NATION AND MIGRATION

HOW CITIZENS IN
EUROPE ARE COPING
WITH XENOPHOBIA

György Csepeli and Antal Örkény

CEU PRESS

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Central European University Press

Budapest–New York

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English translation © Anna Szemere and Ferenc Zsigo

Published in 2021 by
Central European University Press

Nádor utca 11, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000
E-mail: ceupress@press.ceu.edu
Website: www.ceupress.com

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ISBN 978-963-386-367-1 hardback
ISBN 978-963-386-366-4 ebook

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Csepeli, György, author. | Örkény, Antal, author.

Title: Nation and migration : how citizens in Europe are coping with xenophobia / György Csepeli and Antal Örkény.

Description: Budapest ; New York : Central European University Press, 2021.
| Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020036390 (print) | LCCN 2020036391 (ebook) | ISBN 9789633863671 (cloth) | ISBN 9789633863664 (adobe pdf)

Subjects: LCSH: Xenophobia—Europe. | Immigrants—Europe—Public opinion. | Immigrants—Europe—Social conditions. | Nationalism—Europe. | National characteristics, European. | Europe—Ethnic relations. | Europe—Emigration and immigration—Social aspects.

Classification: LCC D1056 .C83 2020 (print) | LCC D1056 (ebook) | DDC 305.9/06912094—dc23) | LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020036390>
LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020036391>

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INTRODUCTION

As the title of the book suggests, we would like to present a scientific line of thought to address the inseparable relationship between nation and migration. When we began dealing with the issue of nations in the 1970s this relationship was not at all visible. This was even more the case because the nation as a topic of sociology or social psychology did not appear particularly important or as a well-researched phenomenon. Excluding Karl Deutsch's (1966) book, which analyzed the nation as a communications community in a pioneering fashion, there were no essential sociological theories or empirical studies on the topic of national identity. The study of the problem set of the nation concept was fully monopolized by historical sciences. This situation was changed by Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernst Gellner (1983) whose works are now considered classics. The phenomenon of migration was a part of the sphere of interest of sociology but was primarily viewed as a problem of assimilation and modernization, which was well illustrated by the now illusory social expectation of the "melting pot."

We argue that national identification is primarily a problem of large social groups examined through social-psychological experiments. The results of experiments have shown (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971) that functions between groups are evolution-rooted dichotomy categorization mechanisms, which Sumner had much earlier defined as ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906). Following this realization, we launched studies in the 1970s to uncover the sociological aspects of affective and cognitive factors in Hungarian national identity (Csepeli 1997). We realized that national identity has a wide, public emotional base in a sociological or social-psychological sense, upon which elements attitudes, values and contents of knowledge are built in a pyramid fashion. At the top of the pyramid we were able to identify the ideological elements of national identity, which had been worked out, communicated and popularized by elite groups of society. We named this group the special audience of national identity.

A turning point in our research came when the nations of East Central Europe, including Hungary, were freed from the ideological and political prison of state

socialism and entered Western political space (Csepli and Örkény 1999b). One of the relevant consequences of this change was that in 1995, when the ISSP chose national identity as the topic for its upcoming international study, Hungary was able to participate. Based on our earlier research we were invited to participate in the study as researchers.

Following this, there were two more waves in this series of studies. We constructed an unparalleled longitudinal dataset, the only drawback of which was that the sets of participating countries across waves were not completely identical. We have reported on the findings of the waves separately and comprehensively in various publications. (Csepli and Örkény 1999a; 2004; 2006; 2011; 2012) The summary volume by Max Haller et al. (2009) contained results from only the 1995 and 2003 waves, and was a great help to us. The part of this volume that deals with the nation summarizes these two decades of research.

While we considered summarizing the results of our five decades of research, we were invited to participate in the Group Focused Enmity research project coordinated by Bielefeld University in 2009. It was during this research project that we realized (Örkény and Váradi 2010) that the new situation of the nation could no longer be articulated and conceptualized as we had done previously. It became clear that we should pay particular attention to the relationships between new groups arising from migration and national majority societies, which partly accepted and partly rejected the new groups.

The unbreakable relation between nation and migration is explained by the accelerated processes of globalization in the twenty-first century. Physical space lost its earlier ability to solidify and maintain political-cultural borders that separated groups of various cultures, nations and religions from one another. As a result, borders changed from spatial to cultural entities, as described by Huntington (1996), and brought various cultural-ethnic groups that had no direct experience of one another into close contact. This change, as proven in this volume, has deeply transformed national identity patterns in Europe based on historical foundations and has liquefied the borders between nation types in both political and cultural terms (Bianchini 2017; Brubaker 1996).

In the chapters of the volume dealing with migration we rely partially on the Group Focused Enmity (GFE) study results and partially on our own research in Hungary to reconstruct the various scripts on the development of relations between given host societies defined by the national category, and the religious, cultural, and

various other migrant minority groups that have appeared among the former. This relationship can unfold through assimilation, but we think it is more likely that majority-minority relations develop partly through conflict and partly through harmony. We speak of conflict when the values of the host society and the minority groups clash and social entropy is obstructed, which results in the segregation of the minority group and an interpretation of their experience as unjust. The path out of this situation can be opposition, or in some cases terrorism, to which the majority society responds with refusal and xenophobia. The harmonious scripts of coexistence make possible the presence of both the majority and minority alongside one another. The most desirable situation is where this coexistence takes place based on civic equality ensured by the rule of law and a respect for human rights.

But whichever script unfolds, the most definitive message of this volume is that as a result of migration, neither the nations nor the minorities arising from migration can continue from where they left off. A new story is beginning, the arrival of which we can only signal, but of which we have no concrete knowledge.

We can see that the accelerated and irrevocable migration processes globalization has caused have radically changed the patterns of national identity among European nations, this volume also shows that Europe's historically rooted division into eastern and western regions has not been superseded by the new tendencies. The East-West line dividing Europe, which was previously described by outstanding historians like Jenő Szűcs, Perry Anderson and Anthony Smith, has not disappeared. There is a paradox whereby the mutual effect of migration and the nation in the western half of Europe has created a new sociological and social psychological reality of coexistence. This did not emerge immediately or easily, but these societies appear ready to respond in manners that are democratic and respect human rights. In contrast, in the eastern half of Europe, new minorities arising from migration exist only in the media and in political propaganda, they not having found accepting communities. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the symbolic presence and actual absence of migrants has strengthened the ethnocentric basis of national identity and fed xenophobia, damaging the democratic transition process that ensued after the 1989–90 regime changes. This too is the beginning of a new story, which unfortunately diverges from the story begun in Western European societies.

In our judgment, the divergent approaches of Eastern and Western Europe to the challenges of nation and migration is one of the European Union's greatest challenges in the twenty-first century.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The starting point for the set of problems discussed in this book is Szűcs's reflections on István Bibó's life work (Szűcs 1983). The significance of these reflections is clearer today than forty years ago, when Szűcs's book was published. European political and economic integration has apparently been established, but behind unification it is impossible to ignore the differences between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Further, it is clear that the operation of democratic civic society is facing challenges, not only in Eastern Europe, but in Western Europe as well. The basic research question of our book is the degree to which Szűcs's theory on three developmental regions, the origins of which the author locates at the split of the Roman Empire into eastern and western spheres, is valid today. Which is stronger, divergence or convergence? The theory differentiates the Western European developmental region from the Eastern European one. The historical roots of the differences stem from the social structure of the one-time Carolingian Empire. This region later expanded to include the societies of Scandinavia. Szűcs claims that it was in this region that the micro-structural conditions were met for the foundation of later mezzo and macro levels of the political and social psychological structures necessary for the construction of capitalism and democracy. In contrast, in the eastern half of the Roman Empire, which was centered in Byzantium, empires formed that were centralized and bureaucratic, where personal liberty, mutuality and the rule of law never came to fruition. The most interesting area is the hybrid region between the western and eastern regions, where, in Szűcs's analysis, elements of Western and Eastern European social development mixed. In this book we examine how this tri-regional model persists through issues of national identity, the nation state, nationalism, European identity, xenophobia and migration. We hypothetically assume and proceed to prove in the chapters of the volume, that even though there is convergence among the three regions, historical causes mean divergence is dominant.

A closely related issue is the dichotomy of the cultural nation and the civic nation, the existence of which we strive to verify through the examination and analysis of the results of several sociological questionnaire studies, which led us to loosen the typology.

A separate research concern is the integration of minority and majority groups into nation states. As a part of this issue we deal with social entropy and entropy-

resistant groups. Globalization has led to a new situation, and we assume that the migrant minorities arising through new migration in given European countries will be resistant to entropy, as they have been in the past.

The integration in Europe from the second half of the twentieth century and through the first decades of the twenty-first has softened conflicts between certain national identities and has brought to the fore the development of a European identity, the study of which is one of the key research priorities of this volume. From a methodological point of view, the greatest challenge—the one we had to face when writing this book—is the international comparison of various national identity patterns. In the interest of undertaking such comparisons we developed a cognitive sociological national identity model, the variables of which we could identify and measure in representative samples of the given societies. The details are described in the chapter on national identity. The most important issue we dealt with was the relationship between ethnocentrism and nationalism, through which the limits of the validity of Szűcs's social development models become clear. It seems that differences between Western European and Central European regions are declining, while the Eastern Europe region, rooted in the East European Byzantine past, stands strongly apart. We present the extreme eastern poles of Western and Eastern European national identity development through the examples of Russia and Turkey.

The new manifestations of xenophobia, which can be traced back primarily to migration, are also key research issues in this volume. We found important theoretical inspiration in the GFE theory (Zick et al. 2008), which locates behind manifest prejudice and discrimination the assumed existence of general affective and cognitive patterns which define potential conflict between groups. One of our research questions asked how this pattern appears vis-à-vis minorities arising from the new migration, with a special focus on Muslim minorities arriving from regions outside Europe. In this book we also address how the migration challenge in Europe has activated the rhetoric of right-wing radicalism and populism in the East and the West. We assume that the European Union is aware of the contradictions in the unique operation of the new migration, but we are not yet aware of a solution or whether there can be one at all.

The European Union's decision makers, the Parliament, Commission and Council have either not taken measure of, or misinterpreted, the effects of globalization on the entirety of the European Union and on its member states individually.

Migration is merely one unmeasured and misinterpreted consequence of globalization, with others include Europe's diminishing role in the world economy, lagging behind in research and development and innovation, shortcomings developing and propagating cultural patterns of an attractive European identity, and managing the demographic crises in member states.

Another key research issue of our volume is the identification of conflictual or harmonious patterns in the relationship between minorities created by the new migration and the majority societies of the host countries. The answers provided are based on the results of research projects, partly in Hungary and partly international in their scope. Our questions are primarily focused on exploring what threats the members of majority societies see from migration and what strategies migrants follow when developing their relationships with majority societies.

The final question we deal with in the book is one that refers back to Szűcs's analysis of three European regions and the divergent but striking appearance of othering arising from migration. In Western Europe, where daily contact with the presence of migrants is normal (though not necessarily positive) the cognitive argumentative force of "othering" is necessarily weak, whereas in Eastern Europe fears generated by populist policies and media dominated by a central political will have demonized and scattered the migrant presence, which happens less often in Western Europe.

CHAPTER 1.

THE RISE OF NATIONS:
MODERNITY AND NATIONS
COMING INTO EXISTENCE

It has taken a long time for the communal societies of the world to turn into modern ones—this historical process has been slow, gradual, and unevenly distributed in geographical space. The decisive factor of this shift was literacy, the written word released ideas from the constraints of orally transmitted tradition. Written texts opened up new vistas for the accumulation of knowledge, thus creating the possibility of limitless cognitive growth. Interpersonal relationships became bifurcated by modernity based on whether the actors encountered one another in formal (non-elected) or informal (elected) roles. Up to the present day, the incest taboo related to us through King Oedipus's tragic fate admonishes humans of the fault line between the two types of role relations marking the origins of the modern western individual—one who is free and accountable for their deeds. And while inclined to live by the pleasure principle, they cannot do so under the pressure of the reality principle. Modernity has recreated the social world, laid the grounds for new values, and set off new processes and institutions that blocked the paths of return to the communal structures of society.

In antiquity, three values fundamental to modern societal development were born. The individual's freedom redefined their nexus with the community formerly grounded in the oppression of individual will. Each person can choose to act but is held accountable for the consequences of their actions. The right choices lead to success, and the wrong ones to defeat. Freedom is inseparable from the social value attributed to property, providing its owners with the security to choose one action over another. Finally, the third value is equality, the realization of which prevents individuals from exercising undue power over others.

The sustenance of modern society depends on three institutions. The marketplace released the economy from the restrictions of chance individual transactions, thus establishing the framework of trade based on the universal exchange of goods and services. The nation-state created the structures of political power responsible for maintaining order within the physical, social, and symbolic space controlled by the national imagination. Finally, the social class system, as construed in Gellner's theory (2009), liberates individuals from the forced trajectories of collective determinations operating beyond their control and opens up the opportunity to occupy a place in society based upon their performance, knowledge, and merits. This entails the possibility to either rise or fall on the social ladder, but since the subjects of these movements are free, society as a whole is in continuous flux, with ever-shifting social structures.

In the center of modern society is the autonomous individual whose choices are shaped by considerations of attainability and desirability. Rationality implies the simultaneous reckoning with the attainability and favorableness of one's aspirations in relation to which all other configurations would lead one into the realm of the irrational. Reason guides the free individual who no longer needs guidance from churches that infantilize the adult actor by subjecting them to authority.

Modernity came into being as a protracted and a step-by-step process concentrated in particular geographical regions. Its onset can be traced back to antiquity, yet this project has never been completed. From time to time, modernization set off at some location but faltered and reversed. Yet on a global scale, modernization cannot be stopped. As the psychological burden of becoming economically, politically, and culturally uniform overtakes the individuals released from the ties of communal societies, many would seek refuge in the past, if only they could.

THE THREE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONS OF EUROPE

Europe is the birthplace of modernity. The values of freedom, property, and equality were formed here—along with the institutions of the market, the nation state as well as the processes of individualization, rationalization and secularism, set out to conquer the world but have not yet succeeded. As yet the entirety of the world is far from modern. All societies still have to face the challenges of global modernization.

In the early 1980s (1983), Szűcs formulated a thesis about Europe's three developmental regions, claiming that the geopolitical status quo following the demise of the Roman Empire had proved enduring. Up until the present time the political, cultural, and social psychological boundaries evolved in the aftermath of the breakup into a Western and an Eastern Roman Empire have persisted.

It was in the Carolingian Empire established on the Western Roman territory where Szűcs identified a combination of ancient, Christian, barbarian, and German features construed ever since as the "West." With the border situated along the Elbe-Saale and Leitha rivers, the eastern half fell under the reign of the Byzantium and held rigidly onto its Roman legacy.

The third region lay between the West and the East. Regarding this region, Szűcs stated:

In between the twofold influence and parallel to the first boundary, another no less marked eastern separation line evolved reaching from the Lower Danube's area to the eastern Carpathians and northward along the woodlands separating the western from the eastern Slavs as well as the Polish from the Russian lands, ending eventually in the Baltics in the 13th century. The territory west from here had already been broadly named by contemporaries around 1100 and 1200 as *Europe Occidens* (Occidental), apparently ignoring the former Elbe-Leitha border. As soon as Europe had grown from a mere geographical entity into a cultural and even structural identity synonymous with the *Christianitas*, it bifurcated along the lines of the Roman versus the Byzantine influence. The zone situated from the river Elbe to the Carpathian range and from the Baltics to the Adriatic Sea, that is, the new region attached to the vestiges of the former "Caroling Europe" with an expanse close to half of it, became less and less hesitatingly referred to—not unlike Scandinavia—as "Western Europe." (Szűcs 1983, 2)

It thus appeared that the West would encompass the middle part of Europe as well. The new boundaries were marked by the exemplars of Roman, Gothic, and Renaissance architecture. The absence of such architecture beyond the territories once possessed by the Hungarian and Polish kingdoms and the Knights of Prussia signified the edge of the East.

Central Europe, however, only became incorporated into the West temporarily. As Szűcs explained:

The sharp demarcation line of economic and social structural difference dividing Europe into two parts after 1500, and marking the predominantly more spacious eastern half to be the site of the "second serfdom" in effect reproduced with stunning exactitude the earlier Elbe-Leitha border of circa 800. Moreover, following nearly half a millennium—in the present day—Europe finds itself, once again, cut more definitely than ever, into two "camps" practically by the same geographical boundary—with some minor deviations around Thuringia. One might wonder if Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt had studied carefully the status quo in the era of Charlemagne on the anniversary of the 1130th anniversary of the emperor's death. (Szűcs 1983, 3)

The end of the cold war finally lifted the iron curtain. Within the European Union's organizational framework, Central Europe once again became part of Western Europe, leaving behind Russia, Eastern Europe's most significant country.

The differences between the three regions, however, have persisted. In Western Europe, societies since the Carolingian era have developed in an organic fashion, gradually broadening individual freedoms and the autonomous associations built on those freedoms. This was the foundation on which modern political, economic, and cultural progress took place. Eastern European social development, on the other hand, carried the mark of the Byzantine model from the start, involving an overbearing state, the centralization of power, and a lack of recognition of individual freedom. Even though the Byzantium fell, new empires rose in its place, built upon similar principles.

The Western model of societal organization premised upon autonomous networks enabled the continuous increase of goods, the flourishing of culture, urbanization, industrialization, and the solidification of civil society. In contrast, the Eastern model, centralized and inimical toward individual and collective autonomies, as it was, has permanently lagged behind its Western counterpart, which necessitated reforms to modernize. Once launched, the reforms came to a standstill. No organic modernization has ever transpired.

Drawing on István Széchenyi's (2002) ideas, one could describe the social-psychological effects of Western versus Eastern societal trajectory by reference to the paradigms of "credit culture" as opposed to the "tribute culture." In Széchenyi's understanding, credit is far from merely an economic category; it is a social-psychological construct allowing for a person to have trust in another and in the law. Credit is predicated upon the creditor's belief in getting paid back. Tribute, on the contrary, is an act of taking away or dispossession breeding suspicion and distrust.

The dynamism and growth of Western European society is rendered possible by the credit culture that shapes institutional and personal relationships, implying that the parties of a transaction trust one another, present themselves favorably, and have faith both in themselves and in others. All of this works as a self-fulfilling prophecy as it improves the quality of interpersonal relationships. The culture of tribute operates inversely in effecting a negative psychic spiral. In Central Europe a combination of the two ideal types can be found ensuring either one or the other's dominance at different points in time and geographical space. Discussing the Slovaks' position in Europe, Rudolf Chmel observed a phenomenon applying to other Central European countries as well, namely, that the Slovaks have alternately displayed behaviors characteristic of the closed authoritarian, antidemocratic, and oligarchic East, on the one hand, and the open, more liberal and democratic West,

on the other (Chmel 2016). Comparative research into the values held in different nations compellingly suggests that the past has not been bypassed in Europe. Marx was correct to contend that “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (1852, 1).

THEORIZING THE NATION

Nations are pivotal formations of social life, which help people place themselves and others in the immensity of the world and find meaning and purpose in the post-traditional age following the “death of God” (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 108). Not until the second half of the twentieth century was the concept of the nation subject to sociological inquiry. Before then, sociologists tended to focus on social class issues without considering their national context. However, they had to confront the reality of classes existing within nations.

Sociological thought about the nation is fraught with controversy. Theorists disagree whether the nation should be viewed as a modern or a historically long-standing formation. Those who claim that the nation is historically “old” would also argue that “nothing is new under the sun,” therefore everything to study in a nation’s life has been around for a long time. On the other side of the trench, theorists construing the nation as a modern formation would claim that the habitual behaviors observed in earlier formations have little in common with those shaped by contemporary national frameworks.

The perennialists approach the diversity of nations as an essential response to the indeterminacy that intrinsically characterizes the human condition, enabling the members of such groups to self-identify as a nation and to carve their own time and space out of Nothingness. In this way, they forged a unique formation unmistakable for any other group in the human world. Modernists, on the contrary, believe that national uniqueness is merely imagined and was invented by an intellectual elite in order to restrain the limitless drive for individualism as well as to strengthen social cohesion that had been shattered by the dissolution of communal ties rooted in tradition. The nation, according to this perception, is but a mere construct without any essential qualities to it.

Further dimensions may be added to this debate. One may ask what is essentially collective or supra-individual about the nation—a question which can be undermined by claiming there is nothing preexisting the individual choosing by his or her own will to become a member of the community of a nation. This dilemma is fundamental to theorizing about the nation, allowing one to argue either that the nation is a cultural community or, alternately, it is a political one.

Each of these standpoints is present in the literature. Yet most authors attempt to reconcile the opposing arguments. Stalin's definition of the nation is intriguing since in the empire under his rule he had the opportunity to adjust his policies to his conception. Even by contemporary standards, Stalin's approach is valid, even though precisely the element of the political is absent from it. It asserts that "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Stalin 1953, chap. 1). More than seven decades later Anthony Smith, in essence, replicated Stalin's idea. Smith opines that the nation is a historical and cultural community with a name of its own, inhabiting a unified territory, and instituting mass public education and common rights for its people (1991).

A crucial dimension of the clashing definitions is the historicity of the nation's concept, setting the so called "perennialists" against the "modernists." The former construe the nation to be continuous with the ancient and medieval formations, explaining it in reference to the endurance of the community's name, its semantic space thus created, its symbols, historical narrative, dwelling space, and the traditions incorporated into the culture. As a result of these long-standing features, the pronoun "we" became the time-transcending psychosocial core of communal imaginaries as opposed to "strangeness."

According to the modernists, the intellectual procedures and contents presented the nation as an imagined entity. The contents and symbols of national identity were knowingly invented and propagated by the intellectuals' and politicians' discontent with the feudal order. The nation, in this approach, is the outcome of modern social developments that produced a unified marketplace, an all-encompassing legal system, and a universal school system furthering cultural uniformity within the country's territorial boundaries. The protagonist of this process is the individual bound to others via their national consciousness and national sentiments, which in turn are grounded in civic rights and duties.

The modern nation state did not inherit but simply utilized the identities that had been forged on ethnic and religious bases. The crux of national development is sovereignty deriving from the nation's will. It was up to the pattern of national development, that the concept of the nation implied the "Volk" or the "People." National sovereignty involves total control over the territory and its residents exercised by governmental leaders whose power is earned through elections.

Owing to the meaning-making potential of national ideology, the land vindicated by the nation thus becomes "homeland," a site of shared destiny demarcated by "natural" borders. The nation is not a naturally given group of people, yet it can be made to seem like one by "translating" the national ideology into the individual's lifeworld.

Max Weber has integrated successfully the opposing poles of the theories of nation pointing out that the "nation" is nothing else than a realm of common values, patterning uniquely the collective experiences and meanings, seen as a community, and simultaneously increasing the internal assimilation of its members and the external differentiation from the other national groups (Fleet 2011, 38). Weber is right to emphasize the role of beliefs in common descent in the formation of national consciousness warning that "it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists" (1968, 389).

Gellner (2009) argues that nationalism, inevitably, is the ideological product of the transformation from agrarian into industrial society, offering rights even to those lacking them prior to societal change. The expansion of such rights offers equal opportunities for success to all ethnic, religious, and regional groups and orders. National society in a sense is the "melting pot" of feudal society randomly redistributing members of the preexisting groups into the newly forming social classes. National unity, predicated upon general schooling and a unified cultural canon producing workable psychic effects, has the capacity to override the inequalities generated by a class system.

Taking either perspective, it is evident that the nation is part of a human drama animated by language. The name of a nation engenders the semantic space nurturing the national imaginary, which enables the nation's members to inhabit the drama's space and time setting.

Nationalism cements the goals of national existence. This ideology is more aggressive when national existence is merely willed as opposed to it being an attained reality. The difference is theorized by historian Miklós Szabó who distinguishes between the "ideology of a program" and the "ideology of a situation" (Szabó 1977).

As a secular religion, nationalism filters into the semantic space emptied by secularization providing meaning, goals, and a sense of mission to the orphans of the slayed God. Nietzsche powerfully evokes the imagined moment when the “madman” warns his ignorant fellows that God no longer exists. “Where has God gone?” he calls out:

: I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how
 : have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to
 : wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its
 : sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not
 : dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an
 : above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty
 : space breathe upon us? (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 125)

Nationalism as a secular religion (Geró 2006) embeds humans in historical time, offers them a place, a perspective, and ties to those akin to them, besides ensuring the security of challenging other people perceived as different. It is through symbolism that the nation’s historical chronology and the spaces of its holidays are created: rituals, ceremonies and speech acts are performed according to the dictates of role expectations concomitant with national membership.

The citizenry made legally and mentally uniform through realizing the nationalist project is called the “people,” who is the carrier of sovereignty and the communicator of the nation’s will. Nation states differ in terms of the manner they let the will of the people find expression through the periodical election of individuals into decision making bodies. In liberal democracies the legislative, executive, and juridical functions are separate, and it is through the power of the constitution that human and civil rights such as the right to property, freedom of speech, and religion are guaranteed as the unalterable and inalienable rights of every citizen. In the so called “people’s” democracies the branches of governance are not separated as the legal arrangement is subject to lineage, social psychological, and cultural inheritance. Election is but a periodical act of voting confidence to a leader.

The infrastructure of the modern nation state includes a capital city, a centralized bureaucracy, an army and police, a uniform cultural and historical canon, a national bank, a currency and a legal system. Yet the most important aspect of the nation state’s existence is international recognition, since if it is not recognized by other states, it does not amount to more than an idea or a dream.

THE FULFILLMENT AND FAILURE OF SOCIAL ENTROPY

Gellner (2009) deems the rise of nations to be the necessary outcome of the transition from agrarian to industrial society. In the agrarian society there is no social mobility. No movement is possible between the agrarian workers and the ruling elite of the society. The division between the rulers and the ruled is sustained by political and cultural power warranting the reproduction of this system from generation to generation.

In contrast, industrial society is predicated upon change. The economic and cognitive products of industrial society continuously proliferate, which implies that new generations cannot continue whence their parents left off. Even though goods are distributed inequitably in society, theoretically the opportunities for success are equal. The foundation of social stratification is merit rather than inherited privilege. Continuous economic growth inspires new forms of activity and professions requiring knowledge, expertise, and skills. This is only rendered possible by a universal, mandatory public school system which provides the opportunity for all students to acquire the factual and cultural knowledge needed to move ahead in the national society.

The national society is a knowledge and communicational community, ideally every member of which is capable of having him or herself understood by all other members. Karl Deutsch was one of the first theorist of nation highlighting the theme of communication bounding the members of nations. As Deutsch observes “people are held together ‘from within’ by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members” (Deutsch 1966, 98). Entropy in physics means a transition from the orderly to the disorderly, from regular to irregular states. Entropy in sociology is a metaphor meaning that, in the course of the transition to industrial society, the groups and strata of agrarian society did not stay together. Instead their members randomly found their new social position in the entirety of the continuously growing economic and cognitive structures of labor division. Social entropy is the individuals’ social movement dictated by the dynamism of industrialization, which privileges personal capabilities, motivation, and goals to succeed.

As opposed to the collective determinations prevalent in agrarian society, the new social stratification based on the indeterminacy resulting from a multitude of individual wills is an ideal type. A resistance to social entropy developed in

societies where, within the framework of industrialization, the collective social trajectories of the agrarian era stayed in place, keeping together groups apparently based on ethnicity, religion or race. For the majority of the populace structured according the laws of entropy, the entropy resistant groups seemed like the “other” or the “stranger.” Such perceptions called forth stereotypes and prejudices further deepening the divide between the majority and the minority groups.

Gellner (2009) gives the following example to illustrate how groups resisting social entropy are formed. Let us assume that there is a collection of people in agrarian society whose members have genetically inherited blue skin. Despite policies offering equal opportunities to everyone, most of the blue-skinned end up in the upper echelons of society as it transitions into an industrial one, leading the non-blue-skinned to believe that an undue number of blue-skinned have gotten into privileged positions. Being “blue” therefore becomes the source of prejudice and stereotypes, which will cause these people to be seen as “intruders,” “parasites,” and “exploiters.”

There might be another group whose genetic inheritance is yellow skin. Despite policies ensuring equal opportunities to all, most of the yellow-skinned would end up in the lower social classes in the wake of transition into an industrial society, prompting the non-yellow-skinned to think that an inordinate number of “yellows” are in the lower classes. This will spawn stereotypes and prejudice towards “yellowness” associated with traits such as being “lazy,” “averse to work,” or “dumb.”

Stereotypes and prejudices afflicting given social groups in industrial society are only produced by resistance to social entropy if the original group-forming category appears to be naturally given. Such traits may include skin color, body type or facial characteristics. Stereotypes and prejudice require visibility as a basis for discrimination.

The conflicts arising from resistance to social entropy mask the class structure of industrial society whose fundamental feature is the concentration of resources in the hands of a few, while many are deprived of economic, cultural, and political goods. If there were no entropy resistant groups in industrial society, each generation would start anew the class struggle to acquire these possessions, assuming that the distribution of goods was independent of preexisting social ranking. In such a scenario, the essence of these struggles would not be concealed by stereotypes and prejudices affecting groups that resist social entropy.

An industrial society exempt from entropy resistant groups, however, is a

utopia. Immigration involves the continuous influx of “strangers” who, due to their cultural, religious, and ethnic differences, would not become included in the “social melting pot.” Along their given determinations, the members of immigrant groups tend to organize themselves into networks whose potency is multiplied by the opportunities offered by new information and communication technologies.

In the modern globalized world, wealthy countries attract like a magnet the citizens of poorer countries. The less these immigrants are willing to assimilate themselves along the spectrum of the host society’s structures, the more acute forms of xenophobic attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices they will face from the majority population. In that case they become ghettoized and involuntarily excluded from the division of labor. If they remain outsiders to the economic, cultural, and political system as a whole, their existence will spark severe majority versus minority conflicts.

ETHNONATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE MODERN NATION STATE

Minority is a relational category. A group may be considered a minority if there is a majority in relation to which a minority is separated by a category relevant to both parties. Only in the modern nation state does the majority vs. minority relationship present itself as an issue, since the nation state cannot operate its economic, political, and cultural institutions unless its members are psychologically alike. Moreover, their image of the national group to which they belong makes it possible for everyone to have that invariable and constraining imaginary construct of reality rooted in a national knowledge base. Those situated outside of this imaginary group are considered strangers threatening the unity of the nation. Discussing the sociological processes characterizing the European nation states, we have established that, in the course of national development, the members of all the various groups within the feudal social structure end up “distributed” randomly, according to the law of entropy, in the emergent social structures within the geographical, economic, and cultural space defined by the nation state. Earlier ties based in locality, profession, order, religion, and ethnicity give way to a new

bond with the nation state, a national identity that everyone can accept as their own, which helps make sense of the world for those carrying the identity.

A minority may be regarded as a group whose members in the process of nation formation do not randomly find their place in the new structure but hold together more or less collectively in one strata. In the eyes of the national majority, they appear as a minority and this affects their members disadvantageously in several respects.

The first disadvantage is semantic in nature. The term “minority” connotes “smallness,” “weakness,” and “sporadic” as opposed to “largeness,” “strength,” and “multitudes” associated with the term “majority.” In everyday language use, “minority” is laden with negative value judgments, while “majority” is laden with positive ones. In a 1970s experiment we asked six-year-old Hungarian children (not yet attending school) to draw a picture of their own country and of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China next to it. At this age, children imagined Hungary as big and, accordingly, the drawings showed Hungary at least the size of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. By school age, this tendency was no longer observed. The children depicted their country in its actual proportion, that is, small.

The semantics of the word “minority” evidently played a role in Lenin’s decision when, in breaking his faction away from the Russian Social Democratic Party, he called it “Bolshevik,” meaning “of the majority” as opposed to the other faction designated as “Menshevik,” meaning minority, overlooking the actual numerical proportions of the two factions.

To belong to a minority entails disadvantages in perception as well. Studies by Hamilton and Gifford showed that when the subjects of an experiment had to describe groups “A” and “B,” of which one group’s members were half as many as the other groups, the smaller group’s members were more negatively characterized by the respondents than those of the bigger group. Fewness and negativity forms an illusory correlation in the mind, a tendency more pronounced when it comes to actual minorities. This explains why phrases like “Gypsy crime” or “migrant rape” catch on in the majority’s consciousness (Hamilton and Gifford 1976).

Discriminatory practices occur on different spheres in the society. In everyday life the most common forms of discrimination on social and mainstream media sites are hate speech, offensive jokes, and slurs. Of particular significance is discrimination by police officers, health care providers, teachers and other pub-

lic service personnel. Another social sphere is legislation rejecting human rights such as the case of Jewish laws enacted in Germany and other Central and East European countries between the two world wars or the apartheid regime of South Africa sustained as recently as until 1994.

Minority existence means not only an inequitable share from the socially produced goods and services but political and cultural barriers as well. Semantic and cognitive difficulties tend to justify social disadvantages, concealing the injustice involved. Only by removing the stigma attached by the majority group can the minorities stand up for themselves to restore justice. This necessitates the finding of their voice, empowering themselves, and connecting with an authentic leader like Martin Luther King. Kurt Lewin identified the obstacles of minority emancipation as self-loathing, the difficulty of finding a credible leader, and self-effacing assimilation (Lewin 1948).

The “pure” nation state without minorities in the strict sense of the word is near to a utopia. Even though some entropy-resistant minorities have ceased to exist as such via assimilation or evacuation, new groups have kept arriving via immigration whose religion, language, ethnic origin, and value system have been different from those of the majority. In addition, there are sexual minorities and deviants stigmatized and ostracized by the dominant group.

During World War Two, Bettelheim and Janowitz examined the majority representations of Jewish and African American (or, in the language of those times, “Negro”) groups in the US army. They found that it was “success” with regard to the Jews and “failure” regarding the African Americans that came up as the excuse for discrimination (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1950).

The success of a minority provokes collective jealousy or resentment among members of the majority who, in assessing the achievements of the minority group members, do not see them as the result of high performance, diligence, and effort but instead group loyalty, exclusion of the majority members or, in the lingo of the anti-Jewish Laws in Hungary, “taking up living space” (*térfoglalás*).

The failure, on the other hand, of a minority group is an admonition for the majority group as to the precarity of their own position and the possibility of downward mobility, which is held at bay by mentally maximizing the distance from the given minority. An example of this is the majority’s perception of the Roma in European societies as a dirty, lumpen, crooked, and sexually licentious underclass, a perception expressing the repressed anxieties of the majority.

