Glenn J. Ames

Renascent Empire?

The House of Braganza and the Quest for Stability in
Portuguese Monsoon Asia,
ca.1640-1683

B A R D E S

Amsterdam University Press

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Dedicated to the memory of:
Luis Anibal Teixeira Sa-Pernandes (1920-1998)
Scholar, Humanist, *e o meu tio*

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Acknowledgments

This study began more than a decade ago in somewhat predictable academic fashion. In the summer of 1983, I first traveled to Lisbon to undertake archival work relating to my doctoral dissertation in French history at The University of Minnesota on Jean-Baptiste Colbert's attempt to break into the Indian Ocean trade. My original intent at that time was to search the Portuguese archives for references to Colbert's strategy, and in conjunction with archival work in the Netherlands, England, and France to compile a more complete analysis of his *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* and the Third Dutch War in Asia than had hitherto been attempted. In the midst of that quest, I quickly became enamored with both Portugal and the Portuguese. Much to my surprise, I also discovered that virtually no scholarly work had been completed on the *Estado da Índia* for the period coinciding with Colbert's grand Asian project. Just as importantly, after a good deal of time poring over manuscript documents relating to the *Estado*, I became convinced that the main historiographical orthodoxy of the rather scant literature that did exist seemed to be at odds with what the manuscript sources contained. The traditional view had postulated a radical, sustained, almost inevitable decline, for the late eighteenth century *Estado*, while the documents I perused suggested an earnest effort at change, reform, and rehabilitation. Thus began a new quest that has mandated more than three years in the archives of Lisbon and Goa, and concurrently the opportunity to indulge my growing passion for Portuguese history and culture.

The academic validity of the cliché "everyone loves a winner", and a variety of other factors, have long conspired to largely reduce the rich history of Portugal to the backwaters of scholarly scrutiny in the United States. The number of monographs and articles published each year on Portuguese history remains small in comparison to those that appear on the national histories of the other European powers such as France, Britain, Germany or Italy. Academic positions for specialists in Portuguese history are also rare. Even the amount of space devoted to Portugal in the textbooks we utilize in our introductory courses remains minuscule: with the obligatory section on Prince Henry the Navigator and Albuquerque and then a dearth of information for 400 years or so when we find a reference to Salazar, the *Estado Novo*, and the decolonization warfare of the 1960s and 1970s. This state of affairs is indeed sad, since the Portuguese ex-

perience both at home and overseas furnishes vital comparative evidence for the historian of the medieval, early modern, and modern periods. As this study will hopefully demonstrate, the major structural and intellectual shifts affecting Europe during the age of absolutism were well reflected in Portugal. During the Aviz and Braganza periods, the kingdom retained a reputation and importance for contemporary European powers that belies the scant attention it has received in modern historiography. Moreover, it is clear that early modern Portugal was far from the rigid, traditional society that some historians have postulated. Elements within both the privileged estates and the middle class embraced theoretical and material innovations of Baroque Europe and sought to adapt them to the Portuguese model. As this study will show, men like the Prince Regent Pedro of Braganza and the Viceroy Luis de Mendonca Furrado had learned from the example of the Dutch and English Companies and utilized such lessons on their own reformation campaign of the Asian empire.

In the course of the research for this study, I have obviously accumulated a long list of both personal and professional debts. First, I would like to thank Anne Blais who originally convinced me of the wisdom of the research trip to Lisbon for the Colbert project and who helped tremendously with the language at the outset. At the *Filмотeca Ultramarina Portuguesa*, the entire staff was incredibly generous with their time and support, in particular the late D. Filomena Duke Goncalves Colombo Games and D. Maria Augusta da Veiga e Sousa. The directors and staffs at the Arquivo Historico Ultramarine, the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, the Biblioteca da Ajuda, the Biblioteca Nacional of Lisbon, the Arquivo Historico de Misericordia de Lisboa, and the Arquivo Historico Militar were all exceedingly helpful. During my year in India, the Xavier Centre for Historical Research and its kind Director at the time, Teotonio de Souza; P.P. Shirodkar, Director of the Historical Archive of Goa; and P.R. Mehendirara of the American Institute of Indian Studies all facilitated my work. The Noronha family of Panjim taught me much about Goan life. Over the years, I have also benefited greatly from the friendship, advice, and encouragement of the Sá Fernandes, Vidal, Tudella, and Role families in Portugal, who have made my frequent trips there rewarding in both personal and professional terms. For financial support to facilitate archival work in Europe and India, I would like to thank the Graduate School of The University of Minnesota, the Francis E. Andrews-Minneapolis Fund, the American Institute of Indian Studies, the Portuguese Ministry of Education, the Leverhulme Trust in London for a generous post-doctoral fellowship in Britain, as well as several summer

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Introduction

The 16th century decline of Portugal's Asian empire or *Estado da Índia* is generally considered to be one of the great historical "facts" of the early modern period. Erected over the course of the late 15th and early 16th centuries by soldier-adventurers like Vasco da Gama and Afonso de Albuquerque, the *Estado* was based on a series of fortified trading cities along the rim of the Indian Ocean basin and the South China Sea. By 1580, these strategic *fortalezas* of the "State of India" included Mozambique, Mombassa, Maskar (Muscat), Hurmuz (Ormuz), Diu, Goa, Cochin, Ceylon, Melaka (Malacca), Timor, and Macau, to name but a few. These fortified settlements were usually at the cross-roads of local trading routes as well as multi-cultural enclaves that witnessed a constant mixture of European, African, and Asian peoples, laws, customs, and traditions. The *fortalezas*, moreover, served important economic and military functions. They acted as vital collection points for the highly-prized products of the Asian trade in preparation for their eventual shipment to Europe. They were also utilized as bases for the fleets that were sent out each year to scour the eastern seas for interlopers in the Crown monopoly trade in pepper and other products that the Portuguese had boldly declared upon their arrival in Asia, and at least nominally strove to achieve and protect during the course of the 16th century.'

A historiographical debate has raged for some time over the question of how effective the Portuguese Crown was in its quest to establish and enforce a monopoly in the Asian spice trade. Portugal's relatively meager demographic, maritime, and economic resources along with Albuquerque's failure to capture the strategic port of Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea have traditionally been viewed as fatal flaws in the system.' There is little doubt, however, that during the first decades of the 16th century the Portuguese succeeded in largely shutting off the flow of spices to Europe via the long-standing caravan routes through the Levant. As a result, profits sometimes exceeding 250% were made on the sale of spices by the Crown during these heady years.' Although F.C. Lane, V. M. Godinho, C.H.H. Wake, and Niels Steensgaard vary significantly in their estimates on the annual traffic in spices via the Cape of Good Hope route for the sixteenth century, a figure of 40,000 *quintals* (hundredweights) for 1550 seems a reasonable compromise.' This new-found mercantile wealth thrust a largely unprepared and still essentially feudal Portuguese society

and state into the forefront of European geo-political power struggles. The impressive Manueline architecture on the monastery of jeronimos on the banks of the Tagus at Belem, built with money from the spice trade, stands as a fitting testament to that golden age in Portugal's history.

By the mid-17th century, all this had changed. In December 1662, Antonio de Mello de Castro, the newly arrived Governor of the *Estado da India* wrote an insightful letter to the Queen Regent D. Luisa de Gusmao in Lisbon. After consulting with his immediate predecessors on the Fourth Governing Council in Goa, D. Pedro de Lencastre, Luis de Mendonca Furrado, and D. Manuel Mascarenhas, as well as the members of the Treasury Council, Mello de Castro was forced to report that the *Estado* was nearly bankrupt: "The needs of this State are so many and so great ... and there is not even a single penny to help meet pressing and necessary expenditures." The new Governor soon learned that besides being financially distressed, the *Estado* confronted a host of commercial, religious, and military enemies in Asia including, but not limited to, European rivals in the corporate form of the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) East India Companies, as well as local indigenous powers like the Omani Arabs, the Marathas under Shivaji, the Moslem sultans of Bijapur and Golconda, the Nayakas of Ikkeri, the powerful Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, and a series of petty rulers in littoral Africa.

In many ways, therefore, the early 1660s marked the nadir of Portuguese power in Asia during the early modern period. Economically, problems had begun as early as the 1570s when, as Lane has shown, the Levant trade exploited by Portugal's European and Asiatic competitors began to revive. By 1600, the Crown managed to import "little more than 12,000 *quintale*, most of which was low-priced pepper" via the Cape.' Moreover, while pepper prices generally rose in India, the price that the Crown could command for this commodity at sale in Lisbon fell from 45-55 *cruzados* per *quirial* in the 1580s to 20-25 *cruzados* in the 1620s.' These financial difficulties had of course been exacerbated by the entrance of the joint-stock East India companies of the United Provinces and England during the first decade of the 17th century. The armed annexation of the Portuguese Crown by Philip II's armies in 1580 following D. Sebastiao's romantic debacle at El-Ksar el-Kebir had also ushered in a protracted period (1580-1640) when Madrid, according to some, bled Portugal and her empire dry in a doomed attempt to perpetuate Habsburg dominance in Europe.' This annexation had also exposed Portuguese possessions in Brazil, Africa, and the Indian Ocean to the onslaught of the Protestant powers, and a host of military setbacks for the *Estado* characterized the middle decades of the 17th century. Hurmuz, the key to the Persian Gulf trade, was lost to a joint English-Persian attack in 1622. Melaka, a major entrepot in the Indone-

sian trade, fell to a prolonged VOC blockade in 1641. By 1658, all of the Portuguese strongholds on Ceylon, locus of the lucrative cinnamon trade, had been captured by the Dutch. Finally, in early 1663 immediately following Mello de Castro's arrival in India, the *Estado* lost its remaining possession on the pepper rich Malabar coast to the VOC: When the count of Obidos assumed the Viceregal office in 1652, the deed of transfer had still listed some twenty major coastal strongholds, by the 1660s only half that number remained."

