HERITAGE AND MEMORY STUDIES



Grace T. Leksana

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

Embedded Remembering

Amsterdam University Press

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

Heritage and Memory Studies

This ground-breaking series examines the dynamics of heritage and memory from transnational, interdisciplinary and integrated approaches. Monographs or edited volumes critically interrogate the politics of heritage and dynamics of memory, as well as the theoretical implications of landscapes and mass violence, nationalism and ethnicity, heritage preservation and conservation, archaeology and (dark) tourism, diaspora and postcolonial memory, the power of aesthetics and the art of absence and forgetting, mourning and performative re-enactments in the present.

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

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To Rafael and Chaela
This is our memory's keepsake

Acronyms and glossary

Ansor/Pemuda Ansor	a youth organisation affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Babinsa/Badan Pembina Desa	village-level monitoring officials
Bimas/Bimbingan Masyarakat	mass guidance, a farming credit programme which lasted until the late 1960s
Brimob/Brigade Mobile	Mobile Police Brigade
BTI/Barisan Tani Indonesia	Indonesian Peasants' Front
Bouw	unit of land measurement during the colonial era. 1 bouw = 0.7 hectare
Bupati	regent
Camat	Subdistrict head
Dwikora	acronym for Dwi Komando Rakyat (People's Two Commands), released in 1964. President Sukarno announced Dwikora in relation with the confrontation campaign against Malaysia, instructing the people to thwart the formation of Malaysia as Britain's puppet state, and to form volunteers to assist this campaign.
Front Nasional	National Front
FDR/Front Demorkasi Rakyat	People's Democratic Front
Gerakan 30 September/G30S	30 September Movement
Gerwani/Gerakan Wanita Indonesia	Indonesian Women's Movement
Golkar/Golongan Karya	Party of Functional Groups, Suharto's ruling political party
Gulden (f)/Netherlands Guilders	currency of the Netherlands from the middle ages until 2002. 1 f = € 0,45

Hadji/Haji	people who went to the pilgrimage in Mecca, which made them respected Islamic leaders in a community
Hansip/Pertahanan Sipil	civil defence
Harian Rakjat	the Indonesian Communist Party newspaper
Jihad	holy war in Islam
Juru kunci	guardian of monuments, graves, or other sacred sites
KAMI/Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia	Indonesian Students Action Front
Kamituwo	local leaders who are appointed formally by village authorities
Ketoprak	Javanese theatrical performance
Kodam/Komando Daerah Militer	Regional Military Command
Kodim/Komando Distrik Militer	District Military Command
Koramil/Komando Rayon Militer	Military Precinct Command
Korem/Komando Resort Militer	Military Resort Command
Kopur/Komando Tempur	battle command
Kyai	Islamic religious leader
Lekra/Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat	Institute of People's Culture
Marhaen	a term coined by Sukarno to refer to a category of poor Indonesians who were oppressed by capitalism and imperialism, but who were not part of the traditional peasant or proletarian classes as they were small landowners and owned a few tools

Nasakom – Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme	Nationalism, Religion, Communism, a doctrine in the Guided Democracy era that officially recognized the role of these three major political tendencies in Indonesian political life
NU/Nahdlatul Ulama	a large, traditionalist Islamic group in Indonesia
Pagar betis	'fence of legs', a counter-insurgency encirclement strategy used by the Indonesian military
Pancasila	the five principles of the Indonesian state, consisting of: 1) belief in Almighty God, 2) humanity that is just and civilized, 3) the unity of Indonesia, 4) democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation, 5) social justice for all Indonesians
Pangad/Panglima Angkatan Darat	Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Pandam/Panglima Daerah Militer	Regional Military Commander
Pantja Tunggal	an administrative coordinating body established around 1960s at provincial to the district level. It consisted of governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs, public persecutors and the National Front
Pamong	village authorities
Partai Katolik	Catholic Party
PKI/Partai Komunis Indonesia	the Indonesian Communist Party
PNI/Partai Nasional Indonesia	the Indonesian Nationalist Party
PDI-P/Partai Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PMKRI/Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Catholic Youth

Pemuda Rakyat	People's Youth organization
Pepelrada/Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah	Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora
Pupelrada/Pembantu Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah	Assistant of Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora
Puterpra/Perwira Urusan Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat	Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance Officer
RPKAD/Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat	Army Paracommando Regiment
Santiaji/wajib lapor	one of the programmes under Mental Building for accused ex-communists, where participants were obliged to report and follow indoctrination programmes on Pancasila in the local military office.
Sawah	wet cultivated land
Tasakuran	village communal activity to express gratitude and ask for blessing
Tegal	dry cultivated land
Tokoh	local leader(s)
Tjatur Tunggal	an administrative system in which four government elements, consisting of the governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs and public persecutors, made collaborative decisions on their regional issues
Walikota	city mayor

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Introduction

The owner was the village, and the village had a mind; it could say no to sacrilege. But in the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village became powerless.
Chinua Achebe – A Man of The People

Abstract
Approximately five hundred thousand to one million people were killed in the Indonesian anti-leftist violence in 1965-66. However, the official narrative largely excluded this particular atrocity and depicted the violence as a military success in saving the nation by eliminating the communists. Through a micro-study in a rural district in East Java, where the anti-leftist violence mostly took place, this research presents the complexity of remembering past violence. Memories of violence are not exclusively affected by the state's memory projects, but are actually embedded (historically and socially) in the context where the violence erupted.

Keywords: collective memory, anti-communist violence, Indonesia, post-authoritarianism, transitional justice

The story in this book starts in an East Javanese district named Donomulyo. Located more than 40 km from Malang city, the district stretch on 193 km2 of land. With only 77,080 people living in the area, it became the least populated district in the Malang regency.[1] This is an area of dry land farming, relying mostly on the production of sugarcane, corn, cassava, and in small numbers, tobacco. Agriculture is not the most- preferred income-generating sector in the district. Farming in Donomulyo is "hard work, but no money", as one of my informants expresses it. As we shall see later in the chapters, this

1 Dinas Komunikasi dan Informatika Kabupaten Malang 2020, 252.

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expression reflects the declining agricultural sector since early independence. A more promising line of work, according to the younger generations of the village, is to be a migrant worker with top destinations such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Or to join the local tourism sector, as Donomulyo is filled with beautiful beaches. The district is also a place for religious tourism, with its grotto of Hail Mary built in 1986, called Sendang Purwaningsih. But it was not a holiday nor a spiritual journey that brought me to Donomulyo. It was a story of violence that occurred more than 50 years ago.

The first time I heard of Donomulyo was through a local coffee-shop conversation in the center of Malang city with a friend of my husband. His story of the area was that it was a *red* area, a base of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or PKI) and other leftist organizations which thrived throughout the 1950s-60s. Being a red area does not only imply the progressiveness of the residents, but also the gruesome violence that transformed the whole district. Our friend illustrated this situation with the story of one hamlet that was famous as the hamlet of widows, because all of the men had disappeared. They were taken by the military, and presumed to be killed in the anti-communist operation. The violence in Donomulyo was part of a nationwide extermination project against the communists and left in 1965-66 (and continued in 1968 in some areas in East Java), where approximately five hundred to one million people were killed within that period. The trigger behind this violence was an attempted coup called the 30 September Movement or *Gerakan 30 September* (*G30S*), in which seven army officers were kidnapped and killed by a small fraction at dawn on 1 October 1965. Although there is still an ongoing debate regarding who was behind the movement and why, the Indonesian government accused the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) of being the perpetrator behind this movement.[2] This accusation became the pretext of continuous persecutions against PKI and other leftist organizations, including supporters or family members.[3] Following the coup, a

2 The first critical analysis came from Benedict Anderson, et.al. with their famous Cornell Paper, arguing that G30S was an internal army coup by junior officers. See Anderson, McVey, and Bunnell 1971. A new analysis was proposed by John Roosa, arguing that the 30 September Movement had no clear 'mastermind', whether one person or a tight cluster of people. Although there was one person who served as a bridge between the PKI leaders and progressive military officers, he was not in a position of command nor a decision-maker. In short, the 30 September Movement was a disorganized attempted coup which was easily terminated by Suharto. Roosa 2006, 203-204.

3 The National Human Rights Commission concludes that the 1965 violence was a case of gross human rights violence. It involved structural killing, extermination, forced migration,

shift of government took place, from the previous president Sukarno, to Suharto in 1966. This later regime developed a nationwide memory project of eliminating any narratives about the mass violence against accused communists and members of leftist organisations. Suharto's government initiated commemorative practices that focused solely on G30S through various means. This has created the dominant official narrative of 1965 in Indonesia, depicting the military as heroes and the PKI as villains. For decades, the killings of communists and leftists in 1965-66 have not been part of Indonesia's collective memory. In short, the state's memory construction had created an official narrative centering at G30S on one hand, and on the other, memories of the killings and violence in 1965-66 became submerged and repressed as counter narratives.

The portrayal of PKI as an evil threat to the nation was not only because of the G30S. It was also to diminish a memory of Indonesia's greatest class struggle of the left in the 1950s to 1960s. Historically, the PKI was the core of Indonesia's leftist movement since its establishment in the colonial era in 1914. The party can be said to be the oldest major Indonesian party and the first Communist movement to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the former Russian Empire.[4] The party's importance in their early years lies twofold: it was the only Communist party other than the Chinese in the colonial and semi-colonial Far East that both possessed legality and played a significant role in the political life of the East Indies; and it was the only one to do so in a European-governed possession.[5] It was the failed revolutionary attempt in the form of labor uprising in Java and Sumatra in 1926-27 that led to the party's dissolution by the Dutch colonial government. After Indonesia's independence in 1945, the revival of PKI harshly ended when a miscalculated movement in Madiun in 1948 was declared by president Sukarno and vice president Hatta as an illegal uprising.[6] Nevertheless, the party managed to reconsolidate itself under the leadership of D.N Aidit and successfully

torture, forced disappearances, forced labour, sexual abuse and persecutions. Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia RI 2012, 3-40.

4 See McVey 2006, xi.

5 See McVey 2006, xii.

6 The Madiun Affair occurred when the PKI took a more radical turn against the newly established Indonesian state. Choosing an independent course, they attempted to established the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (FDR) government at the local and regional level, intended as building blocks of a Soviet Indonesia. The FDR government was declared on 18 September 1948 in Madiun, but this movement triggered a counter attack from military units and Muslim militias that was preceded by conflicts between Muslim and leftist factions in villages throughout Central and East Java, including attacks on senior religious leaders. See Ricklefs 2001, 108-111; Poeze 2014, 189-193. More on the 1948 Madiun affair will be discussed in Chapter4.

became one of the top five parties with the largest number of votes in the 1955 election.[7] Along with other leftist organizations with similar vision, such as the Indonesian Peasants' Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia/BTI), Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia/Gerwani), or the cultural organization Institute of People's Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat/Lekra), PKI built a massive people-centred movement at the grassroot level. In the early 1960s, PKI along with those organizations became the main motor in the campaign for agrarian transformation, which became more aggressive when the government released the Basic Agrarian Law in 1960. Seeing the law as the legal basis to eradicate rural inequality through its land reform policy, the party pushed for a prompt implementation of the law. This movement did not go unchallenged. Landlords, who are mostly religious or local leaders, tried different mechanisms to avoid giving up their land for land distribution.[8] Tensions between these two parties escalated towards 1965, when the unilateral action by PKI and BTI became more hostile towards reluctant landlords. The violence in 1965 ended this tension and secured the landlords' ownership of lands, and also the socio-political position of rightist groups. In other words, the 1965 violence was not merely the result of a political coup, but it was also a destruction of the persistent class struggle of Indonesian leftists. It was important, then, to erase such memory of a struggle, to treat it as non-existent, and to make sure that no similar struggles would appear in the future (at least not during the days of Suharto). And to make this happen, is to create a collective memory that juxtaposes class struggle with a demonic treachery against the nation.

Therefore, it is important to look at the construction of memories of violence not only as an effect of a national political coup, but also as an attempt to marginalize the grassroot struggles during Indonesia's post-independence era. This is why delving into Donomulyo is essential – it moves us away from a state-centric approach of looking at collective memories and to look closer at how struggles, violence, and rural transformation all contributed to the complexity of remembering 1965. The district may seem to be just another fragment in the history of 1965 violence,[9] but this fragment brings narratives that may not easily fit to the categories of official or counter narrative.

7 See Mortimer 1972.

8 Asmu 1964.

9 The fragment here refers to Gyanendra Pandey's argument on how fragments of history are central in challenging the state's construction of history, "in thinking other histories and marking those contested spaces through which particular unities are sought to be constituted and others broken up". Pandey 1992, 50.

I will illustrate this argument through my encounters with two villagers in Donomulyo. In 17 August 2016, during a festivity of Indonesian Independence Day, I was invited by my local contact person, who is a local leader, to attend a communal gathering (*tasakuran* in Javanese) where all villagers gather to pray and feast, expressing their gratitude to Indonesia's deceased heroes. Since there are two major religions in the district, Catholic and Islam, the prayers on the Independence Day *tasakuran* were organized in two separate places. Afterwards, both groups gather together in one place to hear the village head speech and followed by a feast. I followed the Catholic communal prayer which was led by Suparman (pseudonym), my contact person. While standing in front of the room, Suparman introduced me to all of the attendees, in a way that sounded more like an announcement. After briefly explaining the purpose of my stay, which was to write a history about the village, he then encouraged all the attendees to be open and 'tell the truth' (*bercerita apa adanya*) to me. There was no talk or preparation in advance for this formal introduction, and what came afterwards was rather shocking. Suparman began to point to a few attendees, who he said were the 'victims of history of the 1965 tragedy'. He then continued to explain in front of the room about Mr. Jarso who had been detained for years without clear allegations, and Mr. Yasin (sitting just a few chairs away) who had been obliged to follow *santiaji* or *wajib lapor* (a surveillance programme developed by the army for accused communists to report regularly to the local army office) for years.[10] I was surprised that he was able to mention 1965 in a very outspoken manner, which made me realise that the violence was probably not a taboo for the community. It is actually part of their everyday life, a kind of public secret in the village, where everybody knows about what happened to certain people. Only on particular occasions, and among certain people, it reappears in distinct ways, such as in this moment of *tasakuran*.

On a different occasion, I met Marwono (pseudonym), a small farmer who was obliged to followed *santiaji* since 1968, with the accusation of being a member of the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*/Indonesian Peasants' Front), the leftist organization closely linked to the PKI. It took several meetings before he actually revealed that he knew more about the leftist movement in Donomulyo. This was different from how other villagers described Marwono, that he was merely a 'victim of history' – the victim who actually knows nothing about the left. In our third meeting, he began to admit that he usually read publications by leftist organizations in the

10 Field note 15 August 2016

1960s, such as the Harian Rakjat newspaper and BTI's book about land reform. While he explained about this experience, a car stopped in front of his house and he suddenly became silent. I noticed the change in his behaviour and also the existence of the car, but was not fast enough to make the connection. I continued with another question, but he did not give a clear answer. He seemed restless and kept looking outside at the car. At this point, I realised that he was bothered by the car in front of the house. I asked whether he was expecting anybody, and he said no. Seeing his uneasiness, I decided to also stay silent with him. A few minutes later, the car drove away. His body language showed signs of relief, so I asked him whether he wanted to take a rest. He refused and then apologized to me. He said he was still 'traumatized', and that the appearance of the car reminded him of the moment when the military came to his house and asked him to report to the office.[11] This silence appeared while we were talking about leftist publications and I doubt that it would have occurred if we had been talking about another topic.

Suparman and Marwono know each other, as they are both part of the Catholic community in Donomulyo. They live in the same village and had gone through the years of 1965-66. But why, then, can one community be so open and yet so silent at the same time, as in the case of Suparman and Marwono? Is this difference simply a result of the state's repressive memory project that placed the violence at the margins of history? If that is the case, why do silence and trauma remain while people talk about 1965 violence, even when the state is actually moving towards democracy? How is memory of violence constructed? Who are involved in its construction? How does a national event become entwined with local experiences in forming the collective memory? What kind of memories are remembered and silenced? Why? These questions show how Donomulyo brings about the debate of power in memory politics, which revolves around the question of who decides what to remember and forget. But the power in this case is not confined into the usual framework of 'state versus people', instead it is embedded in the historical localities, such as class differentiation, land dispute, or generational interactions. This is the politics of memory in everyday life, where the act of remembering and forgetting is in an intricate web of relations between villagers and their past, and within complicated social relations. Donomulyo reveals that the ways people remember the violence is highly contextual – it is embedded in its local context, rather than being exclusively influenced by the state's repressive forces.

11 Field note 13 December 2016

Function and Meaning of Memory

My encounters with Suparman and Marwono above elucidate the function of memory beyond a mere 'store and recall' of individual cognitive process. The silence and openness point to the fact that these memories are social acts – actions taken to convey or retain a certain meaning not only about an event, but about a certain individual or community. The idea of embeddedness of memory was first raised by, among others, Fentress and Wickham who highlight the embeddedness of memory of the past in the present, arguing that memory is strongest when it is constantly exercised, tested, and validated through present experiences.[12] Remembering is a process of representation, and by articulating what we remember, we are explaining who we are.[13] Furthermore, Fentress and Wickham also note that an event is continuously remembered because of their power to legitimize the present and tend to be interpreted in ways that are closely linked (or even contrasted) with present conceptions.[14] Their concept of embeddedness focuses on the presentness of the past, showing that memory is certainly a social element which constitutes a person's or a community's identity. However, Fentress & Wickham did not elaborate further the contexts in which those memories emerged and continue to live in the present.

It was actually Maurice Halbwachs who sets the introduction to collective memory by arguing that memory is not an individual, but a communal process influenced by collective framework in societies. He describes this framework as the instrument to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accordance with the predominant thoughts of the society.[15] He went further by stating that "society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess".[16] Halbwachs emphasizes the malleable character of collective memory, and therefore, studying it should not revolve on internal processes of the mind, but on identifying its shifting social frameworks.[17] He also distinguishes between autobiographical and historical memory.[18] The first

12 Fentress and Wickham 1992, 24.
13 Fentress and Wickham 1992, 9.
14 Fentress and Wickham 1992, 88.
15 Halbwachs 1992, 40.
16 Halbwachs 1992, 51.
17 Olick, Vinitzky-Serousi, and Levy 2011, 18
18 Olick, Vinitzky-Serousi, and Levy 2011, 19.

refers to events that are remembered directly, including those that surround a particular event. For example, one may remember his or her own activities during a historical event, such as the 30 September Movement, although the historical event does not affect the individual directly. Meanwhile, historical memory refers to the effects of events where certain groups assert continuous identity through time. In this case of 1965, we will see in the following chapters how identity of pious Muslims, for example, is related to the extermination of PKI.

Others scholars have further developed Halbwach's initial concept of autobiographical and historical memory. Jan Assmann, for example, tried to elaborate memory, identity and institutionalization of heritage by differentiating communicative and cultural memory. The first is characterized exclusively by everyday communication which, for example, constitutes the field of oral history. Its dependency on everyday communication also makes it unavailable to extend more than eighty to one hundred years into the past – a limited temporal horizon, as Assmann underlines.[19] On the contrary, cultural memory is characterized by the distance from daily forms of communication. It has its fixed point, which makes its horizon consistent through time. Memories related to these fixed points are maintained through 'figures of memory' that include cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).[20] Assmann continues to elaborate the characteristics of cultural memory, focusing on its influence on group identity and the capacity to reconstruct.

While Fentress & Wickham, Halbwachs, and Assmann portray the function of memory as identity formation, scholars from the field of oral history offer another meaning of memory. One example is the work of Alessandro Portelli on the death of a factory worker, Luigi Trastulli, in the city of Terni in central Italy. Portelli argues that what makes oral history sources valuable actually lies in the discrepancy between memory and the actual event. For him, this is not a weakness of oral history, instead it illuminates an active process of remembering and imagining in order to make sense of certain events in the past and also history in general. Through the case study, Portelli continues by showing that Terni's working-class memory of Trastulli's death serves three major functions: a symbolic representation of the post-war working-class experience in Terni; a strategy to deal with psychological consequences (such as humiliation and loss of self-esteem) of the worker's community following upon the inadequacy to react to a

19 Assmann and Czaplicka 1995, 126-7.

20 Assmann and Czaplicka 1995, 129.

comrade's death; and a formal time-marking function for the community.[21] For Portelli, memory is more than a part of identity formation of a certain group, as Halbwachs and Assmann argue, but also a *strategy* to understand the past and its outcomes in the present.

Both as identity formation and as a strategy, memory is filled with the tension of power. In Assmann's elaboration of cultural memory, he stresses the existence of experts in forming memory, such as shamans, priests, clerks, scholars, and so on. Participation in the cultural memory is not egalitarian – some are almost forced into participation while others remains excluded.[22] This indicates the role of hierarchy and power in constructing cultural memory. A more explicit explanation of the notion of power in memory was presented by the Marxist scholars in the *Popular Memory Group*. They indicated 'dominant memory', which points to "the power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics".[23] These historical representations in dominant memory are definitely public and closely connected to the state, but it does not mean that the general public is always in line with their dominancy. On the contrary, dominant memory is always in contestation, where certain representations became central while others remain in the periphery. The Popular Memory Group also highlights representation of the past that is produced in daily life, where they are usually limited to the level of private remembrance. They became hidden and sometimes silenced. However, the Group argues that a study of popular memory should be a *relational study*, by looking at interactions between representations of dominant history in the public, and also subordinate or private experiences.[24]

Discussions about power and memory become more complex within the huge genre of war and conflict studies. Paul Fussel and Jay Winter, amongst others, put forward the study of remembrance, trauma, and mourning of World War I as a collective representation of European society.[25] Their studies show how societies deal with their traumatic violent events in the past, and how they became part of the cultural identity and memory of present society. This approach influenced studies of 20th century atrocities, such as genocides and ethnic-based conflicts, later on. However, scholars

21 Portelli 1991, 26.
22 Assmann 2008, 114-116.
23 Popular Memory Group 1982, 207.
24 Popular Memory Group 1982, 211.
25 See Fussell 2013 and Winter 2014.

have also been examining this idea with regard to memories of violence with a critical remark on whose truth is being told,[26] and claims of collective representations that may exclude certain groups.[27] This critical view also triggered a distinctive approach of memory studies in post-colonial settings. In relation to post-colonial studies in Indonesia, some examples of memory-related works are by Mary Steedly, who explores memories of North Sumatran women of the Indonesian revolution;[28] Ann Stoler & Karen Strassler, with their studies on memories of domestic workers in the colonial Netherlands East Indies;[29] Ana Dragojlovic, who examine gender dimension in post-colonial remembering;[30] and Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, who pointed at the tension and continuity of the meaning and memory of Indonesia's UNESCO heritage site, Borobudur.[31] By examining the complex layers of memory of colonialism and postcolonialism in the present, these studies drew attention to a further exploration of Indonesia's memory culture that should go beyond binary identification of remembering and forgetting; public and private; or past and present.

The Locality in Politics of Memory

The discussion above has pointed to the interplay of power in constructing post-violence collective memory. But how exactly is power executed in this case? And how can a local study like Donomulyo help us to understand such power dynamics? To answer these questions, we firstly have to delve into what Donomulyo is, and how this small district forms Indonesia's citizenship. Forty kilometres away from the city, it will take around two hour drive by car to Donomulyo from the city of Malang. In the 1960s, it was quite an effort to travel from the district to the city. There is only one public transport available each day from Donomulyo to the city (and vice versa), departing at the local market located at the centre of the district. Villagers who do not live nearby the market had to walk or take their ox cart to get to the market. The road was not yet covered with asphalt; it was mainly dirt and rocks.[32] Bicycles can be counted; and motor vehicles do

26 Bauer-Clapp 2016, 2.
27 Langenohl 2008, 171.
28 Steedly 2013.
29 Stoler and Strassler 2000.
30 Dragojlovic 2011.
31 Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2015.
32 Except for roads in plantation areas, which existed in the colonial period. See chapter 2.

not exist in Donomulyo. Electricity was not available until the early 1980s. One villager remembered how they could only listen to a radio when their relative from the city visited them in Donomulyo. It was the only radio in the village. Newspapers were not common, as most of the villagers in the 1960s were still illiterate. What connects Donomulyo with the city of Malang was a political network of political and mass organizations, either the PKI, BTI, or the religious organizations such as NU or the Catholic Party and its youth wing, the Indonesian Catholic Youth (PMKRI). Political activities in Donomulyo were quite intense. As one villager remembers, the Independence Day festivals in the 1960s were a moment of showing off the forces of each organizations through, for example, marching band competitions. The PKI was the best in their performance. In the 1955 legislative election, the PKI came out as the party with the highest number of votes in the district.[33] This shows that the remote access to Donomulyo does not necessarily mean that they were also politically isolated.

Donomulyo's political dynamic shows the vibrancy of a newly independent state, where the people responded to President Sukarno's call for nation building and *berdikari* (stand in our own feet) through activities in mass organizations, political parties, and also elections.[34] This participation illustrates a reconfiguration of the relationship between state and society as an effect of the transformation from colonial to postcolonial state – a relationship that is often understood as citizenship. A conventional understanding of citizenship defines the concept as a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations.[35] An obvious example is participation in elections, which reflects the implementation of an individual's civil rights. But this rights-based description of citizenship excludes broader acts that stand on the border of 'legality'. Land squatting, labour in the informal sector, political brokers, for example, are perceived as deviations from the conventional definition of citizenship. This occurred because conventional definitions are derived from the context of a liberal and welfare state, centering around strong state and

33 In Donomulyo, PKI achieved 12,981 votes, while PNI reached 3609 votes, and NU 591. "Hasil Pemungutan Suara Di Kabupaten Malang," 1955.

34 In East Java province, a total of 9,875,609 people participated in the 1955 election. Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia 1955, 7. Data on the total population in East Java in the same year is not available. But looking at the 1961 census, the population of East Java reached 21,823,020. Biro Pusat Statistik Kabinet Menteri Pertama 1962, 3. Looking at these numbers, it can be roughly seen that the majority of East Java's population participated in the 1955 election.

35 Tilly 1995, 8.

rights-claiming individuals. They tend to overlook the dynamics of post-colonial world, where the relations of state and society are continuously influenced by historical processes of state formation. Critical citizenship studies emerge as a contestation of the conventional rights-claiming approach of citizenship. They see citizenship not as a fixed entity, but is continuously shaped through contestations, negotiations, and claims of 'legality'.[36]

This brings us to another dimension of citizenship – that the effort to define it does not necessarily occur in the legal formal sphere, such as elections. In fact, most of it happens through everyday practices in the informal arena.[37] The *lurah* who functions as labour-recruiter for a plantation company, the act of squatting on ex-plantation land, the Ansor activist who joined the anti-communist operation and later on achieved a village official position; all portray how patronage or clientelistic practices are part and parcel of the local politics of defining citizenship. The patron-client relationship itself is defined as an "exchange relationship between roles, involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron".[38] This relationship has three distinguished features.[39] First, it is based on inequality. The imbalanced exchange in patron-client relationships expresses the disparity in wealth, power and status. The patron has the ability to provide goods and services unilaterally which the client and his family need to survive. The second feature is the face-to face, personal quality of the relationship. This continuing reciprocal relationship usually creates trust and affection between the two parties. In many cases, these mutual relationships are supported by communal beliefs, tradition, and values, resulting in a bond that can persist through generations. The last feature of the patron-client relationship is its "diffuse, whole-person relationship rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds". The bond with the patron may incorporate multiple backgrounds, for example, tenancy of cultivated land, friendship, the ritual of co-parenthood, and so on. This means that the services that the client can provide have a very wide range, for example, they can range

36 Chatterjee, 2004; Berenschot, Schulte Nordholt, and Bakker, 2017; Klinken, 2019; Lund, 2021.

37 Ito, 2017; W Berenschot and van Klinken, 2018.

38 Scott 1972, 92.

39 Scott 1972, 93-95.

from cultivating crops and preparing celebrations to winning an election campaign.

In Indonesia, patronage relations already existed in pre-colonial society, transforming from personal-affective ties between patrons and clients in colonial society[40] into an expanding patronage network covert in bureaucratic institutions in the New Order period – showing the long lasting characteristic of patronage that persists through different courses of Indonesia's history.[41] Even today, clientelism remains a strong feature in Indonesia's democracy, leading some scholars to argue that patronage can coexist with democracy and also exacerbate further such democratic shortcomings as economic and cultural inequalities.[42] The term patronage democracies emerged to characterize the situation where achievement in elections is gained through money power to buy voters, or muscle power of allied criminal elements to coerce voters.[43] In the context of agrarian societies, Gillian Hart even predicts that state patronage can become a threat to state intervention in agrarian policies in the long run, because patronage has been used as a means for those who control the state to pursue their own agrarian interests, within and beyond the rural sector.[44]

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the success and failure of all political agendas at the local level rely on patronage network. David Hardiman has argued against the framework of factionalism (which represents clientelistic practice) in India by showing that the peasant movement in Kheda district was a class-based collective act. Peasants joined the movement not because their patrons told them to or they would be rewarded by their patrons. The movement was a class solidarity which resulted in an organized movement to resist the power-hungry landlords. Therefore, according to Hardiman, a nationalist movement is best understood as a class based movement, rather than a factional one.[45] The leftist movement of PKI and BTI in the village is a case in point. Their campaigns, although varied in different areas, demonstrate a form of class struggle rather than directives from manipulative elites. BTI's unilateral actions that took extreme forms of violence and squatting were a class movement against the landlords who were reluctant

40 Heather Sutherland describes how the Javanese elites were part of the colonial bureaucratic machine. They became distinctive elites, rooted as indigenous Javanese but serving the colonial government. See Sutherland 1979.

41 Nordholt 2015.

42 Klinken 2009, 156.

43 Ward. Berenschot, Schulte Nordholt, and Bakker 2017, 1

44 Hart 1989, 31.

45 Hardiman 1982, 207.

to comply to the land reform regulations.[46] The leftist organizations were actually the ones who tried to challenge the entrenched patronage practices in Indonesia's political sphere. They were trying to formulate Indonesia's citizenship which is based on ideological values of anti-colonialism and self-determination. The violence in 1965 terminated this effort and maintained clientelistic practices in Indonesia's politics.

How, then, does our understanding of patronage politics relate to the collective memory of 1965 violence? The answer to this question lies in two points. First, the state in memory politics does not necessarily appear in formal arenas. The state does not only exist in official monuments, museums, or documents to classify people as political prisoners, but exists in the village head who confiscates land after assisting the military operation; or the Ansor activist who becomes a village secretary. The politics in memory actually lies in the intricate web of local dynamics, often involving transactional and clientelistic practices. The second point resonates with Portelli's study, which depicted memory as a strategy to deal with the past. Memory also became a part of defining citizenship, which sometimes reflects the commitment to one's patrons, and other times illustrates the adherence to class struggle. What to remember or forget, is part of the continuous negotiation to claim one's right, to relate to the state, and more importantly, to be Indonesian.

Scrutinizing the locality of power in politics of memory explains why members of one community that experienced the same event, have different ways of remembering the past, including different acts of silence and forgetting. This is because every community member has their own position and tension in the complex social network, before and after the violence. Therefore, they interpret the meaning and impact of violence differently – some benefited from the violence, while others experienced severe losses. This indicates that memory of violence is not solely a result of state repression against the left, but more closely connected to its local context, particularly with the social relationships which surround the event. Remembering the 1965-66 violence also shows that memory is a historical process – it is not directly constructed right after a particular event, but continuously evolves through time, even long after the event itself, and is influenced by the outcomes of that event. By zooming in to localities, we can also understand how memories of violence actually remain alive even under the state's authoritarian repression, preserved through stories of places and family narratives.

46 See Mortimer, 1972.

Embedded Remembering

Before looking into the complex ways of remembering the violence, I will explain why memories of 1965 violence have been dominated by the binary approach, focusing on the competition of official and counter narratives. Although this approach has contributed significantly to Indonesia's transitional justice movement, it undermines other ways of remembering that may not fit into the category of official or counter memory. One of the root causes of this obsession with the binary approach is the human rights paradigm that limits analysis of violence merely to the indication of victims, perpetrators, and types of abuses.

After 1965, Indonesia's memory politics have been largely dominated by the military. To establish a reference for history writing, the army released its official publication, *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965* (The Forty Day Failure of the G30S 1 October-10 November 1965) in 1966. This army white book accused the PKI of being the mastermind behind the killings of the seven military officers,[47] and has been the main reference for the 1965 historiography, including the seven volumes of the Indonesian National History Textbook (*Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*/SNI) that were released in 1976 and other history textbooks. In 1973, the Suharto government opened The *Pancasila Sakti* (Sacred Pancasila) Monument complex in Jakarta, which was intended to depict the violence by the PKI against the seven army officers through visualisations such as the torture diorama of the officers.[48] In 1983, the government released the film The Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party (*Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September/PKI*), directed by Arifin C. Noor, along with Brigadier General Dwipayana and Nugroho Notosusanto, who both played a prominent role in constructing the official narrative of 1965.[49] None of these state-sponsored commemorations incorporates the violence against civilians in the anti-communist operation.

Indonesia's democratic turn emerged after the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998. This turn, also known as *Reformasi* (Reformation), drove human rights communities to accelerate agendas of transitional justice; demanding reconciliation and truth-seeking of past human rights abuses. Suharto's successor, President B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) took

47 *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965*. 1966.

48 The visualization of torture is in contrast with the autopsy report of the officers' bodies, which found gunshots as the main cause of death and no signs of torture. See Anderson 1987.

49 McGregor 2007, 96-100.

several important steps towards reconciliation for the 1965 case, such as putting an end to the 'national ritual' to air the film *The Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party* on national television every October 1st and releasing the remaining 10 political prisoners.[50] The next president, Abdurrachman Wahid (1999-2001) continued these progressive steps by allowing all the exiles[51] to return to Indonesia and apologising to the victims' families for the 1965-66 violence. He also carried out some structural changes by dismissing the Coordinating Body for the Enhancement of National Stability (*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*/Bakorstanas) whose main task was to assist the State Intelligence Service. Dismissing this body also put an end to the 'special investigation' of a person's ideology during selection of government officials or promotions within government institutions.[52] This act invited series of protests from the rightists, including within Wahid's political party – the National Revival Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*/PKB), accusing him of paving the way for the resurgence of communism and the PKI.[53] After Wahid's resignation, human rights communities pushed for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which ended after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Law was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2006.[54]

Meanwhile, reconciliation efforts were also initiated at the grassroots level. For example, the Foundation for Research into Victims of the 1965-1966 Killings (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan* 1965-66/YPKP) conducted an exhumation of a mass grave in Wonosobo, Central Java in 2000. They had planned for a reburial of the victims, but a mass demonstration by a

50 Budiawan 2004, 40.

51 There are around 1400 Indonesians living in political exile in European countries. Most of them are diplomats, students or correspondents who worked in socialist countries such as Cuba, China, the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries when the 1965 violence occurred. They refused to acknowledge the 1965 violence as a coup attempt by the communists, so their passports were revoked and they were threatened to be detained if they returned to Indonesia. Budiawan 2004, 44.

52 Budiawan 2004, 44-45. The justification behind this 'special screening' was to prevent ex political prisoners, their family or other 'contaminated parties' to become government officers, members of the military or the police force.

53 Budiawan 2004, 7.

54 One of the controversial articles revoked in the constitutional court was article 27, which regulated amnesty for perpetrators as a prerequisite for compensation for victims. The constitutional court then decided that without article 27, the law itself would be non-functional. Therefore, the court decided to revoke the whole law. This was very different from the request of the litigant group, who only wanted to revoke three problematic articles. See Saptaningrum et al. 2007.

religious leftist organisation accused them of being PKI supporters who wanted to revive communism.[55] Another example was the formation of Syarikat, a Nahdlatul Ulama/NU (one of the prominent Islam organisations in Indonesia that was involved in the killings of communists) organization of youths who initiated reconciliation programmes between NU perpetrators and victims of the 1965 violence.[56] Moreover, these attempts to unravel the violence of 1965 also took form in literary publications. In (auto)biographies, survivors wrote their own narratives of the violence, such as works from Hersri Setiawan, Putu Oka Sukanta, and later generations, such as Soe Tjen Marching.

The slow progress of the judicial processes drove the international community of victims (especially those who are living in the Netherlands) and activists to organise the International People's Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia 1965 (IPT 1965) in The Hague, the Netherlands, from 10 to 13 November 2015.[57] Meanwhile, at the national level, under the era of President Joko Widodo, a symposium titled *Simposium Nasional: Membedah Tragedi 1965, Pendekatan Kesejarahan* (National Symposium: Examining 1965 Tragedy, A Historical Approach) was held on 18-19 April 2016. This was the first official collaborative work between government institutions, NGOs and academics to openly discuss this issue.[58] All of these examples illustrate the tension in Indonesia's democratic era, where the counter-narrative that had been repressed during the New Order started to appear in public. It developed into an emerging genre, which Mary S. Zurbuchen noted as *historical memory*, where individual and social processes continued to be intertwined in representing the past in the present.[59] Historical memory is characterized by the distance from textual sources and the incorporation

55 See McGregor 2012.

56 Syarikat was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta as a young NU activists' study group. The background of this establishment is the acknowledgement that NU was involved in the 1965-66 violence and their victims were their own neighbours or people from the same village. Therefore, grassroots reconciliation should take place between them. Budiawan 2004, 196-203. Documents of Syarikat's activities are stored as their organization's archives.

57 The tribunal judges not only find the "state of Indonesia responsible for and guilty of crimes against humanity", but that the State also "failed to prevent the perpetration of these inhumane acts or punish those responsible for their commission". IPT 1965 Foundation 2017, 117-121.

58 The initiator of this symposium was Forum Silaturahmi Anak Bangsa/FSAB, an organisation of family members of national heroes who were killed in G30S. The idea was communicated to the Presidential Advisory Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden) who then continued to involve other NGOs and universities in the symposium. Utama 2016.

59 Zurbuchen 2005, 7.

of other forms of narrative, particularly personal memory.[60] In other words, it brings these 'private' or counter-memories forward in the 'public' sphere.

The effort to bring private memories to the public is perceived as a means to continue human rights advocacy for the case of the 1965-66 violence. Literary works that are related to the violence are regarded as 'cultural resistance' to continue to remember the violence that was silenced so much in Suharto's New Order.[61] This human rights approach is part of a larger framework of 'facing the past' in the international community. Within newly emerging democratic countries, dealing with the past (through truth-telling, memorialization, and so on) is perceived as a precondition for democracy.[62] International communities, such as UN bodies, have tried to formulate policies on memorialization under the term cultural rights.[63] In the report, Western memorial models, particularly commemoration of the victims of Nazism, "while not always the most adequate or appropriate, have become a template or at least a political and aesthetic inspiration for the representation of past tragedies or mass crimes".[64] Furthermore, scholars of memory studies also reinforced the centering of the Holocaust in the growth of the discipline. The editors of the Collective Memory Reader stated that "when one speaks of the memory boom, one is indeed speaking in part – though far from exclusively – of the vast terrains of Holocaust memory, and other terrains of memory modelled on it".[65] The tendency to place the Holocaust as a reference for acts of remembering seems problematic. Not only that it glosses over the different contexts of violence, it also assumes a linear and direct progression between past violence, truth seeking, and acts of remembering, which occurred in the same way in every nation. In the case of 1965, such linear progression did not exist, as I have explained above.

Another problem of the human rights approach also lies in the intensification of the binary position of the dominant and public narrative. Perceiving the anti-leftist violence as the counter narrative, human rights advocates usually bring these private narratives of violence into the public as proof that the violence occurred and, consequently, demand actions from

60 Zurbuchen 2002, 579-581; Zurbuchen 2005, 16.

61 See Hill 2012.

62 Theodore Adorno discusses the culture of forgetting that threatens democracy, and the need of self-critical reflection of the past to build real democracy. David 2017, 302.

63 In 2013 and 2014, two important reports on history textbooks and memorialization in general were presented at the UN General Assembly as part of dealing with the promotion and protection of human rights. David 2017, 305.

64 David 2017, 308.

65 Olick, Vinitzky-Serousi, and Levy 2011, 30.

the state. On the one hand, this is understandable, in the context where impunity and silence are salient, private narratives have legal functions. On the other hand, making private narratives public and the move to 'break the silence' implies that there is only one way to acknowledge the violence, which is to bring them to the public sphere. It distances us from the fact that the silence and hidden narratives have created their own language and distinct ways of representing the past in the present. For example, in different places, ruins of a burnt house, a crack on a cupboard or a shattered window caused by the weapons of anti-communist militia attacks are left unrepaired because they remind the surviving families and communities of how their loved ones were taken away.[66] This shows that the private narratives are not always 'hidden' or 'silenced', but are actually communicated in their distinct way.

Apart from existing studies of the 1965-66 violence, there are only a few that focus on its memories. In a compilation of oral history essays in *Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir,* the researchers started their volume with a discussion of oral history and the memory of the 1965 violence. They point to the fact that memories of violence are a 'public secret' that never diminished even under Suharto's authoritarian regime.[67] One of the examples that the editors mentioned was literary works in the early New Order that present the 1965 killings as a central theme in their stories. In terms of intergenerational memory amongst victims of the 1965-66 violence, Andrew Conroe examines post-memory and memory transmission between generations of the 1965-66 victims' families.[68] Conroe elaborated the activism and tension among families of victims in Central Java, as a dynamic manifestation of remembering the violence. Meanwhile, another group of scholars have traced the memory of the 1965 violence that exists in or relates to certain places. The work of Eickhoff, Danardono, Rahardjo & Sidabolok shows how certain sites of memory in Semarang, Central Java, preserved the memory of the 1965 violence. These places became significant in conveying narratives of the 1965 violence in the present because of the constant interaction and re-interpretation by the surrounding people.[69] Their study also resonates with Kar Yen Leong's article on sites of violence and narratives spirits.[70]

66 Santikarma 2008, 207.
67 Roosa, Ratih, and Farid 2004,1-23.
68 Conroe 2017.
69 Eickhoff et al. 2017.
70 Kar-Yen 2021

Besides these studies, the anthropological approach in the study of memory of the 1965 violence has added a critical stance to the discussion about the representation of violence. Leslie Dwyer & Degung Santikarma, who studied the 1965 violence in Bali, pointed to the fact that the violence in Bali was entangled in local communities and kin groups, where 'neighbours killed neighbours and relatives killed relatives'.[71] Because of this entanglement, memories of violence amongst Balinese should not be seen as 'homogenous repositories of shared understandings of the past'.[72] In Bali, practices of everyday life, social interaction and language shifted to accommodate memory of the violence and its further consequences (such as being labelled as communists even when the violence had ended). Dwyer & Santikarma argue to focus on the context where memories are formed and transformed, and also on the agency of victims of violence in Bali in remembering 1965, including their silence, which is an active way of remembering and not an absence of memory. Dwyer & Santikarma also stress the insufficient binary approach to memory of the 1965 violence and its reconciliation prescription – to suggest that talking about violent memories (instead of keeping silent) is part of revealing truth and moving towards healing -- because the process of remembering violence is part of a complex and dynamic social interaction. This is how current memory of the 1965 violence can be understood better: not in the competing position of official versus counter-narrative or the public versus private narrative, but through their co-existence,[73] entanglement, and as I will show later, embeddedness in their local context and social relationships.

The Case of 1965 in East Java

East Java was one of the worst-affected areas in the violence besides Central Java and Bali. Using statistical methods and population data, Siddharth Chandra estimates a total loss of population of 175,169 in East Java alone, not only because of death, but also migration between regions.[74] Violence in this province is characterized mainly by salient participation

71 Dwyer and Santikarma 2006, 198.

72 Dwyer and Santikarma 2006, 202.

73 Eickhoff, van Klinken and Robinson regarded this as a dualism: although Indonesians still believe in the formal narrative about communism, it does not necessarily mean that they do not sympathize with the victims. Eickhoff, Klinken, and Robinson 2017, 458.

74 Chandra 2017, 1078.

Figure I.1. Location of Malang Regency in East java

of civilian and religious organisations, predominantly the Nahdlatul Ulama or NU. Religious reasons are seen as the main motive for their involvement in the violence, for example by portraying the violence against the atheist communists as *jihad* (holy war in Islam).[75] This resulted in some of the most gruesome killings throughout 1965-66. Body parts were exposed in public, to exhibit the fate of these communists.[76] This has led some scholars to believe that the nature of the conflict in East Java was basically a group clash between religious organisations and the PKI. This was reflected, for example, in Hermawan Sulitstyo's study in Kediri and Jombang which emphasises the minor role of the army in those two areas, by giving the arena to NU protagonists to end previous political conflicts with violence. The slaughter became uncoordinated when local Muslim youths, with the approval of their religious leaders, were given the opportunity to kill the communists.[77] A similar study by Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko on the violence in Bali and East Java also emphasizes the role of political men or activists (instead of ordinary peasants, *santri*, or

75 Young 1990, 87.

76 Pipit Rochijat's account of the violence in Kediri recorded the hanging of male genitals in front of houses in the prostitution complex. Rochijat 1985, 44.

