumption is that the economic reasons for migration are dominant, as are the assumptions that men, almost without exception, were the ones who migrated. In collective memory too, there was an overriding picture of the male guest worker, and the depiction of labor migration was that of an exclusively male form of migration. Empirical data material, however, reflects a different reality. The proportion of women participating in labor migration to Austria in the 1960s and 1970s stood at between 20% and 30% yearly.

Women, like men, came alone, together with their husbands and wives or partners, with their families, or for family reunification, or with acquaintances, to take up work. Yugoslavian labor migrants were not a homogeneous group. They did not make decisions solely based on age, their gender/sex, their religious backgrounds, and their level of education. But also not according to their ethnic, religio-cultural characteristics and political positions. Their motives for migration, its course and their life realities, were quite diverse.

95 Ljubica P., in discussion with the author, July 13, 2012.

96 Ljubica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.

With the help of qualitative research methods, it was possible to show that female migration processes were not simply a reflection of male ones. Women were confronted with other challenges, demands and gender role attributions, which influenced their daily lives. Their lives were particularly characterized through the connections between employment, looking after the family and running the household. Professional as well as social networks made their lives in their new surroundings easier.

Neither Here Nor There – *Ni ovde, ni tamo* Religiously Connoted Social Media Self- Representations of “Generation In-Between”

Eva Tamara Asboth/Silvia Nadjivan

Introduction

This article focuses on a generation in Austria who considers themselves as living between two worlds because of their migrant heritage from the former Yugoslavia.¹ Either they are grandchildren of the so-called *Gastarbeiter*, or *gastarbajteri*² who formed the immigrant workforce movement during the second half of the twentieth century; or they are children of war, who fled to Austria from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Today they all have grown into young adults. We refer to them as “Generation In-Between.”³

On first glance, it appears that this generation has successfully integrated into the Austrian society.⁴ However, their perspectives on faith,

1 This article is based on the research project “Glaube, Leben, Hoffnung der Generation In-Between: Glaubens- und Lebenswelten junger, ex-jugoslawischer Erwachsener in Österreich,” which was headed by Erhard Busek (Chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, IDM) and Rainer Gries (Professor and Holder of the Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies at the University of Vienna), and which was supported by the Future Fund of the Republic of Austria from June 2016 to March 2017. Researchers were Eva Tamara Asboth (Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies at the University of Vienna) and Silvia Nadjivan (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, IDM).

2 In reference to the German term, *gastarbajteri* is—mostly in an ironic way—used in the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language(s); see Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl, eds., *Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration* (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2004).

3 Rainer Gries at the book presentation “Generation In-Between: The Children of the Balkan Wars. Getting to Know a Crucial Generation,” March 10, 2016; see also Katharina Schmidt, “Die dazwischen stehen,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 11, 2016.

4 It is worth noting that Austria and the Yugoslav successors share a common history of alternating cooperation and conflict times since the expansion politics of the Habsburg Monarchy and other empires. As a result, economic, social and cultural exchange processes among Austria and the Balkans have a long tradition, with comparable values and beliefs. See Wolfgang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, *Gemeinsame Geschichte? Ein Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2015).

their attitudes and opinions toward religion, combined with political and everyday life issues, have hardly been publicly discussed, despite the fact that they were mostly born into fragmented family and cultural situations, which means that important questions on social structures and social cohesion arise. We therefore want to know which political, social, and cultural attitudes and opinions these young people share in Austria, and to what extent they might attach to radicalized or extremist attitudes in the context of today's secularized world.

The aim is to gain an insight into the generation's worldviews and belief systems, which we managed to converge through the documentation and evaluation of several conjunctions of religiousness. We thus revealed conjunctions between religiousness and self-representations, including imaginations of homeland correlating to, or competing with, mental maps of Europe; religiousness and collective memories; and religiousness and gender (divided into masculinities and femininities as well as gender roles and gender order). So on the one hand we explore their loyalties and their affiliations and on the other their understandings of past, present, and future.

Social media platforms give us direct access to the exchange and negotiation processes of these young people's opinions and attitudes. The members of Generation In-Between articulate themselves, like other young people in Austria today,⁵ over social media: in forums, blogs, the short news service Twitter and, of course, over Facebook. This enables us to monitor and analyze their communications authentically, in the face of events and topics that were relevant not only for Austria, but also throughout Europe in 2016.

The Generation In-Between in Austria

In focusing on young adults of ex-Yugoslav origin, the concept of *generation* provides a formidable theoretical basis; *generation* has become a basic category of social and cultural science research in the last century.⁶ Thus, its importance is comparable to other basic, later-developed categories such as class, milieu, gender, or ethnicity.

5 According to the *Social Media Radar Austria*, the age group who dominates significantly in terms of having a Facebook account is between 20-29 years old, followed by those who are between 30-39 years old; accessed Apr. 20, 2017, <http://socialmediaradar.at/facebook>.

6 Karl Mannheim, "Das Problem der Generationen," *Kölner Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Soziologie* 7 (1928): 157-185.

To investigate social groups from a generational perspective means that typical needs and experiences of people at different stages of their lives, from childhood to adulthood, are put in relation to specific possibilities for actions a society offers in times of stability or stagnation, build-up, change, or even in times of crises, conflicts, and wars. As a matter of fact, generations form their own cultures, in which their members communicate about the essentials and the appearance of “their” generation.⁷

Speaking about generation is by no means an attempt to create a container into which we compress all different groups of young adults with ex-Yugoslav background. Quite the contrary: the category generation rather serves as a frame to capture all questions concerning this age cohort, for those who had to cope with similar existential challenges in their lives and still have to cope with it today, in the sense of Karl Mannheim. Their multifiform and complex responses will help us discover all the ways in which we can differentiate this generation scientifically and politically, in Austria as an immigration country, and in the Yugoslav successor states as countries of origin.⁸

The most important characteristic of Generation In-Between is the fact that their members lead an “experienced double life,”⁹ which means they live as natives in two different cultural worlds—at least—where they use two or more everyday languages as mother tongues and prove to be familiar with different, even opposing, traditional values and habits.¹⁰ As children, they were either directly affected by the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, or they indirectly—through conveyed

7 Rainer Gries and Thomas Ahbe, *Geschichte der Generationen in der DDR und in Ostdeutschland: Ein Panorama* (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 2007); Rainer Gries, “Kommunikationshistorie aus generationengeschichtlicher Perspektive: Ein kursorischer Überblick,” in *Kommunikationsgeschichte: Positionen und Werkzeuge. Ein diskursives Hand- und Lehrbuch*, ed. Klaus Arnold, Markus Behmer, and Bernd Semrad (Münster: LIT, 2008), 235-258; Ulrike Jureit, *Generationenforschung* (Göttingen: UTB, 2006).

8 Rainer Gries, “Integration von Flüchtlingen aus Jugoslawien in den 1990er Jahren: Die ‘Generation In-Between;’ Aufriss der Forschung,” in *Migration: Flucht – Vertreibung – Integration*, ed. Stefan Karner et al. (Vienna, forthcoming). Under the direction of Rainer Gries, the Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies—apart from this present study in cooperation with IDM—aims to encompass the polymorphism of this generation in Southeastern and Central Europe, to be able to compare it with the diversity of their peers in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe.

9 Claus Leggewie, “Kirche oder Sekte? Muslime in Deutschland und in den USA,” in *Politik und Religion*, ed. Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 164-183 (here 172).

10 Hilde Weiss, *Leben in zwei Welten: zur sozialen Integration ausländischer Jugendlicher der zweiten Generation* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007).

experiences—used to get in touch with the tragic war situations in their grandparents' homelands.¹¹

As family ties between the country of origin and the host country may hold on for decades, it is usually not only the so-called second generation, the guest workers' children, but also the third generation in Austria, the *Gastarbeiters'* grandchildren, who still maintain contact with relatives and friends living in the Yugoslav successor states and emigration countries, such as, for instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro.¹² Today's young adults make use of the technological advances and extended networks as well as communication spaces in both directions.¹³

According to the latest findings of *Statistik Austria*, 513,000 persons of the resident population in Austria show an ex-Yugoslav migration background, whereas 153,700 people belong to the second generation.¹⁴ Worth mentioning is that naturalized citizens are not gathered by this data. Further, statistical specifications regarding Generation In-Between have proved not to be available yet. In that sense, literature such as the first (2003) as well as the second Migration and Integration Report (2007),¹⁵ edited by the well-known migration researcher Heinz Fassmann, revealed statistical difficulties in covering the second generation appropriately, which also applies to data regarding the third generation.

Also among this age cohort are the approximately two hundred thousand children, who fled to Austria due to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and are now grown up.¹⁶ They experienced expulsion and flight during their

11 In Austria, where the former Yugoslavia was hitherto perceived as a popular destination for summer holidays as well as the guest workers' home country, the break up of the Yugoslav wars was hardly understood. What followed were contradictory peacekeeping neighborhood policies. See Wolfgang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, *Gemeinsame Geschichte? Ein Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen*, 145-146, 148-149.

12 As research findings show, Austrian immigrants—even in the third generation—tend to liaising with someone from their countries of origin. See Gudrun Biffl, *Migration and Labour Market Integration in Austria – SOPEMI Report on Labour Migration: Austria 2015–16* (Krems: Danube University Krems, Department for Migration and Globalisation, 2016), 98.

13 Leggewie, "Kirche oder Sekte? Muslime in Deutschland und in den USA," 172.

14 "Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund im Überblick (Jahresdurchschnitt 2015)," Statistik Austria, accessed Jan. 10, 2017, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/index.html.

15 Helga Amesberger and Heinz Fassmann, eds., *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht: rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, demographische Entwicklungen, sozioökonomische Strukturen* (Klagenfurt: Drava-Verlag, 2003); Heinz Fassmann, ed., 2. *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht* (Wien: Drava Verlag, 2007).

16 Rainer Gries, Eva Tamara Asboth and Christina Krakovsky, *Generation In-Between: The Children of the Balkan Wars; Getting to Know a Crucial Generation for Europe* (Wien: ERSTE Stiftung Studies, 2016), 45; Gudrun Biffl, *Migration and Labour Market Integration*, 38.

early socialization. It is a fact that they became victims of military violence, which in many cases led to serious traumata. They passed through personal crises, and they have usually been left alone with their traumatic experiences.¹⁷ They still carry fragments of memories and experiences with them, as well as fragments of stories and opinions passed on from their family members, which are possibly official narrative patterns from their home countries.¹⁸

When attempting to discuss religious confessions among members of Generation In-Between in Austria, we face a similar data shortage as mentioned before. As a result, we take a short look at the religious confessions in all of Austria¹⁹: Catholicism dominates historically and traditionally. After the last census of 2001 ceded 75% of the Roman Catholic faith, and since the census was no longer allowed to record the religious confession statistically,²⁰ current figures are merely based on estimates. According to the Media Services Center *New Austrians*, most people are still Catholic (5.36 million), the second largest is Muslim (up to 600,000), and the third Orthodox (with about 500,000). Fourth place are members of the Protestant Church (302,000). A significant minority are members of the Jewish faith (about 15,000) as a result of the Shoah under the Nazi regime in the Second World War.²¹

Apart from still existing difficulties in statistically capturing young adults with ex-Yugoslav migration background, we have nevertheless considered this age cohort as one generation with regards to their common

17 On-site studies show the extraordinary daily burdens of the children during these wars, see Sarah Warshauer Freedman and Dino Abazović, "Growing Up During the Balkan Wars of the 1990s," in *International Perspectives on Youth Conflict and Development*, ed. Colette Daiute, Zeynep Beykont and Craig Higson-Smith (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 57-72; Andreja Brajša-Zganec, "The Long-Term Effects of War Experiences on Children's Depression in the Republic of Croatia," *Child Abuse & Neglect* 29, no. 1 (2005): 31-43.

18 Kalina Yordanova shows how transgenerational knowledge in the case of the Bosnian War is passed on. As a result, the children have formed their own image of the war strongly influenced by the war stories that family members have told them. See Kalina Yordanova, "The Second Generation's Imagery of the Bosnian War (1992-1995)," in *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 33, no. 1 (2015): 70-86.

19 For additional information on religion in Austria, see Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Hermann Denz, eds., *Religion in Austria*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 13 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005).

20 Walter Reichel, Thomas Eder, and Roman Kasses, "Religionen in Österreich: Übersicht der in Österreich anerkannten Glaubensgemeinschaften," *Bundeskanzleramt, Bundespressedienst* (2014), accessed March 18, 2016, <https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=55998>.

21 "Weltreligionen in Österreich – Daten und Fakten," *Medienservicestelle Neue Österreicher/innen*, last modified Jan. 18, 2013, accessed Mar. 8, 2016, http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2013/01/18/weltreligionen-in-osterreich-daten-und-zahlen/.

heritage (correlating or competing collective memories), common knowledge of the past and present time, and their daily practices of switching between at least two cultural worlds. Thus, the concept of generation provides a formidable theoretical basis for examining the focus group's system of beliefs. And it serves as a category of analysis to grasp the young adults with ex-Yugoslav background as a "Generation In-Between." Either born in Austria as guest workers' grandchildren, or having fled with their parents during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, all of them share similar collective memories and social experiences. When comparing their living standards with those of their peers in the Yugoslav successor states—countries they or their grandparents had left behind—they may have the impression of facing better living standards. At the same time, they may perceive themselves as being disadvantaged compared to Austrian peers, a fact highlighted by expressions of individual experiences.²² For many years, the migrant blue color workforce has been marginalized with regards to employment, housing, education, social networks, and political participation. Even the third generation of immigrant children appear to not be as well integrated as their peers without migration backgrounds.²³

The term *migration background* has varying definitions. In general, it refers to the ancestry of the parents of affected persons, not the persons themselves, as pointed out by the Austrian Media Service Point.²⁴ However, to encapsulate all young adults of ex-Yugoslav origin, we talk about the "ex-Yugoslav background," regardless of their birthplace and actual citizenship. From a statistical point of view, citizens with ex-Yugoslav migration

22 Result of the discussion of generations at the book presentation "Generation In-Between: The Children of the Balkan Wars. Getting to Know a Crucial Generation," at the University of Vienna on March 10, 2016. As some participants emphasized, at school, for example, they had to prove themselves more than their peers without migration background.

23 Fabian Georgi, "The Politics of Adaptation and Integration in Austria: European Migration Centre," *emz-berlin.de* (2003), 14, accessed Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/IntPol_Austria.pdf; Stephen Castles, "Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?" *International Migration Review* 40, no. 4 (2006): 741-766; for further critical points see Rainer Bauböck, ed., *Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation; IMISCOE Reports* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press 2006); Jochen Blaschke and Bastian Vollmer, *Employment for Immigration in the European Union* (Berlin: Parabolis, 2004); Ulrike Davy and Harald Waldrauch, eds., *Die Integration von Einwanderern: Ein Index der rechtlichen Diskriminierung* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2001).

24 "Migrationshintergrund': ForscherInnen uneinig," *Medienservicestelle Neue Österreicher/innen*, last modified Mar. 15, 2012, accessed Dec. 5, 2016, http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2012/03/15/forscher-migrationshintergrund-sensibel-verwenden/; Silvia Nadjivan, "(In)Visibilities of migration backgrounds in Austria," in *Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade: Proceedings of the 9th DRC Summer School*, ed. István Tarrósy and Susan Milford (Pécs: Publikon, 2013), 43-57.

backgrounds have about half less housing area than non-immigrants.²⁵ And as in previous years, after finishing their academic studies, young adults with an ex-Yugoslav (and also Turkish) migration background still have more difficulties in finding an appropriate job than those without a migration background.²⁶ As a result, the members of Generation In-Between in Austria observe their peers leading clearly more privileged lives.

However, due to both these previously mentioned migration flows to Austria (the so-called guest workers movement since the 1960s and the refugee movement during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s), the relatively high number of Generation In-Between members lead to their increasing political, economic, social, and cultural importance. Of interest to us, therefore, were the social media self-representation and socializing processes among these young adults with ex-Yugoslav migration backgrounds.

Backstage Discourses on the *Kosmo* Facebook Page

In our study, we analyzed the postings of our focus group on Facebook, which has proved to be one of the most influential social network sites globally. Facebook can be defined as a “hybrid space that challenges the traditional distinctions such as offline and online, and private and public.”²⁷ It more or less shows what its members seem to do “right now” by offering the possibility to post everyday information, photos and statements. It also reveals fading distinctions between the public and private sphere, “because there is no critical point where online activities can be defined as private as opposed to public.” Therefore, “Facebook could be understood as a public sphere where individual users contribute with private postings and through their activities negotiate the degree of intimacy.”²⁸ And finally Facebook interlinks mass and personal communication so that boundaries between one-way and two-way communication are disappearing. As a

25 Statistik Austria, “Mikrozensus-Wohnungserhebung 2014; Jahresdurchschnitt über alle Wochen. Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten,” *Migration & Integration: Zahlen, Daten, Indikatoren* (Wien 2015), 77.

26 Hilde Weiss and Anne Unterwurzacher, “Soziale Mobilität durch Bildung? Bildungsbeteiligung von MigrantInnen,” in *2. Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht*, ed. Heinz Fassmann (Wien: Drava Verlag, 2007), 227-241 (here 229); Roland Verwiebe and Melek Hacıoglu, “Berufseinstiege von AkademikerInnen mit Migrationshintergrund: Projektbericht,” *medienservicestelle.at* (March 2014), 21, accessed Dec. 20, 2016, http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/IBIB_Berufseinstiege_von_AkademikerInnen_mit_Migrationshintergrund_Projektbericht_2014.pdf.

27 Gunn Sara Enli and Nancy Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online: Exploring Facebook,” *Observatorio (OBS*) Journal* 6, no. 1 (2012): 87-105 (here 91).

28 Ibid., 92.

result, Facebook users are simultaneously producers and recipients of media content. They have the possibility to share their opinions relating to news on various local, regional and international events. The Facebook interface and infrastructure gives its users the impression of being part of a global community, which is additionally supported by the fact that this global social network is independent from territorial borders.²⁹

In contrast to the nation as an “imagined community” (according to Benedict Anderson), Facebook appears as an “online community based on social relationships rather than geographical territories.”³⁰ However, this essay will show that this so-called online community is discursively composed of permanently changing imagined communities with varying loyalties and enmities which by themselves are embedded and expressed in specific power relations so that the constructions of loyalties and distinctions are always changing.

In terms of methodology, the first step of the analysis was to collect and extract Internet threads that were written by Austrian young adults with an ex-Yugoslav background and dealt with topics of faith and religion. Therefore, we relied on the ethno magazine *Kosmo*, which is produced and published by people of ex-Yugoslav origin in Vienna. Due to the focus on its target group, Austrian residents with ex-Yugoslav migration background—the so-called ex-YU community—the monthly magazine *Kosmo* uses the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language(s), or BCS. Moreover, as *Kosmo* is partly available online and has a separate Facebook page, it turned out to be a most appropriate source to start with. The Facebook page in particular is highly frequented by Generation In-Between, a fact that is proved by the parallel use of German as well as Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language(s). Sometimes, even Cyrillic postings can be found.

Due to the fact that *Kosmo* editors regularly post topics on their Facebook page that inspire a huge number of comments, we compiled a corpus of sources from selected topics from the year 2016 that directly or indirectly touched questions of religion. The corpus includes twenty-eight topics such as wearing headscarves, feeling at home in Austria, or homosexuality/homophobia.³¹

29 Ibid., 92-94.

30 Ibid., 95.

31 The source base is compiled by individual comments which we do not claim to represent a whole generation. We took screenshots from all comments we have analyzed to make sure that the sources are available even if they are removed from the *Kosmo* Facebook-page. Quotes from users are designated with their abbreviated user names and the time of publishing the comment. All comments that are taken from the *Kosmo* Facebook-page and translated into English, serve as responses to postings from the *Kosmo* editors advertising new articles in their magazine.

A factor that is usually problematic for privacy reasons turned out to be a highly important advantage for our research: the condition of already being registered on Facebook and having a profile in order to comment on a *Kosmo* posting. Individuals who want to participate in online networks like Facebook are obliged to register themselves by setting up a Facebook account or other online identity.³² On the basis of posted photographs, shared videos and self-descriptions, we were able to assume with some probability that the users belonged to our focused generation. Other important variables for profiling the users was—apart from the visual self-representation and language use (in the cases of German or BCS)—also the style young people wrote their comments in, particularly in regard to the use of emojis or pictograms. According to the semiotician Marcel Danesi, the use of emojis depends on age and peers, which means it mostly appears in the communication of younger generations, including Generation In-Between.³³ The same can be assumed for the use of abbreviations like “lol,” which stands for “laughing out loud.” A visual expression of “lol” is meanwhile the emoji or the pictograph “Face with Tears of Joy” which proved to be highly popular among all collected postings. Incidentally, in 2015, this emoji was selected by the internationally well-respected *Oxford Dictionary* as the word of the year, although it was just a pictograph, without any words at all.³⁴ In our project, we identified and scrutinized the collected Facebook postings including religiously connoted statements that were often underlined by such pictographs in order to reveal specific discourse patterns.

With the aid of the discourse analytic approach of Siegfried Jäger, the collected threads were then assigned to specific discourse strings.³⁵ The main question herein was to what extent are religiousness and self-representations and perceptions of the so-called “other” interrelated? Moreover, to what extent are religiousness and self-representations interlinked with debates among young adults with ex-Yugoslav migration background? Given that knowledge, norms, and values are produced in a specific discourse representing specific power relations, we define discourse in accordance with the sociologist Reiner Keller as “identifiable ensembles of cognitive and normative devices. These devices are produced, actualized, performed, and transformed in social practices (not necessary, but often, language use) at

32 Enli and Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online,” 88.

33 Marcel Danesi, *The Semiotics of Emoji: The Rise of Visual Language in the Age of the Internet* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016).

34 “Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year is the Tear of Joy Emoji,” *BBC*, Nov. 17, 2015, accessed Dec. 20, 2016, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34840926/oxford-dictionaries-word-of-the-year-is-the-tears-of-joy-emoji>.

35 Siegfried Jäger, *Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung* (Münster: Unrast-Verlag, 2004).

different social, historical and geographical places. [...] Discourses in this sense constitute social realities of phenomena ... [and] are realized by social actors' practices and activities."³⁶ As Keller tells us, the power to enforce their own interpretation or discourse depends on the resources available for social actors. Thus, the teaching of "common knowledge" is not focused on, but rather the social production of knowledge within differing public sectors, or identifiable and distinct institutional, and thus permanent, fields of society.³⁷

A novelty about social media like Facebook is the fading distinction between the public and the private sphere. However, a fruitful approach for our study is offered by the sociologist Anders Persson. Instead of drawing distinctions between the public and the private sphere regarding social media representations and socializing processes, Persson directs the attention to the difference between frontstage discourse and backstage discourse.³⁸ Referring to Erving Goffman's³⁹ concept of the frontstage and backstage performances and behavior, Persson compares (offline) face-to-face communication with online person-to-person interaction, or "computer-mediated" and delayed "ping-pong" interaction, and comes to the conclusion that social media brings backstage discourse to the front.⁴⁰ Due to the physical absence of an audience, the impression (illusion) of anonymity, and a consequently lacking "interaction order" of respectful behavior, users are seduced to articulate themselves in a way that would be inappropriate in face-to-face communication.⁴¹

"Social media entail the creation of a private place in public, the backstage nature of which is underscored in that the individual is often actually in his or her private physical back region when the communication occurs." As a "self-centered social medium," the blog can be seen as a mostly "backstage medium."⁴² Therefore, the collected postings do not represent public, not to mention reflective, debates on various topics in relation to religiousness, but rather a spontaneous backstage discourse mostly characterized by self-representations more or less interlinked with religiousness.

36 Reiner Keller, "Analysing Discourse: An Approach From the Sociology of Knowledge [33 paragraphs]," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 6, no. 3 (2005), accessed Dec. 20, 2016, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0503327>.

37 Ibid.

38 Anders Persson, "Front- and Backstage in Social Media," *Language, Discourse & Society* 1, no. 2 (2012): 15-17.

39 Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (University of Edinburgh: Social Sciences Research Centre, 1956).

40 Persson, "Front- and Backstage in Social Media," 21.

41 Ibid., 22-23.

42 Ibid., 23.

Conjunctions of Religiousness

Due to various developments in recent years, particularly current migration movements, religion and religiousness (or even religiosity, as a pejorative term for religiousness) became a new, highly important political and social factor not only in Austria, but also throughout Europe and worldwide.⁴³ In religiously plural and disparate societies like Austria, negotiation processes about the importance and relevance of religious symbols and achievements must be made possible and opened up in the common social coexistence. Christian-Jewish and Western influences are no longer sufficient as a framework to meet the strongly divergent needs of different groups and generations in European societies in the twenty-first century.

Additionally, secularization processes of the societies are still continuing, while processes of an “individualization of religion,”⁴⁴ as well as a diversification and optimization of religious contents and rituals, are emerging, which lead to new and complex forms of religiosity. Religiousness is now no longer bound by religious institutions, but instead based on the diversity of competing religious and quasi-religious offerings outside the churches. We have to acknowledge the production of individually selected and mixed religiousness as “multireligious collages of religious convictions.” In this sense, there is not only one religiousness that exists. Instead, a “variety of attitudes, experiences and behaviors” can be found so that consequently religiousness exists in the sense of a fundamental setting that is expressed through diverse attitudes, experiences, and behaviors.⁴⁵ This kind of patchwork-religiousness and multiple forms of religion do not pre-suppose a fixed or declared membership but instead are based on a voluntary basis with a temporary character.⁴⁶ The basis for these multi-option religious practices are, therefore, community selection, evaluation, exchange, and negotiation processes, which are conveyed essentially through social media. This is also true for

43 Ulrich Willems and Michael Minkenberg, “Politik und Religion im Übergang: Tendenzen und Forschungsfragen am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,” in *Politik und Religion*, ed. Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 13-41 (here 32).

44 Ulrich Beck, *Der eigene Gott: Die Individualisierung der Religion und der Geist der Weltgesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).

45 Gert Pickel, *Religionssoziologie: Eine Einführung in zentrale Themenbereiche* (Wiesbaden, 2011), 401.

46 Ronald Hitzler, Anne Honer and Michaela Pfadenhauer, “Zur Einleitung: ‘Ärgerliche’ Gesellungsgebilde,” in *Posttraditionale Gemeinschaften: Theoretische und ethnographische Erkundungen*, ed. Ronald Hitzler, Anne Honer and Michaela Pfadenhauer (Wiesbaden, 2008), 9-31.

young adults, like Generation In-Between, as they have the possibility to communicate with peers in Austria as well as in Yugoslav successor states.

As a matter of fact, we draw conjunctions, first between religiousness and the self-representations in connection to Austria, Europe, and the Balkans, secondly between religiousness and collective memories within the “Yugo” or “ex-YU” community, and lastly between religiousness and imaginations of femininities/masculinities, and gender roles and orders.

Religiousness is, as previously mentioned, not based on fixed religious membership, but instead on voluntary activities with a temporary character. Conjunctions between religiousness and self-representation in opposition to the so-called “other” also vary depending on the specific context, embedded in specific power relations. This constellation embodies a “complex triangular” relation among the self, the other, and object/representation.⁴⁷ With regards to the analyzed Facebook postings, the *self* is embodied by the user or communicator, the *other* by the respondent, or audience in general, or third persons, and the *object/representation* is illustrated by the topic that is discussed in relation to religiousness. It is worth noting that religiousness hardly ever plays an important role, but is rather arbitrarily referred to when felt to be appropriate for the communicator.