Diverse explanations have been proffered over the years to explain this rather precipitous decline. Rather predictably, Portuguese historians and others have long argued that this reversal of fortunes was occasioned by Philip II's actions and the unfortunate decades of the so-called Spanish Captivity that followed." British historians of the past century like F.e. Danvers, R.S. Whiteway, V.A. Smith, and W.W. Hunter argued that it was the corrupt nature of Portuguese administration in Asia, and by implication the moral shortcomings of Lisbon's servants, that undermined the work of Da Gama and Albuquerque." For OR. Boxer, the reasons for Portugal's imperial decline were more straightforward: "the superior economic resources, superior manpower,[and] superior firepower" of the United Provinces." Niels Sreensgaard has more recently maintained that the entrance of the more advanced proto-capitalist entrepreneurial companies of the English and Dutch into the Asian trade doomed the monarchical monopolism of the Portuguese Crown to virtual extinction." One constant, however, in this century of historiography is that the year 1663 indeed marks an important watershed in the history of the *Estado*, for the loss of Cochin early that year is generally considered to have constituted the death knell for Portuguese power in Asia. The loss of the Malabar possessions coming in the wake of the earlier losses in the Moluccas, Hurmuz, Melaka, and Ceylon has been viewed as the concluding chapter in a century of rapid, if not inevitable "decline". The words used by the Jesuit Manoel Godinho, who made the overland trip from Goa to Lisbon in that fateful year, to describe the *Estado* have often been quoted: "If it was a giant, it is now a pigmy; if it was great, it is now nothing.".,

Godinho's overblown description, typical of the standard Jesuit accounts of that period, along with a general acceptance of the dictum of "stagnation and decline" have stood until now as the definitive word on the post-1663 *Estado*." Consequently, while volume upon scholarly volume traces the rise of the empire and the exploits of Da Gama and Albuquerque *et al.*, and a notable body of work details the setbacks of 1620-1663, not a single secondary work has yet appeared on the post-recj *Estado*. This dearth of literature is unfortunate. That the *Estado* was reduced in size is undeniable, equally so is that problems and setbacks con-

tinued for the remainder of the 17th century. Nevertheless, this should neither detract from nor obscure the fundamental fact that the years from c. 1663-1683 were vital ones for the *Estado da India*. Based on the extant manuscript collections in Lisbon and Goa, there is every indication that the years commencing with the reign of Prince Regent Pedro (1668) and culminating with the Viceroyalty of Luis de Mendonca Furrado (1671-1677) witnessed a notable reformation campaign. The wide-ranging reforms discussed and implemented during these years emanated from the belief on the part of Pedro, his grandee advisors, and the members of the Overseas Council in Lisbon, that the remaining Asian holdings, if properly administered and exploited, in conjunction with the rich *Rios de Cuama* region of Mozambique could serve as the basis for a profitable and viable *Estado*. The political, economic, military, and religious reforms that were part and parcel of this campaign would ultimately result in a gradual stabilization of the Asian empire after a half century of setbacks in Europe and the East.

This study will concentrate on detailing the motivations, underlying assumptions, specific policies, and results of this reformation campaign in Portuguese Monsoon Asia. It will also seek to examine the structural limits imposed on this campaign by the internal political, cultural, and economic structures of early modern Portuguese society. An important consideration in this process will be to define the nature and structures of the absolutist state in Braganza Portugal, developments that can also be largely dated from the accession to power of Pedro and his clique of aristocratic supporters in late 1667. Much of the spirited historiographical debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in early modern Europe, and the concurrent rise of the absolutist state, has ignored these developments in Portugal, the "other" Iberian kingdom. For far too long, this historiography, like the literature on the post-rej *Estado*, has largely reinforced the academic validity of the cliché "everyone loves a winner", and in doing so relegated the serious study of post-15th century Portugal to the backwaters of scholarly scrutiny. The traditional historiography on the absolutist state has also tended to be rather Eurocentric in approach and focus, overlooking the role that the overseas empires of these states, including Portugal, played in such developments. One of the seminal events of the early modern period was obviously the creation of a world market economy which began with the voyages of Columbus and Da Gama. As Raynal noted in his *L'Histoire philosophique*: "There has never been an event as important for the human race in general and the peoples of Europe in particular, as the discovery of the New World and the passage to the [East] Indies by the Cape of Good Hope. Thus began a revolution in trade, the power of nations, in money, industry, and the

government of all peoples.'?" To exclude *outré-mer* considerations in the study of the absolutist states of Europe, and especially Portugal, is therefore a less than satisfactory methodology to adopt.

In one fashion or another, the Crown and all segments of Portuguese society had been influenced by the creation of an overseas empire during the late 15th and early 16th centuries and the benefits that had flowed to the metropolis during the glory years of the *Estado*. This influence would continue during the late 17th century as well: the Crown would seek the perceived wealth of Asia with renewed vigor, segments of the nobility, as always, would seek lucrative positions in colonial administration, some among the mercantile class, and particularly the New Christians would seek to end monarchical monopolism and open the trade to all the king's subjects, the popular classes would help, or be forced, to defend such possessions and fleetingly glimpse or sample the Asiatic goods that the caravans brought back from the East. A fundamental link therefore existed between the internal structural changes inherent in the formative years of the absolutist states of Europe and the policies adopted in the empires of those kingdoms. Braganzan absolutism of the late 17th century and the reformation campaign in the *Estado da Índia* were logically the product of the varying challenges confronting Portuguese society and government during these years. These differing challenges at home in the *Reino* and abroad in the *imperio* would at times necessitate fundamentally different, and even contradictory, responses from the Crown and its Viceroy.

What were these challenges? At home, the primary threat, as in most of Europe, would come from a peasantry freed from the yoke of feudalism and not yet enslaved by wage labor, as well as an increasingly powerful merchant class embodied most visibly in the New Christian community." In Europe, the primary threat was that of the military from nascent Bourbon ambitions on the continent; ambitions that would thrust Europe into prolonged warfare for most of the second half of the 17th century and in doing so most particularly threaten Portugal with renewed warfare with Spain. Overseas, the threat would continue to come primarily from the capitalist companies of the Dutch and English, and after 1664 the joint-stock entities of Colbert as well. The reformation campaign undertaken in the *Estado da Índia* from roughly 1668 until 1683 offers a prime example of how the overseas empires of the European powers challenged, reflected, and helped to define the nature of the absolutist state, and conversely how the policies pursued by such states in their empires were in many cases a reflection of these structures, and the limits such structures inevitably placed on the Crown.

Despite such "structural" limitations, there is definitive manuscript evidence to suggest that beginning in c. 1668 a series of reforms were initi-

ated in the *Estado* that resulted in a gradual stabilization of Portugal's Asian empire by the early 1680s. These reforms had a fundamental impact on the fortunes of *India Portuguesa* and its ability to survive as a viable entity into the eighteenth century, overcoming in the process the plethora of daunting challenges and decades of setbacks that had confronted Antão de Mello de Castro upon his arrival in India in 1662. That these important advances were recognized by contemporaries in the trade is admirably reflected in statements made by Portugal's rivals in Asia. Grudging praise for this unexpected rehabilitation is even found in the official correspondence of the English East India Company, and especially that from Gerald Aungier, the astute English President in Bombay. As early as 1674, Aungier, in a letter to his Directors in London, detailed the initial stage of the rehabilitation of Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean. "The Portuguese follow their trade as well in India as Europe vigorously, they have sent this yeare fewer shippes full laden for Lisboa, two or three shippes for China, some to Mossambique, Monbass & Patta, & in October last they sent an Armada consisting of 5 shippes & about 10 small frigatts well-manned to the Persian Gulph."¹⁰ In its most elemental form, this study will therefore examine the process by which the Portuguese Crown, in the span of less than two decades, was able to turn the pitiful lamentations of Mello de Castro into the respectful, even envious, descriptions of Aungier and other competitors in the trade. The details of this significant *volte-face* have never hitherto been told.

Priorities in the *Reino*, c. 1640-1683

The two decades beginning in 1660 were crucial to Portuguese history. Above all, this period witnessed a gradual stabilization of the kingdom following the ravages of the preceding two decades. The consolidation of what might be described as Braganzan absolutism also took place during these years. These developments, like most crucial events affecting Crown fortunes in the *Reino*, in Europe, and the *imperio* were tied to perhaps the seminal event in seventeenth-century Portuguese history: the revolution of 1640 against the Spanish Habsburgs and the subsequent twenty-eight year Restoration struggle. It is therefore difficult to understand the reforms of the years after 1660 without understanding the initial events and stages of the Restoration period. In the midst of the *annus horribilis* of 1640 for Philip IV and Olivares, a group of provincial nobles had finally convinced the duke of Braganza to accept a nascent Portuguese throne after sixty years of foreign "captivity". The duke, the largest landowner in Portugal and overlord of some 80,000 people, had long demonstrated an "evasive and overcautious attitude" towards such intrigues, often disheartening his supporters who for a time even considered a republican solution as in the United Provinces to effect the revolt against Spain. D. João finally acceded to such demands in late 1640, and arrived in Lisbon on December, 6. He was crowned João IV nine days later on a platform in the palace square along the Tagus river, the *Terreiro do Paço*. While Philip IV and Olivares, absorbed with mounting setbacks in the Thirty Years war and facing internal revolts like the Catalan uprising, were unable to reconquer its erstwhile lucrative vassal state immediately; the independence war would in fact drag on for most of the next three decades, draining the resources of both countries in the process.'