77 Sulistyo 2000, 244.

villagers), who were members of or had ties to anti-PKI organisations, in the violence.[78]

Other scholars have a different opinion about the case of East Java. Regarding the portrayal of the 1965-66 killings as religious conflict, Kate McGregor and Greg Fealy argued that socioeconomic and political factors were more dominant than religion. This was reflected, for example, by the growing popularity of the PKI in East Java and their campaign against the elitist *kyais* (Islamic religious leaders).[79] Another study in East Java, specifically South Blitar, by Vannessa Hearman, also reflects a different opinion than Sulistyo's and Sudjatmiko's horizontal conflict approach. Relying on oral history interviews of survivors, perpetrators and community members in the areas where the violence occurred, she highlights that although violence in East Java was often portrayed as a horizontal conflict, structure and organization of the army were a crucial element in triggering the violence against the left.[80]

Another influential study of 1965 in East Java is Robert Hefner's research in Pasuruan, where he scrutinizes the social dynamics of the area before the violence occurred. Using an ethno-history approach on Tengger communities in lowland and highland Pasuruan, Hefner examines how the transformation of economic life in different historical periods shaped the identity of the Tengger community. In doing so, he found how 1965 had drastically transformed the socio-economic contour of the community. According to Hefner, the lowlands were dominated by Muslims of NU, while the highlands were a domain of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and PKI. The study criticized the perception of the PKI struggle as merely a class struggle, because in highland Pasuruan, the activists of the local PKI consisted of villagers from a different class background, campaigning against corruption and demanding the removal of authorities who mistreated the usage of land.[81] The party did not demand redistribution of property, or any demands that can be perceived as challenging local class structure. Moreover, Hefner also concluded that the NU acted independently against the communists in the lowlands during the first period after the 30 September Movement, without causing any significant violent acts. The tables were turned when the military began to take control and intensified the anti-communist violence both

78 Sudjatmiko 1992, 236-237.

79 Fealy and McGregor 2012, 129-130.

80 Hearman 2018, 80.

81 Hefner 1990, 209.

in the lowlands and highlands of Pasuruan.[82] All of these studies show continuous debate in analysing the 1965 violence, scrutinizing how the violence was executed and the involvement of civilians in it. In chapter 2, I will elaborate more on this analysis of violence, particularly in East Java, by using the Military Regional Command (Komando Daerah Militer/ Kodam) V Brawijaya archives. The archive strengthens the argument that the military structurally encouraged and coordinated the involvement of civilians in the violence.

A Note about the Method

Donomulyo consists of 10 villages (*desa*) and 39 hamlets.[83] However, considering the distance and availability of informants, this research only covers three villages and six hamlets. For ethical and security reasons, which I will explain in more detail below, I will not mention the name of the villages, instead I will use the pseudonym "Banyujati" area to refer to the three villages covered in this study.

In order to understand how memory of violence becomes a survival strategy and also to comprehend the context in which these memories develop, I took two interrelated approaches in this study. First, using historical analysis, I studied the evolving agrarian society of Donomulyo, including their continuity and ruptures in three different periods; namely the colonial period, the revolution and Sukarno's leadership, and the New Order. The analysis includes a specific study on the 1965-66 operation itself, focusing on how the army collaborates with civilians to execute such massive violence and establish the New Order regime.

The historical approach in this research uses archival study to reconstruct different historical periods of Donomulyo, and to highlight some continuities between those periods. For the colonial period, I used different sources of colonial archives, company reports of NV. Kali Tello, colonial welfare survey, and Dutch newspapers. I also combined these sources with oral history information from villagers whose families had worked on the plantations. Reconstructing the history of Donomulyo is challenging, because the sources are limited and scattered. Not to mention that the administrative government of the area during the colonial era was different from the present administration, making it difficult to locate the information on colonial

82 Hefner 1990, 210-211.

83 http://donomulyo.malangkab.go.id/?page_id=5, accessed on 10 December 2018.

Figure I.2 Location of Donomulyo district in Malang Regency

Donomulyo in the archives. During the colonial period, Donomulyo was part of the Pagak subdistrict, in the Senggoeroeh district, Malang regency, the Pasoeroean residency. Apart from the NV Kali Tello company report, there are only very few documents that mention Donomulyo. However, there are more sources about the Pagak subdistrict and Senggoeroeh district, which I used to construct a more or less overall picture of Donomulyo in the colonial period. Nevertheless, I realise that although descriptions of districts and even the regency are more accessible, variations at village level may exist.

The early independence period is even more difficult to reconstruct as sources on this war period are more limited, scattered and patchy. Most of the information that I used to reconstruct this period came from newspapers, several agrarian research reports in the 1960s, and oral history interviews with villagers in Donomulyo. The period after independence in this research specifically focuses on the leftist movement during the 1950s and 1960s, although it is very hard to find accurate information on this movement in the Donomulyo district. Meanwhile, the military operation and violence in 1965-1968 in Malang were reconstructed based on the analysis of the Kodam V Brawijaya military archives and oral history from the villagers. Declassified CIA documents, archives from the Malang Regency, the Regional Development Body (Bappeda), and East Java provincial archives also added to this period, and constitute most of the rural dynamics in the

New Order era. Moreover, documents from the Malang diocese were also used to elaborate the dynamics of the Catholic community in Donomulyo, especially in the post-1965 period.

The second approach is an ethnographic approach, with a focus on life history, which aims to explore how society remembers the past in the present. In order to delve into the connection between local experiences and national events, I follow villagers' life history, probing experiences throughout their lifespan. This enables me not only to uncover information that is not documented in formal sources (such as history books, government documents or archives), but also to learn about their understanding and interpretation of the past. This ethnographic approach also allows me to look into transformations that occur at a local level, as a cause of national affairs and policies, specifically after the Reformasi era. Moreover, combining historical analysis and ethnographic methods enables me to look at the continuity of events in different periods of time, connecting their causes and effects.

This approach includes 38 interviews with residents of Donomulyo, former activists in Malang city and other sub-districts. The informants from Donomulyo have a wide range of backgrounds: farmer, teacher, local leader, member of women's organization, or shopkeeper. They also have different experiences of violence: some experience it directly, either as victims, local collaborators, or witnesses; others do not. I also interviewed the second generations of families of victims and collaborators of violence. Besides the interviews, I also conducted two focus group discussions with young people in the Banyujati area, who are not necessarily connected to the 1965-66 violence (i.e. not part of the victim's or perpetrator's family), in order to explore how they know about the event.

I encountered my informants through an informal snowballing method – one interviewee led me to another. I realize that this method can entail some disadvantages, for example, a person may only refer to people in his or her own network. To overcome this, I tried to go beyond the network of my key informants, and to delve into different groups in the area. In order to capture historical continuity and local interpretations, I usually started the interviews with questions on the interviewee's childhood experiences and then continued to discuss different periods of their lifespan. I asked them to describe their surroundings: activities, festivities, food, education, relationship with families and other children, and so on. This strategy is not only efficient to gather narratives on the pre-and post-violence situation, but also to avoid resistance that usually occurs when talking directly about the 1965-66 violence. It is important to note that I did not experience avoidance

or reluctance from the interviewees on this matter – which reflects that the violence was in fact an open secret. I recorded all of the interviews and also made field notes.[84]

As part of an ethnographic and oral history study, I also participated in some of the villagers' activities, such as the Independence Day festivities, Catholic community prayer, and other celebrations (*tasakuran*). I also visited and observed activities in several places, such as the village head's office, a pilgrimage site (i.e. the cemetery of the village pioneer) and a spiritual site (i.e. St. Mary's Grotto/*Goa Maria*). When I discovered that narratives of violence are also attached to places, I visited some of the sites that frequently appear in my interviews. This includes two monuments, one community hall, and two mass graves. In order to explore these sites, I discussed it with several people who are attached to them (such as the victim's family, caretaker or *juru kunci*), and also to the people who live nearby.

To avoid this risk and protect my informants' privacy, the names of informants in this book, in and outside Donomulyo, are written in pseudonym. This includes villagers whom I did not interview or meet directly, but are part of the narratives of violence, such as deceased members of a victim's family and former village heads. An exception applies for prominent national figures such as military generals or commanders (i.e., Basuki Rachmat, Suharto, and so on), and activists of mass organizations at the national level (i.e., Cosmas Batubara, Father Beek, Harry Tjan Silalahi, and others). The use of the term the Banyujati area also serves the purpose of protection, to avoid any lead that can point to certain interviewees.

Structure Of the Book

This book consists of five chapters, divided into two main parts. The next two chapters focus on the historical reconstruction, while the remaining three chapters focus on the memory culture of 1965-66 violence. I arranged the structure in such a way, so that the first historical chapters will provide a clearer context of the historical event itself, in this case, the 1965 violence. By understanding the rural context, the military operation, and the transformations that these events caused, readers will be able to comprehend how and why memories of violence develop in such a way. After building this introduction, the first chapter presents the evolving social and economic

84 Due to security reasons, these data (recordings and field notes) are under embargo. I am currently thinking and discussing with professionals to make the data available in the far future.

contour of Donomulyo. Centering on the agrarian dynamic, the chapter begins with a description of a colonial plantation in Donomulyo, followed by its destruction in 1948, during the war of independence. The chapter also describes Donomulyo's situation in the period from the 1950s to the 1960s, especially the leftist movement promoting agrarian reform, followed by the agrarian development project in the New Order era.

The second chapter describes the anti-communist operation in East Java, specifically in Malang. This chapter elaborates further the argument that the Indonesian military, since its establishment, has always been a political body that continues to form alliances with civilian elites. Furthermore, these civilians use their patronage connections with the military for their own agendas. I begin this chapter by describing the growing power of the military at the local level prior to 1965. I will also describe existing studies and analyses about the violence in East Java, particularly arguments about the NU and the military. Using documents from the Kodam V Brawijaya archives, and interviews with the villagers, I will show the structural nature of the military operation in Malang, where the military issued explicit instructions to use civilian forces. The documents also show the army's involvement in establishing the New Order regime at the regional level.

Chapter three is the first chapter on memory, which discusses the memory culture of the 1965-66 violence in a rural context. The main argument of this chapter is that instead of being formed exclusively by the state, memories of violence are embedded in their localities. The local context in this case is the patronage network that strongly influences villagers' interpretation of their local experiences, connecting the national with the local. Another context is the agrarian transformation that emerged after the violence, which aggravated rural differentiation through its capitalistic policies which only benefited a few groups in the village. Embeddedness in this context also shows the intersection of the personal and political in the villagers' memory culture. More importantly, embedded memories also reflect silence as a strategy to deal with the past.

The last two chapters discuss the means of preserving memory of violence in the village, despite denial and repression from the state. Chapter four discusses the memory landscape in Donomulyo, which refers to *lieux de mémoire* or sites of memory that relate to the anti-communist violence. In this landscape, state-initiated monuments exist together with locally initiated sites of memory, such as mass graves. While the first have lost their relevance today because of their top-down nature, the latter are still commemorated by villagers. Some of these sites are also used by villagers as an instrument to maintain their relationship with state patrons.

Chapter five discusses the memories of the young generation, especially the second generation of victims' and perpetrators' families. By looking at stories of four families, we will see how their memory of violence develops, and how silence becomes an integral part of it. Silence itself does not simply mean forgetting or an absence of knowledge, but is a result of negotiation between the past and present; and also between the private and the political. This chapter also describes history education and community gatherings as moments where narratives of violence travel between generations. The conclusion will summarize the main findings of this study and discuss the major questions in the field of memory studies and state violence. I will also reflect on these results and the methods used, and share the implications for reconciliation processes in the present and future.

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1 The Context of Remembering[1]

Abstract

This chapter is intended to introduce the context in which memories of violence are formed. This context is a village called Donomulyo, which has undergone different state transformations. I will scrutinize the structural influence of those transformations on life in Donomulyo, particularly the social inequalities and the clientelistic practices between classes that evolved historically. Although the state had transformed, the inequality and patronage relations tend to endure. This continuity occurred not only because of state penetration in rural areas, but also because rural elites needed to form alliances with the state to maintain their privileged position, access, and properties. At the same time, clientelistic practices exacerbate the inequality in the area, leaving out those who are not involved in the patron's circle.

Keywords: clientelism, colonial plantation, Indonesian revolution, agrarian transformation, rural inequalities

This chapter is about Donomulyo, or to be precise, about how Donomulyo became what it is today. The district seems to be an insignificant location on the global map. Yet, it represents everything that our global community is currently facing: growing inequality, climate crisis, agricultural decline, migration, and so on. These are all reflected in my informants' everyday life. Some of them are local businessmen, retired school teachers, or retired village officials, who are still maintaining their farms although none of

1 This chapter is a reworked version of a published Indonesian journal article. See Leksana, G. (2019). Ketimpangan dan kontinuitas patronase dalam lintasan sejarah: menelusuri sejarah perubahan agraria di Malang Selatan. *Bhumi, Jurnal Agraria dan Pertanahan* 5(1): 54-68. Part of this chapter is also published in Leksana, Grace. "Remembering Anti-Communist Violence in Rural Society in Indonesia: Patronage, Agricultural Transformation, and the Legacy of Violence." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Anti-Communist Persecutions*, edited by Christian Gerlach and Clemens Six, 459–76. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

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DOI: 10.5117/9789463723565_CH01

their children are interested in becoming a farmer. The land that they own still functions as a capital, although slowly losing its productive purpose. Other villagers own almost no land. They could not afford to send their children to universities, so most of them work as hard labourers, such as sand miners or repairmen. Being a migrant worker is the most preferred option to escape from their poverty. But this also requires a certain amount of money to arrange passport and undergo trainings by certain agencies.

This social and class differentiation that exist in Donomulyo today are shaped by different courses of history. Interviews with villagers unravelled stories about the village's first settlers, sometimes with supernatural powers, who became *tokoh* (local leaders) and landowners, passed down to their current descendants. Other stories revolved around a colonial plantation, where some of my interviewees' parents used to worked, either as daily labourers or in higher positions such as an overseer. These stories moved us away from the image of village as a static void, filled with subsistence-oriented peasants into the fact that the village is "the basis of a complex political and economic framework".[2] It is complex because the political framework is constituted both by local and national elements. *Lurah*, or the village head, is a civil servant who is paid by the state budget, but how he or she manages the errands relies heavily on local networks, power, and negotiations. The state in this case should not be perceived as an external factor that resides far away in central-national politics, but fully present and can be seen by zooming into patronage relationships that influence rural dynamics.[3] These relationships that already existed in pre-colonial societies were used and sharpened further by the colonial economy, re-shaped in the war of independence, challenged during the revolutionary period, and returned to their former clientelistic nature during the New Order regime.

Perceiving the state as a part of a complex network in the village resonates with Joel Migdal's concept of State in Society. The state is not an independent and autonomous power, nor a separate hierarchy from society, but a part of a mélange of social organisations within society.[4] For Migdal, the state in society model should explore its two main elements; first, the strong image of a clearly bounded, unified organization that can be spoken of in singular terms, as if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated manner to rule a clearly defined territory. Second, the practices of a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, which stand

2 Elson 1984, 12.

3 Hart 1989, 31-32.

4 Migdal 2007, 49.

inside and outside the official state borders and often trigger a conflicting set of rules with one another and the official law.[5] Society for Migdal is not a static formation, but a result of struggles and conflicts between the above two elements, which includes numerous strategies chosen for individual survival or upward mobility.

Understanding this context of the complex village relationship, their political framework, and local manifestation of 'the state' will help us to comprehend the eruption of violence in 1965-66, and allows us to grasp how memories of violence are shaped, maintained, and forgotten. Using a historical-anthropology approach,[6] I follow the structural agrarian transformation in a particular setting and delve into the impact of those changes in society. By doing that, I ask how were inequalities shaped and maintained in different historical periods in Donomulyo? Who were involved in maintaining and confronting those inequalities? How did violent episodes in Indonesia's history affect rural differentiation in Donomulyo? Answering these questions forms the basis of the context of remembering the 1965-66 violence.

The Village Under Colonial Capitalism

From different oral sources, the origin of the Banyujati area[7] relates to the Javanese wars that took place in Central Java against Dutch colonialism, at the height of global capitalism and imperialism of the Netherlands. Villagers believed that the first settlers of Banyujati were the surviving troops from these wars who migrated to East Java to build a new livelihood. In some interviews, villagers mentioned *Pangeran Samber Nyawa* (Prince of Catcher of the Soul) – a prominent figure in several wars in mid-18th century Central Java. He was an aristocrat from Surakarta-Central Java, whose real name is Prince Mangkunegara I of Surakarta, or better known as Mas Said.[8] Meanwhile, other villagers believe that the first settlers of Banyujati were the former troops from a different Java war in 1825-30 between Diponegoro (eldest son of Central Java's aristocrat, Sultan Hamengkubuwana III) and the

5 Ricklefs 2001, 22.

6 For examples of similar studies, see Kano 1990; Hefner 1990; and Yuwono 2018.

7 Pseudonym for 3 villages where I conducted my fieldwork. See introduction.

8 Ricklefs 2001, 127-8. Ricklefs also argued that the appellation 'Samber Nyawa' came from his troop's battle-banner, which expressed the fierce power of Mangkunegara I. Ricklefs 2015, 543-547.

colonial government.[9] Despite the limitations with regard to confirming these stories of Banyujati's origin, both versions imply a wave of migration from Central Java because of the colonial wars, resulting in the emergence of new inhabitants in some parts of East Java. Although these groups arrived as migrants, they became a privileged group, assuming the roles of village headmen and landowners.[10] Up to today, the graveyard of the village pioneer became a site of pilgrimage and a centre for traditional village activities (such as village cleansing or *bersih desa* – an annual communal activity to pray for a better condition of the village in the upcoming years).

Records from the 1870s showed that the land tenure system in Java was bounded by communal regulations in the village. Analysing a survey report from 1868-69 in Java, Hiroyoshi Kano describes two main features of land tenure: the heritable individual possession and the communal possession.[11] In the individual possession system, the system works as follows: a particular individual occupies a plot of land, can hand over the land (due to death or by will) and can freely dispose of it by selling, leasing or pawning the land. However, there were communal restrictions surrounding this individual possession. For example, sometimes it is completely forbidden to sell land, and the right of the possessor is usually recognised by the totality of the village only when he is actually cultivating or interested in cultivating the land.[12] Transfer of land to others from another village is prohibited. Meanwhile, in the communal possession system (which was more common in Java at that period), an individual or family uses certain land that is part of the village or hamlet communal land, and therefore, the person does not have the right to hand over or dispose of the land. This system also involves periodic rotation of shares, except in Malang where the distribution of the tenure period and its sharers is fixed (in this case, Kano noted that communal possession in

9 Ricklefs 2001, 151-2.

10 In other studies, such as Husken's in the village of Gondosari, Central Java, the first settlers owned about half of the village's *sawah* (wet land) and approximately one-sixth of the village *tegal* (dry land). Throughout generations, not only was their ownership of land extended, but also their control over land, usually by renting to needy villagers (Huskens 1989, 309).

11 This survey, called *Eindresume van het onderzoek naar de rechten van den inlander op den grond* (Final summary of the survey on the rights to land of the native population), was conducted by the Dutch colonial authorities and resulted in three-volume reports presented in late 1872. The main aim of this survey was to examine the land right practices of the Indonesians (or natives at that time). The survey area covered all residencies in Java and Madura, except Batavia, Kedu, Jogjakarta and Solo. Not all villages in each residency were examined, but at least two of them were selected. For Malang, the survey included villages in the district of Gondanglegi, Pakis, Penanggoengan, Karanglo and Ngantang (Kano 1977).

12 Kano 1977, 11-12.

Malang can be considered equal to individual possession, except that there is no freedom of disposition). Moreover, while individual possession does not allow people outside the village to receive land, the communal system allows people from other villages to become sharers after spending a certain period of time in that particular village.[13] Nevertheless, Kano noted that the sharing system within communal possession is not completely egalitarian in practice. In some areas, larger shares and priority to choose a site are given to those who own livestock. In other cases, where the village officials have the power to decide on the distribution, it was done arbitrarily in their favour.[14] Both the individual and communal land tenure system already included a patronage network between landowners and land cultivators, which delineates most of the early agrarian societies.

Kano also argued that this land tenure system in the 1800s does not seem to resemble a landlord system, although the salary land contains a strong element of class relation.[15] It was the development of a commercial economy, especially an estate economy that further developed the landlord-tenant relationship, by increasing the transfer of arable land and penetrating into class relationships in the village.[16] This condition was exacerbated by the implementation of several colonial policies on corveé labour.[17] As a result, the communal system expanded, as was the case in Central and East Java, where land without owners was designated as communal land in order to share the heavy burden of corveé labour.[18]

In the Malang regency, the area transformed from a frontier area into a high-functioning economy in the mid-19th century. Once considered an insignificant economic area and the bases of criminal activity in East Java, Malang changed into a productive area due to the order in 1826 from Governor General Du Bus Gesignes that instructed the transformation of all unproductive land, including in the forest areas, to be converted into

13 Kano 1977, 15-17.

14 There are three common methods of distribution of communal land: 1) the village authorities decides on the distribution, 2) an agreement is made among sharers, 3) the shares of village authorities are first determined based on agreement among sharers, and then shares are rotated among the sharers in the same order each time (Kano 1977, 19-20).

15 Salary land is land assigned to officials for their private use. For village heads, 5-10 percent of the total communally possessed paddy fields were salary land, which cannot be cultivated by the working hands of the village head's household, resulting in the use of a number of the village labour force to till the land (Kano 1977, 31).

16 Kano 1977, 40.

17 *Cultuurstelsel*, for example, demanded land allocation to produce export crops to be sold at fixed prices to the colonial government (Ricklefs 2001, 156).

18 Paulus 1917, 824.

productive land.[19] This instruction not only affected Malang, but also other areas under the Pasuruan residency that altered empty land or villagers' land into coffee and sugar cane plantations. The second turning point was the establishment of the 1870 Agrarian Law, which enabled private enterprises to rent uncultivated land from the government for up to 75 years.[20] These policies increased the number of private companies who soon made investments particularly in coffee and sugar industries. From 1881 to 1884, almost one-third of the coffee production in Java came from Malang, and in 1922, the regency contributed 19.6% of the whole coffee production in Java and Madura.[21]

This private company boom did not only affect the colonial economy, but also created a distinct environment of plantation society. Technology, electricity, roads, were established to support the plantation economy. It also created a wave of migration of labour which resided in the area and became the administrative residents outside the village (original settler) bonds.[22] The workforce within the plantation was highly stratified, where the Dutch employees occupied the top decision-making positions, while the natives were stretched around the middle and low level strata – from overseers to daily labourers. Therefore, colonial plantation industries should not be examined in a limited economy framework, but also as a "microcosm of the colonial capitalist effort, at once compact and enormous ateliers in which racial, class, ethnic and gender hierarchies were manipulated, contested, and transformed".[23]

Outside the plantation compound, village officials played the role of brokers, linking cultivator and higher level Indonesian officials not only in terms of tax collection, but also in providing labour for the plantation.[24] In the districts of Karanglo, Pakis, Sengguruh (in the colonial administration, Donomulyo was part of Sengguruh district), Turen, and Gondanglegi in Malang, a high official received f 2.50-f 5 per bouw[25] from the company for their services in helping to rent land. Village officials received f 0.50-f 2 for their role in arranging contracts with labourers and crop transporters.[26] This

19 Hudiyanto 2015.
20 Paulus 1917.
21 Kano 1990, 13.
22 Departemen Koperasi 1978, LXXX, CXV.
23 Stoler 1995, 2.
24 Breman 1983, 6.
25 One bouw equals 0.7 hectare.
26 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking

system often bred corruption and also led to the exploitation of villagers.[27] In the Sengguruh district, village heads were involved in tax evasion and land leasing fraud.[28] The traditional patronage relationship that existed earlier gradually shifted to accommodate the colonial economy. Patronal ties that previously relied on crop-sharing and household chores were now expanded into practices of the money economy.

In the early 1900s, village officials were the elites and landlords, playing a role as brokers, while at the same time enjoying their privileged position in society. Another group that can be considered as being landlords were the *Hadjis* (title for people who went to the pilgrimage in Mecca, which made them respected Islamic leaders in the community), who could own up to 50 bouw of *tegal* land (dry land used for planting non-rice crops), such as was the case in Sumberpucung, Malang.[29] These elites were the patrons in colonial times. On the one hand, they became a concrete manifestation of the 'state' at the local level, implementing colonial policy and taking advantage of 'the rewards' given for their efforts. On the other hand, this was done through coercive means towards villagers which gradually reinforced the elite's economic and cultural power in society. In return, their clients would receive jobs as plantation workers or land cultivators.

Plantation Life in South Malang

Donomulyo also became part of the plantation industry, through the establishment of a coffee and rubber company, NV Kali Tello, which operated in the Northern part of Donomulyo. Starting with 370 bouw of land, the company faced multiple challenges during its first years of production,

van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 125. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

27 Ricklefs 2001, 157.

28 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 161-2. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

29 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 18-19. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

such as drought, plant diseases and unfavourable market prices of coffee.[30] Their high-quality products were sent to Holland, while inferior coffees were sold in Surabaya. The challenging first years slowly began to improve through expansion (by adding another 130 bouw of coffee plantation) and diversification of crops (cacao and pepper) in 1902.[31] Leaf or other plant-related diseases and extreme weather conditions (drought and heavy rainfall) remained influencing factors of the harvest in Kali Tello throughout the years. In 1910, the company started to invest in rubber by planting more than 17,000 trees aged one to four years, and continued by building a rubber factory two years later.[32]

World War I and disasters affected the distribution of Kali Tello's crops to the Netherlands.[33] However, the company continued to operate and in 1922, it occupied 1465 bouw, of which 207 bouw was used for the factory, houses, kampongs, roads; and the other 1258 bouw was used for the coffee and rubber plantations. A few years later, NV Kali Tello started to acquired other companies, namely the adjacent Poerwodadie coffee company, Soember Nongko I-IV rubber company, and Kali Gentong kapok plantation (both in Kediri). However, in 1929, the company started to deteriorate along with the fall of global coffee and rubber prices. The company entered into a financial deficit that resulted in a 10% salary reduction for their European staff, and ceased rubber production in the Soember Nongko plantation in 1931.[34]

Modern infrastructure was built by the company to process coffee and rubber. For example, modern machinery and fresh running water were used to produce latex in the rubber factory.[35] Electricity was used in the factory and became accessible to the neighbouring kampong, Oemboel Dawe.[36] After the acquisition of the Poerwodadie plantation, the entire

30 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1895. 1895. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
31 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1902. 1902. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
32 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1910. 1910. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
33 The yearly report recorded earthquake, Kelud volcano eruption, fire on the plantation, and plague, which affected the plantation's activities. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1917. 1917. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
34 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1931. 1931. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
35 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1914. 1914. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
36 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1919. 1919. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Table 1.1. Size of Land, Number of Trees, and Harvest of NV Kali Tello in 1928

Plantation	Coffee			Rubber	
	Total size of land (bouw, 1 bouw = 0.7 ha)	Total number of trees	Harvest 1928 (picols; 1 picol = c 61,7 kg)	Total number of trees	Harvest 1928 (in ½ kg)
Kali Tello	1460	932900	14688	103526	486630
Poerwodadie	1568	699572	5008	146773	934364
Soember Nongko	833			86649	304030
Total	3861	1632472	19696	336948	1725024

Source: Verslag Over Het Boekjaar NV. Cultuur-Maatschappij Kali Tello 1931.

coffee factory in Kali Tello was electrically driven from a power plant located in the nearby rubber factory. To enhance the transportation of coffee from Powerwodadie to the factory in Kali Tello, a 2600 m. cable car (*kabelbaan*) was operated in July 1926.[37] The company also invested in infrastructure, such as the main road to the railway station (presumably Ngebroek station in Sumberpucung, Malang), and a private road from the plantation to the main road, which made the area accessible for small cars.[38]

The opening of new plantations in South Malang increased the number of migrants. Between 1880-85, the population in the Pagak subdistrict tripled due to the opening of new coffee plantations in Sengguruh, Turen and Gondanglegi, facilitated by the opening of the Surabaya-Malang train connection.[39] Besides new labourers who arrived from Central Java, Madurese were also reported as immigrants to this area and were even preferable and more trusted compared to the locals.[40] Migration seems to have increased the labour supply, but was not followed by a rise in job opportunities. This

37 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1925. 1925. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

38 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1925. 1925. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

39 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 5. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlandsp.

40 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 83-4. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

condition caused a fall in wages for labourers within the period of twenty years:

Table 1.2. Wages for Labourers in 1880 and 1900

Type of earnings	Labour Wages	
	1880	1900
Overall earnings per day	ƒ 0.40 and ƒ 0.75 (for men)[41] ƒ 0.30 and ƒ 0.50 (for women)	ƒ 0.20 (for men) ƒ 0.30 (for women)
Coffee picking	ƒ 0.75 – ƒ 1.25	ƒ 0.50 – ƒ 0.60
Cultivation per bouw (around 30 days of work)	ƒ 20- ƒ 25	ƒ 15
Tilling land for planting (around 90 days of work)	ƒ 50- ƒ 60	ƒ 40

Source: Onderzoek naar de mindere welvaart 1907.

There were no pensions, financial compensations or compensation in labour time when a worker was unable to work.[42] Wages fluctuated, and companies often had to compromise between demand by the government to ease the welfare of 'indigenous people', and the company's own budget and harvest.[43] For example, wages for coffee pickers in Lebak Roto (a coffee plantation in Turen, Malang) fluctuated between f 4.13 per kg in September/November 1936 to f 2.80 per kg in March/May 1937 and increased to f 4.68 per kg in September/November 1937. The plantation administrator in Lebak Roto estimated that these wages were still sufficient to cover the workers' living cost of 12.5 cents per day.[44] For families, the amount was estimated as much lower compared to a single person because of the assumption that

41 1 ƒ or Netherlands Guilders = € 0.45

42 Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 85. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

43 Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 10 December 1937. 2.20.01, inventory 11638. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

44 Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 10 December 1937. 2.20.01, inventory 11638. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

married women also worked as labourers and thus also contributed to the total amount of wages per family. However, it seems that this calculation did not take family size into account, where children and extended family members often live together in one household.

With these unstable conditions, workers tended to move from one type of work to another, depending on the wages and facilities they could obtain. Kali Tello management repeatedly reported difficulty in finding labourers, because of higher wages that were offered by neighbouring plantations, especially the sugar industry, or simply because people preferred to work in their own fields.[45] To tackle the shortage of labour, besides offering higher wages, the company also provided facilities, such as housing or health care.[46] Nevertheless, these were not the only way to keep the workers on the plantation. From my conversation with Prambodo, who was born in 1933 on the rubber plantation Gledekan Pancur in Dampit – Malang regency, plantation owners provided workers with other facilities to informally bind them to the plantation. He was the son of a high-overseer assistant. His father organized lower level foremen in different divisions, such as factory, rubber tappers, maintenance, and so on. Prambodo grew up on the plantation, but went to elementary school in the Malang municipality and returned to the plantation during school holidays. During his stay on the plantation, he realised that providing entertainment was one of the Dutch strategies to keep the workers attached to the company:

> [the workers'] wages were paid every week, each Saturday. Lower level foremen, in different divisions, were gathered together by their superiors and their data were submitted to the factory overseer who was responsible for the wages. … I think the Dutch were very smart. We lived on a plantation, in an isolated area, so they provide us with entertainment [every Saturday]. There were dancers, and also people who played dice [gambling], so I realised the workers were busy with these entertainments. Meanwhile, the Dutch took a break to Malang [municipality], stayed in a hotel or went to *kamar bola* [a place to play billiards]. The workers were drinking, having fun, dancing, and so on. After that, their money was gone,

45 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1913. 1913. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands

46 Medicine was provided for free, while patients with serious illnesses were sent to a clinic in Malang. An outpatient clinic was established in 1927 near Kali Tello and Poerwodadie, where the plantation's residents could be treated by a doctor who came from Malang once a week. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1927. 1927. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

> spent just like that. Because they didn't have more money, they would work vigorously again on Monday. … There were a lot of Madurese workers. … They were cheap labour on the plantation. … The Madurese like to play [the dice] or cock fights, and this was allowed by the Dutch. Because by the end [of the week], their money would be gone. Madurese were usually involved in a fight. … The police usually came to take those people who were fighting. … That's the life of uneducated workers, maintained by the Dutch to work [on the plantation].[47]

Prambodo described a lively situation of workers that is not usually recorded in the companies' reports. He depicted the existence of Madurese workers (as also mentioned in colonial reports) and the entertainment that was provided by the companies. According to Prambodo, this was a 'smooth' strategy to keep workers on the plantation. At the same time, he also highlighted the gap between Dutch administrators and ordinary labourers.

A common incident in the 1920s on Javanese plantations was coffee thefts. The first case of coffee theft in Kali Tello was recorded in the company's 1922- annual report, where around 20% of its coffee beans were stolen by a group of coffee thieves. In the following years, women were also involved in these thefts.[48] NV. Kali Tello used several means to eliminate coffee thefts, including severe punishment for the thieves, erecting barbed-wire around the plantation, special plantation police, and cooperation between plantation police and *dessa* (village) police.[49] The company reported that the numbers of thefts increased due to the abolishment of the *koffie-passen stelsel* (a pass that authorised coffee transport) around 1931. Initially, in Malang, a pass or permission was required for local owners to possess, process, or transport coffee. The pass was considered necessary because of the frequent occurrence of coffee theft, caused by the coffee boom (high prices for coffee) in the 1920s and insufficient security on plantations.[50] When coffee prices fell dramatically during the great depression around 1929-1930, and the security system had been improved, the passes were abolished. However,

47 Interview with Prambodo, Malang, 29 July 2016 #14.04-18.15

48 A newspaper article in 1939 reported that a woman together with a 15-year-old girl were arrested after stealing 3.5 kg of coffee beans. While the girl was returned to her parents, the woman was imprisoned for six weeks and fined f 7.50 for using a fake name. "De Koffiediefstallen in Zuid Malang", 12. 1939. *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*. September 22, 1939.

49 Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1929; 1930. 1929 & 1930. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

50 "De Nieuwe Koffie Ordonantie", III-1. 1931 *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*. July 13, 1931.

it did not diminish the acts of thievery. Therefore, it is highly possible that the abolition of the *koffiepassen stelsel* may not have been the determining factor for the higher degree of coffee thefts, but the combined factors of economic crisis, migration, and fluctuation of labour wages. For the locals, thievery was an act of surviving the dire living conditions in colonial times.

Workers of the Plantation

The plantation affected the livelihood of villagers in Banyujati, especially for those who were employed by the company. Different positions within the labour force (for example, coffee pickers and overseers or *mandor*) generated different amounts of income for the locals, which enabled them to accumulate more or less capital for their families. Today, these differences can still be seen in the lives of the second or third generation of those former workers. One of these families was that of Burmudji, who was born in 1952, a former school teacher and a retired staff member in the district education office. His father, Darsa, was born in 1917 and was one of the descendants of Banyujati's first settlers. He managed to finish school in *Ongko Loro* and *Ongko Telu* (schools established by the Dutch for the natives) and became a teacher in Kebon Agung, another district in Malang. Around 1930, he became a Catholic and, as part of the Catholic mission, Darsa was assigned to teach in a newly established Catholic school in Donomulyo.[51] After a few years, he established another Catholic school in a village outside the Banyujati area. Together with two other Catholics in the village, Darsa was respected as the pioneer of the Catholic community in the district. His ability to read, write, and count, also enabled him to work as an overseer in the Kali Tello plantation.

> When the plantation still existed, my father was a *mandor* (overseer) of labourers. But don't imagine it was like a *mandor* today. It was more like a group chief. For example, there were ten labourers, so my father was the chief. This chief is called *mandor*. Because my father was considered 'educated' [quotation marks emphasized by Burmudji], although he only attended *Ongko Loro* and *Ongko Telu*… he was considered educated. So he was assigned administrative matters. … So [for] wages or other [matters], it

51 In 1938, *Sekolah Rendah Katolik* was established in Donomulyo, but later closed during the Independence war. It was reopened in 1948 and obtained official permission from the Regent of Malang in 1950 as a *Sekolah Rakyat Katolik*/Catholic Elementary School (Suhadiyono et al. 2010).

> was enough to only call for the chief, and then the boss gave instructions. … My father also distributed the wages. Although we were poor, we were not *that* poor compared to other people around us.[52]

Burmudji is fully aware of his family's status in the village. Darsa's educational background had led him to become a teacher, an overseer of plantation labourers, and a respected Catholic leader in the area. Reflected by the case of Burmudji's family, the existence of the Kali Tello plantation had contributed to the class and status formation of the villagers.

Being part of the plantation also enabled villagers to extend their capital ownership. This was the experience of Mrs Aji Marlan's father. Aji Marlan himself was the village secretary in the New Order era and the son of a local businessman, who traded cattle (mostly cows) around different areas in the district. His father-in-law later joined the business and both of them became the village's 'rich men', according to Marlan. Furthermore, his father also became a respected religious figure, with connections to Hajj around the area because of his trading business. Aji Marlan's father built the first mosque in the hamlet, and Marlan became an Ansor (a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, one of Indonesia's prominent Islamic organizations) activist later on. Both fathers of Mr and Mrs Marlan had already shown managerial capabilities even before they collaborated in the business, which started through the work on the plantation.

> Mrs Aji Marlan: [it was] my father. My grandmother sold *gethuk* (Javanese sweets made with cassava and shredded coconut) in the place where the people worked. And her son, my father, was the only child. He worked with the Dutch, but only to tap the rubber, not as an overseer. He was always given a packet of food [by his mother], but he did not eat it, instead he sold it to his friend. Then when he ate, he ate with my grandmother. He constantly saved the money, so he could buy a *sawah* (rice paddy field). He was always an economist ever since he was young. He worked with the Dutch. … The Dutch paid their labourers, there was no forced labour. People were paid daily, but the wages were low.[53]

Although wages for labourers were low, Mrs Aji Marlan's father managed to overcome this by selling his food ration. The money that he saved by working on the plantation, and from the cattle business later on, was used

52 Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #01.09.29-01.11.20

53 Interview with Mr and Mrs Aji Marlan, Donomulyo, 15 May 2017 #01.10.33-01.12.43

to purchase large amounts of land in the village. This, together with the land that he inherited from Marlan's grandfather, and his network of Islamic figures, also positioned the family in the village elite group.

However, there were also other villagers outside the elite circle who worked on the plantation. This was the case of Marwono, which was very different from the family of Aji Marlan or Burmudji. Marwono, born around 1936 or 1937, is currently a farmer who owns a small plot of land. His land is planted with food crops, mainly cassava and a few cacao trees, and also timber (*sengon* type). In our conversation, he admitted that he had had a difficult childhood, growing up without knowing his parents and then he lost his aunt who took care of him.

> I was born in Bejirejo (an area in the Kasembon district, Malang). There was a coffee and rubber plantation there [in Banyujati area]. My aunt and grandmother worked as labourers in the factory. There was a factory and a plantation. They picked coffee beans during the harvest season, and at other times, they worked as labourers on the plantation. … When I was small, I remember my grandmother and aunt worked on the plantation. My brother and uncle, who also worked there, usually came home and brought firewood. Then they sold it. Wages at that time were very low, but I don't remember how low they were. But it was not enough for us to live on. We ate more vegetables. The value of firewood was really unpredictable. Sometimes we traded it for food, *tiwul* (cassava-based meal), to add to our daily menu. … The people worked in the factory, they came from the surrounding area. There were no migrants from outside. The Dutch managed the factory, but the overseers were mostly Javanese. There were Dutch people, but only a few. … There were usually feasts during holidays, all the workers gathered in the factory. Some of the food crops, including corn in the factory, were distributed to the workers. Once I also grilled the corn until dry. There was no entertainment during the feast, but only an invitation to eat together. We did not use plates at that time, but only banana leaves.[54]

Marwono's family migrated to Banyujati because of the work opportunities on the plantation. As with Aji Marlan, Marwono mentioned the low wages for plantation workers, especially for his large extended family. They relied only on their limited wages, selling firewood, and free crops from feasts;

54 Interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 #02.45-10.38.

Marwono's family did not have any reserved funds, let alone being able to buy land for their property.

The family history of Burmudji, Aji Marlan, and Marwono illustrates the aggravated class relationship that was influenced by colonial industry, enabling village elites to extend their capital, leading to intensified landlordism and escalating inequality in the village. Participating in the colonial plantation industry enhanced their position as patrons, increasing their capital and connection to the colonial state. From the case of Donomulyo, it is interesting to note that people like Burmudji or Aji Marlan became members of the village elite not only because of their economic status, but also because of their religious and cultural connections. Aji Marlan came from a religious elite circle, while Burmudji was the descendant of the village's first settlers who were considered sacral by the locals. In other words, their positions as patrons in society were a result of intertwined factors of tradition, religion and economy. However, challenges against the position of these patrons started to emerge after the independence war in 1945-50. The closing of the Dutch company because of the war provided the opportunity for villagers to occupy former plantation land.

Under the Changing State: Japanese Occupation and Independence

In general, plantations in Indonesia experienced massive transformation under two phases of state transition in Indonesia. First was the Japanese Occupation in 1942-1945, followed by the war of Independence between the Republic and the Dutch in 1945-1949. When the Japanese occupied Java on 8 March 1942, they rapidly took control of Java and started to exploit the island's economic resources to support their military operation during the war. This resulted in massive changes in agrarian policy and labour. Farmers under the Japanese occupation almost had no freedom in choosing the crops to be planted on their land.[55] Production of cash crops such as tea, coffee, and sugar cane were largely reduced because the limited market would create a surplus of production. Most of the plantation areas that were once owned by Dutch companies were transferred to Japanese companies, such as the case of 80 Dutch-owned sugar companies in Java that were distributed to six Japanese corporations.[56] However, not all of the sugar companies

55 Kurosawa 2015, 4.

56 Kurosawa 2015, 52.

continued to produce sugar under the Japanese government. Of the 85 sugar companies, only 13 still continued their operations, while at least 17 others were converted to cement factories and 9 into spinning mills.[57]

Although the Japanese government launched massive campaign to increase food production, production actually dropped sharply, in part because the amount of land for growing food crops decreased, being taken up by the production of non-edible crops.[58] Another factor that contributed to the decrease in food production was the shortage of labour to work on farm lands, because most of them were mobilized for defence and production.[59] Within this campaign to increase food production, the Japanese government established a policy in 1942 which instructed farmers to deliver their rice crops to the government under certain quotas.[60] In this process, village officials played a significant, sometimes aggressive, roles in achieving the demanded quota. In some cases, officials forced farmers to reached the target by submitting all their rice crops despite the quota. This left the farmers without sufficient food for their daily consumption.[61] In other cases, such as distribution of clothing material to the villagers, village officials were reported to deviate from the intended distribution by hoarding the materials and selling them to the black market.[62] In conclusion, during the Japanese occupation, social economic life in the village transformed dramatically. Within the dire limitation of food crops, clothing, and manpower, villagers risked famine and death. However, as Julianto's research has shown, even within this dire situation, village officials used and abused their power either to collect materials for their own consumption, or to prove their loyalty to the new government through, for example, fulfilling the rice quota.

Hope emerged after the defeat of the Japanese, followed by Indonesia's declaration of independence on 17 August 1945. But this declaration was not easily accepted by the Dutch, who tried to recapture independent Indonesia as their colony. This attempt led to war between Indonesia and the Netherlands which occurred during two phases of military aggression by the Dutch (or 'police action', in the Dutch term) from July-December 1947 and from December 1948-January 1949. These phases of military aggression,

57 Kurosawa 2015, 61.

58 Sato 2010, 257.

59 Defence in this context included a range of activities related to military (and semi-military) activities. Production involved concentrating on strategic resources such as oil, minerals, transport, and clothing. Sato 2010, 245.

60 Ibrahim 2020, 227.

61 Ibrahim 2020, 229.

62 Ibrahim 2020, 231.

also known by Indonesians as the war of independence, confirm the use of extreme violence by the Dutch in that period.[63] On the other hand, when Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, it did not necessarily mean that all regions in the archipelago were automatically united as 'Indonesia'. Tension and competition between the local and national elites were ubiquitous in this period until the 1950s. Some of them erupted in violent uprisings such as the Darul Islam in West Java (1949) and Aceh (1953-1962), and the leftist People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat/FDR) in 1948 in Madiun, where PKI leaders such as Musso were involved. East Java reflect such tension, where the local elites and military were not always in line with the approaches of the national elites and military.[64] For example, East Java's elites believed that civilians who were brave and willing to fight the Dutch should be allowed to join the army. For them, armed forces were not only about intelligence or fighting skills, but about bravery. The *laskar* (civilian army with limited military training) in East Java illustrates particularly this aspect – they were rebellious, ignorant of their ranks or their merit badge. But East Java's stance about civilians in the army was mostly neglected by the government, which wanted to separate the army and *laskar*.[65]

During this turbulent period of revolution, several things happened in plantations across Indonesia. After being exploited under Japanese occupation, Dutch companies tried to take over their previously owned plantations. They put much effort into securing their properties, for example, by forming Plantation Guards consisting of indigenous and a few European personnel under the companies' direct management.[66] However, on the Republic side, plantations had other functions. First, crops were used to finance the war. Since March 1949, the Indonesian government hardly had any funds to pay the salaries of their employees. Instead of earning a salary, employees were paid with crops that were collected through compulsory donation from farmers. Regular farmers had to give 20% of their crops, where 10% were given to the army and 10% to the civilian government.[67] Every district was given the responsibility to

63 The research team noted that although the analytical concept of extreme violence refers to violence that was largely used outside direct regular combat situations against civilians or fighters, the fact shows that extreme violence was carried out within regular combat, risking civilian casualties (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH), and NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs 2022, 109).

64 Sapto 2018

65 Sapto 2018, 109-112

66 See Frakking 2014

67 Sapto 2018, 225

provide food, money, and travel funds for the military division within their area.[68] This policy was very hard to control and often lead to the military's arbitrary act of seizing state-owned crops.[69] Second, some plantation lands were occupied by the state and continued to produce crops. In some cases, the state also divided plantations land into arable land for incoming refugees of the war. Third, plantations were also destroyed as part of the war tactics to prevent the return of the Dutch. Former plantation laborers then converted this ex-plantation land into residential areas and arable land. This was the start of emergency villages (*desa darurat*), referring to villages that emerged during the Revolution by converting previously owned Dutch plantations. While these villages later became formal ones and were included in the administrative government, others created a continuous dispute between villagers and the state, such as the case of the current land dispute in Sumbermanjing Wetan, Malang.

Returning to our plantation Kali Tello in Donomulyo, no traces of it can be found today. Kali Tello was destroyed, materials from the factory were dismantled and looted, and the land was occupied by villagers. Marwono, Donomulyo's villager whose parents worked as plantation laborers, received around one hectare from this plantation land.[70] This was presumably part of the Republican soldiers' guerilla tactics, supported by the villagers, that applied in most areas in South Malang.[71] However, land-squatting during the revolution also created a lasting side effect: the emergence of the Indonesian army as a new player in the agrarian business. For example, a report from NV Kooy & Coster van Voorhout in 1951 mentioned that a former TNI (Indonesian army) formed an alliance to establish NV. Sumi, which used the former plantation lands of Wonokoio, Banduardjo, Alas Tledek,

68 Sapto 2018, 222

69 ibid.