Within this self-other-object triangle, social representations offer various possible identities to adopt “in relation to the symbolic field of culture.”⁴⁸ When entering the online network Facebook as a specific social field, individuals participate in processes of reproducing and negotiating meanings, values, and norms. So, “the production, circulation and reception of representations [...] always take place in complex and specific contexts,”⁴⁹ embedded in concrete power relations. Social representations moreover convey “the meanings related to an object as well as the positions towards that object.” In that sense, “social identities ‘reflect individuals’ efforts to situate themselves in their societies”⁵⁰ according to specific values and norms. That all takes place in communication processes embedded in specific power relations and social hierarchies. So, identities and concepts of oneself and the so-called other are discursively constructed and negotiated. As a process, this can be defined as “doing identities.”⁵¹ Values and

47 Eleni Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relations,” *Papers on Social Representations* 19 (2010): 14.1-14.13 (here 14.2).

48 Ibid.

49 Enli and Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online,” 89.

50 Gerard Duveen and Barbara Lloyd, “The Significance of Social Identities,” *British Journal of Social Psychology* 25 (1986): 219-230 (here 220), quoted in Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relation,” 14.2.

51 Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relation,” 14.4.

norms within a society are also the product of concrete power relations and dynamics.⁵² In that sense, social representation as a way of self-legitimation refers to internalized values and norms and changes relating to concrete situations and settings.

Between Religiousness and Self-Representations

Our research showed that those postings that were directly addressing religious topics such as the Orthodox “Slava” tradition—feasts celebrated for Orthodox saints—were hardly commented on by anyone.⁵³ It was rather postings only indirectly or even tangentially dealing with religious topics that offered occasions for religiously connoted statements and postings from Generation In-Between members.⁵⁴ Moreover, religiousness did not play an important role in the first comments on a *Kosmo* posting. It was much more often the case that during a heated discussion, users posted phrases such as “I am following the Bible,”⁵⁵ or “When you are a Christian, you should show that you understand what it means to be Christian.”⁵⁶ Both comments, however, referred to Christianity when calling for the respect of human rights. As phenomena of the Facebook backstage discourse, which does not offer an interface for profound or philosophical discussions on religiousness, comments in general mostly proved to be ephemeral expressions. Much more obvious is that religiousness is implicitly used to draw distinctions between oneself and the other, which therefore leads to the paradoxical situation that despite the ideal of participating in a broad and equal online community, the self is set apart from a—mostly degraded—other.

According to the 2015 “Migration & Integration” report commissioned by the foreign ministry and conducted by Statistik Austria, a huge majority of people with ex-Yugoslav migration backgrounds identify themselves

52 Ibid., 14.5.

53 “Srećna slava, Begrade! [Happy feast, Belgrade!],” posting on *Kosmo* Facebook-page, June 9, 2016 by *Kosmo* editors.

54 One exception was the debate on women’s veiling that will be elaborated later on in this text.

55 “Ich richte mich nach der Bibel,” comment on *Kosmo* Facebook-page, Oct. 22, 2016 by N. I., who wrote these words in order to stress the need of respecting human rights and furthermore accepting homosexuality.

56 “Wenn du Christin bist, zeige dass du verstehst was es bedeutet eine Christin zu sein,” comment on *Kosmo* Facebook-page, Nov. 16, 2016 by G. D. T., who in a heated discussion on the current refugee movement called for understanding the situation of refugees in Austria, instead of denigrating them.

with Austria or being Austrian.⁵⁷ Feeling home in Austria or not is another discourse string we detected in the communication on the *Kosmo* Facebook page among Generation In-Between. Most of the young people stated that they felt connected to the Balkans as well as to Austria. It is not an either/or decision, but rather a both/and. We can assume that the topic of being Austrian or sharing an Austrian identity really matters for Generation In-Between by taking into consideration their self-representations.

Coming back to the backstage discourse, some comments regarding an Austrian identity give insight into the generation's inner division. As one young woman summed up: "in Austria we are foreigners or Tschuschn... in Yugo *dijaspora*, *stranci* [aliens], *bauštelci* [construction workers],"⁵⁸ which means that she feels like a foreigner or unwelcome stranger in Austria as well as in ex-Yugoslavia. Interestingly, there is more than one comment, which shows the "lost in space"⁵⁹ situation, and all of those similar statements are surrounded by "Red Heart" emojis posted by other Facebook users. The imagined community supports its members within this discourse string, as long as they share their feelings about being in-between two home countries.

So, at first stage all Facebook users seem to have the equal chance to participate in the *Kosmo* Facebook page—provided that they speak and write in German. In case somebody uses the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (BCS) language(s) in the second stage, all those who are not capable of speaking the South Slavic languages are excluded. Thus, when Generation In-Between members want to "stay among themselves" without disturbing comments of outsiders—representatives of the now-excluded Austrian majority—they immediately switch to their common mother tongues. At that stage, they understand each other, no matter if typical Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian expressions are in use. The common link among these participants is characterized by individual experiences of marginalization and discrimination within the Austrian majority society. So, now within this protected sphere, they turn the tables and exclude Austrians, who are ironically also named "Švabos,"⁶⁰ the South Slavic modification of the German *Schwaben* (Swabians). At that stage, religiousness does show

57 Statistik Austria, "migration & integration: zahlen. daten. indikatoren 2016," *integrationsfonds.at* (Wien 2016), 17, accessed Jan. 24, 2017, <http://www.integrationsfonds.at/fileadmin/content/migrationintegration-2016.pdf>.

58 "in AT sind wir Ausländer, Tschuschn...in Yugo 'dijaspora, stranci, bauštelci'," comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Oct. 26, 2016 by L. M. The term *Tschuschn*, a discriminating term for ex-Yugoslav migrants, etymologically originates in the Habsburg Monarchy.

59 "lost in space," comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Oct. 26, 2016 by S. B.

60 "Und zum Punkt 'swabo' – Dođi Švabo, da vidiš gde je srpski Tekeriš!," April 28, 2016 by K. T.

hardly any relevance for self-representation in distinction to the other, i.e. the German speaking users, and for creating a common ex-Yugoslav community.

For Generation In-Between, their *roots* seem to be important for their identity building process and should not be forgotten. For example, one user expressed concerns about the loss of a Balkan identity for the next generations, because they increasingly prefer to speak German at home. Taking a look at the *Kosmo* Facebook comments, the grammatical mistakes in Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian writings are obvious. It seems as if a correct written text is not important, neither in BCS language(s) nor in German. Quite the contrary, the commenters joke about some mixed words and phrases and simply switch between both languages, more or less correctly used, within one comment. This underlines their cynic interpretation of being in-between.

The imagined community stands together against comments from outsiders. In defense of knowing the German language quite as well as Austrians, one Facebook user highlighted his perfect German, which has been reflected in his graduation work. Members of this generation make clear that they are as hardworking, diligent, and responsible as those Austrians citizens without migration backgrounds. Moreover, the often self-appointed “Yugo” group is able to handle injurious comments by racist and xenophobic users quite well and self-confidently, which becomes possible through the building of a strong online community. Regarding the “Yugo” group, which proves to be a “hybrid” sphere, the members are shown to have a lot in common and express their commonalities through language and feelings (with the aid of emojis), but without religion. It is reminiscent of Tito’s time: standing together requires avoiding touching upon sensitive topics such as religion, history, or nation states, while at the same time stressing the commonness, which in today’s case means having a migrant background and some kind of feeling of living in exile, neither here nor there.

The ex-Yugoslav community quickly loses its apparent unity, however, when religion comes into play. In the socialist state of former Yugoslavia, religious practices were defined as part of the private sphere, and therefore marginalized; the ex-Yugoslav heritage of the Titoist slogan “brotherhood and community” may implicitly still serve as a common reference. Addressing religion or religiousness may, however, imply feelings about nation. As nationalisms have referred to existing religions in South East Europe during the 19th century, the Croatian nationhood now consists of the Catholic religion, while the Serbian

one refers to the Orthodox religion.⁶¹ In the course of destabilizing and destroying the Yugoslav state, former communist leaders misused religion in order to stay in power and to create new nation states on the basis of heretofore-marginalized religions. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were therefore constructed as religious wars, silencing concrete power and socio-economic interests of the warring political elites.⁶² The newly established post-Yugoslav states, however, revealed drastic contradictions between national(istic) narratives and the broad ethnic and religious spectrum of their inhabitants.⁶³

Against the background of specific (liberal or xenophobic) narratives shared within their families and social milieus, Generation In-Between members show more or less nationalist, religiously connoted, or even nationalist-clerical positions, even in postings about Austrian or European political issues. The young people transfer their heritage in knowledge they think they might use for European or Austrian topics, like the refugee movements since 2014 or the presidential elections in 2016. In that sense, the “Yugo” group is quite outstanding, because they form their own mixed social realities concerning the past and the present, which is mirrored in their self-representations.

We then discovered those topics that conjured different opinions along nationalist and religious attitudes. Especially inner political or European issues, such as the presidential election or refugee movements in 2016 revealed a dividing line between two camps. On the one hand, there were users who openly supported Alexander Van der Bellen during the presidential elections in 2016 and expressed their anger against members from the other camp, who voted for Norbert Hofer with the intention to endorse his restrictive policy regarding refugees and asylum seekers. The discourse strings of Austrian domestic politics, today’s refugee movements, and memories or narratives from the past always get intertwined

61 Holm Sundhaussen, *Experiment Jugoslawien: Von der Staatsgründung bis zum Staatszerfall* (Mannheim: Meyers Forum, 1992), 9-15; Ernest Gellner, *Nationalismus und Moderne* (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1991), 87-90.

62 Mary Kaldor, *Neue und alte Kriege: Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 82, 95; Radivoj Cvetičanin, “Serbian Media in the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution,” in *The War Started at Maksimir: Hate Speech in the Media*, ed. Velimir Čurgus Kazimir (Belgrade: Media Center, 1997), 71-96 (here 72).

63 Serbia consists also of a Croatian population, and there are still Serbs living in Croatia. Besides, Muslims are living in Croatia and Serbia, while Sandžak and Christians live in Kosovo—not to mention the highly diverse population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Matjaž Klemenčič and Mitja Žagar, *The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Source Book* (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2004).

and thus generate two camps that often argue in their postings with religious motivations.

There are some comments from young people, mostly women, who show concerns or even fear about a future possibility in Austria where Hofer or the right populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) holds the power. In that case, they would struggle more than today, due to their migration and additionally their Muslim backgrounds. Furthermore, they feared being excluded from the Austrian collective identity, which they see based on Christianity as propagated by the FPÖ party.

On the other hand, there were users who tried to persuade the online community to vote for the FPÖ⁶⁴ in order to get rid of the refugees. Those users were mostly not members of Generation In-Between, but older people, often the generation of their parents, i.e. the second generation.⁶⁵

We can observe that Generation In-Between members experienced a ground-shaking identity crisis caused by the interplay of national and international shifts to the right, and their perception of religiously based arguments about political issues.⁶⁶ Some young members of the *Kosmo* Facebook community seemed to be quite upset about religiously connoted political comments. Such reactions might result from the influence of family and social milieu beliefs that the combination of politics and religion can lead to war. One young woman posted: “The only shame is that no one of you has read what he [Hofer] wants for this state! All [people] only heard about one topic *Asylant Asylant Asylant* [pejorative German term for asylum seeker], what about the rest? No one has a clue! That means someone of us works all the time and suddenly loses the job and gets nothing. This is indeed fine!”⁶⁷

64 In order to attract possible voters with Serbian migration background, the FPÖ also uses strategies such as not recognizing Kosovo’s independence which of course does not show to be a guarantee for more votes among this group. So, other more actual populist xenophobic performances are used as well.

65 Such new expressions of xenophobia show that the older generations (the first and the second ones) feel so well integrated in Austria that they openly express their negative feelings against current refugee and migration movements. That was brought up by the deputy Alev Korun from the Austrian Green Party during the panel discussion “Natürlich ging ich weg...’: 50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen mit dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien” [‘Of course I left...’: 50 years of the agreement on labour recruitment with former Yugoslavia] in the Austrian parliament in Vienna on December 13, 2016. The panel discussion was organized by Emina Adamović from the “Initiative Minderheiten” [Minorities Initiative] in cooperation with Alev Korun and the Green Party.

66 There are a lot of comments that stressed the personal observation that the interplay of politics and religion is scary and growing.

67 “Sramota je samo to, sto niko od vas nije procitao sta on hoce za ovu drzavu! Svi samo culi jednu temu *Asylant Asylant Asylant*, a ostalo? Nema niko pojma! Znaci neko od nas, radi citavo vrijeme od jednom dobije otkaz i ne dobija nista. Bas je to fino!,” comment on *Kosmo*’s Facebook-page, on April 29, 2016, by M. O. D.

Another young woman photographed her ballot paper of the presidential elections after checking the box “Van der Bellen” and posted it on her Facebook account. There seems to be a strong Muslim community worried about their future in the country that once saved them. So, the notion of a safe and secure home appears to be stronger than feelings of love for Austria or Europe. One posting of a young woman shows an anxious and victimized position: “FPÖ has always been against foreigners and especially now against Muslims, don’t forget that, he [Hofer] wants to put all foreigner in the second class.”⁶⁸

Between Religiousness and Collective Memories

Due to the fact that Generation In-Between mostly grew up in Austria, they have internalized different and even competing narratives from the past, passed on by their parents and grandparents who either live in Austria or in the Yugoslav successor states. Postings indicate that this generation is highly interested in the history of the Balkans, not only in recent wars, but also in the time of former Yugoslavia and before. Additionally, the transferred narratives they post are either uncertain, unfinished or contested, or very convinced and therefore nationalistic. Comparing the voiced narratives and collective memories of ex-Yugoslav migrants, the structure and the dynamics of the intra-generational backstage discourse shows different worldviews of young adults who grew up in Austria, compared to those of their parents or elder siblings. Fragmentary images of the past that are absorbed and formed by Generation In-Between fit into their migrant and in-between lives in Austria. Their remembrance culture as a specificity of their youth culture conquers the narratives of their older family members.

The Slovenian psychologist Marija Kuzmanić highlighted the “utterly dialogical relationship” between identity and (collective) memory in her article about the memories of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.⁶⁹ One has to acknowledge the importance of collective memories for the creation of individual and group identities. Collective memories emerge from the process of remembering, forgetting, representing and identifying and are organized in narrations that provide the structures for this process. They are therefore

68 “[...] FPÖ je uvijek bio protiv Ausländera a pogotovo sad protiv muslimana, nezabori to, on hoće da stavi sve auslāndere u drugu klasu,” comment on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page on April 29, 2016, by A. B.

69 Marija Kuzmanić, “Collective Memory and Social Identity: A Social Psychological Exploration of the Memories of the Disintegration of Former Yugoslavia,” *Psihološka obzorja / Horizons of Psychology* 17, no. 2 (2008): 5-26 (here 9).

linked to the concept of social representations and essential to consider in research about “historical transition or rupture,” as in our case disintegration, war, or refugee movements. “Taken together, current social representations determine our memories of the past and are, at the same time, sustained by them. Memories and representations ‘feed’ group or social identities, but, in turn, they are also determined by people’s membership of particular groups.”⁷⁰ In fact, they contribute to the concept of *generation*.

Discussing history is much more dividing than talking about Austrian issues, and it proves to also be an alternative, anonymous, emotional, and often shameless form of exchange within the generation. If a comment attacks Kosovo for its independence, for example, or Serbia for not recognizing Kosovo’s independence, the answers follow national(ist) lines. The backstage discourse within the online “Yugo” (or ex-YU) community serves to them as a vehicle to provoke, to speak out opinions and narratives that are better not stated face-to-face, and therefore function as a coping strategy. The closed sphere of ex-Yugoslav migrants, which is guaranteed by using BCS language(s), indicates a strong need for exchanging, opposing or defending narratives among members of Generation In-Between.

One *Kosmo* article that was shared on the magazine’s Facebook page dealt with the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. The title of the *Kosmo* story was “Serbia threatens Kosovo,” which led to an impromptu discussion including, for example, postings about the wish to understand the conflict; but also centuries-old narratives came to surface, as one young man commented: “Why should Serbia threaten Kosovo, for Serbian people Kosovo is their holy land! And it still hurts if someone dances on it... it was brutally ripped off...”⁷¹ On the top of his Facebook page, he presents a photograph of an Orthodox church, and in his timeline there is a collection of pictures full of religiously and politically mixed symbols. Religion serves not only as legitimation for a national Serbian master narrative—including that Kosovo belonged to Serbia—but also for the feeling of being treated unjustly and misunderstood. His self-representation shows his belief in the Serbian Orthodox community that conserves the narratives of the former “golden times”⁷² and today’s injustice brought by the West (he posted a drawing of Slobodan Milošević tearing the American flag). Another young

70 Ibid., 9–10.

71 “Wieso sollte serbien kosovo drohen, wenn die Serben das als heiliges Land sehen ! Und es weiterhin weh tut wenn man da herumtanzt... es wurde brutal weggerissen...,” comment on *Kosmo*’s Facebook-page, Oct. 27, 2016 by B. III. The use of the Cyrillic alphabet might be understood as a support of the old, orthodox Christianity, described as the authentic one in contrast to the Western one, accused of being decadent.

72 Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 45.

man expresses his worldviews through posting symbols of the national football-club Delija, which holds a strong friendship to other clubs based on the common Orthodox faith, like Spartak Moscow.

As we have shown, narratives rooted in the Middle Ages as well as in the recent Yugoslav wars are discussed by the Generation In-Between. Narratives from the Second World War especially mark another referential horizon for this generation and are still very much present in their collective memory.⁷³ “I have fun seeing angry Četniks [like you], just be annoyed about it [Kosovo] until you tumble down,”⁷⁴ was a comment of one young man. The term “Četnik” refers to supporters of the Serbian King since the 1930s and during the Yugoslav civil war during the Second World War (1941-1945).⁷⁵ From those days on, a “Četnik” was a metaphor for an orthodox Serb, most probably a monarchist, in delineation to the catholic Croats who are labeled as “Ustaše” and who supported the German Nazi regime during the Second World War.

We can assume that religion, especially in combination with war guilt, still plays an important role for Generation In-Between. The Second World War often serves as an aid to talk about issues from the 1990s because young adults have much more distance to events that happened more than seventy years ago. Additionally, popular national narratives that often go hand in hand with religion allude to historical events and heroes several centuries ago, such as the (Serbian) Empire of Zar Lazar, which was also brought up in such discussions. Religion therefore serves as a marker along national lines, which is often reflected in the Facebook profiles of this generation’s members. Remarkably, historical events and developments are referred to in a selective and ahistorical matter, for instance by neglecting a timeline that spans more than 500 years. According to such a nationalist-clerical logic, all historical events may appear at the same time, where the living might feel the support of their ancestors and deceased, in a “permanent presence,” as the social anthropologist Ivan Čolović argues.⁷⁶ Such narratives include

73 Mila Dragojevic, “Memory and Identity: Intergenerational Narratives of Violence Among Refugees in Serbia,” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 6 (2013): 1065-1082.

74 “mir macht richtig Spaß wenn ich wütende Cetniks sehe, also ärgere dich bis zum umfallen,” comment on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page, June 24, 2016 by J. M.

75 Wolfgang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, *Gemeinsame Geschichte? Ein Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen*, 66-67, 97, 100-102.

76 Ivan Čolović, “Die Erneuerung des Vergangenen: Zeit und Raum in der zeitgenössischen politischen Mythologie,” in *Bosnien und Europa: Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft*, ed. Nenad Stefanov and Michael Werz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 90-103; Ivan Čolović, *Bordell der Krieger: Folklore, Politik und Krieg*, translated by Katharina Wolf-Giesshaber (Osnabrück: fibre, 1994), 12.

clearly defined, bipolar images between Us and Them, whereas masculinities are not contested, in contrast to the issues addressed in the following chapter.

Between Religiousness and Gender

Issues such as homosexuality (often provoking homophobia), as well as Muslim women's veiling, reveal close conjunctions between religiousness and gender. Similar to the previously mentioned social practice of "doing identities," the feminist concept of "doing gender" also points to the social construction of gender.⁷⁷ Gender relations form power relations as well, where according to the male-female bipolar logic the knowledge production of men is perceived as more valid than the one produced by females, according to various studies mentioned by the social psychologist Eleni Andreouli.⁷⁸

According to the political scientist Eva Kreisky, the term *gender* includes the following interfering dimensions: first of all, men and women on the micro level; then masculinities and femininities, and consequently gender roles and gender relations, on the meso level; and finally gender order—or gender regime—on the macro level, and gender ideologies on the meta level (such as nationalisms for instance).⁷⁹ Both topics, homosexuality and Muslim women's veiling, show that the deeply emotional backstage discourse is mostly focused on masculinities and femininities, gender roles as well as gender order. Remarkably, these gender-related discussions were predominantly conducted in German, not in Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, since nationalities or ethnicities appeared not to be important therein.

With respect to homosexuality, postings—not surprisingly—either illustrated the acceptance of homosexuality as a part of an enlightened and liberal society that fosters human rights and freedom of expression, or they showed traditionalist, sexist, and homophobic points of view. Arguments

77 Regine Gildemeister, "Doing Gender: Soziale Praktiken der Geschlechterunterscheidung," in *Handbuch der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung: Theorie, Methoden, Empirie*, ed. Ruth Becker and Beate Kortendiek (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), 137-145.

78 Andreouli, "Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relation," 14.3.

79 Eva Kreisky, "Staatenlenker und Staatsdiener': Männlichkeiten im Bild des Staates," summary by Martin Weidinger and Marion Löffler of a lecture during the lecture series "Staatsfiktionen," Dec. 10, 2009, 1-5 (here 4), accessed Jan. 30, 2017, http://evakreisky.at/2009-2010/ring-vo/Kreisky_Maennlichkeiten.pdf; Eva Kreisky, "Männlichkeit regiert die Welt: Ein exemplarischer Rückblick; der Krieg im Kosovo als Arena von Männlichkeiten; Zur Relevanz der Dekodierung von Geschlechtlichkeit," accessed Feb. 3, 2017, http://evakreisky.at/onlinetexte/maennlichkeit_kreisky.php.

in this second illiberal and homophobic point of view often referred to nature and religion, such as: “Adam and Stevo were sent to earth by God; buy the Bible; what should be O.K. here?”⁸⁰ It is worth noting that homosexuality was only discussed in relation to men, not in relation to women, not to mention lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer movements (LGTBQ). So, self-representation is based here (by a young man) on the concept of heterosexual normality, while the so-called other is thought to be “abnormal.” The short reference to the Bible serves to legitimate the poster’s own position where nature, normality, and religion seem to form one unity and unmistakably regulate heteronormative gender roles and relations.

Interestingly, as a counterpart answer, a female contributor just—from an obviously agnostic or atheist point of view—deconstructs the religious connotation in the following: “Your God would not tolerate it? How can you presume to speak in his name? To judge? You think that everything was created by God, right?”⁸¹ The self-representation in distinction to the other is defined here in accordance to faith, believing in God or not.

Although the postings within this backstage discourse mostly do not show highly reflected elaborations on religion in relation to gender roles, but rather reveal short cynical statements combined with various pictographs, meaningfully underlining the personal cynical perspective, they all reveal differing and even controversial experiences among Generation In-Between. Rising ethno-nationalisms in former Yugoslavia since the 1980s and the violent dissolution and wars on its territory during the 1990s went hand in hand with Catholicism, Serbian Orthodoxy, Islam, and therefore with patriarchy, re-traditionalism, and xenophobia.⁸² All those developments, changes, and disruptions determined the values and habits within the post-Communist societies. That all influenced the highly diverse Generation In-Between, whether born in Austria as guest workers’ grandchildren, or arriving here as refugees.

80 “Ah jaaa Adam und Stevo wurden von Gott auf die Welt geschickt kauf dir die Bibel was soll da OK sein!?,“ comment on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page, Nov. 12, 2016 by E. E.

81 “Euer Gott würde es nicht tolerieren? Wie könnt ihr euch nur anmaßen in seinem Namen zu sprechen? Zu (ver)-urteilen? Ihr denkt doch, dass alles von Gott geschaffen wurde, right?,” comment on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page, Nov. 12, 2016 by L. N.

82 Patricia Albanese, “Nationalism, War, and Archaization of Gender Relations in the Balkans,” *Violence Against Women* 7, no. 9 (2001): 999-1023 (here 1005-1009); Silvia Nadjivan and Stefanie Wöhl, “Women’s Political Participation and Representation in South Eastern Europe: Introduction,” *Der Donauraum* 51, no. 2 (2011): 89-118 (here 107-110); see further: Mirjana Morokvasić, “The Logics of Exclusion: Nationalism, Sexism and the Yugoslav War,” in *Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies*, ed. Nickie Charles and Helen Hintjens (London 1998), 65-90; Jelena Batinić, “Feminism, Nationalism, and War: the ‘Yugoslav Case’ in Feminist Text,” *Journal of International Women’s Studies* 3, no. 1 (2001): 2-24.

However, religious attitudes among this generation do not only show a new acceptance of national traditions in Austria, but rather a new form of youth culture, which the backstage discourse on Muslim women's veiling proves. Sociologists such as Maruta Herding even speak of a new Islamic youth culture, which inspires the music, fashion, and media sphere in Western Europe.⁸³ According to Herding, this new youth culture is characterized by "halal fun" that "opposes two adverse concepts: on the one hand that of having fun without any moral barriers and without a dedication to God, and on the other, the concept of being purely religious without any generation-specific means of expression."⁸⁴ Of course, on the *Kosmo* Facebook page, hardly anyone declared him- or herself as being religious, agnostic, or atheist within the first posting. But in the course of several statements, it was possible to reconstruct many users' self-representation in distinction to others'. The emotionally charged debate on the Muslim women's veiling especially enabled us to capture this new form of youth culture.

With its highly charged question about being for or against a burka ban in Austria, the *Kosmo* team provoked various parallel, long-lasting, and partly polemic discussions. The positions ranged from the advocacy of the burka ban, to a partial prohibition and ultimately a strict rejection of banning all veiling. While the necessity of adapting to the Austrian society was brought up and a cynical comparison between burka wearing women and nuns was made, one short statement drew the attention to women's motivation wearing veils: "They do that for God, not for men!"⁸⁵ An immediate reaction to this posting was: "I have not read this much trash in a long time."⁸⁶

Of course, the pro and contra positions were argued intensively, and not only deeply atheist and agnostic, but also openly faithful, points of view were articulated with high self-esteem. Moreover, a kind of expert discussion arose on the question to what extent women's veiling is manifested by the Koran. Both niqab and burka opponents and veiling proponents

83 Maruta Herding, "The Conservative Avant-Garde: Islamic Youth Culture in Contemporary Western Europe," *Forum21: European Journal on Child and Youth Research* 6 (December 2010): 92-99 (here 93). This paper is based on a conference paper, presented at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Gothenburg, Sweden, July 11-17, 2010 at the Joint Session of Research Committees Sociology of Religion (RC22) and Sociology of Youth (RC34) on July 13, 2010.

84 *Ibid.*, 94.

85 "Sie machen es für Gott und nicht für ihre Männer!", comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 by S. A. D.

86 "Soviel mist habe ich schön lange nicht gelesen," comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 by E. B.

similarly referred to the Koran in order to confirm their arguments and quickly switched to BCS. Herein, one proponent even posted a link to an Islamic information portal.⁸⁷ By doing so, the proponent seemingly tried to convince the opponent by referring to the common religion and South Slavic language, while the other politely refused mixing up religion and politics and thus political Islam.

While the burka opponent was easily identifiable as a young Muslim man, the identity of the burka proponent, who obviously tried to proselytize the other one, was a lot more difficult to determine. With his or her carefully designed profile, mysterious self-representation and shared postings, the user seemed to play with identities in regards to religion and gender. The findings by the political and communication scientists Barbara Franz and Gerit Götzenbrucker could indicate that the proponent might be a young Muslim woman. Their study revealed that young Muslim women much more than their male counterparts recognize the potential danger of social media and therefore tend to use pseudonyms or ambiguous presentations in order to save and free themselves from gendered censorship.⁸⁸

An example of deconstructing religious habits was shown by another backstage discourse where a young Islamic expert who had explained the various forms of women's veiling according to the Koran was confronted with the following question by a young woman: "Why don't you and all the other men of your religion wear burkas yourselves? Why does only the woman have to cover her face or her beautiful body with those long clothes?"⁸⁹ His answer—"Don't you understand German [...]?"⁹⁰—provoked a heated discussion on integration in Austria, the correspondence of someone's own faith to another one's, and finally on proper religious practices.