The new Portuguese king was neither a brilliant nor particularly charismatic figure. Yet, these were not prerequisites for the task at hand. Rather, he was cautious, stubborn, and with relatively modest ambitions that did not "extend beyond the limits of Portugal, the dominions whereof only, he desired to preserve himself". While João IV may have rather unexpectedly laid claim to a royal dynasty in 1640, his position "was certainly not to be envied". The break with Philip IV created a plethora of political, economic, and religious problems that would largely set the tone for Portuguese Crown policy in Europe and in the empire for

the decades that followed. Not only would Lisbon find itself involved in a bloody struggle with the Habsburgs on the continent, but the eminently successful campaign of the East and West India Companies of the United Provinces of the Netherlands would also continue for much of the same period. This vicious campaign in the *outré-mer* would not only demand naval and military expenditures that the Crown could ill-afford, but it also witnessed the temporary or permanent loss of a series of valuable possessions in Brazil, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. On the religious side, Spanish influence with the Holy See and Urban VIII ensured that Rome would not recognize the new dynasty; and by 1668, twenty of the twenty-eight dioceses in Portugal and overseas had no legal prelate! The tri-dimensional struggle in Europe, the New World and Africa, and the *Estado da India* would therefore dominate the calculations of João IV and his immediate successors after 1656; D. Luisa de Gusmão, his wife and Queen Regent (1656-1662), D. Afonso VI, his son and king (1662-1668), and Pedro, his son and Prince Regent (1668-1683).

The kingdom that the early Braganza rulers fought to maintain for their Infant dynasty in many ways resembled the essentially late-medieval kingdom that Philip II's army had conquered for him some sixty years previously in the wake of Dom Sebastião's debacle in North Africa. The traditional juridical orders or "estates" of clergy, nobility, and commoners remained firmly entrenched. Of a total population of ca. 1.5 million, 35,000 or so (4%) were clergy, another 150,000 (10%) nobles, and the remaining 86% commoners. As in most of Europe, real and honorific privileges set the upper estates apart, as did their dominance over landed property, by far the most important sector in the still agrarian based economy. By some estimates, the privileged orders controlled nearly two-thirds of the land in Portugal. This wealth and a near monopoly of lucrative colonial appointments from the Crown gave the nobility more than sufficient power to meet any challenge from the urban merchant class, a group that in any case generally aspired to noble status and remained enfeebled by the lingering schism between the Old and New Christians in Lisbon and the other port cities.¹ Still, the Portuguese nobility, like their counterparts throughout continental Europe, evidently perceived that its traditional social dominance was under attack by the twin threats of a peasantry emerging from the bonds of feudalism and the growing wealth of the merchant classes. In such circumstances, following the revolution of 1640, absolutism found favorable conditions in which to take root in Portugal.²

The nobility therefore played a pivotal role in the rise of the absolutist state in Portugal under the Braganzas and concurrently in the quest to rehabilitate the *Estado da India* in the years after c. 1668. This task was far

from homogeneous. Nevertheless, all nobles in Portugal enjoyed carefully prescribed rights, exemptions, and privileges that definitively distinguished them from the *povo*. There were six basic grades within the Portuguese nobility. The *titulares* or *grandees* held the highest rank and included dukes, marquises, and counts, some of whom could claim lineal ties to the royal family. *Fidalgos* or *fidalgos do solar* owned their own castles or country manor houses and lands from which they took their titles. *Fidalgos dos Liores de El Rey* had their coats of arms or *escudos* registered with the Crown. *Fidalgos simples* came from families who had not engaged in manuellabor for at least four generations. *Fidalgos de espada* were holders of the higher military ranks, while *Fidalgos togados* included the chief civil ministers of the realm.'

Nobles holding the rank of *Fidalgos simples* and above held the right to belong to one of the four great Portuguese military orders. Aviz, Santiago, and Christ all dated to the nth and rjth centuries and had been founded as part of the crusades against Islam. Afonso Henriques, Portugal's first king, had founded the order of Saint-john of Jerusalem in the late rath century for much the same purpose. These Orders had played a vital role in the *reconquista* effort against the Moors. While initially founded as small aristocratic and Christian brotherhoods noted for their typically medieval quests of charitable works, chivalrous behavior, and valiant acts in fighting the Infidel, they had soon evolved into very influential social and economic institutions, possessing huge tracts of lands granted by a grateful Crown. These extensive properties, called *commanderies*, were much coveted prizes for higher ranking nobles. For example, the Order of Christ owned the lands of Tomar and Soura and c. 450 *commanderies* throughout the realm. As in Spain, the King had become Grand Master of Portugal's three most important military orders, and the Crown was thus able to bestow these properties to deserving nobles, usually for two generations. The *commanderies* guaranteed a notable economic return to their holders in the form of tithes paid by landed peasants and tenants living on these properties, as well as clear and perpetual titles.'

Yet, the economic position of the noble estate was far from secure. Wedded to an agrarian regime that was increasingly anachronistic and a social *mentalite* that discouraged involvement in trade, while mandating huge expenditures on a conspicuous lifestyle, many Portuguese nobles found it difficult to make ends meet as the rsth century, a period of general economic decline, continued. Living largely off the collections of revenues from leases and produce from rural estates, lavish expenditures at court ensured that aristocratic indebtedness also increased after ,640. Despite their extensive land-holdings, the nobility was thus forced to supple-

ment their incomes and lifestyles by income from the *imperio*, that is to say from the Crown's far-reaching colonies in Brazil, Africa, and the *Estado*. The entrenched law of primogeniture also ensured that the younger sons of large noble families had also been forced into service of the Church and in the empire to find alternative sources of wealth to increase the economic and social position of the family and its *casa*. It appears that most of the money made from service in the empire was usually re-invested in landed property and not into more productive mercantile enterprises that would have broken the vestigial medieval cycle of economic uncertainty. These rather harsh economic realities meant that the Portuguese nobility was increasingly dependent on Crown largesse as the seventeenth century progressed. The alliance or perhaps better *quid pro quo* that resulted at the expense of the peasantry and bourgeoisie and sanctioned by the Church, constituted the *leitmotif* of Braganzan absolutism once the yoke of Habsburg sovereignty had been broken in 1640.⁸

By the beginning of the 17th century, the nobility had already been differentiated into four functional categories: nobles of the sword, nobles of the robe, the provincial nobility, and finally the court and administrative nobility. While a degree of mobility certainly existed within these groups, the primary criteria for such social movement was possessing sufficient rank within the noble estate itself. During the Habsburg period, the court nobility had predictably been undermined in favor of the provincial nobility as part of Madrid's strategy to dominate the kingdom by destroying effective centralized control and fostering regionalism. Nevertheless, by the time of Philip IV, this ploy backfired. The robe nobility, schooled at the University of Coimbra under legal scholars like Padre Francisco Suarcz, preserved the principle of renascent rule under an indigenous dynasty. Moreover, the provincial nobility favored during the "captivity" at the expense of the court and administrative nobility in Lisbon, was sufficiently strong by 1640 to place the leading provincial noble of the realm on the throne, based on hereditary ties to the Aviz dynasty and the legal doctrines current in Coimbra.

A crucial consideration in understanding the subsequent *quid pro quo* which developed between the Crown and the nobility during the formative years of the Restoration is that while the early Braganzas were logically forced to revive the fundamental role of the court and administrative nobility, they did so by bringing in erstwhile members of the provincial nobility to fill these lofty positions in the capital. The *titulares* of the years after 1660 were almost invariably the sons of provincial nobles who had supported Joao IV and who followed the new king to Lisbon to receive his grateful largesse. This largesse, of course, took the rather traditional form of bestowing *commanderies*, appointments to the king's main councils, as

well as to the most lucrative posnngs in the empire. Men like D. Nuno Alvares Pcreira de Melo (1638-1727), the first duke of Cadaval; D. joac de Mascarenhas (1633-1681), the marquis de Fronteira; D. Luis de Meneses, third count of Ericeira; and especially joao Nunes da Cunha, first count of Sac Vicenre; Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque, (d. 1677) the first count of Lavradio, and D. Pedro de Almeida, the first count of Assumar (d. 1679} all fit this scenario. By the reign of Pedro, first as Prince Regent (1668-1683} and then as king (1683-1J06), such men dominated the administrative system of the Braganzas at home and in the *imperio*. During the crucial decades of the 1670S and 1680s as Portugal strove to consolidate her position once again in continental as well as imperial matters, Cadaval, Fronteira, and Ericeira dominated the king's councils and helped to set economic, religious, and foreign policy. Sac Vicente would serve as Viceroy of the *Estado* in the late 1660s. Lavradio would oversee the rehabilitation campaign in the Asian empire in the 1670S and be succeeded by Assumar."