70 interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 #14.36-21.02.

71 This was known as scorched earth (*bumi hangus*) tactics, part of the Indonesian Republican Army's guerilla tactics, geared towards inhibiting Dutch economic reconstruction (Nasution 1953), 20). When an Agricultural and Technical expert, R. Ismantri, visited the south Malang area in August 1948, he reported that all the estates of Poerwodadie and Kali Tello had been completely destroyed and only 2% of rubber remained. Copy Certificate Re: Condition of Estates and Factories South Malang Area, August 3, 1948. Inventory 11636. Nederlansche Handel Maatschappij (NHM). Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands. The yearly report 1941-1949 of NV Kali Tello also stated that their factories, plantations and dwellings were destroyed as a result of the scorched earth tactic. The company decided not to reinvest in the plantation and decided to divert their assets to establish a tobacco company. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1940-49. 1949. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Donowarie and Kali Tello.[72] There is no further information on NV. Sumi, but it is likely that the company was unable to survive after independence.

When villagers in the Banyujati area started to occupy the former plantation land, it did not automatically lead to an improvement in their economic situation. Destruction of the plantation meant that the villagers lost the village's largest economic sector, including its infrastructure (i.e. electricity, housing) and facilities (i.e. health care). It also meant that the village's money economy that was introduced by the colonial plantation industry became disrupted with the loss of the plantation. Even when villagers eventually managed to own their land, tilling and planting was a whole different story. The quality of soil had changed after the intense exploitation of the coffee and rubber plantation. The dry-soil character and limited rainfall also made food crop farming very difficult. It was not surprising when East Java experienced a food crisis in 1963 and the Donomulyo population suffered extreme malnutrition.[73] Furthermore, even when the state shifted (from colonial to independent Indonesia), crop-sharing, land tilling, and the communal land system remained mostly the same, including the patron-client relationships that operate these systems. The only difference was the patron's connection to the state. In the colonial era, the plantation industry was the link between rural patrons and the state, while in the post-independence period, the military became a leading representation of the state. Moreover, the end of the Dutch plantation in Donomulyo was not followed by changes in their class relationships. The colonial plantation industry in Indonesia managed to increase socio-economic differentiation, concentration of land against the landlessness or near-landlessness, semi–proletarization and the emergence of a core of modern skilled labour.[74] Indonesian independence could not bring significant changes during the early independence years, as in Donomulyo. At that time, there was a frequent expression among the villagers: "When is this independence going to end (*Kapan yo entekne merdeka*)?".[75] This did not mean that the villagers wanted to be recolonized,

72 In this period, there was competition between different military groups to legalize ownership of former plantation lands. The group from NV. Sumi was competing with the TNI group led by Oemar Maksim, who had strong connections with ALS (*Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat*). Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 12 March 1951. 2.20.01, inventory 11636. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

73 "Notes Ketjil dari Malang Selatan: Tragedi Busung Lapar Perlu Perhatian", 4. 1964. *Trompet Masjarakat*. 25 Januari 1964.

74 Slamet-Velsink 1988, 167.

75 Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #19.29

but they felt that Indonesian independence was not bringing any improvements to their lives.

Confronting Class Differentiation: The Left and Agrarian Reform

Class differentiation also influenced the ability of villagers to overcome hardships. For example, during a period of starvation in Donomulyo, Burmudji's father received donations such as rice, oil, milk, sugar and even cigars because he was working for the church Carmelite foundation.[76] In contrast, Marwono's family only ate *tiwul* (a dish made from fermented cassava) and the inner-side of papaya stem to survive the famine. It was the leftist organisations, mainly the PKI and the Indonesia Peasant Front (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*/BTI) who started to confront and criticise these village inequalities together with practices of 'feudalistic' patronage. Information on how the BTI started to establish their branch in Banyujati is not clear. Some of the interviewees were certain that the organization became active because of the agrarian reform, which was marked by the establishment of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) no. 5 in 1960. But in general, the BTI's advocacy on land issues already started even before the law was introduced. In 1951, the BTI criticized the new Indonesian government because of their tardiness in legalizing the occupied former plantation land. The BTI strongly urged the government to be more aggressive and to even opt for forced handover of those lands to the people.[77] They also supported advocacy and mass actions by the people to defend their lands, the *desa darurat*, which were also formed on forestry land during the war. They condemned forestry officials in the ministry who still argued that squatted forestry land should be returned without considering the lives of the villagers.[78]

It is highly possible that the BTI's advocacy of land for the people and their position against feudalistic village administration,[79] led to their success in the 1955 legislative election. In the Malang Regency, the NU party received the highest number of votes (231,918 votes), followed by the PNI (Partai

76 Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #01.03.50

77 Tj. "Okupasi Tanah", 3-4. 1951. *Suara Tani*, 31 Djanuari 1951. Edisi Tahun VI.

78 Sardju, Imam. "Aksi-Aksi Kaum Tani Mempertahankan Tanah Bekas Kehutanan Jang Sudah Lama Dikerdjakan", 2. 1957. *Suara Tani*. July 1957, tahun VIII no. 8.

79 In a Suara Tani article, the BTI criticized the undemocratic mechanism in forming village authorities. The existing practices relied on family relationships to choose the village apparatus. The BTI suggested the formation of village law (Undang-undang Desa) to tackle this problem. Djojohadiwikarso, Kasno. "Keadaan Desa", 19. 1951. *Suara Tani*. Djanuari 1951, Tahun VI.

Nasional Indonesia – Sukarno's party) with 193,297 votes and the PKI with 164,159 votes.[80] In contrast with the provincial result, the PKI actually received the highest number of votes in the Donomulyo district, up to 12,981 votes. The second place was for the PNI with 3609 votes, followed by the NU in third place with 591 votes.[81] This election result explains why village heads in the Banyujati area were members of the PKI, as well as the term 'red village' mentioned in the previous chapter.

The BTI's mobilization became more intensive when the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) no.5 was introduced. The law had several functions: it asserted the 'social function' of land and other resources; reiterated the state's responsibility for managing those resources in the interests of 'the people'; prohibited absentee and foreign ownership of land, and paved the way for the redistribution of land through subsequent land reform legislation.[82] In short, the law aimed to provide land for the landless. However, the implementation of the law tells a different story. In 1963, the Central Land Reform Committee recorded that only 153,043 ha of land had been distributed of a total of 403,000 ha of government land.[83] Up to the end of 1964, the agrarian minister noted difficulties in executing the Law, such as deficiencies in the registration of land; lack of understanding of the necessity and significance of the Law; and the inhibition of peasants' organizations from playing a significant role in the committee.[84] In extreme cases, obstruction of land distribution by the landlords was found in forms of deception by converting surplus lands into false grants, divorce, leasing and even deaths that led to false inheritance.[85] These landlords were apparently reluctant to give up their land which served as the basis of their status as patrons in society. The government was seen to be very slow in implementing the law, which led the PKI to take an aggressive step by launching unilateral actions. These actions took several forms, including physical attacks against landowners (usually followed by acts of retaliation towards the peasants); land grabbing; or refusal to hand in part of the harvest to the landowners.

80 The number of voters (478,454 people) in East Java was small compared to the total number of residents in the province (1,226,754 people). There is no explanation for this discrepancy. Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia. 1955.

81 "Hasil Pemungutan Suara Di Kabupaten Malang", 2. *Suara Masjarakat*, Oktober 1955.

82 Lucas and Warren 2013, 2.

83 Asmu. "Keterangan Asmu Tentang Aksi Sepihak: Aksi Sepihak Kaum Tani, Karena Ada Aksi Sepihak Tuan Tanah II." 1964. *Harian Rakjat*. June 29, 1964.

84 These difficulties were disclosed in a report by the Agrarian Minister in 14 January 1965. See Utrecht 1969, 78-79.

85 Asmu. "Keterangan Asmu Tentang Aksi Sepihak: Aksi Sepihak Kaum Tani, Karena Ada Aksi Sepihak Tuan Tanah II." 1964. *Harian Rakjat*. June 29, 1964.

In the Donomulyo district, 41,001 ha of land was already registered as excess land (*tanah kelebihan*) and 75 people were registered as candidates for the redistribution of this land.[86] There was no further information whether this redistribution was implemented or not. Land reform policy generated opposite reactions amongst Banyujati villagers. Village (*desa*) capitalists perceived this policy as a threat to their property. This was the case with Burmudji, as he explained his position on the policy:

> My father was the head of the Catholic party. He was an opponent figure. The [PKI] village head's policies were always opposed. In front of my house, there was a plaque "Head of the Indonesian Catholic Party", and beside it "Head of Catholic Youth". My father was brave. "If I died, I died in the name of Jesus". … There was a policy called land reform. … At that time, my father was leading the resistance against the village head. Because land reform was really making the people suffer … the land was controlled by the bureaucrats. … So even if I had inherited land, those bureaucrats would decide only this [size] is your land. I could not do anything, because it was restricted. Individual ownership was restricted, because of the PKI influence. There was a promise that members of the BTI will receive a piece of land. That land was actually obtained by reducing [ownership] through land reform. … My father was supporting the people who felt harmed [by the land reform policy], so he took a role as the vanguard. Father had two missions, besides defending those oppressed people, he also had a private agenda. By generating goodwill, people will become Catholics. Directly or indirectly, they will be interested in Catholicism … realising that those who suffered were defended.[87]

In Burmudji's perspective, agrarian reform was a threat to his family's private property. Implying resentment against bureaucracy, he sees his family as a victim of the law and blamed the PKI as the initiator of the law, which is not completely accurate.[88] Moreover, Burmudji's account also shows how

86 Sagijati 1968.

87 Interview with Burmudji, op cit. #02.32.13-02.35.57

88 During debates about the law in the Supreme Advisory Council and the parliament, the PKI had objections to some features of the law. Despite this, the party still voted in favour of the amended Bill that was finally adopted. According to Rex Mortimer, the PKI was playing consensus politics, guarding their alliance with the President, and demonstrating to the elite groups that they were moderate and responsible men. In other words, rather than influencing representatives of the political parties in the Parliament, they were conforming to negotiations on the law. Mortimer 1972, 16-17.

land issues are intertwined with religion. His father was using his advocacy against agrarian reform as a strategy to increase Catholic followers in the village. In other areas, unilateral conflict turned into religious clashes because most landowners were part of Muslim religious institutions.[89] This became intensified when religious propaganda was used, i.e. portraying communists as atheist and therefore, as a threat to Islam and Catholicism.

In my interviews, the villagers explained that although there was resentment between the leftist organizations (PKI and BTI) and religious ones (NU, Catholic Party) in Banyujati area, there were no physical clashes during the land reform. This is different compared to other places in East Java, such as Kediri and Jombang, where violent conflicts occurred between these two polarized organizations. One possible explanation of this condition in Donomulyo may stem from the differences of grassroot activities of leftist organizations in rural areas, which may not fit in with the solidity of the peasant's mobilization that the PKI central committee had imagined. A study conducted in 1961 in nine subdistricts in the Malang Regency by the *Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* (Internal Affairs Academy) reported that people in the region were reluctant to engage in political activity. For example, in the Purworedjo, Ngantang district, the presence of political parties and organizations was extensive. The PKI was the largest, followed by the PNI and NU. They existed together with many leftist organizations such as the BTI, Pemuda Rakyat (Youth organization) and Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*/Indonesia Women's Movement). The later was reported to have a sub-branch in every four hamlets in the subdistrict. However, these parties and organizations were basically stagnant, because they had lost the support and confidence of the locals.[90] Even some of these locals admitted that they were already bored with political activities. In the Ngadas, Tumpang district, it was reported that even political campaigns did not exist and therefore, no villagers joined political parties. The reporter himself was also puzzled, because in the last election, every party in this area had voters. Unfortunately, the study did not explain further the causes for such disinterest.

89 Mortimer 1972, 50-51

90 This research aimed at providing input for political and social-economic re-organization and development. The Malang Regency was intended as a first case-study which would then be extended to other regions in Indonesia. The nine subdistricts were considered as sites that had sufficient democratic institutions based on the results of the village elections since 1955. Six research assistants, who were second year students from *Perguruan Tinggi Hukum dan Pengetahuan Masjarakat Kota Pradja Malang* (Law and Public Knowledge University in Malang City), were involved for a minimum one-week stay in the subdistricts. Ruspana 1961, 44-45.

Four years later, a participatory study by the BTI and PKI cadres found similar results. This research was started in early 1965 by the Academy of Social Science 'Aliarcham' and was supported by the government. Covering Java, Bali and Lampung, the research report reflected on the variety of grassroots PKI and BTI movements. In some areas, the movements were rather passive, lacking consolidation and support; while in other areas, BTI members were aggressive, more demanding and no longer willing to rely on peaceful means.[91] These variations, according to Slamet-Velsink, resulted from a combination of several factors, such as the local political context, colonial capital penetration, and cultural elements (religion and ethnicity).[92] In other words, there was a huge discrepancy between the political strategies of the peasants' movement designed by the BTI's political elites with the actual grassroots situation.

This may also be the case in the Banyujati area. Although the PKI dominated the political sphere in the area, this does not mean that villagers (including landless peasants) were also progressively leftist. These different levels of activism and participation might also relate to the fact that there was no continuous dispute over former plantation land in Donomulyo. It could not be said that the whole village lived up to the same level of Leftist ideology. Another reason why the BTI was not very active, although politically strong in Donomulyo, is because most of the former plantation land had already been occupied by the locals during 1945-49. Sarbupri (labour union affiliated with the PKI) also did not exist in the area, which led to less resistance against the state during the reclamation and nationalization of plantations compared to other areas in South Malang.[93] Despite this discrepancy between central and rural politics, friction in the village was later used by the military to annihilate the leftists.

Rural Transformation under the New Order

The anti-communist operation in Donomulyo took place in 1965, under the name of the Pancasila Operation, and in 1968, namely the Trisula operation. Both of these operations had the same impact: mass disappearance,

91 Slamet-Velsink, Ina 1988, 47.

92 Slamet-Velsink, Ina 1988, 164.

93 Compare to the Yuwono study in Central Java, where many plantation workers joined the Sarbupri because they thought that the organization would defend their rights, as the workers fell further into poverty after nationalization. Even then, Yuwono also noted that not all motives involved in the Sarbupri were ideological. See Yuwono 2018.

detention, killing, and continuous surveillance of villagers accused of being members or sympathisers of Leftist organizations (see Chapter 2). Villagers that were not detained were required to report continuously to the district military office (Koramil). This was a programme of *Bina Mental* or Mental Building, a screening programme to make sure that leftist ideology was diminished and to direct people's ideology to the Pancasila (the national ideology). Bina Mental methods consisted of three elements: *bina rohani*/spiritual building (aimed at rebuilding faith in God through religious teachings), *santiaji* (aimed at enforcing the mental ideology of the Pancasila) and *pembinaan tradisi*/tradition building (to achieve spiritual welfare and fighting spirit).[94] Although the programme claimed to build a nationalistic character, it was basically applied to control and ensure the establishment of the New Order at every administrative level in Indonesia. In Donomulyo, the people who were obliged to undergo the *bina mental* were known as the *santiaji* or *walap/wajib lapor*. In 1997, 2.731 santiaji[95] were recorded in Donomulyo, which decreased to 1.850 people in 1999.[96]

This monitoring mechanism also involved replacing all village heads with military officers and removing all leftist elements in the village apparatus. This happened to the PKI village head in Banyujati area, Ario Dursam, who disappeared. Political activities vanished throughout the late 1960s, but re-emerged under the New Order command. Its ruling party, the Golongan Karya or Golkar, dominated the political sphere in the village by mobilizing all of the village elites to join them. The New Order repression not only affected the former leftist activists in Banyujati, but villagers in general. Santi, Head of the village branch of the Catholic Women's Organization (*Wanita Katolik Indonesia/WKRI*) and organizer of the Family Welfare Education programme (*Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*/PKK) in the 1980s, described how villagers were too scared to be involved in any of the organization's activities. They believed that the violence against communist activists was a result of their political involvement in mass organizations. Santi and her fellow organizers in

94 Tim Skrining Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur. 1984, 31.

95 "Surat Kepada Kepala Direktorat Sosial Politik Propinsi Dati I Jawa Timur – Daftar Rekapitulasi Bekas Tahanan Narapidana Dan Walap G30S/PKI Se-Wilayah Kabupaten Malang Dan Se-Kotatif Batu Bagian Bulan Desember 1997". January 18, 1998. Arsip Badan Perencanaan Daerah Jawa Timur, Surabaya, Indonesia.

96 "Daftar Nama WNRI Yang Terlibat G30S/PKI (Walap) Atau Organisasi Terlarang Lainnya (ELA) Di Wilayah Kecamatan Donomulyo, Kabupaten DATI II Malang," September 1999. Pendidikan, Sosial, Politik. Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, Surabaya Indonesia.

the WKRI and PKK struggled to convince people that both organizations were not political in any way. In WKRI, through guidance from the Regional Officials, Santi started to revive the organization through routine communal prayers. In this manner, she convinced villagers that it was safe to participate in the WKRI.[97] Similar reluctance was also experienced by traditional theatre groups or *Ketoprak*. Before 1965, these groups were the vanguard of mass education and mobilization by conveying revolutionary messages to the villagers. After the anti-communist military operation, all Ketoprak players were accused of being members of Lekra (the leftist cultural organization, closely related to PKI) and were either killed or became *santiaji*. Since then, cultural performances disappeared, but started to re-emerge again in the early 1970s. This was monitored closely by the Babinsa (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring officials) and became the funnel of New Order propaganda. In short, all organizational activities in the village were highly controlled under New Order authoritarian ideology.

Another prominent transformation in the village was the conversion of religion, because the New Order government instructed that every Indonesian should have one of the five monolithic religions approved by the state. This was a national phenomenon as a result of the 1965 violence.[98] A letter from a former priest in Donomulyo parish, B. Soedarmodjo, stated that parishioners increased rapidly especially in the years of 1966 to 1968. "Most of them have the motive of political security as a result of the communist rebellion Gestapu/G30S. Therefore, they have not reached the maturity of faith", said Soedarmodjo.[99] Data from the Catholic parish in the district showed that only 378 people were baptized in 1960-1965, and 290 people received communion. These numbers increased sharply in 1966-1970 where 3,472 people were baptized and 2,666 people received communion.[100] A report from the Carmelite foundation mentioned that villagers were protected by the catholic priests, teachers and students during the G30S turmoil. This became the reason why most of the villagers turned to Catholicism instead of Islam because the later became perpetrators of the mass killings, according

97 Interview with Santi, Donomulyo, 20 September 2016 #05.04-10.55.

98 In Central Java, Catholic Church members grew 126% in 1966 and onwards. Meanwhile, the Christian Javanese Church (Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan or GKJW) in East Java, reported an increase of around 32,500 baptized members and eight new congregations between 1964 and 1967. Hearman 2018, 181.

99 Soedarmodjo. "Ikhtisar Mengenai Paroki Purworejo Keuskupan Malang," March 5, 1977. Arsip Keuskupan Malang. Keuskupan Malang, Jawa Timur.

100 Appendix in Suhadiyono, et. al. 2010, 37.

to the report.[101] People who converted to Catholicism or Christianity were formerly not devoted religious people (some of them also practiced *Kejawen*, a spiritual Javanese belief), but chose these religions to avoid the accusation of being a communist. In Central Java, Christianity was chosen for several reasons, such as the use of the Javanese language instead of a foreign language (such as Arabic), the use of traditional cultural performances in their prayers or masses, and in some cases, Christian organizations provided economic support (for example, scholarship or sponsored transmigration programmes).[102] In other cases, people were also attracted to Christianity because of its principle of equality.[103]

At the national level, the development agenda was completely transformed after 1965. During Sukarno's leadership, economic policy in the 1960s revolved around control of the state in all sectors of the Indonesian economy; destruction of imperialism and subordination of foreign capital to national social and economic goals; and replacement of the colonial import/export economy by a more self-sufficient and industrialized economy.[104] This policy took a capitalistic turn in the hands of the New Order government. In 1965-1968, the National Planning Board (*Badan Perencanaan Nasional/ Bappenas*) technocrats were convinced by the IMF (International Monetary Fund)/RD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) ideology of free-market economics, which limited the state in providing the fiscal and monetary conditions for capital accumulation, and trusted in the mechanisms of the market to generate maximum growth and efficiency.[105] When Bappenas released the five-year development programme (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun/Repelita*), 60% of the programme's budget expenditure was derived from foreign loans.[106] This drastic transformation of the economic policy leads several scholars to argue that the 1965-66 killings happened in order to set the foundation for the growth of capitalism in Indonesia.[107]

101 Hogenkamp. "Beberapa Pandangan Mengenai Jajasan Karmel Bagian Pengadjaran (Diterangkan Dan Dibitjarakan Dalam Rapat Definitorium)." 1972. Jajasan Karmel. Arsip Keuskupan Agung Malang, Indonesia.

102 Nugroho 2008, 176-180.

103 Sevenster-Brouwer 2017, 46.

104 Robison 2009, 71-72.

105 Robison 2009, 133.

106 In December 1966, the Indonesian government delegation made a statement at the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) conference in Paris that resulted in reopening access to international networks of finance. See Robison 2009, 137-138.

107 Farid 2005, 4. Foreign countries, such as the US, were expecting this kind of transformation. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have noted that the massacres in Indonesia represented

This change in economic policy directly affected the agrarian strategy. Emphasizing increasing food production, the New Order created one of the well-known intensification programmes, BIMAS or *Bimbingan Massal* (mass guidance). It started in 1965-1966 under the supervision of the state-owned enterprise 'Pertani' which was tasked with giving information, providing the peasants with seedlings, fertilizer, insecticides and fodder for the plough-oxen, and granting credits.[108] This programme then took a different turn under the New Order with the involvement of multinational corporations. Companies such as the Swiss Ciba and West German Hoechst were contracted by the state and paid about US$50 per hectare for provision of the necessary Green Revolution inputs including fertilizers, insecticides, extension and management, and the new IR/rice varieties. Peasants were expected to repay these inputs by delivering one-sixth of their crop to a national collection agency.[109] Although BIMAS resulted in a substantial increase in rice production, it only lasted until the late 1980s because it became very problematic, which includes practices of corruption.[110] A study in Gondanglegi, South Malang, concludes that BIMAS was only effective for middle- or upper-class farmers, because this group tended to have larger plots of land and more capital to access farming credit, compared to lower-class farmers.[111]

Meanwhile, the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law continued to be used by the New Order, although the law's principle of state control became diluted. Land distribution was implemented under patronage politics and top-down control so that concessions were centralised in the establishment of an alliance between a property-owning elite and government-backed-army.[112] The military's interference can be seen, for example, in the case of a land dispute between villagers and the PT. Swadaja/State Estate Company (*Perusahaan Perkebunan Negara*/PPN) in Ampelgading, in the Malang Regency in 1968. Villagers, who lived on former plantation land converted to *desa darurat*, were forced to return the land to the company and relocate to another area. To execute this demand, Military Resort Command 083 released an instruction decree, which was soon followed by another decree by the East Java Land Reform Committee. Both documents instructed the termination

a 'benign bloodbath' and a 'constructive terror because they served US foreign policy interests'. Roosa 2006, 16.

108 Utrecht 1973, 161.

109 White and Huskens 1989, 252.

110 Utrecht 1973, 161; Crouch 1988, 290-291.

111 Kano 1990, 120-21.

112 Lund and Rachman 2016, 1320.

of the certification process of former plantation land that was inhabited by villagers, including land certificates that had already been issued requiring to be reassessed.[113]

In Donomulyo, by replacing the leftist village apparatus, the army and village elites easily formed a new alliance. After the 1965 violence, local patrons who were once confronted by the left, remained unshakable with this new alliance. People such as Burmudji's family, who resented the land reform policy, benefited from the loss of the leftists. The property and social status of these groups in the village was no longer questioned. Alliance with the military reinforced their position, while at the same time paving the way for establishing the New Order in rural areas. This also led to several forms of arbitrary action, such as land confiscation. For example, Marwono's father-in-law lost 18 aré[114] of land to village officials which was later distributed between them and the local army. It was not possible to resist, because Marwono and his father-in-law were following *santiaji* at that time. "It was confiscated because he was accused of being a BTI. It was only one reason, a member of BTI is PKI", said Marwono. Local patrons repeatedly used this communist label to benefit themselves not only through land confiscation, but also by controlling the distribution of farming credits. This case reflected how village elites in the New Order era became "political and economic agents of the state in the countryside and were co-opted into the larger structure of power as preferred but dependent clients and in return, they were granted access to subsidised credit, inputs, licenses, guaranteed prices, and so forth for their service in monitoring the village".[115]

Conclusion

The history of Donomulyo illustrates the connections between larger global state economic policy and local livelihoods. Through this historical narrative, Donomulyo shows the continuity of inequality and patronage that persisted throughout different periods of history. This continuity occurred not only because of state penetration in rural areas, but also because rural elites who attempted to maintain their privileged position,

113 The documents include Surat Perintah 001/10/1967 by Korem 083, and Surat Panitia Landreform Daerah Tingkat I Djawa Timur No.7/Agr/Lf/01/67 on 12 June 1967 (Sagijati 1968).

114 1 are = 100 square meters.

115 (Hart 1989), 33.

access, and ownership, needed to form alliances with the state. The case of Burmudji above, shows an example of how village elites despised land reform, and were relieved when the left ended their advocacy. During the colonial era, alliances were formed between village authorities and administrators of colonial plantations or colonial government. The traditional patron-client relationships formed through the land tenure and crop-sharing system were transformed into economy-driven patronage relationships after the establishment of the Dutch plantations. Practices such as elites who became middlemen for collecting taxes and recruiting labourers are some of the examples of this shift. When this relationship accommodated the colonial economy, it also exacerbated the inequality in Donomulyo. In the independence era, it was the leftist organizations, mostly the PKI and BTI, that became the vanguard in challenging this village inequality. It was also during this period that the patrons' alliance with the state started to transform – from economy-oriented to authoritative and power-oriented (under the banner of creating security and order). The opposition from the left had completely vanished along with the anti-communist operation in 1965 and establishment of the New Order. Rather than reforming the village patronage, the New Order created a new alliance of patrons between the local elites and the military. It is within this context of patronage and inequalities that memories of the 1965 violence were formed and shaped.

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2 Executing the Violence[1]

Abstract

How did the anti-communist violence occur in East Java, particularly in Donomulyo? Was it structural violence organized by the military, or the result of communal anger from rightist groups? Using newly discovered archives from the Brawijaya Military Division, East Java, this chapter points to the structural coordination of the army in executing the violence in the area, including the utilization of civilian forces. This anti-communist operation was a mass violence which is well collaborated. Furthermore, the military project to establish the New Order down to village levels in East Java, indicates that the 1965-66 violence can be seen as an attempt to establish a new regime, rather than merely an extermination project against communists.

Keywords: mass killings, anti-leftist violence, Indonesian military, state violence, capitalist regime, authoritarian state

Before going deeper into the memories of violence, it is important to reconstruct how the anti-communist violence itself occurred. The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the violence, particularly in East Java, by arguing that the violence that occurred in the attempt to overthrow Sukarno's government would not have resulted in mass atrocities if the army or civilians had acted solely on their own. This does not mean that the military is not responsible for the violence. On the contrary, as we will see in this chapter, the case study on East Java shows that the army was structurally involved in the violence, specifically by coordinating scattered anti-communist civilian mass movements under a single military command. Moreover, this army-civilian coalition was not one-directional, but beneficial (yet unequal) not only for the military, but also for the civilian

1 This chapter is derived from an article published in the *Journal of Genocide Research* 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 58–80, available online https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2020.1778612.

Leksana, G.T., *Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia: Embedded Remembering*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023
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groups themselves. Therefore, the important question that I propose in this chapter is no longer to seek 'who is responsible for the violence', but how did this collaboration come into existence? What made it possible? How did it develop? What kind of instruments (laws, decrees, instructions) were issued to facilitate this coalition? To answer these questions, I agree with Kammen & McGregor that the killings should not be treated in isolation. Instead, this should be examined together with other forms of violence (detention, property seizure, torture, sexual violence, and so on) and its periodization should be extended from 1965 to 1968 to see that the violence was not only an attack against the left, but also a counter-revolutionary movement to established a new regime in the making.[2]

Existing analyses of the 1965 violence can be categorized broadly into three different trajectories: the horizontal conflict, the vertical or structural violence, and the dualistic thesis.[3] The first one framed the violence as a horizontal rupture, caused by rooted conflict between the communists and religious groups. This type of analysis often emerged in official statements and government publications, such as the white book of the 30 September Movement written by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, which stated that "… tensions finally exploded into communal clashes resulting in bloodbaths in certain areas of Indonesia".[4] In this framework, the military presented their operation as an attempt to secure the situation from an explosive conflict. They justified the violence against the left during the operation with the argument of maintaining peace and order. Participation of civilians in the violence also led some scholars to believe that the army only had a minor role in the violence.[5] However, these communal-conflict analyses fail to explain how collective tensions could escalate into nation-wide mass killings in a relatively short period of time.

In contrast to this horizontal conflict theory, another group of critical scholars and activists argue a different stance, emphasizing that the state (in this case, the army) played a central role in the violence. A structural order was given by the central command to their subordinate military commands in the regions to organise the mass killings. As Geoffrey Robinson argues, genocide and mass killings are political acts, which means that they do not occur 'naturally', but were intentionally and politically initiated by the authorities. Whether the killings started early or later, depended largely

2 McGregor and Kammen 2012, 11-12.

3 See Roosa 2016.

4 Notosusanto and Saleh 1968, 77.

5 Sulistyo 2000.

on the alliance between the authority and local civilians to carry out this violence.[6] For example, in areas where the regional military command was united and had sufficient troops, the killing took place earlier (such as in the case of Aceh), but delayed in areas where the regional army command was politically divided (such as in East Java).[7]

This line of argument became stronger when two recent regional studies analyzed military reports that pointed to the army's structural coordinating role in the violence. The first is Ahmad Luthfi's article on the violence in Banyuwangi, where he uses reports of Kodam (district military command) 0825 Banyuwangi. In his study, he argues that the violence was structurally coordinated by the army through, for example, the establishment of the army-directed Vigilance Command Body (Badan Komando Siaga/BKS) in every village.[8] The other is Jess Melvin's study on Aceh's military command, in which she shows that the commander actively went on a tour to different districts in order to coordinate the annihilation of communists in the province. Melvin also argues that the anti-communist operation in Aceh took place with the support and knowledge of the national military command, and therefore can be regarded as an intentional act to eliminate certain groups of people, or an act of genocide.[9] Both studies are even capable of providing numbers of detainees and victims that were killed during the military operation. Adding to this archival-based research, Vanessa Hearman's study also provides the same conclusion. Through an oral history approach in South Blitar, East Java, Hearman underlines that the violence was part of the military's structural order and was no match for the remaining communists who were easily annihilated under the Trisula operation in 1968.

In between these two analyses, another group of scholars argue that although the army directed the violence, they did not necessarily have absolute control over societies in different areas. Even though the killings followed a national pattern,[10] regional differences also occurred and may not be easily analyzed to correspond with this uniform national pattern.[11]

6 Robinson 2018, 15-17.

7 Robinson 2018, 151-2.

8 Luthfi 2018.

9 Melvin also presents a critical analysis on the genocide definition, as stated in the 1948 Genocide Convention. She includes previous discussions that pointed to the intentionality of the 1965-66 violence and the target group in the violence that went beyond members of a political party. Melvin 2018, 300.

10 The national pattern in this case shows that the killings were usually preceded by mass detention and disappearance. Roosa 2016, 12.

11 Young 1990.

This dualistic thesis argues that the killings cannot be regarded as the responsibility of a single party or institution,[12] and therefore no general-national pattern of violence could be generated. For example, Robert Cribb highlighted the connection between national (the 30 September Movement) and local dimensions that resulted in regional variations of the killings. In some areas, such as Java and Bali, the killings occurred between late 1965 to 1966, whereas in other areas, such as West Kalimantan, the worst massacres occurred in 1967.[13] Even within Java itself, the magnitude of the killings differs between West, Central and East Java, with the last province being recorded as having the worst killings due to the tension between religious and leftist groups.[14] However, according to Robinson, the different degree of mass killings in Java does not necessarily mean that there was no general pattern. On the contrary, the difference was influenced by various factors, such as the willingness and ability of the local military and other groups to carry out the violence, and also the national leaders to mobilize them.

This chapter supports and elaborates further the existing vertical or structural analysis of the violence through examination of the archives of Kodam (Regional Military Command) V Brawijaya, East Java from 1965 to 1968. Adding to the vertical analysis argument, I would argue that a national pattern of violence can indeed be found. Examination of these archives, particularly on the Malang military command, shows that the military played a major role in the violence, and that participation of civilians took place under their coordination. Both the dualistic thesis and the horizontal conflict theory are considered unsubstantiated as this chapter will demonstrate that the violence became massive in East Java not because civilians acted on their own, but because the army created a situation where collaboration between them became highly possible. The military utilized the long-existing and historically shaped factions in society to eliminate the left. However, elaborating further the vertical or structural analysis, I argue that at the same time, these factions were also taking advantage of their supra-local attachment to the military. The military operation was not a one-directional alliance, it was a beneficial collaboration, where both military and civilian groups benefited from the violence. The case of Donomulyo shows that certain parties actually profited from the rise of military power in rural society. Burmudji's story in Chapter 1, for example, illustrates how the position of rural elites was secured after threats against

12 Gerlach 2010.

13 Cribb 1990b, 23-25

14 Cribb 1990b, 26-27.

their land ownership were eliminated with the killings of the PKI and other leftist members in Donomulyo.

The primary base of this chapter is the archives of Kodam V Brawijaya-East Java, located in the Brawijaya military museum in Malang. The collection consists of the history of the East Java military command and their various operations from early independence (1945) to East Timor (1975). For the purpose of this chapter, I use their specific inventory called 'G30S/PKI tahun 1965' (30 September Movement/PKI in 1965). The inventory consists of reports, radiograms, instructions, and other documents from different levels and regions of military commands in East Java from 1965 to 1968. In this inventory, documents from the Military Resort Command (Korem) 083 Malang contain daily situation reports from 8 October to 29 December 1965.

Although this specific inventory of the Brawijaya archive collection contains important information on the anti-communist operation in East Java, it should be read carefully for several reasons. First, the records are basically reports written by military officers in certain divisions and sent to their superiors or other divisions. This means that these records may only capture what is needed or accepted within the military circle, and exclude other facts. Therefore, it is important to analyse the reports together with other different sources, such as interviews. Second, reading the Brawijaya documents can create the impression that the army was an autonomous and powerful body. Instructions related to civilian groups that were released in 1965-66 may falsely lead readers to believe that these civilians were agentless individuals who only followed orders. This is not the complete case. We should keep in mind that the Indonesian army was not only a defence body, but also a political institution that constantly formed alliances with different civillian groups for certain aims. Within these alliances, civilians also acted based on their political or individual goals, which were often not explicitly stated. The presentation of this chapter will be on this relational (and not merely directive) basis between the army and civilian groups.

The third reason to read the archives carefully is because the language that is used in these army documents is often vague, and none of them explicitly mentioned the killings or other forms of violence that the army conducted. This is very much a characteristic of Indonesian military reports, which can also be found in the case of East Timor, where the documents did not point to any military crimes, instead they repeated the government's propaganda on the occupation of East Timor, which transformed into a belief that justified the military violence.[15] In the case of the Brawijaya

15 Moore 2001, 10.

documents, the propagandic terms created an image of a civilian war in 1965-66 and at the same time, dehumanized the victims. Throughout this chapter, I will point out these three critical aspects (the selective nature of the report, the image of military as an autonomous body, and the vague language) in analysing the Brawijaya documents.

This chapter will begin with a description of the expansion of the army's power prior to the 30 September Movement. They did not only expand their territorial command (stretching their institutions down to the district level), but also in political terms, which included building alliances with civilian groups. The next section will discuss the alliance in East Java, specifically in the first month after the 30 September Movement. In the later section, I will highlight the major findings from the Brawijaya military archives, which includes the military operation in Donomulyo. Furthermore, the army's role also extended to the establishment of the New Order through the New Orderization (*Peng-Order Baru-an*) programmes in all government levels, including districts and villages.

Expansion of the Army's Power

Apart from being a national defence institution, the Indonesian army has always been a political body. Their political nature can be traced back to the period of struggle for independence, where guerrilla fighters were politically aligned into irregular units (local *laskar*) besides serving as regular armed forces.[16] Its political character also means that the Indonesian army is quite diverse, with extra-military political loyalties and a stronger commitment from soldiers to their commanders than to the army institution as a whole.[17] Throughout the 1950s to 1960s, the army's power had expanded, not only in terms of organisational structure, but also in their political power, including in regional authorities. This period also witnessed the tension between three political powers: the army, President Sukarno, and the PKI that ended along with the 30 September Movement.[18] Until 1965, the army was not a professional Armed Forces in the Western sense of understanding – they had no cohesion, no obedience to government directions except when it was

16 The guerilla strategy used during the war also contributed to the political character of the army. With lack of professional training and modern equipment, the army relied heavily on the support of local civilians. This had created a thin boundary between military and civilian life during the guerrilla phase. Crouch 1988, 25.

17 Crouch 1988, 27.

18 Melvin 2018, 63-69.

to the Armed Forces' advantage, and their performance in facing foreign opponents had been insufficient.[19]

The crucial period for the expansion of the army's power occurred in 1957, along with the introduction of martial law (State of War and Siege/ *Staat van Oorlog en Beleg* or more well-known as SOB) as a response to the increasing regional Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh (1953-62), West Java (1948-62), South Sulawesi (1953-65), and the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in West Sumatra and Sulawesi (1958-61). The army became more firmly entrenched in the political (and also economic) field, by placing their members in the cabinet, upper echelons of the civil service, and regional administration.[20] They also tried to dominate the National Front, a coordinating body that was established in August 1960 with a main goal to complete the national revolution and "organise the closest cooperation between the Government, the people and other state bodies".[21] Among the 73 members of the Executive Board (including representatives from the PKI), at least 11 of them were military men, and of the 17 provincial branches established by April 1961, 9 of them were chaired by the local army commander.[22] With a structural organization from the central government down to the district level, in 1962, the National Front allowed membership of individuals and political parties.[23] In March 1964, members of the National Front were incorporated into the *Tjatur Tunggal*, an administrative system in which four government elements, consisting of the governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs and public persecutors, made collaborative decisions on their regional issues. By placing their officers in the position of governors and regents, the army tried to increase their power over the regional administration.[24] With the integration of the National Front into *Tjatur Tunggal*, the name was changed into *Pantja Tunggal*.

Another form of expansion of the army's political power occurred against the backdrop of the confrontation with Malaysia, where in 1964, Sukarno issued a decree for the formation of the Regional Dwikora Executive Authority (*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*), or *Pepelrada*.[25] In 1964, its main task was to organise and supervise all activities concerning or affecting the

19 MacFarling 1996, 73.

20 Crouch 1988, 41.

21 R. A. Mortimer 1974, 101.

22 Sundhaussen 1982, 152.

23 R. A. Mortimer 1974, 101.

24 Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

25 Dwikora is an acronym for *Dwi Komando Rakyat* (People's Two Commands). President Sukarno announced Dwikora in 1964, in relation to the confrontation movement against Malaysia,

anti-Malaysia campaign.[26] The decree also stated that in carrying out its duty, the *Pepelrada* should consult with *Pantja Tunggal* in their own regions to obtain suggestions for policy development, assistance for coordination between government bodies, and support for the implementation of related policies.[27] The authority of the *Pepelrada* included confiscating properties, prohibiting a person to reside or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and transferring a person to certain locations under high surveillance if the person was indicated as disrupting security.[28] The *Pepelrada* was also obliged to report directly to the President, and thus, bypassing the central military headquarters. Furthermore, the President himself appointed the head of the *Pepelrada*, which was dominated by the provincial army commander. Therefore, regional decisions relied mostly on the commander, including decisions to eliminate the communists in 1965.[29] As we shall see in this chapter, existing bodies such as *Pantja Tunggal* and *Pepelrada* became a significant institution in supporting the annihilation operation against the left.

Together with the expansion of political power, the army also increased their territorial power. The concept of territorial warfare was derived from the guerrilla warfare strategy during the Independence war. This strategy was regarded as the most effective tactic to defeat Dutch soldiers who were considered better equipped and larger in numbers. In 1958, a Committee on Army Doctrine emphasized that guerrilla warfare was the only adequate strategy for the Indonesian army, and therefore, support from civilians became a prerequisite for successful military operations.[30] This thesis became the Army's Concept of Territorial Warfare, highlighting the advancement of people's national consciousness (especially villagers) 'to the extent that they will be willing to sacrifice anything in the defence of the higher cause', and in return, the army should establish stability, internal security and social justice.[31]

One year later, the army used this guideline to expand their Territorial Organization. The *Tentara and Territorium* (Army and Territory or T&T),[32]

instructing the people to thwart the formation of Malaysia as Britain's puppet state, and to form volunteers to assist this movement. H. Setiawan 2003, 74.

26 Crouch 1988, 168.

27 Muhono 1966, 1245.

28 Muhono 1966, 1246-7.

29 Sundhaussen 1982, 186.

30 Sundhaussen 1982, 138.

31 Sundhaussen 1982, 140.

32 In this territorial concept, there were seven military territories during 1950-1957: North Sumatra (T&T I), South Sumatra (T&T II), West Java including Jakarta (T&T III), Central Java (T&T IV), East Java (T&T V), Kalimantan (T&T VI) and East Indonesia (T&T VII). These T&Ts

Figure 2.1. Current Structure of Kodam VIII/Brawijaya Territorial Command

which was established at the provincial level, were renamed as *Komando Daerah Militer* (Regional Military Command/*Kodam*) and the number was increased from seven to sixteen. At the lower level, *Komando Resort Militer* (Military Resort Command/*Korem*), which incorporated several regencies, were established in several areas, followed by the formation of *Komando Distrik Militer* (District Military Command/Kodim) at the district or regency level, and *Komando Rayon Militer* (Military Precinct Command/*Koramil*) in the subdistricts. The logic behind *Koramil* was to prepare the mentality of the people for territorial warfare, and prevent unrest on this score.[33] This, according to Sundhaussen, was basically the military's strategy to tackle the PKI's growing influence on the grassroots masses, especially since the escalation of the unilateral action (see chapter 1), although never explicitly stated by the army.

In line with Sundhaussen's argument, the expansion period (1963-1966) of the command units in East Java indicates that it was geared to confront

were established to conduct guerrilla warfare independently of orders and supplies from the headquarters. Within the regiments in the T&T, a subordinate body of Military District Commands was specifically responsible for liaison with the civilian population. Sundhaussen 1982, 58-60.

33 Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

the increasing support of the PKI in the lowest administrative levels. The T&T V Brawijaya became Kodam VIII Brawijaya based on the army decree dated 24 October 1959.[34] New military units were established, such as Korem 083 on 16 October 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/Brawijaya no. Kep 152/10/1963*), Korem 081 and 082 on 25 November 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/Brawijaya no. Kep 185/11/1963*), and Korem 084 on 9 July 1966 (through *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/Brawijaya no. Skep-1 03/7/1966* although the unit was already incorporated into Kodam VIII Brawijaya since 1964).[35] Meanwhile, the Kodim structure was established through a commander's decree on 25 January 1964, where 10 Kodim were formed in Korem 081, 7 Kodim in Korem 082, 9 Kodim in Korem 083, and 7 Kodim in Korem 084.[36] With this new territorial structure, the army started civic action programmes, such as public indoctrination or cultural events, while at the same time, connected closely to the civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organizations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels. They even sent doctors, engineers, and entertainment groups for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the people.[37]

However, the army's growing power was not uncontested by the PKI, which was fully aware of their strategy. The PKI chairman Aidit, for example, expressed criticism of the army for becoming increasingly authoritarian and endangering Indonesia's democracy. Aidit captured the intention of the military 'to create a Martial Law rule without the Martial Law itself', for 'continuing a dictatorial rule in the name of Catur Tunggal in the provinces', and for activating their units in villages.[38] The PKI was aware of its weak influence in the army and also used its close connection with Sukarno to propose the expansion of the Nasakom principle into the military by establishing advisory teams to work with the commanders of the four services.[39] This tension between the PKI and the army illustrates that both

34 The territorial code for the Brawijaya command was changed from VIII to V, based on the decision of the Army Chief of Staff no. Kep/411/1985 on 12 January 1985. Since then, the East Java Regional Military Command is known as Kodam V/Brawijaya. K. Setiawan 2006, 43.

35 K. Setiawan 2006, 37-38.

36 K. Setiawan 2006, 37.

37 Sundhaussen 1982, 141-2.

38 Aidit stated this criticism in a report to the Central Committee on 10 February 1963. Sundhaussen 1982, 176.

39 Nasakom stands for *Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis* or Nationalist, Religious, Communist—a principle that represented the unity of three major socio-political tendencies in Indonesian society. Sukarno used this term to bring together competing forces during Indonesia's Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) to foster a sense of national unity. Crouch 1988 43-44, 87.

parties did not only compete for upper-level political support (in this case, from Sukarno and political elites), but also for lower grassroots civilian allies. After the 30 September Movement, this tension ended with the military's control at both levels.

Key Features of East Java's Military Operation

Previous studies in East Java focus on two main features of its military operation. First, the slowness of the Kodam VIII Brawijaya to respond to the 30 September Movement. The army had already made their official statement about PKI as the mastermind of the 30 September Movement in the army newspapers since 8 October 1965,[40] but Kodam VIII Brawijaya had not taken any actions against the communists in East Java. The commander, Basuki Rahmat, was regarded as slow and indecisive. Second, because of this slowness, civilian organizations took the initiative to start anti-communist persecutions, resulting in the most gruesome bloodbaths in the nation. However, as the structural analysis already shows, explaining the 1965 violence as an effect of civilian rage is insufficient due to the fact that the violence occurred systematically in other parts of Indonesia. Even in the context where the army was weak or slow, we could assume that these civilians did not move independently against the left if they were not assured of the military's support for their action. Furthermore, keeping in mind that the army was a political body, they would certainly need political allies to execute the persecution. Therefore, Brawijaya command's hesitancy or slowness should also be seen as a moment of shifting political alliance: from one that was subordinated to Sukarno, to a coup-oriented military faction dominated by Suharto. A shift which assured that once the elimination of the left started in East Java, it would receive the most significant support that it needed.