Apart from interreligious debates, there was also a lot of discussion within the virtually constructed Islamic community, for instance about what "real Islam" might mean. There was a lot of polemic, which also involved denying the so-called other being a real Muslim. In contrast to former Yugoslav state socialism, religion, no matter if in the post-Yugoslav successor states

87 Putemislama: Islamski informativni portal [The Way of Islam: Islamic information portal], accessed on March 8, 2017, <https://putem-islama.com/>.

88 Barbara Franz and Gerit Götzenbrucker, "The Second Generation and the Use of the Internet: Communication and Friendship Structures of Young Turks in Vienna, Austria," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2, no. 5 (2012): 38-49 (here 42).

89 "[...] warum trägst du keine Burka bzw. alle anderen Männer euren Glaubens? Warum muss nur die Frau ihr Gesicht bzw. ihren schönen Körper mit diesen langen Stoffen bedecken?," comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 by N. M.

90 "Verstehst du kein Deutsch [...]?", comment on *Kosmo's* Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 by D. L.

or in Austria, is no longer only part of (often silenced) Yugoslav private life, but instead spreads into the public and political life, and even influences youth culture. With respect to Austria, the legal recognition of Islam is based on the “Recognition Law” of 1874 (*Anerkennungsgesetz*), where Islam was also recognized as an official religion in 1912.⁹¹ The highly polarized debates surrounding headscarf, niqab, burqa, or veiling in general are mostly characterized by two competing positions: on the one hand, veiling as a symbol of oppression and discrimination of women; and on the other, as a human right and illustration of their freedom of expression, as articulated by Islamic feminists.⁹² In Austria, where prohibitive regulations have not hitherto existed, the governing Social Democrats and People’s Party have agreed on the ban of full-face veils in public places, which has been maintained in the government’s work program for 2017/18.⁹³

Apart from heated women’s veil debates, Generation In-Between members prove to confidently choose, discuss, and contest religiously connoted self-representations, neglect religion at all, or claim real religiousness, and finally modernize all religions according to the needs of the twenty-first century. The conjunctions between religiousness and gender brought to light striking insights concerning their values, habits and orientations. Apart from a joy-oriented agnostic or atheist youth culture, a new, religiously connoted one is currently emerging and influences the Facebook backstage discourse.

Conclusion

According to our findings, the *Kosmo* Facebook page serves as an exchange platform for Generation In-Between where worldviews, meanings, and narratives are negotiated by the use of teasers touching sensible

91 Sevgi Kiliç, Sawitri Saharso and Birgit Sauer, “Introduction: The Veil. Debating Citizenship, Gender and Religious Diversity,” *Social Politics* 15, no. 4 (2008): 397-410 (here 402).

92 Masood Khan, “The Muslim Veiling: A Symbol of Oppression or a Tool of Liberation?” *UMASA Journal* 31 (2014): 1-11 (here 2-4). This so-called Islam Law of 1912 resulted from the Monarch’s decision in 1867 to guarantee constitutional equality of legally recognized churches and communities in Austria, which was extended to the provinces Bosnia and Herzegovina after their occupation in 1878. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 also led to Islam friendly policies. See Richard Potz, “Das Islamgesetz 1912 – eine österreichische Besonderheit,” *SLAK-Journal: Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis* 1 (2013): 45-54 (here 47-48).

93 “Für Österreich: Arbeitsprogramm der Bundesregierung 2017/18,” accessed on March 9, 2017, <http://archiv.bundeskanzleramt.at/DocView.axd?CobId=65201>.

topics. It provides a space for the self-appointed “Yugo group” that seems to be terribly in need for such a safe space. Members of this online community, who are strongly interconnected through common language(s), even make fun of their complicated past by sharing inside jokes and creating their own timing when talking about the recent past: “*prije rata*” (before the war), “*za vrijeme rata*” (during the war), and “*poslije rata*” (after the war).⁹⁴ Within this online community, young adults who grew up during the 1990s seem to be overrepresented and make strong use of the possibilities the platform offers. A topic about being a “Yugo-child in the 90s” gathered 326 likes, twenty-three “Haha” emojis, and one “Love” emoji.⁹⁵ Additionally, it was shared thirty-four times and commented on seventy-seven times, mostly with a lot of “Face with Tears of Joy” emojis.

The generation’s status of being in-between is also reflected in the Facebook communication among its members. From one topic to another, they replace their smiley and heart emojis with fights and accusations to the point of extremist statements. Here, backstage, everything seems to be allowed and every opinion is represented. This is what makes it a perfect space for a generation that has a lot in common, but also shows numerous differences and disagreements regarding their contested collective memories, values, and different forms of youth culture.

As a result, the backstage discourses prove to be religiously connoted along gendered distinctions as well as national(istic) lines. However, even within the same religious beliefs borders are drawn, along the question of who might be the true believer. The highly diverse Generation In-Between shows changing distinctions always depending on various reference points. Their religious patchwork setting is not stable, but rather interferes with their (changing) values, present lives, and future expectations in Austria. Instead of reproducing religious habits, these young people create new forms of social practices, in search for like-minded persons within the digital backstage or hybrid space. Finally, they seem to be able to adapt everywhere, but share the intimate feeling of belonging nowhere.

94 “Jugo-Eltern und ihre am häufigsten verwendeten Zeitformen,” posting on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page, May 20, 2016 by *Kosmo* editors.

95 “4 Dinge, von denen kein Jugo-Kind der 90er verschont blieb,” posting on *Kosmo’s* Facebook-page, March 4, 2016 by *Kosmo* editors.

The “Refugee Crisis” Today and Its Reflection in Society and the Arts

Austria Bordering Europe: Blocking and Brokering Routes Amid a Manifold Crisis

Andreas Th. Müller/Andreas Oberprantacher

Austr(al)ia is in Europe

In Austria, it is a running joke to play with the phonological proximity between Austria and Australia while emphasizing that the former should not be confused with the latter. This joke features on a variety of souvenir t-shirts warning prospective tourists that the letters “a” and “l” matter, since, unlike Australia, there are no kangaroos in Austria. At the end of Austria’s satirist video contribution to the pseudo-competition “America First (but which country is second?),” the team from the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) responsible for the country’s mock presentation referred to this popular joke by stressing that Austria—and not Australia—should be ranked second after America.¹

But as Sigmund Freud, the prominent Viennese psychoanalyst, already noted in his study *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905), in order to generate pleasure, jokes tend to “employ the device of distracting attention by putting forward something in the joke’s form of expression which catches it.”² In the case of the aforementioned running joke, it may indeed be argued that while the attention of the audience is diverted to remarkable differences between the two countries, the confusion of a minor member state at the margins of the European Union with a major country at the center of Oceania is still secretly enjoyed. But apart from this concealed *jouissance*, there is also something else that is being repressed when insisting on insurmountable differences between Austria and Australia: Austria—through large parts of its government, administration, and population—is becoming one of the most fervent European supporters and promoters of

1 Thanks are given to Mag.^a Verena Kirchmair for her support with the documentation of the present paper. See ORF – Willkommen Österreich, “Austria Second (Official Video),” accessed Mar. 6, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGoqs9wJC6E>.

2 Sigmund Freud, *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, with a biographical introduction by Peter Gay (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 186.

the “Australian model”³ of dealing with people who are crossing borders without the required documentation. Especially the Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Sobotka, and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sebastian Kurz, both politicians belonging to the right wing of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), have repeatedly called for viewing the Australian policies of pushing back “coffin boats” with asylum-seekers on board, of installing off-shore detention centers for undocumented refugees and migrants on remote islands like Manus or Nauru, and of investing in the Operation Sovereign Borders (established 2013 and on-going) as a paragon for the European Union’s own border management system.⁴

Even though none of Austria’s state borders coincide with the very borders of the European Union, except for those that are shared with the neighboring non-EU countries Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein, which have both become parties to the Schengen Agreement in 2008 and 2011 respectively, this relatively young EU-member state has been repeatedly at the European front of redefining notions of the border. Be it terms like *Obergrenze* (upper limits),⁵ introduced in the European debate by Austrian politicians in order to explore legal means to limit the number of asylum-seekers by restricting their admission to the asylum procedure, or experiments with so-called *besondere bauliche Maßnahmen* (particular constructional measures) around the Styrian district of Spielfeld, situated at the border between Austria and Slovenia, or the Tyrolean mountain pass of Brenner that links Austria to Italy, Austria has turned out to be quite an inventive key player for blocking and brokering routes to and through Europe.

In our joined paper, we plan to make sense of some of the perplexities that concern Austria’s efforts to become a chief gatekeeper of the European Union in the wider context of the manifold crisis that has become known as the European “refugee crisis,” but also as the European “migrant crisis.” Since these efforts are multidimensional, our own approach is itself

3 Cf. Suwendrini Perera, *Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and Bodies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Tania Penovic and Azdeh Dastyari, “Harm and Accountability in Transnational Detention Environments: The Case of Australia’s Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Seekers,” in *Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global and Transnational Issues*, ed. Rich Furman, Douglas Epps, and Greg Lamphear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 141-154.

4 See in this respect also the briefing addressed to the members and staff of the European Parliament: Ionel Zamfir, “Refugee and Asylum Policy in Australia: Between Resettlement and Deterrence,” *Briefing for the European Parliament* (November 2016), accessed Mar. 6, 2017, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593517/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)593517_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593517/EPRS_BRI(2016)593517_EN.pdf).

5 See chapter “What a Border Is (Not).”

transdisciplinary in the sense that our arguments will repeatedly cross the line between legal analysis and political theory while considering also related fields of scholarship. As far as the structure of our argumentation is concerned, we will first confront limited concepts of the border as a device of state sovereignty with the more comprehensive notion of borders as “border regimes” serving a plurality of (conflicting) interests. Secondly, we will discuss Austria’s ambivalent role as a “gatekeeper” in the midst of the manifold crisis dubbed the European “refugee crisis.” After that, we will try to characterize some of the most problematic traits of the Austrian interests to manage the current crises by experimenting with schemes and by advancing propositions that tend to be situated at the margins of the rule of law. And finally, we will conclude our paper with a reflection on the European asylum system which at the least claims to be based on solidarity.

What a Border Is (Not)

In a controversial interview for the German journal *Cicero*, a “magazine for political culture,” the notorious German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk said that the “postmodernist society dreams itself in a state ‘beyond border security.’ It exists in the surreal mode of border-oblivion [*Grenzenvergessenheit*]. It enjoys its existence in a culture of thin-walled containers. Where once were thick-walled borders, there are now small membranes. And these are massively overrun [trans. by AM and AO].”⁶ Such statements, which reflect popular sentiments that are typically catalyzed by right-wing pressure groups such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), or the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) in Germany, or by the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria as well as by pan-European movements like the Identitarian Movement, are significant insofar as they illustrate how the notion of the border is conventionally identified with massive border fortifications that are said to coincide with the territorial limits of the modern state.

In other words, Sloterdijk exemplifies what is frequently the case among scholars of rather conservative disciplines such as philosophy and law, two disciplines that contributed to legitimize the formation of the modern state. It is a common prejudice that archetypal borders are those maintained by states in order to separate one sovereign country from another and to

6 Peter Sloterdijk, “‘Das kann nicht gut gehen’: Peter Sloterdijk im Gespräch mit Alexander Kissler und Christoph Schwennicke über Angela Merkel, die Flüchtlinge und das Regiment der Furcht,” *Cicero: Magazin für politische Kultur* 21 (2016): 14-23 (here 21).

determine who is allowed to enter (or exit) under which conditions. What is more, Sloterdijk's arguments, echoed by intellectual companions such as Rüdiger Safranski,⁷ are also evidencing that at least in philosophical terms the Conservative Revolutionary movement, which was mostly active in the interwar period, seems to still be thriving among some European thinkers. For it was Carl Schmitt who first claimed in his post-bellum book, *The Nomos of the Earth* (1950), that modern border fortifications supported by states are basically the result of a Euclidian vision of political modernity; that is, they were born from a legal *mos geometricus*. According to his line of reasoning,

[L]ines were the first attempts to establish the dimensions and demarcations of a global spatial order. Since these lines were drawn during the first stage of the new planetary consciousness of space, they were conceived of only in terms of surface areas, i.e., superficially, with divisions drawn more or less geometrically: *more geometrico*. Later, when historical and scientific consciousness had *assimilated* (in every sense of the word) the planet down to the last cartographical and statistical details, the practical-political need not only for a geometric surface division, but for a substantive spatial order of the earth became more evident.⁸

Such preconceptions are problematic because the rhetorical figure of the infinitesimally small dividing "line" gradually evolving into substantive border fortifications usually overshadows how inconsistent the historical formation of modern states was, how many transitions, passages, and crossings between various "surface areas" existed side by side, and how the *Jus Publicum Europaeum* was implicated in the colonial disordering of the earth.⁹ They are also problematic because one—rather simplistic—definition of the border is preferred over many others that are silently neglected. In an essay entitled "What is a Border?," the French philosopher Étienne Balibar argues that the

7 See Rüdiger Safranski, "Rüdiger Safranski über den Sinn von Grenzen," in *NDR.de*, Nachdenken über... Grenzen, Mar. 29, 2016, accessed Mar. 3, 2017, <http://www.ndr.de/ndrkultur/Ruediger-Safranski-ueber-Sinn-von-Grenzen,safranski116.html>.

8 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. and annot. by Gary L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006), 86.

9 See, in contrast to Carl Schmitt's arguments, Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).

idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by definition, absurd: to mark out a border is, precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border, to assign boundaries or borders (in Greek, *horos*; in Latin, *fnis* or *terminus*; in German, *Grenze*; in French, *borne*). The theorist who attempts to define what a border is is in danger of going round in circles, as the very representation of the border is the precondition for any definition.¹⁰

Unlike Schmitt and, these days, Sloterdijk or Safranski, whose arguments reflect a rather conventional definition of “the” border as a device that separates sovereign states (on idealized maps), Balibar warns against simplistic notions, since borders are, in truth, complex entities.

In order to come to alternative terms when engaging with “the equivocal character of borders in history,”¹¹ Balibar suggests that it makes sense to consider the following three aspects: their *over-determination*, their *polysemic character*, and their *heterogeneity*. As Balibar clarifies in more detail, it is first of all paramount to comprehend that basically all types of borders are over-determined to the extent that there is a range of “other geopolitical divisions”¹² that either weaken or strengthen the borderlines running between single states. In other words, since the Schengen Agreement and the so-called Dublin system came into force, it makes a difference, for example, if a country’s borders overlap (in part) with those of the European Union or not. Secondly, borders “do not have the same meaning for everyone;”¹³ they transport a polysemic character, since it is also a question of passports and, beyond that, of social status, which borders may be easily passed and which may not. Or, as Balibar puts it, for “a poor person from a poor country [who risks getting stuck on their journeys], [...] [the border tends to become] an extraordinarily viscous spatio-temporal zone, almost a home—a home in which to live a life which is a waiting-to-live, a non-life.”¹⁴ And thirdly, borders can be said to be also heterogeneous. This is to

10 Étienne Balibar, “What is a Border?,” in *Politics and the Other Scene*, Étienne Balibar, trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson, and Christ Turner (London: Verso, 2002), 75–86 (here 76).

11 Ibid., 78.

12 Ibid., 79.

13 Ibid., 81.

14 Ibid., 83; see also Shahram Khosravi, *‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

say that they are increasingly falling apart in the sense that “*some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all* [italics in original],”¹⁵ considering, for example, that with the advent of satellite imaging and biometric imaging technologies borders become as mobile as those people who, suspected of being illegal trespassers, are monitored from a macroscopic or a microscopic level.

When Balibar argues that it is a problematic preconception to believe that borders coincide first and foremost with state borders, he is ultimately also asserting that it would be a gross misconception to perceive borders in such a limited fashion. In similar terms, the architectural theorist Eyal Weizman also notes that the “last fortified line to have entertained the fantasy of solid defense was the Israeli Bar-Lev Line.”¹⁶ At the latest since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, it became increasingly visible that “contemporary geopolitical space has several frontier characteristics.”¹⁷ Accordingly, Weizman contends that such space “instead of being demarcated by continuous lines, [...] has come to resemble a territorial patchwork of introvert enclaves,”¹⁸ which tend to suspend sovereignty and extra-territorialize jurisdiction for strategic purposes and thus “violate the traditional juridical territoriality of the sovereign state and call the Westphalian border-based state system into question.”¹⁹

It is against this theoretical background that scholars like Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, or research groups like Transit Migration, have adopted the comparatively elastic term “regime” when discussing borders as complex entities that comprise different (public, private, national, transnational, etc.) actors, material and immaterial elements, documents and rituals, more or less sophisticated technologies, and that more often than not are organized transnationally.²⁰ In fact, a variety of contemporary

15 Balibar, “What is a Border?,” 84.

16 Eyal Weizman, “Principles of Frontier Geography,” in *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism*, ed. Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006), 84–92 (here 85).

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.; see also Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007), 1–16; Didier Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?,” in *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe*, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 49–99.

20 Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos, “Movements that Matter: Eine Einleitung,” in *Turbulente Ränder: Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas*, 2nd ed., ed. Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 13–17; Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 178–183.

borders are “managed” both by police and military units, but also by international agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), and increasingly in cooperation with multinational corporations such as G4S or Sodexo.

Moreover, it would be too reductive to identify borders solely with material arrangements such as walls, fences, gates, etc.²¹ For people who are classified as “deportable” aliens, it is the fear of being detected, of being separated from significant others, and of being removed by force that makes the border an immaterial, but embodied, sensation.²² In this sense, it may also be argued that border regimes consist of a combination of policies and performances that in one way or another regulate how borders are to be operated (controlled, passed, or sealed). And finally, one should not forget that the history of border regimes reflects the history of technological change: the Border Security Expo in San Antonio, Texas is just one of the many venues that could be used as an example to illustrate how the newest technologies are traded between companies and countries in order to render “border environments” more secure while forcing border-crossers to attempt even more insecure journeys.

Keeping such methodological provisos in mind, it makes sense to take “the border not only as a research ‘object’ but also as an ‘epistemic’ angle [...] [that] provides productive insights on the tensions and conflicts that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion, as well as on the profoundly changing code of social inclusion in the present,”²³ as Mezzadra and Neilson put it. And with respect to the theme of our paper, there are indeed several reasons to assume that Austria acts as quite an inventive gatekeeper that tries to regulate the access to the European Union by brokering and blocking routes with a variety of means. In the next section, we will refer to some of these means while discussing the ambivalent attitude of Austria with regard to the manifold crisis the European Union is facing.

21 See Ronald Rael, ed., *Borderwall as Architecture: A Manifesto for the U.S.-Mexico Boundary* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2017); Olivier Razac, *Barbed Wire: A Political History*, trans. Jonathan Kneight (London: New Press, 2002).

22 See Victor Talavera, Guillermina Gina Núñez-Mchiri, and Josiah Heyman, “Deportation in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: Anticipation, Experience, and Memory,” in *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 166-195.

23 Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, viii.

The EU “Refugee Crisis” and Austria’s Role in It

The “refugee crisis” dominated public discourse in 2015 and 2016, in Europe and particularly in Germany and Austria. This becomes manifest, on the one hand, in “refugee” being chosen as the word of the year 2015.²⁴ On the other hand, the “crisis” is evidenced by the sheer numbers of persons arriving in Austria: Throughout the year 2015, 88,340 applications for international protection were submitted to the Austrian authorities.²⁵ This made Austria, behind Germany and Sweden, the third-largest recipient in absolute numbers of asylum seekers within the EU.²⁶ In relative numbers, with 10.3 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants, Austria was, behind Sweden, the second-most frequented EU country.²⁷ Even higher was the number of persons crossing through Austria on their way to Germany and further north: It is estimated that more than 800,000 persons transited through Austria between mid-2015 and mid-2016, with only 5 to 10% among them filing an application for international protection in Austria.²⁸

The steep increase in the number of refugees knocking at Austria’s doors was due to at least two interwoven developments: First, in the last years, more and more people started fleeing from conflict zones in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., but there were also people crossing over from Africa.²⁹ While countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey shoulder the lion’s share of refugees coming from the Near and Middle East,³⁰ the number of persons arriving at the borders of the EU has also grown substantially over the past years. It is in this context that the second and even more important factor has been realized. In 1990, the EU countries devised a distribution

24 Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, “GfdS wählt ‘Flüchtlinge’ zum Wort des Jahres 2015,” in *gfdS.de*, Dec. 11, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://gfdS.de/wort-des-jahres-2015/>.

25 See BMEIA, “Austrian Integration Report 2016,” in *bmeia.gv.at*, 27, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/Integrationsbericht_2016/Integration_Report_2016_EN_WEB.pdf.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.; Germany with 5.9, Italy with 1.4, Greece with 1.2, France with 1.1, Spain with 0.3, and Poland with 0.3. The European Union average was 2.6 per 1,000.

28 Government ordinance on the determination of threat to public order and inner security, Explanation according to § 36 Abs. 2 AsylG 2005 (*Verordnung der Bundesregierung zur Feststellung der Gefährdung der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und des Schutzes der inneren Sicherheit, Begründung gemäß § 36 Abs. 2 AsylG 2005*). From 803,600 persons transiting through Austria between Sept. 5, 2016, and June 6, 2016, 56,600 requested international protection in Austria.

29 4.9 million refugees came from Syria, 2.7 million from Afghanistan and 1.1 million from Somalia; “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015,” *unhcr.org*, June 20, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>.

30 Ibid.

mechanism for asylum seekers, the Dublin system.³¹ Its chief objective was (and is) to identify a single responsible state for every asylum application in order to avoid both asylum shopping (i.e., strategic applications in more than one member state) and the phenomenon of “refugees in orbit” (i.e., the situation where no state accepts responsibility to examine an asylum application).³²

While reformed twice since then,³³ the substantial features of the system have remained the same. In practice, the most important criterion is that which allocates the responsibility to conduct asylum proceedings (and to care for the needs of asylum seekers while these proceedings are under way) to the member state whose borders the asylum seeker has “irregularly crossed” from a third country,³⁴ with the other member states being authorized to send an asylum seeker back to the “Dublin state,” i.e. the member state responsible according to the Dublin regime.³⁵ Typically, this is a country at the southern and southeastern periphery of the European Union, notably Italy and Malta (from Northern Africa) as well as Greece (from Turkey).³⁶

As living conditions and the quality of the asylum procedure had massively deteriorated in Greece already in the late 2000s, the two highest European courts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg, intervened in 2011³⁷ and declared the sending back of asylum seekers to Greece to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and thus it was in violation of the human rights obligations of the EU members states seeking to return asylum seekers to the member state where they originally entered European Union soil.³⁸ This brought the Dublin mechanism to the brink of collapse, and it has remained in this state of dysfunction ever since then.

31 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (Dublin Agreement) of June 15, 1990, OJ 1997 C 254/1.

32 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” *Comparative Migration Studies* 2 (2014): 181-202 (here 185); see also European Court of Justice (CJEU), joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, para. 79.

33 Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003, OJ 2003 L 50/1 (Dublin II) and Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, OJ 2013 L180/31 (Dublin III).

34 See Art. 13 para. 1 Dublin III Regulation.

35 Art. 18 Dublin III Regulation.

36 See Iris Goldner Lang, “Is there Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU?,” *Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy* 9 (2013): 1-14 (here 6).

37 See European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Aug. 27, 1997, No. 20837/92, M.S. v. Sweden and ECtHR (GC), Jan. 21, 2011, No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.

38 See e.g. Andreas Th. Müller, “Solidarität in der gemeinsamen europäischen Asylpolitik,” *Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht* 70 (2015): 463-489 (here 477ff.).

The rising awareness of this dysfunction and the poor prospects for achieving a solidarity-based redistribution mechanism on the EU level³⁹ have made it increasingly attractive for the affected member states to look for unilateral solutions. *Lamentabile dictu*, Austria has become one of the forerunners of such unilateralist policies in 2016. This harshly contrasts with a quite different approach initially pursued by the Austrian government. The first reaction to the massive increase in the numbers of persons seeking refuge in Austria was to generously allow them to enter the country,⁴⁰ invoking humanitarian responsibilities and historical traditions regarding the admission of refugees (notably with respect to the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, as well as the dissolution and the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s). The “welcome policy” (*Willkommenspolitik*), first adopted on the government level, was reflected and reinforced in the civil society camp with people applauding the arriving refugees, spontaneously providing for food, clothes, and accommodation, as well as organizing solidarity concerts such as “Voices for Refugees.”⁴¹ Yet the massive inflow of persons also led to a temporary breakdown of the train traffic between Austria and Germany due to the vast number of persons seeking to continue their journey northwards.⁴² For several weeks, the underground parking of the Salzburg railway station was turned into a refugee camp.⁴³

Against this background, in October 2015, the Austrian government reversed its policy and effectively closed the Nickelsdorf border crossing between Austria and Hungary for asylum seekers. Since, also due to similar measures by the Hungarian government, the Eastern Balkans route was not available any more, the migratory movements relocated to the Western Balkans route. In the case of Austria, this meant that the refugees arriving from the south would now seek to enter the country through the Styrian border crossings Spielfeld and Bad Radkersburg between Slovenia and

39 See chapter “(The Lack of) Solidarity in the Common European Asylum System.”

40 Announcement of Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann of Sept. 4, 2015; “Budapest will Verkehrskollaps verhindern,” *ORF.at*, Sept. 4, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://orf.at/stories/2296946/2296947/>.

41 Oct. 3, 2015, Heldenplatz, ca. 100,000 participants; Voices for Refugees, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, voicesforrefugees.com.

42 See “Zugverkehr Salzburg–München bleibt bis 4. Oktober eingestellt,” *diepresse.com*, Sept. 22, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4826657/Zugverkehr-SalzburgMuenchen-bleibt-bis-4-Oktober-eingestellt>.

43 See “Der Tag, an dem die Grenze (kurz) verschwand,” *diepresse.com*, Sept. 6, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4814424/Der-Tag-an-dem-die-Grenze-kurz-verschwand?from=suche.intern.portal>; “Flüchtlingsrückstau in Salzburg,” *diepresse.com*, Sept. 27, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4830558/Fluechtlingsrueckstau-in-Salzburg?from=suche.intern.portal>.

Austria.⁴⁴ Shortly afterwards, the Austrian government announced to erect a 3.7 kilometer long border fence in Spielfeld in order to be able to better control the border movements in this area and to facilitate the registration of asylum seekers in a “transit zone” near the border.⁴⁵

The next—and, in symbolical terms, particularly telling—step was the political agreement, on the occasion of the January 20, 2016 “asylum summit” including the federal government, the governors, as well as the Association of Cities and Towns and the Association of Municipalities, to establish an “upper limit” for the admission of asylum seekers to Austria. In September 2015, an amendment to the Austrian constitution⁴⁶ had been adopted, creating a legal obligation for every municipality, town, and city in the country to receive and house at least 15 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants.⁴⁷ The political agreement on the upper limit took inspiration from that law and set a limit of 127,000 asylum seekers (i.e., 1.5 % of the Austrian population of 8+ million people) for the following four years. This number was allocated degressively so that the following annual upper limits were defined: 37,500 for 2016, 35,000 for 2017, 30,000 for 2018 and 25,000 for 2019.⁴⁸ With 36,030 persons admitted to asylum proceedings, the upper limit for the year 2016 was eventually not reached.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the ÖVP has launched a debate as to whether the limit for the year 2017 should be divided in half, since the influx of asylum seekers into Austria is still regarded as overstraining the country’s reception capacities.⁵⁰

44 See “Nickelsdorf leer – Route verlagert sich nach Süden,” *diepresse.com*, Oct. 8, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4846518/Nickelsdorf-leer-Route-verlagert-sich-nach-Sueden?from=suche.intern.portal>.