Discrimination, which is unjust toward minorities, may be eliminated by altering the relationship between the majority and the minority groups, which demands efforts to be made by both parties. The minority group needs authentic leaders, finding a voice of their own, and a strategy for social mobility. The majority must be led by an elite that makes no concessions to racism. In public service there must be zero tolerance for violating human rights. Segregation in preschools and public schools is forbidden by the law. Civil movements must work to enhance tolerance between social groups exemplified by organizations like the Not in Our Town movement in the United States¹ or the Theatre of Witness in Northern Ireland.²

ETHNOPOLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

In general, globalization seems to be a process that incessantly and unstoppably homogenizes the societies of this world, erasing its differences and realizing the free movement of people, ideas, goods, and services. On the other hand, we can argue that the process of globalization is far from linear, there are recessions, counter tendencies, increasing resistance and other serious pitfalls. It has been disputed when this phenomenon began. Some trace it back to antiquity, while others believe it started with the colonizing expeditions of Western and Southern European states. All the authors concur, however, that capitalism has accelerated globalization, turning it into a process that indeed traverses the entire world (Wallerstein 2005).

Recognizing the intrinsic connection between capitalism and globalization, Marx surmised that as a result of the internationalization of the economy the social structure of national societies would emerge everywhere in the world creating an international bourgeoisie and proletariat. He predicted that, with the class struggle transposed onto the international level, the existing national, religious, ethnic separations would be transcended, the nation states would be politically meaningless, and a world government of the proletariat triumphant in the global revolution would come into being.

¹ See <https://www.niot.org/>.

² See <https://www.culturenorthernireland.org/features/performing-arts/theatre-witness>.

Contrary to Marx's position, globalization did not eliminate but rather intensified the ethnic, national, and religious differences on a global scale. In the new world order of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the battle is waged not between classes but, in Huntington's phrase, between "civilizations" (1996). Sociologists had to come to terms with the reality that their concepts, theories, and methodologies, which were tailored to the study of capitalist societies' class structure in a national context, unsuitable for inquiry into the international and intercultural processes spawned by globalization. The interpretative space of human activities has been irreversibly transformed (Tomlinson 2007).

The space that appears meaningful to people is a cultural product which, given the semiotic uncertainties brought about by globalization, is the sole reference in answering the existential question "who am I?" It seemed that modernization rendered this question moot by foregrounding the rational, free, and responsible individual who presumably rid themselves of the prejudices called "idols" by Francis Bacon (2000). The events of the twentieth century, however, have refuted this expectation. Two world wars and a cold war made it clear that multitudes of individuals disillusioned by modernization would seek refuge in autocratic regimes deploying buzzwords like race, nation, or "the people" (Fromm 1994).

With the end of the Cold War, the security offered by a bipolar world evaporated. The West found itself on its own. New centers of power emerged reordering the state of affairs. Yet the distribution of goods required for material well-being continued to follow Pareto's rule even in the new world order: 80 percent of the goods are consumed in regions inhabited by 20 percent of the global population, while the remaining 20 percent of goods are distributed to 80 percent of the world's population (Pareto 1897).

Some of this disproportion is due to the drastic growth of the world's population. The following table (1.1) regarding growth trends was published by Pter Kende, based on the summer 2015 issue of the Paris periodical *Commentaire* (Kende 2016, 56):

**Table 1.1. Changes in the world's population between 1900 and 2050
(in millions and percent)**

	1900	2014	2020*	2030*	2050*
The entire world's population (in million)	1625	6067	7238	8444	9683
Europe (in percent) (1)	17.9	8.6	7.4	6.5	5.7
The broadly understood "West" (in percent) (2)	26.5	22.7	21.4	20.1	18.8
The Russian Empire (in percent) (3)	7.7	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.4
All Muslim-majority countries (in percent) (4)	9.8	16.6	18.0	19.4	21.4

(*) projected

(1) EU-28 + Norway and Switzerland

(2) The same group complemented with North and South America, Australia, and Israel

(3) In 1900: Czarist Russia; from 2000 onward: The Russian Federation

(4) Muslim countries of Africa and Asia only.

The figures of the table show that in the twentieth century the West's and, within it, Europe's share of the world's population significantly decreased, and will continue to do so, unless millions migrate from the Muslim countries to the West. The direction of migration will be discussed in detail later in the book. At this point we would merely like to state that the Western countries' level of material well-being may be sensed as an injustice by the countries failing to provide for their populations—an issue addressed by colonial independence wars and, subsequently, by the radical Muslim movements.

All the countries on Earth have had to face the challenges of modernization, to which local societies responded with various degrees of resilience. Following the end of colonial dominance, new countries were established on the former colonies' territory whose borders became drawn—with calipers and rulers—by the ex-colonial states, irrespective of the inhabitants' religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions. The citizens of the new states could not always develop a solid sense of identity, the majority continuing to define themselves while the other groups were seen as strangers according to the religious and ethnic categories of the pre-colonization era. After being forced into the new states, these societies responded to modernization in diverse ways.

Eisenstadt (1973) believes that some societies reacted to modernization with completely passive and negative attitudes. Other societies chose the path of active organized resistance, in the course of which they strove to preserve traditional values as much as possible. Finally, there have been societies capable of transformation, creating the new economic, political, and cultural conditions necessary for modern life.

Huntington's (1996) typology as to how non-western societies responded to modernization is quite similar to Eisenstadt's model. Huntington also discusses rejection as being the most extreme fundamentalist answer to modernization. Fundamentalists revolt against the most basic prerequisites of modern development, with the exception of the armament, of which they, unmistakably, would prefer the most technologically advanced. The fundamentalist rebels speak the language of terrorism, the only one with which they can communicate.

According to Huntington, another trajectory is Kemalism, which persecutes all possible manifestations of traditional society in working towards total societal modernization. This was a path taken by Peter the Great in eighteenth century Russia, followed by many other modernizing dictators in the twentieth century. In the absence of the social reforms needed to fully realize the modernization project, the idea of "progress" as interpreted by the dictator would not necessarily overlap with the will of the majority upon whom the changes are imposed. Sooner or later such a scenario would induce fundamentalist reactions, bringing about the fall of the ruler and the emergence of a new "people's" dictatorship in its place (Kapuściński 1992).

The modernization puzzle can best be solved via reformism, carrying out social change gradually, one step at a time, thus leaving traditional values intact. Huntington argues that reformism accepts modernization but refuses overt forms of Westernization (1996). Singapore might serve as the best example of this model (Magasházi 2019).

The countries incapable of the reformist solution have faced political crises inducing conflicts between social groups identifying themselves along ethnic and religious categories. While some conflicts stayed within the boundaries of the nation state, others inflamed into wars between them, leading in turn to the splintering of existing countries and the emergence of new ones. Where the government's authority was shattered or destroyed entirely, genocidal forces were more easily unleashed (Snyder 2015). Failed states can seldom restore order from chaos, resulting in escalating fights via the revival of former ethnic and national identities.

The endless wars urged new migrations, with masses of people seeking out regions believed to be safe.

Of the civilizations that reacted poorly to the challenge of global modernization, Islam, which comprises one fifth of the world's population, must be noted. Kemalism in Turkey seemed to be a successful mode of adaptation in the twentieth century, but the events of the twenty-first century suggest otherwise. In other Islamic countries adaptation failed from the start. Various explanations can be offered for the cause of failure. A most compelling one is the resistance of social organization premised on Islamic principles of secularization, an essential facet of modernization. This resistance makes Islam-based societies impervious to the establishment of modern nation states with its separation of the secular political realm from organized religion. In the wealthy Islamic states, the merging of the religious and the political realms does not present potential for conflict, at least not as long as there is enough wealth to go around. In contrast, countries with populations in the tens of millions may hold a grudge against the West for dominating and exploiting some of the Muslim societies, including a minority of twenty-first century Muslims who believe it to be their duty to restore justice by re-arranging the world's regions (Huntington 1996).

Our initial hypothesis in this book draws on Hans Kohn's (1965) theory of the nation, distinguishing between its "political" and "cultural" variants. The "political nation" overlooks ethnic ties, considering everyone as the citizen of the nation state. The "cultural nation," on the contrary, rests on ethnic bonds. We will see that in reality the two types do not differ very sharply at all. The insecurities produced by globalizing processes favored the ethnic principle, reviving it even in countries where nation building originally had followed the principles of "political nation." Aktürk (2012) classifies nation states in terms of their relationship to the ethnic principle.

The identity policy of *par excellence* political nations does not recognize ethnic principles. The United States represents the classic example of this, granting citizenship to every individual born on its territory, irrespective of their native language, religion, and ethnicity. A similar national policy characterized the French Republic from the earliest times.

Our sociological data concerning national identities suggests that in the European Union's nation states both models—the political and the cultural nation—are present. In the past one could observe the growing prevalence of the political national

principle at the expense of the cultural one in all of the EU's member states. Yet the massive and continuous migration has been a challenge for both the mono-ethnic and multiethnic national policy regimes. In the former regimes relying on the cultural national concept, the assimilation of minorities has always been a vexed and slow process involving, in the past, evacuation, cultural discrimination, forced assimilation, and the majority's intolerant behaviors toward minorities. To remedy the "minority-problem" caused by migration, monoethnic nations had no other option but the expansion of legal space to obtain citizenship, a move exemplified recently by Germany (Aktürk 2012).

As a result of the migration to Europe accelerating in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the European nation states rejecting the ethnic principle are less and less able to maintain a national identity centered merely on citizenship, which is seen as threatened by immigrants of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.

The example of Germany shows that the monoethnic national regime is, evidently, not suited to the needs of the new minorities arising from migration as they do not want to assimilate themselves to the majority population's culture, history, and religious traditions not their own. The case of France indicates that the monoethnic regime does not work either since many of the immigrants cannot or do not want to live in a secular modern society where they are forced to shed their communal ties, they cannot fare merely as individuals.

The large numbers of immigrants arriving from non-Western civilizations pressed by global modernizing forces entail problems of identity which are rarely resolved through the act of immigration. In numerous cases these individuals would carry along the traumas of wars waged in the border zones of civilizations, thus further aggravating the process of their integration into the European majority society that they have chosen to be their new home.

For the nation states of the European Union, an obvious solution could be the multiethnic national policy regime. For the people dwelling in the EU's territory that would imply the cultivation of an identity which would produce a sense of belonging via the category of "Europeanness," while also retaining their specific national and ethnic heritage integral to their identities.

The multiethnic national policy regime of the Russian Federation exemplifies that the category "of Russia" ensures identification for all the citizens of the Federation, irrespective of whether one self-identifies as Russian or not. The frames of

identification for the non-Russians are provided by the 21 republics formed on the Federation's territory on the basis of ethnic and cultural parameters. This system was not known in the Russian Empire where social mobility required from one to join such outspokenly Russian state institutions as the army, the police, the public administration, jurisdiction, the railway or the postal service. The Soviet Union eliminated this legacy of assimilation, which led to the establishment of a network of formally autonomous republics grounded in ethnic and cultural categories within the territory of the Russian Empire. These republics operated as the vehicles of social success and mobility with no pressure on assimilation. Some republics were among the member states of the Soviet Union, while others formed part of the Russian Federation. In the wake of the Soviet Union's fall and the secession of the member republics, the Russian Federation stood by itself while preserving the ethnic and cultural frameworks developed in the Soviet era. The unity of the Federation was successfully secured by the multiethnic organizational regime.

The multiethnic state, however, can only operate if there is a mediator language understood by all the people inhabiting it. In the Russian Federation this is the Russian language. While the integration of the different ethnic and religious group under the banner of the Russian Federation can be successful, we should not forget about the deeply rooted character of the pattern of coexistence which is conspicuously impressive. Aside from this political difference, the greatest practical problem hindering the transition of the EU into a multiethnic state is the absence of a mediator language. No doubt that the European Union has a very strong democratic foundation, while the Russian Federation is lacking democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, the means of providing a strong European identity, like a common language, a common stock of knowledge of European identity, and symbols of unity are missing in the European Union.

CHAPTER 2.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EUROPE:
THE KNOWLEDGE BASE OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY**

The nation forms part of social existence and if language is the “house of being,” as Heidegger (1998) has suggested, the nation would have no place in this house without the linguistic tools helping its members believe that nations exist, and that they belong to one.

As established earlier in this book, the nation becomes conceivable to its members (and non-members) via its name. The name of the nation marks the individuals that belong to it. The negative word “not” is also significant since it allows to draw a dividing line between things that are in a positive versus negative relationship with the nation. National semantic universes are as many as nations themselves (Benveniste 1935).

The first delegates to the first Roma World Congress held in London in 1971 were well aware of the significance of naming when they decided to choose a name for themselves. This was the event where the designation “Roma” came into being, devoid of the negative connotations of the earlier term “Gypsy” (*Zigauener*, *cigány*, etc.). This name provided the ground for the Roma nation building by opening up the possibility for an extremely fragmented and diverse ethnicity, living all over the world, to identify its members as such, and thus construct and cultivate a shared identity.

Any fact of our physical reality may be transposed into the metaphysical world merely by placing it into the semantic space evoked by the nation’s name. Whether taking our own or another nation’s perspective, any theme can easily and clearly enter the national knowledge base via the adjectival structures thus formed (Berlant 1991). It is through the adjectival structures that utterances like “English weather,” “Hungarian Vizsla,” “Dutch landscape,” “Russian summer,” or “Chinese panorama,” (Picture 2.1) gain tangible reality—and any number of similar examples could be given to illustrate this point.

Picture 2.1. Adjectival structures

Russian summer

Hungarian Vizsla

Dutch landscape

Chinese panorama

The human world fragmented by names and groups enables us to “own” a place somewhere that we may call home—a place that seems close and familiar to us both in time and physical space. The social identity theory by Tajfel et al. (1971) stresses the significance of categorization focusing on one’s group, which organizes the human world cognitively and affectively, thereby offering individuals a sense of order, security, and identification. In the case of categorization by name, the outcome is a spontaneous national identification that is immediate, taken-for-granted, and requires no justification. People that consider themselves members of a particular nation inhabit an environment graspable in space and time, with the potential to be experienced and communicated through national themes for the members of present and future generations. The thematizations of nature, for example, make possible the incorporation of the landscape and some of its components (for example, rivers, mountains, lakes or seas), the weather, as well as plants and animals into the nation’s knowledge base.

As the “national gaze” has produced the environment inhabited by members of the nation, the anthropological thematization has created the human bodies

whose build, clothing, and community constitute and “live” the events of national existence. Such events appear in contexts spawned by a great variety of thematizations for the nation’s members. History evokes the times of the dead for the present time, portraying scenes of conflict and harmony, relating stories of epochal change, as well as “great men” and the nameless. The theme of culture contributes to the nation’s capacity of giving meaning (Kántor 2004).

The themes of politics, law, society, economy, and the military offer the opportunity for the nation to exhibit its achievements and highlight its values for its own and other peoples (Gellner 2009). Due to their visibility and communicability in the international arena, sports are of utmost significance. Of the themes from everyday life, food, drinks, sex, fashion, and leisure are most suited to represent the peculiarities of the nation. The usefulness of these themes can be aptly illustrated by the commercials produced to boost tourism for international audiences.¹

Thematizations merely disclose what happens or has happened on the national stage and they convey scarcely anything about qualities and values that could offer guidance to the nation’s members regarding what would serve the nation and what would not. Evaluations take place with the help of relevancies determining what is good or bad in the nation’s life and what’s attractive and unattractive in national performance. Psychological relevancies facilitate the assessment of traits attributed to the national character. Economic relevancies ascertain the relative share of particular economic areas in the nation’s life such as industry, agriculture, commerce, and services. Political relevancies ascertain the limits of desired and undesired behaviors and occurrences in themes like statehood, legislature, and conformity to the law. With regard to international thematization, relevancies determine whether the nation’s members would follow the principle of national self-centeredness or interdependence (Leersen 2006).

Typifications enabling the nations’ members to view “typical” features as essential national characteristics will render fuzzy and vague differences noticeable and visible. National attitudes are forged and cultivated on the ground of relevancies and typifications. It is through these national attitudes that an individual can make sense of the nationally constructed reality in every theme. Not only would they reckon to know a particular object but, in assessing it in the field of attraction and repulsion, they would be able to instantly place it as well. Moreover,

1 “Magyarország—Think Hungary—commercial,” November 14, 2013, video, 2:18, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4ZjYJOmX80&t=3s>

Stereotypes are pivotal components of the national knowledge base, making ideas about one's own and other nations accessible (Hunyady 1998). A late eighteenth century guide to Europe's nations has been preserved (see Picture 2.2), which links each people with characteristics along a set of surprisingly well-selected criteria.

The inside walls of Styria's inns were decorated with the so called *Völkertafel's* pictures and delineations, which allegedly represented Europe's nations. Styria, laying as it does on the border of Europe's western and eastern regions, could have hosted in its inns guests who traveled from East to West or vice versa—travelers curious about what to expect on their journeys to different lands.

Picture 2.2. A brief characterization of European peoples

Table 2.1. A brief characterization of European peoples

	Spanish	French	Italian	German	English	Swedish	Polish	Hungarian	Russian	Turkish or Greek
Morals	vainglorious	tireless	servile	candid	shapely	strong and big	rude	dishonest	evil	capricious
Temperament	wonderful	honest, garrulous	jealous	tends to be good	amicable	cruel	mad	cruel	as the Hungarian	fiendish
Wits	clever	thoughtful	quick-witted	smart	confused	obdurate	vainglorious	small-witted	none	considerable
Character	manly	childlike	adaptive	playful	feminine	unknownable	lackluster	mad	excessively rude	mellow
Knowledge	literate	militarily versed	theologically versed	versed in jurisdiction	secular knowledge	humanities	foreign languages	Latin language	Greek language	shrewd political skills
Clothing	appropriate	motley	appropriate	imitate	French-like	leather	long tail	garish	fur	feminine
Negative features	arrogant	fraudulent	corrupt	prodigal	restless	superstitious	boastful	crook	always suspicious	fraudulent
What do they admire?	fame and glory	war	gold	drinking	sex	good food	nobility	revolt	beatings	themselves
Illness	constipation	syphilis	bad disease	gout	tuberculosis	hematoma	inguinal hernia	epilepsy	whooping cough	depression
Country	fertile	civilized	picturesque and beautiful	good	fertile	hilly	sylvan	rich in gold and fruits	icy	kindly
Military virtues	generous	cunning	foreseeing	invincible	hero of the seas	intrepid	impassioned	rebellious	dull	lazy
Religion	religious devout	rather religious	moderately religious	pious	variable	fervent	faithful	indifferent	renegade	no better than the others
Ruler	king	king	pope	emperor	one or the other	country lords	elected king	barons	pretenders	tyrant
What is abundant?	fruits	trade	wine	corn	pasture	ore	furs	everything	bees	light and soft goods
Leisure	games	betrayals	gossiping	drinking	working	eating	arguing	doing nothing	sleeping	complaining
Animals	elephant	fox	bobcat	lion	horse	ox	bear	wolf	monkey	cat
How do they die?	on ship	in war	in a cloister	in wine	in waters	on the ground	in a stable	by sword	in snow	by treachery

Table 2.1 represents eleven peoples along seventeen dimensions. Even by contemporary standards, the selection of dimensions seems insightful. Particular emphasis was placed on the psychological and behavioral aspects, which included morals, temperament, character, knowledge, and religiosity. Negative traits, military virtues as well as leisure activities and the things admired (referred to as “relevances” in modern language use) were mentioned separately. Clothing, too, received its own row, demonstrating the authors’ awareness of the adage that “fine feathers make fine birds.” Illnesses were included supposedly to guide the traveler about primarily sexual encounters with individuals of various nationalities. The picture also informed the reader about what each country abounded in; what animal was associated with its residents; and, finally, what kind of death the members of particular nations could typically expect for themselves.

The Turks and the Greeks were depicted as one people, while the information imparted to the other nine nationalities was featured in separate columns. As to the substance of the information, it appears quite distinctive for each national group; and, even in our days, they would not be dramatically different. The travelers, however, may not have made much of the author’s typing of the Spaniard as arrogant; the French as civilized; the Italian as wimps; the English as daring on the seas; furthermore, the Polish as boastful, the Hungarian as rebellious, the Russian as rude, and the Greeks-and-Turks as dishonest! Yet these detailed accounts may likely have helped to pin each nationality onto the travelers’ cognitive map. In many cases they merely reinforced what they had reckoned to know through prior experiences or hearsay.

Overall, the pictures caution to be distrustful towards every nationality, the difference being the unique set of reasons for distrust and caution. Entertainment might have been another purpose of the compilation, especially considering the last line where the various kinds of deaths typical of a nation were listed, or the mention of goods and animals generally held characteristic of them.

Recent research into stereotypes sets out with assumptions no different than the Völkertafel’s images. Stereotypes help recognize the members of a group, both in terms of their empirically observable features and the non-observable ones that can be inferred (Leersen 2006).

Besides physical attributes, contemporary studies of stereotypes concern assumptions about morals and competency. Our investigations based in the region of the Carpathian Basin indicated that national and ethnic groups’ stereotypes

of themselves and one another vary according to a distinctive pattern along the East-West axis. The groups in the “East” are viewed by “Easterners” as less competent but morally more solid, while the groups in the “West” are rated in the exact opposite manner, as highly competent but of inferior morality. The study furthermore confirmed the thesis about autostereotypes being more positive than heterostereotypes (Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi 2002).

Interpretations facilitate the operation of the national knowledge base and the sorting of information perceived in a national context. They make it possible for us to apprehend, experience, and communicate the reality constructed on national categories with the help of thematizations, relevances, and typing. Furthermore, interpretations enable one to evaluate problems, dilemmas, attempted solutions and actions within the nation’s dramaturgical space—a space peopled by heroes and traitors, filled with an array of grand achievements, successes and failures, tragic and victorious events.

The socially constructed world becomes mentally bifurcated through dichotomization: one’s own nation occupies the “familiar space,” whereas other nations, cultures, and civilizations are relegated to the “unfamiliar space,” and are viewed through the lens of one’s own national group as strange, remote, and often threatening.

Rationalization is a well-known psychological mechanism the purpose of which is to protect the self by, first, keeping things that are incongruous with the positive self-image at a distance and, second, by discarding such items once they pop up. This mechanism is activated whenever facts, information or communication eroding the positivity of national identity arise. National rationalization knows no other truths than its own. Consequently, every nation would privilege self-justifying rationalizations and stave off alternative perspectives which would hold the nation accountable for mistakes and failures that transpired. At the opposing end of national pride and rationalization is self-loathing and the admission of guilt and shame, a relatively rare occurrence.

Creating and sustaining a consistently positive national self-image depends on properly identified causes that emphasize the nation’s own attributes like its creative force, intelligence, and heroism when it comes to its successful endeavors. On the contrary, mostly outside agents (foreigners, minorities or enemies) are blamed for the nation’s failures. Of particular relevance is scapegoating through which the causes of social ills become palpable and immediately graspable.

Compensation is rooted in a sense of inferiority, which may surface on both an individual and a collective level. Compensation occurs when the national performance lags behind other, similarly positioned nations' performance in empirically quantifiable areas (for example, economic growth, living standards, the number of victories scored in battles and wars and so forth). What compensation enables for the nation's members is a sense of national superiority over members of other peoples concerning any arbitrarily selected areas such as the size of the hunted stags' antlers or the number of Olympic gold medals per capita. The same social psychological mechanism lies behind the cliché of "small country of great accomplishments." The ultimate dread of national existence for a nationalist is the prospect of extinction, and members of the national community are mobilized to fend it off via faith in collective survival and hope for the future.

Symbols constitute a vital part of the national knowledge base in that they convey, on a non-rational level, a sense of belonging, common fate, and timeless existence to the community. Flags, coat-of-arms, anthems, and other national symbols are indispensable requisites of the scripts enacted on festive events. The roles of the script provide the opportunity for all participants to unite under the sacred idea of the nation.

The revered sites of national past such as the heroes' tombs and birthplaces are also charged with symbolic power, a reason why nations struggle so bitterly to reconcile themselves with relinquished territories related to epochal historic events, the birth, life, or death of the protagonists of national culture and history. The capital of every modern nation state has a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which serves as a veritable catalog of essential patriotic symbols.

National ideology is the most elaborate yet the least accessible segment of the national knowledge base in terms of its social reach, being as it is a system of explicitly and elaborately stated ideas. Its rationale is to provide justification for the nation's existence. The closed version of national ideology is exclusive and restrictive with regard to its membership, proclaiming separateness and national self-centeredness. The open version, in contrast, is an inclusive system of ideas striking a balance between nationality and human rights. While the closed type is centered on ethnic and biological ties, the open is grounded in the notion of citizenship.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE KNOWLEDGE BASE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

It was with considerable delay—in the second half of the twentieth century—that the social sciences set out to study the problem of the nation more systematically. Social psychology was the first to achieve considerable progress in revisiting the issue of national identity. It defined the nation as a social group, hence the assumption that the specificities of national belonging may be captured in the framework of inter-group relations. The most favored research questions addressed the concept of national identity itself: the roots and development of identity in individual psychology, the examination of ethnic and national attitudes, the depiction of inter-ethnic relations, as well as the study of stereotypes (Hamilton and Gifford 1976), prejudices and conflicts (Sherif and Sherif 1953). Only recently did sociology engage with similar questions. The first systematic international empirical investigation took place in 1995 with the purpose of offering a sociological explanation for the problem of national identity. Prior to this, research had been conducted, by and large, in individual countries starting in the mid-1980s.

Sociology's delayed interest in this topic may be traced back to the discipline's long-standing proclivity to conceptualize social differences and inequalities with reference to socioeconomic groups and principles of stratification. Only since the 1960s have cultural systems and group formation rooted in these systems received increased attention. In addition, sociologists' reliance on data collection from individual subjects—both in micro or macro-level surveys—also hindered the growth of this area, since national identity studies focus on collective consciousness and thus draw on symbolic and narrative data. The current popularity of this topic, on the other hand, is well-served with the increasingly common inclusion of symbolic and cognitive phenomena in the depiction of social conflicts. Furthermore, in the explanation of collective behaviors, the organization of cultural identity, double or plural identities, and social conflicts with symbolic or cultural roots have come to the fore (Örkény 2011).

The knowledge base of national identity may be approached, firstly through various historical, political, and cultural components. Secondly, it may be investigated through the political and intellectual process whereby the knowledge is formed and changed, and its fabric is shaped, rewritten, and transformed by a variety of actors. Thirdly, the knowledge base can also be studied as a collection of representations

such as national symbols, objects, texts, and events. Finally, and for our project, it is of crucial importance that the elements of everyday knowledge and mechanisms of identification are also uncovered and analyzed in their temporality. The subjects of our inquiry are thus ordinary people, and our primary goal is to reconstruct the particular image of the nation as it coheres in the individual's consciousness of observations, attitudes, and value judgments. We are furthermore interested in the manner these components congeal into a unified knowledge-based identity on the societal level.

In order to "belong" to a nation and grow attached to it, the individual must develop some kind of relationship to his or her (national) group, in our case, to the Hungarian people. Evidently, everyone builds a sense of belonging via positive sentiments and values, otherwise the importance and meaning of national affiliation would be challenged. If the fact of birth into a nation assures one's national affiliation in the legal sense, affective and cognitive contents must "fill" and reinforce one's national identity in a psychological sense.

The existence of one's own group presupposes that other groups exist as well, and they are mutually aware of each other's existence. In the next step of identification, not merely a sense of difference between one's own group and that of the others becomes palpable, but the difference from the members of other groups acquires negative features. That is how generalizations and stereotypes are formed such as, for example, the belief that Hungarians are talented and educated, while others are lazy and primitive, therefore the Hungarians are superior to others. This exemplifies the first level of a classic ethnocentric worldview whose essence is holding one's own group in high regard and squarely deprecating the other. Ethnocentrism does not quite amount to nationalism unless ethnocentric ideas pervade the full range of the community's activities, functioning in effect as a systemic ideology. In such cases nationalism governs a country's political orientation as well, including its economic, foreign, and cultural policies (Örkény 2011).

Our inquiry into the everyday social psychological characteristics of national consciousness and national identity is based on the model elaborated by György Csepeli (1997) in his research studies of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as its modified version employed in Henk Dekker's (2000) studies. National identity, according to this model, may be construed as a cognitive and affective body of knowledge, consisting of tightly linked elements and thus cohering into a unified structure. The shape of this structure is a pyramid that represents the frequency and intensity of each element's occurrence in society (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. The pyramid structure of the elements of national identity

On the primary level of attachment, one can find spontaneous emotional identification fostering a feeling of closeness to the group defined by the nation's members. Onto this emotional base is grafted a diverse set of attitudes, inclinations, values, and ideologies that organize identity. Through various categorizations, attributions, stereotypes, ethnocentrism and nationalism, the nation as a social group gains the particular shape and substance that comprise the framework for psychological identifications—ranging from the most instinctive to the increasingly conscious ones. The cognitive and the affective patterns may evoke a variety of themes encompassing the natural environment, the construction of historical past, and the central issues of culture, politics, the economy, and ethics. Taken together all layers of the pyramid from the bottom to the top are equally important. However, in many cases nationalism is produced and aroused by intellectual and political elites profoundly who are interested in perpetuating the various forms of national sentiments of the masses.

Following the logic outlined above, we will explore the characteristics of national knowledge bases, drawing on the results of an international comparative survey conducted in 2013. This survey has been conducted several times over the past 25 years, so we have had the opportunity to observe the changes that occurred between 1995, 2003, and 2013. In the first part of our account, we examine the psychological components of national identity; subsequently, we look at the

various expressions of national sentiment and mentality along the entire “pyramid.” Finally, the third part of our analysis will discuss how the different social psychological components affect nationalism’s penetration of one’s everyday consciousness and, on that grounds, what types of attachment individuals display towards their nation.

ABOUT THE RESEARCH

Our investigation rests on the data of the 2013 International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) comparative research series, occasionally complemented with data from the 1995 and 2003 surveys.² These studies inquired into the specificities of national identity in various countries of the world including those of Europe, addressed the issue of how people perceived strangers and internal minorities, and questioned whether anything beyond national identity (such as a transnational or supranational identity) could be seen to arise.

An aggravating dilemma in international comparative research is to decide which methods to use for comparing the information and data gleaned from individuals in nationally-based sociological studies. Understandably, international research significantly alters the contextual space of the conventional sociological inquiry by expanding the interpretive field construed on the individual level (methodological individualism)³ onto culturally and politically constructed collective symbolic interpretive spaces. These spaces include the community of nation states, the supranational space of political and cultural communities, the regional level of similarities and differences in terms of geography, history and politics, and the political and economic associations organized above the level of nation states such as the European Union (methodological nationalism).⁴ Besides national attachments and identities, the relationship to Europe and the issues of European identity represent a problem that can only be approached by viewing

² See www.issp.org.

³ The concept of methodological individualism was introduced by Schumpeter (1909), it refers to approaching social phenomena through studying the characteristics of the individual.

⁴ Methodological nationalism refers to grasping social phenomena by taking into account the effects of the nation-state as a framework and the global transnational processes. The description and comparison of collective cultural characteristics, according to this approach, offers a path to understanding complex social processes (Wimmer and Schiller 2003).

them at the intersection of all the mentioned interpretive spaces. The citizens of the modern world socialized into national communities are pressured to come to terms with their personal relationships to Europe and its various regions, all in the context of emerging new collective identities and old residual ones that either fade away or seek to survive under new circumstances.

Whereas international comparative research projects date back to the early 1960s, they only entered the canon of officially accepted sociological perspectives with the 1987 general meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), which highlighted the comparative paradigm as the meeting's main theme. In his programmatic speech, Melvin L. Kohn (1987), the ASA's president at the time, distinguished between four types of such investigations. In the first one the nation itself is the object of study; in the second, the nation is the context of the research; the third type conceptualizes the nation as a research unit; and the fourth type addresses transnational relations. The earliest international comparative projects belonged to the first category, conceived as they were, within an epistemological paradigm where the focus of inquiry was society organized in the framework of the nation state. The question that this research raised was whether the observed sociological phenomena exhibited differences from country to country. In a wide variety of themes these studies aimed to call attention to the specific, diverse patterns of political, economic, and social institutions and phenomena in individual countries. The second type of comparative effort went further to examine the degree to which the workings of various social institutions and structural processes could be generalized, and whether in explaining them, their national context does or does not play a role. Classic examples of this approach include the study of stratification and social mobility of industrializing societies. The genuine paradigm shift, however, came along with the third and fourth types of studies where the similarities and differences between countries served as the initial assumption for addressing questions like "what, beyond a universal or individual vantage point, is the contribution of various types of nations and countries to the grasping of particular issues?" and "Are there shared or divergent cultural specificities that explain people's ways of thinking and behavior beyond their national context?" (Örkény 2011).

Significant developments occurred in the sociological study of national identity in a number of countries during the 1980s. They did not, however, go beyond exploring the nature of concepts such as the nation, national attachment, and nationalism within the confines of the nation state, in conjunction with their his-

torical political, social and psychological background and peculiarities. The first impulse to develop a more complex comparative paradigm dates back to the ISSP research in 1995. Certainly, the ISSP's unparalleled data bank offers an exquisite opportunity for the in-depth study of any country's national identity with the help of quantitative methods. It furthermore facilitates research beyond the national idea in terms of its ideological, political, historical, symbolic, and narrative dimensions to examine the social psychological and value-related facets of people's ties toward their nation (Haller, Jowel, and Smith 2009). Our own analysis is more ambitious in that we attempt to uncover the more comprehensive cultural and structural trends corresponding to the third and fourth types of Kohn's scheme. The ISSP series of research relied on national representative samples and questionnaire-based surveys from numerous countries all over the world. The large number of European participant countries afforded us to test the contemporary relevance of Szűcs's (1983) theory of Europe's three historically formed regions. Likewise, we were interested in the plausibility of his distinction between the "political" and "cultural" nation. In our book (Csepe et al. 2007) drawing on data from 1995 and 2003, we developed an analysis which only partially corroborated such a distinction.

Both in the first and second rounds fifteen European countries participated; in 2013 the number of participants increased (see Table 2.2)⁵ In the present analysis respondents' attitudes in twenty-three European countries will be compared regarding issues like national affiliation and supranational identity. These countries accurately represent the nations that originally formed the European Union or joined it soon after its establishment; the mixed group of countries admitted in several rounds of the Union's enlargement; and, the post-socialist states joining in the last enlargement.

Given the notably broader international participation in the third round of the investigation, we chose a different, regional classification, one more differentiated and sensitive to differences than Szűcs's (1983) threefold typology. Taking into account the original theory's historical, political, and cultural criteria, we set up a system of European regions. Our decision was motivated not merely by our concern with the knowledge base of national identity but by the special significance we attributed to the European context and identification with the European Union.

5 Germany's data bank traditionally marks the west and east German territories, thus offering the opportunity to compare the respective relationships between the political past and national sentiments. Given our current focus on the present and the recent past, we did not separate the two sets of German data but instead analyzed the common sample of the new Germany unified in the wake of the regime change.