So far, researchers argue that regional differences in the 1965-66 violence existed because the army's capacity and political unity differed in the regions. The case of Aceh shows an example of unity between the military commander Brigadier General Ishak Djuarsa and his direct superior, Lieutenant General Ahmad Mokoginta. Both opposed Sukarno and the PKI, which led to the immediate launch of military operations against the PKI in early October. Meanwhile, in areas where the army command was politically divided, faced resistance, or did not have sufficient troops, mass

40 McGregor & Kammen 2012, 2.

killings were delayed for some time, but then accelerated dramatically when the balance of forces tipped in favour of the anti-communist position.[41] This was the case in East Java, where the regional military commander, Brigadier General Basuki Rachmat was considered indecisive about moving against the communists. The killings in this region only began in early November along with Rachmat's replacement.[42] In other cases where there was no consensus within the military leadership or where the strength of loyalist troops was insufficient, the onset of mass killings coincided with or immediately followed by the deployment of troops loyal to Suharto from outside the command area. This was the case in Central Java and Bali, where the Army Paracommando Regiment (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*/RPKAD) units took the lead in the operation.[43]

East Java in the 1960s was certainly an example of a diverse political orientation of its authorities. The Surabaya Major, Moerachman, was a BTI who was later detained after the accusation of being involved in the 30 September Movement. Eight regents (*bupati*) and mayors as well as the PKI-nominated representatives in regional government bodies and assemblies were also suspended on 29 October 1965 by the East Java Governor Wijono as a response to the Movement.[44] Meanwhile, the Kodam VIII Brawijaya officers were considered fairly Sukarnoist as they were personally loyal to Sukarno but sporadically did express an anti-communist stance.[45] The Brawijaya Commander, Basuki Rachmat, was one of the 'moderate reformers' group and was more critical of but not directly hostile towards Sukarno. However, dissention increased after 1 October 1965.[46] Both Rachmat and the Pepelrada chief of staff, Colonel Widjaja Sukardanu, were seen as hesitant to issue instructions for large-scale operations against the communists.[47] Besides the problem of insufficient troops,[48] the delay of action

41 Robinson 2018, 151.

42 Robinson 2018, 151.

43 Robinson 2018, 152.

44 D. Setiawan 2014, 215. In *Report from East Java*, the reporter noted that Governor Wijono was irresolute. His subordinates complained about his slowness in commencing purges against the communists, even those directly under his supervision. Report from East Java 1986, 148. Wijono's decision to dismiss Leftist-oriented officials may be a result of his political shift.

45 Sundhaussen 1982, 212.

46 Sundhaussen 1982, 227.

47 Report from East Java 1986, 146. This article is a translation of a report by an intelligence officer to his superior in East Java, written on 29 November 1965.

48 Eight of the province's sixteen battalions were serving elsewhere at that time. Robinson 2018, 151. In addition, thirty percent of them were involved in the coup. Report from East Java 1986, 146. Dahlia Setiawan also supports this analysis using US intelligence documents that

was also because Rachmat was a strong supporter of Suharto even before the 30 September Movement,[49] but at the same time, loyal to President Sukarno. This suggests that Rachmat and his officers needed time to ensure that the political shift that they were going to make would not disadvantage them. In this case, the Brawijaya Command is an interesting example that being anti-communist and loyal to Sukarno were not at opposite ends of the spectrum.

As a consequence of Rachmat's irresolute attitude, two of his subordinates moved more aggressively against the communists, in accordance with the national anti-communist statement that had already been launched publicly in the army's newspaper since 8 October 1965. One of them was Willy Sudjono Madiun Regional Commander, who was recorded as having initiated arrests of the PKI cadres (about 200 in the city of Madiun alone).[50] The other was Colonel Sumadi, the Regional Commander in Malang-Besuki, who was reported as being the firmest in arresting the PKI leaders and activists. On 14 November 1965, Sumadi organised a meeting with several local Heads, Regents, Residents and former Governors and Residents, in order to establish a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation between military and civilian authorities; solve problems resulting from the extermination of the PKI; and solve economic problems, which could be exploited by the PKI.[51] It is unclear to what extent the meeting initiated the killings, but intelligence reports mentioned that killings were already taking place in the residencies of the Kediri, Jombang, Mojokerto, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and Besuki region even before the meeting.[52] In Kediri, NU's youth wing Ansor had already organized a mass demonstration on 13 October 1965, which accelerated the killings in rural areas.[53]

This brings us to the second key element of the violence in East Java, which is the participation of civilian groups. Some scholars concluded that the killings in East Java were the result of initiatives of lower-level military and civilian forces without clear direction from their military superiors.[54] In this case, the civilian force that took the lead in East Java

reported Rachmat's conversation with the American embassy's political officer, Jacob Walkin, stating that the commander now had enough troops to continue the anti-communist purge in East Java (based on a telegram sent on 19 November 1965). D. Setiawan 2014, 247.

49 Rachmat was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs (1966-69) in Suharto's cabinet.

50 Report from East Java 1986, 147.

51 Report from East Java 1986, 148.

52 Report from East Java 1986, 145.

53 Young 1990, 80-81.

54 McGregor & Kammen 2012, 16-17.

was NU's youth wing Ansor. Their involvement resonated with the religious reasoning of Holy War and defending Islam that was widely circulated by their respected Islamic teachers (the *Kyais*).[55] However, it is important to note that there were different factions within the NU itself regarding the 30 September Movement. The young generation of the NU, led by Zainur Echsan Subchan, was determined to move more aggressively against the PKI, while their senior leaders were more passive.[56] Studies and reports about the violence in East Java also described gruesome acts in the killings, such as public torture, mutilation and decapitation.[57] In many areas, body parts and corpses were left in public spaces to generate terror.[58] Massive involvement of religious organizations such as Ansor and the Catholic Youth in the violence in East Java led a number of scholars to argue that the violence was a result of rooted conflict between religious organizations and the PKI while the army remained largely passive.[59]

However, both the horizontal conflict and state-led violence analyses seem to overlook that neither civilian organizations nor the army worked independently. They had been forming a political alliance even before the 30 September Movement, which culminated in the violence throughout 1965-68. Few socio-historical analyses of the involvement of civilian groups in the violence implicitly pointed to advantages that these groups gained by eliminating the PKI. For example, Greg Fealy and Katherine McGregor argued that political and socio-economic reasons such as electoral popularity and attacks against NU landowners were more significant than religious reasons for the killings.[60] This implies that the elimination of the PKI secured the political and economic positions for the NU.

Not only the NU, the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*) and Catholic Youth (*Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia/PMKR*I) also formed an alliance with

55 Other reasoning includes statements such as "If the PKI were not killed first, then we would be killed"; "A person is not a real Muslim if he does not want to exterminate PKI members"; "They had attacked our faith". Robinson 2018, 173. Harold Crouch also noted that it was common to find religious teachers (*kyai*) and scholars (*ulama*) of NU mobilizing their students at religious schools (*pesantren*) to take communists from their homes and kill them at certain places. Crouch 1988, 152.

56 Feillard 1996, 45-47.

57 See Cribb, 1990a.

58 Pipit Rochijat told a story where body of corpses were stacked together on rafts with the PKI banner on top. Rochijat 1985, 44.

59 Hermawan Sulistyo recorded that the military remained passive in the massacres in Kediri and Jombang. He only noted that the Kodim commander in Kediri sent his officers in civilian clothes to join Ansor's mass actions. Sulistyo 2000, 166.

60 Based on correspondence between central and local NU officials, the central leadership played a role in encouraging the violence in the local regions. Fealy & McGregor 2012, 105-130.

the military even before the 30 September Movement. Acting independently from their central leadership, the Catholic Party and PMKRI in Malang used the Catholics within the military to safeguard their movement. FX Trikatmo, a former PMKRI activist in Malang explains the relationship between the PMKRI and the military prior to 1965:

> It was [19]63 and very intense.[61] Intimidation was also strong. Ah, why did we dare to organise a Bishop's mass meeting (*apel Uskup*)? Because at that time in Malang, Catholic figures were dominant. Amongst others; the chairman of Askam (*Aksi Sosial Katolik Malang*/Catholic Social Action in Malang) was Colonel Moedjiono. He was the Commander of the Military Police (POM) in East Java – Brawijaya. The POM Korem Commander was also a Catholic. Their auditor, in East Java, in Malang, the military auditor was also a Catholic. The air force commander was also a Catholic, but apparently, he was in Oemar Dhani's[62] cadre. So he was arrested. There were a lot of Catholic figures. When the military was dominant, then, who will dare [laughing]. They were the ones who supported us in Malang.[63]

In this conversation, Trikatmo portrayed the Catholic community as having a close connection with the army, which was considered as a support and protection against the left. They took advantage of the Catholics within the military body to secure their mass movements, and strengthen the position of Catholics within the tense and intimidated rivalry with the PKI around 1963. From Trikatmo's account, we can see that the Catholics were not merely a submissive community that executed orders from the army, instead they were also an active group which constantly maintained their relationship with authorities. With this kind of alliance and political support, civilian organizations seemed to move firmly against the communists in early October 1965. For example, Jess Melvin mentioned that as early as 1 October 1965, PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic High School Students) activists in Banda Aceh already produced anti-communist posters without direction from the army. Melvin argues that at this early stage, it is highly possible that civilian groups acted independently but were soon organized under the military's command.[64] However, reflecting on

61 Trikatmo was referring to the political rivalry between the PKI and anti-communist organizations such as the NU and the Catholic Party.

62 Oemar Dhani was the national air force commander (1962-65), who was accused of being involved in the 30 September Movement.

63 Interview with FX Trikatmo, Malang, 11 June 2016 #20.36-22.32.

64 Melvin 2018, 119-120.

Trikatmo's account, I think that even when civilian organizations seemed to act independently, they would not have made the decision to do so if they were not completely sure about the army's support for their actions. This indicates that coalitions between the army and civilian groups were continuously maintained before, during and after the violence.

From Chaos to Extermination

The first weeks after the 30 September Movement were filled with ambiguity. Authorities and civilians in the regions were not certain about what the movement was, and how to respond to it.[65] As this section will show, in the first weeks of October 1965, military actions in East Java were geared towards maintaining peace and order. However, as soon as the political tendency shifted into an anti-Leftist stream, these actions transformed into creating and facilitating anti-communist violence. Civilian groups that were once more-or-less independent allies of the army, now became clients of their military patrons, believing that the nation was entering into a war against the communists.

In East Java, the weeks after the 30 September Movement were rather chaotic: both the communists and anti-communists groups mobilized themselves to convey a public statement. From early to mid-October 1965, mass movements included demonstrations (by rightist and leftist groups), destruction of Leftist properties (houses or offices), and clashes between the two parties.[66] During that period, the authorities were still trying to take control of the situation. For example, on 10 October 1965 in Pasuruan, Pantja Tunggal dismissed 2000 demonstrators from religious groups targeting communists.[67] On 11 October 1965, the battalion commander of Zeni 5 was instructed to cooperate with *Puterpra* (*Perwira Urusan Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat* which later on became *Koramil*) in Lawang to keep demonstrations in order (*menjaga ketertiban demonstrasi*), and prevent

65 In Aceh, an activist who was putting up posters accusing the PKI of being the mastermind behind the 30 September Movement was confronted by a military guard using his bayonet. This happened because in the early days after the 30 September Movement, even the military was not sure who was behind the movement. Melvin 2018, 121.

66 This also included destruction of houses or properties of Chinese residents in the area, accusing them of supporting the Indonesian communists. "Laporan G30S/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 1965.

67 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

destruction of houses, stores and officers, and to release a warning shot, if necessary.[68] Meanwhile, the communists also organized their mass movements. On 21 October 1965, for example, 300 communists in Cluring village, Banyuwangi organized a demonstration.[69] Received by the local Pantja Tunggal, the demonstrators made several statements: they will continue to support Sukarno as reminded by the PKI central committee; create national revolutionary unity on the basis of NASAKOM; execute five revolutionary principles (*Panca Ajimat Revolusi*); and persecute the people who are responsible for burning down innocent people's houses. Up to this point, it seems that mass mobilizations were organic and uncoordinated, while the authorities were still attempting to prevent a high number of casualties from these movements.

A turning point in East Java's purge against the left occurred after the formation of Pupelrada. A telegram to the regional Pantja Tunggal and Kodim mentioned *Pepelrada* Decree No. Kep-15/10/65 about the formation of Pepelrada in *Korem/Kopursiaga* (*Komando Tempur Siaga*/Battle Command) and the establishment of *Pupelrada* or *Pembantu Pepelrada* (Asssistant Pepelrada) in Korem 083 Malang on 13 October 1965. Located in Bromo street 17, Pupelrada Korem 083 operated under the leadership of Colonel Sumadi, the Korem (Military Resort Command) 083 Commander.[70] Pupelrada was also established in other districts and regencies.[71] Its formation meant that now the *Korems* also had extra-judicial powers such as prohibiting a person to reside in or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and so on. Furthermore, the information division of *Pupelrada* 083 clearly stated that "all parties are obliged to assist efforts to normalize the situation and to prevent the misuse of the people's current emotional state".[72] This was

68 Radiogram T. 582/1965 directed to Komandan Batalyon Zeni Tempur (Dan Jon Zipur) 5 on 11 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

69 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 5. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

70 Radiogram T. 591/1965 directed to Regional Pantja Tunggal ex Residence/Besuki (Pantja Tunggal Tk. II ex Karesidenen/Besuki) through Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 16 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

71 Another document from the Brawijaya archives also shows the existence of Pupelrada in Korem 081, Madiun. Laporan Korem 081. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

72 "Pokok-Pokok Kebijaksanaan Penerangan Staf Pupelrada Korem 083 Dalam Menghadapi Penyelesaian Apa Yang Dinamakan Gerakan 30 September", November 6, 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia. This document sometimes uses Pupelrada and Pupepelrada. It refers to the same body.

basically an explicit call for every group, including civilians, to be involved in the anti-communist operations.

One day after the formation of Pupelrada in Malang, religious youth groups held an Action Command (*Komando Aksi*) public meeting at the Malang town square on 14 October 1965.[73] At this meeting, the youths stated publicly that they would assist the army in crushing the 30 September Movement and were received by Colonel Sumadi, Commander of Kopur III/83 (*Komando Tempur*/Battle Command under Korem 083). The meeting also handed over 250,000 youths from 30 mass organizations under the *Front Pemuda* (Youth Front) of Malang City. It did not state further to whom the youths were handed over. Although the number seems to be exaggerated, public meetings became a common starting point of a more coordinated mass mobilization that also occurred elsewhere.[74] On the same date, the military began to issue orders to arrest and investigate members of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat in order to search for 'complete information related to the 30 September Movement'.[75] This radiogram instructed every Kodim (District Military Command) to cooperate with the local police command and *Pantja Tunggal* to investigate Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat members who were involved in the training of volunteers in Jakarta. The investigation should focus on their knowledge about the 30 September Movement and its implementation in the regions. Whether or not this radiogram influenced the mass killings is still unclear, but it shows that previous mass demonstrations started to initiate attacks against the left.

On 23 October 1965, the Head of Staff *Pupelrada* 0825/Brawijaya (presumably refered to Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi) conducted a limited meeting attended by *Puterpra, PP* (presumably *Pemuda Pancasila*), *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil*/civil defence), and the heads of government Departments (*Djawatan*) to inform them about the establishment of *Pupelrada* in East Java.[76] The meeting also stressed the military operations needed to secure and stabilize local government. From then on, the nature of the Korem 083

73 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

74 In Surabaya, a mass rally took place on 16 October 1965 at the Heroes Monument, which was organized by the East Java and Surabaya Action Committee to Crush Gestapu (Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu). D. Setiawan 2014, 210.

75 Radiogram T. 587/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 14 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

76 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

daily report started to change. From late October to December 1965, the report frequently mentioned the killings of members of Leftist organizations by unidentified killers (*pembunuh tidak dikenal*).[77] For example, on 16 November 1965, four cases of killings were recorded in the report and in one of those cases, four bodies were found in a rice field.[78] The document also reported self-disbandment of Leftist organizations in different areas. However, a radiogram on 30 November 1965 stated that disbandment of political or mass organizations that were involved in the 30 September Movement should be accepted by the District Military Commander (*Dandim*) as head of Pupelrada and witnessed by *Pantja Tunggal* and other organizations in the National Front.[79] This indicates the possibility that self-disbandment was not voluntary, but occurred under the pressure of the military.

When Local Acts Became Coordinated

The formation of *Pupelrada* became a turning point where spontaneous movements from Rightist and Leftist groups in the first weeks of October 1965 then shifted into attacks against the left by mid-October in Malang. The diverse political orientation amongst East Java's authorities was now becoming increasingly coherent in support of eliminating the left. In this case, involvement of civilian masses in the anti-communist purges should not be perceived as a solution for the insufficiency of troops, but as an effort to create the impression that the violence against the PKI was the result of spontaneous communal anger – a feature of a civil war.[80] In fact, it was certainly the army that had made civilian movements increasingly massive and aggressive towards the left in East Java. On 21 October 1965, Basuki Rachmat finally established the Pancasila Operation to eliminate the left in East Java. This decision secured Rachmat's own career, and he was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs (1966-68) in Suharto's cabinet.

77 The language that is used in the document is vague. It did not reveal any actors, but focused on the finding – bodies that were predominantly of members of Leftist groups.

78 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 12. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

79 Radiogram T. 715/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 30 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

80 Robinson 2018, 212.

The Pancasila Operation instruction stated that "with all authorities in all Kodam VIII/Brawijaya, together with other *Angkatan, Pantja Tunggal*, and other apparatus, we should improve the implementation of Dwikora and continue the extermination of the remaining contra-revolutionary 30 September Movement down to its roots to create peace and order in East Java".[81] In this operation, every battalion was obliged to report on the local situation every six hours to a joint command post in Surabaya.[82] The operation also instructed every Korem to "execute every military or non-military act, by our own troops or by other parties, in accordance with the Commander's policy".[83] This instruction implied the need to align every action under one military command. Furthermore, the operation also targeted the left within military bodies. Any military personnel who committed disciplinary offences related to the 30 September Movement were to be handed over to the screening team of KODAM VIII.[84]

The Pancasila Operation also explicitly authorized the use of civilian forces. The document stated that "for the purpose of the operation, local civilian forces that have clearly expressed their support for the army can be used in eliminating the 30 September Movement".[85] Although the document did not specify further the involvement of civilians, it opened a spectrum of possibilities for civilians to conduct violence against the left. Furthermore, the Pancasila Operation instruction was acknowledged by the National Army Commander (*Panglima Angkatan Darat/Menpangad*) A.H. Nasution (1962-66) and the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Panglima Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*/Pangkostrad) Suharto

81 *Dengan segala wewenang yang ada, seluruh slagorde Kodam VIII/Brawijaya bersama-sama dengan lain ANGKATAN, PANTJA TUNGGAL dan segenap aparatur lainnya tetap meningkatkan pelaksanaan Dwikora dan terus membasmi sisa-sisa golongan kontra revolusi "Gerakan 30 September" sampai seakar-akarnya untuk menciptakan suasana aman dan tertib di wilayah Jatim*. "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

82 "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 5. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

83 *Mengadakan usaha dan tindakan-tindakan yang diperlukan sesuai kebijaksanaan yang telah digariskan oleh PANGLIMA baik dalam segi militer maupun non militer, baik ke dalam pasukan sendiri maupun keluar.* "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 3-4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

84 "Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

85 *Untuk keperluan operasi dapat menggunakan tenaga sipil setempat yang telah nyata-nyata mendukung gerakan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia dalam rangka penumpasan Gerakan 30 September.* "Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5", 3. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

(1963-65).[86] This suggests that the operation was obviously acknowledged by the national central command of the army.

After the Pancasila Operation was released, a number of radiograms were sent to the Kodim under Korem 083 Malang to organise the use of civilians. A radiogram released on 26 October 1965 instructed that "progressive revolutionary organizations that stand behind the army to crush the counter-revolutionary movement should be under *Puterpra*" (former name for Koramil), including combative military trainings by individuals or groups.[87] This suggests the army's intention to stop random mass actions and consolidate actions under the *Puterpra*. Later in November 1965, the *Puterpra* was ordered to be armed, including the Technical Assistance Unit (*Unit Bantuan Teknis*) which would be assigned later on to the weak *Puterpras*.[88] Arming the Puterpra also meant that military forces at the lowest level (subdistrict) should be more aggressive in eliminating Leftists.

Soon after this radiogram, a series of documents also issued similar instructions regarding civilian forces. On 23 November 1965, a radiogram ordered:[89]

1. Headquarters should be provided to mass action movements that do not yet have any. Catur Tunggal should provide this for the mass action movements, and combine them with *Hansip* (civil defence).
2. KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*/Indonesia University Students Action Front) should be united with the aforementioned AA[90] and include the University Students Regiment (Resimen Mahasiswa)

86 The Pancasila Operation instructions were sent to the Battle Command in Korem 081 to 083, commanders of the battalions in East Java, Menpangad, Pangkostrad, the commander of Kodam/Regional Military Command Diponegoro (Central Java) and Udayana (Bali), and to other units in the Brawijaya command. "Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5", 4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

87 The radiogram also ordered the formation of investigation teams (*tim pengusut*) at district and subdistrict levels, of which members should be adjusted to the local situation. Radiogram T. 298/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 26 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 3. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

88 Radiogram T. 658/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 6 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 4. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

89 Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 23 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

90 The document did not provide any further explanation of AA. However, a term of *Golongan Agama*/Ansor (Religious group/Ansor) was used in a situation report of Korem 081 Madiun

3. The task of the aforementioned AA is to assist the army by:
   a. Forming teams to register residents at the level of the village neighbourhood, village, subdistrict, district or regents, national companies, private companies, universities, and so on in order to abolish the PKI internally (it should be abolished by the end of November)
   b. Providing information
   c. Providing information and indoctrination for former PKI sympathisers who want to be good citizens
   d. Conducting operations together with the ABRI
   e. Creating psy-war defence
   f. Conducting counter[91]
   g. Staying anti Neo-colonialism (Nekolim)[92]

The document did not further explain the details of each point. However, it is clear that the army was organizing civilian forces under their command to register residents (presumably using screening teams similar to Central Java's Teperda),[93] provide assistance in military operations, and participate in indoctrination efforts for villagers and detainees.

Instructions to organize civilian forces under the army command continued towards the end of November 1965. For example, a radiogram on 25 November 1965 ordered middle-rank officers (*Pama/perwira menengah*) to directly lead mass actions.[94] Meanwhile, two days later, another radiogram instructed cessation of all mass movements; and to channel AA through *Hansip*, provide them (mass movements) with uniforms

and Kediri. It is highly possible that the AA in this document referred to this specific civilian group. "G30S/PKI di Daerah Korem 081 Madiun-Kediri". 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

91 "Melaksanakan counter" (original text). There was no further explanation about this instruction, but it may relate to strategies in countering the communists.

92 The term Nekolim was introduced by Sukarno in relation to the independence revolution. While during the Sukarno period, anti-Nekolim refers to independence, anti-Dutch or foreign intervention, in 1965, Nekolim means anti-communists, because the communists were seen as endangering Indonesia's revolution.

93 This is similar to Central Java's Teperda or Regional Investigation Teams (Team Pemeriksa Daerah), which had the duty to interrogate and collect information from prisoners. The formation of Teperda was at the direct instruction of Suharto. Hammer 2013, 53.

94 Radiogram T. 706/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

and let the army direct them.[95] This was a very explicit order to convert civilians into military personnel. Another radiogram clearly stated the acknowledgement of KAMI as the only student organization permitted by the military, in which all students were obliged to be involved with the main task of annihilating the 30 September Movement under the army leadership.[96] Through these instructions on civilians' involvement, it is not surprising that by 4 December 1965, the Commander of Korem 083 reported to the Brawijaya Commander that all the PKI under *Korem* 083 area 'were terminated'.[97]

To conclude, there are two strategies that are highly significant in the anti-communist operation in East Java. First is the establishment of *Pupelrada* that provide a legal basis for the Korems under the Brawijaya command to perform arrests, confiscate property, and perform other extra-judicial acts. The second is the use of civilian forces in the Pancasila Operation, which had been assigned various tasks ranging from providing information to directly assisting in the operation. Although detailed evidence about civilian involvement can only be found (so far) in Korem 083 Malang, it is highly possible that other Korem in East Java, and even in other provinces, also issued similar instructions. This shows that although the civilian forces acted locally in the first weeks after the 30 September Movement, these forces were eventually coordinated under the structural command of the East Java army command as from late October 1965.

Records of Detention

Another indication that the army was monitoring the violence was through their records of detainees. In the report on the 30 September Movement in Korem 083, a specific log was available to track the number of detainees. These numbers were recorded daily, starting in early November (at least in Korem 083 – it may be earlier or later in other regions) until December 1965. The mechanism for recording the numbers of detainees was not specified,

95 Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 27 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

96 Radiogram ST.705/1965 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

97 "Laporan G30S/PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki", 16. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

but on several dates, the document also provides numbers of prisoners in each Kodim (see data from 10, 13 and 16 November). This suggests that the numbers were generated hierarchically, presumably from Koramil, to Kodim, and then to Korem 083, and maybe reported further to Kodam VIII/Brawijaya. Prisoners' data at the Kodim level was also found in other regions, such as Kodim 0809 Kediri which listed 245 civil services, 211 village officials and 2955 civilians in detention.[98]

Table 2.1. Number of Prisoners in Kopur Siaga III/083, November-December 1965

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
4 November 1965				2472	-
10 November 1965				2337	Kodim 0818: 471 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 165 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 262 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 118 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 158 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 553 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
13 November	39		2428	2467	Kodim 0818: 529 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 241 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 106 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 222 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 196 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people

98 The date of this record is not available. Rekapitulasi: Daftar korban-korban penumpasan GESTAPU/PKI di wilajah Kodim 0809/Kediri. Komando Distrik Militer 0809 Kediri. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya. Museum Brawiaya Malang, Indonesia.

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
16 November				2821	Kodim 0818: 543 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 253 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 204 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 235 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 441 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 243 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
20 November	34	1	3959	3997	-
21 November	45	1	3974	4020	-
23 November				1509	-
27 November	102	1	4903	5006	-
28 November				5034	-
4 December 1965	91	1	5450		-
6 December				6175	-
7 December, until 08.00	106	2	6183		-
7 December, until now (the hour is not available)	133	20	5652	5805	-
8 December	18	100	6109	6217	-
9 December	106	17	6087	6210	-
12 December, until 12.00	134	14	6111	6259	-
12 December, until 24.00	134	14	5650	5798	-
15 December	133	20	5454	5607	-
17 December	134	14	5904	6052	-
21 December	133	20	5480	5633	-
23 December	163	19	5435		-
27 December	224	27	4193	4444	-
29 December	213	27	4191	4431	-

Source: "Laporan G30S/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/83 Malang-Besuki" 1965, 8-18.

Based on the table above, we can see that the number of prisoners increased from early November (2,472 people) to early December (6,259 people), and decreased slowly towards the end of December (4,431 people). Note that on

12 December 1965, the number of prisoners decreased sharply within only twelve hours. No further explanation of this change is provided. However, keeping in mind that mass killings were usually preceded by detention; it is highly possible that the numbers declined because the detainees were killed.[99] Their detention period was also uncertain. In Korem 082 in Mojokerto, for example, 7,398 people still remained detained until the end of 1966. The report further explained that since October 1966, Korem 082 no longer received maintenance funds or donations for the prisoners, so they had to rely on their own families for food for the remaining detention period.[100] These records of detainees that occurred in different places indicate that the anti-communist violence occurred under the surveillance of the army.[101]

Military Operations in South Malang

Even though the Pancasila Operation was launched on 21 October 1965, it was not until 29 November 1965 that it commenced in South Malang, under the command of Captain Hasan Basri.[102] As mentioned earlier, the delay might have been related to the shortage of troops, but it is also possible that the army needed time to consolidate internal forces to support the anti-communist operation. A report on the operation stated that the troops entered Donomulyo on 29 November and that they searched for direct information by establishing a connection with the local *Tjatur Tunggal*.[103] Oral sources also confirmed this mechanism, and explained that village heads were summoned to the Koramil office once the army entered the area.[104] This was the starting point of army-civilian collaboration to execute

99 See Kammen & Zakaria 2012.

100 "Kegiatan Kopur II/Rem-082 Dalam Penumpasan Gerakan 30 September", 5. 1965. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya. Museum Brawiaya Malang, Indonesia.

101 Not only in East Java, the military in Aceh also recorded 1,941 public deaths since early October 1965. Melvin 2017, 496.

102 Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.0.004/1965.Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

103 Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.0.004/1965.Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

104 Conversation with Jono, 8 August 2019.

the rank and file of communists in Donomulyo. The following day, one platoon raider already started a cleansing operation in Tlogosari complex and another in Sumberoto, two subdistricts located in Donomulyo.[105] Next, the troops were divided to three other districts in Sumbermanjing Kulon, Pagak and Bantur, for a two-day operation. During the night, *Kodim* instructed the extension of the operation for another seven days, which provided more time for the army to execute another cleansing operation in Donomulyo up to the Blitar area. Therefore, on 2-3 December 1965, one platoon raider was assigned to move into the Wates area in Blitar, while other troops under the *Puterpra* Donomulyo moved into different subdistricts of Donomulyo. Also on 2 December 1965, a meeting was conducted in Turen to discuss the progress of the 30 September Movement operation and the cleansing operation against rampant robbers in South Malang. Besides the army, the marines (*Korps Komando Angkatan Laut*/KKO) were also involved in the operation, covering the Karangsari area on 5-6 December 1965. The next day, 7 December 1965, a meeting was organized between *Kodim*, troop commanders, including *Brimob* Commander (Mobile Brigade/*Brigade Mobil*, a special operation unit under the National Police force) and the District Head/*Camat* of Bantur. From 9 December 1965, *Brimob* supplied additional troops, including troops assigned to guard prisoners in Wonokerto. On 19 December 1965, investigators were assigned to the operation, two from *Korem* 083 (assigned in Wonokerto and Pagak) while other posts were filled with investigators from *Brimob*. The operation continued to move around different districts in South Malang and ended on 18 January 1966.

Based on the operation report, 90% of the residents in Donomulyo were allegedly PKI. The army also discovered 12 firearms in the Western part of Donomulyo.[106] During the examination by the investigation team (consisting of *Tjatur Tunggal*), the suspects readily admitted the existence of those firearms. The report then continues:

> Despite the secured activists in Batu, there are still 24 activists of the PKI, PR, BTI and Lekra. Following the screening, they will certainly

105 Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.0.004/1965.Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

106 Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.0.004/1965.Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

> be terminated (*diselesaikan*). Remaining PKI members in 8 villages in Donomulyo have disbanded themselves. For those people, education on state administration, *Pancasila*, and religion have been organized.[107]

The report ended by stating that the people felt lively and secure again, and they thanked the military for restoring the situation. This was a typical military narrative, portraying the PKI as the villain and the military as the national hero. It should be kept in mind that the report was sent to and read by superiors, so the army needed to construct such a narrative (we will see in later chapters that this narrative is also part of the villagers' memories). Therefore, facts and numbers that are written in the document should be read critically. The report stated that the army intended to 'secure' a few leftist villagers in Donomulyo.[108]

The term 'secure' is very much a euphemism. What happened in Donomulyo was much more than what was recorded in the report. Villagers clearly stated that the killings occurred in the area. Jono, for example, was a Catholic Youth activist who was assigned as a local guard in Donomulyo. He describes how the prisoners were taken away and killed in a public cemetery:

> I saw it [the military operation]. People were detained, including my friends. They were brought to the police station, and punished, but not through a judge, prosecutors and so on. They were accused of being militant PKI members, such as members of a branch, sub-branch, and so on. Others were only followers – many of them. … It was the army who did the killings. … In the public cemetery, next to the main road, they dug a large pit. People's hands were tied at the back, then they were shot with an AK (presumably referring to AK-47, a type of firearm). … Ansor assisted, sometimes they also slaughtered. It was mob rule. Maybe they have a grudge, so this was their chance to get rid [of them].[109]

Besides stressing that the killings happened, Jono also explicitly pointed to the involvement of Ansor. This may explain why the anti-communist operation was successful in an area where 90% of the residents were considered

107 Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.0.004/1965.Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

108 This is a common practice that also happened in other areas in East Java, such as Banyuwangi. See Luthfi, 2018.

109 Interview with Jono, Donomulyo, 23 August 2016 # 17.25-31.30

to be communists. It was an operation which heavily utilized civilian forces, and therefore resulted in little resistance on the ground.

Establishing the New Order

As discussed in chapter 1, the aim of the 1965-66 violence was not only to eliminate the left, but also to establish a new regime. In order to succeed in its establishment, the New Order government had to secure support not only from the elites, but also from the rural masses. This was also conducted through coalitions with civilians, using intellectuals and local elites to disseminate the New Order's propaganda. This section will focus on East Java military's strategy to build such a regime, based on the findings from the Brawijaya military archives.

The effort to establish the New Order started with a coordination meeting between all army commanders in Java, together with the Commander of the Army Reserve Command (*Kostrad*) and the Commander of *Puspasus/RPKAD* (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat/RPKAD) on 5-7 July 1967 in Jogjakarta. At the meeting, the Commanders agreed to act more strictly against those who wanted to revive Sukarno's Old Order, and they emphasized their support for the New Order.[110] The meeting was not only an expression of consolidation between the regional commands (which previously were not solidly unified), but also an agreement to purge the remains of Sukarno's supporters and support the establishment of the New Order. In East Java, the purge began under the command of the New Brawijaya Commander, Major General Jasin. Under the campaign of New Orderisation (*Pengorde Baruan*), Jasin dismissed and replaced many military and government officers, including the Surabaya resort commander Willy Sudjono; the East Java Governor, Major General Wijono and almost all PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*/Indonesia Nationalist Party – Sukarno's political party) members in the local government.[111]

Thus, New Orderisation was not only directed at eliminating the leftist government and military members, but also at ensuring support for the New Order down to the district level. In September 1967, the Brawijaya Commander authorised the Provincial New Order Guidance Team (*Tim*

110 "Siaran Kilat No. 1/1967. Kebulatan Tekad Para Panglima Komando Se-Djawa, Panglima Kostrad Serta Komandan Pus Pasus/RPKAD." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

111 Crouch 1988, 233-234.

Pembina Order Baru) which had already been established in Surabaya since July 1967.[112] The main function of the team was to assist the Brawijaya Military Commander to execute New Orderisation in East Java, which meant that the team would receive direct instructions from the Commander. More interestingly, the personnel of this team included elements from the army, action force or *kesatuan aksi,* mass and political organizations, the ministry of internal affairs, joint secretariat of Golkar (Suharto's ruling party), the Women's Organization Cooperation Body (Badan Kerjasama Organisasi Wanita/BKOW), the press and other interested parties.[113] Again, this suggests that the cooperation between the military and civilians, presumably those that existed before and during the 1965 violence, continued during the period of the New Order. Furthermore, the Commander also instructed all *Korems* and *Kodims* to establish New Orderisation Guidance teams in every district and city in East Java. While the provincial New Orderisation Guidance team was authorized to plan, conceptualize and control New Orderisation in East Java; the coordinating team (which was established at *Korem*) had the duty to coordinate all New Orderisation teams at the district and city level. As we can see, the structure of the New Orderisation teams followed the military territorial command structure exactly.

The New Order Guidance teams had 7 short-term programmes, among them were New Orderisation of civilian leaders, military leaders, mass and political organizations; to eliminate obstacles, such as latent power, subversion, infiltration and so on, in developing the New Order; and to execute the general election to ensure the victory of the New Order.[114] The programmes implied a structural coercive attempt to control the region and generate votes for Suharto's political party, Golkar, in the election. In the next chapter, we will see how patrons in Donomulyo were mobilized to generate votes from villagers. The New Order Guidance teams also set targets that by October 1967, New Orderisation teams should be established at each level. By December 1967, the people of East Java should have understood

112 "Surat Keputusan No. Kep-001/ORBA/9/1967 Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/Propinsi Djawa Timur." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

113 "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 5. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

114 "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 1-2. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

the meaning of New Order through information from the mass media; and by January 1968, all control actions should be implemented (no further information is provided on the meaning of 'control actions' in the document). Under this attempt to 'control', the military replaced all of the village heads with army officers (commonly known as *caretakers*) and postponed village head elections in the former PKI areas.[115] Through this systematic and structural control, the New Order built an easy path to implement their new development policies, including agrarian transformation already elaborated on in chapter 1.

As part of the effort to established New Order, the East Java military command was faced with another challenge in 1968, when remaining PKI members managed to regroup in the western part of East Java, particularly in South Blitar. These remaining members planned an armed struggle against Suharto's government by forming a guerrilla detachment with around 150 people headed by an ex-army officer.[116] They survived with the help of local villagers and by constructing cave-like hiding places along the river or on the slopes in the hills, which they called *ruba* (*rumah baru* or new house). According to one of the survivors, the army detected their movements because the guerilla group started to attack former executioners of the 1965 operation and thugs around South Blitar.[117] Therefore, in 31 May 1968, the army launched the Trisula Operation Command Unit (*Komando Satuan Tugas*/Satgas Trisula) to eliminate these remaining ex-communists.[118] While most of the operation was concentrated in South Blitar, it also reached several areas in South Malang such as Binangun, Gondangtapen, Sumber Manjing Kulon, Kalipare and Donomulyo.[119] In Donomulyo, the army moved in on 27 to 30 June 1968, under the operation 'Sharp Bamboo I' (*Bambu Runcing* I) where they managed to capture 12 people and confiscate one hand grenade, with the assistance of Donomulyo's subdistrict civil defence.[120]

115 Major General Jasin sent a letter on 9 September 1967 to the Governor of East Java, stating that placement of military caretakers as village heads had prevented the revival of the PKI and brought development to the villages. Therefore, replacement of village head caretakers was considered unnecessary. "Surat No.R.02/1967 Tentang Penangguhan Pemilihan Kepala Desa Di Desa-Desa Ex Pengaruh PKI." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

116 Waskito 2017, 87-89.

117 Waskito 2017, 90.

118 Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 64.

119 Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 68.

120 Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 122-123.

The Trisula operation was no match for the leftist fugitives as they were poorly organized and armed. Brawijaya military command, M. Jasin, also mentioned the imbalance of power, but also pointed out the support of civilians in revealing the communists in hiding. Jasin stated that "the army's fighting forces are far larger than the enemy's. However, we (the army) must consider the power of local civilians who are generally on the enemy's side".[121] In three months, some 2,000 people were killed and thousands more detained and displaced as a result of the operation.[122] Furthermore, the army interrogated and screened villagers and also destroyed their villages during the army's search for the fugitives. Until today, South Blitar and their residents remain stigmatized and fearful to talk about this past.[123] Compared to the violence in 1965-66, the Trisula operation differs in two aspects.[124] First, the involvement of civilians was low, and even when they were involved, their roles were limited only to intelligence, providing assistance in patrols and capturing fugitives. They did not execute violence as in 1965-66. Second, leaders and detainees of the South Blitar movement were trialled rather than killed. This policy of following the judicial system was aimed at showing that the New Order was following the rule of law in handling the PKI's retaliation attempt.[125] In short, the Trisula Operation could be seen as a public performance that a new regime had been firmly established.

Conclusion

The case of East Java leads us to rethink three different analyses described in the beginning of this chapter – the horizontal conflict, structural violence, and dualistic thesis. This chapter has shown that the alliance between the military and civilians during the 1965-66 violence was part of Indonesia's military political nature, modelling the guerrilla warfare during the Indonesian revolution. My new findings shows that the violence was executed through a collaborative network of army and civilians. However, as this research also shows, this network and participation of civilians could not have taken place if the military had not given any opportunity for such a

121 Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 43.
122 Hearman 2017, 519.
123 Hearman 2017, 526.
124 Hearman 2018,165.
125 Ibid.

thing to occur. The new analysis of the Brawijaya archives in this chapter pointed to this opportunity, created by official structures and commands, which triggered chances for such massive bloodbaths.

In East Java, two important instructions were released in relation to this. First was the establishment of *Pupelrada* in mid-October 1965, which became a turning point for East Java's military resort commands (Korem) to have extra-judicial powers in executing their anti-communist purge. The second was the release of the Pancasila Operation instructions on 21 October 1965 by East Java's military commander, which clearly stated the use of civilians in the army's operation against the communists. Although it is true that the instruction for the anti-communist purge in East Java came a bit late compared to other areas such as Aceh or Central Java, it was not merely a problem of an indecisive attitude of the commander or a technical limitation (shortage of troops). Nevertheless, I argue that the delay should also be seen as a period of shifting alliance – that the Brawijaya command needed to form new alliances (both at the top structural level and the grassroots level) against the communists and to ensure that it would be sufficient to start a massive purge in the province.

Even within this alliance between the military and civilians, the latter should not be seen as agentless individuals. The collaboration succeeded because these civilians also had their own agendas during the violence. These agendas may have ranged from organizational or ideological reasons (for example eliminating political rivals or securing economic properties) to individual motives (for example acts of revenge against a communist neighbour or attempts to seize other villagers' properties). Added to these motives were the rewards that civilians received for their collaboration in the 1965-66 violence and the Trisula operation, which took different forms, such as property, employment, or development projects. In short, civilians had gained benefits from their supra-local attachment to the army. Losses and profits that were experienced after the violence constituted the context of Donomulyo's embedded memories, which I will discuss further in the next chapter.

The army-civilian collaboration also continued to the establishment of the New Order. In this period, the army was not only targeting the communists, but also the remaining supporters of Sukarno. The East Java New Order Guidance teams were established at every structural government level to achieve this purpose, including ensuring the victory of the New Order in the public election. This strategy also maintained the military's grip down to the village level and paved the way for massive rural transformation during the New Order. Furthermore, reflecting on the newly found regional archives in Aceh, Banyuwangi and East Java (particularly Malang), the clear

conclusion is that participation of civilians in the 1965-66 violence could not have been this massive without the army's leadership. In other words, the army clearly coordinated such violence.

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3 Embedded Remembering[1]

Abstract

This chapter explores the memories of violence of the residents in Donomulyo. Going beyond binary categorizations of victims versus perpetrators or official versus counter narratives, as well as public and private memories, this chapter shows how different memories of violence converge, diverge and shape each other. Memories became a strategy and a range of performative acts embedded in local context and social relations in the village. Patrons and clients who benefited from the violence maintain the anti-communist narratives to provide legitimate grounds for their violent operations and support for the establishment of the New Order. While others who fall outside this network, who were excluded and suffered from the violence, perceived the violence as a form of injustice and a setback of their rural livelihood.

Keywords: memory politics, patronage, silence, rural development, perpetratorship, anti-communist violence

In September 2016, I met Mbok Menik, a local merchant who lives in the Banyujati[2] area. Originally from Jogjakarta, Central Java, she moved to the area with her parents in 1963, following her father who established a small shop in the Donomulyo market. The shop sells materials and equipment for religious rituals, such as myrrh. Mbok Menik inherited the shop and continued her father's business. During our conversation, I asked about her childhood experiences as a migrant in the area. When I eventually asked her about the period of 1965, she instantly said, "Oh, it was *gégér*!" (*Oh, gégér,*

1 Part of this chapter is published in Leksana, Grace. "Remembering Anti-Communist Violence in Rural Society in Indonesia: Patronage, Agricultural Transformation, and the Legacy of Violence." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Anti-Communist Persecutions*, edited by Christian Gerlach and Clemens Six, 459–76. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

2 The pseudonym for the research area in this study, covering 3 villages in the Donomulyo district.

Leksana, G.T., *Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia: Embedded Remembering*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023
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mbak!). *Gégér* is a Javanese word which means uproar, frenzy or rumble.[3] It is a common term in Javanese, especially in shadow play (*wayang*) performances, where *gégér* depicted wars between good and evil such as in the epic battle of Bharatayuddha or Hanoman's battle with Rahwana's army of giants.[4] This was the term used by people in Donomulyo when I asked them to describe the situation in 1965, followed by numerous depictions of violent acts. It illustrates how the villagers remember the violence, which differs greatly from how the military constructed the anti-communist operation – as an act to create peace and to save the nation. Nothing was in order, nor at peace. For the villagers, the violence in 1965 and 68 was completely unbearable; a time of chaos, confusion, nearly apocalyptic – a period in which villagers lost everything. These different interpretations of the violence illustrate the disparity of meaning between a political coup that happened in the central capital with the killings that occurred mostly in rural areas. Most villagers knew nothing of the 30 September Movement even when the killings commenced in their areas. At the same time, the presence of the army in Donomulyo forced the villagers to make a connection between their local turmoil with the coup in the capital. The violence in 1965 reflects both the disparity and connectivity between the national and local memories.

In this chapter, I will explore how disparity and connectivity of the public and private narratives interplay in the process of remembering the 1965 violence. More importantly, this chapter will also examine how villagers use this interplay to represent themselves. In this case, remembering became a performative act that does not necessarily relate merely to recalling past events. How and why people remember the violence are very much related to what they gain or loss from the atrocity. Central authority figures who took part in executing the violence usually ensured that other villagers understood why the violence *should* take place, under the reasoning of security and order. Therefore, the act of remembering is not an isolated individual act, but a continuous social reinterpretation of a particular event. Maintaining or excluding a narrative is connected, for example, to the risks of being accused as communist or the reward as a supporter of the New Order.

Memories of violence are very much embedded in the social context not only when the violence occurred, but also before and after it. The context also includes the patronage[5] network and clientelistic practices which

3 Zoetmulder 2004, 285.

4 Brandon and Guritno 1993 (eds) 1993.

5 See the introduction chapter for a definition of the patron-client relationship and chapter 1 for the historical evolution of this relationship in Donomulyo. James Scott describes the patron-client

already existed since the pre-colonial era. When patronage relationships are created, or enforced by the violence, those who are in this network tend to support the narrative that legitimized the violence. While for others who fall outside this network, who were excluded and suffered from the violence, the violence is perceived as a form of injustice and a setback to their rural livelihood. The social context and patronage network can also help to explain why one event generates different memories and representations, as well as different forms of silence amongst villagers. This chapter will scrutinize the connection between this social context with various acts of remembering the violence. How and why does the context and patronage network generate different ways of remembering?