45 Wolfgang Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law: A Race to the Bottom?,” in “Constitutional Dimensions of the Refugee Crisis,” special issue, *German Law Journal* 17, no. 6 (2016): 949-966 (here 951); “Erste Zaunpfosten in Spielfeld aufgestellt,” *derstandard.at*, Dec. 7, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://derstandard.at/2000027113824/Erste-Zaunpfosten-in-Spielfelder-Boden-getrieben>.

46 Federal constitutional law on accommodation and allocation of vulnerable foreigners in need of help (*Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Unterbringung und Aufteilung von hilfs- und schutzbedürftigen Fremden*), Federal Law Gazette I 120/2015.

47 *Ibid.*, Art. 2 para. 1.

48 Common approach of *Bund, Länder, Städte* and *Gemeinden* to the asylum summit of Jan. 20, 2016 (*Gemeinsame Vorgangsweise von Bund, Ländern, Städten und Gemeinden zum Asylgipfel am 20. Januar 2016*), *bka.gv.at* (Office of the Federal Chancellor, 2016), point 4, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=61858>.

49 Ministry of the Interior, “Asylum Statistics 2016,” *bmi.gv.at*, December 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Asylwesen/statistik/files/2016/Asylstatistik_Dezember_2016.pdf.

50 “ÖVP will Obergrenze auf 17.000 Asylanträge halbieren,” *derstandard.at*, Jan. 11, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://derstandard.at/2000050551611/OeVP-will-Obergrenze-auf-17-000-Asylantraege-halbieren>.

The lawfulness of binding upper limits for the admission of persons requesting asylum at Austria's borders inspired controversial discussions within Austria and beyond. Regarding the latter, the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Koen Lenaerts, clearly objected such a measure.⁵¹ Concerning the former, the President of the Austrian Constitutional Court, Gerhart Holzinger, also took a negative stand regarding binding upper limits.⁵² As there existed serious doubts regarding the compatibility of the planned upper limit with international law, EU as well as constitutional law, the Austrian government commissioned a legal opinion on these questions from two law professors.⁵³

The ensuing legal opinion indeed confirmed that absolute and unconditional upper limits violate international law, EU law, and constitutional law. In particular, the *non-refoulement* principle, i.e. the prohibition to return persons to a country where they face a real risk of being killed, tortured, or treated inhumanely or degradingly, must be respected at all times, irrespective of capacity concerns on the part of the receiving country.⁵⁴ In addition, the comprehensive *corpus* of EU law on substantive and procedural aspects of asylum law must be complied with. However, the legal opinion suggests a certain relaxation of these requirements by relying on Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to which those provisions "shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security."⁵⁵ Yet the relevance of this provision in justifying a deviation from the guarantees of EU asylum law was critically received within Austria's legal academia.⁵⁶

In spite of this criticism, the Austrian government opted for realizing the upper limit along the lines suggested by the aforementioned legal opinion. Subsequently, a new section entitled "Special provisions regarding the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security

51 "Lenaerts: Asylrecht schwer vereinbar mit Obergrenze," *noz.de*, Jan. 18, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://www.noz.de/deutschland-welt/politik/artikel/659460/lenaerts-asylrecht-schwer-vereinbar-mit-obergrenze>.

52 "Verfassungsgerichtshof: Obergrenzen wären rechtswidrig," *derstandard.at*, Mar. 15, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://derstandard.at/2000032924967/Obergrenze-Gutachten-duerfte-Regierung-Ruecken-staerken>.

53 Legal Opinion "Völker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für den beim Asylgipfel am 20. Januar 2016 in Aussicht genommenen Richtwert für Flüchtlinge" of Mar. 29, 2016, by Professors Bernd-Christian Funk and Walter Obwexer; *bundeskanzleramt.at* (Office of the Federal Chancellor, 2016), accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.at/DocView.axd?CobId=62571>.

54 See *ibid.*, 9, 43-44, 48, 77-78.

55 See *ibid.*, 15ff., 41ff.

56 See in particular Benedek, "Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law," 954ff.

during the conduct of border controls” was added to the Asylum Act.⁵⁷ It authorizes the federal government to adopt, with the consent of the Main Committee of the National Council, i.e. the Parliament’s first chamber, a regulation—commonly, albeit not technically termed “emergency regulation” (*Notstandsverordnung*)—formally determining that the maintenance of law and the safeguarding of internal security are in danger.⁵⁸

When adopting this regulation, the government would re-establish border controls (as opposed to the open borders provided for by the Schengen regime) and set up specific “registration offices.” Asylum seekers would have to submit their applications exclusively at those offices. Yet such an application would only be accepted, and asylum proceedings conducted, if the person can demonstrate that he or she would face the risk of being killed or tortured or treated in an inhuman and degrading fashion if returned (i.e., a violation of the *non-refoulement* principle), or that his or her presence is mandated in Austria for private or family life reasons.⁵⁹ If this is not the case, the application would be treated as not having been made in the first place, and thus no asylum procedure would be opened.⁶⁰ Hence, as soon as the emergency regulation is adopted,⁶¹ the right to asylum in Austria would, to a large extent, be suspended.

On 7 September 2016, the Austrian government released the draft of the emergency regulation to the public for comments and reactions.⁶² In view of the widespread criticism in regard to this draft⁶³ and the dissent

57 §§ 36–41 AsylG 2005, Federal Law Gazette I 24/2016.

58 See § 36 AsylG 2005; see in this regard also Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 956.

59 See Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, Federal Law Gazette 210/1958 as amended by Federal Law Gazette III 47/2010, which enjoys the status of constitutional law in Austria.

60 As regards the functioning of the emergency regulation regime see in particular Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 955–956; Andreas Th. Müller, “Die Flüchtlingskrise 2015/2016: Eine rechtliche Chronik aus österreichischer Perspektive,” in *Aktuelle Probleme der Flüchtlingspolitik*, ed. Roman Lehner and Friederike Wapler (forthcoming).

61 According to § 36 AsylG 2005, the regulation can only be adopted for a maximum duration of six months, extendable for further six months three times. Hence, there is a maximum duration of the emergency regulation regime of two years.

62 “Entwurf für Asyl-Notverordnung liegt vor: Regierung einigt sich auf Text,” *derstandard.at*, Sept. 7, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, derstandard.at/2000043960567/Entwurf-fuer-Notverordnung-liegt-vor-Regierung-einigt-sich-auf-Text; “Asyl-Notverordnung ‘höchstens für ein paar Tage,’” *diepresse.com*, Oct. 6, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5097248/AsylNotverordnung-hoechstens-fuer-ein-paar-Tage?from=suche.intern.portal>.

63 See in particular the criticism in UNHCR, “UNHCR-Kurzanalyse der Asylgesetzesnovelle 2016,” *unhcr.at*, Apr. 21, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.unhcr.at/fileadmin/rechtsinfos/fluechtlingsrecht/4_oesterreich/4_2_asyl_positionen/4_2_4_positionen_ab_2011/FR_AUS_Positionen_AsylG-Novelle_2016.pdf; Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 957ff.

among the coalition parties on the question whether the regulation should, for reasons of prevention, be adopted immediately (ÖVP's position), or only when the upper limit is actually reached (Social Democratic Party of Austria's, i.e., SPÖ's position), the emergency regulation has not been set into force so far. Yet the mere existence of the amendment to the Asylum Act, making the far-reaching suspension of the right to asylum a realistic scenario, has already contributed to the erosion of asylum guarantees in Austria. Even though the numbers of asylum seekers in Austria are declining, notably after the closure of the Western Balkans route in the wake of the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016,⁶⁴ the Austrian government is continuously working on the tightening up of the accessibility and "attractiveness" of the Austrian asylum system,⁶⁵ thus making Austria one of the most restrictive countries in admitting asylum seekers.⁶⁶

Of Horizontal and Vertical and Other Borders

In her seminal essay entitled *Waning Sovereignty, Walled Democracy*, the US-American scholar Wendy Brown writes that

one irony of late modern walling is that a structure taken to mark and enforce an inside/outside distinction—a boundary between "us" and "them" and between friend and enemy—appears as precisely the opposite when grasped as part of a complex of eroding lines between the police and the military, subject and *patria*, vigilante and state, law and lawlessness.⁶⁷

Even though Austria has not shown any serious interest to date to build a massive wall along its southern and eastern territorial borders, it is nonetheless important to note that it experimented repeatedly with *ad hoc* barricades and with the idea to take other "particular constructional measures" in order defend its professed sovereignty against people suspected to be "economic refugees" (*Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge*), as they are disrespectfully

64 European Council, "EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016," *consilium.europa.eu*, Mar. 18, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/>.

65 See only in the last two years Federal Law Gazette I 70/2015 and Federal Law Gazette I 24/2016; see also the draft law of Feb. 28, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/ME/ME_00279/index.shtml.

66 See Benedek, "Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law," 950.

67 Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 25.

referred to. However, as Brown further contends, such fortifications “often function theatrically, projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise and that they also performatively contradict.”⁶⁸

In the case of Austria’s efforts to block routes through and to Europe not only by investing in material means, but also by coercing—through immaterial means—a number of states along the Western Balkans Route to curb the number of people on the move, it may certainly be argued that such means are more often than not contradictory. Apart from the theatrical effect of such efforts, which was reinforced when units of the Austrian military patrolled the transit zone around Spielfeld next to Austrian police units, it is also important to recall that the Balkan Peninsula in particular is of great economic importance for Austrian industries such as finance, construction, and retail companies. This is to say that any effort by Austria to portray itself as a sovereign state that is able to protect its territorial borders by temporarily interrupting the “free” flow of goods, services, and people had and has to be balanced with all the transnational interests that connect Austria with a wide range of countries along the Balkans route. But even in the case of Austria’s threat to block the Brenner Pass to Italy, should the number of illegal border-crossers further increase, one should not forget that such measures would have seriously undermined the relationships with South Tyrol, the northernmost province of Italy, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian County of Tyrol until 1919 and which is still of special political interest for the Austrian Government. Considering these ties, there is indeed little reason to assume that Austria planned to shut its borders by putting up walls.

Very much like the sound bite coined by the former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2009, when he said that, in view of all the people that are trying to reach the shores of Australia on derelict vessels, it is mandatory to be “tough but humane,”⁶⁹ it may be argued that Austria too tried to reconcile contradictory interests by means of diversifying its border regime and, with it, the European border regime. In fact, the ominous legal discourse of “upper limits” may be read as part of the comprehensive strategy to complement “horizontal border control” initiatives with “vertical border control” policies. In other words, the Austrian government was and is well aware of the fact that it cannot possibly risk its reputation as a liberal country that has overcome its totalitarian past by declining access to groups of people who have suffered from persecution and destitution, in some cases consisting of families travelling with infants. A tough stance at Austria’s territorial limits, where military and police units confront impoverished

68 Ibid.

69 Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, 167-175.

civilians, would immediately backfire, at least on an international, if not also on a national level. Considering this risk, it is quite plausible to argue, then, that Austria has a genuine interest to explore other options for how to retain a tough stance as a European gatekeeper without appearing excessively inhumane at the border crossing points.

As Mezzadra and Neilson stress in their reflection of the contradictions of the Australian model, it would nevertheless

be a mistake to correlate toughness with border reinforcing and humaneness with border crossing. [...] Toughness is a quality associated not only with the violence of interceptions and border reinforcement but also with the forced border crossing implicit in practices of deportation and *refoulement* [...]. Humaneness, by contrast, is a quality associated with the international system of human rights, which plays an important role in migration management. Human rights provide the dominant frame for negotiating questions of borders and migration in the world today.⁷⁰

While Austria acted comparatively “humane” at its border crossing points, despite occasional threats to restrict the free passage for people who had already crossed into the European Union without (valid) documentation, it became much “tougher” in terms of how it began to deal with their situation once they decided to apply for asylum, that is, to remain.

The emergency regulation draft, discussed in the previous section of our paper, is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg of a range of related efforts to find alternative, that is, “vertical” means to manage borders, without being denounced for using disproportionate violence at the border. Apart from this draft, which reveals the interest to shift burdens and responsibilities from the Austrian authorities to the asylum applicants who have to provide valid reasons for not being refouled—in an asylum interview that is itself problematic from the beginning⁷¹—there are also further examples that can be given in order to illustrate how ingeniously Austria borders Europe: A number of Austrian federal states, such as Salzburg, Upper Austria, or Lower Austria, are just granting “basic care” (*Grundversorgung*)—instead of the much better financed “needs-based minimum benefit system” (*bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung*)—to those who qualified for subsidiary protection status instead of asylum. This results in situations where the

⁷⁰ Ibid., 175.

⁷¹ Khosravi, *‘Illegal’ Traveller*, 33–35.

families concerned are usually unable to afford a flat on their own, where especially children are at risk of further impoverishment and where there are also little chances to improve one's situation by finding an adequate job, since the subsidiary protection status is usually conferred for one year only (after which it may or may not be prolonged). What is more, the new Integration Act (*Integrationsgesetz*), which is still being discussed as of this writing (March 2017), will require all people who either qualify as refugees or for subsidiary protection status to regularly attend language courses in German language as well as so-called "value courses" (*Wertekurse*). And those who fail to meet the requirements will be sanctioned by having their social benefits reduced.

Besides these efforts to make the lives of many people—who barely reached Austria after crossing treacherous zones such as the Mediterranean or the Balkans—quite miserable in order to persuade them that they might be better off somewhere else, there are also other, more drastic means that indicate how borders may differ from the territorial limits of a country. While the Federal Minister of the Interior, Sobotka, has proudly proclaimed at the European Police Congress in Berlin that Austria is the most successful European country at deporting people without the right of abode,⁷² the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kurz, has stated that he will urge the European Union to extra-territorialize reception centers by developing such infrastructures in Georgia, the Maghreb countries, or in the Western Balkans.⁷³ Both statements are not isolated incidents of high-ranking Austrian politicians, but rather integrated attempts to redefine the European border regime in accordance with Austrian preferences that are in turn inspired by the Australian model. In both cases, the "toughness" of securing borders occurs not necessarily where borders are conventionally believed to be located, but somewhere else: in confined and, to a certain extent, legally "obscure" environments such as deportation centers or so-called "hotspots," where people are either removed or restrained by force.

According to Nicholas de Genova, it is precisely such situations of deportability (and, we may add, detainability) that mark

the zone of indistinction between a condition that is (virtually) stateless and one that is positively saturated with the state. [...]

72 "Österreich laut Sobotka bei Abschiebungen in EU 'deutlich führend,'" *derstandard.at*, Feb. 23, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://derstandard.at/2000053045083/Oesterreich-laut-Sobotka-bei-Abschiebungen-in-EU-deutlich-fuehrend>.

73 "Kurz verlangt Flüchtlingslager außerhalb der EU," *faz.net*, Mar. 5, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/asylbewerber-kurz-verlangt-fluechtlingslager-ausserhalb-der-eu-14910008.html>.

Deportation [and detention too, AM and AO] is, indeed, a premier means for perpetrating, embellishing, and reinstating a “threshold [...] that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside.”⁷⁴

We are not claiming that Austria is the only or even the most zealous gatekeeper of the European Union, but we have reasons to assume that over the past few years it has become quite inventive when trying to block and broker routes through and to Europe. This is to say that Austria is at the front of redefining the European Union’s border management system, even though it is located rather at its margins than at its limits. And these perplexities will almost certainly aggravate unless the structural deficits of the current asylum system of the European Union, which contributed to make Austria’s position so prominent, are not addressed with more solidarity.

(The Lack of) Solidarity in the Common European Asylum System

It has become common to conceive of, and conceptualize, the question of admitting asylum seekers to Europe first and foremost as the “refugee problem” or as a challenge of “burden sharing,” which chiefly carries negative associations.⁷⁵ It is true, however, that the arrival, presence, and inclusion of human beings fleeing from their home countries to the EU create various challenges to the European Union and its member states that should be coped with in a spirit of solidarity. This is not only a moral claim or a political program, but a legal principle prominently enshrined in EU law. According to Article 67 paragraph 2 and Article 80 TFEU, the Common Asylum Policy of the European Union shall be “based on solidarity between Member States” and “be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States.”

74 Nicholas de Genova, “The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement,” in *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 33–68 (here 46); see also Judith Welz, “Die österreichische Abschiebepolitik in Zahlen: 1995–2013,” *INNEX Working Papers* 1 (2014), accessed Mar. 6, 2017, https://inex.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ag_divpol/INEX-working-paper-Nr-1-Ost-Abschiebepolitik-in-Zahlen-JuWe-310314.pdf.

75 See also in official documents: European Parliament resolution of Sept. 2, 2008 on the evaluation of the Dublin system (2007/2262(INI)); see, for instance, the criticism in Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” 186, 190, 198.

Solidarity is therefore laid down as a principle of EU law in general⁷⁶ and of EU asylum law in particular.⁷⁷

Alas, it is difficult to see such a spirit of solidarity at work when looking at the current asylum policies of EU member states. First, if at all, there is a discourse on the solidarity between member states, but not on solidarity with the human beings fleeing to Europe, and second, while lip service may be paid to the need for solidarity mechanisms between member states, those mechanisms are currently (and in the foreseeable future) not working.

The One-sidedness of the European Solidarity Discourse

The aforementioned Articles 67 and 80 of the TFEU expressly refer to the solidarity *between member states*. And indeed, this is what the EU treaties⁷⁸ and, following them, the predominant legal discourse are focusing on.⁷⁹

76 See Christian Calliess, *Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union*, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Peter Gussone, *Das Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union und seine Grenzen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006); Martina Lais, *Das Solidaritätsprinzip im europäischen Verfassungsverbund* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007); Malcolm Ross and Yuri Borgmann-Prebil, eds., *Promoting Solidarity in the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Andreas Th. Müller, "Solidarität als Rechtsbegriff im Europarecht," in *Solidarität: Vom Wert der Gemeinschaft*, ed. Clemens Sedmak (Wien: Facultas, 2010), 77-104; Ségolène Barbou des Places and Chahira Boutayeb, *La solidarité dans l'Union européenne: éléments constitutionnels et matériels* (Paris: Dalloz, 2011); Andrea Sangiovanni, "Solidarity in the European Union," *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 33 (2013): 213-241; Stefan Kadelbach, "Solidarität als europäisches Rechtsprinzip?," in *Solidarität als Europäisches Rechtsprinzip?*, ed. Stefan Kadelbach (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 9-19.

77 See European Commission, COM(2011) 835 final, 2: "a guiding principle of the common European asylum policy."

78 See also Articles 23, 31 and 32 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as Article 78 paragraph 3, Article 122, Article 174, Article 175, Article 194 and in particular Article 222 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the latter constituting the so-called "solidarity clause" in the EU Treaties; see in this regard Antonio-Maria Martino, *The Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clause: Legal and Political Challenges of an Integrated EU Security System* (European University Studies, 2014).

79 Daniel Fröhlich, *Das Asylrecht im Rahmen des Unionsrechts: Entstehung eines föderalen Asylregimes in der Europäischen Union* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 262ff., 317ff.; Roland Bieber and Francesco Maiani, "Ohne Solidarität keine Europäische Union: Über Krisenerscheinungen in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und im Europäischen Asylsystem," in *Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2011/2012*, ed. Astrid Epiney and Tobias Fasnacht (Bern: Stämpfli Verlag, 2012), 297-328, 311ff.; Paul McDonough and Evangelia Tsourdi, "The 'Other' Greek Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 31 (2012): 67-100, 67ff.; Reinhard Marx, "Solidarität im grundrechtskonformen europäischen Asylrechtssystem," *Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht* (2012): 409-413, 409ff.; Goldner Lang, "Is there Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU?," 1ff.; C.A. Groenendijk, "Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht," in *Solidarität: Hohenheimer Tage zum Ausländerrecht 2012*, ed. Klaus Barwig et al. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 41-52, 41; Peter Hilpold, "Solidarität im EU-Recht: Die 'Inseln der Solidarität' unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Flüchtlingsproblematik und der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion," *Europarecht*, no. 4 (2016): 355-474, 389-390.

At the same time, there have been (so far widely unheard) calls for a need to develop a more comprehensive perspective on the concept of solidarity within EU law.⁸⁰

A first step in this regard is becoming aware that the EU Treaties, at a closer look, not only provide for solidarity between member states, but also for *transnational* solidarity with human beings in other EU member states. This becomes manifest first and foremost in the guarantees emerging from EU citizenship, i.e. the rights of EU citizens and their close relatives (even of third-country nationality) to travel to and reside within other EU member states, including non-discriminatory access to social welfare, the education and healthcare systems, etc. This transnational aspect of EU solidarity is prominently reflected in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, which includes a special title devoted to “solidarity.”⁸¹ Furthermore, the Charter’s preamble as well as Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) guarantee that the European Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity. This testifies to an understanding of solidarity that transcends a mere member states-focused perspective of burden sharing.

Inasmuch as the aforementioned provisions refer to solidarity as an “indivisible and universal value,”⁸² the perspective is widened so as to go beyond the borders of the European Union to include human beings in a spirit of *trans-EU* solidarity. Moreover, as the preamble of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter stipulates that the European Union “places the individual at the heart of its activities,” the well being of all human beings, not only EU citizens, should be the yardstick of the European Union’s action. This cosmopolitan perspective inherent to the EU Treaties further becomes manifest in Article 21 of the TEU, according to which, “the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement,

80 Timo Tohidipur, “Solidarität in der europäischen Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik,” in *La solidarité dans l’Union européenne/Solidarität in der Europäischen Union*, ed. Otmar Seul and Tomas Davulis (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 164, 179; Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” 186-187; Marx, “Solidarität im grundrechtskonformen europäischen Asylrechtssystem,” 189; Bast, “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht,” in *Solidarität als Europäisches Rechtsprinzip?*, ed. Stefan Kadelbach (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014); 19-32 (here 21); see also European Commission, COM(2011) 835 final, 12: “[...]especially as the Union has a duty not only to its Member State, but also to asylum applicants”; see also Andreas Th. Müller, “Solidarität in der gemeinsamen europäischen Asylpolitik,” 465ff.

81 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Title IV, Articles 27-38.

82 The wording is inspired by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 25, 1993, no. 4: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”

and which it seeks to advance in the wider world,” amongst others “the principle of solidarity.”

The constitutional framework of the European Union thus provides for a legal basis for solidarity beyond its borders. At the same time, such trans-EU solidarity is systematically marginalized in the dominant EU law discourse. Indeed, “the way in which the concept of solidarity has been theorised in EU law leaves little, if any space for the application of the principle of solidarity beyond EU citizens or those ‘within’ the EU and its extension to third-country nationals or those on the outside.”⁸³ This gives rise to the one-sidedness from which the current EU solidarity discourse direly suffers. It tends to conceive of the human beings leaving their countries of origin and fleeing to the European shores and borders primarily as a “burden” whose financial and other implications are (or are not) to be shared between the member states, making “the refugees” mere objects of the political discourse. But even on that level, the inter-member state solidarity mechanisms, insofar they exist at all, have proven weak and inoperable.

The Lack of Genuine Solidarity Mechanisms within the EU Asylum Policy

The Common European Asylum System is often identified with the Dublin regime, which is certainly its most well-known component. However, the Dublin system, even when functional (which it is not⁸⁴), is not providing for mechanisms of redistribution of asylum seekers and is in that sense not a solidarity mechanism.⁸⁵ The rules for the allocation of responsibility in the Dublin Regulation, as also acknowledged by the European Commission,⁸⁶ are not accompanied by any relevant corrective mechanisms. The inequalities in terms of distribution of asylum seekers throughout the European Union are rather reinforced by the fact that legal transit to other member states is not possible, since once a member

83 Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” 187, criticizing the EU solidarity concept as “exclusionary.”

84 See chapter “The EU ‘Refugee Crisis’ and Austria’s Role in It.”

85 See Bast, “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht,” 35; Tohidipur, “Solidarität in der europäischen Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik,” 175; Goldner Lang, “Is there Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU?,” 13; Daniel Thym, *Migrationsverwaltungsrecht* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 365.

86 See European Commission, COM(2008) 360 final, no. 5.1.2.: “The Dublin system was not devised as a burden sharing instrument: nevertheless, its functioning may de facto result in additional burdens on Member States that have limited reception and absorption capacities and who find themselves under particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location.”

state becomes responsible for examining an asylum application, it remains the responsible state even if the asylum seeker travels to another EU country.⁸⁷

Efforts to reform the Dublin regime so as to include a genuine redistribution mechanism have so far failed. In view of the situation in Greece, the Commission had proposed an early warning mechanism that would have provided for a temporary suspension of the Dublin regime to the benefit of a stumbling member state, with the effect that its peers would have had to shoulder additional responsibilities.⁸⁸ However, there was no majority in the Council for that proposal.⁸⁹ When the new Dublin (III) Regulation was adopted in 2013, member states could solely agree on the introduction of a “mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.”⁹⁰ Accordingly, if the Commission establishes that the Regulation’s application “may be jeopardised due either to a substantiated risk of particular pressure being placed on a Member State’s asylum system and/or to problems in the functioning of the asylum system of a Member State,” the latter shall be invited to draw up a “preventive action plan.” If the situation worsens and the Commission establishes that “the implementation of the preventive action plan has not remedied the deficiencies identified or where there is a serious risk that the asylum situation in the Member State concerned develops into a crisis which is unlikely to be remedied by a preventive action plan,” the Commission may request the member state concerned to draw up a “crisis management action plan.”

This mechanism might be elaborate, but this cannot change the fact that it remains a purely optional instrument. In addition, it focuses on the member state under duress, but does not create any obligations for the other member states to provide assistance. Since the EU “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016 which mostly affected Austria, Germany, and Sweden, it is precisely those states that are now campaigning for such solidarity obligations of the other, less-affected member states as well as a meaningful redistribution mechanism after having helped to prevent it for many years before. This rather recent change in attitude tends to undermine the credibility of those member states, and it is not surprising that the member states that still oppose redistribution mechanisms, notably the so-called Visegrad Group or the Visegrad Four (i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,

87 See ECtHR (GC), Jan. 21, 2011, No. 30696/09, *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece*, para. 223.

88 See European Commission, COM(2008) 820 final, 9; COM(2011) 835 final, 13.

89 See Minutes of 3111th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Sept. 22/23, 2011, Council document nr. 14.464/11, 8.

90 Dublin III Regulation, Article 33.

and Slovakia), continue to remind Austria and Germany of their previous rejection of redistribution of asylum seekers within the European Union.

A year ago, the Commission launched a further attempt to complement, and thereby correct, the misallocation of asylum seekers by the Dublin regime by virtue of a genuine solidarity mechanism. In its proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation, submitted only three years after the adoption of its predecessor, the Commission suggests the creation of a “corrective allocation mechanism.”⁹¹ Accordingly, an automated system shall monitor each member states’ share in all asylum applications made within the European Union. The application of the corrective allocation for the benefit of a member state is triggered automatically, where the number of applications for international protection, for which a member state is responsible, exceeds 150% of the figure identified in the respective reference key. This key is calculated based on two criteria with equal 50% weighting, namely the size of the population and the total GDP of a member state. As of the triggering of the mechanism, all new applications lodged in the member state experiencing the disproportionate pressure are proportionately allocated to the other member states. However, a member state of allocation may decide to temporarily not take part in the corrective mechanism for a twelve-month period. Such a member state must then make a solidarity contribution of EUR 250,000 per applicant.⁹²

Not surprisingly, this proposal was also doomed to fail. At least currently, the qualified majority in the Council that would be needed to adopt a general and binding redistribution mechanism does not seem politically feasible. Alas, the state of inter-member state solidarity is even worse. On Sept. 22, 2015, the Council had adopted a decision in which it relied, for the first time, on Article 78 paragraph 3 of the TFEU.⁹³ Pursuant to this provision, in the event of one or more member states being confronted with an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the member states concerned. On this basis, the Council decided that, as a one-time solidarity measure, 120,000 asylum seekers should be relocated from Greece and Italy to the other member states. Even though the Visegrad States, as well as Romania, fervently opposed this measure, and even though Slovakia and Hungary even took it to the Court of Justice

91 European Commission, COM(2016) 270 final (Dublin IV), Chapter VII, Articles 34-43.

92 See *ibid.*, Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal, II.

93 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of Sept. 22, 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ 2015 L 248/80.

of the European Union,⁹⁴ the decision was adopted by qualified majority and is thus legally binding. Yet the implementation of the decision, many months after its adoption and entry into force, is still highly disappointing,⁹⁵ so much so that the policy of binding relocation measures among member states, even if only in single instances, must be deemed to have failed.