Table 2.2. Countries participating in the research in 1995, 2003, and 2013

1995	2003	2013
Austria	Austria	-----
-----	-----	Belgium
-----	-----	Croatia
Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Czech Republic
-----	Denmark	Denmark
-----	-----	Estonia
-----	Finland	Finland
-----	France	France
Germany (eastern part)	Germany (eastern part)	Germany (eastern part)
Germany (western part)	Germany (western part)	Germany (western part)
Great Britain	Great Britain	Great Britain
Hungary	Hungary	Hungary
-----	-----	Iceland
Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
Italy	-----	-----
Latvia	Latvia	Latvia
-----	-----	Lithuania
The Netherlands	-----	-----
-----	-----	Norway
Poland	Poland	-----
-----	Portugal	Portugal
Russia	Russia	Russia
Slovakia	Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia
Spain	[defected data]	Spain
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
-----	-----	Switzerland
-----	-----	Turkey

We have arranged the examined 23 countries into six regions.

- (1) The first region “EU core countries,” has been set up to include the core countries of the European Union (Belgium, France, and Germany), plus Switzerland.
- (2) The second region “Northern EU countries” consists of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, irrespective of EU membership).
- (3) The third region is the “off-the-continent EU countries,” has been identified to include the two island nations (Great Britain and Ireland)
- (4) The fourth region is “Southern EU countries” includes two Mediterranean countries (Portugal and Spain).
- (5) The placing of the post-Soviet central and Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) into one separate region, “Central European countries,” seemed a sensible choice. And, finally,
- (6) Russia and Turkey constitute a separate region as inheritors of Byzantine Empire.

Considering their geographical situation, history, pattern of modernization, political history, and a number of cultural features, we assumed that, besides their differences, the countries of each region share a great deal of characteristics. The identification of six regions offers an interpretive framework to study the various patterns of intensity with which people are attached to Europe. Furthermore, the question as to whether citizens dwelling in different regions have (or don't have) faith in a unified European future will be addressed as well.

International quantitative comparative projects pose multiple methodological difficulties which nationally-based studies working with homogeneous samples do not have to address (Elder 1976). Let us discuss one in detail: the representativeness of the sample. As established earlier, the individual countries' research studies tend to be based on national representative samples. However, since we are dealing with regions, a problem is presented by large deviations in population size among the countries of the specific region. When comparing regions rather than countries, we set up weighted sample units proportionate with the size of the populations involved. In attempting to represent the entire continent, we weighted the regions as well in order to reconstruct the effect mechanisms in an accurate manner.

SPONTANEOUS NATIONAL IDENTITY, MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL GROUP, AND PRIDE IN ONE'S NATION

In discussing the structure of national knowledge base, we argued that one's spontaneous national identity is the Archimedean point on which the entire affective and cognitive structure of national self-identity is built. Clearly, however, the identity of men and women raised in modern society consists of multiple dimensions, merely one of which has to do with national affiliation. In the framework of the ISSP research, one question concerned the extent to which respondents attributed differential importance to various categories of self-identification. Unfortunately, in the 2013 survey this question was dropped from the questionnaire due to time constraints. Given the availability of the 2003 data, we wish to present its results, since it is unlikely that measurable change would have been recorded ten years later.

Table 2.3 exhibits the relative weight attributed to criteria forming one's social identity in 16 countries.⁶ Respondents were asked to choose among ten criteria of identity formation the three most important ones. The frequencies of occurrence of the single most important criterion are presented below.

Table 2.3. The relative importance of criteria attributed to social identity formation; the criterion considered most important, 2003 (in percentage)

Country	Occupational affiliation	Ethnic group affiliation	Gender	Age	Religious affiliation	Political party affiliation	National affiliation	Families	Social class affiliation	Local regional affiliation	No answer
Austria	17.2	5.0	8.8	2.5	3.9	1.0	8.5	39.0	3.1	5.5	5.6
Czech Republic	26.0	4.2	15.3	8.9	2.3	0.9	8.5	25.6	3.1	4.6	0.5
Denmark	7.4	0.8	3.4	2.0	1.4	0.5	3.5	41.3	1.0	1.2	37.5
Finland	13.8	1.0	5.4	5.4	2.4	0.9	12.4	10.5	1.4	1.5	45.3
France	13.6	6.9	19.7	5.5	4.2	1.8	14.7	18.7	5.5	5.9	3.5
Germany (eastern)	17.8	4.1	18.3	5.5	1.6	0.0	5.3	24.5	3.4	5.7	13.7
Germany (western)	14.7	5.1	13.3	4.1	3.1	1.1	3.1	27.8	2.0	3.8	22.1
Great Britain	9.1	1.7	7.0	3.0	2.2	0.2	6.7	40.6	1.5	1.4	26.7
Hungary	13.0	7.9	7.0	12.0	3.1	1.2	0.3	31.9	5.7	11.7	6.5
Ireland	14.5	2.9	7.9	2.8	7.4	0.5	14.9	37.3	0.7	3.8	7.4
Lithuania	22.4	12.2	8.0	10.1	2.9	0.0	1.2	35.3	4.1	2.6	1.2
Poland	16.0	1.6	9.2	3.8	9.6	0.3	12.0	29.9	2.3	4.0	11.2
Portugal	12.7	2.7	18.0	5.4	3.2	1.1	14.7	29.6	1.9	5.5	5.2
Russia	25.5	10.2	8.5	8.0	2.1	0.6	2.9	27.5	6.5	7.2	1.0
Slovakia	14.5	1.5	10.9	3.7	12.2	0.6	4.8	40.6	0.8	6.4	4.0
Slovenia	17.5	11.4	9.8	5.9	2.8	0.3	10.0	24.4	1.6	11.6	4.7
Sweden	7.0	0.4	6.5	2.1	1.1	0.7	2.8	24.6	0.4	1.3	53.1
Average	15.9	4.9	10.4	5.5	3.8	0.7	7.7	29.3	2.9	5.0	

⁶ This question was not featured either in 1995 or 2013. In this particular case we retained the distinction between the two regions of Germany.

This table shows that the majority of people, when supplied with a range of identity categories, would not select nationality as their top choice. Generally, Europeans place their role in the family as the most significant, followed by their professional and gender roles.

The respondents' social identity is determined to the largest degree by categories whose potency lies in everyday life. Categories removed from everyday life contribute far less to one's identity. Merely 8 percent of the interviewees appear to be identified primarily via their nationality. Countries, however, exhibit great variability: in Finland, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia 10 percent or more chose the nation as their primary object of identification as opposed to the rest of the countries where this figure was considerably below 10 percent. The preeminence of the nation in identity formation appears quite small in Denmark, Lithuania, eastern Germany, Russia, and Sweden.

Hungary was no exception to this trend where family ties were strongly emphasized, along with regional belonging and professional identity. Surprisingly, however, age also featured here more than in other nations. Additionally, Hungarians ascribed more significance to ethnicity than to nationality. While almost no one mentioned national identity in the first place, ethnicity was the primary consideration among 8 percent of respondents. Russia exhibited a similar picture with a particularly high relative importance attached to ethnic identity (10 percent). The nation is not the exclusive platform on which a feeling of closeness rooted in spontaneous identification is centered. The neighborhood or district where a person grew up or is living forms the most immediate circle associated with security and familiarity. This is followed by a circle larger than the neighborhood but narrower than the nation: one's region. The broadest spatial reference of identity is the continent.

In the ISSP study the local, regional, national, and continental identity was assessed through answering one question (Figure 2.2). Respondents had to check, on a four-point scale, the degree of closeness felt toward their immediate region, their country, and their continent.⁷ The maximum closeness was marked with 1 and the minimum as 4.

⁷ The question was the following: How close do you feel to your town or city; your [country]; [COUNTRY]; [continent; e.g. Europe].

Figure 2.2. Local, regional, national, and continent-based identities, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)

We were interested in the degree of closeness depicted with the broadening circles of spontaneous identification within the European Union. The heights of the columns on Figure 2.3 show the distance reported by our respondents to feel toward their country and Europe, respectively. The higher the value of the column, the larger is distance felt toward the residence, their immediate region, their country, and their continent. Correspondingly, the closer the value, the smaller is the distance perceived toward these spaces of identity.

Figure 2.3. Spontaneous affective identification in Europe, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)

The most general characteristic of European societies is the powerful affective binding capacity of national identity indicated by the consistency of values between 0.6 and 0.8 on the 4-point scale. However intense are the processes of globalization and the European integration, the nation as a communal space and an identity-forging relation has not significantly faded over the past decades. This finding is supported by the lack of sizable shifts across the data recorded in 1995, 2003, and 2013. However, the two island nations, Great Britain and Ireland (lumped together in one group based on geography), display considerable divergence. In Ireland the sense of belonging is much stronger both on the local (0.9) and the national (1.7) levels than in Great Britain where we found a strikingly low value (2.0) in comparison to other European countries.

In contrast to the “nation,” Europe as a continental and cultural space shows a very weak spontaneous affective potential for identification. In the core countries, Northern and Southern Europe as well as in the Central European region, the perceived affiliation is of medium strength, while in Russia and Turkey an appreciable sense of distance was detected (2.3 and 2.4, respectively). Despite living in a country partially belonging to Europe, for Russia’s and Turkey’s residents, the continent appears remote in an affective and psychological sense (see Figure 2.3).

Furthermore, it is remarkable how removed, three years prior to Brexit, Great Britain’s residents felt toward the continent. This was hardly a fresh development. The surveys of 1995 and 2003 already indicated a similar trend, which we called the “island effect” (Csepi and Örkény 1998). In 1995 the figure for the perceived distance from Europe was 1.9, in 2003, it was 1.8. Through time-based comparison we detected another intriguing trend: as opposed to the Brits, the Irish and the Scandinavians grew increasingly close to Europe (for 1995: 1.7; for 2003: 1.5, and for 2013: 1.4).

Regional comparisons, however, tend to conceal the differences among individual countries. In every region some countries exhibited stronger national adherence than others as exemplified by Denmark, France, Iceland, and Norway. In contrast, the national ties are weaker than the average in countries like Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Portugal, and Spain displayed intense identification with Europe—compared to the average—while the figures for the Baltic states, especially Latvia, were low.

To conclude, in every region the national bond is the most powerful one. With the exception of Great Britain and Ireland, the distance felt toward Europe has leveled out among the EU member countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is remarkable considering that the 2003 data suggested that the EU

core countries showed the lowest level of spontaneous identification in contrast to the prospective EU countries, which were filled with hopes and positive sentiments. By 2013, apparently, the illusions about membership in a common Europe in Southern and Central Europe were shattered by the realities of belonging.

Within the elements of the national knowledge base, the ISSP survey also interrogated the criteria on which respondents relied to determine membership in the nation. In each country the survey intended to uncover the “substance” of national membership—who may or may not be considered part of the nation. Respondents ranked the relative degree of importance attributed to the following criteria: birthplace, citizenship, residence, native tongue, religion, the fundamental political and legal principles characteristic of the given country, a subjective sense of belonging and self-identification, and ethnic and national origins. For each criterion, they used a four-point scale. The more importance attributed to a component, the higher value was assigned to them on the scale.

On Figure 2.4 we present the data received in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey.

Figure 2.4. Criteria of national membership: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)⁸

⁸ The question was the following: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [Nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following are?”

As can be read off the chart, with the exception of religion and ethnic/national origins, each component was deemed quite significant for our respondents. In every country there were many who listed a number of criteria as simultaneously contributing to national membership. Requiring several criteria for such membership implies posing, intentionally or not, difficulties for those pursuing, for whatever reason, the goal of becoming part of the national community. The less criteria mentioned, the less exclusive their concept of nationality may be, since to meet fewer criteria is obviously easier than meeting many.

Citizenship, language proficiency, and the freedom of choosing one's identity ranked important in every country. Of the three-criteria, language proficiency (whether native or acquired) stood out as almost unanimously supported. The only exception was represented by Ireland where the majority did not consider this factor important.

With respect to the other components of national membership, however, interesting differences could be observed. Moving from West to East, religion and ethnic background appear to gain in relative significance. Owing to secularization, religion barely matters in the western region. Strikingly only 20 percent or less of respondents connected religion and national identity in Belgium, France, Finland, and Sweden. In Russia and Turkey, in contrast, a fairly large proportion of research subjects thought religious identity to be bound up with nationality (68 and 84 percent, respectively). A comparison over time threw a light on the conspicuous growth of religion's relevance between 1995 and 2013. Especially notable is the bump around 2003, which may be associated with a shift occurring in Russia's political outlook and the tightening of the nexus between the state and the Orthodox Church. Even more marked is the divergence between the "West" and the "East" of Europe with regard to ethnic descent. Again, moving eastward, ethnicity as a determinant of national identity and national boundaries matters increasingly. Yet our data do not indicate the total lack of ethnicity's importance in the western regions. Sweden is the only country to demonstrate a unanimous and extreme rejection of ethnic background as relevant to one's national membership. In the rest of the countries responses were divided with a generally moderate emphasis placed on this criterion.⁹

9 Curiously, back in 1995 researchers entirely refused to include this category, led by theoretical considerations. They did not even approve our proposal to place a question about the role of ethnicity on the ISSP questionnaire. But in 2003 and 2013 "descent" was readily accepted among the category choices, which, to our surprise, proved relevant in every single country, albeit to various degrees. This might be explained by the prevalence of the political concept of nation in the academic perspectives; few believed that essentialist national ideas had disappeared from contemporary views.

The “West” displays the opposite trend. Here political loyalty and the constitutional idea of citizenship plays a prominent role at the expense of religion and ethnicity. In France and Sweden, practically everyone appears to agree that belonging to the nation presupposes unconditional political loyalty. Compared to the other regions, respondents in the EU’s core countries and Scandinavia set less of an expectation for a person to have been born in the country to be considered a first-class citizen. A preference or dismissal of a person as would-be citizens based on their birth on the nation’s territory is a reliable predictor as to which regions of Europe would accept or reject refugees and migrants. The countries situated off the continent, such as Great Britain and Ireland, display a less inclusive mindset than the Western Europeans. Both one’s residence and birthplace ranked here as more significant than in the core countries and Scandinavia.

Since our respondents could not make sharp distinctions among the eight criteria as a whole, we attempted to uncover the relative differences with the help of a mathematical statistical procedure. The factor analysis brought three hidden dimensions to surface. The results are shown on Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5. The structure of national categorization in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (average of factor scores)

The first factor exhibits a response profile that excludes the criteria of religion and ethnic descent, while retaining all the other criteria as a whole without making distinctions among them. We see this pattern of thinking everywhere except in the Scandinavian region. The factors' values of the response profile that is sensitive to religion and descent vary widely across the regions. On the western and northern parts of Europe (including Great Britain) no considerable role was attributed to religion and descent. In the Mediterranean and Central European countries religion and descent mattered but only showed a moderate significance for national identity. In contrast, Russians and Turks stressed religion and descent as key aspects of national identity. The pattern of categorization ascribing a strong role to political loyalty is predominantly a Western European feature not present in the Southern and Central regions of the continent. Particularly heavy emphasis is placed on the relationship between political loyalty and national identity in France, Norway, and Sweden. In these countries support for political loyalty exceeds 90 percent.

Figure 2.6. Support for the significance of the eight criteria of national categorization in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (incidence of significant and highly significant choices, average of indices, max. value is 8).

We have examined how large or small was the group of criteria set up by our respondents for national identification. As we established earlier, exclusive national categorization implies that the group of preferred criteria is large, while an open and inclusive categorization signifies that the group of criteria required for national membership is small. The table shows the varying occurrence of the closed (exclusive) concept of nationality measured by the support of exclusionary categories (eight of them altogether) in the different regions of Europe (Figure 2.6).

Our data clearly indicates that the two concepts of nationality apply differently to the European regions. Although the difference is relative, one can observe that in the West the exclusive idea of nationality is less prevalent. Respondents here set up the least narrow range of criteria for national categorization. In the Eastern countries, on the other hand, less inclusiveness was displayed, especially in Russia and Turkey.

Spontaneous national identity implies a division of the human world into an in-group and an out-group. The primordial ethnocentric pattern of positive identification with the in-group (Sumner 1906) resurfaces as national pride among the citizens of the modern nation state. Such pride can be occasioned by various aspects of reality constructed by national existence. Ten such aspects of reality were listed in our questionnaire; our subjects had to determine the degree to which each aspect induced national pride in their own country. The questionnaire featured the following themes: democracy, equality, international influence, economy, culture, the army, history, human rights, social welfare programs, and sport (Smith 2009).

The mathematical statistical analysis of the responses indicated a bifurcation of themes stimulating national pride (Figure 2.7). The first group featured themes like: democracy, international influence, economy, social welfare programs, and the protection of minorities, all of which represent the values of modernity. The second group consisted of themes like: science, sports, the arts, the army, and history. The themes of the first group rest on empirically verifiable facts. People whose pride is centered on them can therefore refer to facts to justify their pride. The themes of the second group, on the other hand, offer “data” not based on empirical grounding. National pride built on them usually relies on others’ opinions and value judgments for support. Festinger (1954) has called this process “social comparison.”

The figure below shows the typical themes evoking pride and the extent to which respondents identified with them.

Figure 2.7. Ten sources of national pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)¹⁰

The trends are similar in the various regions. Pride in the nation is dominated by themes whose effectivity largely derives from social comparison rather than empirical facts. The sources of these themes include historical accomplishments, cultural and scientific achievements, and success in sports. We may also see that the themes linked to modernity's values and based on empirical facts (democracy, economy, political influence, welfare system, and minority rights) are treated very differently in the West and the East. In Southern and Central Europe and Russia they are less likely to evoke pride while the trend is the opposite in the West. Turkey is an exception, where themes related to modernization are quite popular—a fact reflective of the country's economic, political, and social welfare accomplishments over the past few decades.

Carrying out the analysis on the European countries' data bank, we see three prominent sets of themes (Figure 2.8.) The first group's themes are relevant to national pride such as science, sports, the arts, the army, and national history. The second group's themes relate to classic modernization such as economic capacities and global political influence, and the third group's themes are democracy, human rights and human welfare, all of which carry great significance in postmodern society.

¹⁰ The question was the following: "How proud are you of [Country] in each of the following? (Please, check one box on each line)"

Figure 2.8. Symbolic-narrative, modernizing, and postmodern themes of national pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)

The more one moves toward the West, the more one finds modern and postmodern themes as sources of national pride. Citizens in the Eastern regions are less likely to consider such accomplishments as their own, with Turkey representing the only exception where modernizing values enjoy considerable support in the population. Besides the differences among the regions, variations among those in the West are noteworthy as well. In the three western regions, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland stand out with the highest level of pride in achievements in modernization; Denmark, Finland, France, and Great Britain are quite a bit behind them. However, as regards national pride in themes tied up with postmodern values, the prominent countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland. All the other countries appear less interested in them. The Irish seem the least concerned with their country's modern and postmodern achievements.

Yet our analysis intimates that pride evoked by conventional symbolic themes is present in every region in equal measure.¹¹ It is interesting to note that the post-Soviet societies of Russia and Central Europe produced vast achievements in quite a few areas during the quarter century following the regime changes. However, these results, apparently, did not register in people's perception.

A deficit in national self-esteem may have many reasons. First, while the former Soviet zone's countries made progress, so did the other European countries that had never been affected by Soviet hegemony, leaving the gap between them unchanged. Another reason may be that capitalism has produced few winners and too many losers. These losers may not be enthused by the political and economic achievements of the post-communist era. For this group patriotic pride using symbolic, cultural, and traditional themes could serve as a time-honored means of deflecting tension built up through social frustration.

In Turkey, however, the recent decades have spawned an unparalleled economic upturn in tandem with the country's increasing political influence and broader social redistribution of wealth. This explains why the Turks' pride in modernization and traditional themes complement one another harmoniously. However, this contentment is not exempt from contradictions. National bias may have led the Turkish respondents to be proud of their democracy at a time—in 2013—when the rise of a dictatorship and the persecution of the Kurd minority may have been evident.

NATIONALISM: TYPES OF NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

Atop the pyramid of national knowledge base, one may see the ideological contents of the world's representation through a national prism, which enables people to imagine and experience "national self-centeredness" or national uniqueness. These contents are sustained by the affective and cognitive structures described earlier, present and operating in the consciousness of broad strata of the national society. The contents of national ideology, however, do not reach but a narrower social stratum since their acquisition rests on knowledge of the arts, history,

11 Even though in every country the values measured for symbolic-narrative pride were high, the exceedingly high values of Great Britain, Ireland and Iceland still surprised and intrigued us, providing yet another aspect to understanding the background and peculiar resources of the off-continent countries' national identity.

politics, economics, and sociology. Elevating the nation above universal humanity, nationalist ideology represents it as the carrier of special aesthetic, ethical, and mental values. Once absorbed into one's identity, nationalism affords a person—on the grounds of spontaneous national identification and fueled by national pride—to view themselves as superior to people belonging to other nations, irrespective of their individual talents and achievements. This “added value” granted by nationalism is available and effective in every situation when nations compete with each other. The Olympic Games, for instance, present such a situation where the victories bring glory not only to the winners but to their nation states. Wars waged between nation states likewise arouse nationalist emotions, through the fun house mirror in which one's own country appears superior and the nemesis inferior.

Drawing on the pyramid model of the national knowledge base, the following scale set up by Dekker and Malova (2003) serves to reveal the nationalist potential based on a series of statements that range from spontaneous national identity to nationalist identification.

Figure 2.9. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (aggregated average on a 5-point scale)

As argued earlier, the positive affective core of modern national identity is ethnocentrism, which classifies the human world according to the conceptual binary of in-group versus out-group (Smith 1993). On the ISSP survey's questionnaire, four

statements represented the ethnocentric antecedents of modern national identity. The respondents were asked to determine the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the content of each statement. Taking all the answers together, we set up a 5-point scale demonstrating the degree of general ethnocentrism observed in each country (see Figure 2.9).¹²

The highest values of ethnocentrism were found in Turkey and Russia; the lowest ones in the core countries and Central Europe of the EU. These differences are relative, however, since all the regions' citizens expressed ethnocentric sentiments. At least one half of the population in every European country, according to the figure above, approves ethnocentrism. Yet, as with the choice of criteria for national categorization, the similarities were larger than the differences across the regions. Therefore, once again, we attempted to uncover the relative differences. Drawing on our mathematical statistical procedure, we have created the main component that measures ethnocentrism, whose values for the different regions can be seen on Figure 2.10.

Figure 2.10. The relative weight of ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averaged factor scores)

¹² Ethnocentrism was measured with the following statements: “Rather be a citizen of [Country],” “World would be a better place if people were more like the [Country Nationality],” “[Country] is a better country than most other countries.” 5-point scales were used. The agreement scores of last items were reversed.

Within Europe, the ethnocentric approach to national community is the least present in the EU core countries and the south EU countries. Among the exceptions are EU countries outside the continent and north EU countries with relatively higher values of ethnocentrism. No less surprising is the relatively moderate presence of this attitude found in Central Europe, although it may be due to the conspicuously high levels measured in Russia and Turkey. The latter, especially, stands out with an extreme level of ethnocentrism. The question is, how did the intensity of this attitude changed over time? Figure 2.11 provides an answer.

Ethnocentrism may be seen as the unchanging tribal component of collective identity. We could not observe substantial fluctuations between 1995 and 2003 in any of the regions. When the countries are viewed separately, only Great Britain exhibits a moderate yet continuous rise, possibly forecasting the Brexit in 2016, while in Ireland the decline has persisted. Pride and ethnocentrism nourish the positive sentiments of national identity. Besides these, fears, uneasy sentiments, tragic experiences and traumas occur in the life of every nation, adding a darker tone to national identity. Some nations are more apt to resolve these issues than others.

Figure 2.11. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, 1995–2013 (aggregate averages on a 5-point scale)

In the survey, one question inquired about these negative sentiments asking respondents whether they felt ashamed of their respective countries. The resultant figures' breakdown is shown for individual countries since the contribution of regional context is negligible in this case (Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12. The incidence of shame toward one's nation in Europe, by countries, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)¹³

A cursory look at our data suggests that in European countries the feeling of shame is present in one's national identity. At least to a medium degree, in every country this controversial feeling is part of people's sense of belonging to the nation, although some countries are apparently more affected by shame than others where this feature is less characteristic. The Czech Republic tops the list with Croatia right behind it, which in turn is followed by Ireland, Sweden, three Baltic nations, and Great Britain. Citizens of Turkey, Switzerland, Hungary, and Germany appear to be less fraught with shame for their country.

Certainly, we would be hard pressed to find a nation whose history would offer no reason for shame. Crimes have been committed in every nation's past—some acknowledged, others swept under the rug. It is quite possible that the ratio of owned and disowned collective crimes would account for the degree to which shame is common or generally viewed as a legitimate sentiment.

¹³ "Things about [Country] feel ashamed"

It is of particular interest to observe on a timeline how in each country the sense of shame (or lack thereof) changed during a period of nearly a quarter century (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13. The incidence of shame felt about one's country in Europe in 1995, 2003, and 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

The most intriguing finding is that, with the exceptions of Russia and Hungary, the subjective sense of shame about one's nation rose in all the observed European countries between 1995 and 2003. The table shows that the Russians stood apart since the start of our study. In 1995 and 2003 they reported the highest levels of shame, which subsequently dropped to the average of the figures from European nations. It may be argued that shame among the Russian people became "normalized." In contrast, the Hungarians did not express a strong sense of shame at all. While the figures dwindled later, the shift was not too significant. In the majority of the countries, however, we see a trend of growing shame.

Underlying the fluctuations over time of the expression of shame, no corresponding increase or decrease of perpetrators could be found but rather a shift in the politics of national remembrance. In the twenty-first century, the majority of

Europe's countries reevaluated their histories, resulting in an enhanced awareness of morally reprehensible past acts and actors and, subsequently, the rehabilitation of victims with a focus on their grievances. The turn of memory politics that accounts for the rising trend in people expressing shame toward their country was associated with various deeds and victims: the colonial past in Great Britain, the Civil War in Spain, the ambiguous neutrality during World War Two in Sweden, or the amicable relationships sustained in Lithuania and Slovakia with Nazi Germany. In the same vein, national self-image in Ireland was tarnished by terrorism in Northern Ireland, while in Germany the revival of horrendous memories from the Nazi era could have aroused this crisis of national identity. Slovenia had to face the negative memories from the Yugoslav era, whereas the Hungarians have yet to undergo their own memory political turn. While Russians have had such a turn in remembrance, it will take a long time before they are able to reflect on their national past without controversial feelings (Bernhard and Kubik 2014).

Nationalist ideology is the next element of the national knowledge base. Earlier we discussed the segments of the pyramid-shaped knowledge base helping to uncover the national potential. We set out discussing the feeling of closeness toward one's country, then proceeded to address national categorization and analyzed the substance of national pride and ethnocentrism. Finally, as a counter test, we discussed the sentiment of national shame.

Exclusive national categorization, admiration for one's country, the absence of shame arising from historical guilt, and ethnocentrism do not necessarily amount to nationalism. It is only when ethnocentrism entirely pervades the community's life and functions as a systemic ideology to generate ideas about national existence, that one can claim the prevalence of nationalism. In such cases the political character of a country as a whole is defined by nationalism—from the economic to foreign and cultural policies.

Nationalism was quantified with reference to six statements in the ISSP investigations. Some of them measured its political manifestations such as the claim that "international organizations vindicate too much power vis-à-vis national governments, which should stand up for the nation's interests under all circumstances, even at the risk of conflicts." Other statements probed the economic facets of this ideology such as the claim that "domestic goods have to enjoy pride of place over foreign ones," "foreigners should be barred from purchasing land," or that "multinationals bankrupt domestic producers." Statements expressing

cultural nationalism included the imperative of airing domestic shows on television. All statements boiled down to the unconditional privileging of one's own country over others. The respondents had a 5-grade scale to mark the extent to which they did or did not agree with each claim. The values of support for particular claims measured in the European region can be seen on Figure 2.14, on 5-point scales.

The overall image of Europe shows that, irrespective of addressing political, economic or cultural issues, nationalism is present with more than medium-level intensity on the continent. The only comment to add is that economy-related nationalist views and political nationalism are slightly more popular than views about the cultural field where they were not put forward very forcefully.

Figure 2.14. Support for nationalist themes in Europe as a whole, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

The above figures lead us to conclude that nationalist beliefs about particular themes hinge on a latent nationalist disposition. Therefore, we devised a general aggregated nationalism index based on the six items, once again on a 5-point scale (see Figure 2.15). We assumed that the penetration of general nationalism would vary more markedly across different regions in 2013.

Figure 2.15. The intensity of nationalism in Europe measured by an aggregate index: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on 5-point scale)¹⁴

The figures suggest that, even though differences on nationalism can be detected between regions, it penetrates all of them, including Russia and Turkey at a level exceeding the 3.5 score average. It is well-known that the European Union was established to further the political and economic integration of its member states, which assumes a balance between national and European interests. This equilibrium may be jeopardized by the ubiquity of nationalism across Europe, whether it concerns economic issues, political power, national sovereignty or the cultural terrain.

Nationalism and the autonomy of national policies are comparatively less favored in the European Union's core countries and Scandinavia, a shade more so in Great Britain and the Mediterranean countries, whereas it is quite popular in Central Europe, Russia, and Turkey. The differences accurately reflect the diverse perspectives and strategies applied to current European conflicts.

¹⁴ The statements operationalizing nationalism were the following: "TV should prefer [Country] films and programs"; "[Country] should follow its own interests even if conflict results"; "International organizations are taking too much power from the government"; "Large international companies damage local business"; "Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [Country]"; "[Country] should limit import of foreign products"; "People should support country even if it is wrong."

Yet we cannot contend that the spread of nationalism in present-day European thinking and politics is the negative consequence of actual crises. A look at the period between 1995 and 2013 in terms of nationalism's penetration will convince the reader that it is a phenomenon deeply embedded in all the European societies (see Figure 2.16).

Figure 2.16. The penetration of nationalist thought in Europe: EU regions 1995, 2003, 2013 (averages on 5-point scale)

Figure 2.16 shows that nationalism has had a solid and continuous popular support in Europe over twenty-five years. Despite some fluctuation occurring in every region, stability has persisted. While the EU has been engaged in its enlargement, along making the national borders increasingly porous and establishing transnational cooperation in the economic, political, and cultural areas, the robust forces of nationalism have not disappeared.

Of course, the regional trends, once again, may conceal the more pronounced differences among the countries. Neither Russia nor Turkey are members of the European Union. In 2013 these countries exhibited the most susceptibility toward nationalist ideology scoring 3.6 support shown in Turkey. Support of nationalism

was found the highest among the all countries observed between 2002 and 2013, a slight decline can be seen. In 2013 in Hungary and Czech Republic, despite becoming member states of the EU, appear no less attracted to nationalism. The respective scores are 3.5 in the Czech Republic and 3.6 in Hungary. Croatia which became an EU member much later reached a core of 3.4 score. Also, surprisingly enough in France we founded extensive adherence to the nationalist thought (score 3.2).

Societies that gravitate the least toward nationalist ideology can be found in Germany (score 2.7), Norway (score 2.8), Sweden (score 2.6), Belgium (score 3.0), Iceland (score 3.1), and Denmark (score 3.2). For the sake of interest, we can mention that within Belgium, Brussels produced a somewhat lower score (2.9).

Nationalism is present in every country and may well be around in the future, too. The question is the extent of its penetration. Nationalism as a dominant ideology may fare especially well in countries that fall behind in the competition among nations; the underdogs will likely blame integration, globalization, and transnational economic, political and cultural forces for their failures. However, the struggle for transnational cooperation, economic, political, and cultural inclusion, on the one hand, and parochial nationalism, on the other, will last for a long time.

The positive emotional foundation of one's national identity rests on belonging to a group perceived to be familiar, close, and natural, whose power draws on endogenous and exogenous determinants. It is a sign of one's solid national identity if its positive foundations are formed, primarily, of endogenous determinants. If identification with the nation is fraught with complexes and insecurities, one's capacity to maintain positive sentiments will require reliance on external determinants. This, in turn, would result in a gap between the national in-group and the out-group.

Xenophobia is a powerful means of distancing oneself from the out-group. Through the looking glass of the negative image drawn of the out-group, the in-group gains superior valuation, thus becoming a refuge for those who are ridden by uncertainties. We measured the extent of xenophobia using nine statements. Some statements formulated pejorative judgments about strangers, in this case, immigrants. For example, associating them with crime, accusing them of taking away of jobs from the locals or posing a threat to the host culture. Other statements contained favorable judgments such as immigrants enrich the host culture, they bring economic benefits, and legal migrants must be integrated into the host country. Xenophobia could be inferred when the respondent agreed with the negative judgments and rejected the positive ones.

As to the extent of agreement and disagreement with particular statements in the entire European region, the overall image seems quite varied (see Figure 2.17).

Figure 2.17. The extent of agreement regarding migration and migrants in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey together, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

Opinions strikingly converged in disagreement with the statement that the quota of immigrants could be raised in the respondent's own country. As to the negative and positive statements, responses tended to diverge as reflected by the values in the medium range. There was relatively strong consensus on two other statements: one urging sanctions against illegal immigrants, and another—a positive one—underscoring the essential importance of providing equal educational opportunities for immigrant youths.

In comparing regions in terms of level of xenophobia, we can see that all are affected by it. In Western Europe, the hatred for strangers was somewhat more restrained, with the exception of Great Britain, where it reached virulent levels as early as 2013, possibly forecasting the Brexit that took place three years later. In contrast, in Southern European countries we found a relatively moderate level of aversion toward migrants despite the rise of immigration at the time. In Eastern Europe, Russia, and Turkey resistance to foreigners was considerable (Figure 2.18).

Figure 2.18. The strength of xenophobia's aggregated index in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

Beyond the regional differences, there are also differences among the countries. In Western Europe, xenophobia is higher than average in Belgium and Great Britain; in the north, Finland stands out with 50 percent. In the Southern European countries, the figures are markedly low, barely exceeding 40 percent. Moving to Eastern Europe, we measured values around 50 percent in the Baltic states as compared to 55 percent found in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and the considerably lower figures, 46 to 48 percent, measured in the Balkans.

As earlier in our study, it is worthwhile viewing the trends in a temporal dimension, as shown in Figure 2.19.

Retrospectively, from the perspective of the recent migration crisis, it is noteworthy that over the period between 2003 and 2013 xenophobia receded in all the regions of Europe. This trend was most marked in the South and Central Europe, but the decrease occurred also in the EU's core countries, including Great Britain and Russia.