This chapter is written by putting emphasis on the person, their individuality, and agency, not to put their memories within a binary position of the hegemonic state narrative and the 'counter' memories (see the discussion on the limitations of human rights approach in the introduction chapter), but to see how both of the narratives of violence converge, diverge and shape each other. Most of the information that I use in this chapter is based on an ethnographic study in Donomulyo, particularly the life history interviews of villagers who were involved in or impacted by the 1965-68 violence. While using this approach, I realize that the villagers do not record events in a similar temporal dimension as historians do. Instead, they use particular events as a mark of their temporal dimension, such as starvation, leadership of particular village heads, or planting seasons. Their approach also affected the distinction or lack of distinction that they make between the violence in 1965 and 1968. On many occasions, villagers seemed to blur those two events and were unable to differentiate between the Trisula (1968) and Pancasila operations (1965). But this actually shows that, for them, these two events have the same apocalyptic nature.

Patronage in Memory Construction

I first raised the question of connectivity between the local and national event when I met Karsono and his wife, Parminah. Karsono himself used to

relationship as an "exchange relationship between roles, involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron". Scott 1972, 92.

work as an elementary school teacher in Donomulyo. Now retired, he spends most of his time tilling his land and looking after their cattle. Meanwhile, Parminah is a member of the Catholic Women's organization and devotes most of her time to raising their grandson, while his parents work abroad as migrant workers. During my visits, we talked in the living room, with a neatly decorated interior showing elements of Catholicism and pictures of their families, including Karsono's brother who is a Catholic priest in Jember, East Java. Karsono began to tell his childhood experiences, including when he was in the 4th grade of elementary school in 1968, where his parents' house was transformed into a military post during the Trisula operation. Karsono witnessed villagers being taken away by the army.

> They (the army) stigmatized this area as PKI. The fact is, not all of them [were PKI]. Only a few of them, but others were only accused. So they brought in [battalion] 513, the army. My house was the base … As far as I know, some people were taken every day to the district office. I didn't know what happened to them. Their hands were usually tied at the back, five, six people, and walked this way. Here (showing his wrist) are all tied. I saw it here (in front of the house).

Karsono was only a child at that time, but he was talking about the army battalion and the PKI stigmatization. But the event that he saw was only a group of people being tied and taken away by the military. How did he know all of this when as a child, he only experienced one fragment? I asked him about this, and he explained:

> They said it was the PKI. **They** said (Karsono emphasized). [Grace: Who told you about that?] well… (stammered)… everybody knows if there were people being taken away, it must be PKI. People were guarded in the posts. The Army, together with the villagers. Villagers were obliged [to guard] at night. And all the women were told to be in one place. For instance, I should be with the others in a house across the street. Nobody dared to be alone in the house. Children were brought along. **They said** (Karsono emphasizes) back then, if we didn't do it, the PKI will kill us if we are home alone. We were scared.[6]

It was an extremely frightening experience for Karsono to have a group of people with guns entering his daily life and taking other villagers away.

6 Interview with Karsono and Parminah, 3 December 2016 #48.17-49.28; 49.42-50.39

But understanding what this fragment means is a very different process. Karsono himself repeatedly emphasized the word 'they said' (*katanya*) which implies that this knowledge was provided by an external party. When I tried to clarify who these people were, Karsono was a bit confused and explained as if this was a common knowledge ("if there were people being taken away, it must be PKI"). His reactions imply that he was also confused about how such knowledge came into being. Thus, Karsono continued to explain that not all of the detainees were PKI. This statement is related to Karsono's father's experience, which I found out towards the end of our interview. Apparently, his father, who was assigned by the army as a night guard, slept during his shift. Karsono's father was later punished by being detained in the local military office for half a day. Karsono emphasized that this was the reason for his father's short detention and not because his father had any involvement with political parties. Apart from this story, it is also possible that Karsono's criticism of the PKI label stemmed from his father's political experience. Indonesian teachers in the 1960s were highly political. Even the Minister of Basic Education and Culture together with the Coordinating Minister of Education, Knowledge, and Culture in 1961 were supported by the PKI.[7] It is very likely that Karsono's father may have been involved in leftist activism through a teachers' association, which Karsono did not openly share with me. This also adds to the reason for his father's detention – that he was considered to be part of the communists, and not only because he slept during his guard shift. Karsono's statement that not all people who were detained were PKI originated from his family's experience. He was bringing his personal experience into a general interpretation about the violence in Banyujati.

It seems that turning several civilian homes into command posts was part of the military's strategy to mobilize and coordinate civilian's involvement in the operation.[8] Besides Karsono, I also talked to Sardono, whose house was also used as a command post. As one of the descendants of the village's first settlers, Sardono was regarded as a local and spiritual leader. Although his exact birthdate is not recorded, he remembered that he was in second grade during the Japanese occupation. This is another example

7 On the other hand, the Department of Higher Education and Science was controlled by the army. These factions competed in influencing policy development. In addition, institutions under the Ministry of Education, including professional teachers' organizations were also fragmented. Suwignyo 2011.

8 The selection of these houses was not very clear. I assume that it was because the people living in those houses had close relationships with authority or were members of the village apparatus.

of localising a temporal dimension that I have mentioned before. Based on his description, I estimated that he was more than 80 years old when this study was conducted. When I asked him about 1965, Sardono explicitly stated that the army informed villagers about the events that occurred in Jakarta:

> It started in [19]65, until [19]68. Oh, [19]65 was intense, coupled with [19]68. People were shot in [19]68. A lot of people were detained in [19]65. [Grace: How did you first hear about G30S and the coup attempt?] Lha, the fact that they were against the *pamong*, police, wasn't that an attempt to destroy the government? I didn't [read newspapers]. I just knew. What newspaper at that time? Compared with the present day, everybody knows everything because of television. Back then, there was nothing. I didn't know about the Generals. I only heard from those ABRIs (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*/The Indonesian Army). … they stayed in the village head's house. That was their base.[9]

Sardono's account juxtaposes the intense violence in 1965 and 1968 with the 30 September Movement in Jakarta. Interestingly, this juxtaposition was not originally developed by Sardono himself, but through one-directional information from the army. Sardono emphasized that he did not know anything about the Generals (referring to the army officers who were killed in the 30 September Movement), and that the news was brought into the area by the army. Furthermore, Sardono portrayed communists as trouble-makers who always opposed local authorities such as *pamong* (village officials) and police. Although he did not specify the case or incident, he used this image to support the information about the 30 September Movement and the portrayal of communists as 'national traitors'.[10] Localities were used to justify the importance of a military operation in Donomulyo.

The army was not the only source of information. Religious leaders, such as those of the NU or Catholic Party, actively disseminated anti-communist propaganda after 1965. I recognized this while talking to Aji Marlan, the former village secretary described in chapter 1. In 1965, Marlan was a member of Ansor (Islamic youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia) and later became the treasurer of the Ansor sub-branch in the Banyujati area. When I asked him about the situation

9 Interview with Sardono, 19 August 2016 # 31.57-35.26

10 This portrayal of the PKI as being responsible for the 30 September Movement is actually propaganda launched by the army to provoke and legitimize mass violence. Robinson 2017, 467.

in 1965, he explained about the NU leaders and the war-like condition in his neighbourhood.

> … it was the NU leaders who told us [about the 30 September Movement]. Then it expanded. The army was the one who brought peace. If the army didn't come, perhaps there will be war. Everybody brings their war tools, sickle or sword. Those who didn't have any, brought sharp bamboo. … But it didn't happen. My father's house in the back [of my current house] was surrounded by shouting communists. But our house was strong, so they couldn't enter. Although my father ignored them, inside the house he was prepared with a sickle. I was with him, because I'm his oldest son. After that, we were too scared to sleep at home. We slept in the field with father, perhaps there were 5 to 7 people. After that, party members were gathered together, NU with NU, the Catholics with the Catholic party. We guarded [the village].[11]

Aji Marlan's memory presents a different perspective. For him, the PKI and NU were at war; they were attacking each other. The presence of the army was to secure the situation and it brought an end to this situation of 'civil war'. For Marlan, the one who created *gégér* was not the army, but the PKI, who tried to attack his family. Marlan's account resonates with the horizontal conflict approach described in chapter 2. This construction of a 'war' situation between the NU and PKI created a belief among the NUs that the Muslim community would never be safe until communism was annihilated.[12] Whether or not this was the actual state in Banyujati should be questioned because, as discussed in the previous chapter, no significant conflicts occurred in the village before the arrival of the army during the Pancasila Operation in 1965.

Both Sardono and Aji Marlan's stories echo the state's narrative of the 1965 violence – that it was the PKI that was the threat to society, and that the violence was the result of an excess of communal hatred. This type of reproduction became important for them considering their background. Aji Marlan's family was a renowned Haji in Donomulyo. Aji himself was one of the Ansor sub-branch officials in the area. Meanwhile, Sardono was a descendant of the village's first settlers. He was one of the acknowledged local leaders in the area, and presumably also owns large amount of land. Both of these people are members of the village's elites, and it is important

11 Interview with Aji Marlan, 22 August 2016 # 32.11-34.26

12 See Fealy and McGregor 2012.

for them to preserve their position without being threatened by the left. Even long after the violence ended, they needed to maintain the narrative of the PKI as the villain in order to legitimize their annihilation. It became *their* collective memory. While Sardono and Marlan needed to maintain the state narrative, Karsono's story is different because his family was aggrieved by the military operation. Karsono implied that the PKI label was imposed from outside Donomulyo. In this case, narratives and memories depend on what patronage relationships can bring to their clients. It will correspond with the state's narrative as long as patrons and clients both benefited from the violence. When the situation is the opposite and villagers became disadvantaged from the violence, memories will diverge from the official line.

Nevertheless, although patronage networks affect the representation of the past, in some cases, it does not instantly show this linear causal relation. I came to this conclusion when I met Jono, a local merchant, who owns a grocery shop and other businesses (middleman in a cassava business – collecting the crop from farmers and selling it to larger collectors before going to the factory). He used to be part of the sub-branch of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, Indonesia's nationalist party) in 1990s. Though not a formal member, Jono's main task was to gather votes in Donomulyo for the party. His track record of political activity stretched back to the period of the 1960s, when he became a member of the Indonesian Catholic Students Association (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*/PMKRI). During the 1965-68 operation, at around 14 or 15 years old, he was assigned to assist the military as a civil guard, where he witnessed the disappearance of detainees from the *Koramil*/office of the military precinct command in Donomulyo (see chapter 2). After the 30 September Movement occurred in Jakarta, Jono frequently travelled from Donomulyo to the Malang municipality to meet and discuss with other PMKRI activists, following the developments of the political situation. Several Catholic activists from Jakarta frequently travelled to different regions to consolidate the movement between central Jakarta and the regions. Among these figures were Harry Tjan Silalahi, Cosmas Batubara and the controversial father Beek, who often visited Malang city.[13] This shows the structural chain of information within

13 Father Beek, a Catholic priest, initiated the intensive one-month leadership training known as Kaderisasi Sebulan/Kasbul. It succeeded in creating generations of militant anti-communist Catholic leaders, some of them managing to be high level politicians in the Suharto years. The travels of these Catholic figures to the regions, as mentioned by Jono, also took place even before the 30 September Movement, with the purpose to disseminate information, especially about the latest political situation. During the violence in 1965, Cosmas Batubara and NU activist,

religious organizations such as the Catholic Youth, from central Jakarta to other cities, and later to different districts in the regency. We have to keep in mind that at that time, the military had already established close cooperation with youth organizations which resulted in the mobilization of anti-communist actions.[14] Within this background, Jono was summoned to the regional military command (Korem) in Malang municipality to give information about the communists in his village.

> So I stayed there [PMKRI office in Malang] for a couple of days. Then I was summoned to Korem. There was the three of us, if I'm not mistaken. Wignyo, the one who is ill right now, was also summoned. Me, and Yusup. We were asked for information about this or that person, their location and what they look like. It was the villagers in here, and perhaps villagers of Lohdalem [another district in Malang regency]. Those who were summoned were Catholics, and the ones that the Korem indicated were also Catholic.

Jono's experience reflected the use of organizational connections that were utilized for the military operation (between the army and the PMKRI). The network was used by the military to obtain information on a specific area. Jono eventually did not give the names to the Korem officers. He stated that if he did, it would only give the army an opportunity to extract money from those alleged communists in exchange for their safety or freedom. Jono took a risky decision within a repressive situation at that time. The motives for this decision emerged when Jono continued his story:

> When I joined the meeting in Malang, Donomulyo looked very scary. Even when I returned to Donomulyo, I felt scared, because I heard from Malang about this and that. But for the villagers here, everything was normal and fine. But for those, who did not know the real condition in here, it was scary because the communists here were fierce, able to kill, etc. But there was never a communist movement that killed marhaenists

Samroni, travelled to different regencies in East Java not only to disseminate information from Jakarta, but also to gather reports of the situation in the regions and report them back to the center. Cosmas Batubara was supplied with a gun from Kodim Malang. Interview with FX Trikatmo, Malang municipality, 11 June 2016 # 07.45, 48.30

14 On 2 October 1965 in Jakarta, a meeting between the military, and young generation leaders of anti-communist parties established the Action Front to Crush the Thirty September Movement (KAP-Gestapu). Two of the prominent leaders of this front were Subchan Z.E of the NU and Harry Tjan Silalahi from the Catholic Party. Crouch 1988, 141.

> (a nationalist supporter) like me. Nobody was killed by the PKI. It was the other way around, like I mentioned before, a lot of the PKI were killed.[15]

Jono's account shows that while the narrative in Malang city was dominated by the official narrative of PKI as dangerous, the local narrative tells a different story, that the PKI did not resist, almost helpless, and that they were killed. It is highly possible that Jono's decision not to submit villagers' names to Korem in his previous account was because he did not believe that those names were communists, or if they were, they were not as dangerous as the army had depicted. Later on, Jono told me that his family members were politically diverse. While he was in PMKRI, his father was a PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party – Sukarno's political party), and few of his siblings were PKI, who also suffered during the military operation. Within this diverse political background in the family, the situation and decisions became more complex, and it would be difficult to remain loyal to the organization's agenda. It led Jono to be more critical of his patron (the army), enabling him to conclude that Donomulyo's communists were not creating any danger.

In areas such as Donomulyo, where infrastructure, mobility, and access to central politics are limited, information is highly dependent on local patrons. The roles of the army, religious leaders, and also village heads were crucial in 'rationalizing' the violence in Donomulyo. These elites established a connection between violence experienced at the local level and a movement that occurred in the capital, which later constituted the villagers' memory of the violence. On the other hand, it was important for clients to maintain the state's anti-communist narratives because they were benefitting from the elimination of leftists in the village, for example in maintaining their status, properties, or gaining benefits after supporting the violence. In contrast, people who were harmed by the violence remember the event in the opposite way from the state-constructed narrative. Patronage in memory-making will be more complicated when a person has a diverse background, either politically or socially, making them more critical towards these patrons such as in the case of Jono and Karsono.

Local Collaborators and Memory Work

The patronage network was not static. In some cases, the network became stronger in the post-violence situation in which villagers obtained concrete

15 Interview with Jono, 23 August 2016 #40.41-46.25

benefits from their coalition with the patrons. However, in other cases, where loyalties shifted for various reasons, patronage alliances could have become weaker. As a result, villagers who used to be clients of their patrons were also experiencing the same coercive treatment which was usually directed towards the leftists. In other words, villagers who used to be perpetrators or collaborators could also become victims, once their relationship with their patrons lost its solidity. Furthermore, this dynamic patronage alliance can be seen in the ways individual experiences were used to legitimize national violence, and through practices of distancing oneself from the violence.

Although I was not able to interview perpetrators of the violence, I managed to get in touch with a few of the local collaborators in the Banyujati area. Their collaborative acts ranged from guarding prisoners to assisting the army during house raids. The concept of collaboration itself emerged to include more dynamic relationships of actors in genocide that could not easily be categorized into victims and perpetrators. Anton Weiss-Wendt and Üğur Ümit Üngör describe acts of collaboration as collective actions where subordinate groups, resulting from structural inequality, assist the hegemonic power to destroy another group with the aim of improving the collaborator group's status.[16] Furthermore, Weiss-Wendt and Üngör also pointed out that collaborators usually participate without a centralized authority that orders the mass killings, rather there is an unspoken consensus within the minorities that resulted in their participation. Weiss-Wendt and Üngör's explanation of collaborators highlights the beneficial relationship between them and the hegemonic power, which in Donomulyo was reflected by the connection between villagers and their patrons.

Like many villages in Java, victims, collaborators, and perpetrators continued to live together in Donomulyo after the 1965-68 violence (see the illustration about Suparman and Marwono at the beginning of the introduction chapter). One of the collaborators that I met in the Banyujati area was Parjito, who assisted the army during house arrests in 1965 and 1968. Our first encounter occurred when I visited a monument in Donomulyo where Parjito served as the guard (*juru kunci*). Although my initial intention was to explore stories about the monument (more about the monument in chapter 4), I became interested in Parjito's own life history. He was born

16 Weiss-Wendt and Üngör 2011, 427. However, my research shows that collaborators do not always necessarily originate from subordinate groups. The case of the Nahdlatuls Ulama's Ansor shows how dominant groups can also collaborate with the hegemonic group (in this case the Indonesian army) when both of their agendas to eliminate the Left are in line. See chapter 2 and Leksana 2021.

in 1942 and spent most of his life in the Banyujati area. He currently lives with his daughter, son-in-law and two grandchildren; and works as a farmer, growing cassava and corn. His daughter also manages a small store (*warung*) in front of their house. Once in a while, Parjito also taps rubber from a small plantation just a few meters away from his home. He was assigned as the guard of the monument because of his close relationship with the police and army since the 1965-68 operation. He became a collaborator in the operation because he was already a member of the village civil defence (*pertahanan sipil/hansip* – usually responsible for village security) before the army entered Donomulyo.

I decided to explore further Parjito's experience in the violence, particularly during his involvement in military raids.

> I became the civil guard, so I followed the army. I already joined them in 65. I wore a uniform and I was proud. Bayonets [and] rifles were not allowed. Only the army was allowed to carry rifles. If they were tired, they told us to carry it for them. Even before there was the caretaker, I was already a civil guard. Back then it was called *Hanra* (*Pertahanan Rakyat*/People's Defense), and then *Pertahanan Sipil* (Civillian Defense)/ *Hansip*. I guarded every day. … I didn't go around the village, but every day I went to guard in the village meeting hall (*balai desa*). There was a post there. … The army embraced the civilian guards. When they came, they instantly approached us. They gathered every civilian guard in the afternoon, together with the *pamong*. We follow them when it was time for operations or for gatherings.

Civilian guards were automatically used by the army once they arrived in the village. They became close collaborators of the army, although they could not perform all duties, such as handling firearms, as Parjito explains. He also felt very proud to take part in the operation. When I asked why he participated, he explained clearly that "They [the communists] resisted, they were the enemy. For the state, they were the enemy of the government". As a collaborator, Parjito mirrors the official narrative that justified the violence against the left. He felt proud to be able to participate in an act to capture the enemies and save the nation, in his perception.

I was curious to know more about his specific role in the operation. Parjito described:

> I went with the soldiers to houses. Oh, it was fierce when we go to houses. We brought flashlights, in daylight. Even if there was nobody in the

> house, the door was forced open, and we searched with the flashlight. We searched inside, upstairs, it was very meticulous. I followed to people's houses every day. They usually did it during the day. … If someone was caught, we took them to the posts. For example, if the post was in my house, then when somebody was captured, they tied them like a prisoner. Handcuffs were not available at that time. Then they took them to the post and interrogated them, "Why did you become this or that?" … Back then, there was no limit to beating people. Not like nowadays, where violence is not allowed. The soldiers, they had no mercy. A lot of people confessed but they still beat them, though. My friends were gone because of that. … Not so many people gave themselves up [to the army]. Rather than giving up, they chose to hide until it was safe. I saw them [soldiers making mass graves]. I followed them everywhere. … I saw the process. I saw the victims sat. I saw the soldiers beating the detainees. It was the army who did it, not civilians. We were not allowed and we didn't have the right. It was their *special right* (italic emphasis by author), because it was a heavy issue, about the rebels.[17]

This was an intriguing conversation particularly because there are many confusing aspects, which Parjito stitched together to present it as a reasonable argument. First, he explained how the army was fierce and used physical force to search for communists, interrogate, and later detain them. Second, he stated that his friends also became victims of the army's operation. Third, Parjito seemed to distance himself from the violence by stressing that it was the army who did it. It was the army's 'special right' to kill, because the PKI affair was a serious issue to be dealt with. Parjito implies that not only the violent operation was justifiable, but also that his losses were inevitable. It was the consequence of such critical national interference. There was no statement of proudness in this case. In the first part of Parjito's statement, he implies the importance of civilians for the army. But when it comes to cases of mass killings, he draws a strict line by stating that the killings were the army's business. This is what I frequently encounter when talking to collaborators: on the one hand they emphasize the importance of the operation, but on the other hand, they distanced their involvement in the killings.

Parjito also told me a bit about his family's background. His father was a PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia/*Indonesian Nationalist Party*), and according to Parjito, this political affiliation saved his family from being victims in

17 Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 37.42-39.55; 47.15-56.59; 57.23-58.51

1965. However, some of his relatives were killed during the 1965 and 1968 operations because they were involved in the PKI. Remembering Jono's family's political diversity and his critical stance against the formal narrative (see previous section), I was very curious to know what Parjito thought about his family's experience and the state's depiction of the violence. I asked him how he felt about his losses.

> [It was] not only my friends, but also cousins, uncles. Around nine people, relatives from my parents: uncle, younger nephew. There were even two persons taken from one house, they were brothers. Yes, I joined [the soldiers who took them]. I didn't want to follow people who went hiding. [How did it feel?] Well, horrifying. But what can I do? I think I was also heartless. I told you before that I was stopped on my way home from the Quran recital (*ngaji*). They [members of Pemuda Rakyat/leftist Youth Movement] grabbed me on the sides, and put a knife. … They said, "Stop the recital. I'll kill you if you don't stop". They already grabbed me in the rice field. "If you want to kill me, then kill me. If you hurt me, I will kill you and your friends", I told them. Then they retreated. "If you don't believe me, just watch". They backed off [and said], "Okay then, go home". The next day, I went to my Quran recital, and they stopped me again. "Go away, I'm going for my recital. Mind your own business. Go away". And they left.[18]

While answering my question about his feelings of loss, Parjito slowly shifted the conversation to his experience of being threatened by people from *Pemuda Rakyat* (leftist youth organization affiliated with PKI). In this fragment, Parjito framed the intimidation as something that is more significant and important than his emotions or loss. The tendency to portray communists as anti-religious troublemakers dominated Parjito's story.

> All *pamong* of Banyujati were substituted with caretakers. … The village head was from ABRI. The *kamituwo* were also from ABRI, not to mention the Babinsa. If they didn't do it, it would be dangerous. The old *pamong* were dismissed from their positions, replaced by the army. They were not even involved. If they did not take this action, it would be hard. It could never be safe here. There would always be incidents; thievery or other things. The main purpose was [to create] commotion in the *kampongs*. … That was the act of people who disagreed with the government. Perhaps they were [PKI].[19]

18 Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 01.05.19-01.08.21

19 Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 21.42-24.58

As with Sardono's statement before, here Parjito portrayed the PKI as the source of the problems in the neighbourhood. In his view, the army ought to be part of the village apparatus in order to secure the village. It is only in such a way that villagers can live in harmony. Parjito's perspective on this matter follows exactly the military's reasoning for the Pancasila operation, which was to create peace and order.

Parjito's role after the 1965-68 operation may explain his reproduction of the state's narrative. He was appointed as the caretaker of a police monument that was erected in 1971 in the Banyujati area. Being proud of his position, he repeatedly emphasized his close relationship to one of the local police officers in Donomulyo who initiated the monument. He also showed me the decision letter for his appointment as the monument caretaker, which means that he also received a government payment for this task. For an ordinary villager to be appointed to such a position and to have a close relationship with the state authority was regarded as upward mobility. In the case of Parjito, this mobility was made possible by assisting the patrons in the violence and also afterwards, through a new assignment of preserving the symbol of the state (police monument) in the Banyujati area. Therefore, it is important for collaborators such as Parjito to support and recreate the anti-communist narrative by making his personal experience (being threatened for reciting the Quran) to fit in with the national narrative. Parjito's experience became an individual example of the national enemy, portraying them as troublemakers and traitors of the nation. Furthermore, I realise that Parjito's story, regardless of its truth, was a story that he *wanted* me to believe. The image of the PKI as evil was far more important to maintain, compared to his grief of losing family members and friends in the anti-communist operation. This illustrates 'orientation toward the good', as Steedly highlights in her research, where individuals build certain moral values into their narratives, creating a framework and interpretation of their actions.[20] For local collaborators, their moral values served to sustain the national importance of eliminating the dangerous communists.

However, the role of collaborators cannot be simplified into supporting the state's narrative alone. The post-violence situation could create changes in patronage relationships, which resulted in ambiguities in the position of collaborators. I acknowledged this through the experience of Suparman, my landlord (*bapak kost*) in Donomulyo, who previously introduced me to Marwono (see the introduction chapter). Born in 1945, Suparman

20 Steedly 2013, 56.

currently lives with his youngest grandson. He became a central person in my fieldwork, who introduced me to the area, the villagers, and their history. I stayed in his house and after a while I became accustomed to the mixed elements of Catholicism and Javanese culture. Sometimes I joined them for a Catholic community prayer in a neighbour's house and I became acquainted with Catholic members of this community. While observing his interaction with other villagers, I realised that he was well-known and highly respected amongst villagers for several reasons: his higher educational background, his former profession as a school teacher of Catholicism, and his previous political role in the Catholic Youth organization (PMKRI) in the 1960s. He came from the family of the village's first settlers, with a *modin* (village apparatus which arranges spiritual or religious matters) grandfather, and a father who introduced Catholicism in the district. Suparman inherited his grandfather's extensive knowledge of Javanese culture, which became his well-known expertise amongst villagers. People from areas in and outside Donomulyo would come to consult him about spiritual matters, from deciding a perfect day for weddings to spiritual problems (such as troubled spirits inside a house). During the Javanese New Year or 1 *Suro*, his house would be filled with *Keris* (Javanese traditional weapons) from various people who asked for a spiritual cleansing of their weapon. Suparman also works as a Master of Ceremony in Javanese weddings due to his great skill in reciting Javanese songs (*tembang*). Although he never sets a price for his services, people always give him a certain amount of money. This became his source of income besides his pension fund as a former Catholic school teacher.

Around 1955 or 1956, Suparman's father became one of the candidates for the village head. His rival was the PKI leader, Brahmantyo. His father received 515 votes, while Brahmantyo successfully received more than 900 votes. This, according to Suparman, was because the villagers were mainly PKI. After Suparman finished his elementary education, he continued his junior high school in a Catholic seminary. Around this time, his father died and he did not return to the seminary, but moved to a pedagogic academy (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru*/SPG) in Malang, based on a recommendation from a Catholic priest. This is where he became intensely involved in the PMKRI. In 1965, he was in Malang, participating in the anti-communist demonstrations:

> [In] 65 the G30S/PKI happened. The exam was postponed for 6 months. It was supposed to be in June, but they started in January. So I spent those empty months in politics, in Malang. My mother told me not to come home, but it was calm in Donomulyo, nothing happened. Malang was full of demonstrations. I went to Pasuruan, Surabaya. … Furniture

> was dragged outside; books were burned in the education office [of East Java]. For six months, it was only those activities.

Since early to mid-October 1965, these kinds of mass demonstrations were intense across the nation. In Surabaya, for example, a mass rally took place on 16 October 1965 at the Heroes Monument, which was organized by the East Java and Surabaya Action Committee to Crush Gestapu (*Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu*). This group, presumably a branch of the KAP Gestapu, claimed to have the backing of sixty-seven political and mass organizations.[21] Catholic communities were strongly involved in this group, such as in the case of Suparman. As the secretary of the Catholic Party branch in Donomulyo, he became one of the core activists in the anti-communist demonstration in Malang.

> When I returned, around junior high school, I was already the [Catholic] party's [branch] secretary. My name was only written, those who did the work were the other members. But because my name was written, then I learnt about politics. … I came home during the vacation and became active in the party's meetings. … Then from the city monument [in Malang], [we walk] to Ijen (main road in Malang) to ask for the Bishop's blessing. We demanded to disband the communists. All of us kneeled, and the Bishop blessed us. After that, there was no fear to join the demonstrations to Pasuruan, Surabaya, Bangil. I read [the declaration] to disband the communists. We read it in the square [in Malang municipality] and also in front of the Bishop. We were The Catholic Students Union (*Persatuan Pelajar Sekolah Katolik*/PPSK). … The Catholic Youth then gave birth to the Yellow Cross (*Salib Kuning*). During the 68 cleansing (the Trisula operation), the Yellow Cross was victorious. By chance, the commander of one of the Yellow Cross companies was me. I trained them in self-defence.[22]

Yellow Cross is an alias for the Catholic Command Force (*Pasukan Komando Katolik/Paskokat*), a security group that was established as guards for the church as a response to the 30 September Movement. The first members reached up to 150 people and were inaugurated in Jakarta by Mgr. A. Djajasepoetra, with the main task to guard the church, deliver aid to demonstrators and accompany the injured to hospital, if needed.[23]

21 Setiawan 2014, 209-211.

22 Interview with Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 37.46-40.12; 45.56-47.09

23 Djokopranoto, Lahur, and Soedjoed 2010, 307-308.

For the Catholic activists in Malang, Suparman emphasised the prohibition from the Bishop not to participate in the killings.

> For the Bishop, the main thing was that we didn't take part in the killings. For example, if there were people who were placed in trucks, we let them go and we didn't take part. We are not even sure if they were wrong. Sometimes they were just indirect supporters, but because one person accused them, they could be killed directly. It was not a secret anymore that the most frequent questions asked among Ansor leaders was "How many did you slaughter?". But after it was safe, around [19]71 [or] 1973 the leaders of Ansor became stressed. … They targeted people who were not directly involved [with the communist party], only accused, but then got slaughtered anyway. Most of these perpetrators are already dead.

Nevertheless, the Bishop's appeal was not entirely obeyed in the field. Former PMKRI activist in Malang, FX Trikatmo, told of his experience that Catholic activists were 'invited' by Kodim (district military office) Malang to 'send' prisoners. Sending usually meant killing, which commonly took place in Southern Semeru. Trikatmo himself followed a group of NU and witnessed them killing detainees in fish ponds around Pasuruan. During PMKRI's monitoring observation in other regencies such as Kediri, Trikatmo saw bodies along the road from Pujon district in Malang to Pare district in Kediri. In a big banyan tree, bodies had been hanged with the trees' tendrils, forming a display of terror.[24] However, during my interview with Trikatmo, he never explicitly stated that he also participated in the executions.[25]

Another obvious involvement of the Catholics in the 1965-66 operations was in the screening team of detainees. In the case of Semarang, Central Java, the late Vicaris General of the Archdiocese of Semarang, P. Carri, SJ, wrote letters in 6 November 1965 to forbid priests and religious members of the Archdiocese to join military actions to screen for membership of the Communist Party. However, in 6 January 1966, another letter was released to encourage lay people to support the military actions by taking part as members of the screening team with the prerequisite not to get involved in violent actions.[26] Although this was the case in Semarang, it is highly

24 Interview with FX. Trikatmo, Malang, 11 June 2016, #48.27-52.49

25 A more explicit case occurred in South Blitar. Vanessa Hearman pointed out the explicit involvement of Catholics in the 1965-66 killings. See Hearman 2018.

26 Subanar 2001, 239-240.

possible that similar structural instructions or appeals also occurred within the Archdiocese of Malang. For Suparman, the instruction not to participate in killings was an important element. This, as he implies, differentiated the Catholics from the Ansor who lived an unhappy life after slaughtering many villagers in the operation. I continue by asking how exactly the screening process was conducted. Suparman explains:

> I was already in Jogja in 68. I returned with KAMI, the Indonesian student group, who was appointed to assist with the screening [of prisoners]. … For example, the passengers of a whole truck were brought, not only once. … So [for example] in Mrs Mujanah's house, they got off one by one. They were asked, interrogated. For example, "Don't go with them". "No, I follow Aidit". So it's done. "Don't you feel pity for your relatives?". "No, it's fine. I will take the consequences by myself. Send my regards to my relatives". Then they got in again in the truck and were taken somewhere, I don't know. Those who obey the army were listed to *santiaji*. I think [the post in Mrs. Mujanah house] was the second screening. The third was in Sumberoto, on the border with Blitar. They were taken from the detention centre. They were captured and detained in Donomulyo or Pagak. There was a detention centre in the sub-Regency (*Kawedanan*). I don't know how they ate and where they took them from there. But I know several places where they were shot.[27]

The screening procedure was not very clear. Without guidelines, screening teams seemed to rely mainly on individual questions to confirm the detainee's political alliance. From Suparman's account, it is very likely that the team's decision depended mainly on the interrogator's opinion. In other words, screening team members such as Suparman had the ability to decide whether or not a person deserved to be killed. Although Suparman seems to differentiate himself from the brutal executors of Ansor, at the same time, he still participated in the process of sending villagers to the killing fields. He builds a self-consciousness that distances himself (the collaborator) from the perpetrators, without fully admitting that he also made the killings possible. It is also hard to believe that such a submissive act was expressed by the victim. A portrayal of 'ready to be killed' reduces the coercive image of perpetrators and their collaborators, and at the same time builds an image that perpetrators and victims have the same objective: to remove the communists.

27 Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 51.37-52.54, 54.58- 55.41

Nevertheless, the coalition of civilian collaborators with their military patrons changed in the post-violence situation. When Suparman finally returned to the Banyujati area in 1971, he tried to ease the tense situation by reviving the traditional Javanese theatre performance group (*Ketoprak*). In this post-violence period, as I discussed in chapter 2, the military had installed intense surveillance on rural life, which included cultural activities in the village.

> I put forward the cultural approach [when I returned]. Why? So I could reach out to [people with] other religions, [and] because the cultural approach was easier. In our first performance, Pak Wahid [and] Mustaji argued with the Babinsa. "Take it (the costumes) off. Do not perform", [said the Babinsa] but I had already prepared the actors. It was during a person's wedding. We were devastated, but we couldn't argue. I still continued the play, but I eliminated their roles. I shortened the play.

The argument with Babinsa happened because two of the players, Wahid and Mustaji, were *santiaji* (a propaganda programme for accused Leftists, where they had to report weekly to the local military office), who were accused of being former BTI members. As the director of the play, Suparman was responsible for the players.

> So I was fetched the next day, with a bicycle to Koramil. I had to be responsible for the play where the actors were *santiaji*. We reached an agreement, although through a hard way. They said, "So whose side will you follow: The Catholic Party or Golkar?". "Golkar" [I said]. So that's it, I just wanted to be safe. After we talked, they said, "Hold the microphone". They took me for a motorcycle ride where I had to shout "Come, join Golkar!", along this road. … I knew one victim, Pak Handi who was beaten in Koramil. Why? Because he remained in the Catholic Party.

The treatment of Suparman shows how patron-client relationships in the New Order period were not static. Once the patrons saw signs that their clients were not in line with their agendas, they acted coercively towards them, sometimes in similar ways as they did towards the left. In order to maintain the client's benefits from the patronage network, they needed to prove their loyalty to the patron again. In the case of Suparman, this meant aligning his Ketoprak group with the demands of the patrons. Moreover, he became a vote-gatherer for the New Order's political party,

Golkar, ensuring that the newly established regime had a supporting mass in rural areas.

The patronage network was realigned once both parties were assured that they benefited from the same agenda. This was reflected in Suparman's description of his Ketoprak performance after the warning from the local military officer:

> Not long after I became a Golkar, [the Babinsa said] "All right, you can play. The important thing is that you should arrange it very carefully. The main characters should not be the santiaji". That was after Pak Mustaji and Pak Wahid were dismissed. I know it hurt them very badly. Pak Mustaji cried in front of me. "What am I supposed to do?". We still have 3 performances to go. … I met with the assigned Babinsa. He was placed in Karangrejo. His name was Pak Dandi. … I said, "So if you have to report to your superior, tell him that I will still continue the Ketoprak. They had already summoned me [to the Koramil]. You should be there during our [*Ketoprak*] practice [and] also during our meetings". So he attended [the meeting]. In the end, every time we performed, I took him in his army uniform, to guard. I bought him cigarettes and snacks, and he was happy. …I gave the opening speech [at the *Ketoprak* performance] and announced the message from the government. [For example] There is a message: "there will be a public meeting tomorrow", announcements from the government. It was usually announced during the opening speech or through the comedian [in the performance]. It always had to be inserted. Because, if we obeyed and stayed loyal, they gave us the freedom to perform. I had a *sinden* (singer of Javanese songs) who was involved (a victim of the 1965 violence), but she was allowed to perform eventually. At first she was not allowed because she was part of Lekra. They kept an eye on us until [19]78.[28]

In the end, the Ketoprak group managed to continue their performances. In return, they had to be a funnel for New Order programmes, and become representatives of Golkar in their community. Both the patrons and the clients regained their advantages in the network. This was the prerequisite for the existence of cultural groups in rural societies in the early years of the New Order. None of them was able to maintain a critical stance and function against authorities as they did before in the 1950s-60s.

28 Conversation with Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 07.09-11.38; 12.35-12.55; 13.49-14.37; 14.59-16.48

These cases of local collaborators show the dynamic patronage relationships. Although established through coalitions in the 1965-66 and 1968 violence, their relationships did not always continue to exist in similar conditions after the violence. Collaborators were used to support and guard the establishment of the new regime, and in return, they gained security to continue their activities in the village (such as Suparman's ketoprak group), or were rewarded with certain positions in society (such as Parjito, who became a monument caretaker). It was important for collaborators to support the official narratives of violence that were spread by the patrons, because collaborators benefited from these patronage relationships. Maintaining such relationships and their narratives came at the expense of suppressing their own losses. On the other hand, participating in the killings may have triggered a sense of guilt that could not easily be articulated, because its expression could be regarded as a form of disloyalty to the patrons' past role in the violence. As a result, collaborators distanced themselves from participation in the killings, which reflects their attempts to reconcile their collaboration in violence and loyalty to their patrons on the one hand, with their personal losses on the other.

From these cases of local collaborators, it is more fruitful to understand actors in mass violence as a dynamic process rather than identifying them into categories of perpetrators or victims. Moving beyond categorization, examining perpetrators, victims, and collaborators as a process will enable us to understand why such a role emerges and transforms, and when a specific role is performed, distanced, or denied in the process of remembering. Dwyer & Santikarma's work on Bali in 1965 pointed to the blur and overlap of categories of perpetrators and victims, because the violence in Bali was entangled in local kinship and relationships. Therefore, different roles in violence were not established instantly when the violence erupted, but were attached to their social backgrounds in a specific society and utilized by the military to eliminate the left. In Bali, those who were victimized by seeing their family members killed eventually participated in violent acts themselves.[29] As studies of bystanders during the Holocaust also point out, the category of bystanders should be seen as a "specific and inherently dynamic subject position that arises in the genocidal process". The term bystander and even perpetrator or victim should not be considered as a reference to a particular group, but as a process.[30]

29 Dwyer and Santikarma 2006, 200.

30 Victoria Barnett as quoted in Ensel and Gans 2018, 112.

Post-Violence Rural Development

Another element that influenced the process of remembering the 1965 violence can be seen when we examine the post-violence context. In chapter 1, I described the massive transformation in the village in the early years of the New Order. Political activities were confined to one political party, Golkar, that supported the new regime. All village heads were replaced with military men, who were commonly known as caretakers. The same also happened in the cultural sphere, where traditional theatrical performances were heavily monitored and had to be in line with the New Order national agendas. Furthermore, the major transformation in the post-1965 period at villages was the changes in agrarian policy. Under the capitalistic orientation, New Order's agriculture programmes such as the Green Revolution and BIMAS (Bimbingan Masyarakat or Mass Guidance) farming credit brought more problems to rural areas. In Donomulyo, it increased inequality in the village because most of these programmes only benefited middle-class farmers, were not accessible to local peasants, and distribution relied heavily on the local patronage network. The question of 'who gets what' after the violence lingered in the minds of Donomulyo villagers and influenced their memories of violence. This shows that memory formation is an ongoing historical process, which is not instantly complete once the defining event occurs. Memory is shaped by years of subsequent experiences and interpretations after the 1965-68 violence.

I started to give close attention to this matter of post-violence transformation when I encountered stories of a central figure in Donomulyo during the early New Order period. I became interested in this figure because villagers, who either benefited from or were harmed by the violence, frequently stressed his central role in Donomulyo's infrastructure development. His name was Ario Dursam, a caretaker village head who won the village election (presumably in a pseudo-democratic election) in 1973 against his predecessor, Susanto, who was also an army officer, assigned directly to Donomulyo after 1965 to replace the PKI village head who had disappeared. Before being stationed in Donomulyo, Dursam was assigned in Kalimantan and West Java. In the latter province, Dursam was involved in a battle with Darul Islam and injured his leg. Later, he was assigned to East Java and served in the Subdistrict Military command (Koramil) in Ngajum, another district in Malang, 25 km from the regency capital of Kepanjen. Around 1968, he was transferred to *Koramil* in Donomulyo. He sold all his properties in Ngajum and used the money

to buy land in Donomulyo, taking his wife and four children to settle in the new district. Through his appointment in Koramil, he initially became the *Babinsa* (village security apparatus) in the Banyujati area and later, he became one of the *kamituwo* (local leaders) under Susanto's leadership.

Dursam died in 1992, but I was able to talk to his son, Hadiman, who is still living in Banyujati. He was born in 1958 in Ngajum, and moved with his parents to the Banyujati area, Donomulyo, in 1968. He recalled the decrease in their standard of life in Donomulyo, because in his childhood eyes, "rice was very scarce in Donomulyo while it was very abundant in Ngajum". After finishing his middle school in Donomulyo, Hadiman worked as a farmer, tilling his inherited land. Around 2000, together with another villager, he initiated a local NGO to deal with environmental issues in their village, which only lasted for several years. Both Suparman and Hadiman ran as village head candidates in 1998 but lost to Sulaiman Chodir, who became the village headman until 2006.

In one of our conversations, I asked Hadiman about the start of his father's career as one of the kamituwo or village authorities. He explained that although the village head was elected by villagers, *kamituwo* was appointed by the village head and district leader (*camat*). The main consideration in this appointment was whether or not *kamituwo* could cooperate with the village head. This top-down nature of their election also suggests that *kamituwo* are more likely to put forward the agenda of village heads (and other leaders above him, such as the district officer), rather than villagers themselves. During the New Order, *kamituwo* was an extended part of the army's grip on the village and became the vanguard to establish New Order's policies. This was Dursam's initial position before he was elected as Banyujati's village head.

According to Hadiman, when his father became village head during the 1970s, he gave special attention to programmes for the village youth, especially sports. Dursam himself was a sports lover and joined many sport clubs in the surrounding area, such as volleyball, football, and martial arts. His preference for sports led him to provide villagers with facilities, such as attempting to provide a football field in every hamlet, and organized football tournaments. Sometimes, Dursam even provided transportation by borrowing trucks from the air force or marines, so that all villagers could watch football tournaments in different districts. He also facilitated cultural activities, by creating *Ludruk Karya Bakti* (*ludruk* is a traditional East Java theatre performance. This is different from *Ketorprak*, which originated from Central Java and is closely related to wayang stories). It

was very popular, but it was also expensive to ask the group to perform, according to Hadiman.[31]

Besides a man of sports and culture, Dursam was also well-known for his initiative in coordinating infrastructure development in the village. Before his leadership, roads in Banyujati were made of dirt. Dursam then organized villagers to do collective work (*kerja bakti*), gathering stones and putting them on the dirt road, making it a semi-solid one so it would be easier for vehicles to use this road.[32] Obviously, collective work during the New Order and under a military caretaker village head was not fully voluntary. Hadiman noted that this kind of collective work was *instructed* by village authorities. This was a typical situation during the New Order – that authorities would exert their power even for something that was considered a 'communal' effort. However, according to Hadiman, although such coercive instruction existed, his father was still considered to be a good leader and preferred by villagers. Towards the end of our conversation, Hadiman compared his father's leadership with the previous village headman, Susanto. "Before 1975", Hadiman said, "they [village leaders] were militaristic. They gave orders. Perhaps that was what people didn't like. Pak Susanto used to carry guns everywhere. Second, Pak Susanto was appointed as a village head caretaker".[33] The word 'appointed' was what differentiated Dursam from Susanto. While the former was elected by the villagers, the latter was appointed as the caretaker. When describing his father's life, Hadiman seems to present an image of a responsible leader, who was elected by the people and facilitated people's aspirations. As we will see later, rather than representing a democratic and ideological leader, Dursam actually resembled an authoritative and pragmatic figure of the New Order.

Apart from Ario Dursam's contribution to sports, culture, and infrastructure development, Hadiman pointed to another characteristic of his father that is interesting. Hadiman started to mention his father's vicious character.

> Probably that was why people were interested, according to me, although my father was vicious. … If it's wrong, then it's wrong. For example, if people gambled, he would take the people to the police station. … This is my analysis today. Back then, Kamituwo and the village head were monitoring their territory 24 hours a day. If there was a burglary, my father would do his very best to find the burglar. He worked with the

31 Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 #11.20-16.58, 22.38-22.58, 29.27-30.51, 41.23-42.35

32 Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 # 02.44-09.23

33 Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 # 41.23-42.35

> police. To find the burglar, he sold my mother's necklace, or our goat. We had goats, but a goat was sold and the money was used to cover the cost to find the burglar. For example, if they knew the stolen property was taken to Pucung, he would go there using his own money.