As an alternative and arguably more appropriate concept, the Visegrad States are now advertising mechanisms of “flexible solidarity.”⁹⁶ Hence, every member state shall, on the basis of its experience, social structure, and economic potential, make voluntary contributions to handle the challenges faced by the European Union and its member states. For those critical of the concept, the call for voluntariness is only a pretext to evade any effective solidarity mechanism and, even worse, to avoid the admission of persons of different (notably Muslim) religion and creed to avowedly Christian nations.

While Austria is so far (albeit rather lukewarmly) distancing itself from such “Occidentalism” advances on the part of the Visegrad States, the spirit of unilateralism becoming manifest in their political rejection and sabotage of legally binding relocation decisions is mirrored in Austria’s own unilateralist ambitions, as described before in relation to the adoption of upper limits, with seeming reliance on Article 72 of the TFEU.⁹⁷ Against this background, we are witnessing a general trend of renationalizing asylum and migration policies, which belies the long-standing efforts to establish a Common European Asylum System. The existing solidarity mechanisms—the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF)⁹⁸ which administers an amount of EUR 3.136 billion for 2014–2020 as well as the European

94 CJEU, case C-643/15, Slovakia/Council; case C-647/15, Hungary/Council; both cases still pending.

95 Relocated from Greece: 9.632; relocated from Italy: 3.946 (as of Mar. 3, 2017); European Commission, “Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism,” *ec.europa.com*, Mar. 3, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf.

96 Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, *visegradgroup.eu* (2016), accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-the-160919>; Markus Kotzur, “Flexible Solidarity – Effective Solidarity?,” *voelkerrechtsblog.org*, Nov. 16, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/flexible-solidarity-effective-solidarity/>; Solon Arditis, “Flexible Solidarity: Rethinking the EU’s Refugee Relocation System after Bratislava,” *blogs.lse.ac.uk*, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <http://bit.ly/2cCR3Yo>; Zsuzsanna Végh, “Flexible Solidarity: Intergovernmentalism or Differentiated Integration. The Way out of the Current Impasse,” *visegradinsight.eu*, Dec. 19, 2016, accessed Mar. 16, 2017, <http://visegradinsight.eu/flexible-solidarity/>.

97 See chapter “The EU ‘Refugee Crisis’ and Austria’s Role in It.”

98 Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014, OJ 2014 L 150/168.

Asylum Support Office (EASO),⁹⁹ the EU's asylum agency in La Valletta with its mostly technical mandate—are not sufficiently relevant to compensate for the massive centrifugal forces that are currently impacting on the European asylum system.

99 EASO, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, <https://www.easo.europa.eu/>.

Marginalized Memories: The (In)visibility of Migration History in Public Space in Austria¹

Christiane Hintermann

Introduction and Approach

“Where are sites of remembrance for migrants? Where are the places for migrants to remember and where are the places where they are remembered?” Christiane Harzig asked these questions in the introduction to the anthology *Migration und Erinnerung* (Migration and Memory) which she edited in 2006.² Especially the last question is in the focus of my research and this contribution, which is situated at the intersection of migration history and migration research in general, memory studies and urban and cultural geography.

Starting point of my work and the work of others in the field is the empirical fact that most European societies today are pluralistic, heterogeneous immigration societies. Population differs not only according to ethnic origin, religion or country of origin but also with respect to their individual and family biographies as well as their collective histories and transmitted historical and political experiences. Despite all the past and present migration experiences and the emerging pluralistic societies, Europe’s self-image is still very much centred on national paradigms and narratives. These national paradigms also prevail when it comes to the shaping of historical consciousness and memory by institutions like museums, media or schools.

What we are focusing on when we are talking about the interrelations of migration and memory not on an individual but a societal level is the question in which ways immigration societies construct, reconstruct and negotiate their migration past. We are dealing with central questions like “Is (im)migration history part of the post-World War Two narratives in Europe?,” “How is the rich (im)migration history of Europe remembered

1 Research for this contribution has been done within the frame of the project V 186-G18 “Lieux de mémoire of migration in urban spaces: the example of Vienna,” funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF.

2 Christiane Harzig, “Einleitung: Zur Persönlichen und kollektiven Erinnerung in der Migrationsforschung,” in *Migration und Erinnerung: Reflexionen über Wanderungserfahrungen in Europa und Nordamerika*, ed. Christiane Harzig (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2006), 7-20.

in the national histories of different European countries?,” “Have immigrants a position in the historical consciousness of a society?,” or “Do they have a place in the cultures of remembrance of a society?”

Generally speaking, migration history is no integral part of the hegemonic narratives of European societies in general and Austria in particular. Migrants and their histories live on the fringes of our historical consciousness and also migration research has neglected the memories of migrants and the marginalization of the younger Austrian migration history for a long time.³ One piece of evidence for this general observation is the fact that historical museums in Austria completely ignored the migration history of the country in their permanent exhibitions until recently.⁴ Another indicator is the observation that public space is virtually free of any symbolic places that would point to the recognition of national, regional or local migration histories, especially regarding the younger migration history of the country. In the following I will investigate this (in)visibility of migration history in public space. I will shortly argue that it might also be interpreted as selective representation and will then discuss the *making* of a visible site of remembrance in the context of migration and asylum in public space in Vienna—the so called Marcus Omofuma Stone, a memorial in remembrance of a Nigerian asylum seeker who was killed during his deportation flight from Austria to Bulgaria in 1999. The analysis will especially focus on the conflicts connected to the installation of the memorial and the appropriation of public space connected to it. Fundamental questions of equality, of exclusion and inclusion are at the bottom of the study: Whose history is visible in public space? Who tells the stories and from which perspectives? Who has the right to be remembered permanently in public space either with a monument, a memorial, a commemorative plaque or with street names? These are eventually questions of uneven power relations in society and unequal access to social, financial and cultural resources.

3 Christiane Hintermann, “Gedächtnislücke Migration? Betrachtungen über eine nationale Amnesie,” *Zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 3 (2013): 149–165; Dirk Rupnow, “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Plädoyer für eine Geschichte Österreichs als Migrationsgesellschaft in transnationaler Perspektive,” *Zeitgeschichte* 40, no. 1 (2013): 5–21; Christiane Hintermann and Dirk Rupnow, “Orte, Räume und das Gedächtnis der Migration: Erinnern in der (post)migrantischen Gesellschaft,” *Mitteilungen der Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft* 158 (2016): 59–83.

4 Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl, *Gastarbeiter: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration* (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2004); Christiane Hintermann, “[...] that migration simply and really is the absolute normality”: The Narration of Austrian Immigration History in Exhibitions,” in *Migration & Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960*, ed. Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2010), 162–181; Regina Wonisch and Thomas Hübel, *Museum und Migration: Konzepte – Kontexte – Kontroversen* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012).



Selective Representation and Marginalization

Visible representations of Austrian migration history in public space are rare and highly selective. An investigation of the symbolic landscape suggests that some events of the Austrian migration history are more easily integrated in and accepted as part of the hegemonic narratives of the Second Republic than others. Analyses of school textbooks show that while labor migration only inhabits a very small part of the country's cultural memory, the story of Austria as an asylum country is an uncontested part of the historical consciousness.⁵ This self-perception and self-definition of Austria as a generous asylum country is very much founded in the reception of refugees from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968 and from Poland in 1981. In her study on ethnic discourse in the Austrian parliament in the 1990s, Sedlak refers for instance to the "myth of the 'Austrian golden heart'" put forward in parliamentary speeches in the context of Austrian asylum policy in order to establish a positive self-presentation and imply that Austria is "a nation of donors and helpers."⁶ That many of these

5 Christiane Hintermann, 'Beneficial', 'problematic' and 'different': Representations of Immigration and Immigrants in Austrian Textbooks," in *Migration & Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960*, eds. Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2010), 61-78.

6 Maria Sedlak, "You really do make an Unrespectable Foreigner Policy ... Discourse on Ethnic Issues in Austrian Parliament," in *Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Teun A. van Dijk (Klagenfurt: Drava 2000), 107-168.

refugees did not stay in the country but only used it as transit country is another story, seldom told. For instance, only approximately 10% of the originally roughly 180,000 refugees from Hungary settled in Austria permanently. The flight of Hungarians or rather their reception in Austria is at the same time one of the few “migration events” of the last 60 years, which is not only prominently represented in Austrian school textbooks but also visibly remembered in public space. The *Bridge of Andau* at the Austrian-Hungarian border, spanning the so-called *Einser Kanal* is such a site of remembrance.



More than 70,000 Hungarian refugees used this bridge as their way to Austria before it was destroyed by the Soviet troops in November 1956. The new bridge was reconstructed in 1996 as a symbol of tolerance and helpfulness. It is symptomatic for the Austrian remembrance policy in connection with refugee movements during the Cold War that not the refugees who crossed the bridge or their difficult situation are remembered in the commemorative plaque but mainly the hospitality, the helpfulness of the Austrian population.⁷

⁷ Cf. the Austrian perception of Hungarian refugees: Karin Liebhart and Andreas Pribersky, “Brücke oder Bollwerk? Grenzland Österreich-Ungarn,” in *Memoria Austriae II: Bauten, Orte, Regionen*, ed. Emil Brix, Ernst Bruckmüller, and Hannes Steckl (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2005), 411-441; Berthold Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe: Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg,” in *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich*, ed. Manfred Rauchensteiner (Wien: Böhlau, 2010), 687-774.

The refugees themselves are not even mentioned. A similar example is a commemorative plaque fixed to the Red Cross building in Eisenstadt, also remembering the events of 1956.⁸

Quite a number of historical sites in Austria, especially commemorative plaques and memorial stones are connected to the flight and the settlement of so-called “ethnic Germans.” Laa/Thaya for instance—a small town in Lower Austria on the border to the Czech Republic—hosts a museum on the history of refugees from South Moravia (*Sudetendeutsche*). And the district museum Floridsdorf, one of the twenty-three districts in Vienna, shows a small exhibition on Siebenbürger Saxons, based on the initiative of a migrant himself.

There is, however, no reference to labor migration to and from Austria at all or the recruitment of labor migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. Jan Motte and Rainer Ohliger confirmed this result for Germany. They argue that labor migration to Germany from the 1950s onwards has largely been invisible in public space.⁹

The Marcus Omofuma Stone

To raise a historical monument means to create special “places” with the central function to commemorate historic events and/or people in public space. Remembering materializes in public space, memories are written into the landscape. Contrary to most monuments, the Marcus Omofuma Stone (MOS) can be interpreted as an expression of a *counter memory*.¹⁰ It represents a marginalized and contested part of the younger Austrian history and focuses on a central and much disputed conflict in our migration society: How to deal with asylum seekers and refugees in Austria as well as with structural racism and discrimination. The story of the MOS can also be read as a reference to an official policy of remembrance that tends to be exclusionary when it comes to the representation of events that are questioning the principles of our democratic societies, like cases of racism and discrimination.

8 Liebhart and Přibersky, “Brücke oder Bollwerk,” 425.

9 Jan Motte and Rainer Ohliger, “Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Einführende Betrachtungen,” in *Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik*, ed. Jan Motte and Rainer Ohliger (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2004), 7–16.

10 Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Sage House: Cornell University Press, 1977).

Marcus Omofuma

Marcus Omofuma was a Nigerian asylum seeker. He applied for asylum in Austria in 1998 on the grounds of religious persecution. His application was rejected twice by the court of the first as well as the second instance. The reason given for the rejection by the authorities was “obvious unfoundedness.”¹¹ After the sentence he was taken in detention pending his deportation.

On May 1, 1999 Marcus Omofuma suffocated on his deportation flight from Vienna to Nigeria via Sophia. He was escorted by three police officers from the alien’s police who wrapped his body including his mouth and obviously at least partly also his nose with an adhesive tape and tied him to his seat in the aircraft.¹² The police officers anticipated resistance from Omofuma because he had told them before that “he was not willing to return to his home country.”

The three police officers justified their action among other things with the explanation that Omofuma “went wild” which made it necessary to bind him. They had only acted in defence. The officers were only shortly suspended and accused of “torture of a prisoner resulting in death,” a crime which can be punished by a maximum of ten years’ arrest in Austria. Eventually the court followed the line of argumentation of the defence lawyers (both of them prominent members of the Austrian Freedom Party) that the officers were only subordinates and that gagging and tying people up was a well-established police practice in the routine of deportation flights in Austria at that time. The officers were finally sentenced to eight-month imprisonment suspended for a probation period of three years. This also implied that they were still allowed to keep their jobs.

The police officers were not the only ones to be charged. There were also proceedings against the Minister of the Interior (at that time a politician from the Social Democratic Party, well known for pursuing a restrictive migration and asylum policy), the Austrian Head of Security, the respective head of department in the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of Police in Vienna. All of them were accused of having had notice of the practice and not having stopped it.

11 AK Marcus Omofuma Stein, *Ohne Aufenthaltstitel* (Wien, 2009).

12 If not indicated otherwise the following argumentation as well as quotes are taken from the opinion of the court on the trial against the three policemen from Sept. 29, 2002; “Das Urteil,” *no-racism.net*, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, <http://no-racism.net/article/303/>.

The Stone Story

The suffocation of Omofuma is most certainly a crucial incident in the younger Austrian migration history and the history of racism and discrimination. It was then the culmination of an inhuman asylum policy and practice and a culmination of stereotypical and racist reporting in certain media on especially Nigerian asylum seekers. But it was also a starting point for a closer cooperation and networking of African communities in Austria and anti-racist and anti-discrimination NGOs and it is one of those rare incidents in the younger Austrian migration history which is publicly—although not officially—remembered.

The Marcus Omofuma Stone is the product of a private initiative. The sculpture was produced by the Austrian artist Ulrike Truger without any public funding. Her applications for financial support to Austrian officials like the Federal President or the respective City Councillor of Vienna were all declined. She finally managed to finance the big stone—African granite from Zimbabwe, called *Nero Assolute Zimbabwe*—by selling ten bronze casts of the original model she had made, € 2,500 each.

The sculpture – it is three meters high and weighs five tons—is not an image presentation of Omofuma himself but an abstract and symbolical presentation symbolizing the torture and the pain he had to endure. The cuts represent the adhesive tapes that cut into Omofuma. It was the first time in her work that Ulrike Truger used a cut-off wheel and not only hammer and chisel which she found appropriate in the context of the brutality against Omofuma. “And I thought that it was alright, this cutting, this brutal handling [of the stone].”¹³

The most interesting part of the stone story in the context of remembrance policy and questions like who has the right to public space and who has the right to be commemorated in public space was the positioning of the stone in October 2003, four and a half years after the death of Omofuma and its relocation to its actual position a month later.

Contemplating over the disinterested and negative attitude of the city and national representatives towards her funding applications, the artist thought she would not be very successful in getting permission to position her stone in the city centre where she wanted it to be raised; in her own words: “... and then I thought, when I now turn to them and dutifully ask for a place, this will not work. At the end I might get permission to put it

13 Ulrike Truger, in discussion with the author, March 27, 2012.

somewhere in a ‘*Beserlpark*.’¹⁴ Ulrike Truger decided to position her stone unauthorized on a Friday morning next to the National Opera in Vienna’s city centre at the so-called Herbert v. Karajan Square. “Then I came to the conclusion that illegality is part of the topic anyway. Consequently, I erected it there illegally and exactly at the right place, a place where it got the most possible attention. And that was the Opera.”¹⁵



Ulrike Truger chose the square next to the National Opera, the famous Hotel Sacher and the Kärntner Straße not only because it is one of the busiest parts of the city and it was clear that it would attract a lot of attention. For her this was also the right place because it is a meeting point of society, culture and commerce. It was her intention to bring important topics like racism and asylum policy forward and make them central in a central place of the city “[...] because it is here that people spend money and live in their idyllic world of sophisticated culture. It is exactly here where it has to be

14 A “*Beserlpark*” is a colloquial expression for a very small park, sometimes not more than a green traffic refuge in Vienna.

15 Ulrike Truger, in discussion with the author, March 27, 2012.

between Sacher, Kärntner Straße and Opera, that is where it belongs as a symbol that there is something else to be integrated as well.”¹⁶

After this unauthorized act Ulrike Truger got notice that she had to remove the stone within a certain time limit. In an open letter to the city mayor Michael Häupl she asked for time of consideration of four weeks to think and negotiate about a “good” place for the stone in Vienna; a time which she was granted. This of course also implied that the stone would remain where it was during that time as a “thorn in the side”¹⁷ of society.

During that time the current location was found; a place which is again a meeting point of culture and commerce; the corner of the Mariahilfer Straße—the most popular and busiest shopping street in Vienna—and the *Museumsquartier* (museum quarter), a cultural and social hot spot in Vienna with art museums, cultural venues, restaurants and pubs. The place belongs to Vienna’s 7th district, one among three of the twenty-three districts in Vienna with a green majority in the district council and Thomas Blimlinger of the Green Party as District Chair Person. He and the Green party supported the idea of Ulrike Truger to move the stone there and to have it stay there for good.

With her artistic intervention Ulrike Truger took a stand against forgetting. It was civil society who called for remembrance and challenged the national narrative of a generous asylum country when those politically responsible for the death of Marcus Omofuma would have preferred collective forgetting. The social need of collective forgetting, which is as important for the establishment of collective identities as shared memories,¹⁸ has been disturbed by the intervention and a controversial debate has been initiated on the questions of what is memorable in public space in society and who has or takes the power to decide.

The Intervention in Public Space – A Provocation of the Population?

The undocumented installation and the repositioning of the Marcus Omofuma Stone raised heated social, political and media debates. All bigger Austrian newspapers – among them *Der Standard*, *Die Presse*,

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Jaques Le Rider, “Mittel- bzw. Zentraleuropa und Österreich als imaginäre Gedächtnisorte der euroäischen Identität,” in *Die Verortung von Gedächtnis*, ed. Moritz Csáky and Peter Stachel (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2001), 139-150.

Kurier, *Wiener Zeitung*, *Salzburger Nachrichten*, *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, *Neue Vorarlberger Tageszeitung*, *Kleine Zeitung* – with the exception of the *Kronen Zeitung*, reported on the positioning and repositioning of the memorial. The *Kronen Zeitung*, Austria's tabloid newspaper with the highest circulation and well known for its populist style, discriminatory language and depiction of immigration as a problem, only covered the topic in letters to the editors. Here Marcus Omofuma was again, like in the coverage on his death, depicted and criminalized as drug dealer. The authors of the letters to the editor expressed their concerns and their consternation that Austria honors a drug dealer in a monument.

In general, the media coverage concentrated on the unauthorized positioning of the stone, which was described in a matter-of-factly or slightly positive way when it was interpreted as an act of civic courage:

It was the aim of the action to provoke and to rouse – the sculptress Ulrike Truger, 55, from Hartberg [Styria] succeeded in both last Friday morning on the Front of the National Opera.¹⁹

You have to take important things in your own hands because authorities and politicians tend to forget topics that are not to their own credit, is the opinion of Ulrike Truger.²⁰

Some journalists interpreted the “illegal act” as an unreasonable demand, though.²¹ The media did not at all engage in a debate on remembrance policy. Authorizations, responsibilities and potential consequences were discussed, but not the issue of remembrance. Surprisingly, there was also no discussion on the artistic work of Ulrike Truger. This is also reflected in the finding that only two reports were published in the arts section of the papers, the majority however in the local news. Not the artistic work but the intervention in public space was discussed most prominently.

After the repositioning of the memorial it became obvious that the MOS would be permanently visible in the public space of the city. That was the time when the Austrian Freedom Party interfered in the debate and took a stand against the memorial and, moreover, took the occasion to start a racist discourse on African asylum seekers in Vienna, who were overall accused of being drug dealers. In press releases the memorial as

19 “Denkmal-Aufstellung auf Wienerisch,” trans. by the author, *Kurier* [italics], Oct. 11, 2003.

20 “Wichtige Dinge, meint die Bildhauerin Ulrike Truger, muss man ...,” trans. by the author, *Der Standard* [italics], Oct. 11, 2003.

21 “Stein des Anstoßes,” trans. by the author, *Die Presse*, Oct. 11, 2003.

such was described as a “questionable case” and a “provocation of the whole population of Vienna [...] who are daily confronted with asylum seekers from black Africa who are dealing drugs in the streets of Vienna.”²²

Implicitly the Freedom Party also answers the central question regarding remembrance policy: the question if African asylum seekers have a right to be publicly remembered in Austria. Their answer is a clear “no.” On the contrary, Marcus Omofuma was posthumously accused of being an illegal immigrant abusing the right to asylum.

The Marcus Omofuma Stone and its installation were also debated in the Vienna City Council.²³ Similar to the media coverage, the debate mainly highlighted the “breaking of the law” by Ulrike Truger. The social democratic government in Vienna was blamed for their passive attitude and their acceptance of the offense. Josef Wagner, a local city councillor from the Freedom Party at that time, interpreted the installation as such and the assumed inactivity of the City government as a concerted action against the then national government, the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party and the Freedom Party. The former Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann, who was the responsible city councillor at that time, was accused of having influenced the administrative procedure. Werner Faymann himself interpreted the installation of the memorial at the Herbert von Karajan Square as a problem of the city building authority, who found a solution and acted according to the administrative rules and procedures. Neither the social democrats nor the member of the Austrian People’s Party, who raised his voice in the debate, positioned themselves as supporters or opponents of the memorial. It was mainly a debate on a suggested political influence on the Vienna city administration. Only a member of the Green Party interfered in the debate with regard to contents and remembrance policy.

In her press releases, however, also the Freedom Party considered the dimension remembrance policy, when they asked on the one hand who had the right to be an actor in the field of remembrance culture and policy and argued that also “other” parts of society might raise memorials and stones *ad libitum*. On the other hand, they raised the question of who was memorable and which merits of a person were necessary to justify a memorial. That Omofuma did not meet the necessary criteria was very clear for the Freedom Party, who argued: “As tragic as the death of Marcus Omofuma may be, his achievements and his behaviour for our country and our city are in no way suitable to justify memorial stones in his remembrance.”²⁴

22 Press Release, Nov. 10, 2003, OTS0075, trans. by the author.

23 City council of the capital city Vienna, 34th session, verbatim protocol, Nov. 4, 2003.

24 Press Release, 17 Nov. 2003, OTS0108, trans. by the author.

That the MOS really was a thorn in the side of parts of the society is also obvious by the fact that it has been the target of right wing and neo-Nazi devastation many times, especially during 2004 and 2008.²⁵ The information plaque has been damaged and stolen repeatedly, poured with resin and tar and garbled with varnish. The Stone itself has been sprayed and doused with varnish as well, right wing propaganda has been scrawled on it and in 2004 even a KKK-symbol (for Ku-Klux-Klan) appeared on the memorial.

The Marcus Omofuma Stone – An Invisible Memorial?

By symbolizing a marginalized and contested part of younger Austrian history, the Marcus Omofuma Stone fulfills a central function of memorials, which is according to Stachel “to focus slumbering conflicts in society” and to “provide an occasion and a place to exchange differences.”²⁶ The central and open social conflict addressed with the MOS is how a society deals with the right to seek asylum as well as questions of structural discrimination and racism in our migration societies. As controversial as the topics were the reactions and debates around the installation of the memorial.

Although migration and asylum continue to be very controversial issues in Austria, and they even gained a new momentum with refugees from Syria trying to escape to the European Union since 2015, the Marcus Omofuma Stone did not raise a lot of attention during the last years. It has not been attacked as frequently as before, which might be interpreted as a sign that people got used to the monument or that the meaning of the memorial sank into oblivion; that the Stone itself became invisible again like migration history as such. This interpretation is supported by empirical findings which show that even people who pass by the stone daily have no idea about its meaning and its history. Two surveys with questionnaires among 115 randomly selected passers-by near the Stone show that the meaning and the story of the memorial is widely unknown. Only six of the interviewees knew who and which fatal incident was commemorated there,

25 A photo documentation of the destructions and the cleaning actions afterwards is published in: AK Marcus Omofuma Stein, *Ohne Aufenthaltstitel* (Wien: no publisher, 2009).

26 Peter Stachel, “Stadtpläne als politische Zeichensysteme: Symbolische Einschreibungen in den öffentlichen Raum,” in *Die Besetzung des öffentlichen Raumes: Politische Plätze, Denkmäler und Straßennamen im europäischen Vergleich*, ed. Rudolf Jaworski and Peter Stachel (Leipzig: Frank und Time, 2007), 13–60.

hypotheses about the possible meaning included mainly the Holocaust and the time of National Socialism in Austria.²⁷

This low degree of awareness does not mean, however, that the memorial has no importance regarding the remembrance topography of the urban landscape. The Marcus Omofuma Stone as well as Marcus Omofuma as an individual are points of reference in the continuous discussion of the Austrian asylum law and policy as well as for NGOs working in the field of anti-discrimination and anti-racism. The stone itself is often used as meeting point for rallies in connection with migration and asylum policy or as place for closing rallies.²⁸

Altogether the example of the Marcus Omofuma Stone shows quite clearly that the visualization of migration history in public space in Austria and elsewhere is a conflict about the material and symbolic availability and appropriation of public space and the unequal opportunities of self-representation. The demand for visibility and audibility of migrant stories is therefore also a basic issue of equality and acceptance in our societies.

27 The first interview round was conducted within the frame of a university course at the Institute for Geography and Regional Research at the University of Vienna by the students Philipp Polanski and Rainer Rockenbauer in December 2010. The second was carried out as part of the FWF project, headed by the author "Lieux de mémoire of Migration in Urban Spaces." These interviews were carried out by Corinna Wachtberger and Dieter Huemer in October 2014.

28 Cf. reports and documentations on the platform <http://no-racism.net/>.

Austrian Public Opinion in the “Refugee Crisis”

Manfred Kohler

Introduction


The European Union and its member states, as well as the United States, if not the whole western industrialized world, have been grappling with the challenge of high and rising inflows of asylum seekers and refugees, the most recent ones being triggered mainly by the conflict in Syria as well as political, economic, and socio-religious instability haunting the entire Middle East and North Africa at least since the Arab Spring. At the end of 2015, UNHCR registered a total of 65.3 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide. This equals a 5.8 million increase over the previous year, a year that already saw an unprecedented rise by 8.3 million.¹ The extent to which origin and receiving countries are affected differs, however, across the world. The current “refugee crisis” may serve as an illustration. While the United States of America counted “only” some 286,200 refugees,² the EU-28 registered 1.3 million new asylum applications by the end of 2015 alone, 28% of which were Syrians; the next most common applicants originated from Afghanistan and Iraq.³ With almost 90,000 first-time asylum applications, Austria ranked fourth among the top five refugee-receiving EU countries in 2015, which together processed more than 70% of all asylum applications across the EU-28. That speaks volumes for the issue of fair burden sharing.

1 UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2016), 1

2 Ibid., 45.

3 Eurostat, “Asylum and Managed Migration Database,” accessed Feb. 5, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database>.

Figure 1: Number of first-time asylum applicants in the EU and EFTA in 2014 and 2015 (in thousands)



Source: Eurostat

Article 80 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requests from the Union legislator to provide for the fair distribution of burdens among member states in the framework of creating a common border checks, asylum, and immigration policy. However, the implementation of this objective has not yet been possible due to a lack of solidarity among EU member states against the backdrop of the recent mass-inflow of asylum seekers: in 2015, some 1.5 million refugees entered Europe, of whom 1.3 million registered as asylum seekers. In Germany alone, some 500,000 asylum seekers were documented. The handling of these larger numbers represents a major risk for the European Union as it stands. Right-wing parties are gaining power, a trend for which national parliamentary elections in Austria may testify this or next year. The same accounts for Germany, Italy, and France, which are all facing elections this year that could tilt the electoral balance more to the right and spark the ultimate surge of anti-EU and anti-immigration parties in some of the most powerful EU member states. The *Front National* under Marine Le Pen had particularly strong chances of winning this year's presidential elections.