The reasons for the change in public opinion are not the same in the West as in the East. The outpouring of anti-immigrant sentiments in the West may have

been tempered by the continuous and, at the time seemingly successful, economic immigration; the contribution of newcomers to the economic achievements of the host countries, and the more or less effective integration processes. In the East a gradual shift in attitude toward inclusion and acceptance brought on by multi- faceted intercultural interactions could be witnessed.

Figure 2.19. The strength of xenophobia's aggregated index in Europe in a temporal dimension in the EU regions, 1995, 2003, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

Arguably, the migrant wave of 2015 cut deeply into this encouraging process. Due to its suddenness, predictability, sheer size, and dramatized treatment by the media, the arrival of refugees in Europe caused a shock effect among the population of numerous countries. In some groups all over Europe, the event provoked fear, insecurity, suspicion, and plain rejection exacerbated by the tragic terror attacks committed by extremist Islamists. Particularly powerful was the xenophobic reaction in Central Europe fueled by moral panic.

In 2013 xenophobia was relatively low in a number of countries such as Ireland, Iceland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, with the level of immigrant rejection fluctuating between scores 2.6 and 2.8.

The results received in response to questions on migration made it possible for us to not only observe the level of general resistance to strangers but to investigate each of the multiple narratives concerning migrants. One set of questions presented a collection of common stereotypes related to immigration (for example, “they take away our jobs,” “they spur crime,” “they erode our culture,” or “they do not bring economic benefits”). The other set of questions focused on the political aspects of immigration (for example, “illegal immigration has to be stemmed,” “the quota of immigrants needs to be reduced,” and “integration should not be pushed”). The horizontal line on Figure 2.20 shows the level of xenophobia taken together the results from all statements concerning immigration. The left columns show agreement with negative stereotypes; the right columns show the agreements with the statements aimed to exclude or reduce migration in policy level.

We have found that in the Eastern European region including Russia and Turkey the level of xenophobia is conspicuously high, reinforced primarily by the negative stereotypes. The tendency is just the opposite in Western Europe, where the weight of general xenophobia is lower, while agreement with the restriction of migration by political means is stronger.

Figure 2.20. The strength of the aggregated index regarding general xenophobia, including adherence to collective stereotypes about immigrants and the support of anti-immigrant policies in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

Our earlier claim is thus corroborated, according to which xenophobic sentiments are not related immigration policies but are produced by factors such as psychological detachment, the incitement to collective fear, cultural dominance, and moral panic. On the basis of these results we can argue that the cognitive structure of the anti-migration attitude is different in the Western and the Eastern part of Europe. The resistance to migration is more pragmatic and empirical in Western Europe, while in Eastern Europe the xenophobia is much more detached from everyday experience, mediatized, and rooted in emotional responses.

Conventional research on xenophobia tends to concentrate on attitudes of discrimination and rejection. The ISSP survey went beyond these to formulate a number of questions about acceptance and inclusion, too. Thus, we had the opportunity to compare the frequency of our respondents' approval of positive versus negative statements in the different regions. Our factor analysis carried out on the full range of statements offers a sharp image of the relative differences discerned among the regions, as seen on Figure 2.21.

Figure 2.21. The factor structure of agreement with statements concerning the acceptance of migrants in Europe: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (averages of factor scores)

In the EU's core countries, and especially in the Scandinavian and the Southern European region, agreement with positive claims clearly prevails, while agreement with the negative ones is much less common. Almost a negative mirror image of this is presented by Central Europe, Russia and Turkey where, compared to the West, negative statements were more popular. Russian and Turkish respondents, in particular, had a hard time identifying with statements of acceptance and inclusion of immigrants.

A significantly lower level of xenophobia was measured in Western European societies than in those located East of them. Yet in the West, we detected also a distinct expectation from migrants to assimilate (Figure 2.22). A sizable proportion of respondents agreed with the claim that "those who fail to appropriate fully our county's culture and traditions cannot become first class citizens." This idea found few followers in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 2.22. Standard deviation of viewpoints concerning immigrants' assimilation versus letting immigrants preserve their customs: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (percentages)

We may say that the sentiment of rejecting the "other" is observable both in Western and Eastern parts of Europe, but reactions are different. In the East overt xenophobia that denies assimilation prevails, whereas in the West the rejection is covered up by the imperative of assimilation.

THE EXPLANATORY MODELS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

In the following section of our analysis we will attempt to reconstruct the building up and functioning of a nationalist belief system as a process. In doing so, we will employ the path-model of linear regression. This method enables us to illuminate particular social psychological mechanisms in terms of their impact on the formation of nationalism, as they are grafted on one another in accordance with our pyramid model discussed earlier.

In unveiling the paths to nationalism, we will investigate the manner in which the most important variables of the national knowledge base are connected to one another (Figure 2.23). If nationalism is the dependent variable, the models show the effects of the independent variables on the formation of nationalism. The list of independent variables is as follows: a person's spontaneous national identity; exclusionary or narrow national categorization, symbolic or modern justification of national pride, ethnocentrism and, finally, xenophobic sentiments.

Figure 2.23. Nationalism's path-model of linear regression¹⁵ in the EU countries, ISSP 2013¹⁶

¹⁵ Path analysis is a complex regression model. The outlined models show to what degree various sociological and attitudinal factors can explain level of nationalism. "Explanation" refers to the strength of the tie between two variables, while its degree is indicated by the arrows linking different boxes. These figures are the beta values of regression, their signs indicate the direction of the relationship: the positive sign indicates that the two variables move in identical directions, while the negative sign indicates opposite directions. Path analysis allows us to see how independent variables affect the dependent variable directly and through other variables, as well as the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Explanation: This Figure exhibits the relationships that either strengthen or weaken the penetration of nationalism in Europe. The arrows signify the positive or negative direction of the relationship, depending on the sign in front of the figures, which in turn indicate the strength of the relationships. We may distinguish between direct and indirect factors accounting for the intensity of nationalism. In case of the former the arrows represent a direct connection to the explanation of nationalism, while in the latter the arrows exert their influence on nationalism's intensity indirectly, through mediating factors.

As to the direct effects, this figure shows that almost every element of the national knowledge base has an immediate effect on nationalism. The strongest impact is produced by xenophobia and ethnocentrism. The more adamantly someone scorns and excludes aliens from the national community, and the more someone values his/her own nation over others, the more he/she will identify with the content of nationalist ideologies.

An instructive outcome of our application of the path model is that national pride built on the themes of modern societal development precludes the appearance of nationalism and negatively correlates with nationalistic beliefs. Accordingly, the antidote to nationalism may be found in a scenario where people take pride in their country's democratic polity, affluence, and equality. However, when pride in modern societal values is coupled with ethnocentrism (indirect effect), the former becomes a supportive cognitive background to nationalist ideology.

The symbolic/narrative pride associated with the country's past, culture, language, and history directly contribute to the potency of nationalism. But even here there is an opposite path: when pride is grounded in modernization and is free of ethnocentrism (indirect path), it may just as well lead to the eschewing of nationalism as a systemic and system-justifying belief.

The exclusive national categorization is another critical cognitive aspect of, and background to, nationalist ideas. It is a direct effect but, when paired up with ethnocentrism and xenophobia, it adds even more to one's investment in nationalism.

A final yet crucial point gleaned from our analysis is that emotional attachment to one's nation and love for the homeland does not inevitably produce a nationalist. If we refuse to exclude others from the national community merely for being born in another land, lacking proficiency in our language, and having ancestors that look

16 In the ISSP survey of 2003 not all of the countries (Norway, Germany, Slovakia, Russia, Turkey were missing) were represented.

different from our own, and if we shun xenophobia and ethnocentrism in our affection toward our country, we may still end up happy members of the national community, unencumbered by the ideology of nationalism. Perhaps this sums up best what patriotism and patriotic attachment to the national idea means.

The individual countries' and regions' path models do not offer significantly different explanatory schemes for nationalism. The affective and cognitive background of this ideology seems universally valid in all of the Union's countries.

In order to control our finding, we examined the cases of Turkey and Russia to detect the difference between these two countries, on the one hand, and the EU countries, on the other, in terms of their paths leading to nationalism (Figures 2.24. and 2.25).

In Russia's case, we found a striking deviation of ethnocentrism exceeding xenophobia contributing to the explanation of nationalism's intensity. The former's beta value of 0.30 and the latter's of 0.20 suggests that the penetration of nationalism in Russia derives foremost from overvaluing itself while undervaluing other countries, rather than from the lesser factor of excluding or including aliens. Neither does pride have a direct explanatory force whether concerning the country's modernizing achievements or the symbolic narrative stature of the Russian people, except when pride is linked with ethnocentrism. The cognitive psychological allure of Russian nationalism thus lies predominantly in its ethnocentrism (Thompson 2000).

Figure 2.24. The path-model of linear regression for Russian nationalism, 2013

Interestingly, the two types of national pride are far more closely related here, meaning that the symbiosis of the double profile of pride is stronger than in the case of European countries. Furthermore, the role of spontaneous emotional attachment is appreciably more separate from the cognitive space fueling nationalism in Russian society. Furthermore, there is no direct link between exclusive ideas of the nation and nationalist ideologies.

Figure 2.25. The path-model of linear regression for Turkish nationalism, 2013

The explanatory space of Turkish nationalism resembles the pattern of the EU countries more than the Russian one, albeit with some unique features of its own. As regards the spread of nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and the nation's exclusive idea seem to play a similar role as in Europe. But the Turks' pride in their nation is unrelated to their version of nationalism—whether the former is rooted in the country's modernizing accomplishments or its symbolic/narrative aspects. And in Turkey—like elsewhere—spontaneous emotional attachment cannot be linked to nationalist thoughts, neither is it tied up with xenophobia, which was characteristic of Europe.

TYPES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Whereas path-models display the structure of national identity and the variables determining nationalism as its end point, nothing can be uncovered about as to how a population is divided in terms of their national identity, if relying on these models only. To answer this question, we have conducted a cluster analysis relying on variables employed in the path-model.

Cluster analysis made on the European countries' samples was helpful in identifying four groups whose members show marked differences along the variables determining national identity. Combining all the samples we found that the members of the second most frequent group (28 percent) gave responses suggestive of a robust nationalist ideology in all the dimensions of our cluster analysis. Therefore, we have tagged this group as *radical nationalists*. The second group—the smallest one in our sample—has received the label *ordinary nationalists* (15 percent). For this type, national identity, more than anything, is a taken-for-granted relationship, subject to temporary mobilization by extreme situations (for example, war, terrorist attacks or outstanding sports achievements). The third rather large group came across as what we have called *moderate nationalists* (31 percent). This group cannot be defined as excessively nationalist, ethnocentric or xenophobic either. Yet they take considerable pride in their nation both for modernizing achievements and symbolic/narrative themes. Although considering themselves part of the national community, they only listed a narrow set of requirements for “others” to become citizens. The fourth significant type has been called *illiberal nationalists* (25 percent). The primary difference between them and the radical nationalists is their dependence on symbolic themes for their pride in the nation. Also, this group is not made up of committed ethnocentrists. Yet they strongly adhere to nationalist and xenophobic ideas and are closely attached to their home country.

The specific groups displayed characteristic configurations across the European regions (Figure 2.26).

The percentage of illiberal nationalists can be seen to rise steeply as we move across the map from west to east and from north to south, demonstrating the contemporary validity of Szűcs's classic theory (1983). The other finding that corroborates this is the steep drop of moderate nationalists' share in the countries from north to south and from west to east.

Figure 2.26. Types of national identity in the EU regions, regional distribution of clusters, 2003 (percentages)

Ordinary nationalism, which is immune to nationalist ideology, is least prevalent in the Eastern European countries. The most intriguing outcome on this figure is the radical nationalists' presence, albeit not as a dominant group, in the whole of Europe, irrespective of the region. Even though our data goes back to 2003, it can be read as a forecast of later developments, like Brexit and the ascending trend of Islamophobia in Western Europe.

The overall picture barely alters with the inclusion of Russia and Turkey into our analysis (Figure 2.27). In the light of what transpired more recently, it is hardly surprising to observe the surge of radical nationalism in Turkey. In Russia, the presence of ordinary nationalists is quite conspicuous, albeit their percentage might have decreased since the 2013 data collection, as indicated by the already significant share of the illiberal nationalist group in that year.

Figure 2.27. Types of national identity in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey, regional distribution of clusters, 2003 (percentages)

EUROPEAN VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITY

The key issue of the European unification process lies in the EU's ability to offer such powerful integration and European identity for the citizens of its member states as to compete with their national identities rooted, as they are, in centuries of political and historical traditions. In this section of our discussion we will attempt to find out more about the current state of the progress toward a shared European consciousness. In which group of countries has a more-or-less tangible European identity formed? Have the countries' relationships to Europe changed over the past decade? Presently this problem is gaining in importance, following the challenges and crises of the past years. The financial meltdown of 2008, the crisis in Greece, the quandary about migration, and Brexit have all eroded the EU's political system and, along with it, the idea of a shared European polity and community of values.

The history of the EU may be described as an expanding and ever more complex process of unification. Initially, integration occurred in security policy, the economy, and the markets, which subsequently led to the next phase of political cooperation.

Political integration brought forward the need to define the Union as a political community, which implied that the members of this ever-enlarging organization should think through the actual content of belonging. As an inevitable consequence of this process, re-evaluating the member states' political legal status and their inter-relationships became urgent. As did the imperatives to clarify the legal and social norms ensuring the cohesion of the community, draft the European constitution, and elaborate the idea of a European identity (Deflem and Pampel 1996). The latter problem has become of paramount significance. Over the past few decades, unification proceeded largely on the grounds of geopolitical realities, the political will of individual governments, and the interests of nation states. But the "confederation" thus created cannot do without the active support of the citizens of the EU countries and a broad-based social and political legitimacy.⁹

For the EU citizens, the increasing tangle of concerns raises the question ever more pressingly: what will guarantee their security, well-being, and the preservation of their political values? Moreover, what role may national politics play in achieving common European solutions?

Figure 2.28. Support for the EU in the member states, measured by three questions 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)

From the onset, the ISSP research on national identity focused heavily on the in-depth exploration of the contextual aspects of the European Union. Due to the constraints of the research, the scope the questions addressed was limited, yet in all the three survey periods, three cardinal questions were repeatedly posed on the questionnaire (Figure 2.28):

- “In your opinion, the EU membership is advantageous or disadvantageous to your country?”
- “Do you believe that your country’s government has to abide by the decisions made by the Union even when it disagrees with them?”
- “Do you think that the EU should have a) quite a bit more, b) more, c) less or d) quite a bit less power than the governments of its member states?”

Public opinion in the surveyed countries showed great variance in their reply as to whether the EU is advantageous or disadvantageous for their country. France stands out with its positivity on the issue (unfortunately, Germany was not surveyed on this question in 2013); likewise, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, and Iceland displayed an optimistic climate. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Hungary, Latvia, and Finland, however, seemed more skeptical. The picture offered by the off-continent EU member states was mixed: respondents in Ireland were quite positive, while in Great Britain they appeared highly critical toward the Union.

Far smaller differences were detected among the countries in regard to the approval of common EU decisions and the EU’s leverage. The averages of the opinions in each country concentrated in the middle range. Great Britain again was slightly negative concerning acceptance of the decisions of the EU.

The statement stressing the confederal attitude was found the far more rejected one among all respondents. The respondents in Lithuania, Belgium and Slovenia were found relatedly positive concerning the confederal attitude, while Great Britain, Ireland, Czech Republic and Denmark were against.

We compiled the answers to the EU-related questions in order to identify types. The cluster analysis allowed us to distinguish between four profiles as shown on Figure 2.29.

Figure 2.29. Cluster typology concerning the EU's support in the EU region, 2013 (percentages)

The proportion of those favoring by all means the EU membership and an increased leverage of Union policies is high, predominantly, in the core countries and Scandinavia, amounting to one third of all the respondents. At the opposite end are the EU skeptics whose share is less than one fourth of the respondents in all the regions. The exception is Great Britain where the public opinion is remarkably polarized. We should add that the share of Central Europe's skeptics comes close to one fourth. Noteworthy is the large percentage of those emphasizing the EU's benefits among the non-continental EU countries (40 percent), which may be attributed to Ireland. In the Mediterranean and Central European region, the relative majority would favor a larger decision-making power assigned to the Union. This by no means should be taken as evident, considering that since 2015 this issue has been provoking fierce objection from those who worry about national sovereignty in Central Europe.

A glance at individual countries allowed us to discern the following notable differences (Table 2.4): Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, and Spain stand out as the most supportive EU countries as opposed to the Czech Republic and Great Britain showing the highest degree of Euroscepticism. Hungary is well below the average. Great Britain and Ireland represent contrasting views about the Union. In 2013, the skeptics made up 45 percent in Britain and merely 15 percent in Ireland. Every other person in Ireland deems the EU beneficial.

Table 2.4. Cluster typology concerning the EU's support in 15 of its member states in 2013 (percentages)

Country	EU support in all respects (high value)	Following EU decisions (high value)	Attributing benefits to EU membership (high value)	EU support in all respects (low value)	All
Belgium	36.5	30	23.3	10.2	100.0
Croatia	13.6	34.6	23.3	28.5	100.0
Czech Republic	15.4	29.8	19.5	35.4	100.0
Denmark	40.7	17.0	21.7	20.6	100.0
Finland	16.5	34.7	20.6	28.1	100.0
France	28.6	18.2	38.2	15.0	100.0
Great Britain	10.6	18.2	26.2	45.1	100.0
Hungary	21.6	53.7	6.0	18.7	100.0
Iceland	40.0	1.3	58.7	0.0	100.0
Latvia	12.6	25.5	35.1	26.8	100.0
Lithuania	22.9	25.5	42.1	9.5	100.0
Portugal	20.6	36.2	21.8	21.4	100.0
Slovenia	22.8	37.2	24.1	15.9	100.0
Spain	30.1	33.2	17.9	18.9	100.0

After setting up a scale to measure the degree of general support and skepticism for the EU based on the three statements, we obtained figures clearly suggestive of a pervasive uncertainty regarding the EU in the European public mind (Figure 2.30). None of the regions' average value reaches the middle point of the scale, indicating a fundamental ambivalence and relative skepticism across the board. Especially small is Great Britain's value on the scale, which, presumably, reflects the country's general attitude, as compared to the already mentioned highly positive perspective among the Irish citizens of the EU.

Figure 2.30. The aggregated index of the EU's support, 2013 (index averages of the regions)

Figure 2.31. The aggregate index of EU's support, 2003 and 2013 (averages of the regional indices)

The evaluation of the overall picture offered by the 2013 data becomes more refined if compared with data collected in the 2003 survey. The most crucial insight gained from the comparison is that the Europeans' weary and critical standpoint regarding the EU is far from being a recent development. It has accelerated throughout all Europe over the past 10 years, except in the Scandinavian countries (Figure 2.31).

Finally, let us explore the connections between our respondents' support for the EU and their patriotic sentiments, especially, their nationalism. The linear regression path-model below depicts support for the EU as an end point and the various determinations by factors such as spontaneous affective attachment to Europe, exclusive national categorization, national pride justified by modernizing or symbolic/narrative themes, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and nationalism (Figure 2.32).

Support for the European Union is influenced by two, largely unrelated, cognitive patterns. First, and rather surprisingly, the sense of closeness to Europe has the greatest immediate impact on one's support of the EU. The larger this variable is, the more we can anticipate the formation of a more robust EU-based identity. Second, a sense of closeness to Europe directly tempers xenophobia fed by nationalist isolation and ethnocentrism, which then turns into support for the EU.

Figure 2.32. The linear regression path-models of the EU's member countries

The other cognitive pattern is linked with the penetration of nationalism. The stronger respondents identify with nationalist ideas, the less they approve of European integration. Underlying nationalism one can detect all the cognitive factors countering the European integration that lead to the espousal of nationalist ideas, such as an ethnocentric perspective, exclusive national categorization, and the affective rejection of the EU.

Only xenophobia connects the two factors. The isolationist national attitude would by necessity refuse the acceptance and inclusion of foreigners, immigrants or refugees, as this would be incongruent with the shared European values and the affective charge of European-ness. However, when people are unaffected by the traditional, exclusive, culturally unitary, historicizing, and nativist concept of the nation superimposing its interests above and beyond others, they are culturally open and have an attendant sense of belonging to what Europe represents. Intrinsic to the above is the sentiment that one is simultaneously a member of the national and the European community. This is what the dual legal status of national and EU citizenship represents and is the true meaning of a common supranational identity.

The Europe-wide migrant and refugee crisis of 2015 therefore holds special significance. If it has intensified xenophobia in Europe, as indicated by recent research studies, and encouraged traditional nationalist political pursuits, as witnessed in Western and Central European states a year later, the legitimacy of European integration may be severely tarnished. Along with it, we might expect a decline in the recognition of shared interests as well as the solidity of a common European identity and a sense of belonging.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the comparative research studies conducted in European countries on national and European identity show the influence exerted by the historically formed regional position of particular countries on the frequency of patterns of national identification. Our data has indicated the persistent validity of Szűcs's (1983) theory about the three historical regions of the continent. Yet we also witness the emergence, tentative and slow as it may be, of a minority in the member states' societies that is able and willing to relinquish the symbolic rewards of nationalism and readily support the integration of EU members. This offers some hope that the regional differences in Europe will eventually fade. The examples of Turkey and Russia suggest, however, that the schism between countries within and without the EU will continue to persist.

CHAPTER 3.

ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS
IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CRISIS
AND XENOPHOBIA

Presently, the European Union is undergoing the most severe crisis of its existence. The history of the EU's past sixty years has brought about an unprecedented era of democracy and prosperity on the continent. It is the first time that generations have lived without experiencing the horrors of wars, and a growing number of countries came together around the ideal of cooperation and realizing common interests as successfully as possible. And while the EU has had its rough patches, such as the economic meltdown of 2008, with the exception of the Greek crisis, joint political efforts could effectively manage them.

Paradoxically, the EU's first globally serious crisis was set off, not by the breakdown of the integration's internal system, but by a challenge coming, essentially, from outside, the migration wave beginning in 2015. As it became evident, the dramatic events of 2015 did not simply pose the challenge of accommodating the refugees and migrants, but they brought to the surface some serious internal problems as well.

Only a few of them will be mentioned here. The first fundamentally important set of issues concerns areas which initially were less problematic, including: the protection of the EU's borders, uniform border patrolling, the registration of asylum seekers, the fair treatment of asylum applications, the distribution of resources, and the provision of broad-based humanitarian assistance. Other areas were even more problematic, like inadequate collaboration among the member states, all-pervasive mutual distrust, disunity precluding common solutions, political hostilities and suspicions. The crisis further highlighted the weakness and ineffectiveness of the EU's power structure and governance, specifically Brussels's inability to make decisions and to enforce them when finally pushed through. Clearly the EU lacks political institutions and executive bodies to manage a crisis situation such as the one in 2015. And such crises may occur at any time and on any number of issues in the future. Political and institutional problems have undermined the very idea of a United Europe. Born to overcome the traditional concept of nation states premised upon division and hostility, the vision of a United Europe has been increasingly problematized by selfish, nationalist populist schemes of member states. Such self-seeking and self-interested policies forced onto the others are shattering the faith in a modern European community of values transcending the nation state and people are questioning fundamental values like freedom, the union, democracy, universal human rights, solidarity, tolerance and mutual acceptance, trust, cooperation, and self-limitation. As a result of these processes, even

in less extreme political quarters, the concept of a looser, confederative Europe grounded in the principle of solid national sovereignty is gaining adherents who are opposed to the idea of supranational integration. Moreover, in a number of European countries, extreme nationalist and chauvinist populist parties are flexing their muscles, powering a public discourse no longer free of authoritarianism and expressions of prejudice like cultural superiority, *kulturkampf*, racism, antisemitism, homophobia, and islamophobia (Altemeyer 1981).

The crisis set off by the 2015 migration wave thus directly influences peoples' everyday behaviors, their common culture, and interpersonal relationships. The most aggravating consequence of the recent developments possibly is that in several EU countries the moral disarray eroding political and ethical values reaches the deepest layers of society as well as ordinary human relationships. A kind of resentment, antipathy, or hatred filled with envy of others have become widely recognizable, along with vindictiveness, aggression, and discrimination. Many tend to blame external causes, usually other people, for the way they themselves fare in the world and their misfortunes. Instead of cultivating self-esteem and self-confidence, they fabricate enemies to explain or justify their plight. Refugees and economic migrants, the "aliens," are ideally suited to embody this enemy.

It is questionable whether the new, shared, and inclusive European value system founded on tolerance can offer an alternative to this resentment; and whether it is merely the current crisis—the breakdown of the moral framework and the moral panic sprouting from it—that is responsible for the cultural tensions prevailing in so many countries of the region. Had the success of political and economic unification obliterated the less than model features of everyday mentality in Europe? Or, alternately, could the ever broadening European integration—successfully encompassing, besides the economy, services, and capital, the labor force, competences, personal career options and the cultural field—have brought forward a wider and more profound political socialization affecting hundreds of millions, the essential outcome of which would be the citizen-consciousness of the European Union?

This question may be of particular interest to professionals and intellectuals whose job is closely linked to the next generation's education and political socialization. If we agree that the European Union is more than a project to improve the life of people, that it involves a common European mindset and identity, the success of the European Union depends on the extent that this mindset and iden-

tity is shared by the younger generations. But then, what are the regressive forces that might impede the formation of a common European language, culture, and identity?

This is the question we wish to address in our study by presenting the findings of two empirical research projects (Group Focused Enmity and International Social Survey Program). These projects preceded the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis by a few years. This may leave the reader dissatisfied considering how the 2015 events have shifted attitudes towards aliens in various European countries, and how these events have affected our European-ness and respective national identities (EP 2015; Wike, Stokes, and Simmons 2016). The elapsed time, however, allowed us to explore people's views about "aliens" and immigrants in a considerably less tension-filled and panic-stricken era. This ties in with our larger concern, beyond xenophobia, to the broad sociological determinants and the cognitive and affective patterns of thinking that shape everyday attitudes towards migrants.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the interest of a more accurate interpretation of our findings, our theoretical framework needs to be laid out. We must clarify the notion of alien (or stranger) and how to theorize the often-experienced phenomenon of xenophobia. In his seminal essay "The Stranger" Alfred Schuetz suggested that, from a social philosophical perspective, the stranger as a concept gains its meaning in the context of the comfort of one's own group (Schuetz 1944). In general terms, this boils down to the fact that we all belong to a group from the moment of our birth, whether it is a family, a smaller community or a larger societal group. The taken-for-granted nature of our own group is evident for all the members. We know and understand each other, and this mutual understanding appears to be naturally given. We share a language and a culture. We belong together, and solidarity binds us. Our perceptions are sufficiently coherent, clear, and consistent. As Schuetz has wittily put it, being part of a group provides us with recipes in every walk of our lives as to how we should behave, think, and form our individual self and identity.

Strangers stand at the opposite pole. They come from somewhere else; they are not one of us. We don't know them, and we fear the unfamiliar, so we are afraid

of strangers. Our thoughts are filled with uncertainty and frustration. When meeting a stranger, we lack the shared code of understanding. Our ignorance of the unfamiliar makes us prone to develop incoherent ideas, and we cut them short by not caring to comprehend the stranger. Habitual and spontaneous cultural patterns do not work in our relationship with them. We lack the tried and tested recipes to guide us in connecting with them and no experiences are available for such recipes.

All of the above affect the strangers' predicament, too. Lacking access to the behavioral patterns, language, and culture of the host group, they tend to remain outsiders, continuously swaying from standing apart to being comfortably inside. Hesitant and insecure, they will treat their hosts with suspicion, since the hosts appear to be strangers from their stance.

For the individual—the host and the newcomer alike—the encounter with strangers and, through them, with another culture represents a peculiar psychological and sociological situation replete with suspicion, anxiety, communicational barriers, and conflicted interests. This unique situation determined by an amalgam of proximity and distance inevitably entails a sense of estrangement felt on both sides and conflicts arising from it.

However, the relationship between a stranger and their host is shaped by more than the contradiction inherent in the objective situation they both find themselves in or its personal psychological effects. The collective norms of the groups are no less significant. Thus, it is necessary to introduce another essential theoretical pillar, the rejection of groups (Zick et al. 2008). As we proceed from the individual to the group in studying the stranger and the host, we may discern a primary inter-group hostility premised upon cultural differences and mutual inter-group rejection. As we mentioned by way of Schuetz's theory, personal psychological factors may account for this hostility. But behind this hostility we may discern a more general mechanism which justifies using the term syndrome, first described by a group of researchers led by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002).

According to their theory it is common for the more powerful groups in a society to devalue and discriminate against the less powerful ones, which is an effect of the systemic ideology of cultural inequalities. This ideology overtly aims to maintain a hierarchy among groups. The risks imagined by the majority group associated with the cultural or civilizational condition, the different culture and language, the economic "uselessness" of the minority group and the effort to

minimize those risks, offer the justification for discriminating against them. The prejudices targeting various outer groups (or out-groups) thus cohere into an interconnected mental scheme and attitude, which comprises xenophobia, or more generally a prejudiced mentality as a collective sentiment.

The theoretical background of the GFE research project integrated all the relevant social psychology theories explaining prejudice against small social groups. The theory of Adorno and his colleagues on the authoritarian personality, developed and empirically tested in the 1940s, was our point of departure (Adorno et al. 1950). Complementing this theory, Rokeach (1960) related authoritarianism to a closed “dogmatic” personality style. Hostility against groups, however, is a complex problem prevalent in societies that cannot successfully manage the political, cultural, and social integration of their minorities. Social entropy-resistance (Gellner 1983) leads to discrimination against, and rejection of, minorities by majority members who monopolize economic, political, and cultural power. As a result, the hostilities aimed at specific groups of people are integrated into the dominant ideology rationalizing unfair and inequitable inter-group relations and blaming or scapegoating the various ethnic, religious, and cultural groups for the ills of society.

Xenophobia thus may be a political or an ideological construct, mediatized public discourse, or an everyday sentiment. The rejected group may not belong to a specific ethnicity or religion; any strangers can be victimized. Xenophobia may appear in tandem with prejudice, racism, and cultural exclusion. It may be motivated by insecurity, frustration, fear of the unknown, and a sense of being threatened. It also may be rooted in prejudice against, and hatred for, the “other.” The hostilities may be ignited by moral panic, which is a mediatized response to a menace felt to shatter the foundations of the social order and the general value system favoring the majority (Kitzinger 2000). Moral panics are characterized by broad-based social involvement, contagiousness, and a clash between the morally “good” and the “bad” (Cohen 2002).

THE EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN XENOPHOBIA AND PREJUDICE [GFE-SYNDROME]

In sociological research, xenophobia may be viewed either as a social phenomenon and attitude, or a litmus test for a prejudiced mindset. Usually, xenophobia is equated by sociologists with negative attitudes towards migrant groups, especially concerning delinquency, sexual assaults, and fear of loss of jobs. (Bernáth et al. 2015; Messing and Ságvári 2016). Since the stranger is difficult to define as a group, each research project builds on a different definition, employs a different apparatus for measurement, and produces different results. This makes their comparison difficult, but the modes of operationalization used in these studies are suitable for the valid testing of relationships concerning xenophobia. In terms of operationalization, xenophobia as a subjective feeling is not a dual variable category (unlike complete rejection or complete acceptance) but a position marked on an infinite scale between complete rejection and complete acceptance. The interpretations of the measurements for xenophobia may also be quite diverse. It may be:

- a personality characteristic involving fear of the “other,” groups of “others” and strangeness in general (Schuetz 1944);
- a social psychological symptom expressing frustration, insecurity, distrust, a sense of threat or negative inter-group sentiments (Tajfel 1971);
- a sociologically determined sentiment such as status anxiety, dissatisfaction, self-interestedness, or clinging to the benefits of the social welfare system (welfare chauvinism) (Habermas 1996);
- moral panic (broad social involvement, rapid spread, moral collision) (Cohen 2002);
- finally, a culturally determined ideological occurrence serving to rationalize the social system, maintain existing inequalities and the regime of dominance, authoritarianism, social and cultural superiority, distance, disdain for the weak, and political estrangement (GFE syndrome).

In the course of the GFE research¹ in 2008 we measured the mechanisms of rejecting groups in a number of dimensions. Among them were attitudes toward

¹ See <https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1587786>.

immigrants, but we also probed attitudes toward Muslims, Blacks, Jews, homosexuals, the homeless, and people living with disabilities. On the basis of our data we will confine our study to comparing the intensity of xenophobia with that of racism,² antisemitism,³ and homophobia⁴ in various countries. In each case, the individual dimensions were measured by aggregating the answers given to several questions, which produced our indices. On a four-point scale the indices measure the level of rejection towards the four groups. High values signify highly negative mental states.

Let us proceed to discuss how the intensity of rejecting these groups varied across the eight European countries of our study in 2008 (Figure 3.1). The figures exhibit both general trends and regional as well as country-based specificities. Our first and most striking finding is that, to a smaller or larger degree, all of the indicated groups were subject to rejection in every country of our investigation. The extent of rejection, however, varied according to the country and the group in question (Örkény and Váradi 2010).

For the Europeans, racist views were the least attractive, whereas the penetration of xenophobia and homophobia appeared quite high. The prevalence of xenophobia came as less of a surprise to us, since the process of immigration and the attendant tensions and conflicts in the economy, the labor market, the social and cultural life have been, albeit to varying degrees, part of Europe's shared realities for several decades. What startled us was the very high incidence of homophobia, only traceable to possible cultural (religious) and ideological motives and prejudice.

2 The original items were the following: "There exists a natural hierarchy between white and black people." "Some ethnic groups' members are more talented than the members of other groups." "Some cultures are superior to others beyond question." "We need to protect our own culture from the influence of others." "It's better if blacks and whites do not marry each other."

3 The original items were the following: "Jews usually don't care about anybody and anything except their own kind." "Jews have too much influence in Hungary." "Jews enrich our culture." "Jews nowadays try to take advantage of being the victims of Nazism in the past." "Israel's politics helps me understand why people dislike the Jews." "Israel wages a genocidal war against the Palestinians."

4 "Marriage of two women or two men should be legal." "There is nothing immoral about homosexuality."

Figure 3.1. The level of rejection of (or prejudice against) four groups by country, GFE data, 2008 (averages on a 4-point scale)

Sorted by region, Eastern European countries' data reveal outstanding affinity with anti-Semitic and homophobic attitudes, even as xenophobia, too, appears quite prevalent. In Western Europe, however, the relative vigor of anti-immigrant views exceeds that of the other three GE-indicators. This seems to confirm the theoretical assumption concerning the mechanism of group rejection affecting people's mindset in a general way in Europe's countries, irrespective of the specific group being targeted. Yet there are differences among the countries and regions in terms of the level of disdain for minority and oppressed groups. Clearly, in Western Europe, anti-immigrant and, to a slightly lesser degree, homophobic sentiments, drive the GFE-mechanism. In eastern and southern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Portugal) the population spurns all minority groups.