The administrative system after 1640 was a hybrid of legacies from the Aviz dynasty, the eighty years of Habsburg rule, combined with a few innovations of the early Braganzas. The Secretariat of State dated from the reth century and controiled the broad outlines of domestic, colonial, and foreign policy as well as the armed forces. The Council of State (c. 1569) was clearly the supreme administrative body for deciding issues of war and peace as well as making the highest civil, military, and ecclesiastical appointments. The tragic loss of most of the records of this council in the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 certainly complicates the task of establishing the subtleties of Crown policy during these years." The Council of War was one innovation of the Braganza period, established by joao IV in December 1640 to muster the resources of the kingdom against the Spanish. This Council appointed officers of the army, navy, supervised fortification in the realm and was responsible for the conduct of war. The *Desembargo do Paco* or Supreme Court was presided over by a great noble and composed of 6 judges or *desembargadores*, one of whom was an ecclesiastic. The Council of Finance directed economic policy and was headed by 3 *Vedores* or superintendents, all noblemen. The Court of Accounts, the *Casa da India*, the Mint, the royal dockyards or *Ribeira*, and Consulates, the Customs Houses or *Alfimdegas* and the *Junta do Comercio do Brasil* were all subordinate to this Council. The Overseas or Colonial Council dated from 1643, replacing the old Council of India. A noble president, 6 councilors (2 nobles, 4 lawyers), and assorted secretaries and clerks oversaw the government of the colonial possessions of the Crown, the organization of the merchant fleet, and colonial mercantile policy, expecting that of Brazil. There were ample opportunities within

this burgeoning administrative structure to bestow royal largesse to deserving nobles and concurrently to create a service nobility at home as well as in the empire."

The traditional representative body of the three juridical estates was the Cortes. This meeting of the three estates, with each assembling in a separate monastery was technically needed for the approval of all new taxes. Between 1641-1698, the Cortes in fact met only 8 times, and not at all from 1679-1697, nor again after 1698. Perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the body was that, like the Parliament in England before 1640 and the *Estates-General* in France, it had never obtained more than an advisory function. The Crown retained the right to convoke or close the body and the idea that redress should precede supply had also never been established. The Cortes narrowed in both function and composition during these years. Matters formerly within their control were increasingly decided either by Crown officials or the guilds. Under the early Braganzas, therefore, the chief functions of the Cortes were to rubber stamp matters relating to the dynasty or to approve new taxation. For example, in 1641 it met to recognize João IV and the revolution, and in early 1668 it met to sanction the coup against Afonso VI by Pedro. On matters of taxation, the 1641 body approved an initial 1.8 million *cruzados* to fight the war against the Habsburgs by imposing a property tax of 10% on all classes except the clergy, which would contribute a lump sum according to the resources of each diocese. The 1668 Cortes assisted the economic recovery of the realm under Pedro and Afonso VI by sanctioning a series of excise taxes known as the *real d'agua* to raise some 500,000 *cruzados*."

Increasingly assured of the support of an erstwhile provincial nobility wedded to the largesse of the new regime, bolstered by the continuing economic and moral support of the largest landowner in the realm, the Roman Catholic Church, and with the Cortes under control, João IV and his successors could concentrate on the most pressing issues confronting the new dynasty: the continuing Restoration struggle with Spain, and the quest to regain a semblance of stability in the overseas empire. Between 1640 and his death in 1656, João IV pursued relatively straightforward priorities at home and in the *imperio*. Economically, his strategy was simple: raise as much money as possible to fight the war against the Spanish and Dutch. Sensitive to the fragile nature of the kingdom's economy, João sought various subsidies from the four meetings of the Cortes during his reign, but did everything he could to avoid raising direct taxes. The first Braganza ruler also found a ready source of cash in the form of the merchant community, especially the New Christians, who were more than willing to lend the king money in return for certain considerations regarding the activities of the Inquisition. From 1649-1659, for example, in an ex-

tremely controversial move, immunity was conferred upon the property of New Christians sentenced by the Holy Office in Portugal. Additionally, the administration over property that had already been confiscated was transferred from the Inquisition to the state. joao was also anxious to develop an extensive trade with Brazil and northern Europe, as a means to break the traditional commercial ties with Spain and her trading network."

Militarily, joao IV's main task was to withstand the Spanish onslaught. This was a far from facile task given the generally dismal state of the kingdom's defenses. Border fortifications had predictably lapsed into disrepair during the Habsburg period, the royal stud farms had been discontinued in 1580, the army was virtually non-existent, and the once vaunted navy was in disarray. These sizable handicaps, joao's cautious nature, and a chronic lack of money easily explain the largely defensive strategy adopted by the Portuguese during the first sixteen years of the Restoration struggle. Fortunately, Philip IV and Olivares were unable to bring the full weight of Spain's military might to bear at this juncture. Madrid's military commitments to fighting the French down to 1659, quelling the Catalan revolt until 1652, and overcoming the rebellion of the duke of Medina Sidonia in Andalucia in 1641 all diverted men and materials from the quest to regain Portugal. The war, therefore, largely took the form of limited border operations centered on the main towns of Montijo, Elvas, and Badajoz, directed by successive commanders including the count of Obidos, Matias de Albuquerque (later the count of Alegrete), and the marquis of Torrecusa. The most notable Portuguese victories came at Montijo (1644) and Arronches (1653). Nevertheless, the war in the Alentejo furnished an indispensable chivalric proving ground for the sons of the provincial nobility that had placed joao IV on the throne. D. Pedro de Lencastre, Antonio de Mello de Castro, Luis de Mendonca Furtado, and D. Pedro de Almeida would all win their spurs in combat with the Spanish under the wilting sun of the Alentejo in preparation for their more lucrative careers in the empire in the years that followed.¹⁵

Diplomatically, joao IV's foremost priorities were to seek settlements with the Dutch and, if possible, the Spanish, based on a much desired League with France that would ideally be cemented by a dynastic marriage between one of his daughters and Louis XIV. Despite his most diligent efforts, the king and his agents were never able to achieve these goals. The United Provinces, in the midst of stripping Portugal of some of her most valuable overseas possessions, snubbed all entreaties to a negotiated peace down to 1661, rejecting over that time offers of 200,000 *cruzados* to the stadholder personally and between 2-3 million to the Dutch West India

Company. Philip IV remained firmly committed to reconquering Portugal and similarly rejected all attempts at mediation and recognition of the new dynasty. The most logical mediator between the two Iberian powers, England, was of course debilitated for a time by the convulsions of the revolution and Civil War. Moreover, joao IV's rather ill-conceived support for the royalist side, especially after Charles I's execution in 1649 and the subsequent arrival of Prince Rupert's fleet in the Tagus, ultimately resulted in the Angle-Portuguese conflict of 1652-1654. This war with Cromwell ended only with the harsh list of economic clauses incorporated into the treaty ratified at Alcantara in June 1654. The French, moreover, under both Richelieu and Mazarin viewed Portugal primarily as a convenient pawn to be used for leverage in negotiations with Madrid. Despite Richelieu's pact with joao IV of 1641 which obliged the Portuguese to enter the war and a plethora of diplomatic missions, no grand League was arranged. In fact, the most prominent characteristics of Franco-Portuguese relations during the reign was, on one side, the gradual diminution of French support for joao's position in its negotiations with Madrid and, on the other, the proffering of increasingly attractive terms by Lisbon in its envoys to Paris, culminating in the 1656 embassy of Fr. O'Daly."

In the far flung *imperio*, the new dynasty had been acclaimed almost unanimously. Only the tiny enclave of Ceuta in North Africa had remained loyal to Philip IV. As joao IV soon discovered, however, being acclaimed king was one thing, attempting to maintain a global empire in the face of the Dutch onslaught, quite another! The reign in fact witnessed the loss or near loss of many of Portugal's most lucrative imperial holdings. By 1641, the Dutch West India Company had already taken parts of northern Brazil with johan Maurits installed at Pernambuco, as well as pieces of Angola and São Tome. In the *Estado da India*, the VOC finally captured Melaka in 1641 after periodic sieges (1616, 1629, 1633-), the Omani Arabs had expelled them from Maskar in 1650, the Dutch had begun the process of reducing Portuguese dominance over the lucrative island of Ceylon in the late 1630s by capturing the bay of Batticaloa (1638) and then Trincomalee (1640) and Calle (1644), while Goa (blockade from 1637 onward), and Macau (1626, 1626) were also either attacked or blockaded for months at a time. A ten year truce with the Dutch from 1641-1651, gained at the expense of huge commercial concessions at home, temporarily interrupted this panoply of losses, but the setbacks continued in Asia after this arrangement lapsed."