She is a pronounced anti-EU contender and had the potential to reverse European integration, since France has been one of the two main engines of European unification, along with Germany. We can see from the above that refugee migration is a global issue that affects countries in different ways and to varying degrees. This article focuses on the case of Austria, one of the countries most strongly affected by refugee migration over the past two to three years within the European Union, notwithstanding the fact that more than two thirds of all refugees worldwide still remain in developing countries.⁴

The main question to be answered here is how this surge in asylum-seekers and refugees has affected public opinion in Austria. Herbert Vytiska presented a survey carried out by GfK-Austria in the fall of 2015 at the height of the “refugee crisis” that suggested a tilt to the right by Austrian public opinion. The survey showed that the asylum issue was particularly polarizing among the Viennese population. Of all respondents, 80% said that the refugee issue was the most frequently debated topic with family, friends and at the workplace. Additionally, 50% responded that the maximum capacity to absorb refugees would soon be reached, with another 49% of the surveyed thinking that the flow of refugees can be best controlled by stricter border protection. However, reinstating border fences or walls within EU territory also did not constitute the right solution, according to 63% of respondents. Only 37% of the surveyed were satisfied with how the government handled the refugee issue, with 63% heavily criticizing the government for its refugee management; 90% of the surveyed agreed with restrictive asylum and immigration policies, which also formed their foremost motive to possibly vote a right-wing party like the FPÖ.⁵

But does that mean that Austrians—and Europeans—are becoming increasingly right-wing? Or are they just dissatisfied with the government’s refugee management? In the following, we want to dig a bit deeper and present an unpublished opinion survey by GfK among mayors of more than 900 Austrian municipalities and a survey published by the Institute for Social Research and Consulting (SORA) among residents of 248 towns and municipalities in Austria.⁶ Both surveys were carried out in 2016 and the questions therein relate to 2015.

4 UNHCR, *Global Trends*, 1ff.

5 Herbert Vytiska, “Asylthema polarisiert Österreichs Öffentlichkeit,” *EurActive.de*, Oct. 19, 2015, accessed Feb. 10, 2017, <https://www.euractiv.de/section/osterreich/news/asylthema-polarisiert-osterreichs-offentlichkeit/>


6 SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016); GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016).

How Austrians Assess the Refugee Issue

Local and Regional Authorities Are Better Refugee Issue Managers than National Ones

In March and April of 2016, SORA carried out a survey among a random sample of 1,054 persons, aged above 16 and scattered across a total of 248 towns and municipalities in Austria. An interesting outcome of the survey was how different the respondents assessed the performance of the different levels of government in handling the refugee issue. The further away a government institution, the worse people assessed its performance.

Figure 2: Public opinion on how institutions and persons handled the refugee issue



Source: Author's own depiction. Data from SORA, "Städtebarometer: Endbericht" (Vienna, 2016), 47.

While approximately 60% of respondents found the handling of the refugee issue by the mayors and the *Länder* (federal states) to be excellent and fairly good respectively, less than half of the respondents found the same to be true for the Austrian federal government and only 20% for the European Council, the institution made up of the heads of state and government at EU-level, which also happens to be the most important institution for decision-making in European affairs.⁷ This assessment by respondents corresponds with the fact that the European Council, or the EU overall, has not managed to apply and implement a fair scheme to relocate asylum-seekers from overly burdened Italy and Greece to other member states. Even though the member states pledged in September of 2015 to relocate 160,000 refugees from Italy and Greece by September 2017, only 86,317 have been relocated by February 6, 2017.⁸


The Refugee Issue Stirs Concern and Optimism Alike

Another interesting question the survey raised was what kind of emotions the residents of Austrian cities and municipalities associated with the current refugee situation. Regarding the refugee situation in and around Austria, 34% of the respondents were optimistic, while an equal 34% were concerned, and 25% were even angry. The attitudes regarding refugee assistance and the integration of the latter were more optimistic. When it came to refugee assistance in Austria and at the municipal level, approximately 50% of respondents were optimistic, while the share of the concerned and angry was markedly lower. In terms of the integration of refugees, people were more optimistic (52%) regarding integration at the municipal level than at the national level (41%), as can be seen in figure 3 below.

7 Manfred Kohler, "European Governance and the European Parliament: From Talking Shop to Legislative Powerhouse," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52, no. 3 (2014): 600-615 (here 609).

8 "Member States' Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism," European Commission, Feb. 6, 2017, accessed Feb. 10, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf

Figure 3: Emotions regarding the refugee issue




Source: Author's own depiction. Data from SORA, "Städtebarometer: Endbericht" (Vienna, 2016), 46.

Public Opinion on Refugees Became More Positive Once Refugee Flows Abated

As opposed to the generally more negative attitudes toward refugees at the height of the refugee flows in the fall of 2015, indicated by the GfK poll in the introduction section,⁹ the SORA survey conducted in March and April of 2016 drew up a more positive picture, with positive attitudes and emotions prevailing towards refugees: seven out of ten respondents were shocked by the hatred of some people for refugees. Less than half of respondents (40%) said that Austria should prioritize domestic problems over spending money for refugees. Of all respondents, 30% felt like strangers in their own country (see figure 4 below).

9 Herbert Vytiska, "Asylthema polarisiert Österreichs Öffentlichkeit."

Figure 4: Attitudes towards the refugee issue in 2016




Source: Author's own depiction. Data from SORA, "Städtebarometer: Endbericht" (Vienna, 2016), 47.

GfK conducted an unpublished survey called *Bürgermeister and Flüchtlinge* in March and April of 2016 among the mayors of more than 900 Austrian municipalities, of which more than 600 hosted refugees. The public opinion as expressed by the closest representatives of the people, the municipal mayors, did not necessarily appear to be negative. While 22% of the mayors said that the reception and hosting of refugees entailed more risks and disadvantages, another 23% of them claimed that opportunities and advantages prevail; 55% of the responding mayors just simply remained neutral in this respect (see figure 5 below), suggesting that it would be better to see how things develop in the longer run. It appears that, overall, the real problems with refugees in general are not as far-reaching as depicted by some media outlets in Austria, like the *Kronen Zeitung* (the most widely circulated newspaper in Austria), which takes a more anti-immigration stance.¹⁰

¹⁰ "Flüchtling überfällt eigenen Betreuer mit Messer," *Kronen Zeitung* (Feb. 15, 2016), accessed Feb. 11, 2017, <http://www.krone.at/oesterreich/fluechtling-ueberfaellt-eigenen-betreuer-mit-messer-serie-an-gewalttaten-story-496154>

Figure 5: In general, do the advantages or disadvantages prevail regarding the reception of refugees?




Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percentages) from an unpublished poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016).

Civil Society and Faith-based Organizations are the Best Support Providers

Similar to the SORA survey mentioned above, in which people did not consider the national and European levels of governments good refugee issue managers (see figure 2), the GfK poll *Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge* shows that mayors have a negative opinion of the national institutions, like the Ministry of Interior or the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in terms of how helpful they were in organizing accommodation and care for refugees. While faith-based organizations like CARITAS ranked first in terms of how helpful they were in providing and finding accommodation and care for refugees in the eyes of the responding mayors (46%), the national ministries mentioned above only mustered 4% and 3% respectively, as can be seen in figure 6 below.


Figure 6: Which institutions are most helpful in terms of accommodation and care for refugees?



Source: Author's own depiction. Data (in percentages, multiple answers possible) from an unpublished poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by GfK, "Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge" (Austria, 2016).

Quite contrary to national institutions, the voluntary support for refugees by municipal residents (civil society) seemed to be overwhelming: 47% of the responding mayors in the 682 municipalities said that collaboration and support by local residents was great, paralleled by 48% of them who claimed that there was at least partial voluntary support. Hardly any mayor suggested that people were not helping during the "refugee crisis" in 2015.

Figure 7: Voluntary assistance by municipal residents




Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percent) from an unpublished poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016).

Mayors Say There Are Jobs Refugees Can Perform for the Common Good

The Austrian Foreigner Employment Act (*Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz*) provides little opportunity for asylum-seekers to work while they are waiting for their applications to be admitted or denied. The law only provides for seasonal work in forestry, tourism, and agriculture three months after asylum-seeker applications were accepted for processing, while at the same time there are labor market tests, which make sure that jobs go to Austrians first.¹¹ However, the GfK survey clearly shows that there are public-benefit activities refugees or asylum-seekers could perform, as figure 8 below suggests.

11 Anny Knapp, “Country Report: Austria,” *Asylum Information Database* (December 2015), 71.

Figure 8: In which areas could refugees perform public-benefit activities?



Source: Author's own depiction. Data (in percent) from an unpublished poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by GfK, "Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge" (Austria, 2016).

As figure 8 suggests, among the possible jobs refugees could potentially perform at that time, according to the surveyed mayors, were the maintenance of public areas (78% of mayors mentioned this kind of public-benefit activity), cleaning corridors (72%), road cleaning (64%), building yards (59%), and the maintenance of pathways, just to mentioned a few. With the unemployment rate among asylum-seekers so high, public sector work for refugees seems more logical in terms of the integration of these newcomers. It may give them hope and keep them off the streets.

Summarizing the Survey Results

The Reception and Care for Refugees Works Well in the Majority of Cases, the Work of Local and Regional Governments is Appreciated

More than half of the residents of towns and municipalities that received refugees in 2015 claimed that the reception of refugees in their

municipalities worked excellent or fairly well:¹² 30% of the respondents said that it worked “not so good” or “not good at all”;¹³ 59% of respondents assessed the mayors’ performances as “excellent” or “fairly good,” while 27% found their performances “not so good” or “not good at all.” Regarding the performance of the Austrian federal government, 47% were satisfied and 48% expressed dissatisfaction (see figure 2 above).

Reception Worked Rather Well Because of Civic Engagement, However There is a Desire for Fair Refugee Distribution

Among the reasons why refugee reception was deemed to have worked pretty well were people’s voluntary commitment to providing and caring for refugees and the willingness of refugees to integrate, along with smooth organization and accommodation. The reasons for problems regarding refugee reception were attributed to the great number of (male) refugees and their aversion to integrating. There was also fear among respondents that there would not be enough training and employment opportunities for all refugees, and respondents thought that the distribution of refugees among municipalities and *Länder* was not fair enough. Approximately 70% of the respondents indicated that they were in favor of resettling refugees according to the population size of the respective town or municipality.¹⁴

Individual Living Conditions and Future Prospects are Key Determinants for Attitudes Towards Refugees

Popular sentiment toward refugees was predominantly positive: 69% of the respondents were shocked about the hatred by some people for refugees (see figure 4). People with a higher degree of education, women, and persons living in rural areas with adequate income reported that the reception of refugees worked well. Furthermore, respondents who were optimistic regarding future job security and adequate living standards were more positive in general in terms of both the reception and acceptance of refugees.¹⁵

12 SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016), 50

13 GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016).

14 SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht,” 50

15 SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht,” 51

Concluding Remarks: Why Nation-States Fail in the Governance of Refugee Migration

One of the obvious results of the two surveys presented here is that Austrians are not happy with the way the EU and the national government handled the refugee migration issue over the past couple of years. I argue here—and this is a hypothesis that requires further testing—that the reason for popular discontent with the national government in terms of how it has handled the “refugee migration crisis” is not so much a direct result of obvious mismanagement, but more a latent consequence of the structure of migration governance in general and the structural constraints states are facing in that particular policy domain. There are several constraints states have to face when determining priorities about groups of persons receiving humanitarian protection and/or settlement rights on humanitarian grounds. These constraints are multi-faceted in that they are, amongst other factors, structural, political, and ethical in nature. The structural constraints of states are determined by the fact that they are particularistic agents that are mainly bound to further the interests of their own citizens. The political constraints are defined by (domestic and electoral) politics, in turn influenced by the interests of business and labor, NGOs, religious and other interest groups and by foreign and security policy concerns. These political constraints reduce the capacity of governments to contribute to a morally adequate response to refugees and asylum seekers. The third constraint, the ethical one, denotes the “difficulty of predicting the societal costs of applying a particular normative standard in entrance.”¹⁶ Other constraints stem from the global character of refugee flows and differing regimes trying to cope with them. Betts (2009) puts it that way:

The challenge in the current refugee regime is that asylum is subject to a strongly institutionalized and widely accepted norm, while the burden-sharing is subject to weakly and highly contested norms. In other words, states have a strong obligation to protect refugees who reach their territory but little incentive to support refugees elsewhere in the world.¹⁷

Forced migration in the form of refugee migration is an issue that has to be tackled by its roots. As long as refugee migration is merely governed

16 Matthew J. Gibney, *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 196f.

17 Alexander Betts, *Global Migration Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 315.

by the obligation of states to protect people who seek asylum and not so much by the need to eradicate the reasons for flight, there will be no change to the current migration pattern from the southern to the northern hemisphere. In fact, climate change will increase these patterns in the decades to come. As long as these forced migration issues that are global in character and outcome are not addressed globally and in solidarity, there is no end in sight for this most eminent phenomenon called refugee migration.

Book Reviews

**Elisabeth Röhrlich (assisted by Agnes Meisinger),
ed., *Migration und Innovation um 1900:
Perspektiven auf das Wien der Jahrhundertwende*
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2016)**

Annemarie Steidl

Migration to Vienna and Viennese modernism around 1900 are well-studied research fields; much has already been written on these topics. So why, when taking a first look at the volume edited by Elisabeth Röhrlich, do we need another book discussing this thematic? What makes this conference volume innovative and worth reading, at a second glance, is the unique combination of many authors who approach the topic from various angles. The different texts deal with varying aspects of migration, innovation, identities, heterogeneity, diversity, and culture, thereby trying to give answer to the question of whether Vienna around 1900 can aptly be described as a “melting pot” of the Habsburg Empire. By combining different aspects, the papers not only focus on high numbers of internal migrants from all over the Habsburg territories, but they integrate this high degree of spatial mobility with groundbreaking innovations in arts, culture, and sciences. Many male, but also female, protagonists of the cultural boom at the end of the nineteenth century were either migrants of the first or second generation. In the introduction, Röhrlich, referring to the well-known US-American cultural historian Carl E. Schorske, remembers the role his research plays for modernity and *fin-de-siècle* Vienna.

Migration is omnipresent in our global societies, either in the form of foreigners moving internationally from one country to the other, or intense discussions on the phenomenon, which dominate our everyday life. Given the sharp increase of newcomers in Vienna since the 1980s, and inspired by a questionable historical-political discourse on the 200-year celebration of the victory over the Ottoman Empire (*Türkenbefreiung*), the editors, together with research colleagues, took up the challenge of presenting a new perspective on immigration to Vienna around 1900. The articles in this volume are the result of a research project initiated by Oliver Rathkolb and based at the Vienna Institute for Contemporary History (2011-2015).

The authors focus on various aspects of the topic in music, literature, and fine arts, thereby commenting on political conditions and experiences of discrimination, which affect many migrants.

The volume starts with an overview on immigration to Vienna by Michael John, but other papers also deal with aspects of the large number of urban migrants, who were characterized by a great heterogeneity and a great proportion of women. This migration pattern is still remembered by the Viennese population and part of a collective memory. While Sylvia Hahn especially discusses women who moved to Vienna from Habsburg territories, as well as from other European countries, Andreas Weigl addresses the question of whether the high number of migrants and their influence on Viennese population growth was really unique at the end of the century. Andreas Resch writes about the participation of foreigners in the Viennese “creative industries,” such as publishers, architects, or artists, with a quantitative approach, similar to the aforementioned authors. Other articles—such as the text written by Steven Beller on the influence of Jewish migrants on modern culture or Klaus Hödl, who focuses on stereotyping of Galician Jews by Viennese citizens—deal with specific migrant groups. In contrast to the Jews, who represented an important and influential minority in town, smaller numbers of different Slavic migrants from southern provinces of Imperial Austria and from Croatia-Slavonia never gained that much influence. By challenging the group identity of South-Slavs, Wladimir Fischer-Nebmaier emphasizes the importance of their associations.

What makes this collection of 18 articles unique is the combination of broader overviews on immigration with various aspects of cultural life. For instance, Birgit Peter writes about the diversity of Viennese theaters, while Wolfgang Müller-Funkes’ essay on migration of writers and poets who lived at least parts of their lives in Vienna presents a study on the works of Joseph Roth and Elias Canetti; both have a long migration story but, as writers, were most different from each other. Focusing on the carrier of various musicians with a migration background, Christian Glanz stresses the complex connections of innovation and cultural diversity. Based on the biographical story of the family Hölzel, who managed an important publishing house, Alexander Klee illustrates special conditions and entanglements of economy, society, culture, and science in Vienna at the turn of the century. Elisabeth Heinmann’s article describes Vienna as an important magnet for artists and art patrons from mostly southeastern regions of the empire. During this era of intensified globalization and industrialization, the city was the Habsburg Empire’s center for a fresh start for social climbers from the provinces.

Some of the articles emphasize the process of identity creation and the hybridity of identities of mobile people. Moritz Csáky's contribution elaborates Vienna as the capital of a multi-ethnic empire, where migrants from all over Central Europe, who spoke various languages, gathered and influenced a unique space for communication. Jacques Le Rider describes "crisis of identity" as a characteristic of Viennese modernism (*Wiener Moderne*) around 1900, because of its tremendous social and cultural plurality and the ambivalent potential within such a plurality. In contrast, Hans Petschar deals not with individual stories but with the story of a special book series, the *Kronprinzenwerk*, an encyclopedia of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 24 volumes, published from 1885 to 1902 under the patronage of Crown Prince Rudolf. In this rather long text, the author tries to give an example how researchers, who contributed to the encyclopedia, created identities and ethnic groups. How politics and politicians dealt with the high number of migrants, xenophobia, and antisemitism is discussed at the end of this elaborated volume. Isabelle Lehner is interested how the Viennese municipal council discussed language as an area of conflict in the multi-national empire and how antisemitism marginalized Jewish fellow citizens when finding employment. Thomas Olechowski, whose articles deal with the doctrine of constitutional law (*Staatsrechtslehre*) and its history at the University of Vienna, presents another approach via individual stories. The article by Marcus Gräser is unique in this volume, as it presents a comparison of Vienna with another city, namely Chicago in the United States. The author is interested in how the formation of political parties and local politics works in these ethnically inhomogeneous urban agglomerations, which in 1900, at first glance, show some fascinating similarities. However, a closer inspection uncovers significant differences.

With more than 500 pages, the volume offers innovative macro- and micro-approaches on migration and modernism in Vienna. However, the individual articles would have gained from more intense attention and revisions by the editor. Some of the essays are rather long, and many overlaps could have been avoided. While it is understandable that the article by the American contributor Steven Beller is in English, it is puzzling why, in a German conference volume, the German-speaking author Wladimir Fischer-Nebmaier writes in English. Given these minor criticisms, what makes this book even more interesting to read is the fact that many of the authors assembled here talk about migration patterns and migrants always in conjunction with current public discourses in Austria.

Tara Zahra, *The Great Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World* (W.W. Norton & Co.: 2016)

Sarah Cramsey

If you look closely at the walls of the former Red Star Line buildings in Antwerp, you might see faded Hebrew letters materializing, as if out of historical mist, from behind the chalky paint. Throughout the warehouses and disinfection rooms of the shipping line that, for nearly half a century, linked Belgium to the United Kingdom and ports in New York and Philadelphia, Hebrew letters forming Yiddish words alerted passengers transiting through this space that “everything for passengers is done free of charge in this building.” As evidenced in pictures dating from after 1900, this black-lettered promise appeared in Polish, Czech, German and English as well and was, by linguistic default, intended for migrants coming in large part from the lands of the Habsburg Empire. Tara Zahra’s impressive new book *The Great Departure* (Norton & Co., 2016) begins with the fraught transatlantic journey of these Imperial subjects. Across nearly 300 pages of narrative, Zahra explores how Europeans born in the (presumed) “east” moved westward and, for upwards of 30 to 40% of migrants, back eastward (p. 14), how the states to which these migrants belonged attempted to control their movement to varying levels of success and how the dynamic between states and people morphed from the mid-19th century onward, in the wake of two World Wars, during multiple political revolutions in the region, throughout the Cold War, and even up to the present day.

This is an ambitious book about the link between labor and migration, the power struggle between the potential migrant and state officials and collective visions, some skewed and some more accurate, of the “free world” from the 1840s onward. Across a century and a half, Zahra charts how ideas and anxieties about freedom, mobility, race, the “whiteness” of Slavs and Jewish territoriality changed amongst policy makers, political activists and the migrants themselves on both sides of the Atlantic. While Zahra does not fully contextualize Zionism against other forms of (or indifference to) Jewish nationalism and avoids situating the movement of peoples during the Second World War in her narrative, most of this book reads as a stellar

example of what Zahra does best: weaving original archival sources in English, French, Polish, Czech and German alongside an enviable polyglot bibliography of secondary literature to create a clear narrative that is at once personal, social, and transnational.

Of her seven chapters, Chapter Three, “Happy and Unhappy Returns,” warrants special consideration. This section utilizes a narrative exploring migration, return migration, and population control to understand the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence of new states like Poland and Czechoslovakia on the map of east central Europe in new ways. If the Great Departure begins with the mass movement of people like Faustina Wiśniewska away from European homelands in the 1840s and peaks in the first decade of the 20th century, when “Austria-Hungary was the top supplier of migrants to the United States, sending more than two million subjects of the Dual Monarchy through the gauntlet at Ellis Island” (p. 4), the ramifications of this mass exodus multiply as new states centered around Prague and Warsaw begin protecting the human capital necessary for their interwar citizenries. Zahra traces a few notable shifts to this post World War I moment. First, “new institutions created to regulate migration after World War I were intended to signify the expansion and consolidation of national sovereignty and national ‘self-determination,’” but in fact “became representative of sovereignty’s limits” (p. 108). Zahra traces the use of physical force after 1945 in the region to the institutional framework set in place and the backlash provoked against this framework after the Great War. Second, since national self-determination was incomplete, the still-heterogeneous Habsburg successor states had to deal with minority groups that now had protection from the League of Nations. Paradoxically, in Zahra’s assessment, “the least ‘desirable’ citizens from a nationalist perspective, members of national and linguist minorities, actually enjoyed the most of freedom of mobility” (p. 112), and “the flow of migrants from East Central Europe mostly shifted from North America towards destinations closer to home, especially France” (p. 109). And third, Czechoslovak and Polish statesmen encouraged expatriates abroad to return and experience the true freedom promised by their new states, seemingly reversing “the decades of movement out of Eastern Europe” (p. 114). For example, nearly 900,000 re-migrants returned to these two states between March 1918 and July 1922 (p. 114). These three shifts represented a stark change from the pre-1914 European context.

Zahra illuminates these shifts by employing references to a popular novel (Karel Čapek’s *Hordubal*), an understanding of the International Labor Organization, and fresh archival sources from Prague, Warsaw,

and Paris, while simultaneously making gestures to other European states like Romania (we learn that emigration was outlawed, yet it's unclear why), and Yugoslavia (the government made it difficult to get a passport).¹ The story contained in this chapter engages with the Great Depression, gender issues, passport-acquiring procedures, and labor regulations. Like most of the book, it focuses mostly on Poland and Czechoslovakia (which are termed at varying points in the chapter, see even the quotes above, and throughout the book as both "Eastern Europe" and "East Central Europe") and the citizenries therein. This comment concerning nomenclature is not so much a critique as it is an observation. On the territory that once encompassed the northwestern and northern reaches of the Habsburg Empire, it is hard to find an agreeable regional term that suits the long chronology of this history and the contemporary perspective of actors inside and outside of these places. Zahra's story is more about Polish-, Czech-, and Yiddish-speaking populations than it is about "Eastern Europe" with a capital (Cold War-era and/or western-imagined) "E." Zahra might have considered offering her audience a clear explanation about her own use of terminology and why the "Eastern Europe" of the title is both used and not used throughout the book.

Any story about mass migration from east central or "Eastern" Europe will be, at least in part, a story about the Jewish experience, and this book is no exception. Jewish themes, references and people can be found in each chapter, from the Jewish travel agents on trial in the town of Oświęcim in Chapter One to Zahra's utilization of Joseph Roth's novelette, "The Wandering Jews,"² and her hesitant engagement with perhaps the most divided historiography in European Jewish Studies, that of Jews living in Polish spaces throughout the modern period. In fact, Zahra identifies Eastern Europe's Jews as the "most tragic victims of a growing conviction that emigration could solve the perceived 'problem' of national, linguistic and religious diversity" (p. 18). In this way, the Jews from this region constitute her main subjects. Already, in the introduction, she identifies a "broad consensus" that developed in the 1930s "among Western diplomats, Zionists, humanitarian organizations and East European officials as well as ordinary Jews" whereby "the 'solution' to the so-called 'Jewish problem' would entail the mass emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe" (p. 18).

She details these schemes in a chapter problematically entitled "The First Final Solution." If, as Zahra argues, "the lines between rescue and renewal, between emigration and expulsion, and between humanitarianism

1 I am grateful to Dr. Irina Marin for alerting me to the overall lack of coverage regarding the lack of emigration from Romania in Zahra's book and the historiography overall.

2 Joseph Roth, *Juden auf Wanderschaft* (Berlin: Die Schmiede, 1927).

and ethnic cleansing were already hazy in 1938-1939" (p. 144), historians of the real "Final Solution" or the *Sboab* (which began with the revision of German citizenship laws, continued with systematic discrimination and not-necessarily-voluntary migration in the 1930s but became genocidal in the summer and fall of 1941) should certainly take notice. Zahra does have a point with her provocative language, but it's a strange thing to say explicitly nonetheless. Arguably, two of the most important challenges faced by historians of the Holocaust relate to contingency (it must be kept alive), while also explaining the obscured process by which Einsatzgruppen members, Order Police, and allies attached to the Third Reich apparatus began to kill Jewish women and children en masse in the wake of Operation Barbarossa. The Endlösung, as discussed at the Wannsee Conference in January of 1942, referred to "evacuations to the East," but I have been taught that this intentionally veiled language masked a truer meaning of past and future systematic killings, which nearly all the participants possessed. Does the hazy line between humanitarianism and ethnic cleansing in the late 1930s extend to the event that would later be termed genocide as well? And how do these hazy lines account for what is perhaps the most essential element in the shift from plans that evacuate to plans that eliminate: ideology?³

In the end, forced resettlement and, to be more precise, interwar discussions (which often amounted to little) about hypothetical and real plans for forced resettlement did not constitute a "final solution" as they did not provide long-lasting answers for the Jewish question as a whole. In fact, while Polish government officials harbored visions for the mass movements of peasants and Jews away from Poland in the 1930s, these plans for the most part evaporated when faced with logistical realities.⁴ The importance of charting failed discussions of utopian visions should not eclipse the understanding that the context of the pre-World War II era did not allow for such plans targeting millions of Jews and others for expulsion to fully mature. And while I agree with Zahra that a strange consensus *began* to coalesce in the 1930s, my research indicates that any developing consensus did not produce clear solutions until the 1940s, when a large group of east-central European diplomats, transnational observers and allied statesmen agreed that the region's surviving Jews "belonged" in Palestine and that the United Nation's Relief and Rehabilitation Administrations should

3 John Connelly, "Rule by Inspiration," *London Review of Books* 27, no. 13 (July 7, 2005): 27-28.

4 Timothy Snyder mentions that peasants constituted the first targeted group for mass evacuation schemes in the Second Polish Republic. See Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015), 60.

fund their transit away from postwar Europe.⁵ While Zahra shows that few conclusive solutions emerged from the 1930s, she does not follow how this “broad consensus” changes across the early 1940s to better understand precisely how the *bricha* (or the semi-legal migration of Jews away from postwar Europe) gained support from both Jewish and non-Jewish east-central European (and more specifically Czechoslovakian and Polish) leaders, statesmen, and bureaucrats.⁶

Going further, any discussion of Jewish movement away from Europe after 1945 must be fully situated in a discussion about the transformation of international norms and how those norms expanded in the 1940s to allow for state-sponsored campaigns of ethnic cleansing (for example, the Polish state’s changing policy toward the Ukrainian minority, the largest minority in interwar Poland and the most dangerous threat to the state, from the 1920s to the 1940s).⁷ Students of this puzzling development would do well to challenge the title of Chapter Four, press Zahra’s claim regarding the “hazy lines” in the early 1930s, and wonder why the migrations unleashed by Nazi and Soviet occupying forces within Poland’s former borders found minimal coverage in this book. In fact, mass migrations for some *Volksdeutsche*, more “Slavs,” and for millions of Jews, especially those groups in Czechoslovakia and Poland, reached their peaks only during World War II, when these movements were subsidized by the infrastructure of the expanding Third Reich.⁸ Remarkably, those migrations between 1939 and 1945, which contributed to events like the Final Solution and began the forcible reordering of *Ost Europa* along racial lines, find little space in this book.