Hadiman portrayed his father as a forceful person against illicit acts and willing to use his own funds to solve criminal cases. From Hadiman's description, I had the impression that Dursam's leadership character was full of commitment, intense attention to youth and cultural activities, forceful and authoritative. However, keeping in mind that Dursam's period of appointment was during the New Order, his leadership reflected how the regime actually initiated development through coercive means. Furthermore, the commitment to resolve criminal cases or illegal activities may not only stem from the motive to protect the village, but also to ensure stability and order, as the prerequisite for New Order policy implementation. Indications of instability in a certain area could put a person's career at risk, which Dursam was definitely seeking to avoid.

I also encountered a similar impression of Ario Dursam when I talked to Aji Marlan, who worked as a village secretary (*carik*) in 1975-1996, during Dursam's leadership. Aji was a son of a Haji in Banyujati, who later became the treasurer of the Ansor (the NU youth wing) sub-branch in Donomulyo prior to 1965. In the 1968 Trisula operation, he was involved in capturing remaining leftists in Donomulyo (see chapter 2). Marlan's position in Ansor and his role during the anti-communist operation made it possible for him to be appointed as a village secretary – an illustration of the benefits resulting from the patronage network after the 1965-68 violence. When I explained that I would like to know more about Ario Dursam, who replaced Brahmantyo, the PKI village head who was killed, Marlan instantly corrected my statement. He said, "Not killed, but disappeared" – a simple statement that diminishes aggressive acts against the leftist village head. His statement reflected the common state narrative about 1965 violence, which minimized the role of the state apparatus.

Aji Marlan started as an informal assistant during Susanto's leadership and was officially appointed as the village secretary under Dursam for two consecutive periods. When I asked Aji about Dursam's character, he portrayed Dursam as a vicious figure.

> It [Dursam's leadership] was good. If it was not, then I would not have stayed that long. The way he leads: if it's not right, he will be angry. He was harsh. Back then, it was not like today. Apparatus had to struggle, not

> like today where there is a lot of money from above (central government). In the old days, village heads acted like the colonizer. … but village heads were prestigious. If someone was wrong, he or she would be scolded. People were frightened, because it reflected colonisers. But the relationship was good with the people. He was elected, so he must have been good. The village was further developed during his period. … I liked Pak Ario Dursam the most, because I was his man. He built the village meeting hall (*balai desa*). The offices surrounding it were also Pak Ario Dursam's [initiative].[34]

This conversation with Aji Marlan depicted how he was actually trying to make Dursam's negative character sound justifiable. First, he explained that Dursam was harsh and could easily get angry. Then Aji Marlan stressed that this was understandable, because during the New Order, the challenges and workload of the village head were very different compared to the current situation. In Marlan's example, these days the local authorities have abundant funds from the regency and central government, which was not the case during the New Order. I assume this was not because there were less funds during the New Order period, but because the structural administrative hierarchy was also filled with informal connections of patronage between villages and their district or regency officials to access such funds. While at present, policies and budgets for village development are regulated clearly in the Village Law (*Undang-undang Desa*). Second, Marlan described Dursam's character as harsh and feared by the people. But Marlan continued by saying that people still voted for Dursam despite his character, because he brought infrastructure development to the village. He then compared Dursam's leadership to the former colonial authority, where viciousness was legitimized in the drive for modernization. Keeping in mind the military's domination of the village, it is hard to believe that the election process was free from coercion. Overall, Aji Marlan's description of Ario Dursam was full of legitimation of his negative behaviour towards the people, presenting loyalty to the authorities. I received a similar impression when collaborators of violence explained the 1965-66 operation in Donomulyo.

The image of Ario Dursam as the motor of Donomulyo's development soon shifted into a different perspective once I heard the story from Marwono, a simple farmer. Compared to most of the villagers' houses that I had visited, his was very plain with no decorations on the table and walls. Their living room furniture only consisted of old wooden chairs and a table. A small

34 Interview with Mr and Mrs Aji Marlan, 31 August 2016 #01.08.33-01.11.32, 01.15.10-01.17.04

television was located in the family room with a small bed in front of it to lie down while watching their favourite channels. He had six children with his wife, who still lives with him. All of them already have their own families and only two of them still live in Donomulyo. Although Marwono's identity card stated his year of birth as 1940, he is certain that he was born earlier, perhaps in 1936 or 1937. His age has led to several health problems which has made it difficult for him to work on his own land. Nevertheless, with the help of his wife, he still tries to plant timber (*kayu sengon*), cassava, a few cacao trees, and tend their livestock.

Marwono had a rough past. Living in poverty during his childhood (see chapter 1), he and his father-in-law were accused of being BTI members. The head of the village neighbourhood (*ketua RT*) arrived at his house one day in 1968, and told him to go to Koramil Donomulyo. Since then, he had to undergo *santiaji*, where he was obliged to report once a week at the same time for around two years, and listen to lectures given by the military officers at the office. Despite this treatment, Marwono still considers himself fortunate compared to other villagers, because his friends who were leaders of the BTI were summoned and never returned. Their property was confiscated, including their land and houses. "They (the authorities) will collect whatever they want. If necessary, even the wives will be taken. … *Babinsa* (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring official) came to the village. Nobody could resist", said Marwono. Compared to the previous description by Aji Marlan and Hadiman where they made the impression that village officials were crucial in village development, Marwono presented a different picture. For him, these officials were actually destroying villagers' lives.

Marwono's father-in-law also lost his land. He stated, "It was confiscated because he was accused of being a BTI. It was only one reason, a member of the BTI is PKI". This act of confiscating land was implemented under the same 1960 Agrarian Law. However, the aim of the law was twisted. Instead of distributing it to peasants, land was used for individual gain. When Marwono explained these practices of land confiscation, the name of Ario Dursam appeared.

> Ah, there was this committee, formed in the village. The village head was Ario Dursam, who is already dead. [They included] members of village head, the village apparatus, … and the *pamong*. [How about the Koramil?] Although they did not participate, they received some amount. It would have been impossible without their support. So the committee said to me, "You have this much land, [it should be] reduced to this". They took more or less 18 aré, which is 1800 square meter. It was 66 aré before.

> We bought it with three cows. My mother and father bought the land that was confiscated. [What about the documents?] We didn't have the certificate yet, only the Letter of Land Tax Payment (*Surat Pembayaran Pajak Tanah*/SPPT). I had the letter for each year's payment. When they confiscated, they changed it, arranged by the village head. They changed the letter because the village head had the power. Then the land was sold by the committee.[35]

Here, Dursam was a very different figure. He was not the figure of development, as some villagers mentioned before, but an extortionist. Dursam used his position as a local patron, and the labelling of villagers as communists, to confiscate their properties. Marwono's story reflects a transforming village under the New Order, where patronage alliances between the military and the village apparatus became stronger. But at the same time, this was executed under exploitation and extortion practices against villagers who were accused as communists.

Land was not the only element that the authorities took advantage of. Farmer's credit, such as BIMAS, also developed as a breeding ground for corruption by village authorities. Initially, according to Aji Marlan, the former village secretary, BIMAS seems to benefit the villagers. From his observation, around 50-60% of the villagers participated in the programme. It involved a series of seminars or meetings about farming techniques, new varieties of rice seeds, and the use of fertilizers. These seminars were organized by the Agricultural Department, and also attended by the district chief, police, and Koramil. For famers who participated in this programme, using new types of rice seeds with a shorter harvesting period (such as the famous PB or IR), rice production increased threefold.[36] Nevertheless, Marlan's observation actually only pertains to a particular group of farmers. As research in the Pagelaran district shows, BIMAS was only accessible to middle- or upper-class farmers, because they tended to have larger plots of land and capital to access farming credit, compared to lower-class farmers.[37]

This discrepancy with regard to credit access resonated with Marwono's experience. He described how the village apparatus actually used their position for corruption and to gain advantage from the credit programme.

35 Interview with Marwono, 16 September 2016# 01.12.13-01.22.32. Conversation with Rimando and his wife, another farmer who was accused of being a BTI in Donomulyo, also confirmed that land confiscation after 1965 only started during the period of Ario Dursam.

36 Interview with Aji Marlan, 15 May 2017# 00.16-10-22

37 Kano 1990, 120-21.

> It (BIMAS) existed, but I didn't join. BIMAS, as far as I knew, was assistance for the people. They gave credit in the form of seeds. Farmers were given seeds by the government. (Marwono whispers) But it was controlled by a group of people, those in power, the *pamong* (village authorities). So if there was a credit, the money was gone. People didn't know. The programme existed, but we never received the money. I heard from the *pamong*, but they did not say anything about money. BIMAS was like this, there were seeds, but they never told us there was money. They gathered us in the village meeting hall for a lecture by the *pamong* and district leaders. … Pamong were rich. I had one friend who became a *pamong* back then, until now he is still rich. Because of that [BIMAS], but it was not our money, it was the government's. Although they said it was for the people, but it was only for a group of people.[38]

Pamong, or village apparatus, controlled the distribution of BIMAS by selecting and listing potential beneficiaries.[39] Those who received the credit were more likely to be the people who were close to this group of patrons. This clientelist relationship lasted until the present, in the practices of the KUT (*Kredit Usaha Tani* – farming credit) distribution. To access the credit grant from the regional budget, village officials collected copies of the villagers' identity cards, because the number of eligible villagers would influence the amount of funding granted from the budget. After receiving the funds, village officials would embezzle it, instead of distributing it to the villagers who had handed in copies of their identity cards.[40]

The story of Ario Dursam and the village authorities reflected two interesting yet conflicting aspects. First, it showed the circle of patrons, consisting of village heads and their apparatus, and army men; they controlled most of the rural development projects after the 1965 violence. The question of 'who gets what' after the violence, also affected how villagers perceived the violence. 1965 can be seen as a point where a village that had once fallen behind, was transformed into a modern and developed one. Its progress lay in the success of the village headman in endorsing such development. Second, this progress that Donomulyo experienced was achieved at the expense of a specific group consisting of peasants who were accused as BTI. Ario Dursam is not just a story of multi-faceted leadership in a village, but a reflection of how a memory framework is established. For people who

38 Interview with Marwono, 16 May 2017#07.33-12.04

39 Interview with Suparman, 19 July 2017#15.20-20.15

40 Conversation with Burhan, 12 July 2017.

were involved in the violence or were representatives of the state in the New Order period, individual and communal gains in the post-violence New Order developed into a memory of progress and village improvement. On the contrary, for villagers who experienced losses during and after the violence, the early years of the New Order were not about development, but a memory of marginalization and extortion. This shows that memories of 1965 are not only influenced by structural memory projects at the national level, but are also deeply embedded in the rural transformation which followed the violence.

Navigating Silence

Some scholars believe that the national anti-communist memory project repressed narratives of violence, and turned them into 'silenced memory'. The New Order is considered successful in creating the 'wholesale destruction of the memories of 1965-1966, especially because the stigma and fear are still alive and strong in relation to the incidents of 1965-1966'.[41] I agree that fear and stigma against the communists are still present in Indonesia today. However, it should not be seen merely as a passive reaction to repression which resulted in silenced memory. In other words, being stigmatized and silenced does not automatically result in diminishing memories. Zooming in to everyday lives in rural areas such as Donomulyo, silence can be interpreted differently. It also became a navigating device to continue living within a community, between different actors of violence, decades after the violence took place.

Marwono brought me to this conclusion. Our first encounter was made possible through Suparman, one of the prominent local leaders that I described in the previous section in this chapter. Suparman presented Marwono as one of the ex-*santiaji*, as "Our brother who became a *victim of history*" (*Saudara kita yang menjadi korban sejarah*). *Victim of history* is a common phrase often used to suggest that some victims of the anti-communist purge were falsely accused and that they had nothing to do with the left. But, as we shall see below, the portrayal of a victim of history as someone who did not have any knowledge or support for the left is not necessarily always the case.

In our first meeting, Suparman played a perfect role as a mediator between me and Marwono. In a very simple way, he gave a brief explanation of my

41 Marching 2017, 33.

background, my research and my purpose in the village. After that, he let me introduce myself to Marwono. I wanted to change the atmosphere to be more informal, so I started to talk about everyday things, such as family, church, and so on. The conversation flowed, but in this first meeting, I did not ask anything yet about the 1965-1968 violence.

As I continued visiting Marwono on my own, we became close friends. Apart from Suparman's term of victim of history, I sensed that Marwono knew more about the left in Donomulyo. But every time I asked something about the BTI before the 1965 violence, he always said that he did not know much about it. This statement was usually followed by questions regarding my research. At first, I thought my explanation was not clear enough or too academic, so I repeated my purpose in a simpler way. I also stressed the confidentiality aspect in my research because I thought Marwono was too afraid to talk. However, after several visits, I realised that Marwono was not confused, but he was trying to convince himself that I could be trusted.

As our relationship grew closer, and on a mission to find out more from Marwono, on our third meeting, I began to speak openly about my thoughts on the 1965-66 violence. I told him that I thought the violence was a form of state violence which caused injustice for the victims. I also expressed my fascination of the leftist movement in the context of anti-colonialism in Indonesia's post-independence era and that I regretted its exclusion from Indonesia's historiography. As a student during the New Order, I was one of the younger generation who wanted to know more about this particular history, and that I considered Marwono as a source of this history. That meeting reached into another level of the relationship, where Marwono started to realise that we were on the 'same side' of history. In the conversation, he told me that although he was not a member of the BTI, he knew about caderization courses that took place in Donomulyo. He also read a book about agrarian reform which he borrowed from his BTI friend. He continued to share his involvement in the measurement of land in the Banyujati area, for the purpose of land distribution before the 1965 violence happened. It did not proceed because the PKI village head, Brahmantyo, had already been detained and killed. He then continued to express his admiration for Brahmantyo, even placing him in contrast with Ario Dursam, the army village head who took over in 1968. We were talking about this particular experience, when a car parked in front of Marwono's house and he suddenly became silent (see introduction chapter). The situation was very different when he told the story of mass killings in the village. He was very open, and was not hesitant to talk about this horrifying period. For Marwono, it is not the killings that were kept hidden, but his admiration

and support for the leftist movement in Donomulyo. This latter part is not in line with the 'working consensus', to use Erving Goffman's term, of a *victim of history* – a portrayal that places Marwono as an individual who has nothing to do with the left. The working consensus refers to the informal agreement in everyday interaction, where individuals usually suppress their own feelings or thoughts to deliver an impression or situation that is viewed as acceptable by others.[42] Silence is a way to maintain oneself within this consensus.

Even when my life history interview with Marwono was mostly finished, I still visited him for a friendly meeting. One week after his story about the BTI activities, we were talking about trifling things related to our families and the current national situation. During this conversation, he suddenly asked, "Did you tell my stories to Suparman?". I was quite surprised, because we were not even talking about Suparman at that time. I only replied, "Not all of them". After a few minutes of silence, I asked him why he asked such a question, but he did not answer and only smiled. I continued by saying, "I understand who Suparman is and his position in 1965-68". Suparman, as a Catholic Youth activist at that time, participated in the anti-communist demonstration in 1965-66 and became a member of a screening team for PKI prisoners in 1968. Marwono said, "Ah, that's it (*Nah, itu dia*)", and laughed. It was more than enough for me to understand his complex relationship with Suparman. Both of them stood in very different positions in the past. Suparman, a devoted Catholic and activist in 1960s, was surely anti-communist. Meanwhile, Marwono, an *abangan* who became Catholic after 1968, was supportive of the movement of the BTI and PKI in the 1960s. Today, Suparman is a highly respected cultural and religious leader, while Marwono is an ordinary farmer with no such status in society. For Suparman (and perhaps other villagers), Marwono was only a victim of history. But this victim, apparently, was also a Leftist supporter. He kept silent about this particular aspect, realising who Suparman was and their contrasting roles during and after the violence.

On a different occasion, I accidentally became involved in a conversation about Suparman with Jarso, another Banyujati villagers that Suparman introduced. He was an army officer, who was detained in Malang's Lowokwaru prison for seven years because his battalion and commander were accused of being involved in the 30 September Movement. After his release, he returned to his parents' house in Banyujati area and rebuilt his life. Together with his wife, they owned a grocery store on the main road

42 Goffman 1959, 9.

of Banyujati. In one of my visits, I specifically asked about Suparman's position after the violence.

> It is hard to find out his [Suparman's] exact position. Which side is he on? Sometimes he follows that side, or this side. … When I first return to this village, I heard that he participated in the [anti-communist] movement. But I didn't ask directly, "How was [19]65?". Suparman was still young at that time, and we never talked openly. … if we see his life at that time, most of his friends are actually the *santiaji*. Suparman was also involved in *Ketoprak, Reog*, and there were many *santiaji* in that group. I do not dare talk about it, but I know his position. … We should be careful. I don't want to blame the past, because that is how history is.[43]

Jarso understands very well that Suparman was basically anti-communist, but he also acknowledges that Suparman had many friends that were later accused of being BTI. As I mentioned in the earlier section, Suparman was highly involved in reviving traditional cultural groups where most of its members were *santiaji*. This complex position of Suparman made Jarso keep some distance from him. He remained silent about Suparman's contrasting role in the village, not due to fear of repression, but because he realised that in order to move forward, some things should remain hidden.

These silences reflect the strategies of different individuals within society to be able to keep living together with others who had different positions in the violence. Silence is a negotiation between past and present, between the individual and the communal, and not necessarily a direct result of repression from the state. People who experienced violence, consciously select narratives that they want to express or hide. In other words, being silent is in the first place an active process of reconciling the past, and not exclusively a passive act caused by fear or structural stigmatization. Silence should be seen not as an absence, but a co-presence of memory of violence in everyday life.[44] I will elaborate more about this act of silence in chapter 5.

Conclusion

The case study in Donomulyo has shown that memory of the 1965-66 and 1968 violence is not automatically shaped by the national anti-communist

43 Interview with Jarso, 13 Mei 2017 # 20.13-23.41

44 Kidron 2009, 16.

memory projects (such as museums, books, films about the 30 September Movement) or state repression, but is embedded in social relationships in a particular locality. Throughout this chapter, I have pointed to two main features of the memory culture of the 1965-66 violence. First, memory of violence is also embedded within the context of the salient rural patronage network. Patrons and clients who benefited from the violence maintain the anti-communist narratives (i.e. PKI as traitors to the nation) to provide legitimate grounds for their violent operations and support for the establishment of the New Order. This can be seen in cases of local collaborators, where their personal experiences were performatively extrapolated to fit in with the national narrative, sometimes at the expense of marginalizing their personal losses. At the same time, collaborators also distanced themselves from the act of killing, by differentiating themselves from the army or Muslim groups who directly executed the left. This was a way of reconciling their past guilt with the need to sustain the official narrative. Meanwhile, for other villagers who were harmed by the violence, they remember the event as a turning point of continuous exploitation by authorities. Memories of violence were not constructed by the violent event per se, but also by the post-violence situation that occurred afterwards. The question of 'who gets what' after the violence became an important element in memories of 1965. Moreover, relationships between clients and their patrons are not always static. They can change once the clients do not comply anymore with their patron's demands, as shown in the case of Suparman; the local collaborator who included victims of the 1965 violence in his cultural performance group.

The second feature of memory culture of the 1965-66 and 1968 violence is their function as a survival strategy. In a rural context such as Donomulyo, villagers who were on opposite sides before and during the violence (as perpetrators and victims) needed to continue their lives in the same space, under post-violence rapid changes to agrarian policies. Therefore, the process of remembering (and forgetting) the violence was part of their effort to be able to continue living together in their community after the violence. Memory, in this case, becomes a strategic performance and representation to reconcile the past and present. In some cases, it also becomes a way to conform to a certain identity, or certain aspects of identity that seem acceptable; for example, maintaining the reputation of a victim of history – someone who had no connection at all with the left. By comprehending memory as a strategy, we can understand that silence is not exclusively a passive reaction to state repression, but also an active mechanism of agents to navigate through post-violence situations.

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4 Memory Landscapes

Abstract
This chapter presents the sites of memory in Donomulyo. Different narratives are expressed through various kind of sites, from state-initiated monuments to mass graves, lying in the same space where communities continued their lives after the violence. Although related to a particular violent event in Donomulyo, the meaning of this violence may be interpreted differently amongst the villagers. This creates complex memory landscapes of violence in the area. To examine this complexity, I look into the interaction between places, people, and their memory of violence. In doing so, this chapter will show that sites of memory in this case are not only objects of the past, but also became a negotiation between past, present, and future.

Keywords: sites of memory, memory politics, anti-communist violence, memory landscape, family narratives

Memories of violence tend to persist and never diminish even under the state's repressive acts because they are continuously (re)interpreted, recalled, and even transformed. In these following chapters, we will see the ways in which those memories have survived through changing political spheres and regimes, mainly through sites of memories and family narratives. During my stay in Donomulyo, I realised that stories of the 1965-68 violence were not only about people, but also about places. These places, which have different characteristics, will be discussed thoroughly in this chapter. Some of them were created by the state and thus resemble much of the official narrative. Meanwhile, others have strong family stories attached to them and cannot be easily recognised publicly. Some of the sites of memory in Donomulyo are still maintained and used, others have changed their function, while the rest are practically abandoned. However, all of these places carry different meanings for the villagers that reflect how the past is represented today.

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The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the interaction between places, people, and their memory of violence.

I consider these places as sites of memory, or *lieux de mémoire,* a concept that Pierre Nora introduced as sites where memory is crystallised, and a residual sense of continuity with the past remains.[1] He also proposed two main characteristics of *lieux de mémoire* that distinguish them from other historical objects. First is the willingness or intent to remember, which reflects the interplay between memory and history. This implies that sites of memory are created, either authoritatively or collectively, and their meaning can be constructed. Second, Nora also stresses the fluidity of *lieux de mémoire*. They mix and combine many factors such as life and death, and most importantly, "they only exist because of their capacity for metamorphosis, and endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications".[2] I would like to take Nora's concept further, especially on his idea of intent in *lieux de mémoire*, because this is where the power of memory politics lies. Who has the intent to remember and what kind of past do they intend to remember, are the main questions.

In this chapter, I elaborate on Nora's concept to analyze the sites of memory in Donomulyo. The main feature of the 1965 case is its different layers of history that influence Indonesia's collective memory. Sites of memory, then, are a field of a contested yet intertwined past – representing the violence of an attempted coup by the 30 September Movement, but also the gruesome mass violence against the communists in the regions. Yet, all these different sites of memory lie in the same space where communities continued their lives after the violence. They form memory landscapes,[3] where different sites (despite the various narratives that they convey) are connected and continuously (re)shape the memory of violence. Furthermore, as James Young argues, sites of memory should not only be examined in relation to their representation of the past, but also in relation to their role in the present.[4] A point that Ben Anderson also highlighted in his study of visuals and monuments in the New Order Indonesia is that monuments

1 Nora 1996, 1.

2 Nora 1989, 19.

3 Eickhoff, et al. uses the concept of memory landscapes to show connection between memory and its spatial dimension, including the crucial role of sites in evoking, shaping, communicating or controlling memories. Eickhoff et al. 2017, 531. Echoing with Eickhoff, et al., in this study I use the term landscapes not only to refer to the various sites of memory, but also to the different layers of memory and its dialogical process with the surroundings.

4 Young 1993, 12-13.

commemorate the past at the same time that they are intended for the future.[5] This means that Nora's point on the fluidity of *lieux*, should not only be examined on the representation of the sites itself, but also on their shifting interaction with the people in these landscapes of memory. This is what Bloembergen & Eickhoff called the agency of sites; how sites influence their surrounding individuals or parties in and beyond the national and international framework of heritage.[6] In this case, sites of memory also developed into instruments for negotiating the present.

Therefore, this chapter is an exploration of the agency of memory landscapes of violence: what they represent in the past and how they shape the present. Why are some sites abandoned, and others not? How are the sites and the surrounding people or parties connected? To what extent do they influence the villagers' current life and their perception of the past? More importantly, to what extent the sites intermingled with the personal and the social, or the public and the private? The sites that I will discuss in this chapter were selected because they constantly appeared in my conversations with villagers specifically in Donomulyo (though there are more sites of violence in the area). Some of these sites can be easily recognized through, for example, the engraved names, dates, or events. While others are hidden, but constantly preserved by the villagers' commemoration practices. The sites' diversity also shows that not all *lieux* are 'alive', in a sense that although they preserve history, they have become meaningless in the present.

I will start the chapter by describing the national commemoration project on 1965 through the creation of a museum and a monument. One of the important examples is the Crocodile Pit or Lubang Buaya memorial complex in Jakarta. The main feature of this memorial site is the glorification of the death of the seven military officers during the 30 September Movement, and the construction of the PKI as a threat to the nation. In the next part, I will explore the memory landscapes in Banyujati (the pseudonym for three villages covered in this research) which consist of five sites: the Trisula community building, the Trisula monument, the Bhayangkara or Ngerendeng monument, and two mass graves. For each site, I will start by describing their current condition, representation, and also their connection with the surrounding people. I will continue by analysing how the sites connect past and present, and how they have been reinterpreted by the surrounding people.

5 Anderson 1973, 61.

6 Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2015, 36.

Indonesia's National Site of Memory: Lubang Buaya

In 1973, the New Order government opened The *Pancasila Sakti* (Sacred Pancasila) Monument in Jakarta.[7] This public memorial complex consists of three main parts: a monument, a pit called *Lubang Buaya* (Crocodile Pit) where the officers' bodies were found, and the diorama of torture of the Generals.[8] The monument depicts seven Generals who died in the 30 September Movement, standing in front of a large Garuda Pancasila, the national emblem that carries a shield containing five symbols of the Pancasila (Picture 1).[9] They were regarded as national heroes and victims of a national treason. The interesting part attached to the monument is the bas-relief below the statue of the Generals. The relief shows a summary of Indonesia's official historiography from Independence in 1945, the 30 September Movement, and the establishment of the New Order, which resembles the formal narrative of Indonesia's official history.

The portrayal of the 30 September Movement in the relief only describes scenes of torture and death of the army officers, including scenes when the bodies were thrown into the Pit. Visualizations of the torture in the diorama depicts members of the BTI (Indonesia Peasants Movement) and Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*/Indonesian Women's Movement) as the perpetrators of the violence (Picture 5). However, these visualizations of the official narrative present a number of incorrect facts. The autopsy reports of the officers' bodies found no signs of torture, only gunshots as the main cause of death.[10] Another example of the fabrication of history in the monument is the relief of Gerwani women dancing the *Dance of The Fragrant Flowers*. The state alleged this was a lurid dance performed by Gerwani just before they tortured the generals. Apparently, such an event never happened. Based on a witness account, the women who were present in Lubang Buaya were in fact 'scared and huddled in a corner'.[11] Stories about

7 Pancasila is Indonesia's national ideology which consists of five points. The first point is "Believe in God". The PKI, who were accused of being atheists, were also accused of hatred of the Pancasila especially because of that first point.

8 In the 30 September Movement in 1965, six generals and one captain of the army were kidnapped and killed. Their bodies were thrown into this pit, which was later commemorated as the Crocodile Pit.

9 For further analysis of this memorialization complex, see McGregor 2007, 68-95.

10 Ben Anderson 1987, 109-134.

11 Some members of Leftist organizations such as Pemuda Rakyat (Youth Association), Gerwani and BTI were in Lubang Buaya prior to the 30 September Movement. They were undergoing training for the Free West Papua (*Pembebasan Irian Barat*) movement. When the movement

Figure 4.1. & 4.2. The Torture Diorama in the Pancasila Monument Complex

Source: Grace Leksana

Gerwani's acts of torture were created through military pressure during the interrogation of women detainees after the 30 September Movement.[12]

Since its establishment, the Pancasila Sakti monument has been the centre for commemoration of the *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day on 1 October. The day functions as a reminder to Indonesians of the successful military actions in defending the nation's ideology. During that day, the president, his cabinet, and the families of the national heroes gather to attend the official state ceremony. The president customarily reads his official speech, followed by the laying of a wreath beneath the statue of the seven army officers. Up to today, Indonesians still celebrate *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day with a ceremony in schools, government offices and universities. The monument complex is also a destination for historical tours and school excursions. Nevertheless, neither the monument nor the commemoration practices touch upon the death of half a million Indonesians who perished in the attempt to annihilate communism. The Lubang Buaya monument became a site that

erupted, these members were still in the area, but were definitely not part of the movement. Wieringa 2002, 295.

12 John Hughes, a foreign reporter, requested an interview with the accused Gerwani women prisoners. At the first meeting, the women did not say anything about the torture. However, in the second meeting, Hughes met with the same women together with the information officers who had extracted confessions from the young women. An officer from the division for psychological services was also present in the room. This situation resulted in a statement from one of the women, saying that the women had received razor blades along with orders to tear out the eyeballs of the generals, but that she was unaware of any sexual mutilation. See (Leclerc 1997), 297-298. Sexual tortures were widely used against women in detention camps during the period of 1965-1970 to extract information that benefited the army. Pohlman 2017, 576.

only commemorates 'the permissible aspects of the past' as Klaus Schreiner claims[13] -– by only depicting the military as heroes, and communists as a constant threat to the nation.

Although erecting a monument is not the only means that the state uses to preserve anti-communist memory, it is a widely adopted practice in other provinces and districts.[14] Another example of a similar monument in the East Java region is the Trisula monument in Bakung subdistrict, Blitar, East Java. It was erected in 1972 and comprises five statues depicting three military figures and two peasants. All of them are standing together, symbolising unity against communism and a successful cooperation between the army and civilians during the Trisula operation in 1968.[15] This feature of cooperation is prominent in similar monuments in other districts, as we will see in the next section. To what extent the narrative that they convey influences villagers in the surrounding area, is the question I will discuss further.

Memory Landscapes in Donomulyo

Trisula Public Meeting Hall

A site of memory can be a point of contestation, rather than a mere description of a particular historical event. Through a story of a certain site, we are confronted with the questions: whose history do these sites serve, and what narratives do they contain? In the context of the 1965 violence, no single answer can be offered. In this first site in the Banyujati area, we will see that numerous layers of different narratives are located within one site which reflects the entanglement of the official and unofficial narratives of violence.

The Trisula meeting hall (Picture 3) is easily recognised when we pass the main road, Jl. Raya Donomulyo. It is located in front of Donomulyo's district office, Koramil, and the Sector Police (*Polsek*), and next to one of the district's village offices. The Trisula building is the largest multi-functional hall amongst other buildings in the area and is managed by the district

13 Klaus Schreiner 2005, 273.

14 Besides the monument, the government also released the film The Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party (*Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September/PKI*) in 1983, directed by Arifin C. Noor, along with Brigadier General Dwipayana and Nugroho Notosusanto, who both played a prominent role in constructing the official narrative of 1965. McGregor 2007, 96-100.

15 Hearman 2017, 521.

Figure 4.3. Trisula Public Meeting Hall

office. It is often closed, but on one rare occasion during our observation, the doors were open for an event. Although I have no information about this event, it seemed to be a public seminar attended mostly by government officials in uniform. The initial purpose of the building was to provide a space for the village's public events. In the beginning, it was only intended for government events, but now the function has expanded, and Trisula hall can be rented out to laymen for non-government related events, such as weddings or other ceremonies.

The construction started around the early 1970s, during the era of intense village infrastructure development in Donomulyo district. Although the building holds a reputation as a modern public facility in the early years of its establishment, it also contains stories related to the 1965 violence. I learned about the construction process of the Trisula public meeting hall from Marwono, a BTI supporter in 1965 who was sent for *santiaji* during the New Order.[16] In the *santiaji* period, Marwono and other Leftists were instructed to bring bricks for the construction of the Trisula meeting hall.[17] Although this is not similar to forms of forced labour, it contains coercive acts by the authorities, where they mandated 'participation and contribution'

16 A surveillance system under which every accused Leftist member should report regularly to the district military command. See Chapter 1.

17 Interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 # 01.08.53-01.11.30.

from the villagers. Under the guise of valuing communal work (*kerja bakti*), authorities requested *santiaji* to bring bricks and assist the builders/constructors of the building. For Marwono and the others, their vulnerable position as *santiaji* was used by the authorities to extract materials for the development projects in the village. It was basically an order that if refused, could threaten their lives. Saying 'no' was impossible, because they might be sent to detention under the accusation of not supporting the new government. Out of fear of the official authorities, some members of the *santiaji* who did not have bricks or money to buy any decided to tear out bricks from grave tombs. In Marwono's words: "They were more scared of the military officers than the spirits of the dead". Marwono himself was fortunate because he had a supply of bricks at home, from which he brought four times to the construction site.

During the early years of the New Order, the meeting hall was also used as a venue for the seminars on Pancasila and P4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila*/Guidance on the Application of Pancasila), targeting especially the *santiaji*. In 1978, the People's Consultative Assembly released a decision to upgrade courses on Pancasila, which became better known as the P4. These became mandatory courses for all civil servants and students, and later were extended to diverse functional and political groups of society.[18] There has been a lot of criticism of this project, especially by pro-democratic national groups, arguing that it only provides ideological justification for the New Order's policies. P4 was later abolished in the *Reformasi* period in 1998.[19] Others perceived it as sheer indoctrination, which only stressed memorization of the thirty-six formulaic precepts (*butir*) of the Pancasila.[20] This type of indoctrination also took place in Donomulyo, as experienced by Marwono and his fellow villagers.

The Trisula building contains no traces of the *santiaji* people who 'contributed' to its construction. Nowadays, it appears to be an ordinary function hall, serving anybody who has the need to organize large events. However, for villagers, especially those who were under constant surveillance by the military during the New Order, the place serves as a reminder of the past. It recalls the exploitation and repression of the *santiaji*, who were accused of being involved in the BTI or PKI. Giving the name Trisula to the hall connected the building with the military operation in 1968 to annihilate the remaining communists who regrouped in Blitar and other areas. It

18 Morfit 1981, 838.

19 Morfit 1981, 839.

20 Saunders 1998, 63.

is a symbol of security and development (two main features of the New Order – *keamanan dan pembangunan*), and at the same time, it is a symbol of violence and repression. While the first interpretation appears publicly through its name, the latter circulates in more discreet narratives. The Trisula meeting hall serves as a complex example of a *lieux de mémoire*. It contains layers of different intentions to immortalize the past while simultaneously diverges from the initial official narrative it was designed to represent.

The Trisula Monument (*Monumen Trisula*)

The Trisula monument resembles the same event as the Trisula meeting hall. For official authorities, this anti-communist military operation in 1968 became more important in Donomulyo than the violence in 1965. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Trisula operation became the military's show of force to declare that a new regime had been firmly established. This message is conveyed in two sites in Donomulyo which use the name Trisula (the meeting hall and the monument). However, this message seems to have lost its influence in Donomulyo's society today as it is no longer a point of commemoration of the military operation. It could partly be because of *Reformasi* (a turn of Indonesia's democratic era in 1998), which provided more space for the narrative of violence to emerge on the surface, turning propagandist monuments merely into symbols of manipulation of the New Order. On the other hand, it could also be because these official sites were initiated through a top-down approach, an imposed authorities' agenda. They were not rooted in society and became futile as soon as the authoritarian state diminished.

The Trisula monument is easily recognised in Donomulyo. It lies in the middle of a T-junction, which connects the district to three other adjacent districts. The year of its establishment is not very clear. Based on oral information, it was erected around 1968 or 1969. The monument depicts two statues raising their fists, a military officer and a local villager (Figure 4.4.). Similarly with the Trisula monument in Blitar, this monument attempts to depict the strong cooperation between the military and civilians during the 1968 Trisula operation. This message can also be seen in the bas-relief under the statue that depicts a civilian holding a sharp bamboo weapon and an army officer standing behind him (Figure 4.5).

On the other side of the monument, the base relief describes villagers' activities in different themes such as religion, agriculture, and education (Figure 4.6.). The religious symbol is depicted by a relief of a mosque, and a woman with a headscarf, which represents the Islamic nuance in the

Figure 4.4. Trisula Monument in Donomulyo

monument. Meanwhile, the relief of cassava, a tree, and a woman cooking, represents daily activities in agricultural society. Cassava is a typical harvest for dry-land soil and a common food in Donomulyo besides rice. Another relief, depicting a man reading a book, is also a symbol of education, or knowledge enhancement of a villager. An interesting aspect of this monument is the image of women in the relief. They are all depicted with certain common elements: wearing a head scarf, carrying a wallet, and cooking. All of these resemble an image of 'polite and decent' women, a New Order construction of apolitical and domesticated Indonesian women. Overall, the monument conveys a message of modernity, or to be precise, what a modern village should look like. The elements attached to modernity, such as the construction of women's role, education, religiosity, and improved farming, are key elements of the New Order. Similar representations can also be seen in the Pancasila Sakti Monument in Jakarta, where the New Order juxtaposed visual representations of their government with religion

Figure 4.5. Bas relief on the Trisula Monument

and morality, in contrast to the 'immoral' communists in the previous period.[21]

The other side of the bas-relief contains a Javanese inscription: "*Angesthi Raras Trus Manunggal. Manunggaling ABRI lan Rakyat Minongko Ketahanan Nasional*" (figure 4.6 below). This inscription is written in a high-level Javanese language known as *Krama*. It is the language of the *priyayi* (elites), derived from a Sanskritic sub-language, honorific in character, largely spoken higher up in the social hierarchy as its mastery requires a high degree of education.[22] The character of *Krama* is in contrast with *Ngoko*, the everyday Javanese language, which is more direct, spoken lower down the social hierarchy and among very close equals. However, the first sentence, *Angesthi Raras Trus Manunggal* refers to something else. This is a form of *Candrasengkala* or *Sengkala*, a year that is written in a sentence, instead of in numbers.[23] A good *Candrasengkala* is not only a combination of words, but an entire sentence that forms a profound meaning, conveying philosophical messages to its readers.[24] In the case of the Trisula Monument's inscription, *Angésthi* is derived from the word *ésthi*, which means thought, willingness,

21 McGregor 2007, 82-83.
22 Benedict Anderson 1966, 96.
23 Bratakesawa and Hadisoeprapta 1980, 15.
24 Bratakesawa and Hadisoeprapta 1980, 16.

Figure 4.6. Bas-relief on the monument and inscription on the trisula monument

and feeling (*pemikiran, kehendak, perasaan*). It also represents the number eight. The next word, *Raras*, refers to feeling (*rasa, perasaan*) and represents the number six. Meanwhile, *Trus* in *Candrasangkala* means fulfilled or continue (*terpenuhi, terus*) and is related to the number nine. The last word, *Manunggal*, originates from *Tunggal*, meaning to gather, to come together, to unite and be one (*berkumpul, satu*). Candrasengkala starts with the last unit

in the year, and therefore, *Angésthi Raras Trus Manunggal* refers to the year 1968. It also conveys the message of 'focusing on harmony to achieve unity'. The type of unity is explained in the second sentence in the inscription: *Manunggaling ABRI lan Rakyat Minongko Ketahanan Nasional* – the unity of ABRI with the people is a form of national defence.

Although the use of *Candrasengkala* is not a common everyday practice, the use of Old Javanese words can frequently be found in many government terms, for example Pantja Tunggal, Bhayangkara and so on. By using this type of language, the government implies a certain prestige and majesty – a phenomenon that Benedict Anderson coined as the *kramanization* of public Indonesian. Official Indonesian has tended to become a language of political politeness; a mark of a high level of political sophistication and civilization – something that differentiates the *prijaji* with ordinary people.[25] The use of *Candrasengkala* and *Krama* in the Trisula monument symbolises this sense of sophistication. Through the monument, the idea of unity between the army and the people became grand and almost sacral.

So far, we have recognised the Trisula monument as a site that was meant to be sacral, a reminder of the successful cooperation between the army and civilians, and the hope that this relationship will continue in the future. It also functions to remind people of what the village should be: modern and sophisticated. However, when I discussed the monument with villagers in the Banyujati area, the monument was currently seen only as a landmark rather than as a site of commemoration. Located in the middle of the intersection of three main roads, the monument does not have its own 'space'. This is different from the Trisula monument in Blitar, for example, where a space has been created around the monument and marked by a fence. The space surrounding Blitar's Trisula monument also invites people to pay more attention to the monument and to read the inscription or the name of the army who fought during the Trisula operation. Similar to the Pancasila Sakti monument in Jakarta, the monument in Blitar has become an iconic tourist site. These things do not appear in the monument in Donomulyo. Since its establishment, no significant activities appeared on the monument. Local villagers realise that the monument resembles the Trisula operation in 1968 because of its name and the reliefs, but that is not the only representation of the monument. In a discussion with young generations of villagers, I asked them what the Trisula monument resembles and whether they heard stories related to it. Here is what they described:[26]

25 Benedict Anderson 1966, 110.

26 Focus Group Discussion RT 15, Donomulyo, 15 Mei 2017 #29.04-31.27

> Villager 1: The monument at the intersection, that was about Blitar and PKI. It was '68. … The southern part of Madiun became the hiding area of the remaining PKI. Without the help of the people, [the army] would not have found out their hiding place. The people informed the army, so it was the collaboration between the state apparatus and the people to eliminate PKI. In Modangan beach, there were many PKI hiding places. I heard the place is haunted. That [the collaboration] was a concrete expression of synergy between the army and the people.
> Villager 2: I heard it from my parents-in-law (original residents of Donomulyo) [about 1968]. Everybody was shot. It was tense. Bodies were scattered on the road, every day. But we did not know who did it. Suddenly in the morning, they saw bodies, in the drain, and farm. Those who died were *considered* (emphasis from the villager) to be PKI. Although it had not yet been proven.

Therefore, although the Trisula monument aims to convey the official narrative, its present state resembles a completely different one. This case shows that although the monument was constructed by the state, the current meaning is not determined by the state. It resonates with existing studies by heritage scholars who criticise the frame of colonial determinism.[27] Colonial heritage that we see today is not necessarily defined by colonialism itself nor a representation of the colonial past, although it may have been established in colonial times. This implies that the influence of a power structure that created these heritages, or sites of memory, may not always remain the same. In the case of the Trisula monument, this site became less meaningful in commemorating its constructed history. This history and image of the New Order's modernity, development and security is far removed from what villagers remember, while the 1965-68 violence lingers more deeply in their memories.

The Ngerendeng/Bhayangkara Monument

As mentioned earlier, the 'intent to remember' that characterizes a site of memory can be analysed critically. In the case of the Ngerendeng monument in this section, we can see that the intent has been largely to create an anti-communist memory, by focusing only on one aspect of the violence. This reflects the power structure creating the *lieux de mémoire*. The Bhayangkara/Ngerendeng monument is a simplification of a complex event that occurred

27 Legéne and Schulte Nordholt 2015, 8.

in Madiun in 1948, making it a story of good versus evil that results in the legitimation of the military operation to eliminate communism down to its roots in 1965-68. As we will see, the background of the monument's establishment may relate more to sustaining the New Order's coercive ideology of security and order rather than to commemorate the Madiun event itself. Furthermore, in a society filled with complex patronage relationships, sites of memory also play a role in creating and transforming these relationships. Using the site, clients move closer to their patrons under the New Order agenda to construct an anti-communist memory. On the other hand, their relationship weakened after the *Reformasi*, in which the function of these official monuments also became meaningless.

Accompanied and introduced by Suparman (one of my key informants, a Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s), I came across a police monument, known as the Ngerendeng monument. The small complex was built to commemorate the death of four police officers during the 1948 Madiun affair (an armed struggle in early independent Indonesia). On our second visit to the monument, we managed to find Parjito, a local farmer and also the monument caretaker (*juru kunci*), who assisted the army in the anti-communist operation (see Chapter 3). According to Parjito, four police officers (Lilik Puguh, Jusuf, Musiatun and Pramu) died during the 1948 Madiun affair. They were first buried in the public cemetery in Ngerendeng (located behind the monument), but were later transferred to the heroes' cemetery in Turen in the Malang regency. A monument complex was later constructed on the site of their killings, precisely in 1971, to commemorate these four heroes. The construction and management of the complex took place under the leadership of Bambang Kusdiyanto, the head of the police sector (Kapolsek) of Donomulyo at that time. The monument was formally inaugurated on 1 October 1971, during the commemoration of *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day by Brigadier General Police Samsuri Mertodjoso. The complex consists of two stones; the first one contains the names and ranks of the four police officers as the victims of the PKI movement in 1948 (Figure 4.8). Meanwhile, the other monument depicts solely the symbol of Bhayangkara, the symbol of the Indonesian National police force (figure 4.7).

In order to find more information about the monument, we visited the police sector office in Donomulyo. The current head police officer, although unaware of the story behind the monument, was kind enough to share a document about it. It is a written guide, as Parjito already mentioned, developed by Drs. Moerdjiono, SH on 10 November 2010. Titled a "Short History of The Killings of Sector Police Officers in Donomulyo By the Indonesian Communist Party in 1948" (*Sejarah Singkat Pembunuhan Anggota Polri*

Figure 4.7. The Bhayangkara Memorial Complex in Ngerendeng

Kepolisian Sektor Donomulyo Oleh PKI Tahun 1948), the document consists of only 8 pages. In the foreword, the author states that the history of this monument is less known, and therefore, the document should fulfil the need. But in making such an attempt, he also mentions the limitation of time and reference, which makes the guide document not very comprehensive. The main chapters start with the background of the Madiun affair. According to Moerdjiono, a group of Indonesian leftists were unsatisfied with the Dutch-Indonesian 'Renville' agreement and established the People's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat*/FDR) led by Amir Syarifuddin.[28] Moerdjiono also states that FDR programmes were constantly rejected by the government, which strengthened their opposition and led to collaboration with the PKI to build a communist-Russian state in Indonesia. "PKI and FDR strengthened themselves within an unstable state at that time, creating chaos to increase tension by using criminals to perform criminal acts especially in Madiun, Surakarta and Pati", the guide document states. This led to the Madiun 'revolt' that involved kidnapping and killing of Indonesian police officers in Madiun, Magetan and other areas including

28 Amir Sjarifoeddin was the Minister of Information during Sukarno's cabinet. He resigned on 23 January 1948, after the signing of the Renville agreement. The next cabinet, vice-president Hatta's Presidential cabinet, did not include any of the leftists' representation, leaving them on the margins of the Republic power since Sjarifoeddin's resignation. Poeze 2011, 10-11.