The enormity of these challenges, when juxtaposed with the paucity of the resources at joao IV's disposal, naturally ensured that a triage took place in attempting to defend the *imperio*. The traditional view of events is that joao and his advisors ultimately decided to embrace the defense of

the emerging colony of Brazil at the expense of the interests of the *Estado*. In Boxer's often repeated phrase, the king viewed Brazil as the "milch-cow" of the *Reino* and its empire and was determined to preserve it, even if this meant abandoning the Asian possessions." Portuguese historians have generally supported this view and lauded the king for his wisdom in doing so, given the huge potential value of Brazil and the dubious nature of future revenues from the Asian possessions. The significant level of settlers in Brazil at the time, their spontaneous revolt against the Dutch which resulted in their expulsion by the mid-1650s, the profits made on the sugar trade, and the ever-present allure of gold in the interior all certainly argue in favor of this view." Nevertheless, it is also likely that this argument is somewhat Whiggish, based at least partially on Brazil's subsequent prosperity. In any event, the late 1640s and 1650s were characterized by a lack of serious support for the Asian empire and continuing losses and setbacks for the *Estado*. Dutch blockades of Goa interrupted the sailings of the *Carreira da India* for years at a time, while indigenous rulers like the king of Golconda demonstrated their rising contempt for the *cartaz* system by abandoning the practice of purchasing such passes. Perhaps nothing demonstrates the weakness of Crown authority in the *Estado* at the end of joao's reign better than the coup d'etat of D. Braz de Castro in 1653, who with a group of *fidalgos* overthrew the legitimate Viceroy, the count of Obidos, and held power in the Asian capital for the next two years!" joao IV died in early November 1656, with the work of securing the dynasty and what remained of the empire still very much incomplete. This weighty task would instead fall to his wife and sons.

D. Luisa de Gusmao was well-suited to this challenge. Sister of the duke of Medina Sidonia, she had married joao and then thrown "herself heart and soul into the cause of Portugal". Intelligent, ambitious, and unafraid of the implications of the break with Spain, she had demonstrated more support for the plot against the Habsburgs in its initial stages than had her husband. The revolution of 1640 had given her royal status, and D. Luisa was determined to maintain the future of her children and the dynasty." At home, her main political problem related to the immediate succession. She had borne the king three sons: Teodosio (b. 1634), Afonso (b. 1643), and Pedro (b. 1648). From 1640, Teodosio had been groomed to succeed his father. The Infante was an intelligent youth who, while receiving an adequate education from his tutors, also chaffed under the rigorous court etiquette of his parents. In 1651, he had fled these constraints for the adventures of the war in the Alentejo. There, Teodosio had rather naively demonstrated his free-thinking manner by writing to his father from Elvas, urging him to make good on the arrears in pay the Crown owed to many of its troops. For a time, joao IV and D. Luisa evidently feared some

type of military coup. At length, however, the young prince was induced back to court where he received the title of Captain-General of Arms. Tragically, Teodosio died from an illness in 1653 at the age of nineteen."

Upon joao IV's death in the fall of 1656, therefore, Afonso, then a child of ten, was next in line to the throne. One of the most enigmatic figures in Portuguese history, this prince had evidently suffered some type of paralytic seizure early in life that had left his right arm and leg partially paralyzed and, according to some, also affected "his understanding". Even though the Cartes of 1653 had proclaimed Afonso the legitimate heir upon his brother's untimely death, there was certainly opposition to the idea of enthroning him three years later. Members of all three Estates wanted the youth to demonstrate his abilities before his accession to the throne, others argued that in such perilous times a king was needed, whatever the potential drawbacks. In the end, a *de facto* compromise resulted; Afonso VI was proclaimed nine days after his father's death as a rallying point for the *povo*, while D. Luisa ruled as Regent." During her Regency, the Queen shared power with a group of conservative nobles who dominated the Council of State. Overall, the Queen Regent pursued policies at home and abroad that largely followed the priorities established by her husband.³⁴

Militarily, the war with Spain and the United Provinces dominated the deliberations of the Queen and her Councils. D. Luisa made "great efforts" to reorganize and encourage her troops in the Alentejo, and in the years after 1656 there is evidence to suggest that she was much more punctual in paying her army than joao IV had been. While Philip IV may have vowed to take advantage of his rival's death to launch a decisive offensive, his war with Cromwell conspired to keep the Spanish fleets in their harbors, thus relieving D. Luisa of any fear of attack by sea. Despite all of D. Luisa's efforts, however, the military situation in early 1660 was as serious as it had been in 1640; war with Philip and the United Provinces still raged, the Dutch had even attacked the Portuguese mainland in 1657 and blockaded Lisbon for 3 months, the Puritan government of England was still unsympathetic, and the Spanish-French settlement of 1659 had allowed Philip to dispatch veteran *tercios* from Flanders and Italy to the frontier with Portugal in preparation for the great Spanish offensives that would begin the following year.³⁵

Diplomatically, D. Luisa continued to pursue the elusive League and dynastic marriage with France as the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy. In 1657, she offered Mazarin a dowry of 1 million *cruzados* and either Tangier or Mazagao for such an arrangement. While the wily Cardinal still viewed such negotiations primarily as a bargaining lever in his talks with Philip IV, he did send the count of Cominges to Lisbon that

summer with a clearly unacceptable counter-offer: a League with no dynastic link for 2 million *cruzados*, an annual subsidy of 200,000 *cruzados* for the remainder of the war, Tangier, and the use of 6 Portuguese warships. By the time D. joao de Costa reached France in 1659 seeking military aid, it was clear that rather ominous events were in the offing: preliminaries for the peace between Paris and Madrid had already been agreed to, Louis XIV would not be marrying Cararina, the Portuguese Infanta, but in fact the Spanish Infanta, Maria Teresa. More unnerving was the reality that Portugal would be excluded from the terms, despite Louis XIII's pledge "to establish the king of Portugal in his present state by means of a general peace". A secret article in the settlement in fact obliged France to cut off relations with Lisbon so that "the affairs of Portugal shall be placed in the state they were in previous to the revolution". Da Costa did his best to modify what amounted to a *fait accompli* by offering Mazarin 1 million *cruzados* and the bishopric of Evora to include Portugal in the settlement. He even traveled with the Cardinal to St. Jean de Luz, all to little avail. In early November, the peace of the Pyrenees ended the long struggle between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs and exposed Portugal to the full force of Philip IV's displeasure. The only concession that da Costa received from Mazarin was permission to raise *sub rosa* military support in France, most notably in the able form of the Angle-German count Schomberg."

The harsh *denouement* of the traditional diplomatic priorities of the post-tao period embodied in the peace of the Pyrenees and continuing losses in the *imperio* placed the Lisbon hierarchy in an exceedingly difficult position by 1660, one which forced D. Luisa and her noble advisors to embrace two rather "desperate" treaties in a quest to safeguard Portuguese independence, the dynasty, and whatever remained of the empire. Despite the reclamation of northern Brazil and Angola from the Dutch in the late 1640s and 1650s, the protracted struggle with the United Provinces in the *ultramar* continued to have an extremely dilatory impact on the traditional overseas trade of the realm, especially with Asia. In the summer of 1661, a peace settlement was signed between Portugal and the States-General. The provisions of this settlement were hardly favorable to Lisbon. Henceforth, Dutch merchants were to enjoy the same commercial privileges in Portugal as the English had extorted in Cromwell's treaty of 1654, including a degree of religious freedom in Lisbon, the ability to buy and sell warehouses and other property without hindrance, the right to appoint their own Judge-Conservator, as well as various concessions including customs duties. To satisfy Dutch claims over lost territory in Brazil, D. Luisa promised to pay an indemnity of some 4 million *cruzados*, to be paid primarily out of proceeds from the rich salt trade centered

around the port of Setubal. This peace was signed on August 6, 1661 and ratified by D. Luisa and her Council on May 24, 1662. The States-General only ratified the document on December 4, 1662, while the publication of the treaty did not take place until the spring of 1663, a delay, as noted below, with great import for the continuing Dutch campaign in the Indian Ocean."

In the *Estado da India*, the Regency years witnessed a continuation of the setbacks endured under João IV's indifferent rule in Asia. The onslaught of the **VAC** against the Crown's fortresses on Ceylon continued. Colombo and Jaffna were soon lost, and by 1658 the Portuguese were expelled from the island. On the coast of India, Negapatam {1660} and Quilon (1658, 1661), were also captured by the Dutch. In the midst of these hostilities, local rulers like Sivappa Nayaka of Ikkcn, a state to the south of Goa, exploited this situation by driving the Portuguese from their own domains. In the mid-late 1650s Sivappa Nayaka, for example, expelled the Portuguese from their forts on the Kanara coast at Honawar, Basur, and Mangalore. In January 1662, the Dutch Governor-General of Ceylon and Admiral Rijckloff Van Goens captured the fort of Cranganor on the Malabar coast. Van Goens then besieged the strategic city of Cochin on that same coast in February 1662, and again in October of that year. By the 8th of January 1663, the articles of capitulation were agreed to and ratified by Van Goens and the Portuguese captain Ignacio Sarmiento de Carvalho. On the 9th of February 1663, Van Goens also captured Cannanore, thus completing the process of expelling the Portuguese from their most important possessions on the pepper-rich Malabar coast.³⁸

Soon after the fall of Cannanore, news of the treaty signed between D. Luisa and the States-General reached India. Not surprisingly, the rather irate Portuguese claimed that both Cochin and Cannanore should be returned to them since they had been captured after the treaty had been signed and ratified. The States-General and Directors of the VOC, the *Heeren XVII* saw matters somewhat differently. Invoking Clause VI of the treaty, which stipulated that "all hostilities and offensive deeds shall cease ... in Europe within two months from the date that this treaty shall be signed by both parties, and in other parts of the world from the date of publication", the Dutch refused to restore these places since the publication of the treaty had been delayed until March 1663." The loss of these possessions on Ceylon and along the Indian coast from 1656 to early 1663 certainly placed the *Estado* in a precarious position. Nevertheless, these military defeats at the hands of the VOC and indigenous rulers were not the only signs of continuing decadence in the Asian empire. The commercial interchange between the *Reino* and *Estado* borne by the carracks and sailings of the *Carreira da India* was all but halted during these years by

Dutch attacks, a dearth of financial and political support from the Crown, and periodic shipwrecks. As the Queen-Regent herself confided to a French diplomat at court in 1659 in only slightly exaggerated terms, no news had even been received from India in three years!"