In conclusion, scholars attentive to various manifestations of Zionism, other forms of Jewish nationalism, citizens indifferent to the calls of Jewish nationalist activists and the success of Jewish socialism in specifically the Polish context would notice one particular insinuation that runs like a red thread throughout this book: that Jews, and especially Polish Jews at that,

5 Sarah A. Cramsey, *Uncertain Citizenship: Jewish Belonging and the Ethnic Revolution in Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1938–1948* (PhD. Diss, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 2014).

6 Zahra does not engage with Yehuda Bauer’s magisterial work *Flight and Rescue: Brichah* (New York: Random House, 1970) but does reference two of his other books *Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) and *My Brother’s Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1929–1939* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974).

7 Sarah A. Cramsey and Jason Wittenberg, “Timing is Everything: Changing Norms of Minority Rights and the Making of a Polish Nation-State,” *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no. 11 (2016): 1480–1512.

8 Very useful on *Volksdeutsche* is Valdis Lumans, *Himmler’s Auxiliaries: the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German national minorities of Europe, 1933–1945* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1993).

of both Zionist and non-Zionist stripe were “clamoring to escape interwar Poland” (p. 151). Zahra notes that 400,000 Jews emigrated from Poland between 1921 and 1938 and that “thanks to high birthrates, the Jewish population nonetheless hovered at around three million” (p.151). Even if several hundred thousand more Polish Jews “had registered with Zionist and non-Zionist emigration societies, indicating their desire to leave” by the end of the 1930s it still does not follow that a “majority of Polish Jews” were actively looking for routes out of Poland (and simply by registering as a Zionist should not be taken as an indication of willingness to move toward Palestine or elsewhere immediately; in fact a golden rule of Zionism has been the *unwillingness* of people self-identifying as Zionists to leave the places of their birth for an arguably foreign homeland in the Middle East). As Ezra Mendelsohn noted, in the 1930s the Polish Socialist Bund “rose again.” This “seemingly unexpected development” which flew “in the face of all logic” emerged after the 1935 split in the World Zionist Organization and in response to the tightening of migration into the Palestinian Mandate. In fact, on the eve of World War II the Polish Bundists “could and did claim—without appearing ridiculous—that they had become the single strongest Jewish political party in Poland.”⁹

It seems that the strand of political Zionism tethering Jewish populations to the historical biblical lands had failed miserably on the eve of the Second World War. Samuel Kassow has argued as such in the early chapters of his brilliant book *Who Will Write Our History? Emanuel Ringelblum, the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Oyneg Shabes Archive*, which analyzes the landscape of interwar Polish Jewish politics and dissects the political platform of Left Poalei Zion, the party for which Ringelblum held a life-long membership.¹⁰ For Kassow, Emanuel Ringelblum is representative of Polish Jews who came of age in an independent Second Polish Republic, who spoke Yiddish and Polish fluently, and who were, for better or for worse, unwilling to abandon the “do for the *dortn*” or the “here” in Poland for the “there” somewhere else.¹¹ From a demographic perspective, more than half of more than three million Polish Jews living in Poland were under the age of 30 by 1938, further cementing that generation’s submersion in at least a partially Polish context. And

9 Ezra Mendelsohn, *On Modern Jewish Politics* (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 75.

10 Emanuel Kassow, *Who will write our History? Emanuel Ringelblum, the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Oyneg Shabes Archive* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 15. Also helpful is Kassow’s *The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics: Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe* (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2003) and, most recently, *Who will write our History? Rediscovering a Hidden Archive from the Warsaw Ghetto* (New York: Vintage, 2009).

11 Kassow, *Ringelblum*, 48.

further, it is helpful to remember that, according to the 1931 census, nearly half a million Polish citizens identified their everyday language as Polish and their religion as Jewish, thereby forcing historians to recast our understanding of the elastic possibilities of Polish belonging long after the period that Polish nationalism began to hate.¹² Polish Jewry was a diverse group indeed and a more-than-high birthrate kept their numbers strong in the Second Republic. Ironically, Zahra's coverage of "Zionists" as a seemingly monolithic group would benefit from the nuance present in her other works that understand "national indifference" as an important category of analysis.¹³ And while Zahra is correct to identify postwar Poland as an often-unfriendly place for Jewish returnees, she could offer a more nuanced historiography to understand the complexity of the postwar era. Works by Marci Shore, Anna Chichopek-Gajraj, David Engel, and Natalia Aleksiu help us understand why a majority of Polish Jews left Poland and also why upwards of 80,000 Polish Jews refused, at least in the immediate postwar years, to join their generation's great departure.¹⁴

Even with those critiques in mind, the reader looking to understand more about the Jewish experience in this part of Europe can learn many things from Zahra's book. That reader will join an impressed audience already populated by a number of experts on transatlantic migration, on the connection between labor and work, on changing ideas about whiteness, and on the complicated process by which human beings born in a certain parcel of eastern-ish Europe were (voluntarily and involuntarily) uprooted from the 1840s onward. And, finally, Zahra's book offers the descendants of the Great Departure a notable balance between the personal stories of multiple migrants and the broader social, diplomatic and governmental streams that carried them away from Habsburg lands to unexpected futures. My own great-grandmother Johanna left her rural home nestled in the mountains of Carinthia and arrived at Ellis Island in 1913 ready to become (after quarantine) an indentured servant for a family in Patterson, New Jersey. This story belongs to her as well as my office bookshelf. That is no small feat.

12 I am referring to Brian Porter's wonderful book *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in 19th Century Poland* (Oxford University Press, 2000).

13 Tara Zahra, "Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* Vol. 69, No. 1 (Spring 2010): 93-119.

14 Marci Shore, *Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918-1968* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 2006); Anna Chichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); David Engel, "Patterns Of Anti-Jewish Violence In Poland, 1944-1946," *Yad Vashem Studies* 26 (1998): 43-85; Natalia Aleksiu, *Dokąd dalej? Ruch syjonistyczny w Polsce (1944-1950)* (Warsaw: Trio, 2002).

Marco Büchl, *Dogface Soldiers: Die Frontsoldaten der US-Infanterie und der Krieg gegen Hitlers Wehrmacht im Mittelmeerraum und in Nordwesteuropa* (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2016)
Peter Karsten, *Understanding World War 2 Combat Infantrymen in the European Theater: Testing the Sufficiency of Army Research Branch Surveys and Infantry Combatant Recollections against the Insights of Credible War Correspondents, Combat Photographers, and Army Cartoonists, World War 2 History 5* (Bennington, Vermont: Merriam Press, 2016)

James J. Weingartner

Austrian author and photographer Marco Büchl has endeavored to write a social and cultural history of U.S. Army infantrymen in the Mediterranean and European Theaters during World War II. Offered as his doctoral dissertation at the University of Vienna, it is an effort to explore and define the “dogface” as a key component of the myths of “The Good War” and “The Greatest Generation.” It may seem curious that an Austrian should choose to write on American soldiers in World War II when so little has been done on Austrian troops serving in the Wehrmacht. Indeed, military history seems a forgotten discipline in the Austrian academy, there being in fact no specialists in that field serving on the faculty of any Austrian university. Contact with American troops during Büchl’s employment in the headquarters of NATO/PfP-Multinational Battlegroup South may have stimulated his interest in U.S. military history. Whatever his motivation, Büchl, has written a useful book, although perhaps more so to an Austrian/German non-specialist than to an American reader, at least one who is reasonably familiar with U.S. military history and the U.S. Army’s role in World War II. Büchl lays a foundation for his analysis with an overview of the evolution of “The American Way of War.” Surprisingly, although his bibliography is extensive, he seems to have made no use of

Russell Weigley's 40-year-old, but still valuable, book of that title. Büchl, drawing on the more recent work of Edward Coffman, points to the chronic tension in American consciousness between the professional soldier, a putative threat to a democratic polity, and the "citizen soldier," the latter concept embodied in the militia or, later, National Guard in the Civil War and again in the two World Wars in the form of a mass conscript army with which the United States would fight both twentieth century global conflicts. It was out of the mass of millions of draftees provided by the reintroduction of conscription in September 1940, the first peacetime draft in American history, that the World War II dogface would emerge.

But what does Büchl understand the term "dogface" to mean? Its initial usage by American soldiers who regarded themselves as belonging to that category appears to have slightly antedated American involvement in World War II. Functionally, the dogface was an infantry rifleman, an enlisted man or non-commissioned officer and a member of that component of the U.S. Army which, although constituting a minority of the Army's total manpower, was fated to suffer the heaviest casualties of any of its combat branches. Sociologically, the dogface was a "citizen soldier," conscious and deeply resentful of his status as an expendable element in a vast and impersonal organization. The dogface's lowly status, at least as he perceived it, was eloquently expressed in that and other canine terminology ("dog tags," "pup tents," "fox holes," etc.).

The core of Büchl's book purports to be an effort at a Geertzian "thick description" of the culture that evolved within this subset of U.S. Army combatants. It is contextualized within a narrative describing the growth and experiential development of that army over the course of the war from call-up and training, through shipment overseas, to actual commitment to combat in North Africa and Europe and the conditions under which combatants fought and struggled to survive.

Although he does not ignore other sources, Büchl relies primarily on the work of William Henry "Bill" Mauldin, which the author believes bears comparison in terms of its expressive power with Francisco Goya's *Disasters of War*, depicting the horrors unleashed by the Peninsular War in Spain of the early nineteenth century. One might question, as does this reviewer, whether Mauldin's comparatively anodyne cartoons are really in the same league as Goya's shattering representations of human cruelty and suffering, while at the same time recognizing his success in creating the iconic figures of the bedraggled, cynical and long-suffering Willy and Joe, who became the quintessential dogfaces in the minds of millions of Americans. Mauldin understood the dogfaces because he served among them as a

youthful sergeant in the 45th Infantry Division, which was to experience some of the most brutal combat of the European war in often appalling terrain and horrendous weather conditions. As the central component of his “thick description,” Büchl subjects each of thirteen of Mauldin’s cartoons to a detailed analysis of the personalities, physical settings and accompanying equipment depicted by Mauldin, as well as his interpretation of the message that he believes the artist intended to convey. In light of the fact that Mauldin produced over 600 cartoons in the course of the war, it is surprising that Büchl has used so few of them, particularly in view of his conviction that they are a peerless source that conveys the dogface’s perceptions with an immediacy that cannot be matched by the vast memoir literature that is typically the product of years, often decades, of reflection. But letters and diaries written by combatants in the immediate aftermath of their experiences are more “immediate” than Mauldin’s cartoons, and Büchl might have found Peter Schrijvers’ *Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe during World War II*, based on such sources, valuable. In fact, his description does not seem very “thick” at all. And how completely do Mauldin’s cartoons convey the reality of dogface culture anyway? They succeed admirably in depicting the muddy squalor and physical discomfort in which the dogface subsisted: his hatred of K-rations, the comradeship, even love, that develops between men in combat. Willie and Joe are, in a real sense, lovers. The dogface recognizes the humanity of the enemy soldier, sharing as he did in the dogfaces’ misery. Mauldin’s German soldiers are, save for their uniforms, indistinguishable from his American protagonists. The dogface is skeptical of higher authority, although not openly defiant of it, and is contemptuous of rear echelon troops not subject to his perils and sufferings. But what about the darker aspects of the combat infantryman’s experience: his reactions to the death and dismemberment of buddies, his own fear of suffering a similar fate, his callousness toward replacements not yet accepted by veterans, his pre-occupation with sex, and the near-universality of a vocabulary based on the seemingly indispensable “fuck,” as Paul Fussell conveys so well? And what about the episodic brutality towards enemy prisoners that was common in the fury of combat? Mauldin’s own regiment, the 180th of the 45th Infantry Division, was involved in the mass murders of Axis prisoners in Sicily. Some dogfaces expressed revulsion at the atrocity, while others had voluntarily participated in it. Mauldin was likely aware of these events, yet there is not the faintest hint of any of this or anything similar in his cartoons, nor is it reasonable to expect that there should be. Self-censorship growing out of loyalty to comrades, not to mention the certainty of official censorship, surely would have rendered such

candor impossible. Any assessment of “dogface culture” based primarily on a tiny fraction of Mauldin’s iconic *oeuvre* must therefore be considered incomplete, though nevertheless of value.

Büchl’s book can be compared with a contemporary work by University of Pittsburgh military historian Peter Karsten, which, while serving a different purpose, also addresses the *mentalité* of the World War II U.S. combat infantryman in the European Theater. Although a much briefer treatment, it points the way towards a thicker description. Karsten assesses the “sufficiency” of the U.S. Army’s Research Branch’s wartime surveys of dogfaces’ opinions on a variety of subjects and the private observations of combatants by comparing them with the record created by war correspondents, photographers, and cartoonists. Karsten evaluates the work of 25 of the latter and selects seven who “got it,” namely those who were actually in contact with combat infantrymen on the European fighting fronts for extended periods of time, as most were not. These include well-known figures such as Eric Sevareid, Robert Capa, Ernie Pyle and, of course, Bill Mauldin. Karsten provides insightful and often entertaining observations on the work of both categories of commentators and convincing arguments for doubting the reliability of most of them. He concludes that the observations of the “got its,” Army Research Branch surveys, and the private commentaries and recollections of veteran dogfaces both during and after the war, are complementary and necessary for the fullest possible understanding of the dogfaces’ experience. But a broader question is suggested by these two books: to what extent is “dogface culture” a uniquely American phenomenon, and to what degree are its characteristics simply outgrowths of experiences common to all World War II combat infantrymen?

Hellmut Butterweck, Nationalsozialisten vor dem Volksgericht Wien: Österreichs Ringen um Gerechtigkeit 1945-1955 in der zeitgenössischen öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2016)

Winfried Garscha

Hellmut Butterweck is an Austrian writer, theater critic, and journalist. He had served for decades on the editorial staff of the catholic weekly *Die Furche* and is still publishing commentaries in Viennese newspapers like *Der Standard*. Butterweck encountered Nazism personally, first as a young forced laborer during the war, and then as a committed anti-fascist activist in the 1950s and 1960s. During those postwar years, a considerable number of Austrians refused to confront their country's, and their own, Nazi past. Austria's failure at mastering its own past led Butterweck to a lifelong commitment to raise his voice against the continued belittling of Nazi crimes in postwar Austria and to castigate Nazi nostalgia. Some of his non-fiction works deal with the prosecution of Nazi crimes. His book *Verurteilt und begnadigt* was a detailed documentation of what he called the "clemency lobby" among Austrian politicians. They thwarted the punishment of the Nazi perpetrators by pardoning them after they had served only a short sentence, even if the courts had imposed a life sentence.¹

Among Butterweck's most impressive works of historical fiction is his play *Das Wunder von Wien* (*The Miracle of Vienna*).² It is a malicious grotesque about the appearance of a rabbi in Vienna twenty years after the Holocaust performing miracles ("*Wunderrabbi*"). He claims to be able to raise one murdered Jew from the dead in exchange for 36 signatures from Gentiles. The first resurrected Jews get generously compensated for their suffering. But soon people start to question if they really want the Jews back: what will happen to all the shops and other Jewish property, which

1 Hellmut Butterweck, *Verurteilt und begnadigt: Österreich und seine NS-Straftäter* (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2003).

2 Hellmut Butterweck, *Das Wunder von Wien*, Der Souffleurkasten (Vienna: Thomas Sessler Verlag, 1983).

they had purchased at favorable rates after the “Anschluss”? Had there not been too many Jews living in Vienna before 1938 anyway? As it becomes more and more difficult to gather the required 36 signatures, eventually people start to think about how to get rid of the rabbi. Butterweck wrote the play in 1967. The audio version was broadcasted on radio in Austria and West and East Germany to no acclaim.³ Only in 1982, 15 years later, did Vienna’s *Theater in der Josefstadt* stage the play for the first time. It got favorable reviews. A Hebrew version was performed in Israel. Austrian National Radio broadcasted the play again in 2012.

Butterweck, at the ripe age of 89, published his magnum opus in 2016. He meticulously reconstructed 838 court cases, dealing with 1,137 defendants standing trial before the People’s Court (*Volksgerecht*) of Vienna. The Viennese court tried 48 percent of all the cases against Nazis that came before the four Austrian People’s Courts. These special courts were established after the war, and between 1945 and 1955 prosecuted and punished Nazi crimes and offenses based on the Nazi Prohibition Act of 1945. Butterweck’s expansive sample represents around ten percent of all verdicts of the Viennese *Volksgerecht*. Viennese newspapers and their editors, rather than Butterweck, made the choice and determined the sample, for the book presents all those court cases that the postwar media had covered, including all trials that were politically significant.

In an article in the quarterly of the Social Democrats’ organization of survivors from Nazism—the *Bund Sozialdemokratischer FreiheitskämpferInnen*—Butterweck explained the reasons why he wrote this book⁴ as being related to both his play about the *Wunderrabbi* being met with silence and his personal witnessing of Nazi crimes during his youth. This made him question, after the war, what happened to the perpetrators. On November 10, 1938, as a ten-year-old boy, Hellmut Butterweck accidentally stumbled into a crowd standing in front of the still-smoking rubble of a synagogue in Vienna’s fifth district. A Nazi mob had burned down the venerable Jubilee Temple in the Siebenbrunnengasse, which had been built in 1908 in honor of Emperor Franz Joseph’s sixtieth anniversary of his accession to the throne. The young Butterweck witnessed somebody dragging out the remnants of a ritual vessel from the glowing debris of the Temple and heard a loud voice yelling and sneeringly calling it “Sara’s

3 See “Hellmut Butterweck: Das Wunder von Wien,” in-berlin.de, <https://user.in-berlin.de/~hoerdat/voll.php?a=Butterweck&b=Das+Wunder+von+Wien&c=NDR%2FORF>.

4 Hellmut Butterweck, “Warum ich das Buch ‘Nationalsozialisten vor dem Volksgerecht Wien’ geschrieben habe,” *Der Sozialdemokratische Kämpfer* 10-11-12 (2016): 11, accessed Feb. 2, 2017, http://www.freiheitskaempfer.at/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Heft-04-_2016_finale-Version_low_res.pdf.

chamber pot!" Butterweck noted in his article that this was the moment when he began to think for himself in the Nazi environment. At the age of 16, he was kicked out of the school and conscripted as a forced laborer for the Nazi regime. He met other anti-Nazis who helped him to survive the war.

Butterweck's hope that his fellow Austrians would draw lessons from their recent past did not come true after the liberation of Austria. Writing the play on the *Wunderrabbi* in the 1960s was his way of dealing with his anger and disappointment that the malevolent spirit of Nazism in Austrian society was continuing into the postwar era. In one scene, some of the Jews who came back to life are standing in line in front of the prosecutor's office. They are standing there to bear witness against their own Nazi murderers. While waiting, two of the witnesses conclude that the Austrians are willfully postponing the trials against Nazi perpetrators until such a time when they could finally claim that it was too late for such trials.

Butterweck was convinced at the time that Nazi war crimes would never be prosecuted at all in postwar Austria. Even after the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, all efforts in the Austrian courts to prosecute Nazi war criminals were doomed to fail. When, during the 1970s, Butterweck did library research leafing through a newspaper of spring 1948, he chanced into three trials against Nazi perpetrators being reported in a single issue of the newspaper. He remembers: "I still see the newspaper volume. I went on leafing. More and more trials. How could I have been mistaken to such an extent? Why did they disappear from my memory?"⁵

Butterweck began consulting the statistics of the Ministry of Justice. He learned that in the years 1945-1955, prosecutors in the *Volksgerichte* launched indictments against more than 28,000 people; almost 23,500 defendants received a verdict and more than 50 percent amongst them were pronounced guilty.

Now his interest began to focus on the public perception. If only a small number of those trials were mentioned in the newspapers, this might explain why they were committed to oblivion. But in fact the media coverage was extensive; the Viennese newspapers studiously reported on every 10th trial before the Viennese People's Court. A great number of them published detailed accounts from the courtrooms, depicting the dialogues between judge and defendants in great detail. Butterweck's extensive extracts from these newspaper reports fill most of the 800 pages of this book. So it could not have been the insufficient public attention given to these trials that might have explained why the sentencing of more than

5 Ibid.

13,000 Austrian Nazis in the immediate postwar period had been forgotten completely when the People's Courts were dissolved in December 1955, after the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Austria. For it had been the Allied occupiers that pushed the Austrian government to "de-Nazify" their society. Among those Nazi perpetrators convicted, more than 2,000 were guilty of murder, manslaughter, assault and battery, or other violent crimes. Butterweck was greatly perplexed.

An explanation came in May 1997, when the Austrian contemporary historians met for their third biennial meeting ("*Zeitgeschichtetag*") in Vienna. Austrians simply refused to perceive their actions in World War II as crimes, so no prosecution was needed. Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider recognized the collective postwar amnesia that had been puzzling Butterweck so much. She argued that the "first round of suppression" was the elimination of Nazi crimes from the public consciousness. This called for a "second round of suppression," namely the need to punish those crimes: "Part of the suppression of the crimes was that whatever had been done to punish them, was deleted from public memory."⁶ No mastermind was needed to organize this collective amnesia; it worked as a socio-psychological process.

Butterweck's book tries to uncover the forgotten story of these trials and thus bring the hidden history of Nazism in Austria alive again. His approach is not to present statistics or elaborate analyses of the different types of proceedings instituted by the postwar Austrian judiciary. He simply wants to narrate the tales of hundreds of court cases by letting the contemporary journalists tell these stories. The result represents as close to a master narrative of Austrians' Nazi crimes and their thorough prosecution in the *Volksgerichte* as we will ever get. Butterweck also does not hesitate to describe in detail those cases, where the courts delivered misjudgment, or prosecutors were biased against Jewish witnesses, or even tried to protect perpetrators from meeting justice.

Butterweck's sample contains all cases of mass murder tried in the Viennese People's Court and all high treason trials against prominent Nazis and members of the Austrian political and economic élite. He does not claim his sample to be representative in the statistical sense. The courts saw, as Butterweck writes in his introduction, "an endless parade of 'golden

6 "Denn zur Verdrängung der Verbrechen gehört die Tilgung dessen aus dem öffentlichen Gedächtnis, was zur Ahndung eben dieser Verbrechen getan wurde," see Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider, "Forschungsergebnisse und -desiderata zum Umgang mit NS-Verbrechen in Österreich" in *Zeitgeschichte im Wandel: 3. Österreichische Zeitgeschichtetage 1997*, ed. Gertraud Diendorfer, Gerhard Jagschitz and Oliver Rathkolb (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag 1998), 300; see also Rudolf Ardel, "Warum mangelt es in Österreich an einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Zeit 1938-1945? Die gegenwärtigen Folgen," in *DÖW-Jahrbuch* (1988): 8-9.

pheasants,' as the office-holders of the Nazi Party had been called because of their fancy uniforms, of small and smallest functionaries, who often had been masters over the life and death, exerted inhumane pressure and spread fear and terror in their range of authority" (p. 13). The newspaper reported a great number of trials, and thereby shedding light on everyday life in the "Danube and Alpine Gaue" under Nazi rule, with its "ubiquitous repression, denunciations, and encroachments of all kinds." However, these trial reports also shed light on the deep antipathy of a considerable part of the population against the Nazi regime, "because where there had been an informer, there had to be also a person denounced" (p. 13).

Butterweck presents his cases in a strict chronological order. Moreover, Butterweck is providing a real service for future research with his extremely useful register of the 1,137 defendants of these court cases, complemented by a register of the judges and of the lawyers involved in these trials. No future work about postwar Austria "can ignore this monumental source work," posits Oliver Rathkolb, professor for contemporary history at the University of Vienna, in his foreword to Butterweck's courageous book.

Florian Traussnig, *Militärischer Widerstand von Außen: Österreicher in der US-Armee und Kriegsgeheimdienst im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015)

Georg Hoffmann, *Fliegerjustiz: Gewalt gegen abgeschossene alliierte Flugzeugbesatzungen 1943-1945, Krieg und Geschichte 88* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015)

Günter Bischof

These two excellent books by two young Graz historians deal with the interactions of Austrians and Americans during World War II and are part of the fabric of the larger trajectory of Austrian-American relations in the 20th Century.¹ With their focus on “war and society,” these books may be taken as a strong signal that “the new military history” has arrived in Austria too, where little serious military history is being done in academia.² Florian Traussnig’s study, a by-product of his Graz dissertation on the role of Austrian émigrés in American wartime propaganda, deals with Austrian refugees from all political camps that fled to the United States after the “Anschluss.” They supported their new homeland by joining the American armed forces or intelligence services to make personal contributions to the defeat of Adolf Hitler and his murderous National Socialist regime, which had persecuted them in their native Austria. Georg Hoffmann’s published University of Graz dissertation deals with the “lynching” of Allied airmen shot down over Austria and Hungary during World War II. Hoffmann highlights the cold-blooded murder of American aircrews by the “community” of local people: Nazi bigwigs and soldiers, egging on civilian bystanders. Both books carefully analyze larger stories through the lens of individual biographies, both Austrians fighting for the U.S. against the Nazis and

1 On the tergiversations of the trajectory of the ups and downs of bilateral relations, see Günter Bischof, *Relationships/Beziehungsgeschichten: Austria and the United States in the Twentieth Century*, *Transatlantica* 4 (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2014).

2 See the review essay by Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (Oct. 2007): 1070-1090.

Austrians who, propelled by Nazi propaganda, murdered American flyers on the ground.

As many as 6,000 to 7,000 Austrians in exile in the United States (p. 16) joined the U.S. military and/or the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the U.S. civilian intelligence service during World War II (and predecessor to the postwar CIA). These Austrians became Americans—"leaning on" the U.S. ("*Anlehnungsmacht*")—to participate in the defeat of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Many of them were Jews from Vienna who used their military service as a "fast track" to U.S. citizenship during the war. The Anglo-American powers were less interested in an Austrian resistance that would make a contribution to the defeat of Nazism (according to the 1943 "Moscow Declaration"). They needed loyal people who spoke the German language and were prepared to gather intelligence from the German Army, or were prepared to fight in the trenches to defeat the Nazis. Traussnig aims at elaborating on the role this large group of Austrian exiles played in the Austrian "resistance" against the Nazis. Traussnig is able to show, through a careful biographical approach, that these "Austrians" were quickly forgetting about their homeland and had many different motives in fighting the Nazis. His analysis of some 700 individual biographies of Austrians in the United States gives these anonymous exiles "a face and a name" (p. 25) by adding these hitherto anonymous characters to the historical narrative of the Austrian resistance during World War II.