Figure 4.8. Four officers who died in 1948 madiun affair

Donomulyo. Major Hamid Rusdi, a Republican army and one of Malang's revolution heroes, led the operation against Madiun 1948 that had spread to South Malang. The PKI in Donomulyo, led by Tjokro Bagong, attacked the sector police office one night in 1948 (the date is not stated) and arrested four police officers.[29] Those officers were killed and their bodies were found in the cemetery of the Ngerendeng hamlet, which were transferred later on to the Heroes' cemetery in Turen, Malang regency. Meanwhile, Tjokro Bagong was captured by Rusdi's troop and brought to Talangagung, then transferred to Turen where he was killed.[30] However, none of the available sources could explain why and how a revolt in Madiun spread to South Malang.

The official narrative of the Madiun case, which is also referred to in the written guide of the Ngerendeng Monument, portrays the PKI as evil traitors of the nation. This narrative also frequently emphasizes the PKI's violence towards the Muslim residents in Madiun and reduce the complicated element that surrounds the revolt. First, the Madiun affair should be seen in a context of early independence Indonesia. Although Sukarno

29 An interview with a military veteran, Slamet Hardjo Utomo, also stated that the movement of the PKI troops in South Malang called Batallion Zein (or better known as the Red Battalion) led by Cokro Bagong. Slamet served as the platoon command that moved against the PKI troops in September 1948. He did not mention the attack on the police office in his interview. Utomo 1997.

30 Dukut Imam Widodo et al. 2015, 141.

and Hatta had announced the Indonesian proclamation on 17 August 1945, regions in the archipelago were not automatically unified under the same national agenda. Various groups, often loosely organized, opposed the Republic. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh and West Java, as well as the resistance in Banten are some of the examples. The Madiun affair and the establishment of FDR are part of this turmoil within the early process of creating a 'national unity'. A combination of the removal of Amir Sjarifudin from the cabinet with PKI's shift to a more radical political approach, added up to the culminated violence in Madiun. PKI opted for an independent course, and accused the Republic as bourgeois, licking the boots of America and blocking a socialist revolution.[31] Second, in their effort to create an Indonesian Soviet Republic, the FDR took control of Madiun, where violence was unavoidable. This particular violence became central in Indonesia's official narrative when describing the 1948 Madiun affair, depicting the PKI as having a rooted treacherous character and as haters of Islam. This description was constructed based on the facts that many victims were Muslim. However, Harry Poeze's research on Madiun noted that reports on the gruesome violence in Madiun might have been a part of the propaganda war and therefore, might be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is certain that the PKI leadership was unable or unwilling to control the violence.[32] Moreover, a lot of FDR members were also executed after being caught in the battle against the soldiers of the Republic.[33] The movement ended because it was not supported by the people, and it became a difficult strategy to maintain while the party itself was still in the process of consolidation.[34] In short, official Indonesia historiography uprooted the Madiun affair out of its context and background, and tends to focus on the violence and treachery of the PKI during the event. It is frequently used as an event to support the portrayal of the PKI as violent and evil in the 30 September Movement, and to legitimize the violent annihilation of the PKI in 1965-66.

This brings us back to the Ngerendeng monument in Donomulyo. Although it depicts the Madiun Affair in 1948, it still generates many questions. What is the connection between a violent event in Madiun and Donomulyo? Why did it take more than 20 years to build that monument? Why build a monument to commemorate the Police, while it was the army under

31 Poeze 2014b, 190.

32 Poeze 2014b, 191. An American anthropologist, Robert Jay, stated in 1953 that in PKI territory, armed bands of irregulars sprang into being in large numbers (ibid.).

33 Poeze 2011, 382.

34 Poeze 2011, 382.

Hamid Rusdi's command that controlled the situation in Donomulyo? Available sources could not explain clearly the connection between the PKI in Donomulyo and the FDR movement in Madiun in 1948.[35] Although to investigate this issue would be outside the scope of this book, it points to the fact that the monument was built without a comprehensive research of the event itself. Why then, did the police force provide such a huge effort to build this monument? And why did it take 23 years before they decided to build it?

To answer these questions, we should go back to the other sites in Jakarta and Blitar that have the same heroic depiction of the military. All of these similar monuments were built during the same time period: The Pancasila Sakti monument was opened for public in 1973, the Trisula monument in Blitar was established in 1972, and the Ngerendeng monument in 1971. These monument projects occurred relatively close to the first 1971 national election during the New Order. This election used the army's systematic structure, their domination in villages, and collaboration with local bureaucracies, resulting in the Golkar or Golongan Karya (Suharto's ruling party) as the winner.[36] In other words, the Ngerendeng monument seems to have been part of a greater national project to convey dominant features of the New Order: security (*keamanan*) and development (*pembangunan*), which was basically a message to support anti-communism and economic enhancement of the New Order.[37] This explains the time interval between the Madiun event and the establishment of the Ngerendeng monument, and also the determination of the authorities to build the monument, even though the facts are still questionable. Madiun became an event in the past that was needed to maintain the portrayal of the treacherous communists. The military's successful elimination of the movement became the New Order's symbol of security or *keamanan*. The Ngerendeng monument shows that instead of commemorating the past (Madiun 1948), the site of memory was created to fulfil the needs of the present (the New Order).

35 There are other incidents involving authorities that occurred in Donomulyo. For example, during the Independence war against the Dutch, the situation in Indonesia was filled with chaos and violence, involving confrontation not only between the Republican and the Dutch, but also with the militias or *lasykar*. On 20 March 1949, one of these militias killed three army officers and their men in Donomulyo after kidnapping them for several days. The officials were Major Banuredjo, Captain Rustamadji, Liutenant Pamudji, Sergeant Saelan and their four men. However, this event did not have any connection to the Madiun Affair in 1948 (Poeze 2014a, 230-231).

36 See Ward 1974.

37 Ward 1974, 3.

When I visited the monument complex, it was filled with wild grass and dried leaves. According to Parjito, the monument caretaker, the complex used to be a centre of commemoration during the National Heroes Day (*Hari Pahlawan*) on 10 November. On that day, sector police officers and school children visited the monument and paid their respects to the heroes. Parjito also mentioned that the school children sometimes cleaned the complex with their teachers. Even officers from Surabaya or other districts, sometimes even the Mobile Brigade (*Brigade Mobil/Brimob*), also joined the ceremony. Family members of the deceased from Malang, Blitar and other places in East Java occasionally visited the monument to pay their respects. However, these practices ceased around 2010 (probably earlier than that). Since then, nobody visits the monument or talks about its maintenance to Parjito. According to Parjito, this reflects the negligence of the head of the police sector, because he should be responsible for maintaining the monument and the commemoration practices at the monument. To the same end, according to Parjito, the officer is also neglecting him as the caretaker of the monument. Parjito uses the analogy of a relationship between father and son. If a father takes care of his son, then the son will always be with him. "He should consider me as the guardian of the monument. And he should consider me as one of his subordinates. That way, I will always be close to him", Parjito explained.[38] I asked him whether or not he asked the current head of the police sector about his status and he answered "No. Because he does not want to come down here". In this sense, Parjito thinks that the police officer is not only abandoning the monument, but also himself as the caretaker and their relation.

However, towards the end of June 2019, the sector police of Donomulyo cleaned the monument complex. This activity was part of *Bhakti Religi*, a series of actions in assisting maintenance of religious sites. During that time, they also cleaned the local church together with the villagers. These actions were part of the preparations for the 73rd anniversary of the police force (Bhayangkara) on 1 July 2019.[39] Although this programme illustrates a remaining effort to maintain the monument, it implies a structurally top-down nature of the activity.

The case of the Ngerendeng monument and its *juru kunci* highlights two important points about sites of memory in the context of patronage society. First, commemoration practices surrounding monuments are not spontaneous, but mobilized by the authorities and patrons, who are, in

38 Interview with Parjito, 22 August 2016

39 Kiswara 2019.

this case, the police officers or school teachers. This reflects the power structure in Nora's notion of intent in a *lieu de mémoire*. A *lieu de memoire* is not an empty void, it is always filled with tensions of power. In some cases, as the Ngerendeng monument shows, a *lieu de mémoire* does not serve the function of commemorating the past, but a construction to support the established regime. Second, sites of memory play a role within the complex patronage relationships in a society. When the site was at its most important function, the patronage relationship between the authorities in power and the people who preserve the monument was also strong. This is the case reflected by Parjito and his relationship with the head of the police sector. However, when the function of the site as a propaganda tool begins to deteriorate, the patronage relationship also starts to erode. The function of a site of memory in this context goes beyond remembering the historical past, but becomes a device to negotiate the patron-client relationship in present society.

Kaliasri Public Cemetery

While the previous sites of memory are easy to recognise, the following ones are more hidden. Nevertheless, I still consider these places as sites of memory, as they still play an important role in society, or at least to the community of victims in Donomulyo. Differently from the state-initiated monuments, these sites are maintained and preserved by the villagers themselves. No public commemorations took place in these places, but rather private commemorations during important occasions for the villagers.

I had heard about the mass grave in the Kaliasri public cemetery several times in my conversations with the locals. I had not visited the cemetery until my encounter with one of the victim's family members, who turned out to be someone whom I had known for a while. Her name was Susi, and she works as a helper in my friend's house in Malang. Susi has been working for the family for more than twenty years. After I moved to Malang, I visited the family more often, and they were very helpful in assisting my navigation around the city. From my frequent encounters, I understood that Susi is originally from Donomulyo, though I have never really known her family background.

When I started my field research in 2016, I paid a visit to her and my friend's family. During my light conversation with Susi, I started to mentioned a couple of people that I had become acquainted with in Donomulyo. She asked how I knew them, and I started to explain briefly about my research. At this point, she started sharing her stories. She started by saying that

Figure 4.9. Kaliasri public cemetery

"People are wrong when they say that our village is a PKI village. There was no PKI there. My father was killed in 1965 by the army, but he was not a PKI. In fact, my hamlet became a widow's hamlet because all the men were taken away by the army" and she continued to share the story about her father. Back then, I was surprised that I had never heard this side of Susi's life even though I had known her for years.

A couple of days after that meeting with Susi, I received a phone call from my friend saying that she just heard about Susi's father. I was surprised when she said, "Susi never told us before. Since she started working here, she always said that her father *died because of the PKI*. After she found out what you are doing in Donomulyo, she started to tell a different story". I was really surprised, because I thought my friend's family already knew Susi's background. On the contrary, Susi kept her story discreet. This drove us to visit Susi's family in Donomulyo. As soon as we arrived, we were introduced to her sister, Lina, and their mother. Her mother has a hearing problem, but apart from that, she is very healthy. We were also introduced to Susi's uncle, who shared a similar story about the death of Susi's father. On my second visit, I talked to several other people in the neighbourhood in order to understand what happened to her father. This is the chronology that I managed to reconstruct based on their stories:

One night in 1968, a group of villagers were guarding the neighbourhood at a security post (*gardu*). There were around 15 people in the group, including

the village security or *jogoboyo* named Tokromo.[40] Suddenly, Tokromo was killed with a sharp weapon during his night watch. Although the details and exact reason for this act are unclear, there was indication of a motive of robbery. After the incident, all of the villagers who guarded the *gardu* were taken to the Donomulyo district office. Only five of them returned. From the testimony of one of the survivors, the villagers were questioned about their party affiliation. Those who survived were the ones who claimed affiliation to PNI. While others who did not have any affiliation, or were indicated as BTI, were taken to the public cemetery and killed. Tokromo's murder seemed to be used as a reason to get rid of the remaining communists in the village. Most of the men were taken, but some of them returned. It is difficult to further investigate the incident of Tokromo because of the limited sources. However, the story of Tokromo was quite well known in Donomulyo. Susi's hamlet was called 'the hamlet of widows' because all of the men had disappeared in 1965 and in the 1968 Trisula operation. The mass grave does not have any specific markings, but it became a silent marking of the Tokromo incident.

Susi's father was one of those villagers who was accused of murdering Tokromo. He disappeared after he was taken to the district office for further investigation. A few of the 15 villagers who returned to the village told Susi's family that her father had been killed and buried in a mass grave in the public cemetery. Since then, her sister Lina and her mother usually visit the grave before the fasting month and on Eid Mubarak. The mass grave where Susi's father was buried is difficult to identify, because there are no specific markings (figure 4.9). Despite its discreet location, the public cemetery is a reminder (not only to families of victims, but also to other villagers who know the story) of the mass killings and violence in 1965, 1968, and the Tokromo incident. It does not resemble any notion of creating peace and order, as the military operation claimed it would. The cemetery illustrates that sites of memory are rarely one-directional – never containing a single narrative. A site often reflects what Michael Rothberg coined as multidirectional memory, "a series of interventions through which social actors bring multiple traumatic pasts into a heterogeneous and changing present".[41] Memory, for Rothberg, is subjected to "ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative". The Kaliasri public cemetery

40 In Javanese villages, Javanese terms are used for the positions in the village apparatuses. For example, the village secretary is commonly known as *carik*; and the village security is known as *jogoboyo*. All of the apparatuses are responsible to their village head or *lurah*.

41 Rothberg 2009, 3-4.

not only reflects the multi-directionality of national (the anti-communist operation) and a local event (the murder of Tokromo), but also the private (experience of Susi's family) and public narrative (shared recognition of the hamlet of widows).

Mulyosari Mass Grave

Multidirectional memory that is attached to a site can also be seen in spiritual practices that are related to sites of violence. For example, a mass grave of 1965 victims in Semarang, Central Java, attracts people with different intentions: most commonly to win a lottery, to achieve economic success in their life, or to search for spiritual guidance (*petunjuk*) from the grave. A *sinden* (traditional Javanese singer), who was killed and buried there during the 1965 operation, is believed to be bulletproof. Her supernatural powers are believed to have the capacity to guide people in the present on a path to achieve their life goals.[42] The practice of worshipping spirits in the afterlife can be commonly found in Indonesian society, not only in relation to indigenous beliefs, but also as part of daily practices in modern Indonesian life. Sacred graves that lie all over Indonesia have become sites of worship and pilgrimage, carrying the *potent dead* – the power that the dead (ancestors, saints, national heroes) exert over the living in contemporary Indonesia.[43] However, particular mass graves that resulted from the 1965-68 violence generate the same treatment as the potent dead, yet the dead in this case were not saints or heroes. They were communists and outcasts but it was exactly this gruesome violence against them that produced stories of their supernatural powers. It was the violence that transformed these ordinary people into the potent dead.

My encounter with the site of the potent dead started with my acquaintance with Parminah. She was the only child of Purnomo Sukimin. When she was seven months old, her father Purnomo moved away and she was brought up by her mother and grandmother. Later on, Purnomo Sukimin married Parminah's aunt who gave birth to Tarno, Parminah's half-brother. According to Parminah, Tarno was much closer to Sukimin because they all lived together until Sukimin disappeared during the 1968 Trisula operation. Although Parminah was not really proud of her father's complicated relationship, she still cried the first time she shared the loss with us. In our

42 Eickhoff et al. 2017, 538.

43 Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002, xvii.

second conversation, Parminah explained in more detail about the day when her father was executed:

> I was around 14 or 15 years old. I heard that my father had been taken to the police station. After several months, my brother came. "*Mbak*, you have to see father at the [police] office. He's going to be sent away". My grandmother didn't give me permission. It turns out that the same night, father was really gone. He had been taken to a quiet place, which already had a hole. My father was put in there. He was not alone; there were five or six people. They were placed together. Those who had money to pay were set free, but there were also those who could not [pay]. … My parents were poor, so they could not pay anything. But there was Pak Wisto, my father's friend who paid [for his freedom] and is still alive.[44]

I continue to ask Parminah about the source of this information. According to her, the news about her father's detention came from her brother who was informed by the police themselves. Meanwhile, the news about the killing came from the survivor, Pak Wisto, who told several people in the area. It is from these people that the family knew about the mass grave.

Parminah told us that her father was accused of being a PKI, but she does not know whether this is true or not. After they heard about his death, they could not search for his grave right away. "The situation was still critical. Nobody dared to search, everybody just stayed at home", according to Parminah. It was not until around 2004 that they found the location of his grave. This was the result of her brother's persistent efforts in searching for the grave. Parminah also told us about the difficult access to the location, which became the reason for her less frequent visits to the site. In order to send her blessings to her father, she combines them with the *nyadran* (traditional religious practice to pay respect to the dead, especially during special events) at her mother's grave.

Parminah connected us with her stepbrother, Tarno. He is a farmer who grew up in Donomulyo and later lived in Jakarta for several years. After his return, he dedicates most of his time to farming and taking care of his son while his wife works abroad as a migrant worker. After several visits, we began to talk about his father. It was in 1968 (Tarno was around seven years old) when his father was detained. When he visited the detention centre with his grandmother, he remembered that the place was very crowded. His father's cell was full of people, but they let him out to receive his family's

44 Interview with Parminah and Karsono, Donomulyo, 3 December 2016 #10.35-12.34.

visit. Tarno remembered being cuddled by his father, and after that, he never saw him again. After a few years, he was informed about the location of his father's grave by a person who lived near the market. Around 1974, before he moved to Jakarta, he tried to search for the location. It was almost Idul Fitri, the Islamic holy day, and it is common to visit graves of parents and families (*nyadran*) beforehand. It became a motive and desire for Tarno to have a spiritual visual of his father. Therefore, he went to search for the place in the direction indicated by locals. When he succeeded, he was determined to sleep beside the grave in order to experience an encounter with his father's spirit. But what happened was really unexpected: he saw a large black creature without a face. It was horrifying, and according to Parminah (although Tarno did not mention this), Tarno fainted and was assisted by their uncle who had been waiting for him nearby. Tarno interpreted this experience as a sign that he was not allowed to speak with his father's spirit.

The first time Tarno visited the grave, there was only a pole and several bricks. He does not know whether the killer or somebody else marked the grave. After spending a number of years working in Jakarta, he decided to return to Donomulyo, and he realised the grave had changed. It had become more solid, with a proper tomb. From the information that he gathered, this was done by someone who asked the grave for spiritual guidance in order to win a national lottery.[45] The person successfully won the lottery, and as an expression of gratitude, he restored the grave. This happened when Tarno was still in Jakarta. The present condition of the grave is well-maintained, with a grave stone without inscriptions (figure 4.10). According to Tarno, although there is only one tomb, the bodies inside are possibly of up to ten people. When I visited the grave with him, there were three other tombs beside his father's. Tarno does not have any information about the other graves.

Tarno visits the grave with his family (even his grandchildren) quite often, especially during important events. For example, when his daughter was getting married, he took his family and the family of his future son-in-law to the grave. For Tarno, paying respects is important, "So they know our origins", as he explains.[46] I asked whether there were questions or any resentment from the future son in law's family, but that was not the case. The only question came from his son, who asked what happened to their grandfather. Tarno explained that he did not know much because he was

45 During the Suharto government, this lottery was famously known as SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah or Awarded Social Donation Funds).

46 Interview with Tarno, Donomulyo, 16 Mei 2017 #5.18

Figure 4.10. Mulyosari mass grave

still very young at that time. His son continued to ask why his grandfather was buried in such a place. Tarno only replied, "It's fine. Everywhere is just the same".[47] From the time I spent with Tarno, I didn't sense any anger about the violence that his father suffered, instead only a strong motivation to maintain the family connection.

The case of this particular mass grave illuminates the complexity of the memory of violence as it shows the layers of connection between different people with the grave. I encountered this impression during one of my conversations with Suparman, a former Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s, and a cultural- spiritual counsellor in the Banyujati area (see chapter 3). It is actually through him that I came into contact with Parminah, who visited Suparman for a 'spiritual consultancy'. Parminah's daughter was getting married, so they asked Suparman to choose a good day based on the Javanese calendar. Parminah also asked him to be the Master of Ceremony at her daughter's wedding. However, this was not the only reason that brought Parminah to Suparman. As the wedding approached, Parminah was also thinking about her father's grave. In Javanese, it is a traditional practice that the family visits and pays their respects to the grave of their deceased family members prior to important events. To do *nyadran* is difficult for Parminah, because her father's grave lies somewhere in the woods and is

47 Interview with Tarno, Donomulyo, 16 Mei 2017, #09.35.

difficult to access. Parminah consulted Suparman to determine whether or not it was necessary to pay her respects directly at the site of her father's grave. Suparman then convinced Parminah that the most important aspect of the process is the prayer, which must not necessarily be given at the grave site, but can be sent from home or the church.

For Tarno's family, the grave represents their connectivity with older generations. For Suparman, the grave has a different meaning. After spending several days with Parminah and Tarno, I shared some information about the grave with Suparman. When I told him that Parminah was not certain of her father's involvement in the Leftist organisation that allegedly caused his death, Suparman directly stated that her father was in fact a member of the Pemuda Rakyat (the leftist youth organisation closely linked to the PKI). According to him, Purnomo Sukimin was not very compassionate toward other villagers, although he did not elaborate further. However, the most surprising thing for Suparman was how Parminah's family managed to find the location of their father's grave. Suparman himself had known about the grave from an army officer even before Parminah came to consult with him, but he remained silent about his knowledge. Revealing the grave seemed to have caused uneasiness for Suparman. It was intended to remain unmentioned, while the victim's identity as a Pemuda Rakyat lives on.

Mulyosari mass grave illustrates a complex way of remembering the mass killings in 1965-68. On the one hand, violence turned these ordinary villagers into the *potent dead*. They are sites of intense spiritual activity, such as the lottery winner and Tarno's experience with the black creature. The site not only carries the intimate narrative of a family's loss, but it is also transformed into a public domain, where others besides the family members invoke the spirituality of the site. The grave reflects the entanglement of private and public domain connected by the 1965 violence. There is a relationship of give and take between the site and its 'spiritual public'. Maintenance of the site not only becomes a private matter, but also a semi-public one. On the other hand, for those who have a strong connection with the site's patrons, the location of the mass grave should be kept hidden. When the site starts to be recognised in 'public', it generates discomfort for them.

Conclusion

The landscape of memory in this chapter presents a complex representation of violence in contemporary society. There are some general conclusions that we can draw from the case of Donomulyo. First, sites of memory do

not contain a single narrative, but a complex entanglement of various memories; some can be found in the public sphere, others are more hidden. This is illustrated, for example, by the case of the Mulyosari mass grave, where the deceased are not only a reminder of the family's private origins and the 1965-68 violence that disrupted them, but also a spiritual site of an active, potent dead for a larger public. Second, despite the initial intention during the creation of these sites, their meaning could transform over time. This refers to Nora's point on the fluid meaning of the sites. Most of the official sites in Donomulyo were built not only to commemorate past events, but also to maintain anti-communist propaganda in the present and future, as shown in the case of the Ngerendeng and Trisula monuments. But even then, this function is in contestation with narratives of violence that are not concretized through these typical monuments. As the state which developed these monuments declined, the intended commemorative functions of these monuments became less important. This brings us to the third point, that the sites are always in a dialogical process with the people that surround them. The sites become devices of negotiation in present society, rather than symbols of remembrance of the past. For example, the case of the Ngerendeng monument and its caretaker Parjito shows how the site is used for an employee/client to remain in proximity with his patrons. Therefore, sites of memory function to strengthen or even disconnect the patron-client relationship. For others, discovering hidden sites of memory, such as a mass grave, is an indication that past violence is starting to be recognised by a wider public, and is no longer a private matter of the victim's family.

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5 Postmemory, Silence, and Trauma in Family Narratives

Abstract
Through four different family narratives, this chapter will explore intergenerational memory of the 1965 violence – how memories are conveyed from one generation to the other. These narratives show the interconnectedness of the past with the present, the public and private, and the local and national sphere. A large portion of these stories point to the silences in the families which do not merely reflect trauma of the past, but also a strategy or navigating device to be able to continue living together in a community where members have had different positions during the violence. Besides family, communal celebrations and history lessons at school also serve as conduits for memories of violence to be sustained, despite repression by the state.

Keywords: intergenerational memory, family narratives, silence and trauma, anti-communist violence, Indonesia, history education

As decades have passed since 1965, human rights workers advocating justice for victims of the 1965-68 violence have raised concerns on whether or not Indonesia's younger generations will still be able to remember the violence. Concern also emerges around the lack of significant changes in the national historiography, let alone judicial procedures against the perpetrators of violence. In the last few years, the intergenerational memory has been a major highlight of discussions on the 1965 violence in Indonesia. For example, in 2016 and 2017, two books presented compilations of family accounts of the 1965 violence,[1] filled with stories from the children and grandchildren of victims. These books put forward the main themes of the intergenerational connection within victims' families of the 1965 violence and pointed to the

1 For the latest publications on this issue, see (Sukanta 2016); and (Marching 2017).

Leksana, G.T., *Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia: Embedded Remembering*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023
DOI: 10.5117/9789463723565_CH05

fact that the second and third generations of victims are also experiencing effects of the violence. Other initiatives took form on digital platforms, such as the podcast series *65 Setiap Hari* (1965 Every day), the digital map of violence *FIS 65*, or the website *Ingat 65* that publish everyday stories of 1965 violence.[2] Most of these platforms were initiated and managed by the third generations of victims' families. Others who were involved in these projects are not members of those families, but are 'victims of the New Order'; they were exposed to the persistent anti-communist propaganda of the New Order. These youths can be considered as implicated subjects, which Michael Rothberg describes as "neither a victim nor a perpetrator, but rather a participant in histories and social formations that generate the positions of victim and perpetrator, and yet in which most people do not occupy such clear-cut roles. … implicated subjects help propagate the legacies of historical violence and prop up the structures of inequality that mar the present".[3]

Implicated subjects do not necessarily have direct experiences of 1965 violence. Yet, they are very close to the memories and traces of violence. In many cases, these memories seem to be hidden and silenced, as a manifestation of trauma and fear caused by the structural memory projects of the New Order that brought continuous exclusion and stigmatization of victims' families. Although some of these families have had the courage to publish their stories for a wider public, other first generation victims have decided to remain silent about the violence. This is unpacked by Okky Tirto, editor in chief of the Humanitarian Creativity Institute (Lembaga Kreativitas Kemanusiaan), in his prologue to Putu Oka Sukanta's (a former 1965 prisoner, writer, and member of Lekra – a leftist culture organisation closely linked to the PKI) book. He sees the silence in victims' families as a collective forgetting, arguing that forgetting is not organic, but a structural mechanism constructed by the state to diminish the narrative of violence that the victims have experienced.[4]

Okky Tirto perceives forgetting as an absence of memory of violence. However, this is not always the case. As this chapter will show, the connection between intergenerational memory, trauma and silence does not

2 65 Setiap Hari runs their own podcast, available at Spotify and their instagram @1965setiaphari. FIS 65 has their own website of a digital map of 1965 violence: https://fis.1965.or.id, and so does the Ingat 65 collective: https://medium.com/ingat-65.

3 Rothberg 2019, 1-2.

4 Putu Oka Sukanta's book, *Cahaya Mata Sang Pewaris: Kisah Nyata Anak-Cucu Korban Tragedi '65*, tells the stories of descendants of 1965 violence. Sukanta 2016, xv-xvi.

always result in the complete absence of memory of violence.[5] Instead, I argue that the silences that I encountered in both families of victims or collaborators of violence is not merely a result of the repressive mechanism of the state, but also a means of survival of the victims and their families; an instrument to navigate and cope with the aftermath of a violent event. By portraying the agency in silence, I will show in this chapter that far from being a result of structural repression, silence is a complex process of distancing and juxtaposing the past and present; also between the private and the political public. By expounding on agency, I do not disregard the structural forces, but instead give attention to an uncommon examination of the ways in which agency is used to negotiate between the individual and the structural. This chapter deals with the following questions: How do the first and second generations remember the 1965 violence? How do they obtain information about the past? How do they react to the silence of the first generation? To what extent does the state (public) narrative intertwine with the family's (private) narratives?

The complex intergenerational memory has been the focus of scholars such as Marianne Hirsch, who develops her work from studies of the Holocaust. She proposed the concept of postmemory to portray the complex process of intergenerational memory, which she describes as:

> The relationship that the 'generation after' bears to the personal, collective and cultural trauma of those who came before – the experiences they 'remember' only by means of the stories, images, and behaviours among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to *seem* to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory's connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation.[6]

According to Hirsch, postmemory is not a mere recollection of experiences in the past, but a (re)interpretation of those experiences by the different generations. In the case of the 1965 violence, postmemory exists in a highly political context, where the dominant power decides what can be remembered and what cannot. However, as this chapter will show, postmemory of the 1965

5 This is also in line with Paul Bijl's argument that moves away from the dichotomy of remembering and forgetting. Through the case study of colonial war in Aceh, Bijl argues that colonial violence is widely present in the Netherlands, but is difficult to remember because it does not fit in with the Dutch nationalist discourse. See Bijl 2015.

6 Hirsch 2012, 5.

violence demonstrates not only this constructed official narrative, but also the complexity of the connection between the national and the personal narratives. This interrelatedness between the national and the private is also shown through Andrew Conroe's study on intergenerational memory amongst the family members of victims of the 1965 violence. Conroe argues that both knowledge and silence surrounding the 1965 violence in the families are dynamic, their meaning transforms over time. Most importantly, families may hide the past in order to avoid the consequences that it brings.[7]

Within the trauma debate, the anthropological approach to mass violence has critically questioned the concept of trauma and silence such as the study of Carol Kidron amongst the Jewish-Israeli Holocaust and Canadian-Cambodian genocide survivors. Her research shows that those survivors do not identify themselves as traumatic victims.[8] In the case of the Canadian-Cambodian families, descendants assert that their silence is not a form of repressed traumatic memory, but cultural normative behaviour based on Buddhist values. Furthermore, it is actually these values that helps them through the aftermath of violence – "Buddhism tells us that suffering is part of life".[9] Thus Kidron argues that the choice not to talk about the past is not an indication of pathology. In the case of families of Holocaust survivors, Kidron pointed to the 'silent traces' where memories of the Holocaust are actually present without verbal communication between the first and second generations.[10] These findings also serve as Kidron's criticism of Eurocentric psychosocial norms that view silence as negatively marked absence, which "neglect the phenomenon of silence as a medium of expression, communication, and transmission of knowledge in its own right or as an alternative form of personal knowing that is not dependent on speech".[11]

This chapter builds on Hirsch's and Kidron's work on intergenerational trauma, memory and silence, with particular focus on how silence travels and influences memories within families who experienced the 1965-68 violence. Taking this critical approach does not mean that I reject the notion of traumatic behaviour amongst these families. For example, the case of Marwono in the introduction illustrates the traumatic effect of the violence when he became restless and silent at the presence of an unrecognised car parked in front of his house. In many cases, expressions of traumatic

7 Conroe 2012, 86-87.
8 Kidron 2012, 723–54.
9 Kidron 2012, 736.
10 Kidron 2009, 6.
11 Kidron 2009, 7.

silence can still be found in families who experienced the 1965 violence. But the point that I want to highlight through this critical approach is to place silence *also as a deliberate choice* to deal with the trauma itself. Therefore, the chapter explores further the interplay between trauma and silence or knowledge of violence, and how it (re)creates memories of the past within families. In a different way from the concern of a 'collective forgetting' that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my study in Donomulyo demonstrates how the memory of violence still travels within a community, and through generations. However, their postmemory is not a clear-cut reproduction of the first generation's whole experience, but a mix between a private and contextually embedded memory, with a larger socio-political dimension of the nation.

The families in this chapter have different backgrounds. The first generations had different positions in the 1965 violence; ranging from victims (former activists of Leftist organisations) to collaborators in violence. Some of them are middle-class with highly educated children working in well-paid jobs in the city. Others are in a different situation, with children who have to struggle as labourers to make a living. Meanwhile, almost all of the second generations that I interviewed had lived through the New Order period and became intensively exposed to the anti-communist propaganda either within or outside their school curricula. They also had different types of relationship with their parents. To explore further the younger generation's memory of the 1965 violence, I also spoke to village youths in two separate discussions. These discussions were filled with stories of violence, either those experienced by their own families and relatives, or stories that they heard from surrounding villagers. Local high school teachers were the next group that I visited in order to explore how 1965 is discussed in their classrooms. Interestingly, stories of violence were also brought up by students during their history lessons, including the stories of their families who experienced the 1965-68 violence.

Memories of an Activist – The Family of Suparman

The story that we will see in this family illustrates a narrative of victimization from the Madiun 1948 affair[12] (see chapter 4) and an intense involvement in rebuilding the village after severe destruction caused by the 1965-68 violence.

12 This refers to the PKI revolt in Madiun. The national historiography has portrayed this event out of the context of local turmoil during Indonesia's early independence. See chapter 4.

Suparman (pseudonym – see previous chapters), was a former Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s, who became a respected local leader in Donomulyo. He was married to a woman with Central Javanese roots, who previously lived in Malang. Unfortunately, she died in 2009 due to cervical cancer, leaving behind Suparman and their four sons. All of the sons are married, three of them live in larger cities outside Donomulyo, and one still lives in the district. While he works as a farmer and handyman, the other three are professionals working at well-known institutions. I had the opportunity to meet with Suparman's oldest son, Josua, who lives in Malang and works as the head of an administrative office at a prestigious private high school.

Josua was born in 1971, and spent most of his childhood in Donomulyo until he finished middle school. In 1987, he moved to Malang and continued his high school education until he gained his current position. As the oldest child, his first memory of the past was his responsibility to take care of his younger brothers. On school days, he had to sweep the house, prepare breakfast and help his brothers to get ready for school. He remembered his childhood years as an adventurous time. They usually walked to school, through the sugarcane fields, stealing some of the stalks along the way. During celebrations of the planting season, along with other children, Josua would wait to get the offerings that were used for the traditional rituals. Donomulyo back then was very 'nationalist', according to Josua. People from different religions would visit each other during Christmas or Eid Mubarak. Even when the Catholics were having their communal prayer, the Muslims would join and pray according to their own customs. This situation is different from nowadays, according to Josua, where migrant villagers from outside of Donomulyo have established their lives there and spread a more fundamentalist view. The nationalist view of Josua actually referred to the *abangan* lifestyle (see chapter 1, especially the section on religious conversion), which is characterized by supporting loose boundaries around religious practices.

The relationship between Josua and his father was not an intimate one. As Josua recalls, after his father finished his education at the Teacher's Education School (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/SPG*), he continued to study at the Indonesian Catechist Academy (*Akademi Katekis Indonesia/AKI*) in Jogjakarta. For villagers in Donomulyo, people who gained such a high level of education were highly respected. In my conversation with other villagers, they called Suparman 'Suparman, BA',[13] not only to differentiate

13 The 'BA' (bachelor) here does not necessarily refer to a title after the completion of his studies. It is used more as a nickname.

this particular Suparman from other people in the village with the same name, but also to emphasize his different educational and social status in the community. When Suparman returned to Donomulyo in 1971, he did not only become a teacher in a Catholic school, but also a religious assistant for the Catholic community in Donomulyo. Suparman frequently visited houses of Catholic villagers, led community prayers, assisted in the church masses, or counselled villagers through their family problems. With a schedule that involved teaching in the morning followed by Catechist works in the afternoon until late at night, Suparman could not spend much time with his family. According to Josua, his father used a personal approach to the Catholic community in the village by doing house visits. Josua expressed the opinion that this intense activity resulted in almost no quality time for the family.[14] Furthermore, Josua also explained that his father's parenting style was quite militaristic. The children usually received physical punishment, including instructions to do push-ups and squat jumps. Josua perceived this as the influence of his grandfather, who had a similar parenting style.

Josua's story about Suparman should be analysed in a larger context. His catechist work, which involved spreading Catholic teachings to the locals, took place during the early years of the New Order. This is closely related to the rise of a religious community and political masses that supported the New Order's political party Golongan Karya/Golkar. After the 1965-66 violence, many villagers who were *abangan* (Javanese-traditionalist) had to convert to the formal religions acknowledged by the state. This was part of the state-imposed ideological programme to prevent resurgence of communism in society. In Donomulyo, the number of Catholics who were baptised increased from 378 people in 1960-1965, to 3,472 people in 1966-1970.[15] A church document from 1977 explains that religious life in Donomulyo was still unstable, and therefore, the role of the parish's management (*pengurus paroki*) was to change this situation. To assist with the strengthening of religious life, the Malang Diocese paid one Cathecist and two members from ALMA[16] to support apostolic works.[17] A report from the Carmelite foundation (Yayasan Karmel), presented at a Definitorium meeting on 6 September 1972, analyzed how the Catholics gained support in Donomulyo after the 1965 violence. The writer stated bluntly that the

14 Interview with Josua, 23 May 2017

15 Appendix in Suhadiyono, et. al. 2010. Also see chapter 1.

16 A Catholic association consisting of Catholic nuns who serve disabled people.

17 Soedarmodjo. "Ikhtisar Mengenai Paroki Purworejo Keuskupan Malang," March 5, 1977. Arsip Keuskupan Malang. Keuskupan Malang, Jawa Timur.

Islamic community launched an anti-communist movement and began to kill the communists.[18] The Catholics, who were once collaborators in the anti-communist movement, retreat once the killings occurred. According to the writer, this decision emerged because the Catholics were 'critical and orderly' people. This also influenced the conversion to Catholicism post-1965.[19]

Presumably, Suparman was involved in this kind of work to help the Catholic converts and explain Catholicism to these former *abangan*. Suparman, who was previously a member of the Catholic Party, moved to Golongan Karya/Golkar. Against this political backdrop, it is highly possible that Suparman's 'outreach' work during the early New Order period was geared to transforming previously Leftist villagers into the homogenous political masses of Golkar. As Ken Ward suggests, Golkar's strategy in villages was to use the *tokoh* (local leaders) as agents to generate support and votes from villagers (clients). The *tokoh* in general were not economically powerful individuals, but those who traditionally had influence over the population, such as religious leaders, teachers, and so on.[20] When Suparman was involved in a traditional Javanese performance of *Ketoprak*, the group became the funnel for the government's information, as I described in chapter 3. Suparman was playing this typical role of a New Order patron, a Catholic apostle and a political agent of Golkar, without his family realising what he was really contributing to. For Josua, his father's work was merely a *pelayanan* or service work for the people.

In our conversation, I asked Josua about his father's political activity. The most frequent story that Josua heard from his father was his experience in the AKI (*Akademi Katekis Indonesia-Indonesian Cathecist Academy*) in Jogjakarta. It was in this period that Suparman was encouraged to be involved directly in the community, and not only to study religious texts. The academy also created a strong brotherhood among the students, which they have sustained until the present. Josua, however, did not know much about Suparman's activism in the Catholic Youth organization (*Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia/PMKRI*), let alone his involvement in the anti-communist persecutions. According to Josua, his father's activism in the Catholic Youth organization was automatically attached to his

18 Hogenkamp. "Beberapa Pandangan Mengenai Jajasan Karmel Bagian Pengadjaran (Diterangkan Dan Dibitjarakan Dalam Rapat Definitorium)." 1972. Jajasan Karmel. Arsip Keuskupan Agung Malang, Indonesia.

19 Ibid.

20 Ward 1974, 172.

status as an SPG (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/Pedagogic Academy*) and AKI student. But Josua did not really know what his father did in the Catholic Youth organization. When I asked Josua if he had heard stories about the PKI from his father, he only mentioned the loss of Suparman's siblings in 1948. The cause of their death, according to Suparman, was because his brother and sister were exposed to decomposed bodies in the 1948 Madiun affair. Suparman believed that the Madiun revolt had reached Donomulyo and caused the deaths of a number of villagers, although in the previous chapter, I discussed the difficulty in verifying the connection between an affair in Madiun with Donomulyo. The bodies were in the process of burial when his mother and siblings passed on their way to the market. His siblings fell ill on that same day, and Suparman suspects the bacteria and germs in the corpses led to his siblings' illness and death. Suparman, who was only 3 years old at that time, survived because he stayed at home. Before meeting Josua, I had already heard this same story directly from Suparman, although it is difficult to verify. It is interesting to see that the retold narrative in the family is not related to Suparman's involvement in the 1965-68 violence, but to the 1948 event in Madiun, with an emphasis on his family's loss.

The intergenerational relationship in this case reflects a positioning of the family in relation to the violence. A narrative of the past that is considered important to preserve through generations was the experience of loss against the backdrop of the 1948 Madiun affair. Although Suparman's family members were not direct victims of violence in the Madiun affair, it was important to maintain the portrayal of their family who lost their loved ones as a 'victim'. Suparman's family experience is placed in line with the official portrayal of the Madiun affair; that the PKI was evil and a threat to the nation. Being a victim was an important narrative for the family, not only to remember the loss of the loved ones, but also to reproduce legitimation of annihilating the PKI. In this case, family experience became juxtaposed with the public narrative of anti-communism. Moreover, becoming a victim of the Madiun affair was far more important to be retold compared to Suparman's collaboration in the 1965-66 violence. This might be Suparman's strategy to cope with the past guilt of collaborating in violence – by distancing oneself from it. Therefore, what the second generation understands about their parents is only about the loss that they experienced in 1948 and the involvement in rebuilding the community after the 1965-68 violence through religious and cultural activities. None of these memories contain traces of their parents' collaboration in annihilating the communists and establishing the New Order.

Memories of the Lost Land – The Family of Marwono

The violence that is retold to the second generation often appears in fragments and is sometimes difficult to understand. Interestingly, when these fragments intersect with other sources, for example through Indonesian history education, they construct a comprehensive yet critical understanding of the past. Furthermore, memories of violence in this case are related to the conditions that emerged after the mass killings ended. As in chapter 3, the second generations of the 1965-68 victims also depict the early period of the New Order as a turning point for their family, in which families lost their property.

In previous chapters, we encountered the story of Marwono, a farmer who supported the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia/Indonesian Peasants Front*) in the 1960s. My interaction with him was suspenseful, because it was not until after several meetings that Marwono started to recount his supportive views about the BTI, PKI, and land reform. From here, I became curious whether or not he also shared these views with his children. Marwono has six children, and two of them are living in Donomulyo. The other four are scattered over Malang, Bogor and Surabaya. I first met Burhan, his eldest son, in June 2017. Born in 1963, Burhan went to the elementary and middle school in Donomulyo, but he did not succeed in finishing high school. He originally wanted to study at an engineering school (STM- *Sekolah Teknik Mesin*, vocational school of engineering), but was forced by his parents to enter the Teacher's Education School (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru*/SPG). He did not like it, so after one year, he left school and returned to Donomulyo. Unfortunately, his parents did not have sufficient funds to support his education further. Soon after, he followed his grandfather, who was trying to find work in Malang. Since then, Burhan has migrated to different cities to work. He started as a construction labourer (*buruh bangunan*) in Surabaya, building the famous market *Pasar Atom*. Before the project was finished, he moved to another job in an ice factory in Ngawi. From there, he went to Malang to try several jobs in the craft and convection industry. In 1987, he migrated to Palembang, South Sumatera. He married in 1990 and lived in Malang City with his wife. They returned to Donomulyo in 1999 to settle down and had two children there. Now, his eldest son is still looking for work, and the younger one had almost finished high school at the time I was conducting my fieldwork. Burhan himself is currently working in various jobs, such as a small-scale construction worker and sand miner in the adjacent district of Blitar.

Born before the 1965 violence, Burhan remembered seeing an army officer holding a weapon in the 1968 operation. He was still very young, but he remembered that in this period, his grandfather was summoned by Babinsa (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring official). He was taken and later detained in Koramil (the district-level military command) Donomulyo for 8 months. After he was released, Burhan's grandfather was obliged to report to Koramil every month. In the same way as Marwono, both of them had to follow *santiaji*, an indoctrination programme during the New Order, designed to 're-route' accused communists to the national ideology of Pancasila (see chapter 1). After a few months of *santiaji*, Burhan's grandfather was summoned to produce bricks to build the Trisula community hall. In the previous chapter, Marwono also gave his testimony that the *santiaji* villagers were instructed to bring bricks for the construction of the hall. As the first grandson in the family, Burhan spent a lot of time with his grandfather and he admits that he was much closer to his grandfather than to Marwono.

Burhan told me that he had no knowledge of his father's and grandfather's involvement in the PKI or other Leftist organizations before 1965. This statement should be considered critically. Reflecting on my own process with Marwono in obtaining his views and support on the BTI, it is possible that stories related to Leftist groups before 1965 are not passed on to the children. On the other hand, there is also a probability that Burhan himself was holding back information from me, just as Marwono did on the first occasions of our meeting. Burhan explained that he witnessed directly the violence, encountering an army officer with a weapon and hearing sounds of gunshots. As a five-year-old child, he remembered how frightening the situation was at that time. When he was older, he also heard stories from other villagers about mass graves and that people were killed at these locations. All of these accounts were like fragments or pieces of a puzzle that he obtained directly and indirectly. Another fragment that he acquired emerged during his school years. Burhan's history lessons appeared when I asked him how he knew about the PKI and 30 September Movement:

> When I was in school. Before that, I did not understand the reason (of the violence in Donomulyo). The locals only said *geger*.[21] I knew it from school, through history lessons. They discuss it there that in 1965, there

21 A Javanese word that describes an apocalyptic situation. This is a common word to describe situations of war and violence. I discussed the juxtaposition of the word *geger* with the local violence of 1965-68 in Donomulyo in chapter 3.

> was a revolt of the G30S/PKI in South Blitar. I paid attention, and I dared myself to ask the elderly in the village (on whether or not this is true). … They told me the story (about people being killed). I do not know whether the story is true or not. I think it was related to G30S, but people used the opportunity, taking advantage [for themselves] of the political situation. … About the 30 September Movement, this village was not recorded in history. If there was really a revolt, why wasn't it recorded? Was it really a revolt? Of course, people were afraid, and that is why they hid. They were frightened, they ran away, but they were pursued.[22]

We can see how Burhan's memory of violence combines different fragments that he received since his childhood years. Stories of killings and detention are connected with the state's narrative of the 30 September Movement that he learned from school. Interestingly, these fragments not only resulted in an almost-comprehensive understanding of the violence, but also in scepticism regarding the cause behind it. The history lessons that he received at school were compared with his own experience and other adults in the village. Burhan saw a connection between this national rupture and local violence, and questioned it. He implies that the agenda of exterminating the rebellious communists was not reasonable, and that civilians were also taking advantage of the situation. This is an example of how the official and counter narratives coexist in the younger generation. Different sources of fragments constituted a peculiar postmemory, making the 1965 violence understandable (the violence happened under the pretext of annihilating communists behind the 30 September Movement), but also highly questionable.