To D. Luisa's credit, the second treaty signed in 1661 did seek to arrange an effective solution to the realm's continuing problems with the Dutch. With the long cherished League and dynastic marriage a dead issue in Paris, the Queen-Regent sought solace elsewhere and found a willing royal suitor for her daughter's hand in the recently restored Charles II. The idea of a marriage alliance between these two Crowns was nothing new, since Anronio de Sousa de Macedo, the Portuguese resident in England from 1642-46, had vainly suggested a match between Charles and [João IV's daughter] Joanna at that time. Luisa's envoy to the renewed Stuart court, Francisco de Mello e Torres, later marquis de Sande, however, offered Charles II and Clarendon extremely favorable terms; a dowry of 2 million *cruzados*, the cession of Tangier and of Bombay, the confirmation of the lucrative commercial privileges in the *Reino* first set forth in the 1654 treaty with Cromwell; "the same privileges and immunities so far as they shall relate to trade as the Portuguese themselves in the cities and towns of Goa, Cochin, and Diu," provided not more than four families resided in each place, and similar privileges in Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and "throughout all the dominions of the King of Portugal in the West Indies".'

The English king, chronically short of money and anxious to win a degree of freedom from an overbearing Parliament, accepted these generous conditions with the approval of his royal benefactor Louis XIV. The marriage treaty between the two Crowns was signed on June 23, 1661 and ratified on August 28, 1661. In return for D. Luisa's largesse, Charles II in essence agreed to offer protection to Portugal, her empire, and her overseas trade in light of the ravages inflicted over the previous decades by the Dutch and Spanish. In Article XVI, London promised to maintain an English fleet on the Portuguese coast for the protection of the maritime trade of the kingdom in general and the Brazil fleets in particular. In Article XV, Charles declared that; "In consideration of all which concessions and privileges, contributing so manifestly to the utility and benefit of the King of Great Britain and his subjects in general," that he "promises and declares ... that he will pay the sincerest regard to the interest and welfare and Portugal and of all its dominions, and that he will, with his utmost power, take upon him the defence of it both by land and sea, as if it were England itself". Moreover in a secret article to this treaty, Charles II promised to mediate between the Dutch and Portugal and failing that, when he dispatched a fleet to occupy Bombay, he would "also send such

force, which shall go well furnished of all the necessaries as well as of instructions, to defend, aid, and assist all the Portuguese country in the East Indies".¹²

D. Luisa, however, would not reign long enough to see the results of her diplomatic maneuvers of the early 1660s. The political, economic, and societal pressures engendered by the great Spanish offensives of the years 1661-1662, combined with increasing difficulties relating to the continuation of the Regency all conspired against her. In the spring of 1662, she was deposed as Regent by the mercurial Afonso VI and his favorite LUIS de Vasconcellos e Sousa, the count of Castelo-Melhor. Yet, the Regency years had done little to prepare Afonso for the demands of kingship. Although the young king had evidently learned to read and write, Afonso spent most of his time riding, coursing bulls, watching dog and cock fights, and carousing with his clique of favorites in the streets of Lisbon at night. In 1659, he had been given his own household, where a group of young nobles and the more pedestrian Antonio Conti sought his favor. Beginning in 1661, Conri, the son of stall holders in the *Terre/TO do Paco*, established himself as the royal favorite. In June 1662, the Queen-Regent sought to solidify the succession with two significant acts: Pedro, her youngest son, received his own household in the Corte-Real palace, while Cadaval, now Pedro's main supporter, used a clever ruse to exile Conri and some of Afonso's other rowdy retainers to Brazil."

Ironically, these steps ensured D. Luisa's fall. Castelo-Melhor, the ablest of Afonso's clique, convinced the king that he too might soon be deposed. The pair rode to nearby Alcantara and met troops assembled for his defense. Afonso then assembled the nobility and court and declared that the Regency was at an end and that he had taken over the reins of government." On 12 July, Castelo-Melhor assumed the title of *escrivao da puridade* or private secretary, a very powerful "office nowhere but in Portugal, even here rarely taken up, and once [by D. Sebastiao] abolished, as too much [power] to be put into anyone hand". Henceforth, Castelo-Melhor alone would have access to the king and be able to issue orders and decrees in his name. Faced with this stinging *pronuncimento*, the support that Afonso VI seemingly enjoyed in Lisbon, and the exile of her supporters like Antonio Vicira from court, D. Luisa, could do little but acquiesce to the *fait accompli*. A year later she retired to a convent, where she died in 1666 without fully reconciling with her son."

While D. Luisa waited to die in her convent, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor confronted the dizzying array of internal and foreign problems that were the legacy of his parent's rule. Afonso can perhaps best be described as a mercurial, rebellious, adolescent, "a creature of impulse", whose interests and abilities never transcended those of a spoiled twelve

year old. Indulged by his tutors and the nobles who frequented his household, he had, like his siblings, chafed under the stern dotage of his mother and the rigid, even stifling, etiquette and formalism expected at a 17th-century Iberian court. According to Robert Southwell, the English resident in Lisbon at this time, his mind was "very stout and courageous, but so puffed up with a vain fancy of being the only Hector living that, when he heard of any criminal that had done some barbarous murder, or slaughtered the justice, he would presently call him to the court, and at least make him one of his guards". While Afonso VI was "in his nature exceedingly liberal", his largesse was often bestowed "on those who were unworthy". "He knew nothing of dissimulation, but always told the truth, so what evil he ever heard of any man, he would in his anger upbraid him." His nocturnal wanderings in Lisbon's seamier districts prompted Southwell to note that he "almost changed day into night and night into day". As for his other "vices", the Englishman lamented: "He sometimes smokes tobacco, and drinks wine, altogether beyond the standard of Portugal. For women he had a kind of seraglio, doting on them (as they themselves affirm) without any effect." Moreover, Afonso had, "with his own hands" killed "bulls, boars, and other beasts; and in frequent occasions has shown too little respect to the lives of men".

From the summer of 1662 onward, the count of Castelo-Melhor was more than happy to encourage the king's lust for such diversions, while he in turn dominated Crown policy. Son of a former governor-general of Brazil, Vasconcellos e Sousa was "a young man of unquestioned ability and great ambition". During these years, he strove to create the foundation for an absolutist system in Portugal. Castelo-Melhor and his small clique of similarly inclined young and ambitious nobles largely succeeded in imposing a government by ministry on the erstwhile centers of power embodied in the councils and the high courts. All sources of potential opposition were also banished from Afonso VI's court, including most notably Cadaval, Marialva, and Vieira, men who increasingly looked to Pedro for succor." Nevertheless, it is somewhat exaggerated to suggest that Vasconcellos e Sousa became the "virtual dictator of Portugal" during the mid-recons and "in this sense the precursor of Pombal and Salazar". There is very little doubt, however, that Castelo-Melhor dominated Crown priorities at this time. As *escriuao de puridade*, he decided the main outlines of royal policy, decisions that were carried out in large part by the efficient secretary of state, Antonio de Sousa de Macedo."

Castelo-Melhor's main interests revolved around continental matters, to the virtual exclusion of all else. Whatever else may be said of him, the count was largely responsible for orchestrating the final victory over Spanish arms. Castelo-Melhor accomplished this difficult task thanks to

the fortuitous combination of sound strategy, more efficient control over the armed forces, and much needed reinforcements in the form of English, French, and German mercenaries under the able command of the count of Schomberg, legacies from the 1659 and 1661 treaties.⁴ The victories of Ameixal (June 1663) and Mantes Claros (June 1665) effectively blunted Philip IV's final offensives under his bastard son, Don Juan of Austria and the marquis of Caracena. The Spanish king died in September 1665, leaving behind his four year old and sickly child, Charles II, as king. The Madrid court soon degenerated into a messy power struggle during the Regency between his widow Queen Mariana and Don Juan of Austria. This struggle did much to undermine the ability of the Spanish to wage an effective war with Portugal, in particular during the favorable years of 1666 and 1667, and to set the stage for an eventual end to the struggle that had begun in December 1640."

Relatively confident of the outcome of the war against Madrid following Mantes Claros, Castelo-Melhor turned his talents to diplomacy in order to improve his bargaining position with the Habsburgs, to secure the succession, and to undermine his enemies at home who were lobbying to replace the king with Pedro. To achieve all of these ends, the count embraced the traditional strategy of Joao IV and D. Luisa: the illusive quest for a League and dynastic marriage with France. As early as 1662, Turenne had suggested that the soundest method to repair the damaged relations between the countries inherent in the peace of the Pyrennes and concurrently to secure French influence in Lisbon was to marry both Afonso and Pedro to French princesses. Louis XIV, in the midst of preparing to lay claim to the Spanish Netherlands in the wake of Philip IV's death, was more than willing to encourage such a match. While Pedro ironically rejected such overtures in 1666, Castelo-Melhor did arrange a marriage between Afonso and Mademoiselle d'Aumale, Marie Françoise Isabelle of Savoy, second daughter of the duke of Nemours, Charles Amadeus of Savoy in that year. The most potentially damaging source of opposition to such a match may have been Charles II, since England had been doing a great deal since 1664 to mediate a peace between the Iberian Crowns. In the end, however, Louis's influence and the desire of the English king to receive the unpaid portion of Catherine of Braganza's dowry via Marie-Françoise's offering to Afonso sanctioned the match. In fact, Charles gave the bride safe conduct from La Rochelle to Lisbon, which she reached on August 2, 1666."