One may contend that the rejection of any minority group pivots on a uniform scheme of thinking cohering into an overarching prejudiced attitude that, in turn, mobilizes attitudes toward minorities.⁵ Variations in the individual countries derive from the specific group provoking most powerfully the configuration of prejudiced thinking. In Great Britain and Germany, xenophobia and racism predominate the configuration, while homophobia is of secondary significance. In

⁵ We conducted a factor analysis in order to uncover the common latent background of the four indices. A 50 percent overlap was indicated between the four variables.

contrast, the prejudiced mindset in France, Poland, and Hungary depends less on the syndrome of repudiating groups as such; prejudice in these countries extends to immigrants, Jews, and black Africans. In Poland, homophobia and prejudicial thinking strongly correlate. The smallest correlation was observed in the Netherlands and Portugal between a prejudiced mindset and general repudiation of marginalized groups, although in their respective cases, the connection between immigration and racism was stronger. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the shared space of group rejection and the strength of connections between its types.

Figure 3.2. The correlation matrix of group rejection (prejudice) in the shared space of the countries surveyed*, GFE data, 2008

In addition to studying the intensity of rejecting oppressed groups and the interrelation of these intensities, the GFE project offered a splendid opportunity to study the cognitive and affective mechanisms that would strengthen or weaken expressions of xenophobia in Europe. In attempting to explain the discrimination against, and rejection of, immigrants, we see that this attitude does not stand by itself but forms part of a cognitive space whose distinctive feature is the rigid rejection of some groups as “others.” Among the cognitive background variables we examined

* The figures indicate how each type of group rejection (prejudice) correlates with all the others (correlational coefficients of pairs)

the contribution of (1) authoritarianism,⁶ (2) social dominance,⁷ (3) political alienation, (4) belief in social justice, (5) a sense of threat,⁸ (6) lack of social trust,⁹ (7) lack of security, and (8) maintaining social distance toward migrants. The first four factors lend themselves to be interpreted as the ideological effects of collective societal patterns of thought and shared norms, whereas the latter four may be seen as rooted in personality psychology. In the GFE project each dimension was measured with standard questions, of which indices were produced via aggregation. In Table 3.1 we present an explanatory model where xenophobia is tested with the help of the above listed affective and cognitive variables; a linear regression model explains each country separately.

Table 3.1. The linear regression model explaining xenophobia*, with attitudes as variables, itemized for countries, GFE data, 2008 (regression beta-values and the models' explanatory power)

	France	The Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Portugal	Poland	Great Britain	Hungary
Belief in social justice	-0.022	0.014	0.019	-0.010	0.131	0.014	0.051	0.039
Lack of security	0.046	0.094	0.154	0.038	0.054	0.159	-0.040	0.040
Political alienation	0.057	0.102	0.086	0.064	0.049	0.066	0.192	0.130
Social dominance	0.073	0.186	0.151	0.191	0.142	0.170	0.132	0.165
Social trust	-0.094	-0.120	0.061	0.047	-0.120	-0.051	-0.087	-0.047
Social distance	0.179	0.083	0.032	0.123	0.119	0.187	0.171	0.166
Authoritarianism	0.309	0.179	0.330	0.278	0.160	0.225	0.194	0.116
Sense of threat	0.368	0.331	0.346	0.340	0.372	0.260	0.343	0.317
Adjusted R square	0.567	0.506	0.583	0.544	0.408	0.321	0.587	0.284

* Dependent variable: xenophobia measured across countries (the aggregate index of respondents' agreement with the listed items).

6 The original items were as follows: "In order to maintain law and order, we should be tougher on the trouble-makers." "Schools should teach discipline, first and foremost." "Capital punishment should be restored." "The country needs a truly powerful leader who would dismiss the parliament and the results of referendums."

7 "Every group should be given equal opportunity in life." "We have to do our best to eliminate inequities between groups." "Members of the lower classes (groups) should stay where they are." "There should be a reason why certain groups are on top of the social ladder, while others at the bottom."

8 The original questions were the following: "Are you the kind of person who deems important to live in a safe environment?" "Are you someone who believes it important that the government protect you from all threats?"

9 The original questions were the following: "In your opinion, could people be trusted in general or, on the contrary, we can't be sufficiently precautious with others?" "Do you feel people in general take advantage of you when they have a chance or, on the contrary, they do their best to act honestly?"

The cognitive, value-based, and personality psychological model of explanation offers numerous interesting findings. The first is the high explanatory power of the models (adjusted *R* square). This corroborates the previously mentioned observation that xenophobia, in every country (perhaps least so in Hungary and Poland), is deeply embedded in the assemblage of social ideologies, collective norms, and people's tension-filled social sentiments. Most of all, aversion toward strangers is amplified by social ties fueled by authoritarianism and attitudes of social dominance (SDI), which implies the approval of, and identification with, the principle of hierarchy of various groups. But, with the exception of a few countries, distance from, and disillusion with, politics may also galvanize xenophobic attitudes. All of the above point to the ideological grounding of antipathy toward strangers.

Common social sentiments (for example, fear, a sense of threat, distrust, lack of security, and distance felt toward strangers and other minorities) also need to be taken into account in making sense of xenophobia. The main reason for presenting Table 3.1 is to demonstrate the presence of common social psychological states in all countries. These were social dominance, authoritarianism and sense of threat. From the point of view of GFE syndrome these states can be considered as the most powerful ones throughout Europe as a background of "othering" in negative terms. Variations across countries as results of the test of significance indicate are not negligible in terms of personal psychological states that induce it. Distrust is prevalent mostly in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and France. Lack of security is an important variable predominantly in Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland—but only in Germany does a feeling of distance toward migrants not imply their rejection. Lacking enough empirical background to explain country differences we could have only speculated about them.

Overall, the data confirms the conclusions drawn in the relevant literature and other research projects: sympathy with authoritarianism (Kurthen, Bergmann, and Erb 1997), social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and moral panic (Cohen 2002), as well as a personal sense of threat (Haekwon and Sundstrom 2014) are the leading components of the cognitive and affective embeddedness of xenophobia. Earlier and recent research have both emphasized, however, that the interest motive and assumed or real existential anxieties play lesser or no role at all in the rejection of immigrants. To test this, we examined in another explanatory model of the impact exerted by the respondents' sociodemographic profile, income level, personal satisfaction with their social status, political orientation, and religiosity on

their possible xenophobic sentiments. We also studied the role of migration in the respondents' family history in shaping their views about migrants.

Table 3.2. The linear regression model of explanation for xenophobia,* with the inclusion of the respondents' sociodemographic profile, by country, GFE data, 2008 (regression *beta*-values and the model's explanatory power)

	France	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Portugal	Poland	Great Britain	Hungary
Age	0,144	0,093	0,141	0,198	0,071	0,203	0,215	-0,046
Gender	0,083	-0,012	-0,093	0,049	-0,058	-0,066	-0,061	-0,006
Highest educational attainment	-0,091	-0,244	-0,216	-0,187	-0,280	-0,237	-0,216	-0,165
Household income	0,052	-0,127	-0,150	-0,079	-0,233	-0,232	-0,016	-0,104
Employment	0,061	0,095	-0,155	0,009	-0,005	0,058	-0,054	-0,085
Unemployment	-0,012	-0,053	0,048	-0,050	0,026	0,134	0,028	-0,058
Immigrant background	-0,171	-0,016	0,039	0,021	-0,066	-0,018	0,022	-0,035
Subjective status	-0,082	-0,128	-0,054	-0,157	-0,004	0,085	0,047	-0,202
Political orientation (left vs. right)	0,202	0,306	0,288	0,277	0,048	0,065	0,209	0,121
Religiosity	0,181	0,113	-0,017	0,121	0,169	0,036	0,131	-0,050
Adjusted R-square	0,181	0,307	0,314	0,225	0,290	0,268	0,232	0,146

* Dependent variable: xenophobia measured by country (the aggregate index of agreement with the items).

The most noteworthy outcome was that in every country the models' explanatory power is a great deal smaller than what we found in regard to the cognitive and affective effects. Several issues affecting individuals' everyday life and circumstances show no correlation at all with the intensity of xenophobia. However, as far as social status is concerned, we may state that, with the exception of France, low educational level and modest family income are likely to increase the individuals' rejection of aliens and immigrants. Except for Hungary and Portugal, older people were more inclined to feel xenophobic in the examined countries—a finding likely not unrelated to devout religiosity and strong religious faith resisting the acceptance of immigrants. Yet it may seem odd that in Poland, despite ranking as the most religious country in terms of day-to-day devotion to faith, no connection could

be detected between religiosity and the rejection of strangers. In the model country of secularization, France, however, the opposite was the case! The subjective perception of one's social status, more specifically, dissatisfaction with it and the attendant frustration led to xenophobia only in four countries: France, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Italy. All these conclusions are based on the results of test of significance shown in Table 3.2.

Two quite intriguing correlations emerged from our data. First, a family or personal history of migration exhibited neither negative, nor positive impact on our respondents' attitude toward immigrants, a finding applicable to all countries except France, where one's migrant status significantly decreased the respondents' rejection of newcomers. Elsewhere the data may conceal the common insight about one's immigrant past producing potentially opposite feelings: either solidarity with those having arrived later or their rejection induced by status anxiety and competition. Second, we observed a significant effect traceable to the rise of extreme attitudes on the political landscape. In the majority of European countries this appears to considerably animate hatred toward newcomers. However, in Portugal and Poland such an effect could not be detected. The intense religiosity of the population may account for it in the former case, and the so called "social factor" measured with the level of unemployment in the latter.

Taking all of this into account, the results of GFE research on xenophobia partially support the common argument that, in terms of cognitive modernization, the difference between the western and eastern parts of Europe is best described with a slope (Szűcs 1983) meaning that people in the less developed eastern (and southern) countries are far more prejudiced against "others" —such as immigrants, religious or ethnic minorities, underprivileged and marginalized groups.

THE EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN XENOPHOBIA AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

One of the most essential group affiliations related to views, concepts and biases toward strangers is national membership. The complex thoughts and sentiments about the nation and national membership, on a collective and individual level, are intricately connected to sentiments and views about strangers. Moving beyond the previously examined sociological and social psychological explanations of xenophobia as a particular manifestation of rejecting groups, we will take a look at the correlations between the national context, the cognitive and affective background of identifying with the nation, on the one hand, and the everyday attitudes toward strangers, on the other hand.

Comparative international studies such as the ISSP series conducted in 1995, 2003, and 2013¹⁰ pointed to a very distinct cognitive East-West slope regarding national identity, presenting yet another reason why the divergence of xenophobia's patterns in western and central Europe needs to be examined in the context of national identification. The ISSP studies explored the various patterns of national identity from the perspective of membership in one's group. And in an approach similar to the GFE research they also interrogated majority stereotypes (positive and negative) of migrants. Figure 3.3 exhibits each country's average value on the xenophobia scale based on four questions.¹¹

The advanced western European countries demonstrated relative openness toward immigrants, yet we found no reason for celebration since even in the least rejecting countries our xenophobia index showed just below the average value. The populations of former socialist countries displayed intense antipathy toward migrants. In the West, tolerance was coupled with aggressive assimilationism targeting internal ethnic minorities—a trend exemplified by France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark in particular. In contrast, xenophobia in the East did not involve any assimilationist strategies. Underlying this dissimilarity, various sociological and social psychological processes could be at work. Western Europe championing multiculturalism as their prominent post-material political value has been the goal

10 See <http://www.issp.org/>.

11 Xenophobia was assessed with the help of six statements. Some of them formulated negative judgments about strangers (immigrants), for example, associating them with crime and loss of jobs as opposed to others stating that immigrants enrich our culture and are economically profitable. Xenophobia was identified with the respondent's acceptance of negative and dismissal of positive statements.

of mounting waves of immigration. In several states in the region, the massive migrations generated structural xenophobia traceable to resultant social tensions and cultural clashes. And even though tolerance of otherness is an officially sanctioned value, the masses of newcomers were at times met with passionate opposition or inflated expectations to assimilate. The eastern European version of xenophobia operates according to a different logic. Migration is not an actual challenge yet; the number of migrants is small. However, the national revival in the aftermath of the regime change, along with an intensifying search for collective identity, took place within the framework of cultural uniformity. Strangers could only be perceived as disturbing this process of identity work. Therefore, the small groups of immigrants were treated with suspicion, and divergence from the majority was often brutally rejected. Even the assimilation of the nation's ethnic minorities has been a contested goal.

Figure 3.3. The intensity of anti-immigrant attitudes in fifteen countries, ISSP data, 2003 (averages on a 5-point scale)

Beyond Europe's historical, developmental, geopolitical, and cultural fault lines and their impact on attitudes towards immigrants, the above discussion suggests a complicated relationship between national identity and xenophobia. If our point of departure is that the nation and national cohesion play a special role in people's sense of comfort within their groups, we may presume that a closed and

homogenizing national ideology is inevitably and invariably hostile and discriminatory (Dovidio et al. 2010). But may the national cohesion independent of the specific values by which a nation constitutes itself and the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individual's firm ties to their nation? The ISSP research series have offered excellent empirical material to probe this assumption, inquiring into numerous cognitive aspects of everyday national identity such as:

- the categorization scheme of national membership, meaning its exclusive or inclusive nature;
- the various types of national pride:
 - ▮ based on the relevance of modernizing values including the country's economic achievements, political influence, the effectiveness of the social welfare system, and the protection of human rights;
 - ▮ embracing mainly symbolic sources of pride like the nation's past historical achievements, culture, language, artistic, scientific and sports successes;
- national ethnocentrism;
- proactive economic, political, and cultural nationalism;
- forced cultural and minority assimilation.

The following apparently complicated analytic model shows the extent to which the listed components of national consciousness and unrelated differences traceable to one's country as a variable explain the intensity of xenophobia in Europe and the advanced overseas countries (Table 3.3). For the sake of better comprehension, the factors showing strong correlation with xenophobia's intensity are printed in bold type.

When the everyday affective consciousness of a nation is predominated by one-sided prioritization of its economic interests, the exaggerated protection of its national sovereignty, and a belief in its cultural superiority over other nations, ethnocentrism and chauvinism, it all leads to the insulation of the national community, ethnic and cultural homogeneity, the forced assimilation of minorities, and a wholesale ban on immigration. Aspects of these behaviors could be recognized in the background of the extreme hostility experienced by migrants in eastern Europe (Wagner et al. 2010). This result came as no surprise to us.

Table 3.3. The logistic regression model* explaining revulsion toward immigrants in 23 countries, within the cognitive and affective relational space of national identity, ISSP data, 2003

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Immigrants' proportion	−0,528	0,093	320,078	1	0,000	0,590
Exclusive categorization	0,158	0,014	1300,877	1	0,000	10,171
Pride in modernizing achievements	−0,524	0,032	2610,560	1	0,000	0,592
Pride in symbolic entities	0,031	0,029	10,142	1	0,285	10,032
Ethnocentrism	0,223	0,031	510,220	1	0,000	10,250
Nationalism	0,603	0,026	5450,949	1	0,000	10,828
Forced assimilation	0,667	0,026	6400,523	1	0,000	10,948
Countries Ref: Finland			9250,785	22	0,000	
Australia	−10,785	0,130	1880,400	1	0,000	0,168
Austria	0,250	0,145	20,978	1	0,084	10,284
Bulgaria	−0,102	0,159	0,411	1	0,521	0,903
Canada	−10,452	0,155	870,719	1	0,000	0,234
Czech Republic	10,273	0,167	580,174	1	0,000	30,571
Denmark	−0,679	0,137	240,393	1	0,000	0,507
France	−0,440	0,136	100,503	1	0,001	0,644
Germany	0,321	0,142	50,087	1	0,024	10,378
Great Britain	−0,047	0,148	0,103	1	0,749	0,954
Hungary	0,912	0,146	380,898	1	0,000	20,490
Ireland	−0,085	0,136	0,387	1	0,534	0,919
Latvia	0,260	0,147	30,150	1	0,076	10,297
Norway	−0,205	0,129	20,535	1	0,111	0,815
Poland	0,013	0,139	0,009	1	0,924	10,013
Portugal	−0,924	0,131	500,027	1	0,000	0,397
Russia	0,527	0,132	150,980	1	0,000	10,694
Slovakia	0,220	0,141	20,416	1	0,120	10,246
Slovenia	0,260	0,131	30,922	1	0,048	10,296
Spain	−0,856	0,131	420,418	1	0,000	0,425
Switzerland	−0,314	0,166	30,590	1	0,058	0,731
USA	−0,539	0,128	170,630	1	0,000	0,583
Constant	−0,902	0,134	450,338	1	0,000	0,406

* The dependent variable is the aggregate variable of xenophobia; the Wald statistic equals the square of the ratio of *beta* value (B) and standard error (S.E.).

More intriguing was the link found between pride in one's nation and xenophobia. As long as a shared history, national myths, symbolic national consciousness, language, and culture constitute exclusively the source of such pride, strangers are not likely to be welcomed. But if the concept of the nation and national pride draws on modern communal values, economic achievements, overall welfare, social solidarity, political openness, rule of law, and the acknowledgement of minority rights, then the idea of national community has a whole new meaning. This kind of national sentiment implies openness toward migrants, inclusivity and tolerance, possibly preparing the ground for a fresh way of conceptualizing the nation. Thus, welcoming or excluding national attitudes towards immigrants are not predetermined but rather they pivot on the nation state's policies and the values to which a national community commits itself, as exemplified by several western European countries.

The economic, political, and cultural climate of individual countries, nevertheless, continues to considerably play a role in the acceptance of immigrants. Australia, Canada, the United States, Sweden, Spain, France, Denmark, and Portugal belong to the more welcoming part of the world—in contrast with Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the numerous smaller eastern European countries that joined the EU relatively recently. Viewing migrants with fear and suspicion, these states abstain from accommodating them. Germany represents a unique case with its more advanced western region (coinciding with the territory of the former Federal Republic) open toward immigrants and people coming from other cultures, while the eastern parts (corresponding to the former GDR's territory) remain pervasively unkind toward strangers. Even before the crisis, this scenario accurately foreshadowed the political conflicts of Germany in 2015 along with the rising popularity of the right populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) and the Pegida movement.

The data listed above offers empirical support for our hypothesis stating that the traditional ethnic and culture-based concepts of nationality and nationalism would by necessity promote xenophobia in politics and society at large. The ultimate characteristic of a nationalist worldview rooted in an inflexible and overheated affiliation with the group one belongs to is the rebuttal of diversity, insulation, and advocacy for ethnic and religious uniformity. This inevitably precludes the acceptance of others, the recognition of minorities, and, the principle of ethnic, cultural, and religious pluralism that facilitates accommodating the stranger in

a national society. The idea of ethnicized communities appropriated for state polity, moreover, exerts an unfavorable influence on the entire society, counters globalization, and the often controversial yet unescapable trend of multiculturalism. Not only is this state of affairs calamitous for being discriminatory against, and degrading toward, the newcomer born to another culture but also for harming the long-term economic, social, demographic and welfare interests of the countries involved.

Our results demonstrate the existence of an alternative to this concept of nationhood. One could envision a modern approach to the national idea and shared national identity resting on an entirely different foundation of values and evolving from broad-based societal negotiations of interests and collaboration. Moreover, it would imply a version of patriotism that transcends the all-exclusive national self-interest and self-centeredness. Ulrich Beck (2006) has called this idea cosmopolitan nationalism and Jürgen Habermas (1998) has theorized it via the concept of constitutional patriotism.

The re-thinking of nationhood in the twenty-first century is not a sufficient prerequisite for creating a successful and dynamic Europe on the basis of cross-national cooperation—one that is also open, inclusive, and culturally diverse. More profound structural and social psychological changes will be necessary for it to become reality.

Fear of the “other” is deeply ingrained in people’s everyday sentiments, and in this manner strangers and other minorities are held at bay, in the entrenched political and social ideologies and norms hailing to xenophobia. Instinctive fear of strangers, the motive of self-interest that drives people’s behavior; real or alleged existential anxiety or the breakdown of habitual cultural patterns vis-à-vis strangers are no less crucial components of xenophobia than sheer hostilities focused on subordinate groups and the dominant ideologies justifying unequal inter-group relations and collective scapegoating.

Even though Europe has set the goal of an unprecedented broad-based cultural integration on the grounds of ever-growing cultural diversity, in our daily lives the cultural fault lines do not simply fail to fade but allow for more and more conflicts to erupt. New and proliferating fault lines are coming to the surface between various religious and ethnic groups, cultures, and between traditional nationhood and the European idea. There is an upsurge of autocratic tendencies alongside “illiberal” politics and displays of prejudice, racism, chauvinism, cultural dominance

and religious intolerance. In a few eastern European countries, notably in Hungary, the government has systematically and aggressively stirred up emotions against immigrants and refugees. They have deployed strategies like an anti-immigrant billboard campaign, faux “national consultations,” unilateral severe border restrictions, a referendum against immigrant quotas, and hate speech directed against migrants. The government has been working to demonize strangers, intentionally confusing them with terrorists, criminals, and rapists. As a result, an increasing segment of the population—who is insecure and frustrated, has likely never met a migrant, is mistrustful about their language and culture, and is fearful of the unfamiliar—is growing hateful and entirely rejecting of migrants and refugees, and is even prone to aggressive outbursts against them. Presently, it seems easier for Europe to focus on maximizing efficiency instead of reconciling diverse cultures, a problem dramatically highlighted by the 2015 crisis.

THE EXTREME MANIFESTATIONS OF HOSTILITY TOWARD MINORITY GROUPS IN EUROPE

A wave of millions of migrants set out for Europe in the spring of 2015, and this widely reactivated the existing xenophobia in European countries. It increased suspicion and aversion in every country (albeit to varying degrees) and radicalized people’s views toward immigration and refugees, in particular due to the simultaneous escalation of fundamentalist Islam terrorism. Islamophobia and extreme anti-Arab sentiments flared up in conjunction with growing numbers of atrocities committed against strangers. In parallel, religious intolerance became more intense as anti-immigrant political parties gained traction in several countries. This may be explained in part by strategy of some political leaders and movements to mix terrorism with migration, and migrants and refugees with terrorists. For sociologists testing the intensity of this political and media influence on people’s everyday mindset poses a great challenge. Indirectly, however, we are able to assess it via analyzing the GFE research data gleaned at a time period long preceding the migrant wave and the widespread sense of threat in Europe triggered by terrorist attacks. This data reflects the penetration of radically adverse attitudes toward minority and other groups deviating from mainstream culture.

The East-West differences of extreme xenophobia and prejudice are accurately represented in the context of attitudes toward the four groups. In the original survey four choices to questions were given to the respondents: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” By separating the respondents who had strongly agreed with the listed items in the four group relations (xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, and homophobia), we could generate a measurement tool similar to DEREK.¹² As each of the four types of prejudice was tested with the help of several questions, of which the individual indices were then aggregated, we considered a respondent’s thinking “extreme” if they preferred the extreme “4” as an answer to the majority of the questions for each type of prejudice. On Figure 3.4 the proportion of extreme responses is displayed regarding the four themes of group rejection.

At the end of the 2000s Hungary was in the lead to demonstrate intense hostility toward strangers with close to one fourth of respondents sternly rejecting and unfavorably viewing migrants. Great Britain followed, exhibiting relatively extreme attitudes with close to one-fifth of respondents firmly repudiating immigrants.

Figure 3.4. The intensity of extreme repudiation of groups (prejudice) by country, GFE data, 2008 (percentages)

12 On the DEREK index see http://derexindex.eu/About_DEREX. For discussion in Hungarian see Juhász, Krekó and Molnár (2014).

In Germany and France, the corresponding numbers were merely one tenth, and were even less in the Netherlands and Portugal. Surprisingly, not even in Poland did we detect a large number of people displaying adverse sentiments toward strangers. The Polish example, however, is significant for its stunningly high percentage of homophobes (42 percent). In the other three relations extremist attitudes occur in relatively low (antisemitism and racism) or quite low (immigrants) proportions.

Hungary stands out with the high number of extreme views regarding all but one group relation (racism). This pattern of prejudice is unparalleled in the rest of the examined European countries and does not bode well for the penetration of extremism directed at any kind of otherness (Csepeli and Prazsák 2015).

In the other European countries, the proportion of full-scale rejection of groups does not appear too large, remaining mostly below ten percent. Merely a few cases stand out as exceptions such as the already mentioned anti-immigrant sentiments in Great Britain and Italy, homophobia in Poland and, once again, Great Britain and Italy.

We may conclude that, unlike the generally rather intense penetration of prejudiced thinking in Europe in 2008 (cf. Figure 3.1), expression of extreme attitudes was not particularly predominant at the time (with the exception of Hungary and, concerning homophobia, a few other countries). In some segments of society radical and heightened prejudice was already perceptible but was not permeating the majority of society.

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND FEAR OF FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM TERRORISM IN EUROPE

In addition to the general pattern of xenophobia studied thus far, it is important to address a sub-case, Islamophobia, which at present poses a major problem on the European landscape. In the contemporary European public opinion, the complex issue of Muslim terrorism has far reaching historical background. Most important, however, are the recent Western interferences into the politics of the Islamic countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, and expulsion of Palestinians) that triggered extreme actions on behalf the frustrated members of Muslim fundamentalist sects.

Owing to the fast-paced migration from Muslim-majority countries to Europe, Islamic faith and its adherents raise anxiety within the host populations. Members of the non-Muslim majority regard Muslim immigrants with fear and apprehension, accusing them of terrorist sympathies, unequal treatment of women, and religious intolerance. Patterns of Islamophobia vary from country to country but do share a few traits in common. We hypothesized that differences across the countries would depend on factors like the size of the Muslim minority and the foreign-born ethnic population, the country's socioeconomic conditions, people's living standards and subjective well-being, and, the extent of xenophobia and the prevalence of ideologies targeting minority groups and justifying unequal inter-group relations. There is no doubt that Islamophobia is gaining influence in contemporary Europe. In our analysis, we will point out that the antecedents of current Islamophobia are embedded, as a syndrome of a group focused enmity, in the deep recesses of common European consciousness. As a consequence of the accelerating Muslim immigration, the minorities appearing as Muslims are subjected to unfair treatment and discrimination in the European Union states. Islamophobia thus represents the newest form of group focused enmity in Europe.

The masses of Muslim immigrants cannot find a melting pot in Europe, since the national populations are not sufficiently receptive to integrating newcomers with cultural backgrounds alien to their Greek-Judeo-Christian culture. Neither do the Muslims appear entirely willing to assimilate the values and norms of Western civilization. The Muslims are ready to assimilate in terms of language usage and work culture, but they are unwilling to give up their religion. It is possible to envision that, due to immigration, the conflicts Huntington has termed the "fault line wars" will find their way into Europe. Mass and social media portray terrorist events in a manner producing distress in the public.

The 2008 GFE-research assessing hostilities toward minority groups presented eleven statements that, somewhat foreshadowing the present-day events, proved suitable to measure negative attitudes and anxieties surrounding Islam as well as those triggered by the terrorist threat. Table 3.4 displays reactions to the eleven statements, by country; the percentage of respondents' agreement is marked.

In every country, negative sentiments induced by cultural otherness came across vividly. Consternation about fundamentalist terrorism is intensely present everywhere as well. Yet it is noteworthy that strong fears do not inevitably entail the condemnation of the Muslim minority.

Table 3.4. Negative attitudes toward, and fears of Islam in Europe, GFE-data, 2008 (percentages)

	France	The Netherlands	Poland	Hungary	Great Britain	Germany	Italy	Portugal	All
Many Muslims celebrate Muslim terrorists as heroes	—	29	30	40	38	28	29	30	23
The majority of Muslims regard Islamist terrorism righteous	22	19	26	30	26	17	22	22	17
I'm worried about Islamist attacks to happen in my home country	44	38	48	48	57	52	49	61	48
I'm worried that me or members of my family will become victims of terrorism	35	17	41	46	42	29	26	58	32
Muslim culture does not fit into Europe	54	61	81	70	61	83	73	50	63
Muslim men's treatment of women is antithetical with our values	76	78	72	77	82	76	82	72	73
Intolerance is the essence of the Islam faith	50	47	62	53	47	43	61	62	62
Muslims living in Europe demand too much	47	52	62	60	50	54	65	34	50
Way too many Muslims live in Europe	31	42	47	61	45	46	50	27	38
I don't like Muslims	17	25	78	79	39	35	53	52	51
Wearing hijab should be banned	86	45	33	18	43	47	54	41	43

In order to uncover the latent relationships underlying the responses to the eleven statements, we employed a variety of methods. One of them helped us show the interconnections of statements in a multidimensional space. Figure 3.5 shows that the Muslim culture theme is separate from all the other ones. Another “concentration” encompasses the themes of religious intolerance and the unequal treatment of women, which is associated with the accusation of Muslims “demanding too much.” We find fear of terrorism, part of which flows from anxieties about the massive Muslim expansion, removed from these themes.

Figure 3.5. Concentration of the various themes in a multidimensional space

In order to reveal the hypothetical latent structure of the linkages between and underlying the themes, we conducted a factor analysis in hopes that the analysis of the various items would provide us a key to a more profound understanding of anti-Islam attitudes. Table 3.5 depicts the organization of two latent structures that emerged in the course of the analysis.

Table 3.5. Two patterns of Islamophobia, the items' fitting with the dimensions (analysis of principal component)

	General cultur-ally motivated refusal of Islam	Fear and feel-ing threatened by Islam
I'm worried about Islamist attacks to happen in my home country	0.143	0.893
I'm worried that me or members of my family will become victims of terrorism	0.096	0.909
Muslim culture fits into Europe	-0.563	-0.128
Muslim men's treatment of women is antithetical with our values	0.604	-0.133
Muslims living in Europe demand too much	0.756	0.25
Way too many Muslims live in Europe	0.661	0.376
Many Muslims celebrate Muslim terrorists as heroes	0.302	0.221
Intolerance is the essence of the Islamic faith	0.711	0.107

Figure 3.6. Two patterns of Islamophobia in eight European countries, GFE data, 2008 (factor score averages)

By applying the method of principal component analysis, we distinguished two separate patterns. The first pattern is comprised of statements referring to cultural objections to Islam (unequal treatment of women, intolerance, cultural remoteness, Muslims' demands, massiveness). The second pattern includes negative feelings arising from a sense of threat. These two co-existing and complementary aspects of European Islamophobia shape the various countries' public opinion in very different manners. This is presented on Figure 3.6.

In Germany, Hungary, and Poland, the graph suggests that both patterns are characteristically prevalent. France is unique in that neither pattern can be detected as typical. In Great Britain and Portugal, the population is deeply worried about terrorism but cultural aversion toward Muslims is not significant. The exact opposite is the case in Italy and the Netherlands where anti-Muslim sentiments are fueled, predominantly, by cultural themes, but anxiety about the terrorist threat is far less present.

To offer a more graphic portrayal of each country's pattern of Islamophobia, we conducted a cluster analysis as well, through which four distinct groups of respondents could be identified (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7. Groups representing the four patterns of Islamophobia in eight European countries, GFE data, 2008 (percentages)

Thirty-five percent of all respondents in the eight countries may be considered unaffected by Islamophobia. Members of this group do not nurture a great deal of aversion to Muslims on a cultural basis; neither are they bothered by general or personal fears of terrorism. At the other end of the spectrum, one can find a

strongly Islamophobic group whose members are averse to people of Muslim faith, led both by cultural and psychological motives. This group's share is twenty-one percent. The third group making up twenty-five percent, is culturally averse to Muslims but its members are not afraid or anxious about terrorism. Lastly, the fourth group consists of people worrying about terrorist threats but only moderately unsympathetic to Islam on cultural grounds; their share is twenty percent. On the whole, the majority, amounting to sixty-five percent, may be said to nurture some dislike of Muslims.

Figure 3.8 shows the varying distribution of the four groups in individual countries. The bigot Islamophobes are conspicuous in every country, except for Portugal. Not coincidentally, Portugal stood apart in the multidimensional space as we showed before. In addition, Portugal is unique for having many respondents that are fearful of terrorism, yet only moderately uneasy about Islam culture. The non-Islamophobic group is particularly large in the Netherlands. In Italy and Germany, the group that is culturally averse to Muslims but expresses no fear of terrorism is relatively sizeable.

Figure 3.8. The distribution of four types of Islamophobic groups in eight European countries (percentages)

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND XENOPHOBIA

We hypothesized that Islamophobia forms part of the hostile attitudes generally targeting groups of people. If this is correct, the overlap between xenophobic and Islamophobic groups would be quite large. As seen on Figure 3.9, we were able to test this assumption by clustering the different types of attitudes. The results can be seen in the following distribution within the entire sample.

Our results indicate that general xenophobia does not necessarily go in tandem with Islamophobia. Even when someone is xenophobic, they may not be Islamophobic, and vice versa. In two groups, however, we perceive a connection between these two kinds of hostility: 29 percent of the respondents are neither particularly xenophobic, nor averse to people of the Islam faith. In the case of the other consistent group, making up 17 percent, xenophobia is complemented with anti-Muslim sentiments and fear of terrorist attacks. The other two groups lack consistency. Some (28 percent) are very fearful about fundamentalist Islam terrorism but have no worries about strangers in general. Lastly, there are those (27 percent) that are both anti-Muslim and xenophobic but have no fears.

Figure 3.9. Shows the distribution of the four cluster groups produced on the basis of xenophobia and Islamophobia.

Figure 3.10. The distribution of four cluster groups formed of Islamophobia and xenophobia in eight European countries (percentages)

In reading of the graph, we may clearly see that the share of those with no adverse attitudes of either kind is lowest in Hungary (17 percent), Portugal (20 percent), and Poland (22 percent). In light of our earlier findings, it is hardly surprising that the groups we dubbed “enlightened” have the largest share in France (38 percent) and the Netherlands (44 percent), but in Italy as well they form a sizeable group (31 percent). Those with xenophobic and anti-Muslim attitudes have a substantial presence in Great Britain and Hungary, in comparison with the European average. It speaks to the divided nature of French society that this group is not negligible there either. The proportion of those fearful about terrorism but not really averse to newcomers is outstanding in Portugal (58 percent) and quite significant in Poland and France (27 percent in both countries). With regard to the proportion of those who are moderately averse to strangers and not overly worried about fundamentalist Islam terrorism, no difference could be found among the countries.