Traussnig starts his book with the story of the aborted "Austrian Battalion." Otto von Habsburg, with his excellent contacts to President Roosevelt, managed to persuade the President and the War Department to start an Austrian unit in the U.S. Army, destined both to support the Allied war effort and to serve as a symbol of an Austrian contribution to the reconstruction of Austria after the war. The idea of an "Austrian Battalion," calling for an Austrian contribution to the reestablishment of an independent Austria, was born before the November 1943 Moscow Declaration was issued. The Battalion failed as a result of the deep ideological divisions among Austrian exiles in the United States. Exiles on the Left and their allies in the American press considered it a reactionary and restorative Habsburg project ("a bunch of fascists and royalists," p. 43) and agitated against it. The War Department established the Austrian Battalion in November 1942, and President Roosevelt disbanded it in May 1943 due to a lack of recruits. Among some 600 soldiers trained in Camp Atterbury, Indiana, only 29 volunteers signed up. The rest were Austrian exile draftees and Austro-Americans, many of them from the non-German parts of the former Habsburg Monarchy who opposed a Habsburg restoration

in Central Europe (pp. 47-49). The War Department transferred Joseph Podlipnig, an exiled Socialist from Carinthia, to the Austrian Battalion. He did not think much of the morale and fighting quality of the Battalion (p. 60). Anton Greissle grew up in a Communist milieu in Vienna. "The Emperor's Battalion" raised some feelings of nostalgia in him about the Habsburg Monarchy, but like so many of the involuntary transfers to the Battalion, he was not interested in serving in "Otto's imperial guards" (pp. 66-67). Like most involuntary transfers, he concluded: "I don't want to fight for Otto – I want to fight for America" (p. 91). Traussnig concludes that the Austrian Battalion was "a disaster;" however, one had to give Otto and his conservative supporters credit for their "Austrian patriotism and spirit of resistance" (p. 92).

Traussnig dedicates a chapter to the "Ritchie Boys." The U.S. Army recruited thousands of Central European exiles to be trained at the "Military Intelligence Training Center" in Camp Ritchie, Maryland (p. 94). The "Ritchie Boys" were usually anti-authoritarian exile intellectuals not much given to military discipline – they saw Camp Ritchie as a "utopian counterpoint to a traditional military camp" (p. 106). Take the Jew Karl Frucht, born in Brno/Brünn, who went to law school in Vienna. He worked as a writer in Vienna and in his Paris exile after the "Anschluss" before he managed to get to safety in New York. Frucht, like many of his fellow Austrian exiles, was trained to interrogate German Prisoners of War in Europe. The tactical and operational information they gathered in France after the Normandy invasion was helpful to the U.S. Army as they advanced into Germany. Their intelligence warnings gathered from German POWs about the imminent last Nazi offensive in the Ardennes ("Battle of the Bulge") was not heeded (pp. 107-126). The secrecy of Camp Ritchie transformed the "enemy alien" soldiers from Central Europe into an elite corps of vital intelligence gatherers in the U.S. Army (pp. 150-151).

Many Austrians in exile were drafted into the 10th Mountain division, an elite unit in the U.S. Army that saw some heavy fighting in Northern Italy toward the end of the war. After observing the "winter war" between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939/40, the U.S. Army began training a division of soldiers in Colorado who knew how to ski and negotiate mountains. Austrians, who had been ski instructors and mountain guides in the U.S. before the war, ended up in the 10th Mountain Division. Friedl Pfeiffer, who had been a ski instructor in the 1930s in St. Anton, as well as in New South Wales in Australia and Sun Valley, Idaho, had been a member of the Austrian National Ski Racing Team. Pfeiffer ended up in the 10th and was wounded badly in Italy in April 1945 (pp. 196-198).

Traussnig falls victim to the contemporary mythology proffered in many newspaper accounts that these mountain troops were archetypical American “frontier” pioneers who managed to negotiate the harsh environment of the “Wild West” (p. 167).

The approximately 300 Austrians in exile who served in the American intelligence unit “Office of Strategic Services” (OSS) may be the most distinguished group. Many worked in the propaganda division of the OSS “Morale Operations Branch” and utilized their many talents in propagandizing the Third Reich in general and enemy soldiers on the frontline in particular. Take the young Viennese Socialist Rudolf Anzböck, who was involved in sabotage action against Austrofascism and had to flee Austria to save his life. One step ahead of the Nazis, Josef Buttinger, the leader of the Vienna “Revolutionary Socialists,” managed to get him to New York from his Swedish exile. After a brief interlude in the 10th Mountain Division, the OSS Labor Section recruited the Social Democrat. The OSS trained him and a number of Austrian compatriots for a “penetration” mission into Nazi Germany to gather intelligence on German and foreign slave labor, and, if possible, unleash a revolt against the Nazis. But Anzböck never was dropped into Nazi Germany. Instead, he was used as a research analyst in London on assessing everyday life in Germany (pp. 222–261). The OSS decorated Anzböck for his service; he stayed involved in intelligence work after the war and, like most Austrian exiles, never returned to Austria. Traussnig makes a good case that many Austrian leftists like Anzböck continued their resistance against Austrofascism/Nazism from the prewar era into the wartime. Their personal contribution to the defeat of Hitlerism also contributed significantly to the “liberation of their former *Heimat*” (p. 263). For this, they deserve credit from Austria and Austrian historians.

Traussnig has dug deeply into American archives to provide us with a number of compelling paradigmatic portraits of Austrians who fought in the U.S. Army and served in the OSS. Traussnig is particularly insistent on rescuing these resistance fighters in Allied armies from the ignominy of having been “deserters” due to their support of the victorious side. Austrians who had supported the Nazi regime and latched on to the myth of Austria as “the first victim of Nazism” gave no credit to such “bandits” who had left the country. In a sort of Austrian continuity of anti-Semitism, tens of thousands of Jews, who had been expelled after the “Anschluss,” have been silenced in the historical narrative. The official narrative of the Austrian resistance constructed after World War II as part of the Austrian “victims myth” ignored them and so has a recent quasi-official symposium on the

Austrian resistance and a major new survey of the Austrian resistance.³ These “deserters” have been given their due in the Austrian public recently and have received a monument in a prominent square in Vienna.⁴ They are now considered a crucial element in the Austrian resistance to Nazism and are also included in Austrian memory of World War II (pp. 13-14). Given the “negligible size” of the resistance inside the “*Alpen- und Donaugau*” (p. 323) during the war, the role of this “transnational” Austrian resistance in exile is all the more remarkable.

Hoffmann is the first scholar who presents a firm “body count” of captured and killed airmen in Austria and Hungary during World War II. On the basis of impressively exhaustive research in American, Austrian and German archives he has established a database of every airplane shot down over Austria and Hungary and their crews. 556 airplanes were shot down in the “Alpine- and Danube Area” of today’s Austria (and 281 over Hungary). Crewmembers numbering 2,511 lost their lives, and 169 are “missing-in-action” to this day. Aircrews numbering 4,046 came down alive on their parachutes, of which 149 were killed, while the rest ended up in German POW “Stalags” (p. 136). The Anglo-American Air Forces lost a staggering 27,000 airplanes and 152,000 airmen during World War II. Allied airmen numbering 61,000 were captured alive, most surviving the war in Nazi POW-camps (p. 128). Given that the air war came to the “Alpine- and Danube Area” and Hungary late during the final two years of the war, civilian defenses were not attended to in preparation for Allied attacks. American bombers launched the first large attack against Wiener Neustadt on August 13, 1943 (p. 49). Before this attack, the “Alpine- and Danube Area” had the reputation of being the Third Reich’s “air-raid shelter” (p. 50). From that moment onwards, Austria’s and Hungary’s large cities Vienna, Linz, Graz, and Salzburg, as well as Budapest, Pécs, and Győr, increasingly suffered Allied attacks in 1944. The culmination of the air war against Austria came in the winter/spring of 1945. During the “oil offensive,” the Anglo-American air forces lost 30 planes over Austria and 11 over Hungary on June 26, 1944, with 122 airmen losing their lives (p. 135). On April 12/13, 1944, the U.S. Air Force lost 22 airplanes in wave

3 *Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch: Darstellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Okkupation Österreichs; Nach amtlichen Quellen* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1946); Stefan Karner and Karl Duffek, eds., *Widerstand in Österreich 1938-1945: Die Beiträge der Parlaments-Enquete 2005* (Graz: Verein z. Förderung d. Forschung v. Folgen nach Konflikten u. Kriegen 2007); Wolfgang Neugebauer, *The Austrian Resistance 1938-1945*, trans. John Nicholson and Eric Canepa (Vienna: Edition Steinbauer, 2014).

4 “Denkmal für Deserteure in Wien,” Deutsche Welle, accessed Feb. 20, 2017, <http://dw.com/p/1Dbbz>.

of attacks against Vienna, Wiener Neustadt, and Budapest (p. 134). These were staggering losses.

The focus of Hoffmann's study is the situational circumstances and the social psychology – or, the “referential frame” as he calls it – of the lynching of Allied airmen. In the summer of 1943, Nazi Germany's propaganda chief Josef Goebbels changed his tune by suggesting that the Allies waged the air war as a “criminal war” against German “women and children” (p. 149). Focusing the new “enemy image” on the “terror flyers” and “air bandits” (pp. 150-151), Goebbels called upon the population to exact vengeance against downed airmen on their own. When Kenneth D. Williams was shot down over Bremen on November 26, 1943, he carried the imprint “Murder Inc.” on the back of his flight suit. This was a welcome propaganda message for Goebbels, giving him the opportunity to spread the news of Mafia “gangsters” being recruited in Chicago to murder women and children in Nazi Germany (p. 152). The air war had become existential for the survival of Germany. The Nazi leadership unleashed violence (“*Freigabe von Gewalt*,” p. 167) against Allied fliers, calling upon the German people—including Austrians and Hungarians, once Hungary was occupied by the Nazis—to take matters into their own hands and exact vengeance against these murderous bombing crews. Hoffmann carefully reconstructs the “narrative” of Goebbels' propaganda campaign against Allied flyers as a means to analyze how local communities, egged on and directed by local Nazi bigwigs, gathered to retaliate against Allied flyers as they floated to the ground on their parachutes after their planes had been shot down by German fighters or anti-aircraft guns (“flak”). Curious groups of people assembled to watch the flyers come down, or were gathered by local Nazi bigwigs. They usually were “bystanders,” reluctant to mete out vengeance themselves. They passively watched as uniformed men killed airmen in cold blood (pp. 323-326). As in recent historical scholarship on lynchings in the American South after the Civil War, these local spectacles of communities of violence became quasi-public rituals.⁵

Ironically, on June 6, 1944, the very day the Normandy invasion was launched, the Nazi leadership gathered on the Obersalzberg for a meeting, deciding to allow “lynching justice” (*Lynchjustiz*) to be unleashed by the German people and for Goebbels to further arouse the “people's anger” (*Volkszorn*) against the “air gangsters” (pp. 170-171). Hoffman then carefully dissects the various scenarios of group actions—various group formations incited by the local Nazi leadership to hunt down allied airmen—resulting in the capture and murder of downed Allied flyers.

5 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993).

The “meat” of Hoffmann’s vast empirical work comes together in 26 meticulous case studies of allied airmen captured and killed and the detailed personal biographies of a half dozen murderers of allied airmen.⁶ As late as April 4, 1945, probably drunken Nazi officers brutally murdered Walter P. Manning, one of the African-American “Tuskegee airmen,” on the airfield of Linz-Hörsching. Second Lieutenant Manning’s P-51 was shot down on April 1. Manning’s body was found with a plaque hanging around his neck reading “We are taking care of things ourselves! The werewolf” (*Wir helfen uns selbst! Der Werwolf*) (pp. 293–297). The case of Franz and Markus Lienhart is particularly telling. On March 4, 1945, Franz, a local farmer in Straßgang, a village close to Graz, chased down the flyer Sergeant Steven Cudrak. With the words, “You dog, dumping bombs on women and children” (*Du Hund du, du schmeisst Bomben auf Frauen und Kinder*) (pp. 343–346) he beat him up; later on, his son Markus shot him. Markus had earlier killed with a pistol the two downed flyers, Corporal Harold D. Brocius and Sergeant Levi L. Morrow, with a large group of local women and children watching the violence (pp. 238–242). Military courts prosecuted the two Lienharts after the war and both were found guilty. Franz, the father, went to jail for ten years, and Markus, the son and murderer, was executed in 1946 (p. 346).

Most of them actually got off scot-free and were not prosecuted after the war. Manning’s murderers slipped into obscurity after the war and were not brought to justice. The individual perpetrators who killed Allied airmen portrayed by Hoffmann joined the Nazi movement early; they were ideologically deeply committed to National Socialism and volunteered for military service. After being wounded multiple times on the Eastern Front, they were posted close to home inside the Reich, where they slipped into the business of killing American airmen (pp. 364–365). Most of the “lynchings” happened in villages where the airmen bailed out from planes that had been severely damaged in attacks over cities. Manning’s “lynching” in April 1945 also is further evidence that a deep commitment to Hitler and the Nazi ideology persisted into the most remote corners of the “Alpine- and Danube Area” until the final days of the war.⁷

Concluding his book, Hoffmann reflects on Austrian memory of these war crimes. Austrians considered themselves as “victims” of the Allied air war during World War II. In their minds, this explained the “lynching

6 For a model extended case study of the “lynching” of seven American airmen on the island of Borkum in Northern Germany, based on the extensive postwar trial records, see James J. Weingartner, *Americans, Germans, and War Crimes Justice: Law, Memory, and “The Good War”* (New York: Praeger, 2011).

7 Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

justice” of allied airmen. These Austrian perpetrators continued to consider themselves “victims” and the Allied airmen “perpetrators” long after the war (p. 371). These murders became taboos in the local communities where they were committed and were silenced after the war. In other words, Austrian society never atoned for these war crimes. Postwar Austria has lived with such inversions of World War II perpetrators and victims for a long time. While the victims of the Nazi takeover of Austria, who fought for the Allied cause in exile, were considered “traitors,” the perpetrators of “lynchings” of allied airmen considered themselves “victims” of Allied bombing attacks during and after the war. These two subtle books provide long overdue corrections to these narratives so dear to Austrians.

Maximilian Graf, Österreich und die DDR 1949-1990: Politik und Wirtschaft im Schatten der deutschen Teilung, Internationale Geschichte 3 (Vienna: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften 2016)

Robert Mark Spaulding

This is a timely, well-researched book that reaches far beyond the Austrian-East German bilateral relationship stated in its title to offer information and insights to readers interested in the structures and operations of European international politics in the period of the Cold War.

Graf aims to offer the “first overview” of the “political-diplomatic” and “economic” aspects of Austrian-East German relations, from the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 to end of that state in 1989/90, although the first chapter does reach back to 1945 to establish the sharply different political trajectories of these two parts of Hitler’s former Reich.

Graf’s introduction establishes that his subject has not yet received an adequate treatment. Previous work on Austria’s relations with the Soviet bloc initially focused on the period from 1945 to 1955, with a few studies exploring relations through the 1970s. Newer work on Austrian-Soviet relations extending to 1991 did not devote much energy to the GDR because the West German-Austrian-Soviet triangle was perceived as more important. But Graf’s book convincingly demonstrates that Austrian-East German relations merit a thorough investigation, both for their own sake and for the new insights they provide into larger and broader themes of European international politics in that era.

In order to explicate this ignored and forgotten subject, Graf has mined a wide array of archives and memoirs. In particular, he has taken advantage of East German records, including those of the Council of Ministers (*Ministerrat*) and several individual ministries, which are available at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde and are not subject to the usual thirty-year closure. The source base might strike some readers as very traditional, but the political structures of the GDR—a highly insulated one-party dictatorship—scarcely leave room for innovative approaches to international politics from below or from other angles.

Graf is well aware of recent developments in international and transnational history, as well as new approaches to understanding the history of relationships and exchanges (*histoire croisée*, for example), but he wisely declines to frame his work as a demonstration or justification of any one model or approach. Instead, Graf takes advantage of the lack of earlier work and a field free of established conclusions to produce “primary source based research” (p. 12) that lets the material dictate the shape and scope of the book. As a result, politics and economics are the dominant themes, with other subject areas, such as cultural relations, media representations, and popular perceptions squeezed out. Readers deeply enmeshed in the European Cold War will regret that interparty relations between Austrian and East German communists have also been omitted for reasons of space, but with a book already bulging at 656 pages, it is difficult to argue with that choice.

Graf’s survey of political and economic affairs covers some high-profile incidents, such as the Interflug Affair of 1963, and the nebulous, possibly criminal, activities of the Novum trading company. Other important subjects are less well known, like the significant deliveries of oil from Austria to the GDR in the first decades of the postwar period. Finally, some noteworthy issues are unpacked here for the first time, for example the significant energy devoted by the Austrian government in particular to managing the political and humanitarian consequences arising from 20,000 Austrians living and working in the GDR.

Graf’s best work lies in his analytic conclusions regarding his two major themes: economics and politics. The central role of trade and finance in shaping the overall bilateral relationship between the two states is not unexpected in the era of non-recognition up to December 1972 when economic negotiations were the only forms of official contact between the two states. But Graf insists that economics and politics were impossible to separate even in the years thereafter. One unfortunate conclusion is that we lack reliable trade data for the early years from 1945 to 1949, and even into the early 1950s. Graf’s detailed discussion of the gradual build-up of economic activities that culminated in the “glory days” (*Blütezeit*) of Austrian-East German relations from 1978 to 1984 offers some particularly revealing conclusions about Austrian goals and motives. Successive Austrian governments had pressing domestic reasons for allowing their state to accumulate 20 percent of the GDR’s total hard currency debt in the early 1980s. A central factor was the Austrian use of economic relations with GDR as a means to maintain employment in Austria’s own struggling state-owned industries. Based on his examination of the GDR’s relationship with

Austria, Graf suggests that scholars of the GDR should be placing “considerably more attention” (p. 24) on the economic and financial aspects of GDR foreign policy.

Cold War scholars will find much to chew on as Graf situates the East German-Austrian bilateral relationship in the “dynamically integrated multi-level system” (p. 16) of international politics in Cold War Europe. One of the book’s great services is to bore into the substructures of international politics in this era. Graf presents the Austrian-East German relationship as embedded in two international triangles, which are essential for understanding his subject: first is the Soviet-East German-Austrian circuit, and second is the West German-East German-Austrian. There can be no adequate understanding of Austrian-East German relations without an understanding of Soviet policies toward both the GDR and the Austrian republic, not least of all because Soviet policy towards Austria was part of larger set of Soviet policies directed towards all European neutrals, with Austria as a showcase for the benefits of “peaceful coexistence.” In the period after recognition, Soviet and East German policy attempted to use progress in relations with Austria as an “ice-breaker” to advance the GDR’s international standing; examples include the consular treaty (1975), Chancellor Kreisky’s visit to the GDR (1978) and Erich Hoenecker’s reciprocal visit to Austria (1980). Conversely, the German Federal Republic expected friendly states like Austria to support West German positions, at least in public pronouncements. Graf moves into a larger arena by placing Austrian policies in the network of European neutral states, particularly Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland. That multilateral context was clearly important in the Austrian decision to recognize the GDR in December 1972.

In view of Graf’s thorough investigation into his major themes, this book should remain the standard historical work on political and economic relations between these two states for many years to come. It is difficult to imagine any reader concluding that more work needs to be done on these points. If European relations with Putin’s Russia continue to revert to a cold war in all but name, then some of the lessons from Austrian management of peaceful coexistence may find a more immediate relevance.

**Cornelia Wilhelm, ed., *Migration, Memory and Diversity. Germany from 1945 to the Present*,
Studies in Contemporary European History (New
York: Berghahn 2017)**

Dirk Rupnow

German-US American historian Konrad Jarausch opens Cornelia Wilhelm's collection of essays on migration and diversity in postwar Germany by pointing to the unexcused absence of historians from the debates on immigration: "They have largely failed to inform the public about the important impact of migration on the German past." And rightly so. It is actually refreshing to see a scholar speak so clearly and explicitly at the very beginning of this important volume. Part of the Berghahn series *Studies in Contemporary European History*, edited by Jarausch and his French colleague Henry Rousso, this volume brings together twelve essays by mostly German and US-American historians. They offer different perspectives and thereby draw a truly multi-faceted picture of postwar (West) Germany and immigration. These essays reflect the rich history of migration and diversity in Germany but also the extremely reluctant and obnoxious positions Germans take toward both.

Of course, here, too, the Nazi past and its aftermath play an important role. And we should not forget that, only less than two decades ago, Germany officially accepted that it is an immigration country, an obvious fact it had long been neglecting. In her own introduction, Cornelia Wilhelm discusses how important the labeling of "foreigners," "others," and "aliens" has always been to German identity construction. In spite of the significant political changes around the turn of the century/millennium, such discourses have not changed much in German society even now. New political organizations and parties like Pegida and *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) continue these anti-immigrant discourses, addressing the current situation with more and more people migrating to Europe and Germany.

After all, according to recent OECD studies, Germany has become one of the most important countries for immigration worldwide. Yet "integration" is still considered to be a major problem. Maybe this is because many Germans perceive it to be the responsibility of immigrants to integrate—or rather assimilate—into the majority society. The current discourse in

Germany seems to suggest that migrants can never fully assimilate because of alleged cultural differences. Essentially, this perception is nothing less than racism, as the discourse invokes traditional concepts of the German nation.

So one might wonder if it is really necessary to include ethnic German refugees (“expellees,” or *Vertriebene*) after World War II in this picture. But Martin Schulze Wessel’s essay on the commemoration of forced migration, together with Anna Holian’s contribution on Displaced Persons (DPs) in postwar Germany, are extremely important to understand the longer traditions of handling migration and “foreignness” in Germany. It makes sense that both focus on discourse and memory; in the case of the DPs, this memory is basically a blank spot and missing link in Germany’s postwar history of migration. The history of the DPs is widely overshadowed by a warmed-up public obsession about Germans expelled from Eastern Europe at the end of World War II: the Germans as victims. Here, and throughout the whole volume, it becomes clear that Germans are almost incapable of sympathizing with ethnically different people. This seems only to be possible when they have comparable experiences to be brought into the equation. At the same time, as Schulze Wessel demonstrates, in view of German history, universalization might not be the appropriate strategy to convey German experiences of expulsion and flight, depicting them as part of a paradigmatic experience in the twentieth century. Understandingly, neighboring Eastern European countries insist on a very concrete look at what happened before and after 1945.

Asiye Kaya, with her focus on different strategies of labeling migrants in postwar Germany (as ethnically, culturally, religiously “one of us” or “other”), provides an excellent follow-up to these two articles. Kaya addresses the practical impact on migrants’ lives and experiences, opening up, or foreclosing, possibilities for inclusion and participation, access to the social welfare system, and citizenship. Kaya points to some very important aspects, especially the transitional character of the 1990s. After reunification, more ethnic Germans kept coming from Eastern Europe, debates on German identity flourished, and—along with brutal outbursts of racism on the streets in Eastern and Western Germany—became common again. Finally came the insight that Germany had become a country of immigration, in contrast to the mantra of German politicians. With large parts of Europe mired in a deep immigration crisis, Germany embraces young, well-educated migrants who are seen as assets to the German economy, just like the poorly educated “guest workers” five decades earlier had been seen as assets. Kaya also makes clear that ethnic labeling has a long tradition in Germany. From the 1880s

through the 1940s, Germans worried about the “Jewish problem”; at the end of the 19th century, they fussed over the “Polish problem”; in the 1980s, they fretted over the “Turkish problem,” and today it is either the “Muslim problem” or the “Roma problem.” In these discourses, there are continuing echoes and reverberations of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. At the same time, the history of ethnic German expellees’ resettlement after the war documents how a successful integration policy works when people are actually granted access to society and institutions.

Patrice Poutros’s essay on asylum and the mass media also spans the whole of postwar German history up to today. He starts with the extremely liberal and generous asylum provisions in the Basic Law of 1949, really an answer to the history of Nazism. Unfortunately, as Poutros persuasively shows, the actual reception of foreigners after World War II never met the high standard of the constitution. During the Cold War, all refugees, apart from ethnic Germans, were consistently seen as a threat. The conservative-liberal reforms of the fundamental right to asylum in the early 1990s can be read as a setback but also as a sign for the deep-rooted position of human rights in the political culture of unified Germany after 1990. Apparently, it was not possible to eliminate the right to asylum entirely, even though many called for it. From the German perspective, as long as the “third country regime” kept asylum-seekers in Southern and Southeastern Europe, with no external EU border, everything was fine. This system collapsed in the summer of 2015, finally resulting in a call for solidarity and the distribution of asylum-seekers across the entire European Union. Germans have shown considerable openness during the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015, especially German NGOs and parts of the civil society. But racism, fear, and exclusion also returned, along with paternalism.

Germans’ self-centeredness becomes visible when school textbooks are analyzed. Simone Lässig demonstrates how the only migration movements Germans have noticed were the ethnic German expellees. Later on, Jewish elite émigrés of World War II entered this discourse, but only because they were understood as a loss for Germany. Later again, the utility argument was the premise for “guest workers” to become visible as part of German history. Looking at textbooks corroborates again the transformative nature of the 1990s, serving as a caesura for educational policy and practice.

Given the German reluctance to confront and accept migration and diversity, it should not come as a surprise that the challenge of writing about the perception of “race” in postwar Germany has been taken up by someone from the outside. University of Michigan historian Rita Chin rises to the task. She is well-known as the author of an excellent book on the

“Guest Worker Question” in Germany and coeditor of an outstanding essay collection on issues of “race” in postwar Europe. Chin discusses Germans’ blindness toward racism today. This represents another extremely twisted after-effect of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Nazism had the effect that Germans—along with most Europeans—do not talk about “race” anymore, even though the concept of race, with all its effects, has hardly evaporated. But no language exists in Germany to address this issue when it crops up and becomes visible in German discourses.

Wilhelm’s carefully assembled volume offers impressive and fresh overviews of postwar German history. Dietmar Osses’s and Katarzyna Nogueira’s contribution concentrates on the representation of migration in German history museums, Klaus Lankheit traces migration in German archives and Dietmar Schirmer in German citizenship laws. Kathrin Bower’s essay on the mutual perceptions of West and East Germans after 1989, Karen Körber’s piece on Russian-Jewish immigration to unified Germany, and Annette Seidel-Arpaci’s exploration of the complex debates around antisemitism and Holocaust memory in connection with immigration discourses, all add up to an important book for everyone who wants to understand present-day Germany as a pluralistic and diverse society.

Unfortunately, the texts do not always stand up to the standard of the whole undertaking and its theoretical sophistication. In stark contrast to his own introduction, stressing the necessity of giving the migrants their own voice, Jarausch uses the term “human tsunami” for the refugees coming in 2015, with no quotation marks. Lässig in her text points to this very problem of the omnipresent “water-related imagery” that is drowning the individual experiences of migrants. Klaus Lankheit fails to see that the burden of responsibility to integrate “the others” into German history and to understand them as part of Germany falls on the Germans, not the immigrants who are asked to perceive themselves as part of German society in the face of racism and exclusion. But these are minor lapses in an overall excellent contribution to the history of migration and diversity in Germany. Surely not only historians will welcome Wilhelm’s fine collection.

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This interdisciplinary volume offers methodologically innovative approaches to Austria's coping with issues of migration past and present. These essays show Austria's long history as a migration country. Austrians themselves have been on the move for the past 150 years to find new homes and build better lives. After World War II the economy improved and prosperity set in, so Austrians tended to stay at home. Austria's growing prosperity made the country attractive to potential immigrants. After the war, tens of thousands of "ethnic Germans" expelled from Eastern Europe settled in Austria. Starting in the 1950s "victims of the Cold War" (Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks) began looking for political asylum in Austria. Since the 1960s Austria has been recruiting a growing number of "guest workers" from Turkey and Yugoslavia to make up for the labor missing in the industrial and service economies. Recently, refugees from the arc of crisis from Afghanistan to Syria to Somalia have braved perilous journeys to build new lives in a more peaceful and prosperous Europe.

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