Marie Françoise was an intelligent and ambitious woman. She arrived in the Portuguese capital with the firm intention of "dominating her consort and of forwarding French interests by every means in her power". Her confessor, the able Jesuit Fr. Vcrjus and the clever marquis de Saint-

Romain, dispatched as ambassador to Lisbon with the main objective of preventing the conclusion of a Luso-Spanish treaty, were among those who were determined to assist her in this quest. Her marriage to Afonso was a travesty from the outset: although he escorted her to the church, the king found the elaborate "ceremonies boring, and left her to preside over the celebrations while he dined heavily in bed.,:6 According to most accounts, Afonso was also an utter failure in the royal conjugal bed. The new Queen, moreover, soon discovered that the king was in essence a pawn in the calculations of Castelo-Melhor, who had no intention of sharing any of the power he had amassed since retiring D. Luisa to the convent. As Sourhwel succinctly noted: she found "a total disappointment in her bed, and a perfect insignificance in the government". To remedy these shortcomings, Marie-Francoise soon embraced Pedro and his cause both figuratively and literally. Castelo-Melhor, meanwhile, finally concluded the long desired League with France in March 1667. Among other things, this treaty granted the French most of the favorable trading privileges the English and Dutch already enjoyed in the kingdom, and obliged Portugal to enter the so-called War of Devolution with Spain."

Absorbed with all of these military and diplomatic machinations in Europe, Castelo-Melhor did very little to arrest the alarming setbacks that had beset the *Estado* from 1640 onward. Van Goens's ravages on the Malabar coast had culminated in early 1663. Meanwhile, on the textile rich Coromandel coast of India, the Portuguese were expelled from the town of San Theme by the combined forces of the Qutb Shahi king of Goiconda, Abdu'l-Iah, and a Dutch fleet in the late spring of 1662. Portuguese merchants resident there were forced to seek shelter with the English India Company settlement at nearby Fort St. George in Madras.* A nadir of sorts for the *Carreira da India* had been reached that same spring, on the eve of Afonso's *pronuncimento*, when the Governor Antonio de Mello de Castro had sailed aboard an English fleet under James Ley, the earl of Marlborough, on the way to assume his office." The sailings of the *Carreira* remained intermittent at best during the years that followed. From 1663-1667, one and at most two vessels departed the Tagus for India, and an even smaller number made the return voyage to the *Reino* from Goa." A perusal of the official Crown correspondence with Goa during these years suggests that Castelo-Melhor was content merely to adopt skeleton measures that, in form if not substance, fulfilled the role expected of the Crown in Asia."

Castelo-Melhor had seemingly reached the zenith of his powers with the long desired League with France in the spring of 1667. Ironically, the internal and foreign implications of this alliance greatly assisted those groups in Portugal determined to see the *escrivao* overthrown and Afonso

removed from the throne. By the fall of 1667, an impressive array of forces had assembled against Castelo-Melhor. Pedro wanted both power and to be married to his lover and sister-in-law, the Queen. Marie-Francoise was anxious for the same scenario, thinking that the removal of Castelo-Melhor would in fact increase the influence of the French faction at court. Cadaval, Mariailva, and other leading nobles wanted their power and the power of the councils restored. The peace party in Lisbon was bolstered by the deeply held desire of the *povo* for a settlement with Madrid, while Castelo-Melhor's alliance only promised more years of warfare and suffering. Louis XIV wanted the removal of Sousa de Macedo, a staunch Anglophile. The French monarch knew that Castelo-Melhor was still negotiating with the Spanish through England, and also believed that Portugal would never be a "docile ally" until the Queen had replaced Vasconcellos e Sousa. Encouraged in his diversions, Afonso was generally oblivious to the gathering storm around him. "Surrounding himself with the scum of society, running about the streets at night, and behaving like a brigand and a murdered", the king commanded very little respect, sympathy and support.⁵

Afonso's overthrow, in true operatic style, unfolded slowly over the summer and fall of 1667. In August, Sousa de Macedo was forced out of office on trumped up charges. Castelo-Melhor and the Infante both appealed to the nobility, *juiz de povo*, and the military commanders for support. The *escruião* also attempted, without success, to persuade Afonso to travel to the Alentejo and lead his army against Pedro. Although Marie-Francoise nominally sought to mediate between the brothers, Pedro issued an ultimatum stating that either he or Vasconcellos would have to go. Under extreme pressure, the *escruião* resigned in September and began a long exile in Spain and England. Afonso, however, refused to receive his brother and instead recalled Sousa de Macedo. The final act of this drama began with an abortive attempt to arrest Pedro's key supporters. In early October, the Infante and his heavily armed claque responded by storming the palace, rousing Afonso from bed and demanding that Sousa de Macedo resign. Pedro also began to dispense liberal amounts of cash to the Lisbon regiments in the days that followed. Afonso was soon forced to agree to a meeting of the Cortes in early January to resolve the matter. Meanwhile a French fleet, at the disposal of the Queen, arrived in late November. Marie-Francoise's fulfilled her role by retiring to the convent of Esperanca and wrote to Afonso, declaring she was still a virgin, and thus not his wife, demanding her dowry back, and stating her intention to return to France! Afonso's tragic attempt to visit her was rebuffed by Pedro and his troops and on November 23, the king signed a declaration giving over royal authority to Pedro and his legitimate descendants.'

Pedro's accession to power was dutifully recognized by the *Cortes* in January 1668. At that time, he adopted the compromise-title of Prince Regent; to rule as long as his imprisoned brother lived. The Estates also demanded that Pedro not allow the Queen to depart "both for the great love these realms bear to her great virtues and for the necessity of succession". While matters of the heart certainly dictated that the Prince Regent would comply with this request, the Cartes undoubtedly had matters of the purse in mind when it made it. After all, the Queen's departure would have meant that her sizable dowry would have to be refunded! Thus, the infamous suit of nullity of the marriage was subsequently played out. This farce consisted largely of a barrage of depositions designed to free Marie-Prancoise from her erstwhile husband and king and facilitate her swift marriage to Pedro. Afonso swore that he had done his best to consummate the marriage. For rather obvious reasons, the Queen was never physically examined to substantiate her claim of virginity. In violation of canon law, neither party was subjected to a direct oral examination. Instead, a host of "indelicate" evidence was produced to show Afonso's conjugal inadequacies. A day after the royal depositions were presented the marriage was annulled. In the interim, Fr. Verjus had received a dispensation from one of Marie-Prancoise's relatives, the Cardinal of Vendome. As soon as Verjus appeared with this document, the lovers married. To demonstrate the "fairness" of these proceedings, it should be noted that Vendome's dispensation, which treated the suit of nullity as decided, was issued in Paris some nine days before this verdict had in fact been reached in Lisbon!"

Pedro's rule as Prince-Regent (1668-1683) constitutes one of the most important periods in the history of early modern Portugal. According to the chaplain of the English factory in Lisbon, John Colbatch, the Prince Regent was "of robust and vigorous constitution, tall of person, somewhat above the ordinary size, and proportionally big; of wonderful strength and great activity of body ... of grave and comely aspect". His character had an "air of modesty, as may be thought unusual in persons of his rank". Above all, the Pedro was cautious and stubborn by nature. Like Afonso, he was "addicted to bull-fighting and to hunting". His personal habits, however, were a far cry from those of his elder brother. In Colbatch's words: "He is very temperate in his diet, eats commonly alone ... His meals are extremely moderate, and provided as for a single person." In stark contrast to Afonso, the Prince Regent abstained from wine and "strong liquors". This abstinence in spirits was not matched with regard to the carnal pleasures. "In which, if common report ... is to be credited he hath indulged himself very much. And they say, he has not been wholly free from the inconveniences consequent to such a practice. But

those he hath had this commerce with, are said to be of the lowest rank ... and very many, and not all of the same colour." Pedro's intellectual abilities impressed Colbarch and others who described the Prince "of quick apprehension, and a piercing judgement, sensible, thoughtful and inclinable to melancholy". His intellectual abilities and opinions were largely, it seems, based on personal experience and oral interchanges with advisors since Pedro had "a rooted aversion to books", and was hardly more literate than his brother."