In addition to factors like xenophobia, Islamophobia, and fear of fundamentalist Islamist terrorism, the original GFE research project investigated people’s disposition for racism and antisemitism in these countries (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6. The measured dimensions of the GFE research project in eight European countries (averages on a 4-point scale)

	Xenophobia	Islamophobia	Fear of fundamental- ist Islam terrorism	Racism	Anti- semitism
France	2.17	2.63	2.32	1.94	2.16
Germany	2.34	2.83	2.44	1.99	2.28
Great Britain	2.50	2.68	2.49	1.83	2.02
Hungary	2.72	2.89	2.44	2.37	2.59
Italy	2.35	2.84	2.16	1.68	2.09
Netherlands	2.18	2.66	2.01	1.81	2.00
Poland	2.43	2.84	2.45	2.26	2.66
Portugal	2.38	2.54	2.64	2.31	2.43
All	2.38	2.74	2.37	2.02	2.27

A country-by-country reading of the GFE variables offers the conspicuous observation that Hungary has quite high values in regard to all of them. A counter-example would be the Netherlands with all GFE variables standing at a relatively low level.

Reading the variables individually, in the case of racism and antisemitism, one may see the perfect validation of the core-periphery theory in that the core countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) both racism and antisemitism are at a significantly lower level than in the peripheral countries (Hungary, Poland, and Portugal). As to xenophobia and Islamophobia, however, the picture is quite different. On the whole, we may see a configuration that we referred to earlier. In the eight countries of the study a relatively high value indicates the population's leaning toward xenophobia—with the exception of France and the Netherlands. But when it comes to Islamophobia, we witness a generally high level of incidence in every country. Fear of fundamentalist Islam terrorism is also independent of the center versus periphery as a variable, reaching the highest value in Portugal and Great Britain, while standing at a low level in the Netherlands.

With the help of factor analysis, we sorted the GFE-variables into two distinct types (Figure 3.11). One was comprised of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and fear of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism, while the other consisted of racism and anti-semitism—deemed historically present in Europe—complemented with a moderate level of xenophobia. This latter type is exempt from both Islamophobia and worry about Islamist fundamentalist terrorism.

Figure 3.11. The two types of GFE (new and traditional) in eight European countries (averages of the principal component)

Viewed country by country, the prevalence of the two patterns of prejudice in public opinion places Hungary at one extreme, the Netherlands and France at the other; both types are strongly characteristic of Hungary as opposed to the French and Dutch public opinion, which resist them.

In the rest of the countries we find a combination of the two types in various configurations: in Great Britain a fear of terrorism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia are high, whereas the historical type of hostilities directed at groups is not detectable. Italy exhibits a similar scenario but, in comparison to the Brits, the new GFE-phenomenon is less conspicuous and the old GFE type is the most resisted. In the

Polish and Portuguese societies, the traditional GFE-variables are at a high point, but in Portugal especially, the new form of prejudiced mindset is less marked. In Germany the figures indicate restraint with regard to both patterns of attitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the 2008 research conducted in eight European countries unequivocally demonstrated the existence of Islamophobia in every country, even though in varying degrees. Islamophobia was found to be least intense where the likelihood of interaction with Muslim people was high, e.g., France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. In Germany, the anti-Muslim “potential” is relatively large, despite the significant proportion of Muslims among the population. Undoubtedly, Islamophobia is intense and widespread in Poland and Hungary where Muslims live in the respondents’ minds only, and it is merely the media that produce frightful and distorted representations of them.

General xenophobia, and Islamophobia in particular, are not linked in the countries investigated, but neither are these two attitudes mutually exclusive. The “strangeness” of Islam is not merely the effect of an “alien” culture and religion, it is exacerbated by the sense of threat people associate with fanatic Islamist terrorism. This feature separates Islam from the general category of the “stranger.”

The research has enabled us to distinguish between GFE’s traditional and new manifestations. In the cases of racism and antisemitism, the effect of authoritarianism could be detected in all of the countries. In the case of GFE-related attitudes, their cognitive background in each country also involved the effect—besides that of authoritarianism—of the following factors, albeit on varying scales: lack of trust, insecurity, and the acceptance of social dominance. Across the board, the GFE’s sociological background was rather diffuse; of the conventional sociodemographic variables, the impact of educational attainment was observed in the cases of antisemitism and racism. The sociological background of the Islam-related GFE-attitudes was more colorful. Here the primary effect seemed to be personal frustration (discontent with one’s life and perceived poor material conditions). The impact of religion moreover was conspicuous in almost every country, with the exception of Hungary and Germany.

In light of the events that transpired over the years, the significance of the data from 2008 has greatly increased. We were able to capture the onset of a trend, the full course of which was rendered partly unforeseeable for our present perspective by the dramatic wave of migration.

CHAPTER 4.

MIGRATION, NEW MINORITIES,
AND THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION
OF MIGRANT GROUPS

MIGRATION IN THE PAST AND AT PRESENT

The meaning of the word migration refers to moving to another place, leaving a particular territory, and settling down in another. Migration is not unknown in the world of animals, for instance, birds of passage set out to fly from one continent to another. Among the animals capable of migrating, changing locations is naturally determined, forcing the individual members of a species to set off or to stay. In contrast, for humans, moving from one place to another, as Creswell observes, is a metaphor, implying the closing off and opening up of spaces in a cultural, historical, and social sense. Movement has produced two possible, yet contrary, versions of “geographical imagination.” One posits that space is enclosed by fixed and well-defined boundaries; the other views space as boundless and infinite, only made finite by human beings moving within it (Cresswell 2006, 25–26). Migration has been part of human history since its early days.¹ The size of traveling nomadic hordes varied between 120 and 140 members. These sizes allowed members to keep track of one another, defend themselves effectively from predators’ attacks, and fight other groups (Pléh 2016, 47). In that historical era migration was vital for the survival of human communities.

Settling down brought about a crucial change. In John Armstrong’s view, the nomadic hordes marked the boundaries setting them apart from the world of others not in physical terms but by the lineage of group members. Nomadic groups roamed freely across vast territories. Nothing set limits to their movement, except perhaps the change of seasons, the climate or natural obstacles on their journey such as seas and high mountains. In contrast, the groups who chose a sedentary lifestyle set up their boundaries according to territorial principles. The formerly nomadic peoples, whose size far exceeded the original number estimated by Dunbar, settled down and established ownership over the land that was to become their home.²

At that point, not only did groups break with the nomadic lifestyle but they grew attached to their dwelling place as they developed a sense of belonging and social solidarity. Since then, a bond has existed between people and the place where they live, defining the physical boundaries of their lives and ensuring its

1 For an illustration of the ancient history of migration, see “Map Shows How Humans Migrated Across the Globe,” June 3, 2015, video, 2:23, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJdT6QcSbQ0>.

2 For the process through which territorial borders were formed, see “1000 Years Time Lapse Map of Europe,” July 6, 2016, video, 10:59, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjWVFZ5e_vo.

continuation. Early human communities and the societies evolving from them rendered the dwelling place and the physical environment where people lived to be the foundation of their individual and collective identity.

Nevertheless, this did not imply a limitation to their physical world, since in numerous instances nomadic and sedentary living alternated. Groups that had settled could be forced to move again by other groups or natural disasters. An example of this is the wanderings of the Hungarians reaching the Carpathian Basin in several waves. Following their arrival, they tried to roam further to the West, but they could not. The defeat at the Battle of Lechfeld near Augsburg in 955 put an end, once and for all, to the “era of wanderings.”

Historically, people have always migrated, but the meaning of movement shifted with the rise of sedentarism, resulting in variously constructed realities by the groups separated by geographical space and culture—realities that were not necessarily congruent with one another. What seemed obvious through the prism of one group’s reality looked shocking or terrifying in the reality construct of other groups. Ties to a location, and on that basis, the appearance of closed societies, nurtured people’s awareness of their own group and their shared identity. On the other hand, it generated fear of strangers and other peoples. From antiquity through the Middle Ages, these sentiments often led to wars, persecution, genocide, and pogroms, which in turn contributed to massive movements of peoples, i.e. migration. The Middle Ages crusades, pilgrimages and, subsequently, colonization could be considered forms of migration as well.

The onset of modernity brought about a radical turning point to the contemporary understanding of migration processes. Capitalism and industrialization launched movements of people on a vast scale all over the world from the agrarian to the manufacturing sector, and the inequalities spawned by the market economy spiraled into large-scale relocation of people from the less developed peripheries to the more advanced central regions. The big cities sprouting in the course of urbanization absorbed large rural crowds, and their massive flow thoroughly transformed entire countries and societies, operating as a kind of melting pot that blended increasingly heterogeneous and multiethnic populations.

The new interpretations of migration discussed in the literature on modern migration (Haitzinger, Hegedűs, and Klemmer 2014) state, most notably that population movements are becoming massive and occurring on a global scale. Structural changes caused by modernization offset structural mobility worldwide,

triggering in turn mammoth sized relocations within and across countries. Everywhere, modernization involved the influx of populations. People previously inhabiting numerous small villages and employed in the agrarian sector moved into the cities, centers of industry and commerce.

A particular source of conflict stemming from massive and global migration lies in the modern political transformation, namely, in the national character of the modern political state and community. The new world order shaped by the ideals of capitalism, market economy, enlightenment, liberalism and democratic community has been constrained by its new framework involving a strict link between a political and economic community and a territory. The nation, however, represents a community of shared identity; a community where the sovereignty of the state embodying the political will of the community of individuals depends for its legitimacy on a territorial principle (*ius solis*) or the principle of primordial ethnic and cultural lineage (*ius sanguinis*), possibly on both. Evidently, the two concepts of the nation state imply different relationships between individuals and the community they constitute. Yet the two concepts are alike in the sense of strictly drawing the borders of the political and cultural community and distinguishing people who belong to a nation from those who do not, and thus are strangers. All of this involves setting up physical, legal, administrative or symbolic boundaries which can be crossed but with great difficulty or not at all.

Migration requiring border crossing is called "emigration" from the perspective of the sending country and "immigration" from the standpoint of the receiving country. Viewed from either perspective, the dual nature of modernity (the spread of the globalized market system with the new social relations grounded in capitalism on the one hand and, on the other, the territorially insular modern political state with its legal and administrative apparatus resting on nationalistic principles) gave rise to profound controversies about the free movement of people and massive migration.

Structural mobility set off by the modern era, globalization, and the rising population flows caused by new social and regional inequalities found an obstacle in the enclosure and insulation of nation states generating, up to the present day, insurmountable tensions and conflicts at the micro and macro levels, that is, affecting individuals and societies alike. In Europe and the contemporary advanced world, the nineteenth century was predominantly the age of the modern nation state's development, a process of differentiation and insulation. In contrast, the

twentieth century may be defined as the age of increasingly massive migrations transcending, even ignoring, the borders of the nation state.

In studying the decisions migrants make about leaving their homeland, it is interesting to question whether alternatives to emigration existed for them, or if setting out to start a new life elsewhere was meant to be a lasting or temporary solution. Finally, it is also very important to consider whether the motivation was personal or derived from communal concerns.

Massive migrations caused by structural conflicts have varied greatly. There has always been politically motivated migration, where individuals may be forced to emigrate on account of their political views or the political situation in their country threatening their safety or very existence. Religiously motivated emigration has a long history as well. Oftentimes natural catastrophes compel people to leave their homeland and seek shelter in another country. Genocide and deportation may prompt others to flee their country. From a legal or ethical standpoint, these cases present no dilemma; offering help to such people is the host countries' fundamental obligation. The diverse cataclysms of the twentieth century offered tragic examples of such types of movements, and hardly does the twenty-first century seem to bring about any relief from them.

The plea of economic migrants is more tenuous. Hopes for a better life and the search of a secure and solid livelihood have driven vast numbers of people to move. And they continue to do so even though their aspirations may not fit with the majority population's hospitality in the selected country of destination.

MORAL COSMOPOLITISM OR NATIONAL SELF-CENTEREDNESS?

There is no natural environment where an individual would be at home *ab ovo*. Jesus Christ said of himself—but could have implied if of all humans—that “foxes have dens and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to lay his head” (Matthew 8, 20).³ Being “at home” is a peculiar aspect of our socially constructed reality, the borders of which are negotiated with groups that have already settled. Whether these borders could be rightfully closed by any single group in front of

3 In the New International Version, see <http://www.biblestudytools.com/matthew/8.html>.

non-group members (strangers) is a question subject to dispute. Could there be justification for a group to disallow entry to human beings driven by need and destitution to the territory it controls simply because those individuals are strangers to their land?

The nation state as the organizational arrangement of the modern world raises this question quite acutely. The territorially separate modern nation states protect their borders and, in the name of national sovereignty, maintain the right to determine who may or may not enter their land. Yet, does any nation state have the right to allow entrance to their own citizens and keep strangers out of the territory under their control? After all, we are talking of human beings, whose natural equality should preclude discrimination on the basis of citizenship (Nagy 2012).

This dilemma surfaced in a most dramatic manner at the international meeting in Evian convened on July 6–15, 1938, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to address the rescue of the German Jews, whose existence came under threat in national socialist Germany. The outcome of the meeting was disappointing. Of the thirty-one participating countries, only Dominica in the Caribbean expressed its intent to host 100,000 refugees. The other countries renounced it entirely. Eventually, merely 800 refugees managed to enter Dominica. Forty years later, Walter Mondale could state, rightfully, that in Evian the self-respect and decency of the civilized world was at stake. If each of the participant nation states at the meeting had been ready to host 17,000 Jews, the Jewry of the German Reich would have survived (Mondale 1979).

Nonetheless, in 1938 the participant countries concluded that “the involuntary emigration of people in large numbers has become so great that it renders racial and religious problems more acute, increases international unrest, and may hinder seriously the processes of appeasement in international relations” (Bartrop 2018, 114). Instead of initiating meaningful action, the group established a permanent bureau in London run by a president, four vice presidents, and a director.

This dilemma is still present and will not likely disappear any time soon. To address it, two diametrically opposite solutions have been proposed with arguments for and against both of them (Miller 2016). The moral cosmopolitan argument states that the rights of free movement and choice of residence are universal, irrespective of birthplace and membership in any nation state’s political community. The Earth is the shared habitat of humankind and there is no justification for why some groups would have more right to control certain parts of it than any other

groups. This viewpoint would be viable if there was a global state of which every person would be a lifelong citizen. The same rules would apply to everyone's movement and choice of residence, being citizens of this global state, similar to the way citizens' movement within the territory of their state is regulated by uniform rules.

Moral cosmopolitanism has two variants, of which the stronger one dismisses every type of affiliation, be it to a nation, a city, the family, a social circle of friends or a workplace. The bonds universally affecting every human life are to be more powerful than the loyalties dictated by belonging to specific groups. The weaker variant states that someone in trouble should enjoy special attention. Someone afflicted with problems must be preferred over an unafflicted person. From the state's perspective, this principle implies the imperative of helping strangers in need even when they are not members of the legally determined community inhabiting the state's territory.

The other solution's premise is that people belong to groups defined by spheres of familiarity, comfort, and a state of acceptance. Beyond these spheres lies the unfamiliar: strangers and people living in foreign lands. The distinction between the members of one's own group and those of others is not arbitrary, it is based on the shared experience of a common history and culture. It commands, at the present time, responsibility for one another as well as collective efforts to sustain life (Walzer 1983). Communal bias is an inevitable reaction to the original condition of humans as strangers to one another. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, strangers would have been doomed to perish, had they not formed ties and groups through which to survive in geographical space and historical time (Smith and Szathmáry 1999). However, once groups were formed, the duality of familiarity versus strangeness became established along with the inevitable preference of members of one's own group over those of other groups. After settling down, the communal existence of the group became inextricably linked with the territory that it controlled. It was in ancient Athens where the state as the citizens' political community emerged, making it possible for citizens to live in a space of freedom, as opposed to the strangers who lacked the civic freedom to vote and lived under the constraints of necessity.

In modernity, the country is the nation state's territory—determined via international recognition—where the nation state's citizens reside bound together by special rights and obligations that do not apply to others. The rights of all human

beings were laid down in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Point 1 of Article 13 of the Declaration states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” According to Point 2, “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Point 1 of Article 14 unequivocally claims that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Point 2, on the other hand, states that “[t]his right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”⁴

The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* was ratified by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966. It came into force on March 23, 1976 and, as of 2014, has been signed by 168 states. Protected rights were extended to the rights of children and minority individuals. Unlike the Declaration, however, the text of the Covenant makes no mention of the rights to property and asylum.

The motivational background of migration is provided by personal needs which, if they are unsatisfied, may propel people to move out of their place of residence and seek new places where they may expect to have their needs fulfilled. Unmet needs of security and comfortable living may urge some to change residence. Another powerful motive is the unfulfilled need for freedom. There are additional social needs that, when left unsatisfied, cause people to feel unrecognized, humiliated, and undignified. It comes hardly as a surprise that, given the psychological proximity produced by new informational and transportation opportunities, many residents in countries afflicted by deprivation and oppression aspire to live in a wealthy and free country. Thus, they set out to travel on land, on water, and by air only to find themselves unwelcome in their destination and possibly even forced to return to their country.

The international law currently in effect appears to support the weak rather than the strong perspective on moral cosmopolitanism. The cited Point 1 of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that individuals persecuted in their home country have the right to apply for asylum in other countries. Persecution due to political and religious reasons or sexual orientation constitutes a state of need that can only be met by granting the victim asylum. Other states of

4 See <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.

need include war, famine, epidemics, and environmental disaster. The latter, however, do not necessarily qualify as a reason to grant an asylum. Economic migrants might try their luck without the support of the law. Family reunification may also grant migration.

Once a refugee is granted asylum, national communities are obligated to make every effort to help them become full members of the community. The state cannot discriminate against anyone based on how they have obtained citizenship status.

Nations states have the right to determine to whom they do or do not grant asylum. Legislation regulating the granting of asylum is rooted in the idea of national sovereignty and the primacy of national interests. The human right of free movement contradicts the right to national sovereignty, which at present predominates. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the right to national self-determination often hinges on the international state of affairs. When, in the name of so-called “national self-determination,” the national borders are redrawn, the movement of people alters as well, to the effect that individuals who were formerly citizens of one country now face each other as “strangers” separated by new borders.

TYPES OF MIGRATION

The concept of migration and the category of “migrant” are subject to diverse interpretations and designations, depending on whether the two concepts refer to the life trajectory and social circumstances of the individual or they explain social processes and group relations.

In the broadest sense of the term, everyone is a migrant who leaves their birth-place or place of residence. If the movement occurs from one location to another within a country, we call it internal migration; if it involves moving to another country, it is called outer migration or international migration. In contemporary public discourse, migration usually refers to the latter.

Market mechanisms and economic processes extended by globalization and transcending the confines of the nation state have furthered regional inequalities, thus dividing the world into core and peripheral regions (Wallerstein 2005). Population flows from the periphery to the core involving individual relocation across borders are often designated as economic migration. In a narrow sense, this

refers to the movement of a labor force in response to the pull of labor markets. However, in a broader sense, all relocations fall into this category if they are motivated first, by material aspirations that include an individual's efforts to improve his other living conditions, pursue a career, ensure a livelihood and obtain an education; second, by destitution, impoverishment and the overall deterioration of a person's living standards; and third, by new opportunities created by the unfettered flow of capital, labor, services, information, and knowledge. This type of migration may be regulated or irregular, legal or illegal, voluntary or externally constrained, short-term or long-term, individual or as a family. Nowadays, it is increasingly common for migration to involve not one but several movements, usually encompassing the country of origin and one or more countries of destination. Traditionally, this pattern of relocation has been prevalent in seasonal agricultural and construction work, but white collar and highly specialized professional migration characteristic of more advanced societies follows a similar pattern. The so called "secondary effect" of economic migration derives from relocation driven by the need for families to reunite, following the main breadwinner's move abroad. The magnitude of secondary migration is growing in line with the growing scale of migration. The United States offers an apt example where, by the turn of the millennium, two thirds of legal and long-term immigration cases fell under the rubric of family reunification (Figure 4.1.).

Figure 4.1. The portion of family unification (percent) in all migration cases (million persons) in the period between 1995 and 2001

The prototype of political—in contrast to economic—migration is by and large forced migration. Whether due to persecution through war and other forms of violence⁵ or “persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a specific social group or political beliefs,”⁶ seeking refuge motivated by fear and the hope of survival is a particular type of migration. A political refugee may furthermore be a person whose life is not directly in danger but indirectly threatened by treacherous conditions infringing on their right to personal liberty, security or human dignity.⁷ The general and universal acknowledgement of the refugees’ legal status was not attained until the second half of the twentieth century (Nagy 2012). Not coincidentally, the extraordinary upheavals of the past century and the ensuing mass movements and flights from persecution led to the adaption of the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention granting refugee status to those who met a set of criteria that involved recognition of their unique predicament and the application of special determination procedures.

Fleeing to escape persecution is ubiquitous in human history. Its intrinsic components are external necessity, the absence of regulation, calamity, and the transitional nature of the situation. As soon as the conditions compelling this movement disappear, refugees lose their special status and become subject to the same treatment as regular migrants, frequently ending up repatriated.

Some crises such as natural catastrophes, global ecological transformations like climate change and attendant fluctuations in the world’s water supply may be long term, but they are not regulated separately by international law. These processes may also provoke migration of yet another type.

GLOBAL TRENDS OF MIGRATION

When investigating the global trends of migration, one may clearly see its continuous and even growth over time across the world. During the past half a century, the proportion of individuals born in a country other than their current residence has more than tripled. The rise was somewhat slower until the 1980s but, ever since, it

5 The 1967 Amendment of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

6 The 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

7 For a short overview of the theories of migration, see Hautzinger, Hegedűs and Klenner (1994).

has been soaring (Figure 4.2). In 2015, the number of people living in a country different from their birth place was about 243 million. Of the 243 million, less than ten percent fell into the category of non-economic migrant, that is, dwelling outside of their birth country as a refugee.

Figure 4.2. The size of global migration flow over the period between 1960 and 2015 (million persons)

We see a different picture when we shift our perspective from the migrants and the sending countries to the effect of migration on the host societies' demographic composition. From this perspective, the impact of migration appears less dramatic: merely 3.3 percent of the entire population of the totality of the world's countries may be regarded as first-generation immigrants—only 0.7 percent more than in 1960. This figure, of course, varies across continents and countries (Map 4.1). Extreme cases include the United Arab Emirates (83.7 percent), Qatar (73.8 percent), Bahrein (54.7 percent), Andorra (56.9 percent), and Macao (58.8 percent) with more than a half of the population being first generation immigrants.

The countries where immigrants make up 30 to 50 percent of the population include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Hong Kong in China, Singapore, Oman, Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, Monaco and Gibraltar. Compare this to the respective figures

(in percentages) in the United States (14.3), Canada (20.7), Australia (27.7), Germany (14.9), Russia (7.7), France (11.1), Spain (14), Sweden (14.3), and Great Britain (11.3).

Map 4.1. Countries of the world showing the size of immigration in relation to the host countries' population,* 2005.

* Darker shades signify countries with larger intake of immigrants.

Source: Population Division. United Nations–Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/>.

The image shows a great deal of variation. In the next chapter, we will offer an overview of the most salient theories regarding migration. In light of the global trends of population flows, however, we would like to pose this question: would the wealth, success, and economically advanced status of the destination countries explain migration there from the less developed regions and countries? Disregarding the cases where migration rates are very high or high for specific reasons, we will find that a positive answer to the question may be generally valid but does not offer a full explanation. For example, as regards to Canada, Australia, and the United States, their special status as a traditional destination for migrants as well as the fact that their statehood is firmly embedded in the history of continuous immigration, are crucially important. In the case of European countries, historical traditions, the colonial past, geopolitical as well as language and cultural factors, are no less significant considerations.

A more tangible answer can be given to our question by examining possible significant correlations between, first, economically and geographically diverse regions and continents and, second, the size of migration (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Migrant stock and the fluctuation of the size of migration according to economic and geographic regions during the period between 1990 and 2013 (number of individuals in million and fluctuation in percentages)

	Number of migrants (million)				Annual fluctuation (million)			Annual average increase (percentages)		
	1990	2000	2010	2013	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2013	1999–2000	2000–2010	2010–2013
Global	154.2	174.5	220.7	231.5	2.0	4.6	3.6	1.2	2.3	1.6
Developed regions	82.3	103.4	129.7	135.6	2.1	2.6	1.9	2.3	2.3	1.5
Developing regions	71.9	71.1	91.0	95.9	–0.1	2.0	1.6	–0.1	2.5	1.8
Africa	15.6	15.6	17.1	18.6	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.9	2.8
Asia	49.9	50.4	67.8	70.8	0.1	1.7	1.0	0.1	3.0	1.5
Europe	49.0	56.2	69.2	72.4	0.7	1.3	1.1	1.4	2.1	1.5
LAC*	7.1	6.5	8.1	8.5	–0.1	0.2	0.2	–0.9	2.2	1.8
NA**	27.8	40.4	51.2	53.1	1.3	1.1	0.6	3.7	2.4	1.2
Oceania	4.7	5.4	7.3	7.9	0.1	0.2	0.2	1.5	3.1	2.6

Source: *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision–Migrants by Age and Sex*. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013. United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013/Age).

* Latin America and the Caribbean region

** North America

Even though the most advanced regions of the world demonstrate a higher capacity to accept immigrants, the developing regions narrowly lag behind them. Since the 2000s the difference in the annual increase of immigration between the advanced and developing regions is negligible. Likewise, our comparison across continents shows that the concept of the “East-West slope” is reductive: Europe and Asia barely differ in the number of immigrants and the differences in trends over time are small. The figures for North America are significantly lower than those for Europe and Asia, and even diminish somewhat over time. Finally, even Africa attracts many migrants despite its lower values of development compared to the other three continents, and the size of immigration has been continuously growing.

A more accurate understanding of interrelations is to be had by looking at the size of migration between the continents as well as within them. The columns of Table 4.2 indicate the migrants' location of origins, while the rows show their current residence.

Table 4.2. The population size of emigrants and immigrants according to economic and geographic regions, 2013 (million persons)

Current residence	Location of origins									
	Developed regions	Developing regions	Africa	Asia	Europe	LAC*	NA**	Oceania	Other	Global
Developed regions	53.8	81.8	11.3	38.9	48.8	31.0	2.4	1.6	1.6	135.6
Developing regions	13.7	82.3	19.7	53.7	9.7	5.7	1.9	0.2	5.1	95.9
Africa	1.3	17.3	15.3	1.1	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.4	18.6
Asia	9.7	61.2	4.4	54.0	7.6	0.7	0.6	0.1	3.6	70.8
Europe	40.1	32.4	8.7	18.7	37.9	4.5	1.0	0.3	1.5	72.4
LAC*	2.7	5.9	0.0	0.3	1.2	5.4	1.3	0.0	0.2	8.5
NA**	9.6	43.5	2.0	15.7	7.9	25.9	1.2	0.3	0.0	53.1
Oceania	4.1	3.9	0.5	2.9	3.1	0.1	0.2	1.1	0.1	7.9
Global	67.5	164.0	30.9	92.6	58.5	36.7	4.3	1.8	6.7	231.5

Source: *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision—Migrants by Age and Sex*. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013. United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013/Age).

* Latin America and the Caribbean region; ** North America.

Migration takes place primarily from developed regions to other developed regions (53.8 million persons). Even taking this into account, the number of migrants moving from developed to less developed regions is not insignificant (13.7 million persons).

Few eyebrows will be raised by the finding that there is a vast flow of migration from less developed to developed regions (81.8 million persons). But isn't it remarkable that the movement from a less developed region to another less

developed one barely differs in size— in fact, even surpasses the former figure (82.3 million persons)? This finding clearly indicates the fallacy of assuming an unequivocally positive relationship between migration's destination and highly developed regions. We can obtain an even more nuanced picture by observing the movements between and within continents. By looking at the cells with figures for intra-continental migration and, subsequently tallying them, we will see that half of the total migration of 231.5 million people took place not between but within continents. At the risk of oversimplification, we may argue that migrants' destination is the neighboring country and the surrounding ones. Thus, the misconception that in 2015 all migrants were headed to Europe can easily be disproved. Whereas the internal migration of Europe amounted to nearly forty million, only nine million migrants arrived here from Africa and nineteen million from Asia. The other side of the coin is that 28 percent of all African migrants and merely 20 percent of all Asian migrants settled down in Europe. Overall, Europe's exposure to migration does not strike us as dramatic, especially bearing in mind the size of population at close to a half billion as against the 34.5 million people arriving here from outside of Europe.

Figure 4.3. The size of international migration in eight EU countries in the period between 1960 and 2015 (million persons)

Finally, let us look at the shifting size of migrant populations in a set of European destination countries over the period between 1960 and 2015. Table 4.3 is noteworthy as it shows the widely diverse trends of all-European immigration by country.

Figure 4.3 shows migrant population in absolute numbers for eight selected countries over time. As it ignores the size of the host population, this may be misleading. Thus, while immigration into countries with a small population size may have a low absolute value, it may have a large value when related to the entire population.

France exhibits the most even growth: as early as the 1960s the number of immigrants was already quite considerable, and it has been increasing continuously. Great Britain of the early 1960s witnessed relatively modest numbers and proportions of immigration followed by a steep rise in the 1990s, which led to surpassing the French in the 2010s. The last country to become a migrant destination is Germany, which experienced a sharp increase bump in the 1980s. Up to the present day, the inflow to Germany here has been continuous, spectacularly exceeding both the sizes of British and French immigration. It should be noted that the trend has been almost the same in Spain and Italy where immigration was a relatively unimportant social issue until 2000, only to soar rapidly between 2000 and 2010 and consolidate at around the size of six million people.

THEORIES OF MIGRATION

With the vast expansion of migration, the social sciences have become keener to describe, understand, and explain this phenomenon following the birth of a scientific disciplinary field called migration studies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). With an essentially interdisciplinary and comparative approach and perspective, migration studies have been seeking to build a theoretical framework to describe processes related to migration, develop a specific methodology challenging the traditional research paradigm of the social sciences, and, conduct increasingly painstaking quantitative and qualitative investigations. Previously, two paradigms predominated conventional sociological research.

First, the structuralist-functionalist approach studied social systems and phenomena from a primarily sociodemographic perspective, focusing on the social structure, stratification, mobility, inequalities, and power relations of dominance

and subordination. Naturally, this approach was characterized by methodological individualism based upon the assumption that social issues could be interpreted within the framework of social systems. It dismissed relationships between territories defined by nationality or broader perspectives transcending boundaries. A major turn occurred with the emergence of a new approach in the 1960s which, treating individual countries as unique entities, began to study economic, political, social, and cultural national specificities spanning borders and to compare them across countries or regions. From this evolved the paradigm of international comparative empirical research. Yet even this paradigm remained within the perspectival confines of methodological nationalism, since the unit of inquiry remained the society organized within the framework of the nation state (Sik 2012).

This perspective could not be a viable starting point for migration studies since the nation state may be one but not an exclusive interpretive framework for the migration process whose very significance is its transcendence of borders and boundaries. As well, the motives of migrants could only be understood from a perspective with a larger scope than the nation state.

The first broader theoretical attempts of interpretation emerged from the area of economics. Paradoxically, these first theories still carried the traces of methodological nationalism with their main question being, what macroeconomic processes and interrelationships are responsible for the ever more intense and massive movements of populations?

Neoclassical economists explained migration by fundamentally identifying it with the flow of labor force governed by the macroeconomic rules of supply and demand (Todaro 1976). To simplify this idea, international migration may be viewed as the flow of people from poor to wealthy countries. The dimensions of migration are regulated by labor supply and demand between particular countries, perceptible in wage differences that determine the size of migration. Countries with sizable excess labor and low wages are expected to instigate a movement to countries with paucity of labor and higher wages. This process could be countervailed by the inverse movement of capital. Based on the macroeconomic migration model, economists presumed that, at the macro-level, individuals would follow rational principles when deciding to stay in their homeland or move to another country.

New economic theories challenged earlier explanations of migration phenomena by focusing on the migrants' decision about migration, which earlier theories had ignored. Economists sought to answer the question, why do some people decide

to emigrate and others do not? Such decisions are not made by individuals but by the family or, to put it in economic terms, by household communities. These micro-economic units negotiate, in light of family resources, needs and opportunities, whether to should stay or leave. If they leave, should they do it together or rely on some form of division of labor within the family? Should the migration be short term, temporary or permanent (Stark 1991)? Invariably, there are macro and microeconomic push-and-pull effects underlying these decisions (Grigg 1977) in the context of the sending as well as the host countries. Once those effects are taken into account, the decisions are fundamentally rational based upon the balancing of the pros and cons. Another important consideration is risk-taking or some form of collective (family based) cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the magnitude of migration is no less significantly influenced by the deteriorating economic situation in the migrants' country of origin.

A more recent theory is premised on the concept of the dual labor market (Piore 1979), connecting the micro-level individual and macro-level market perspectives. In more advanced societies the internal labor market is characterized by a duality: internal supply and demand crucially affect the labor force and the wages, on the one hand; on the other hand, there is a secondary labor market involving the effects of immigration and wage differentials. The interrelationship between the two markets influences, first, the extent to which the host country is open (or closed) toward labor pressure from the outside and, second, the opportunities presenting themselves for immigrant labor. This is where demand for cheap labor must be reckoned with, but the dual labor market also shapes migrants' assessment of the benefits of employment in the host country. Brain drain is a central aspect of the dual labor market, and so is the cutthroat competition between the internal and the external labor force because migrant work occupies specific economic niches.⁸

A number of new theories address the problem of migration by moving beyond the realm of economics. One example is the world-system theory placing migration trends into the context of broader, globally construed historical and geopolitical systems such as core and peripheral countries, differences and inequalities between regions, North versus South and West versus East as global frameworks of population flows (Wallerstein 1974; Lechner 2009). Mention should be made of the increasingly compelling theories that explore, either locally or globally, the contribution of demographic processes like under- and over-population and demo-

⁸ The concept of economic niche refers to sectors or economic profiles occupying a market segment.

graphic pressure to the shaping of migration trends. Likewise, the effects of global ecological changes appear to be an increasingly relevant issue.

Network analytic approaches combine sociological and economic perspectives (Massey et al. 1993) with a focus on the role of migrants' relationship networks and the resultant social capital in the migrants' decisions about relocation. Typically, these studies have investigated the ways in which ties with family members and acquaintances affect migrants' departure, arrival, and integration into the host society. Cost-benefit calculations and, regarding the accumulation of social capital, the assessment of one's social network are no less important factors of migration, in addition to the use of internet-based info-communicational technologies. Another branch of research probes the process of institutionalization associated with migration, whereby an increasingly extensive and sophisticated system of institutions is created in order to support the migration process itself and the migrants' full integration into the host society. Impressively rich theoretical literature and research has been dedicated to studying how migrant diasporas evolve and what their role is in the process of relocation.