Another interesting aspect of Burhan's story relates to land confiscation that happened during the early years of the New Order. One day after his grandfather was released, a Koramil officer came to his grandfather's house. Burhan was there, so he still remembered the incident. The Koramil officer demanded an 'expression of gratitude' because his grandfather was released from detention. Because the family did not have any money, the officer started to raise the idea of giving land as a 'token of appreciation'. The whole process was highly pressurized, Burhan said, because the family was still 'traumatized' (Burhan's own words) from being accused as PKI and then killed or detained. In the end, the family relented in giving up their land. Burhan described this method of creating fear and terror as a common strategy by village officials to mobilize their villagers. Those who

22 Interview with Burhan, 12 July 2017 #12.07-13.43, 01.07.00-01.09.00.

did not comply with or obey requests from the village apparatus could easily be accused of being PKI and taken away from their homes. In the context of land confiscation, Burhan was certain that the village head also obtained advantages from this act. Again, the name Ario Dursam (the military village head or caretaker in Donomulyo during the early New Order period – see chapter 3) appeared during our conversation. Burhan realised that during Ario Dursam's leadership, the village was considered developed. However, Burhan argues that this was done through coercion; people were forced to paint their houses, build roads and construct bamboo fences.

Burhan also went on to explain that corruption and nepotism practices which were once visible during Dursam's leadership still exist in the village. The recent Farmer's Credit (*Kredit Usaha Tani/KUT,* a national farming credit programme) that is currently being implemented in the village exists only in rumours, as the villagers themselves in Burhan's hamlet never received it. It is suspected that the credit is only used by a selected group of villagers. Burhan also explained the common practice of credit corruption in Donomulyo. To access the funds, the village leaders need to gather copies of their villagers' identity cards, either directly or through farmer's groups (*kelompok tani*). The copies have definitely been made, but when the funds had arrived from the central government, they were not distributed to those villagers who gave copies of their identity cards. The funds were used only for the benefit of the village apparatus. Burhan said that during the early years of the Farmer's Credit programme, a number of villagers became rich because of such practices.

For families of victims, such as Burhan and Marwono, the violence in 1965-68 did not end when the killings ended. On the contrary, it continued during the early period of the New Order by instigating fear and oppression amongst villagers. This was an efficient means for local patrons and village apparatus to gain benefits (land, position, status, and so on) under the guise of rural development. In this case, intergenerational memory shows an interconnectedness of the past and present. Second generations linked past violence against the PKI with continuous inequality in the village, marked by a stronger patronage relationship that benefits certain groups, and excludes others. Another important conclusion that we can draw from the case of Burhan's family is the way the second generation uses different fragments of information (sometimes incomplete) to develop an interpretation of the past. This information comes from local and national narratives, showing the co-existence of the state and the counter-narrative that grows not only into understanding of the violence but also criticism of it.

Escaping Lifetime Imprisonment – The Family of Baharjo

Like Burhan, many children of victims experienced the horror of witnessing their parents being taken away during the military operation in 1965-68. However, when it comes to the reason for these detentions, narratives are modified. Involvement and activism in Leftist organizations were usually kept silent or transformed into a different narrative that distanced the parents from such activism. Interestingly, memories of violence are often anchored in objects, which juxtapose domestic elements with a national event. This is illustrated in the case of Baharjo family.

My encounter with the family started when I was trying to search for the living descendants of Donomulyo's first settlers. One of the villagers suggested that I go to the house of Mrs Baharjo, who is currently living with her daughter's family. Our first visit was warmly welcomed by Mrs Baharjo and her daughter, Lastri. From this visit, I understood that Mr Baharjo had died in 1982. Mr and Mrs Baharjo met in Solo, Central Java, when Mr. Baharjo replaced his sister to teach at Mrs Baharjo's school. They got married in 1958 in Solo, and two years later moved to Donomulyo, where Mr Baharjo's parents lived. His father was the first Haji and *penghulu* (state religious officer) in the village. He also owned a large plot of (inherited) land and a slaughterhouse business, which made him one of the wealthiest residents in Donomulyo.

Mrs Baharjo did not get along with her husband's family mostly because of class difference – while Baharjo's family is wealthy, Mrs. Baharjo came from an ordinary farmer's family in Solo. Yet, she managed to stay in Donomulyo until now. During their first years in Donomulyo, Mr Baharjo started working as a teacher in the Catholic middle school and Teacher's Higher Education School (*Sekolah Guru Atas/SGA*) in the district. Mrs Baharjo also worked as a teacher in the local private school Taman Siswa, but she quit to raise their three children. Mr Baharjo was also a vanilla farmer when the crop was one of the important commodities in the area. According to Mrs Baharjo, her husband was a teacher, a businessman, an artist, who was not into activism or political organizations. He also had a good relationship with everybody in the village, including those of different religious backgrounds. Mr Baharjo's father was a close friend to the village's Catholic priest. The priest often visited the family and spent time talking with Baharjo's father. The interaction with the priest made Mrs Baharjo interested in Catholicism and later converted to it, while her husband remained Muslim.

Our conversation became more interesting when I asked Mrs Baharjo about the situation in 1965-68 in Donomulyo. In 1965, Mr Baharjo was

doing business as a kerosene agent. He was on his way to deliver money to his supplier in Porong, another district in Surabaya, but he never returned. Later on, a stranger came to Mrs Baharjo's house with a small note made from a cigarette-box label, informing her that her husband was detained in Koramil Batu (a military district office in another district in Malang). According to Mrs Baharjo, her husband had written that message himself, although she did not recognise the messenger. It is hard to believe that a complete stranger would make a long journey from Batu to Donomulyo only to deliver a small note to Baharjo's family. It may be possible that the messenger was someone who was quite well known by Mr Baharjo, whom his wife did not know (or pretended not to know). Following the message, Mrs Baharjo went to Koramil with her baby and accompanied by her niece:

> My youngest child was just 29 days old. Then I went to Korem in Malang, with my baby. A military officer, his name was Pak Noto, gave the name for my baby, Trisula.[23] I asked him why my husband did not come home. He only said, "I'll take care of it". There were a lot of weapons in his room, terrifying. People said Pak Noto was vicious, tough, but to me, he was very soft. It was because one time, he slept in our place for seven days. Then I was informed that Mr Baharjo can return after 7 days. I picked him up from Koramil in Batu, and then we went to my niece's place in Malang, where she bathed Mr Baharjo. After that, we went home to Donomulyo. But my husband was stressed. He had asthma, and it recurred many times. He saw many things in the detention centre, people were beaten and tortured. We sacrificed a lot in one week. I mean, the guard should be given cigarettes… what do you call it? Incentives. "I want to see this person, sir", then [we should give him] money, food, cigarettes, although we already gave it to the front officer. In the examination desk, we should give another one. In the back, all of the officer's friends should get a portion. … There were a lot of people in Koramil Batu. I don't know if they were PKI or not. They were taken there, and gone at night, nobody knows where. If I didn't fetch him, Mr Baharjo may have been gone too.[24]

Mr Baharjo was one of the more fortunate victims from Donomulyo. His family probably had a certain connection with the military officer in Malang

23 Trisula also refers to the Trisula operation that occurred in 1968. It is not clear why the name Trisula was given to the baby, but it illustrates the close relationship between the officer and the Baharjo family.

24 Interview with Mrs Baharjo, 20 January, 2017 #01.03.33-01.10.53

that Mrs Baharjo mentioned, Mr Noto, who was able to order his release. Another factor was the family's wealth that made them able to bribe the Koramil officers, which was a common practice at that time. In order to escape the killings, detainees had to provide a large amount of 'incentives' for the army officers.[25] Furthermore, based on information obtained from other villagers, Mr Baharjo was not only a farmer and businessman, but he was also one of the leaders of *Pemuda Rakyat* (the youth organization affiliated with the PKI) in Donomulyo.[26] This is highly possible, as Mr Baharjo was not only detained in Donomulyo, but was sent further to Batu, where high-level organization leaders were usually detained.[27] While it's also possible that Mrs Baharjo was not aware of her husband's activism, it is more likely that she was hiding this information and disguised the reason for Mr Baharjo's detention as merely a result of business rivalry. While experiences of violence are easier to discuss with others (including their children), the preceding events, such as activism and involvement in Pemuda Rakyat, are kept hidden. It is highly possible that Mrs Baharjo thinks that this information may put her family in danger, or that it would legitimize the violence against her husband. Mrs Baharjo also told me that she did not tell her children about her husband's detention to avoid it becoming one of the 'bad memories' in the family. In this case, rather than seeing Mrs Baharjo's silence as trauma or fear of repression, I consider her act of silence as an expression of agency – a conscious decision to protect the family, and therefore, to enable them to continue living in the same environment where violence previously erupted.

A few months after my conversation with Mrs Baharjo, and driven by curiosity to explore her children's knowledge of the 1965 violence, I had a chance to talk to her daughter, Lastri. Born in 1966, she spent her elementary and high school years in Donomulyo. After finishing high school, she tried to register for Brawijaya University, but unfortunately was not admitted. Lastri then chose to follow administrative courses and was able to find work in Malang. After three years, she moved to Semarang, Central Java, to work for her brother's shop. She did not like it, so she returned to Donomulyo in 1994. Lastri is now married and her husband works in Kepanjen, another district in Malang. She has two children. The oldest works in Malang city as a cashier in a noodle restaurant,

25 This was also mentioned during the interview with Jono, 23 August 2016.

26 Field notes 26 May 2017. Information from Jono and Suparman.

27 The Pancasila Operation report from the Brawijaya military archive collection also mentioned that activists from Donomulyo were 'secured' in Batu. See chapter 2.

while the second child is a high school student in Donomulyo. When Mr Baharjo died, Lastri was only two months away from her middle-school final exam. Her memory of her father was quite mixed. In one instance, Lastri remembered her father as a smart, art-loving person, but in another instance, she recalled his character as harsh and sometimes used physical punishment to educate his children.

I asked Lastri about her father's detention, curious to know whether or not she acknowledged that event. She immediately told a story similar to Mrs Baharjo's; that her father had been detained in Batu, and her mother had tried to arrange his release. This story was shared by her mother when Mr Baharjo was still alive, including the way the family knew of Mr Baharjo's detention: the message on a cigarette box label sent by an anonymous messenger. Mr Baharjo himself, never said anything about this bitter experience. I asked if Lastri knew why her father was detained, and she explained:

> It was a mistake. My father likes to sew. He was asked to sew a uniform. He didn't know, but it was the uniform of those people. So, he was detained. … It was the uniform of the PKI. … Many villagers disappeared, they were taken by Kodim. We didn't know where. But my father was taken to Batu. … My mother gave compensation. She sold her jewellery. Every time my father got his business profit, my mother bought jewellery with it. That was what she used to released my father.[28]

Lastri described a different reason for her father's detention. While Mrs. Baharjo mentioned business rivalry as a cause for her husband detention, Lastri described it as a misunderstanding of his father's connection to the PKI. In this case, narratives of activism are still distanced in a similar fashion to the way Mrs Baharjo explained the reason for her husband's detention. A progressive organizational involvement was transformed with a reasoning that does not sound harmful: benign business rivalry and sewing uniforms. Since my first visit to the family, Lastri was quick to share her father's art work, which includes a number of decorative sewing patterns, paintings, and sketches. She described her father's talent in art, painting and decoration, which apparently was produced to distance him from the actual progressive character. Remembering Mr. Baharjo in the family was done in such a way that depoliticize him, distancing his figure from leftist activism, and portrayed the causes for his detention as external forces.

28 Interview with Lastri, 26 July 2017 #21.15-24.02

The story of the Baharjo family illustrates another aspect of family memory, the intertwining of personal and national narratives, which resonates with Mary Steedly's work on Sumatran-Karo women who were involved in the 1945-49 independence war. She portrays how major public events are anchored in domestic elements in the memories of these women, such as a white hand towel, bathing, or doing laundry. This illustrates a sort of mnemonic link between then and now, between domestic activities and the grand events of national history, according to Steedly.[29] The intergenerational memory in the Baharjo family also reflects a similar case. Through stories of a cigarette box label, selling jewellery, or sewing a uniform, Mrs Baharjo and Lastri connect their private domain to a much larger and violent historical event. For this family, remembering 1965 is far from memories of 30 September Movement, the kidnapped generals, or anti-communist military operations. The national violence became a story of a wife who tried to release her husband. This is what Luisa Passerini called self-representation that features the personal and collective memory.[30] Moreover, this domestic way of remembering does not mean that they are trivial memories and irrelevant to the discussion of 1965. On the contrary, these memories are a reminder that the national violence *is also* a private matter. This will have an implication on the approaches towards reconciliation and justice, which I will discuss further in the next chapter.

Memories of a Survivor – The Family of Jarso

Postmemory, as Hirsch argues, represents the past not only by recalling the event, but also through imaginative investment, projection, and creation.[31] In the case of the Jarso family, postmemory is constituted upon human rights values, considering the unjust mistreatment of the first generation who became victims in the 1965 violence. While the first generation chose to 'forgive and forget', the second generation may have a different stance, involving a progressive attitude of 'straightening history' (*meluruskan sejarah*). This generational difference has resulted in a memory of violence filled with imagination of a human rights movement, which reflects criticism, disappointment, and anger against the national government.

29 Steedly 2013, 52.
30 Passerini 1987, 19.
31 Hirsch 2012, 5.

Jarso was born in 1942 in Blitar, but later moved with his parents to Donomulyo. After finishing middle school in the local Catholic school and working in various jobs, he decided to join the army in 1960. After following basic training in Kediri and advanced training in Malang, Jarso was assigned as military staff in Situbondo, Jember and Kalimantan. At first, he was prepared to be part of the army's general reserve command (*Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat*/CADUAD) for the West Irian campaign (1961-1962). But rather than being sent to Irian, Jarso was assigned to Kalimantan for the Crush Malaysia campaign (1963- 1966). He was part of Brigade IX, battalion 509 Jember, serving the communication company (*kompi perhubungan*) with five other staff members.

During his assignment in Kalimantan, the 30 September Movement took place. At that moment, Jarso was still serving in his battalion as usual, without any significant ruptures. He was married in 1967, and lived in Jember until September 1971. He was arrested within that year, while still serving his company, and leaving behind his pregnant wife. Jarso and 6 other communication company staff members were detained first in Jember for one month and then transferred to Lowokwaru prison in Malang, where he received the news that his wife had given birth. He did not see his child until his release in 1978. It was also in this prison that Jarso converted to Catholicism. After his release, Jarso went back to his family in Jember, only to discover that his wife had remarried and rejected Jarso's return. After that, Jarso decided to return to and live in Donomulyo.

Jarso was detained because his commander was accused of being involved in the 30 September Movement. At that time, Jarso had lived in a rented room in his commander's house, who already died in 1962. The fact that his commander had already died when the September movement erupted, made the accusation of Jarso's involvement even more incomprehensible. During his detention, Jarso was interrogated with questions about the commander's guests who visited his house and about Jarso's family-like relationship with the commander. During Jarso's imprisonment in Lowokwaru, he met around one thousand military officers and staff members from other brigades and regions. Even before Jarso was captured in September 1971, many of his fellow staff members had already been detained. Looking at this period and the number of the military staff's detention, it is very likely that this act was part of the East Java's New Orderization campaign (see chapter 2). In this campaign, led by East Java's military commander M. Jasin, a purge was launched against government and military officials, to 'clean' those institutions from communism and to ensure support for the New Order. This explains why Jarso was detained

years after his commander died in 1962, because the communist label was not only attached to individuals but to the whole group and institutions where individuals were assigned. Apparently, Jarso was one of the victims of this state campaign.

Ever since his release, Jarso's identity card was marked ET (*Eks-Tapol*/ Ex-political prisoner) and he was assigned to follow the *santiaji* programme. Despite all of this, Jarso did not find it difficult to reconnect to society with his ET background. There was no significant stigmatization from other people in the neighbourhood. According to Jarso, being an ex-political prisoner in Donomulyo was very common; many other villagers shared the same situation because the area used to be a PKI base. Five years after he moved to Donomulyo, he married a local resident and had three children. His eldest son lives in Pasuruan and works in a mineral water factory. The second child, his daughter, lives in Gresik, and Jarso's youngest son is currently following an education in Malang to become a Catholic priest. Although Jarso's pension fund was abolished right after his imprisonment, he is able to finance his family from their small grocery store (*warung*), timber plantation (on Jarso's inherited land), and his wife's income as a migrant worker. According to Jarso, he never told his children about his imprisonment because he did not want it to be "a burden for this family" (*menjadi beban untuk keluarga*).

Curious to discuss the family's experience of 1965 (I only approached Jarso's current family, and not the family from his first wife), I went to meet Rio, Jarso's youngest son, at his education centre in Malang. Born in 1994, he spent his elementary school years in Donomulyo and joined the Catholic seminary in 2009. A dominant topic in our conversation was Donomulyo's latest phenomenon: migrant workers. According to Rio, waves of migrant workers from Donomulyo that went abroad to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia,and other countries brought massive changes to the cultural life in his village. Lifestyle in Donomulyo has become increasingly cosmopolitan, while traditions and interactions between villagers have lost their communal character. The conversation also addressed the fact that Rio's mother worked as a migrant worker in Brunei for approximately 10 years.

From a young age, Rio was already involved in managing their family's small grocery store. As his brother and sister had their own families and moved out of the village, Rio was the only child left in the house. When I asked him about his father, he immediately explained that Jarso was an ex-army officer, but was imprisoned because his commander was involved in the 30 September Movement. I was surprised to hear about this, because Jarso said that he never mentioned this past to any of his family members.

Even his wife did not know about this part of her husband's life.[32] I asked Rio about how he had obtained the information:

> Father told me directly. … I heard it when I was in junior high school, but I was not paying close attention. When I was in the seminary, I understood it. Because I had already learned history, so I knew more and became more aware. There was more information that I obtained from school. When I was in the seminary or junior high, father's ex-military friends, the ex-political prisoners, gathered and applied for a court appeal in Jakarta, to clean their names, that they were innocent. They succeeded. They were cleared; they were innocent and were only victims. Their retirement funds are now accessible. Previously, because of the case, they did not receive their pension funds. When the court decided that they were only victims, the funds were released again. But my father did not want to take it, because the amount was very low. He was probably already offended by the imprisonment.[33]

I was really surprised and confused when I heard Rio's side of the story. At first glance, I sensed a similar interconnectedness between the official and counter-narrative as in the case of Burhan, son of Marwono. Rio's memory fragment of his father's detention was not easily understood, but became clearer once Rio was exposed to history lessons at school. But when he continued his story, matters became more complicated, at least for me as an outsider. First, contrary to what Jarso told me, Rio seemed to know more about his father's imprisonment – about his father's innocence, victimisation, and the halted retirement fund. More than that, Rio even shared a story that I never heard before from Jarso himself: the court appeal case. In a situation in which the 1965-68 violence had not yet been resolved in Indonesia, a court appeal by a group of ex-political prisoners had to be a huge breakthrough. The only court appeal that resembles Rio's story is the one arranged by Indonesia Legal Aid (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/LBH*) together with a number of ex-political prisoners of 1965-68 in 2005 through the Central Jakarta Court. They prosecuted five Indonesian presidents from Suharto to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for their complicity in the 1965 violence.[34]

32 In my first meeting with Jarso, we were introduced by Suparman. During our conversation, Jarso already started to share his experience related to 1965. His wife was sitting beside him during our visit, and at the end of our meeting, she admitted that she never knew about this particular story.

33 Interview with Rio, 6 June 2017 #25.30-27.18.

34 For the court appeal case, see Conroe 2017.

The victims demanded rehabilitation and financial compensation for their losses, but the result was disappointing. Meanwhile, what involvement Jarso had in this court appeal was hazy, at best. Rio was pretty certain that he remembered seeing preparation meetings at his house where many of his father's fellow officers came from outside of Malang. Rio even argued that they won the case.

I was very puzzled with this conflicting account between father and son. After my meeting with Rio, I thought that Jarso did not tell me his whole story. With an agenda to clear up this confusion, once again, I approached Jarso. I asked him directly whether or not a court appeal had taken place, without stating explicitly that I obtained this information from Rio. Interestingly, Jarso was also surprised at this information and said that such a thing never took place. He repeatedly emphasized that he was already 'at peace' after his release. Jarso also explained that he had no resentment against the government nor a drive to demand the rehabilitation of his name. He is quite satisfied with his current life. He even generates more income from his shop compared to his retirement fund for serving the country. In Jarso's own words, he was 'saved by God' and has reconciled his life.[35] When he repeated that he never told his family about his imprisonment, I asked him how Rio knew about this. Jarso suspected that the story was told by his ex-wife's family in Jember, as they are still in contact. Their relationship may have come to the fore during Rio's admission to the seminary, where the pastors usually investigate the background of each candidate meticulously. I realised that I had taken a step to interfere with a family's life by confronting a son's story with his father's. Therefore, I decided not to take further actions to verify Jarso's family story. However, the intergenerational memory of Jarso's family shows an interesting distortion that has resulted in a whole new narrative about the past. This narrative may be constituted out of hope or an 'imaginative investment', as Hirsch's describes, for justice against victims of the 1965-68 violence.

My assumption about Rio's imaginative reconstruction became stronger when I heard about his views on his father's status as an ex-political prisoner. He clearly stated that he was proud of his father's survival of the years in prison, especially because he was not guilty. His family story became a sort of 'testimony' of hardship and survival in his circle. For example, during a workgroup about 1965 in his history class, Rio combined his family's history with the textbook information. He also shared his father's experiences during a few sessions of a Catholic group-faith meeting, where life stories

35 Fieldwork notes, conversation with Jarso, 26 July 2017

are used as testimonies of God's power. Rio continued to explain to me his concerns about history lessons, which he thinks are urgently in need of revision. He stated that a 'true' history is needed to replace the fabricated previous version. But Rio doubts whether this will happen, because he thinks that the government is no longer interested in such issues. From his statements, I assume that Rio, to some extent, has an understanding of human rights values. Depicting 1965 as a fabricated history by the government, Rio stressed the need to straighten out the details of history (*meluruskan/membenarkan sejarah*). In his own way, Rio tried to advocate the victims based on his father's case, by telling his family's experience of violence to a wider audience. At the same time, Rio may feel the injustice and anger of mistreatment of his father, and perhaps became disappointed about his father's non-confrontational attitude. With his background in mind, I understand why such an imagination of a progressive advocacy for victims of the 1965-68 violence appeared in Rio's narrative.

The intergenerational memory in the case of Jarso's family shows the complexity of how memory works. Not only does it illustrate the entanglement between the official and counter narrative about the past, but also about the future. To be precise, about *how the future should be* for the family. Past injustices are projected towards the future, which resulted in testimonies of survival, and in a larger discourse, to advocate the national history. Through the study of children of ex-political prisoners of 1965-66, Andrew Conroe pointed to these similar intergenerational linkages that also trigger a challenge to the state's authority.[36] Furthermore, this intergenerational memory actually took shape within silence in the family, for example, Jarso's attitude to not directly describe details of his imprisonment to Rio. However, fragments of information received by the second generation from various sources (such as other families, school textbooks) outside the first generation, constitute a narration of criticism, confrontation and progressive approach against the state. Silence in the family, in this case, became elevated into a projection of justice.

Beyond Families

Outside family circles, narratives of violence also circulate among younger generations in Donomulyo. There are at least three contexts where these stories appear: in places or sites of violence (I have elaborated this in

36 Conroe 2012, 216.

chapter 4), communal celebrations, and history lessons at school. All of them show intersections between private or family experiences with the national grand narrative of anti-communism. By examining how stories circulate in these contexts, we shall see how young generations are continuously exposed to narratives of violence, despite the ongoing official narrative that denies this revealing.

To explore how young generations in a rural context are exposed to stories of the 1965-68 violence, I conducted two focus group discussions (FGD) in two different hamlets. Most of the participants were members of the youth organization *Karang Taruna*, which exists in every hamlet in the district, although not all of them are active. Unfortunately, this mechanism of gathering participants through *Karang Taruna* resulted in FGDs filled with male villagers age 20 to 40. This reflects how youth (*orang-orang muda/ pemuda*) is interpreted in rural Indonesian society, which is predominantly men in their 20s (and possibly) up to mid-40s. As a result of rural-urban migration, only a small number of young people in their productive age stayed in the village, while others left agricultural work to work in urban areas or even to go to foreign countries as migrant workers. The trend of the migrant workforce is also one of the contributing factors to the lack of females in youth organizations.

Even in such a male-dominated discussion, many of the family experiences of violence emerged in the discussions. The first context where stories of violence usually appear is through stories of places in the village. During these discussions, villagers mentioned some of the mass killing sites that they heard from their parents, grandparents, or aging neighbours. Sometimes young villagers occasionally saw offerings (*sesajen*) placed on the road or in the middle of the rice field, to commemorate the victims of mass killings. These offerings are part of Javanese practices to pay respect to the spirits of the deceased. For example, in one of the discussions, the youth group mentioned a mass grave located in a five-intersection in a nearby hamlet. The regular offerings at the location mark the mass grave in the absence of a tombstone or other commemorative signs. Another site that was also mentioned in the discussion was the 'lost lands' that were confiscated after 1968. Young people heard stories about certain locations that they pass on their way to do farming work (such as tilling, looking for grass to feed the cattle, checking irrigation, and so on) with their parents or other adults. These locations were previously owned by a villager that they know, but were confiscated after 1968. In other words, certain locations trigger memories about the 1965-68 violence, and it is through these places that stories were retold to the younger generations.

The second context where stories of violence has emerged is during traditional communal activities. One example that the youth explained was the tradition of birth celebrations (*slametan*). In Javanese tradition, when a baby is born, extended family members and neighbours will gather continuously for five or sometimes seven days in the new-born family's house. This is the community's contribution to the family, to assist the recovering mother, care for the new-born, and ensure that the whole family stays healthy. During these traditional rituals, villagers usually gather until late at night and it is then that stories of the 1965-68 are usually unfolded, sometimes in passing, but also often in great detail.[37] Horrifying stories of the 1965-68 killings often appear at this moment (similar to the FGD excerpt in chapter 4). These communal activities became an opportunity for interaction for young and old people to talk about the past.

The third context, and also the most intriguing one, of exposure to stories of violence exists through history lessons in schools. Besides two FGDs with village youths, I also visited two high schools in the village. One is a private school called Taman Siswa high school and the other is a *Madrasah Aliyah Negeri* or MAN (state-sponsored Islamic high school). In both schools, I was only able to talk to the teachers and not to the students, because another formal mechanism of a permit is needed to arrange discussions with the students. Nevertheless, by talking to the teachers, I understood that the topic of 1965 history is the most debated issue in class. The internet has become increasingly accessible for the students in those schools, which contributes to the exposure to diverse information about 1965. According to the teachers, students show a high level of curiosity, asking which version of history is true.[38] Since 2003, the Indonesian Ministry of Education has taken major steps to transform the educational curriculum to replace their top-down approach and accommodate diversity in educational level, local potentials and students' capabilities. This curriculum is known as the Competency-Based Curriculum (*Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi*, KBK), and it also gives teachers the independence to develop their own teaching

37 Focus Group Discussion RT 15, 15 May 2017.

38 The history textbook for class XII (high school) released by the Ministry of Culture and Education explains seven different analyses about the actors behind the 30 September Movement. However, the New Order version of the 30 September Movement still resonates in the textbook, by depicting the event as a threat to the nation's integration and by presenting a simplified narrative of the 1948 Madiun event (Abdurakhman et al. 2018). However, information on 1965 that is available on the internet covers many other aspects of the violence, (i.e. victims' experiences of violence) which does not always match information in the textbooks.

materials.[39] It seems that this curriculum has made significant changes in the discussion of 1965 in history classes. Teachers usually return to textbooks as references, and keep the debate as an open discourse, without drawing conclusions based on only one interpretation of history.[40] Moreover, from the experience of one teacher, a student also brings his/her family's experiences to the class. It is usually the grandparents' experience as victims, or stories of mass killings that they have heard from the village elderly, that were never mentioned in the textbooks.

The contexts that I discussed above show that even when the official narrative still dominates national history, other narratives of violence still circulate in localities. This is one of the effects of Reformasi, where there is more room to talk about the violence compared to the years of the New Order. As a result, current younger generations are slowly acknowledging stories of violence. In the case of Donomulyo, village youth are being introduced to the 1965-68 violence through history education, communal activities, and stories about sites. Through these channels, narratives about families have expanded to others outside the family circle, and sometimes mingle with the formal narrative.

Conclusion

All of the family stories in this chapter shows that memory transfer from one generation to the other is not a linear process. Postmemory, how the subsequent generations remember a particular event, in this case is very much connected to various elements, such as post-violence context, private experiences, and silence. In some cases, memory of the past is connected to the present, such as the case of Marwono's family, who remembered 1965 as the turning point that increased inequality and clientelistic practices in the village. Postmemory in the second generation also reflects interconnectedness between the public and the private, or the local and the national narratives. In the family of Suparman, private experiences were retold to sustain the image of the PKI as troublemakers. Meanwhile, in the case of the Baharjo family, the national event was coined in private elements in their family.

39 Leksana 2009, 184-5.

40 According to the teachers in Jakarta, this is kept open because the main objective of history lessons is for students to be able to analyze historical events, rather than concluding the truth. See Leksana. 'Reconciliation Through History Education', ibid. From another conversation with a teacher in 2006, returning to the textbook is recommended for students to be able to pass the exam, although the teachers discuss more materials than those in the textbooks.

Furthermore, intergenerational memory in these families also illustrates the co-existence between the formal and counter narrative. Violent experiences within families are linked to history lessons about the 30 September Movement to develop a comprehensive understanding of the past.

These family cases also point to the dominant existence of silence in families, which is not always the same as forgetting or the absence of narratives. Silence may be a covert expression of guilt for collaborators by distancing themselves from the violence, as in the case of Suparman's family. It can also be projected into an imaginative investment of reconciliation and justice, as reflected by the case of Jarso's family and the court case that did not take place. All of these practices show that silence is not merely an expression of trauma, but also a navigating device, a strategy to be able to continue living together in a community where members have had different positions in the violence, either as individuals who participated and benefited from the violence or as those who were harmed by it. To add to Hirsch's concept of postmemory, the way young generations remember the 1965-68 violence is not merely within family relations, but also in larger communal interactions. In rural contexts, such as Donomulyo, traditional communal activities, sites of violence, and history education provide spaces where stories of violence circulate.

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Conclusion

Embedded Remembering, Historiography, and National Reconciliation

Abstract

The study in Donomulyo points to some general conclusions on memory politics that relate to the manifestation of power in everyday life, the co-existence and interrelatedness of different narratives, and the interpretation of silence. This case study was also able to bring some reflections on methodology and historiography in Indonesia, especially regarding studies of violence. Another reflection is related to reconciliation and transitional justice, including an important note on the limitations of a human rights approach. Donomulyo shows the importance of going beyond the question of perpetratorship and victimhood and exploring the issues of massive transformation following violence and how societies deal with it.

Keywords: reconciliation, transitional justice, microhistory, Indonesian historiography, state violence, collective memory.

For many decades after *Reformasi* (a turning point in Indonesia's democratic era in 1998), scholars and human rights activists believed that the different ways of remembering 1965 violence were created by the repressive anti-communist memory projects of the state, in this case, the New Order. These projects, which used various media (museums, monuments, books, films, commemoration days, and so on), constructed the official memory that centred around the 30 September Movement and the death of the seven army officers. In contrast, the violent military operations in 1965-66 and 1968 in East Java, including the deaths of more than 500,000 people, were mostly suppressed from the public discourse. In this case, scholars and human rights activists perceive Indonesia's collective memory of 1965-66 as a manifestation of power in memory politics – the power in this case lies in

Leksana, G.T., *Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia: Embedded Remembering*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023
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the hands of the state, where they decide how the public should remember 1965. However, through this local study in the Donomulyo district, I argue that this is not the complete case. Society's different ways of remembering occurred because memories are also embedded in their local context, in the rural situation where violence erupted and where people continued to live together in the aftermath of the event. Power in memory-making, then, resembles not state power in central politics, but its concrete existence in daily life, manifested in authority figures such as the rural elites, *Babinsa*, army officers, village heads, and other patrons on which villagers' lives depend. This embeddedness also demonstrates that memory is a social act. In the context of mass violence, memory becomes a strategy to survive, to continue living as a community in the aftermath of violence, and to reconcile an individual experience of violence in the past with the present. Memory is also a historical process, it develops through time by interpreting information that is collected gradually over time, including transformations that occurred at the national level, such as the end of the authoritarian regime that led to advocacies of the 1965-66 violence. The community's interpretation of the past is therefore not static, because it changes when the context transforms.

The backbone of this study elaborates further Maurice Halbwachs's theory of collective memory, in which he argues that memory is not an individual act, but a communal process influenced by the collective framework in society. How and what we remember is part of society's existing thoughts and values, which in this case provide meaning to memories of violence. However, as society is not static, collective memory is also malleable. Therefore, studying collective memory is also a study of its shifting social framework. The changing contours of Donomulyo's agrarian society, from colonial era to post-New Order, presents a perfect example. One of the highlights of this changing framework are the inequality and patronage relationships that remain consistent under the changing state. One of the factors that created this *longue durée* of clientelist features in rural society is the fact that rural elites were also gaining benefits through their alliance with the state. In the colonial era, village authorities played a role as brokers of tax collection, land rent, and labour for the colonial government or plantation administrators. In return, these village elites received money or employment in colonial companies or government offices. These practices exacerbated the inequality in the village: those who are in the network with the colonial patrons gain economic and social advantages, while those outside the networks are left with nothing. In the 1950s to early 1960s, the leftist movement started to criticize the growing rural inequality, the dominance of rural elites in

controlling rural resources, and continuous marginalization of peasants. However, their progressive movement ended along with the anti-communist military operation in 1965-66. When the New Order established its power in rural areas, new alliances of patrons were formed between the local elites and the military. While tracing the village's history, we can see that the state does not reside far away in central-national politics, but is actually manifested through these rural patrons. This reflects Joel Migdal's theory of the state in society, where he argues that instead of residing at the top of a hierarchical structure, the state works through a complex network in society.[1] This complex network of state and society culminated during the anti-communist violence in 1965-66. By analyzing the Brawijaya military archives, I argue that the military itself was never an independent state body, but a political one which continuously (re)established its alliance with civilians. Readings of the archives pointed to the fact that the killings in East Java, although they began in late October 1965, became massive and intense because the military activated its coalition with civilians. Documents on the Pancasila operation in East Java explicitly described the use of civilian groups in the annihilation operation of communists. However, these civilians also carried their own agendas during the violence, ranging from organizational or ideological reasons to individual motives. In other words, civilians were also obtaining advantages from their cooperation with the army. The findings that I discuss in this chapter strengthen previous studies on the 1965-66 violence in Aceh and Banyuwangi that stress the role of the army in orchestrating the violence against civilians. The study in Aceh even goes as far as concluding that the violence was an act of genocide. Adding to these findings, the study in Donomulyo highlighted the mutualistic (yet unequal) cooperation between the army and civilians, where the latter gained benefits from this coalition in the New Order period.

The study of Donomulyo posits localities as central in remembering violence. Local patrons connect the local and national, influencing how villagers understand and remember the violence that they experienced in their area. For some people, usually those who have close ties with the state through the patronage network and who benefited from the violence, their memories reflect a similar construction of the state's narrative of the violence – for example, expressing the need to eliminate the PKI, because they were troublemakers in the village. While others, who experienced great losses after the violence, became critical of the official narrative. Some even perceived the advocacy of PKI and BTI against landlords and

1 Migdal 2007.

local elites as a means to break the patronage relationship in the village, but this movement ended along with the anti-communist military operations. Furthermore, for the community, their memories of violence are not about the violent acts per se, but also about what the violence brings to the village. Vanessa Hearman, in her study of the violence in South Blitar, also portrays the connection of the violence with transformations that occurred in the aftermath.[2] In the case of Donomulyo, memories of violence are also connected to the rural transformation that occurred in its aftermath, particularly during the early New Order period. Therefore, the question of 'who gets what after the violence', also constitutes memories of the 1965-66 violence. Moreover, to be able to continue their lives in the aftermath of violence, silence became a tool for survival, a navigating device (more than merely an expression of trauma) that enables perpetrators, collaborators, victims, bystanders and their families to continue their lives in a community.

This case study in a rural community also highlights that memories of violence did not diminish even under state repression. Narratives of violence travel within communities through stories of places, or what Pierre Nora called sites of memory. Through examining these sites in Donomulyo, I describe how, rather than representing the past, these sites function more as a negotiating instrument in the present, as they are always in a dialogical process with their surrounding society. In some cases, sites of memory are used as a means for social mobilization, connecting villagers to a new patron. When these sites lose their meaning in the present, the patronage network that surrounded them is also weakened. This study also shows that sites that were built by the state are losing their function in the present, while sites that are maintained by the community, such as mass graves, remain meaningful not only for the family of victims, but also for a larger public who seek spiritual guidance.

Family is another context where narratives of violence also exist. Post-memory has been a useful concept in analysing intergenerational memory of violence. By looking at narratives in families, we can see how memories of violence are preserved in a complex way, through interconnectedness of the past and present, and between the private and the public sphere. Silence is also another dominant aspect in family narratives. However, silence in this context is not a form of repressive trauma, but a resilient mechanism to deal with the past. These silences enable communities to navigate and continue living together in the present society in which people had different

2 Hearman 2018.

roles in the violence. Therefore, it is important to examine these silences, and to study how and why they emerge.

Furthermore, although this study is conducted in a particular district in East Java, I believe the results point to some general aspects in studies of collective memory in post-violence societies. First, as the case studies also show, power in memory politics is manifested in everyday life. Zooming into people's everyday lives illuminates the complexities of remembering, the different representations of the past, and more importantly, their connections with the present. Second, there is no single collective memory. Even for a devastating event such as the 1965-66 violence, there are different ways in which societies remember the event. Moreover, these different narratives are not negating each other, but tend to co-exist and become interrelated. Third, silence should not be disregarded. It is not the same as forgetting or an absence of knowledge, but on the contrary, silence is also a different way of remembering, an active strategy to reconcile the past and present. Therefore, studying memories should also pave the way to studies on silences and their dynamics.

Insights on Methodology and Historiography in Indonesia

To a larger extent, while moving towards the end of my research, there are two things that linger in my thoughts. The first is how research on memory can contribute to a larger discussion on Indonesian historiography, and not only constitute research that adds to 'revealing the truth'. The second is how these research findings can bring insights to the discussion of reconciliation in Indonesia.

Regarding the first, I realised that this research is being conducted decades after Reformasi, in times where we are still working to demilitarize and decentralize Indonesia's historiography.[3] Research on 1965 has made significant contributions to the discussions on methods of researching Indonesia's history. The use of oral sources, the detachment from the state's historiography, the criticism of military-centric history; are some of the issues that research on the 1965 violence has highlighted. However, as Degung Santikarma discussed in his article, while 1965 is a good case to reflect about power in history, and to advocate for the straightening of history

3 Both of these agendas were expressed by history students in Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta and Universitas Andalas, Padang, in September 2000. Schulte Nordholt, Purwanto, and Saptari 2008, 20.

or *pelurusan sejarah*, we are still using the state conception of 'history' in the same way that they write our national historiography.[4] In other words, in the case of 1965, history has become a zero-sum game to create one dominant narrative. The obsession with making private narratives of violence as public narrative has geared scholars and activists to construct a monolithic counter narrative which tends to overlook the complexities and different ways of remembering.

I am not suggesting that the method in this local study is a remedy to such a case. But while working in the field, I encountered different conceptions, or we can say local conceptions of history. For villagers, 1965 is not about the kidnapped generals in the 30 September Movement, but about a wife's experience of releasing her husband, a farmer who lost his land, and collaborators who aim for an upward mobility of their social status. Through their narratives, a different kind of history is written and more importantly, an interaction between the structural and the individual is developed. History, in this case, is no longer about grand narratives of heroes and nation. History manifests itself in everyday life in the village, and it is the villagers who define what their nation is. Therefore, local history is not only a counter to the national or the state, as Santikarma reminds us, but an exploration of a new meaning of nationhood and citizenship through various historical events.

Reflecting on the case study of Donomulyo, there are two aspects that can be elaborated further in studies of state violence in order to contribute critically to a nation's historiography. First, is to go beyond a national or centralistic examination of the state. As most of this violence occurred at the local level, it is more significant to look at how and in what ways the state is actually manifested at these levels. This will also enable us to see the dynamics that surrounded and contributed to the violence. Second, although the aim of studying cases of violence usually is to answer the question how the violence occurred, it is also important to go beyond the violence per se, and examine situations before and after the violence. This will enable researchers to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the losses and gains of state violence. Moreover, by looking at processes that occurred before and after the violence, this can shed light on how violence fundamentally transforms nationhood. These two aspects should be elaborated further to develop an alternative strategy to the human rights approach that has its limitations in studying cases of state violence in the past. For example, the use of victims' narratives in research on 1965 may

4 Santikarma 2008, 202-3.

romanticize the narratives and fall into a historiography of sympathy and empathy, while moving further from the attempt to contribute to critical historiography.[5] This is not to suggest that victims' narratives should not be used anymore, but these types of sources should be analysed more broadly than merely focusing on the injustices that they experienced.

Insights on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice – Limitations of the Human Rights Approach

Although providing suggestions for reconciliation is far beyond the scope of this research, it is impossible not to think about how this research could add to the existing movement of reconciliation. Years before I started this research, I was involved in different advocacies for the victims of the 1965 violence. I was quite exposed to concepts and works on human rights, transitional justice, and reconciliation. The human rights framework has contributed greatly to the progress of advocacy for the victims of past human rights violations through numerous political, legal and cultural strategies. However, when listening to the villagers' ideas and conceptions of justice and reconciliation in Donomulyo, I realised that the human rights framework, to some extent, tends to gloss over important things that occurred at the local level. A perfect example is the practice of silence. Under the human rights approach, silence is seen as a result of state repression and an expression of trauma and stigmatization of being PKI. However, for villagers, silence is a way to reconcile their past experiences and their present livelihood. Understanding their silence provides an insight that nobody, neither victims, perpetrators nor bystanders of violence, is autonomous to speak of their past. There are always 'strings attached', be it to their own family, neighbours, friends, or even their local patrons, which influence the representations of the past. This complexity shows that victimhood or advocacies against injustice itself does not necessarily influence the victim's ability to speak about their own mistreatment.

Another point that shows the limitation of the human rights approach in reconciliation is the conception of the state as an autonomous body in executing state violence. This conception leads to advocacy practices that solely target the state. In other words, it is only the state that is seen to be responsible for the mass violence. I agree that the state should be held responsible, particularly because the military had structurally mobilized

5 Purwanto and Adam 2005, 24.

and facilitated the violence which became massive and bloody. But I also cannot deny that civilians were highly involved in this violence, often voluntarily, carrying their own ideas and agendas. It is true that the military politically orchestrated the extermination of communists, but it is also us, Indonesia's middle class, who killed, excluded, stigmatized, and erased the left from our own history. The responsibility, then, lies not only with the state, but also with us, as citizens.

The human rights approach also brings us to the discussion of categorizing the 1965 violence as a case of genocide. Scholars and activists have been working intensively to gather evidence that this event should be considered as such a case, even though there is still an ongoing debate on the definition of genocide itself. The analysis of the Brawijaya documents that I used in chapter 3 adds to this evidence of the intent and structural nature of the violence. I do agree that within international and national contexts, the genocide status can apply a certain pressure on the Indonesian state, and also provide some leverage to the victims advocating for their rights. However, I doubt that this status significantly contributes to the discussion on reconciliation. In the case of 1965, arguing that this state violence is an act of genocide will only have an impact at the judicial level. But at the community level, this legal conception is interpreted differently. It becomes losses of family members and properties, insecurity, repression, trauma, and many other things that locals portrayed as *gégér* (a Javanese term that refers to turmoil, chaos, a nearly-apocalyptic situation). Therefore, in order to have more fruitful insights on reconciliation, it is important to go beyond the attempts to prove that specific examples of state violence were acts of genocide or crimes against humanity, and move closer to examining how societies actually deal with such violence.

I do not suggest that the human rights approach should be neglected in formulating the reconciliation of 1965 violence. What I would like to suggest is to shift the discussion of reconciliation from topics of perpetratorship and acts of violence (which is usually the case in the human rights approach) to issues of massive transformation following violence and how societies deal with these transformations. Think not only about generals who authorized military operations against communists, but also about villagers who lost their land to village authorities or about performers of *Ketoprak* who could never perform again. Reconciliation, then, should consider how to re-create spaces, relationships, connectivity and knowledge that were destroyed after the violence, not only for victims and perpetrators of violence, but also for the generations after. Reconciliation, after all, is not an issue between perpetrators and victims alone, but a matter for the whole nation.

Grassroots communities and organizations have moved towards this idea of national reconciliation. For example, victims' organizations, such as Pakorba (*Paguyuban Korban Orde Baru*/Community of Victims of New Order) and YPKP 1965 (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan*/Research Institute of Victims of 1965 Killings), are still attempting to reveal the truth about the 1965 violence by recording mass graves, particularly in Java. Other religious communities, such as Syarikat of NU, have initiated reconciliation between former perpetrators of NU and victims in their local regions. However, what seems to be the current development is the growing tendency of younger generations – those who did not directly experience the violence nor belong to families who experienced the violence – to discuss the violence in 1965. Digital platforms such as 65 Setiap Hari, FIS 65, Ingat 65 are some of the examples of youth engagement on this issue. Not to mention other creative expressions to commemorate the violence, such as theatre performances, films, or exhibitions, that are arranged by groups of young artists.

All of these practices show that 1965 has moved further from a matter between perpetrators' and victims' groups, and is becoming a matter of Indonesia's nationhood. In the future, I believe these socio-cultural (as distinct from legal) approaches will expand and develop, taking different forms, involving different people, and more importantly, raising more questions about how we, as a nation, should deal with the violence.

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