The multiplicity of theories seeking to elucidate and explain migration exist parallel to or in contestation with one another. A cumulative causal explanation has arisen, too, with the goal of synthesizing and integrating these theories into an all-encompassing framework (Massey 1990).

The role of politics cannot be dismissed in describing and making sense of migration. Either viewed from the sending or the host country's perspective, the political circumstances of the relevant countries exert a substantial impact on the migration process, along with the resultant legal and administrative border control and the policies regulating emigration and immigration. Political crises and repression prevailing in the migrants' homeland should not be overlooked either in cases of economic or involuntary migration. Of special importance are the host country's migration and refugee policies, the procedural regulations concerning immigration, and the workings of the relevant institutions in terms of their effects on the magnitude, direction, and consequences of migration.

We are aware of the large body of social psychological literature based on research of transnational migration dealing with problems of assimilation, integration and segregation. This literature proves the multifaceted nature of voluntary and involuntary types of migration with different outcomes resulting various forms of accommodation (Berry 1997; Marsh and Ahn 2009; Hamilton 1985; Levitt and

Jaworsky 2007). In our book, however, we are focusing mainly on the research carried out by one of the authors of this book in 2009. The models developed on the basis of our case study are generally in correspondence with former and later theories of transnational migration. Consequently, we shall pay less attention to these theories, opening the space for further interpretation of our results.

The proliferation of theories has turned migration into one of the most popular empirical research areas in the social sciences. One main branch of inquiry is concerned with macro-level societal relations, another focuses on individual and micro-level issues.

By adopting the latter perspective, following Massey, we tried to build up cumulative causal explanatory model encompassing the broad array of effects behind migration. In this chapter we shall present the results of a research aimed at to understand migration in terms of complexity and multicausality. First, we analyze the conflicts of integration and cultural (language-based and religious) collisions between migrants and the host society from the viewpoint of new minorities. Then, we discuss the challenges posed by the immigrants' assimilation, acculturation, integration and segregation. Third, we will look at the diverse integrational strategies. Our central assumption derived from the model multicausal theory of migration was that in coping with the challenges of accommodation in the host country immigrants will resort to diverse integrational strategies due to their ethnic and cultural background, career aspirations, and the climate of the host country.

THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT GROUPS⁹

Based on a case study prepared in 2009, in this subchapter we discuss the paths available to various migrant groups. The goal of the research was to shed light on the composition and sociodemographic traits of the migrant population (citizens from a third country) living in Hungary, as well as the factors affecting their integration. We were moreover interested in the migrants' contribution to the economic, political, and cultural life of Hungary.

⁹ With co-author Mária Székelyi's consent, in this chapter we used the results of an earlier publication (Örkény and Székelyi 2010).

Since becoming an independent sovereign nation state in the twentieth century, Hungary has remained an ethnically and culturally rather homogeneous society. Despite experiencing several waves of migration in and out of the country, Hungary has become a destination for economic migrants only following the regime change of 1989, when it opened up to foreign residents, who began to form new migrant minorities.

This fledgling multicultural landscape attracted social scientists' attention to issues like the immigrants' social integration, and, more specifically, how the everyday life of society was transformed by this growing segment of the population. The question as to how an immigrant with a different language, culture, and, possibly religion can fit in, build a career, and grow roots in Hungarian society has also developed into an important area of study. We were curious to learn whether immigrants—lacking roots, possessing limited resources and little or no social networks—can find a job, housing, provide for themselves and their families, and ensure their children's education. In other words, we asked whether migrants can find a home in Hungary or whether they find themselves on the edge of society, living in some kind of grey or black zone? The host society's restraint from hostile behavior toward "otherness" is a necessary condition for an immigrant to successfully integrate. Integration is thus an achievement that reflects not only the immigrant's efforts but of the openness of the host population and the country's policies as well.

Various immigrant and migrant groups adopt diverse strategies, and have varying opportunities to accomplish their goal of settling down in a manner they too would consider successful. When we asked six different migrant groups about their reasons for leaving their home country and their hopes regarding their settlement in Hungary, we expected each group to display markedly different strategies. The comparative analysis of the six groups gave an insight into, first, the degree to which Hungary, twenty years after the regime change, has been capable of integrating various migrant groups, and, second, the ways diverse migrant strategies fit in with general schemas of integration.

In our study, we first discuss the various facets of the stories related by members of six immigrant groups about their immigration and their efforts at integration. Subsequently, we will explore the strategies these migrants adopted to ensure a successful life in Hungary.

In selecting the specific migrant groups for investigation, our main consideration was to represent the broadest possible spectrum of the immigrant population

residing in Hungary. Therefore, six groups, each represented by a sample of two hundred individuals, were contacted with a questionnaire.¹⁰ The six groups as a whole provide an accurate picture of more than eighty percent of the entire immigrant population of Hungary including ethnic Hungarians from across the border (further referred to as “ethnic Hungarians”), Ukrainians, Arabs, Turks, Chinese, and Vietnamese people. None of the migrants of our study were born in Hungary, all of them arrived legally from outside of the EU’s borders (from a *third country*), none had Hungarian citizenship, and all of them were older than eighteen years.

Drawing on the theoretical points discussed earlier, we addressed the following issues: to what extent did rational deliberations associated with economic migration—such as job opportunities, expertise, income expectations, higher living standards—affect the respondent’s decision to migrate, and how were such concerns present later in their career? How did particulars such as their cultural background, social networks, language proficiency, and social capital affect their ability to fit in to Hungarian society? How has migration and switching countries shaped their personal identity? How have their interests and activities in social and public life changed? What do they think about the country’s general social climate, and what kinds of hurdles or rejection did they face in interacting with the majority society? What conflicts did they persistently experience throughout the migration process, and what goals did they set for the future?

Regarding these questions, the referential space of the answers cannot be overlooked. One salient aspect of migrants’ life is that it involves constant moving across various political and social spaces, complicating its very interpretation. Whether talking of their career, successes, failures, or future, the meaning of their responses is negotiated in the referential spaces associated with the migrant’s home and host country, the more immediate and the wider inter-group environment. On Figure 4.4 we show the most significant referential group relations in which our respondents’ lives are lived. Our questions were formulated accordingly: whichever dimension of their lives was addressed, we solicited their valuation in that particular dimension, so they could also compare their own situation with that of others from various perspectives.

10 Sample taking was based on the snowball method, with representative sample segments. The sample size was 200 respondents in each group, weighted by gender, age and education. The language of the questionnaire was optional: either the native language or English, or Hungarian. The fieldwork was based on face to face interviews. Later, based on the available macro-statistical information the sample was weighted according to age, gender and education.

Figure 4.4. Migration strategies and the referential spaces of successful migration

Based on our theoretical considerations, preliminarily we identified three types of migrant strategies: the *assimilationist* strategy, which involves the migrant's complete structural fit into the host society, their break from the home country, a complete shift from the original to the new culture, and the radical transformation of their personal identity. On the opposite end is the *segregationist* strategy entailing the individual's structural "coexistence" with the conditions imposed by the host country without, however, giving up their original personal, social, and cultural identity. The segregationists nurture powerful ties with their homeland while maintaining substantial distance vis-à-vis the host country. Finally, the third strategy is called *transnational*, since these migrants are not attached to just one country. The primary motivation is economic, and integration is structurally functional but temporary. We assumed that this type of migration produces a hybrid identity as the issue of "belonging to a place" on a personal level is downplayed.

Let us now proceed from the theoretical discussion to a closer look at the actual situation of our immigrant groups to examine whether it conforms or not to our assumptions.

A) The Demographic Characteristics of Migrant Groups

A truism in the classic literature of migration is the observation that young people and men are overrepresented in the migrant population. In our sample as well, there was a gender disparity with men comprising 60 percent of the population, as compared to Hungarian society, and the average age was as low as 39 years. However, the gender imbalance was characteristic of the Turkish and the Arab groups only, where men exceeded 75 percent; in the other four groups men and women were equally represented. The samples showed barely any difference in terms of age among the groups, with the exception of the Turkish respondents. This group was younger than the other migrant groups with an average age of 34 years.

The microsocial environment carries special significance for migrant people. The family provides more than support and security in the conventional sense. Spouses and the kinship group, depending on ethnic affiliation, may greatly facilitate the process of integration into the local diaspora and the majority society as well. With the exception of the Arab and Turkish groups, most of the migrants were married or cohabitated with a partner. Most families had no children at the time of the survey. This applied especially to the Arab and Turkish members of the sample, 80 percent of whom were childless. Only among the Vietnamese was it common to have children (47 percent). More than 90 percent of the Chinese and the Vietnamese respondents were married to someone of their own ethnic group. The percentage of migrants with a Hungarian spouse was relatively large among the Arabs and the ethnic Hungarians (30 percent).

B) The Sociological Characteristics of Migrant Groups in Hungary

In each of the six migrant groups of our study some people arrived several decades ago, while others were new immigrants (see Figure 4.5). Among the Ukrainians, the Turks, and the Arabs there was a relatively large number of newcomers; the Chinese migrated into Hungary in the wake of the regime change, taking advantage of the opening up of new markets. In contrast, the majority of the Vietnamese were living in Hungary for a longer period of time, with more than one third of them settling down during the state socialist time. The migration of ethnic Hungarians—meaning Transcarpathia and Voivodina as *third countries*—happened continuously following the regime change.

Figure 4.5. The length of stay in Hungary by the ethnicity of the migrant group (percentages)

The need to obtain Hungarian citizenship seemed keenest among the ethnic Hungarians, even though for most of the Ukrainians, too, it appeared a desirable prospect. Only a minority of the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Turks, and the Arabs considered obtaining citizenship, however, among the Arabs the figure was relatively significant (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6. Need expressed to obtain Hungarian citizenship, by ethnicity of migrant group (percentages)

Regarding their level of education, we see that the number of migrant individuals with secondary and postsecondary schooling was high in every group, and very few reported to have low schooling (see Figure 4.7). This is particularly noteworthy in comparison with relevant data from the host country: the latter show significantly lower values. Therefore, it is small surprise that, for most migrants, immigration to Hungary caused no setback in their careers. On the contrary, the generally lower level of education of the Hungarian population allows one to assume that there would be robust opportunities of integration and career building for these newcomers.

A litmus test of successful migration is the migrant's ability to obtain a proper position in the host country's labor market. Our data clearly demonstrate that in all the six groups, largely due to the migrants' younger age and higher education, the number of the employed is high (more than two thirds). Given the dominance of younger people and the nature of migration, students represent a sizeable group (19 percent).

Figure 4.7. The composition of migrant groups according to educational attainment (percentages)

The first marked difference between the various migrant groups concerned the nature of their employment. Our Arab and Chinese respondents were reluctant to disclose their status in the labor market; one fifth of them refused to give an answer on this topic. Most of the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Turkish migrants

worked as entrepreneurs. The Vietnamese tended to run one-person businesses, while the Chinese and the Turks worked with several employees. Of the Ukrainians, especially the ethnic Hungarians among them, a relatively high percentage were menial workers; virtually all of them were employees. Few Ukrainians operated independent businesses. Among the Arab migrants, there was an equal number of independent business owners and employees.

To get a job and make a living in a foreign country is merely one aspect of successful migration. Equally important is whether the new job represents upward or downward mobility relative to their social position in their home country (see Figure 4.8).¹¹ More than half of our respondents (54 percent) could maintain their previous occupation, 20 percent experienced obvious upward mobility, and 7 percent moved down the social ladder. For 20 percent of our sample, the mobility was horizontal.

Most migrants (except the Vietnamese) did not experience either upward or downward mobility. In every group, the number of those moving “upwards” surpassed the number of individuals moving “downwards.” Only among the Vietnamese could striking shifts in occupational status be witnessed but mostly in horizontal direction.

Figure 4.8. The mobility trajectory of migrants in the new county, according to ethnicity (percentages)

¹¹ To study this question is only possible among respondents who had a job in their homeland and are active in Hungary's labor market as well. This explains why the table only contains 510 respondents of the 1200 individuals questioned.

C) The Social Psychological Aspects of Migration

We have established eight points of reference within the social psychological space that members of our six groups inhabited, each signifying an object of attachment. Our respondents were asked to assess the extent of their attachment to each object on a seven-point scale. We started by inquiring about their attachment to the country they had left. Subsequently, we asked them about the strength of their ties to their own ethnic group living in their country of origin. The next question concerned their link to members of their own ethnic diaspora, and finally we asked them about their attachment to their own diaspora in Hungary. Questions concerning the ties to their own ethnic groups were followed by questions about how they related to Hungarians not belonging to their ethnicity and to Hungary as a country. We were furthermore curious about our respondents' connections with other migrant groups living in Hungary; the final question probed their attachment to Europe.

The results can be seen on Table 4.3 and Figure 4.9. The data in 4.3 shows quite compellingly that the structure of the social psychological space inhabited by migrants in Hungary is quite similar, irrespective of their country of origin. The first two strata of "in-group" affiliation—marked by one's homeland and own ethnic group in that country—is substantially stronger in every group than the affiliation with the "out-group." Remarkably, however, in all the groups except the Chinese and the Arab, attachment to Hungary surpasses both the solidarity with the diaspora at large and their own ethnic group in Hungary. The weakest connection, invariably, was reported toward other migrant groups in the country. Attachment to Europe is not as strong as to Hungary among any of the groups but the Vietnamese. Nonetheless, it is more powerful than ties with the diaspora—again, excepting the Vietnamese (See Table 4.3).

Looking at one respondent of the in-group versus out-group relationship, the proximity felt by one's own ethnic group toward the host population (measured with the Bogardus scale), we may observe that the Ukrainians position themselves the closest to the Hungarians and the furthest away from the Vietnamese and the Chinese. The Turks and the Arabs feel less close to the Hungarians than the Ukrainians, but the distance is smaller than in the case of Vietnamese and the Chinese (see Figure 4.9).

Table 4.3. Levels of attachment in various migrant groups (averages on a 7-point scale)

Attachment to	Ethnic Hungarian	Ukrainian	Chinese	Vietnamese	Turkish	Arab
their country of origins	4.24	5.26	6.12	5.80	5.86	5.48
own ethnicity in their country of origins	5.62	5.59	5.94	5.42	5.71	4.81
their own ethnicity in the diaspora at large	5.72	5.06	4.92	5.15	4.74	4.14
their own ethnic group in Hungary	3.89	3.96	3.80	5.90	4.11	3.00
the Hungarians	4.99	4.76	4.14	5.25	4.26	4.13
Hungary	5.55	5.45	4.70	5.57	4.75	4.57
other migrant groups living in Hungary	3.04	3.29	3.59	5.29	3.40	3.02
Europe	4.33	4.42	4.48	5.85	4.27	3.92

Figure 4.9. The social distance felt toward Hungarians, according to ethnicity of migrant group (scale averages*)

* The 0 value signifies maximum closeness. Greater numbers indicate greater distances.

We have assessed the permeability of the borders between in-group and out-group by measuring social trust (Figure 4.10). In the Granovetter sense of the concept, social trust is a weak bind serving primarily to ease interactions and communication between strangers and thus, allow them to assume that future interactions will take place to promote mutual advantages and cooperation (Granovetter 1973). Negotiating the boundary between the in-group and the out-group is the trickiest task for ethnic Hungarians since the category “Hungarian” applies to their own group as well as to the population of the host country. The Hungarian in-group, in their case, refers to migrants from their own country. Yet, the beneficiary of their highest level of trust is not this particular group but the one they left behind. The least trusted group is “Hungarians” in general, wherever they are. The situation is similar for the Ukrainians, the Chinese, and the Turks even if they do not have to deal with the ambiguity of boundaries as the ethnic Hungarians do. In all these groups, the highest level of trust was felt toward the people they left behind in their homeland and the lowest toward Hungarians. The Vietnamese, however, are more trusting toward members of the out-group (that is, the Hungarians) than toward their own ethnic group, whether residing in Hungary or in Vietnam. The Arab respondents, while most trusting toward fellow Arabs of their home country, have more faith in “the Hungarians” than in the Arabs living next door.

Figure 4.10. The level of trust expressed toward Hungarians, one's own migrant group, and one's fellow countrymen left behind, by ethnicity of migrant group (averages on a 5-point scale)¹²

In the course of the research, we questioned respondents directly as to whether they had experienced discrimination (Figure 4.11). Less than 10 percent of the Turks, but more than half of the Chinese and the Vietnamese reported discrimination. Between 20 and 30 percent of the members of the other groups also reported discrimination. The common experience of unfairness among ethnic Hungarians from Transcarpathia and Voivodina (in Ukraine and Serbia respectively) surprised us since neither their “looks” nor their language revealed their migrant status, however, it might be the case that their dialect reveals the place their origin.

Across all groups, we observed that neighborhoods and schools were the most welcoming but migrants encountered adverse reactions in Hungary’s other public spaces and institutions. The sites where discriminatory behaviors were experienced varied widely according to ethnicity, foreboding a corresponding diversity of strategies used by migrants in their efforts to settle down in Hungary.

Migration is a long-term enterprise affecting multiple generations’ lives and its success depends on overcoming language barriers between the immigrants and members of the majority society. Ethnic Hungarians, whose mother tongue is Hungarian, did not face such a hurdle, even though their accents and vocabulary could make them conscious of the gap between their dialect and the one spoken by “mainland” Hungarians. While only a minority reported to be proficient in Hungarian in the other ethnic groups, a relative majority said they were keen to learn it (see Figure 4.12). A fairly large group (20 percent) of the Chinese, Turks, and Arabs expressed no desire to learn Hungarian.

Children’s education constitutes a large part of the families’ migration project. The families that anticipated their children growing up in the host country would naturally enroll them in the national public school system. Our data shows that this preference was highest among the ethnic Hungarians and the Vietnamese (see Figure 4.13). Among members of the other groups, sending their children to a Hungarian school was far from regular—least so within the Chinese and the Arab groups.

12 “How much do you trust in the Hungarians?”; “And in your diaspora living in Hungary?”; “And the people living in your homeland?”

Figure 4.11. Experiencing discrimination due to migrant status, according to the migrants' ethnicity of (in percentages)¹³

Figure 4.12. Proficiency in the Hungarian language, according to the migrants' ethnicity (in percentages)

¹³ Did you experience any discrimination in Hungary?

Figure 4.13. Willingness to integrate into national society: choice of school for children according to ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)

Communication with family and friends in the home country is essential for migrants to connect with the in-group, which has been remarkably facilitated by the use of internet. We could read from our data that such contacts were intensively maintained by the members of all the groups (see Figure 4.14). Most Arabs contacted their loved ones at least once a month. The other groups communicated with relatives at home less frequently; the Vietnamese and Chinese respondents reported the lowest level of contact with their fellow countrymen at home.

On a cultural or symbolic level, another indicator of emigrants' ties with their home country is the observance of holidays. Not only does this act express a person's belonging but makes it visible to both the in- and the out-group's members (see Figure 4.15). Immigrants who celebrate exclusively their own culture's special days will most likely refuse to assimilate or integrate themselves. In contrast, those who only observe the host country's holidays are generally keen to fit in. Integration is signified by immigrants celebrating both their old and the new country's holidays. Ignoring holidays indicates a sense of rootlessness. Examples of all these behavioral variants were found in each group. Overlooking holidays was quite common among the Arab and the Turk diaspora. Celebrating both cultures' special days could most typically be seen among our Vietnamese and Ukrainian respondents.

In none of the groups did we find many who stuck to their old homeland's holidays exclusively. Not surprisingly, the ethnic Hungarians dismissed all but the Hungarian holidays.

Figure 4.14. Frequency of communication with relatives in the home country, by the ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)

Figure 4.15. Observance of Hungarian national holidays and holidays of the home country, by ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)

The life of a migrant person inevitably involves being positioned between two worlds, which raises questions of belonging. Drawing on responses given to a multiple choice question regarding cultural and symbolic attachment, we identified four distinctive types (see Figure 4.16). Attachment to the country of origin was strongest among the Vietnamese and weakest among the ethnic Hungarians. The “rootless” made up a rather high percentage among the Arabs and the Ukrainians (35–40 percent) as opposed to the much smaller percentage measured among the Vietnamese and the Chinese. Those celebrating Hungarian holidays exclusively were just a few in all the groups except for ethnic Hungarians, who experienced little difficulty performing the habitual rituals of cultural and symbolic belonging to Hungary. The “double allegiance” was most prevalent among the Vietnamese, albeit not uncommon among the others either, except for the ethnic Hungarians.

Figure 4.16. Types of cultural and symbolic attachment by ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)

The strength of boundaries between the in- and out-groups was measured by questions probing the composition of our respondents' social networks (Figure 4.17),¹⁴ which generally showed segregation across all the groups. Ironically, this applied even to the ethnic Hungarians, whose friendships were evenly distributed

¹⁴ On the figure illustrating the social network's ethnic composition, the network described by the two situations is represented by the sum of the ties. The family members and relatives, however, were left out due to the obvious fact of representing the same ethnic group as the respondent.

between their own diaspora and native Hungarians. The Turkish and the Ukrainian respondents boasted the largest number of Hungarian ties, although not exceeding 20 percent of their whole network. In every group, most friendships were formed with people of the same ethnicity residing in Hungary. This trend was most conspicuous among the Vietnamese and the Chinese.

Figure 4.17. The ethnic composition of migrants' social networks, by ethnicity (in percentages)

D) Strategies of Migration

In the subsections above we offered an overall demographic portrayal of six migrant groups residing in Hungary. The groups included relative newcomers as well as residents of several decades. Their trajectories were as diverse as the extent to which their cultural, language, and religious backgrounds differed from those of the local population. This implied that these individuals had varying levels of the connection to Hungary and the Hungarian people, diverse perceptions of the hardships of migrant existence, and a variety of assessments as to whether their settling down in this country was a positive or, on the contrary, an unfortunate move to be reversed. The ethnic Hungarians were spared the language barriers; the other groups had to cope with the challenge of learning Hungarian as well as the host society's prejudices against immigrants.

Upon moving to a foreign land, immigrants have several strategies available to them, whether they are drifting along or bent to make deliberate choices. They may be eager to learn the country's customs and language, obtain citizenship, and settle down for good. Alternatively, short of opportunities or led by their beliefs, immigrants may seek sanctuary in their diaspora, enlisting the help of fellow migrants to find a job, speaking mostly their own language, and avoiding social life with Hungarians—in sum, segregating themselves from the host society. There is a third option, which researchers refer to as transnational migration. The lifestyle of such migrants is not restricted to the host country but involves moving between the old and the new countries. By virtue of relocation, moreover, migrants become part of a global system held together by economic, financial, and personal relationships. Within this system the migrants' main goal is to improve their material conditions, their quality of life and possibly run a successful business. They select or change their destination countries in response to emergent opportunities. Transnational migrants utilize a broad array of cognitive skills—the norms of everyday interaction, language proficiency, a general knowledge, smart dressing—and may adjust to the local expectations. This type of migration can easily accommodate segregationist strategies since such migrants are motivated by economic interests. In his study of the Chinese diaspora in Budapest, Pál Nyíri (2002) presented the following succinct characterization of the typical transnational migrant: “[The majority of the Chinese] continuously adapt to their environment as they negotiate numerous considerations such as potential income and mobility, right to legal residence, and access to schooling for their children to ensure an improved quality of life and advancement on the social ladder.”

The three migration strategies could be recognized in some measure in our research study as well. We assumed that those who adopted the assimilationist strategy had been living in Hungary for a longer time and would decide to come to Hungary again, were they to select a country of destination again. We assumed furthermore that these individuals spoke an intermediate level of Hungarian at the minimum, and did not insulate themselves from members of the host society. The assimilationists thus would have a reasonably large number of Hungarian people in their social network and might even have a Hungarian spouse. Trusting the country's institutions, this type of migrant would have their children attend a Hungarian language school. Overall, they would consider their migration economically successful and would be far more content with their life than those who

had adopted a different strategy. Our hypothetical migrant would likely believe that immigrant life is agreeable in this country and would endeavor to obtain a Hungarian citizenship. Their group would have the largest number of homeowners, another marker of the intent of staying in Hungary for good.

The segregationist strategy was typically found among those people who had been forced to leave their home country for political reasons rather than seeking economic prosperity. Either way, these immigrants did not lose interest in the issues of their original country; their attachment to it was unbroken. Trusting the diaspora more than members of the host society whose language they barely speak, the segregationists' social ties were, by and large, confined to their fellow countrymen and women. Migration led to downward mobility for them. Feeling uprooted, this type of migrant was more trusting toward their old country's rather than Hungary's institutions. Additionally, they sustained cultural ties with their homeland, keeping its customs, and observing its holidays. The segregationists believed that immigrants meet with a great deal of hardships in Hungary and they would have been better off if they had never left.

The transnational strategy presented the most difficulty to capture on an empirical level. Migrants wielding this strategy left their country for economic reasons and would readily do so again if given the option. Yet by no means would these individuals want to become Hungarian citizens: as soon as a better opportunity would arise in another country, they would have no second thoughts about moving on. Our transnationalists spoke no Hungarian, nor did they plan to learn it. Their children attended mostly international schools. Despite being surrounded by an extremely extensive social network and many friends, they did not trust the Hungarians or other migrant groups, although they felt no hostility towards them. While they did not demonstrate much interest in their home country's politics, they nurtured intense relationships with the fellow countrymen across the border, in service of their business transactions. Having achieved higher living standards in Hungary, transnationalists may be viewed as successful migrants. Yet in assessing their living standards, they compared them to European ones. They expressed strong faith in the European Union institutions and would be prepared to settle down in some further away EU country. Returning to their homeland was not on their wish list.

We did not expect that the various migrant strategies would be clearly identified in the individual careers of our migrant groups. However, we expected to

recognize the dominant strategies whose characteristics could be isolated with the help of cluster analysis. The three cluster groups showed three prominent strategies (see Figure 4.18). The first group consisted of the assimilationists, and as the figure shows, their percentage widely varies across the migrant groups. The second group was made up of individuals who did not regard Hungary as their final destination. Migrants who self-segregated in some manner constituted the third group. It is worth noting that when setting up our typology of migrant strategies, we took into account our subjects' stated intention to move on or stay in Hungary and also examined which elements in their lifestyle predominated: those suggestive of a long-term tenure¹⁵ or a transient stay?

Figure 4.18. Migration strategies by ethnicity of migrant groups (percentages)

Our initial expectation was that the ethnic Hungarians would wholeheartedly adopt the assimilationist strategy, considering the widespread idea that their main goal crossing the border is “reunification with the mother country.” To our surprise, while such an option was quite attractive to them, merely two thirds of the respondents identified with the assimilationist plan (64 percent). In terms of living standards, the ethnic Hungarians appeared successful on account of the obvious improvement they had experienced after moving to the country. Their acclimatization was evident in the trust they expressed toward the institutions

¹⁵ This explains why the answers given to the direct question “Would you consider moving on?” might differ from the strategies characterizing the given migrant group.

and the people of Hungary, the predominance of local Hungarians in their social networks, and, finally, in the finding that neither returning to their homeland nor migrating to a new place occupied their thoughts.

Some 28 percent of the ethnic Hungarians fell into the category of transnational migrants. However, their case nonetheless deviated from the classic type of transnational migration because these individuals were not linked to a geographically scattered global community on economic, religious or political grounds. Their plan to keep moving on seemed to be motivated by material or career aspirations, despite being firmly connected to Hungary. This interpretation may be substantiated by this group's unfavorable judgment of their living standards as compared to how assimilationist ethnic Hungarians assessed their own situation. The transnationalists' project of moving on would certainly be assisted by their very extensive web of social networks consisting of ethnic and native Hungarian as well as foreign friends.

The segregationist strategy among the ethnic Hungarians (8 percent) signifies frustration and having to live on the margins of society. In the segregated subgroup the level of distrust toward Hungarian institutions is high—2.6 on a 5-point scale, and wariness toward Hungarians was even higher with an average value of 2.3. Such strong distrust shows a severe underlying discontent. The Transcarpathian Hungarians who adopted a segregationist strategy did not fare well economically after their migration into Hungary. They estimated their living standards to be lower than those of other ethnic Hungarians and, unlike the latter, migration caused them to contend with poorer conditions than they had in their home country. Somewhat oddly, they were socially isolated, had a relatively weak network of connections (one or two friends at most) including few, if any, native Hungarians (only amounting to 7 percent of a small network). What may offer a measure of optimism is the relative shortness of their stay in Hungary at the time of the research. It is quite possible that the sociological snapshot taken of their lives merely reflected the initial hurdles of immigrant existence.

A relative majority of the Ukrainians were transnationalist migrants (44 percent). Based on our data, their strategy too deviated from the classic transnationalist model in that their purpose was simply to migrate on due to material needs. The transnationalist Ukrainians held unusually large social networks exceeding more than six friends of various nationalities, indicating the mobilization of their large social capital in their migration project. They will enjoy the benefits of this capital as they cross the next border.

One third of the Ukrainian respondents was categorized as assimilationist. They experienced the largest improvement in living standards, they shared a general sense of contentment, and planned to settle down and stay in Hungary. Contrary to our assumptions, only 22 percent of the Ukrainian group could be deemed segregated. Their economically less successful trajectory compared to the prosperity of fellow Ukrainians could not be explained by their short stay in Hungary. Only half of them had a solid employment as opposed to the other two sub-groups, three fourths of whom held a full-time job.

The greater part of the Chinese migrant group also lived in segregation (59 percent). The Chinese diaspora appeared extremely insulated in every respect. Only two strategies seemed to work effectively for them: segregation or transnationalism (32 percent). Evidence suggests that it was not the strength of their ties to Hungarian society but their embeddedness in the diaspora that influenced their choice between the two strategies. Members of the segregated group were not employed in a family business, nor did they possess sufficient funds to start their own venture. Instead, they worked for non-related Chinese employers. This may be part of the reason of their low living standards and experiencing the least improvement with regard to their living conditions in the homeland. The transnationalist Chinese group, in contrast, was strikingly well off, their living standards were high, and they reported to be fully satisfied with their overall situation. Despite organizing their livelihood and career on a global scale, part of this group (20 percent) appeared adapted to Hungarian society, as evidenced by purchasing real estate, sending their children to Hungarian schools, and so forth. In some sense, Hungary played a pivotal role in their plans. These individuals may be instrumental in creating an opportunity to develop a Hungarian-based international virtual business center.

The other two migrant groups where the percentage of segregated individuals was high were the Vietnamese and the Turkish. New immigrants arriving from geographically and culturally distant countries tend to become closeted in a segregated status. Over time, they have the chance to join the assimilationist group whose members are able fulfill their material and career expectations: 42 percent of the Vietnamese and 14 percent of the Turk diaspora in Hungary adopted this strategy. When their initial hopes are not met, the members of the segregated group are likely to switch strategies and become transnationalists. This may, however, be a deceptive label, since these individuals had lived in the country for some

time without attaining, either objectively or subjectively, genuine success in terms of career or living conditions. Their dissatisfaction, then, urges them to leave and try their luck in another country. There is a great difference between the Vietnamese and the Turkish respondents in that the former were committed to assimilate themselves, while such an option was seldom available for the latter group. For the Vietnamese, the assimilationist choice was more readily accessible as they moved to Hungary at a young age (around the time of the regime change) and many of them were educated in Hungary. The assimilation of Turkish migrants was stronger among those who were secular.

The Arab respondents in our study utilized all the three strategies with remarkable frequency. This may partly be due to the continuous influx of Arab migrants to Hungary, starting already during the socialist era. Most of them reported their intent to assimilate themselves (44 percent), while many others belonged to the transnationalist group (32 percent). The factors underlying the three strategies are identical to those seen among the Vietnamese and the Turkish migrants. The assimilationists had stayed in Hungary for the longest time and had attained the highest living standards. In the least advantageous situation, we found individuals stuck in segregation, while the group classified as transnationalist could not be assessed as particularly successful, either. This may surely go some way in explaining why these migrants were considering moving on to some other country and arranging their stay in Hungary accordingly. In choosing to move on, they did not envision to join the global Muslim diaspora. On the contrary, it was an act of cautiously distancing themselves from the religious community, an assumption supported by their relatively weak affiliation with the Muslim faith. Thus, what we saw within the Arab migrant group also defied the classical notion of transnational migration; it could best be regarded as traversing borders repeatedly in hopes of a better life.

PLACING THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF HUNGARY'S MIGRANTS IN A EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Of the inhabitants of the European Union, 4 percent (20 million people) were born in a country that is not member of the Union. Owing to global circumstances fueling migration, the size of this population continues to grow year by year.

The 2014, data on the education level of all the working-age immigrants (between the ages of 20 and 64) shows that 25 percent have a diploma from a postsecondary educational institution, close to one half (48 percent) have a high school diploma, and 37 percent have a lower level of schooling. In 2014, 56.5 percent of the EU population that had migrated from a country outside of the EU was employed. Earlier, this percentage was 4 percent higher, and unemployment since then has risen correspondingly. In 2014, virtually half of the EU immigrant population faced the prospect of poverty and exclusion. Earlier this challenge only affected 45 percent of them.¹⁶

Public opinion in the host countries vary. Typically, countries with a small immigrant population are more likely to be hostile to immigrants than countries where that proportion is larger. According to a survey made in 2008 on a representative sample encompassing eight countries,¹⁷ xenophobia was rampant in Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland. It was less intense in France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Germany (Figure 4.19).¹⁸ Extreme xenophobia was observed among a particularly large number of Hungarian respondents.¹⁹ Where immigrants are many, one may surmise, xenophobia is a lesser phenomenon.

The Hungarian case can be considered extraordinary not just because the high level of general xenophobia and extreme level of opposition to immigration found in 2008. From an 11-year retrospective we have witnessed a continuous rise of the already high rate of xenophobia and extreme anti-immigration attitude. That was not the case in the other countries taking part in the 2008 research. Since 2010, the ruling party in Hungary has recognized the huge political potential hidden in

16 See <http://www.mipex.eu>.

17 See <https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1587786>.

18 The indices of general xenophobia were produced by aggregating the answers provided to multiple questions. Xenophobia was measured on a 4-point scale where high values referred to strong negative sentiments.

19 By removing the answers of those extremely agreeing with the statements repudiating migrants, we will have an index of answers expressive of extreme views.

xenophobic rhetoric. The government elected in 2010 and subsequently reelected two times based a very effective, in fact permanent, campaign on xenophobia which is probably responsible for the moral panic and political hysteria prevalent in the wild sections of Hungarian society in 2019. We cannot tell how long this unleashed fear of migrants who are not coming to Hungary will continue.

Figure 4.19. The level of general and extreme xenophobia in eight European countries in proportion to the entire sample (percentages)

A survey conducted in 2012 produced comparable correlations. The native citizens of the studied countries were asked to respond the question concerning the legal equality between native citizens and immigrants. The researchers found that in some countries like Cyprus, Hungary, and Lithuania, 60 to 70 percent of the respondents gave a negative answer as opposed to countries like Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Estonia where the negative responses amounted to 10 to 20 percent.

A 2014 study indicated that immigration to the EU elicits “negative sentiments” in 57 percent of citizens, but the percentage in Western Europe is much lower than in the Baltic and Central European region. Immigrants need to grapple with difficulties in countries where their numbers are low and therefore a high level of hostility is directed at them.

Anxieties induced by the actual or imagined size of migrant influx prepared the ground for political parties on the extreme right fringes, which never before was as successful as in the election of the EU Parliament in 2014:²⁰ 25 percent of the votes in Denmark, France, and Great Britain went to candidates of the extreme right parties. In Austria, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, 15 percent of the voters preferred the extreme right-wing candidates. In Sweden and in Greece the figures were above 10 percent.

THE MIPEX RESEARCH

The countries of Europe have exhibited differential capabilities and willingness to integrate immigrants. The process of integration is considered effective when it affects all the essential facets of the immigrants' lives. In a recent procedure, experts with ample experience in handling problems in relation to immigration were asked to evaluate their own countries' capability to cope with these issues (MIPEX study).²¹ Data was supplied by independent civil organizations (NGOs, research institutes, think tanks). In Hungary, this data was given by ICCR-Budapest Foundation. The experts filling out the questionnaires included András Kováts (*Menedék* Hungarian Associations for Migrants), András Kádár (Helsinki Committee), and Boldizsár Nagy (Central European University/Eötvös Loránd University).

In the survey, participants evaluated 8 areas: (1) navigating the labor force; (2) family unification; (3) training and schooling; (4) civic activism; (5) long-term settlement; (6) securing citizenship; (7) access to health care, and (8) discrimination. Each area was qualified from multiple angles. The final outcomes are shown on Table 4.4 with the ranking of the 31 countries based upon the experts' evaluations. We have complemented the original table with additional data: the per capita gross national product and the size of foreign-born population residing in the given country.

²⁰ See <http://www.mipex.eu>.

²¹ See <http://www.mipex.eu>.

Table 4.4. The 31 European countries ranked according to the MIPEx index*

Ranking 2014	Country	Score**	Change since 2010	Per capita GDP, 2010, USD	Percentage of foreign-born residents, 2015
1	Sweden	78	0	47,229	14,3
2	Portugal	75	1	27,624	7,5
3	Finland	69	2	40,838	5,4
3	Norway	69	1	67,445	13,8
5	Belgium	67	2	43,800	12,9
6	Germany	61	3	46,896	14,9
7	The Netherlands	60	-8	48,317	11,1
7	Spain	60	0	34,899	14
9	Italy	59	1	35,811	8
9	Denmark	59	10	45,451	9
11	Luxembourg	57	2	93,174	43,3
11	United Kingdom	57	-6	40,676	11,3
12	France	54	1	41,018	11,1
13	Ireland	52	1	51,119	15,9
14	Austria	50	3	47,031	15,2
15	Switzerland	49	1	58,731	28,9
16	Estonia	46	1	27,995	16,4
17	Hungary	45	1	25,895	4,7
17	Iceland	45	-	45,269	10,7
17	Czech Republic	45	3	30,895	4,0
17	Romania	45	1	20,526	0,9
21	Slovenia	44	0	30,508	11,3
21	Greece	44	-2	26,773	11,1
23	Croatia	43	-	21,169	17,6
24	Bulgaria	42	3	18,327	1,2
25	Poland	41	5	26,210	0,9
26	Malta	40	2	34,544	8,0
27	Slovakia	37	0	29,210	3,3
27	Lithuania	37	1	28,210	4,9
29	Cyprus	35	0	30,770	18,2
30	Latvia	31	2	24,541	13,8
31	Turkey	25	1	20,188	5,81

* Supplemented by the ratio of per capita national income and by the proportion of non-native population living in that country.

** Hundred points scale.

The indicators of the MIPEX policy show a great deal of disparity among the various European countries. Integration that is successful in the various areas is, predominantly, characteristic of the advanced Western countries like Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. The less advanced eastern European countries are found on the lower half of the ranking, with their index being consistently below 50 percent. Last on the list is Turkey with a mere 25 percent value on the 100-point scale. This state of affairs gives some food for thought, in light of the fact that this country is the immigrants' gateway to Europe.

Besides the general trend, one may observe some surprises. In terms of its integration policy, Portugal is remarkably successful (second on the list), and so are Spain and Italy (with their seventh and ninth spot, respectively). Estonia, Hungary, and Romania perform relatively well, too, even though they rank sixteenth and seventeenth, that is, they are positioned on the lower part of the list. It may seem odd and discouraging that the immigration policy and integration procedure of some developed countries with large immigrant populations exhibit mediocre results, such as Great Britain, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, and Austria. This too may give rise to some unease as far as Europe's future acceptance of migrants and refugees is concerned. In addition, these countries boast of a relatively high GDP per capita, thus one may infer that the magnitude of disposable resources does not necessarily guarantee success with the integration of migrants.

Inspecting the temporal dimension of change, it is apparent that the ranking of European countries based on their performance in integration is relatively stable, even though significant changes are detectable in some instances. Denmark, for example, has made a big leap forward, while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have fallen behind.

The last column of the table clearly exhibits how uneven the distribution of foreign-born residents is across the EU's territory: in some countries, their proportion is high and elsewhere it is low. The largest percentage can be observed in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Given the rationale of migrants, the trend of wealthier countries attracting more immigrants than the poorer ones is no surprise. Portugal stands out as an exception. In some other less wealthy countries as well, the presence of non-EU residents is sizable, which is traceable to the given countries' peculiarities in more recent history. For example, in Estonia the size of the Russian population is large owing to its Soviet past. Similarly, in the wake of Yugoslavia's

collapse and the following civil war, many people from Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were forced to relocate to Croatia and Slovenia. There must be an increased attraction among migrants for countries where the GDP per capita and the proportion of foreign-born residents are both relatively high. Along with these factors, migrants may presume that well-functioning institutions and practices are in place to facilitate settling down. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the ranking of countries on the basis of expert evaluations does not always corroborate such assumptions.

With the help of these evaluations the MIPLEX indicator can illuminate how successfully the political and policy apparatus of a country can tackle the economic, sociopolitical, and cultural challenges posed by immigration. Numerous sociological studies conducted on this topic over the past years have inquired about how migrants themselves viewed their experiences; how successful or not they deemed their migration, and what they thought about the prospects of integration into their country of destination.

THE LOCALMULTIDEM RESEARCH

The LOCALMULTIDEM Research²² sponsored by the EU7 grant system took place in 2008. The goal was to compare migrant groups residing in various European cities in terms of their political, social, and cultural integration. Furthermore, the project included the collection of data on the attitudes of the host society. The field work utilized representative samples in all countries. The interviews were recorded either in the official language of the host country or the respondents' native language, depending on the respondents' preference. The data was weighted according to age, gender, and educational level.

In each country, the LOCALMULTIDEM research questioned migrants representing a substantial population. Part of the questions were formulated to accommodate the migrant group's specificities. In searching for general characteristics of immigrants in the 6 countries, we may only consider identically formulated questions, irrespective of the religious and ethnic background of the respondents. In each case, one question concerned the respondent's length of stay in the country.

22 See <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/28802/reporting>.

In addition, it was very important to learn if the respondent spoke the official language of the host country. Of no less interest was the inquiry about the strength of the subject's ties to the host country as well as to the country from where they had migrated. Several questions were formulated to examine the extent to which the immigrant person was integrated into the host society and the degree to which they sustained relationships with the previous homeland. Interest in the news, communication, active discussion of political issues, civic participation, and membership in various organizations all formed part of the research study. Yet another set of questions inquired about the composition of family and friendship circles and their ethnic and religious homogeneity.

Trust and distrust are integral issues when it comes to social integration of various kinds. In this study, separate questions scrutinized the trust subjects felt toward the in-group as opposed to the out-group consisting of members of the majority society. Trusting social institutions constitutes another level examined in relation to the institutions of the host country and the EU. Further valid questions threw light on discrimination perceived by every migrant minority and another inquired about the ease or hardships of fitting in with the majority society.

Altogether we identified 31 questions that were posed in all the 6 countries participating in the research. Subsequently we set up variables using the answers to the questions, which made a cluster analysis possible. The analysis enabled us to isolate 4 distinct groups of migrants. The properties of the various groups offered a clear picture of the challenges of integration into the majority society, many of them quite similar to the variations of integration strategies found in our investigation of migrant groups in Hungary.

1. Migrants with a Double Allegiance

The first group was comprised of migrants with a "double allegiance." Owing to their shared religious and ethnic background, the group members had close ties to one another and no weak connections to the members of the majority (Granovetter 1973). Hence the distrust they expressed toward the members of the host society. Having spent a relatively extended period of time in their chosen country, these individuals still maintained relationships with the country from where they had migrated. While the ethnic composition of their family was homogeneous, their social connections were not. Members of this group reported a great deal of

confidence toward the host country's institutions but far less confidence toward the people whom they meet on a day-to-day basis. Many of them had learned the official language of the host country but some had not.

2. Active Migrants

The second category was set up for the active and self-conscious migrant who did not necessarily stay in the country where they first stopped. They were the ones most closely resembling the type of the transnationalist migrant of Hungary. The members of the group lived in ethnically homogeneous families. Their network of acquaintances, too, were made up of individuals like themselves. They lacked weak connections helping them integrate into the majority society, and they did not necessarily speak the host country's official language. These migrants had not been living in the host country for long. While attached to the host society with medium level intensity, their relationships with their country of origin were lively and rich. They were politically active and engaged in civic, ethnic, and religious organizations. Quite trustful toward the institutions of the host state and the EU, they nonetheless believed that the migrants' situation is treacherous.

3. Segregated Migrants

The third group consisted of new and segregated immigrants with low level of connection to the host society and strong ties to their fellow migrants. Their families, similarly to their social networks, were ethnically and religiously entirely homogeneous. They, too, found their migrant existence onerous and experienced virulent discrimination from the majority. Members of this group were passive and uninterested in the news whether originating in the host country or their homeland. They did not speak the language of the majority population.

4. Alienated Migrants

The members of the fourth group had the most ethnically mixed families and their circle of friends was mixed as well. They had been long term residents of the host country, did not nurture relationships with their homeland, and neither did they

care about it. It seemed as if they had been living in a vacuum, which accounts for the “alienated” label. They showed distrust toward their own kind as well as the majority society. Likewise, the alienated migrants expressed no faith in the host country or the EU’s institutions. Civic and political activities had no real attraction for them. However, they had never sensed being overly discriminated against and did not find their status as migrants too difficult. Most of them spoke the language of their host country.

The results of this research do not offer any other conclusion but that the probability of first-generation immigrants’ integration into the majority societies of Europe is quite low. In the case of second and third generation migrants, however, the four types predict different levels of probable integration. The isolation of the segregated group appears to be enduring—a condition neither the majority, nor they themselves seem intent to alleviate. The active group, as mentioned earlier, will likely adopt the transnational strategy, which we believe involves their further migration within the diaspora that cuts across national, religious and cultural borders. The best chances for the success of integration may be ensured by the “double bind” type of migration, striking a balance between the original and the acquired collective identity. With the alienated type, the original identity is ineffectual and distant, while no new one has been acquired. If this state of affairs persists, the next generations of young people born into such families may become susceptible to assume a “long distance collective identity,” propelling them to engage in radical or extreme acts, since they perceive themselves to be living, social-psychologically speaking, in a kind of nowhere land.

The distribution of the four migrant groups is not uniform in the six countries of the research study as may be viewed on Figure 4.20.

The percentage of double bind migrants is low in Italy (14 percent) and Hungary (8 percent), jeopardizing the future integration of the migrant population. The active migrants’ percentage is highest in Switzerland (35 percent) and Spain (35 percent), while lowest in France (5 percent). Strikingly high is the ratio of the segregated group in Hungary (53 percent) and Italy (56 percent), although segregation, if voluntary, does not provoke conflicts between minorities and majorities. The alienated represent a significant presence within the French immigrant population (62 percent), justifying the anxiety about how the majority versus minority relations will play out in France. The distribution of the various types of groups looks most balanced in Switzerland and Spain.

Figure 4.20. Types of migrants in six European countries (percentages)

Looking at the sociodemographic variables of each group, we find many more men than women among the active group. In the rest of the groups there is no significant gender difference. As regards the variable of age, the segregated and the alienated are younger than the double bind and the active groups, a difference attributable to the longer tenure of the latter groups in comparison to the former. The segregated and the alienated have more students in them than the other two groups. The percentage of unemployed varies between 11 and 14 percent across all the groups. Economic activity is highest among the active group's members, while idleness is certainly not prevalent in the other groups either: 61 to 62 percent are entrepreneurs, employees, and taxpayers, which underscores the benefits of migration for the local economy.

The LOCALMULTIDEM study offered an invaluable opportunity to evaluate various aspects of migrants' integration from both the host society's and the migrants' perspectives, by posing the same set of questions to a sample taken from each group (Figure 4.21 a–d).

Figure 4.21. Assessment of the difficulties of integration by the host society and by migrants in six countries of Europe, * 2008 (averages on an 11-grade scale)

a. Difficulties in the admission process

b. Difficulties in finding a job

* The number on the figures varied in terms of how many countries provided valid answers to the statements on the questionnaires.

c. Cultural and religious rejection

d. Perceived xenophobia

Oddly, overall we found no drastic deviations between the migrants' and the host society's assessments. As a trend—irrespective of the migrants' ethnicity and the host country—both the problems of fitting in and finding a job were assessed as “medium” hard: respondents assigned these items the value of “6” on an 11-point scale. Regarding the difficulties of acceptance, “6” was the assessment of the majority respondents in Spain, Italy, and Hungary, even though in these countries immigrants perceived their problems as more severe by assigning it the value of “8” on average. Also, in these countries, the majority did not properly sense the immigrants' real challenges to get a job. In other words, as a social problem,

it appears underestimated. In the other countries, the perspectives of the majority and the migrants offered completely overlapping assessments.

Interestingly, no divergence was found between the host society and the immigrants when it came to evaluating the level of cultural rejection experienced in their shared social existence. At the time of the survey, in 2008, neither group perceived explosive tensions in this regard, averages hovered around the value of “4.” In general, the research subjects expressed the belief that their host society tends to respect migrants with different cultural backgrounds.

In reacting to the statement according to which “The host society is pervasively xenophobic,” more noteworthy variations occurred among the countries.²³ In most of them, though, the immigrants and the host society agreed in their views of xenophobia being of medium intensity, although a slightly lesser value was assigned by citizens of the host country. We were genuinely surprised by the Hungarian response wherein immigrants perceived xenophobia to be of medium intensity as opposed to the majority members’ claim of it being pervasive!

To sum up, the general trend to be observed was that in 2008 respondents evaluated the difficulties associated with various facets of integration as of moderate intensity in the researched countries with no significant national differences.

THE ICS RESEARCH

With regard to integration challenges posed by the migration flow to Europe, we look at the findings of relatively recent research, the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS) conducted in seven EU countries in 2012.²⁴ The goal of this project was to supply data for professionals in the field of European immigration policy on six areas concerning the outstanding challenges of integration, based on the socio-demographic, cultural, and ethnic background of immigrants. The areas included employment, language acquisition, family unification, civic activism, the bureaucratic procedures authorizing long term stay, and obtaining citizenship. The research subjects were recruited among third country immigrants who already were citizens, whose naturalization was in progress or, who had been residing in the country

²³ This item, unfortunately, was not included on the questionnaire used in Switzerland and France.

²⁴ See https://www.migpolgroup.com/_old/diversity-integration/immigrant-citizens-survey/.

for more than a year on a temporary basis. The central question addressed the process of integration into the host country as experienced by the immigrants themselves, including the problems they faced. The participant countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The research was conducted on quasi-representative samples of each country's migrant populations, constructed via random sampling using accessible registers and a corrected snow-balling method.

The data to be published here presents a synthesis of the ways in which the immigrants, based on their personal experiences, evaluated the success and/or the challenges of their migration. We have set up scales in four dimensions (obtaining citizenship, job search, validation of diplomas from the home country, and language acquisition) in order to measure the various aspects of problems reported in the given area. These four dimensions have been complemented with the aggregate values of subjective satisfaction measured in various areas. The cluster analysis involving the five scales allowed us to distinguish five distinct groups (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5. The organization of the cluster structure measuring the success of integration, with the adjustment of individual dimensions

	Clusters				
	Socially unintegrated	Regarding migrant status			
		Unintegrated	Frustrated	Segregated	Integrated
Obtaining citizenship	0.00	3.42	-0.22	-0.21	-0.24
Job search	0.39	0.58	0.81	0.43	-0.58
Domestication of diplomas from the old country	3.18	-0.01	-0.24	-0.28	-0.26
Language acquisition	0.18	0.12	-0.27	2.02	-0.38
Subjective contentment	-0.12	-0.15	-0.71	-0.32	0.45
N	533	410	1715	920	3411

Regarding their sizes, particularly the last three groups stand out. In the last group called *integrated*, no aspect of the process looks problematic and it is linked with a high level of subjective status contentment. On the opposite end there is

the group of *frustrated* individuals where the personal level of discontentment is particularly high, in congruence with the level of attendant problems in finding a job. There is also the group of *segregated* individuals among whom the status of discontent is somewhat lower but who experience considerable problems in finding a job and learning the language. The first two groups are relatively small in size with medium level of status contentment. The first group reported difficulties in integration on several areas, while the second one experienced failure, particularly in acquiring citizenship and in the labor market.

Table 4.6 demonstrates the occurrence of the various types in the countries of the research.

Table 4.6. The distribution of the types reconstructed with regard to integration, according to countries (percentages)

	Clusters					All
		Regarding migrant status				
	Socially un-integrated	Unintegrated	Frustrated	Segregated	Integrated	
Belgium	5.1	11.3	25.4	13.4	44.8	100.0
France	16.5	11.4	19.7	14.3	38.1	100.0
Germany		1.9	20.3	8.4	69.4	100.0
Hungary	5.6	2.7	17.3	26.0	48.4	100.0
Italy		2.6	42.1	26.5	28.8	100.0
Portugal	15.3	8.8	28.1	8.0	39.8	100.0
Spain	8.7	0.4	19.9	3.0	68.0	100.0
All	7.6	5.8	24.5	13.0	49.0	100.0

It is particularly the integrated group where national differences seemed most spectacular. According to our data, in 2012 two countries excelled in achieving successful integration according to migrants' experiences and reports: Germany and Spain, with more than two thirds of their migrants achieving successful integration. Hungary and Belgium belonged to the countries with medium level of success, while France and Portugal exhibited unexpectedly poor performance.

Italy was reported to be unequivocally the least successful in that year. The latter results are interesting with regard to Italy and Portugal because they contradict those of the MIPEX index. One cause of the discrepancy may lie in the fact that the MIPEX index evaluated the efficacy of integration through the workings of the integration policy's principles, institutions and procedures, as opposed to ICS providing a view of the workings of integration from the immigrants' perspectives.

In France, we found a high percentage of those who lacked citizenship and were not integrated socially. In Hungary there were a high number of segregated migrants, and in Portugal the group of frustrated migrants was relatively large. Also, quite high was the proportion of this group in Italy.

This data may not necessarily reflect the present-day situation of migrants in Europe. Yet the similarity between the time marked by the 2015 refugee crisis and this earlier period of time is notable. The itinerary of migrants in Europe seems to have corresponded to the differential performances of integration in various European countries. The data indicates the crucial dissimilarities characterizing migrants' experiences in terms of the migration process, settling down, fitting in, and integrating into European society.

THE PARADOXES OF FREE MIGRATION

Homo sapiens have evolved through nomadic experiences. The groups that could transcend natural constraints were the ones which, forced by the challenges of movement, adopted innovative adaptive strategies. The anatomical and neurological changes that played a vital role in successful adaptation, made the formation of distinct human social existence possible (Berwick and Chomsky 2016). As opposed to wandering across the Earth, settling down turned out to be the prevailing principle of survival for the majority of humankind. Yet there has always been a minority that has remained nomadic. Sedentary living has never eradicated movement, migration, and relocation, which is a source of both fear and hope for the settled majority.

Human history, as established earlier, has been the history of people's migration. The novelty of the modern age is not that many more people embark on a journey from many more places compared to earlier movements, but that the

obstacles created by humans to control or impede movements are more numerous. Obstacles have existed before as well, even though their character was shaped by nature rather than society. The transportation and communicational conditions of the premodern era did not thwart people's ability to move. However, waters, mountains, and deserts did limit travel both for individuals and groups changing locations in geographical space.

Following the prehistoric wanderings, more and more places on Earth became inhabited by humans who carried in them the neural mutation enabling the development of language. The multiplicity of languages, customs and bodily features was an effect of the scattering of groups producing ethnocentric realities, each of which was predicated on the distinction between the in-group and the out-group. Inherent in this distinction was the emergence of conflicts fostering in a large measure the maintenance of identities.

The identity of migrant groups initially depended on keeping track of blood lineage. Members of the group were the individuals whose mothers belonged to the group. Boundaries between the groups were regulated, not by territorial arrangements, but by descent, the latter being independent of the former. The physical space populated by the members of the group grew to be an intrinsic part of the ethnocentric reality, the borders of which may have been imaginary, but no member of the group could steer clear of the midst of meanings imposed on that physical space. The more generations participated in their transmission, the less they could steer clear of the meanings so that, for the members of each new generation entering life, these meanings appeared a tangible and taken-for-granted reality, without which they could not have developed and sustained their self-identity.

In the premodern areas, the borders of the territory inhabited by the group were primarily mental constructions observed both by the group's members and the approaching strangers. The difference created on the psychological level, however, was monumental since the inhabitants of the territory—the people who had settled there—considered it to be their own. Everyone else was classified as a stranger on account of not having been born there. The strangers may have arrived in the territory for any number of reasons, yet never assumed it was their own. Borders were marked by guards and gates but remained easy to pass. Townsmen protected their towns by walls. Even in our days, the Great Wall of China serves as a preeminent example of how a settled people can protect an entire territory against strangers' attacks.

Migrations were by no means always peaceful. Peoples moved from one area to another and some groups occupied other groups' territories. Borders were redrawn according to shifting inter-group relations but were never erased.

Border protection following the logic of the Great Wall is a tool employed by the nation states of the modern era, involving the definition of border crossing as a legal act. The right of the nation state to distinguish its own citizens from any other states' citizens implies that crossing the border is easy for some and difficult for others. Furthermore, it can legally take place at specified spots only. In the twenty-first century, massive migrations induced by global processes and multiple causes have added special urgency to the question as to whether, irrespective of citizenship determined by the blind chance of one's birth, is it possible to grant everyone the right of free movement. This would inevitably undermine the sovereign nation state's right to admit or exclude strangers. Consensus has already been attained on the imperative of granting admission to asylum seekers persecuted due to their political beliefs, religious, ethnic, or sexual identity. In other cases, there exists no international convention permitting individuals' unobstructed free movement on the globe, irrespective of existent or non-existent guarded borders.

The literature addressing issues of migration is unanimous in claiming the economic benefits of migration for the host country. Those who are pressured to leave their country for economic reasons tend to be performance oriented. Educated or not, they desire to find their niche in the host society's division of labor.

From a human rights perspective, it is hard to argue against free migration, since no one is responsible what native country the lottery game of chance has offered them. Those unhappy with their birthplace will find it difficult to accept the idea of living their entire life in a place where they have to remain poor (Nagy 2011). Whereas one cannot object to the right of free international migration on a human rights basis, culture-based counter-arguments are compelling. Walser (1983) has proposed counter-arguments to migration referring to the community principle, and stating that the government can rightfully protect the integrity of the national community (understood in the historical and cultural sense of the term) comprised of the majority of its citizens from large numbers of immigrants with dissimilar cultural backgrounds. This especially applies to immigrants who cannot or do not want to integrate into the host society, refusing its values and norms.

When a host country is faced with a truly massive flow of immigrants with shared cultural backgrounds among them, it is not surprising that the majority

nurtures resentment and fears of becoming a minority themselves. These anxieties may become more powerful if the migrants' language(s) and religion(s) are different, in addition to following a set of moral and sexual codes other than those of the host society. In a democratic regime, this kind of resentment may easily provide fuel for political agendas that will not be undercut by a reasoning grounded in liberal rationality.

It is global injustice affecting humankind as a whole that produces modern migration on a global scale. Yet it would not be sensible to expect migration to be the royal road of restoring justice. If, as a result of migration, the host society develops ghettos, segregation, and isles resisting social entropy, nothing but the importation of global injustices has been achieved, causing severe conflicts between the anxiety-ridden majority and the frustrated migrant minorities. Conflict sensitivity furthermore is the property not of the first generation of migrants but of their offspring finding themselves in an identity vacuum. Benedict Anderson (1992) has coined the phrase "long-distance nationalism" to describe the kind of idealized identity that frustrated second and third generation migrants secure for themselves as an exit from the identity vacuum. In view of the twenty-first century's global migration processes, we would prefer to talk of "distant collective identities" drawing its contents not on a national but a religious knowledge base. "Long-distance nationalism" and "long-distance collective identity" bear a similarity in possessing an intangible rather than a materially existing—economic and political—reality.

SUMMARY

Our first research question concerned testing the validity of Szűcs's theory in our times, specifically at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Our data makes it clear that the differentiation of the three regions has shortcomings and missing parts and it requires more precision. In our book we have maintained the type of logic employed by Szűcs and constructed a regional typology that pays more attention to differences in modernization. Within the Western European region, we distinguished between the core countries of the region and the countries of Scandinavia. It seemed prudent to differentiate European countries off the continental mainland, including the United Kingdom and Ireland. We treated the countries of southern Europe as a fourth region, which was something Szűcs did not take into consideration. The fifth region is the classic area of Central Europe. And finally, the Eastern pole was represented by Russia and Turkey.

The Szűcs theory is supported by the data concerning the inclusivity of the national category, which clearly shows that moving from West to east in Europe, the logic of national exclusion grows in strength. National pride as an emotional foundation for spontaneous national identity formed relatively similarly in all the examined national societies and showed high level intensity everywhere. The East-West regional differences instead appeared in the character of cognitive constructions that confirmed and explained pride. Moving eastward the weight of modernization causes justifying and explaining pride gradually decreased. The exception to this trend was Turkey, and we deal with the reasons for its exceptional status in the appropriate chapter. Ethnocentrism, which is the defining emotion for national identification, is present to varying degrees in the national societies of the study and depends on their regional situation. Ethnocentrism feeds Eastern European national identities most, although it is considerably weaker in the core countries of Europe and in southern Europe.

Our data shows that nationalism has significant potential in all the countries of the study but moving eastward from the West this potential increases. Our data on xenophobia show that between 1995 and 2013 there was an average decrease.

Within this average, Western Europe decreased from a lower initial starting point, while xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe is relatively high, despite decreases. Research conducted in Western Europe since 2013 show that this tendency has continued, despite the migration crisis of 2015, while in Eastern Europe it rose to unprecedented heights (Örkény 2019; Messing and Ságvári 2019).

In summary, the answer to our first research question holds that by making Szűcs's regional division more precise, the divergence between given regions rooted in modernity still holds, and that based on the affective point of view of national identity, convergence is undeniable. Wherever in Europe people live, spontaneous association with the nation is a self-evident feeling. Whether this leads to the development of an inclusive, bourgeois "civic nationalism" or an exclusive ethno-nationalist national identity depends on modernization paths. The regional division described by Szűcs is as such still valid today, given that it is apparent that civic nationalism is stronger in the West, and the ethno-nationalist interpretation is stronger in the east. This dual mechanism is well illustrated in Figure 2.23.

Our second research question is closely related to the set of problems brought up by the first. Based on our results we can state that the original form of the cultural nation versus civic nation dichotomy has lost its relevance. On the other hand, we feel that among the six regions there are two (Central Europe and Eastern Europe) in which the political nation has undoubtedly been established, but where the foundation of the political nation concept is derived from the cultural nation definition expressed in an exclusive manner. The cultural nation component legitimates the political nation, which as such becomes "liquid." The focal point of the nation state is not the legally protected citizen, but instead belongs to the national community, which is much less legally tangible. A poor compromise between political and cultural approaches to the nation is well illustrated in Hungary's new Basic Law of 2011, which replaced the regime change constitution. Similar tendencies are seen in Poland, Ukraine and Romania. In contrast, the other four regions have seen the political nation maintain its earlier solid contours, allowing for cultural nation interpretations to enter national discourse, competing with the challenges posed by efforts to have historical or new national-ethnic cultural identities prevail.

Our third research question concerned the integration of new minorities arising from migration. We identified four strategies, each of which is empirically possible: assimilation, integration, segregation and transnational migration. The prevalence

of these depends on the given national history, modernization patterns and the cultural characteristics of minorities. As such, the appearance of the four strategies across countries was very divergent. We saw that each of these strategies is possible, but in terms of the future, it is transnational migration that appears to be the most promising, given a capability of maintaining an original identity while connecting to an overarching identity. The risk of this strategy is that it will come into conflict with the ruling majority's national identity. Transnationalism is the polar opposite of segregation, in which neither the majority nor the minority can come out on top. Assimilation is a possible solution, but it requires significant self-sacrifice on the part of immigrants. Integration is a working consensus of coexistence, which requires continuous maintenance and mindfulness on the part of both the majority and all minority groups.

The volume's fourth and most important research question was the state of European identity in the various regions. It appears that psychological-cultural considerations were a low priority in the gradual construction of the European Union vis-a-vis the infrastructural construction of economic, political and legal unity. The founders may have thought, paraphrasing Marx, that "European existence" would create "European consciousness." Based on our data, it is clear that this has not been the case or has only been carried out to a very limited degree. Regarding spontaneous identification, we found that its psychological attraction is lowest in all European countries, and European self-identification is particularly weak in the United Kingdom, Russia and Turkey. But in all member states we see that compared to local, regional and national identities, European identity is always weakest. The proportion of those skeptical of the EU in 2013, with the exception of the United Kingdom, did not exceed one-quarter of the population anywhere. Measured Euroscepticism was lowest among EU core member states. This attitude was most prevalent in the societies of the recently acceded Eastern European states, where they were just a hair shy of one-quarter of respondents. This is interesting because these countries have been receiving an unprecedented level of resources from the EU through structural cohesion and agricultural funds.

The proportion of those unquestioningly supporting EU membership was visibly highest in the core countries and in the countries of northern Europe and was remarkably low in the new member states. Splitting in two positive attitudes toward the EU we see that support for decision mechanisms that encompass all EU member states was highest in the United Kingdom and Ireland, which points

to a contradictory relationship in the UK. Viewing the EU as a representation of profit resources is most common in the countries of southern and eastern Europe (35 and 34 percent), in which we can recognize a realist perspective.

The situation of European identification is not actually bad, recognizing that throughout the European Union's development the conscious cultivation of European identity has not taken place and has not become a part of the political socialization of maturing generations. We can assume that one of the reasons for this is the lack of a constructed common European narrative and symbolic space. From the start of nation building in the case of given nation states, the cultural and political elite paid attention to national symbols, celebrations, cultural and historical narratives and the organization and construction of the semantic space organized around the name of the nation. These steps have not been taken in the case of European identity. From among the several examples at hand we focus on the case of Euro banknotes that look like play money. These banknotes do not take advantage of the potential for presenting persons, stories, narratives and symbolic elements of a united Europe. This was an opportunity that was used effectively when national banknotes appeared. In light of this it is surprising that support for membership is relatively significant in the societies of the member states.

Our sixth question was a methodological dilemma. The most important element of our methodological innovation was the handling of data on not a national, but on a regional level. The regional division theoretically had the goal of catching the Szűcs type of regional differences in the act. The core of our innovation was in further refining the Szűcs typology further, and as such we managed to break down the entire sample into statistically comparable groups with similar population numbers, in which the population levels also contributed to partially evening out inequalities.

The seventh question was how the appearance of new minorities arising from twentieth century migration, which hit Europe like an avalanche, changed intergroup conflict potential in the given countries, a potential that had existed previously. We also wanted to examine how the challenge of new migration mobilized right wing radicalism and populism in both the West and the East. The new Muslim minorities arriving from outside Europe introduced new elements into Europe's usual group-focused enmities' (GFE-s) patterns. The new intergroup experience was formed by the appearance of the unsecularized group following Muslim religious-cultural patterns, a group that had not been effected by secu-

larized European Judeo-Christian traditions. In the name of fear and anxiety this experience further transformed the illusory correlation in which the majority society locates a causal relationship between terrorism and Muslim identity.

Migration pressure did not appear in a uniform manner across Europe's eastern and western halves. In the European Union's western, northern and southern countries, beginning in the 2010s, migration pressure increased continuously. In the Union's Eastern European countries, the number of immigrants was consistently low. Xenophobia against immigrants, fed by affective and cognitive phases of rejecting other groups, appeared in both Western and Eastern Europe. According to our data on Western Europe, rejection of and discrimination against new immigrants was limited by the democratic civil society's tolerance of otherness. In a paradoxical manner, in the Eastern European countries, where new minorities based on immigration did not appear, levels of xenophobia reached unprecedentedly high levels and then continued to increase. In both west and east, right-wing radicalism and populism did not hesitate to take advantage of the expanded political opportunities connected to the existence of negative and fear-inducing attitudes towards new immigrant minorities. We discovered that the use of these opportunities affects only a minority in Western European countries (on average approximately 20 percent). In contrast, in the countries of Eastern Europe (particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic), from the point of view of increasing political influence, anti-immigrant rhetoric and moral panic raising offers unparalleled opportunities for political gain.

EPILOGUE

The completion of the final draft of our book coincided with the 2019 European Parliament elections. The results of the elections show that in all the member states of the European Union there are present those populist, xenophobic, nationalist and extreme right wing phenomena that we examined sociologically in this volume. We see in the elections results the confirmation of the validity of our analysis, as the results showed that in the societies of Europe—with a few exceptions—those forces that envision survival and the guarantee of development through human rights, democracy and the strengthening of the rule of law form a majority. These results further encourage our expectation that by maintaining the path of cooperation in achieving the economic, political and cultural goals the European Union will be able to face the challenges of globalization.

A comparison of the election results with the analyses in this volume also reveals that in certain member states the extreme, xenophobic, populist and nationalist tendencies form a majority, and as such these countries find themselves contradicting the mainstream established through the results of the European Union parliamentary elections. This is a challenge the European Parliament, Council and Commission must master for the Union to be influential in the globalized political, economic and cultural playing field.

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Central European University Press

Budapest–New York

Sales and information: ***ceupress@press.ceu.edu***

Website: ***<https://www.ceupress.com>***

ISBN 978-963-386-367-1

9 78 9633 863671 9 0 0 0 0