From 1668, Pedro and his clique of grandees sought to exploit the unease of the threatened privileged segments of Portuguese society to increase the power of the Crown. The societal and economic tensions unleashed by the long struggle with Habsburg Spain; a peasantry, as in most of Europe, emerging from the more onerous bonds of feudalism; and an aggressive and increasingly powerful merchant class embodied most notably in the New Christian community, all served to create a climate of fear among the long favored First and Second Estates that certainly facilitated this process. As Carl Hanson has shown, Pedro largely succeeded in this quest to create an absolutist state in Portugal. The Prince Regent, in the decades that followed his accession, was able to attract the support of the *vast* majority of the nobility, who "aligned themselves closely" with the Crown and that of the largest landowner in the realm, the Roman Catholic Church, in order to "secure the continuance of the status quo" which had long *favored* their interests. The "absolutist regime rooted in privilege and landed property [that] flowered," did so largely at the expense of the *povo* and the emerging bourgeoisie. In this campaign, Pedro in part resurrected the traditional Council system and the power of the nobility at court that had suffered during the regime of Castelo-Melhor. He also demonstrated the admirable quality of selecting very able ministers to staff his Councils and initiate reforms, in much the same fashion as Louis XIV.⁵⁷

The economic policies pursued by Luis de Meneses, the count of Ericeira, as well as the views on political economy so eloquently expressed by Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo and Anronio Vieira were based largely on the contemporary French example set by Louis XIV's great minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who was in the midst of creating the internal and *outré-mer* mercantilist system *par excellence* of the Old Regime." Pedro, Cadaval, and Ericeira sought to emulate Colbert's policies and create a centralized, mercantilist system. The New Christians constituted the most powerful and dynamic sector of the economy. Since 1640, [the Crown had been dependent on their indulgence for loans to fight the war with Spain and they had long controlled the lucrative private trade carried by the ships of the *Carreira da Índia*.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Pedro was

wary of allowing the New Christians undue, or perhaps better, more blatant influence over the country's economic affairs during his rule. Although from time to time he did entertain various economic stratagem based on their largesse. As a matter of preference, the Crown attempted to substitute state intervention to resuscitate Portugal's flagging financial fortunes in the wake of the long war with Spain and in an age of general European recession. Emulating Colbert's much vaunted reforms of the 1660s, Pedro reformed the grossly inefficient tax-farming and revenue collection systems. The archaic hodgepodge of internal tolls and tariffs was also abolished by Ericeira. To address an unfavorable balance of trade and its accompanying drain on bullion reserves, protectionist tariffs were erected, especially on imported luxury goods. Pedro also offered royal support to encourage internal manufacturing in various fields, including textiles. Royal land holdings were more efficiently exploited and, with the approval of the Cortes excise taxes were raised on tobacco, meat, and wine."

While Pedro was no doubt willing to delegate much more power within this framework to his noble councilors than Louis XIV ever contemplated, it would be an exaggeration to state that anything resembling a "virtual abdication of government by Dam Pedro" ever took place." The Prince Regent attended council meetings, read the *consultas* that were prepared for him with care, made insightful marginal comments, and did his best to decide the overall lines of Crown policy. It is also clear that when he perceived the vital interests of Portugal to be at stake he was willing to stand up to powerful voices on the Councils and at court, including most notably his wife. The best example of this was in Pedro's diplomatic relations with France after 1668. Louis XIV had supported the coup against Afonso largely to increase French influence at court through Marie Françoise and her adherents Sainr-Romain and Schomberg. Pedro, however, had other ideas and refused to become the pawn for Louis's diplomatic maneuverings. Not only did he refuse to honor the provisions of Castelo-Melhor's alliance which called for intervention in the War of Devolution against Spain, but the Prince Regent took advantage of the diplomatic fallout from Louis's invasion of Flanders in 1667 to at long last sign an English mediated peace with Madrid at St. Eloi in February 1668, ending the long Restoration struggle and recognizing Portugal's independence."

Thereafter, Pedro strove to keep Portugal at peace while he sought to rebuild his shattered kingdom and its empire. Above all, the Prince Regent broke with the favoritism that his father had shown for Brazil in *ou-tre-mer* matters, and with the general neglect that had characterized his mother's Regency and his brother's reign with respect to the *Estado*. A

notable effort was made, especially during the Viceroyalty of Mendonça Furtado not only to conserve what remained of the truncated Asian empire, but to initiate measures that would allow it to regain a level of stability and prosperity after some very difficult years in Europe and the East. These reform policies were grounded in the belief that the remaining Indian Ocean possessions, if properly administered, along with the development of the rich Rios de Cuama region could serve as the basis for a rehabilitated *Estado*." Overall, it appears that the Portuguese had learned both from past mistakes and from the example of their European competitors in the trade. Niels Steensgaard has advanced the rather strict dichotomy of proto-capitalist vis-à-vis monarchical monopolism as the most fruitful model for analyzing the commercial struggle between the Atlantic economies (and Asian companies) of the Dutch and English and the Portuguese *Estado* during the 17th century. This, it appears, was far from the case. The *VAC* quickly lost its pristine "entrepreneurial" values, and by the 1660s was squandering huge amounts of cash to defend and maintain dearly unprofitable holdings like Ceylon." At the same time, the Portuguese learned to adapt to changing technologies, business practices, administrative reforms, and geo-political and religious realities in the Indian Ocean trade. These lessons were served as the basis for the impressive reformation program in the *Estado* during the years c. 1668-1683.

Politics and Policies:

Viceroy and Governors, c. 1661-1681

At the pinnacle of the administrative hierarchy charged with governing the extensive imperial holdings of Portugal in Asia was the office of Viceroy. This post had first been created for the king's chief representative in Asia by Manoel I in 1505, and bestowed in that year upon Francisco de Almeida. The likely precedent for this highest administrative title probably came from the Mediterranean, and particularly the empire of Aragon, since in Columbus's original *capitulacion* from Isabella and Ferdinand we find the title "Viceroy" of the Indies. Although the office of Viceroy and that of Governor later came to have virtually identical *de facto* powers, originally there was indeed a *de jure* difference. In 1509, Afonso de Albuquerque was given the title of Governor for one of the three territories carved from Almeida's earlier single jurisdiction. Albuquerque, however, soon took over the powers of all three and a grateful Manoel allowed this to stand. Henceforth, his successors would remain as the Crown's single plenipotentiaries under the lesser title. In 1523, the title of Viceroy was revived for Vasco da Gama's appointment by Joao III.¹ Although the vast extent of the empire in the mid-sixteenth century prompted D. Sebastiao in 1571 to consider a short-lived reversion to a tripartite structure under a single Viceroy and two Governors, a single Viceroy or Governor over the entire *Estado* was generally the rule, with members of the higher nobility who accepted the post given the more prestigious title.² During the period 1662-1682, Antonio de Mello de Castro (1663-66), Joao Nunes da Cunha (1666-68), Luis de Mendonca Furtado (1671-77), and Francisco de Tavora (1681-86) all held the title of Viceroy.

During the seventeenth century, the appointee seldom held the post for more than the traditional three year term, the same length of service usually imposed on all officeholders in the colonial administration. From 1575-1605, only 6 of 34 royal appointees received a second term. This practice, however, would change in the following century. Initially, such limitations seemed to have been imposed to avoid entrenching any person in the position long enough to amass dangerous powers and a large dependent clique built through the largesse bestowed from the viceregal palace in Goa. Nevertheless, there were definite shortcomings to such constraints. The huge distances and time delays involved in royal communication via

either the ships of the *Carreira da India* or the overland route through the Levant precluded effective communication and implementation of royal policy within such a brief period. The Viceroy, most commonly a noble from the *Reino* with at best some previous experience in the *Estado* and appointed for a limited time, was also forced to compete with powerful local interests in attempting to carry out his policies. Groups like the married Portuguese resident in the *Estado* or *casados* and the plethora of religious orders established in the Asian possessions had interests that were frequently at odds with those of the Crown and its Viceroy, and usually exploited the temporary nature of the appointment to their advantage. The difficulties of establishing oneself in power, so far from the metropole, and then pursuing a coherent policy all within three-years's time can thus be easily imagined.'

These difficulties eventually convinced the Crown that it was in its best interest to renew the position for a second term more frequently in the quest for more efficient and effective administration. From 1605-1682, 8 of 21 Viceroys and Governors served at least part of a second three-year term: There were in fact few real limits on a Viceroy's power. Once he had assumed this office, commonly at the church of Reis Magos near the mouth of the Mandavi, and headed up to river to *Velha Goa*, sire of his palace and seat of government for the Crown's possessions from the Cape of Good Hope to Macau, he could do much as he pleased. However, he and his judges could not, for example, pronounce the death sentence or mutilation on (*idalgos* without the express permission of the king. Lisbon also controlled the appointment of the higher public officials in the *Estado*, and the Viceroy could not dismiss them outright. He could, however, refuse to install them in such positions or suspend them with cause. At such times, the Viceroy attempted to influence the Crown on suitable replacements.'

Aside from these limitations, the king was forced by circumstances and distances to give his Viceroy wide powers over matters of administration, diplomacy, finance, and war and peace. Enconced in a region famed for its lavish court display, the Viceroy was also allowed many outward trappings to demonstrate his power to resident Portuguese and the neighboring kings alike. His palace in Old Goa, formerly that of the Adil Shah of Bijapur, was suitably grand. Whenever he departed from its impressive, latticed, entrance he did so in an ornate sedan chair, escorted by halberdiers and retainers, all announced by trumpeters. The most important member of his personal staff was the *secretaria da India*, who also served as the secretary of the *Conselho*, and managed the Viceroy's large correspondence with dependent *fortalezas*, neighboring kings, and Lisbon. The Viceroy also had a personal chaplain, a barber, interpreter, chief investi-

gator, a captain and sixty guards, as well as musicians and servants. While his salary was 3°,000 *xerafins*, by the 1660'S this was hardly sufficient to support such a lifestyle for himself and the many family members who usually accompanied any appointee to Asia in the hope of enrichment.'

Nevertheless, as Virginia Rau and Anthony Disney have demonstrated, "the viceroyalty of Goa was one of the most lucrative patronage appointments in the gift of the Portuguese Crown". 'The great service nobility of the seventeenth century that initially served the Habsburgs in Asia, like the count of Linhares, and ultimately served the Braganzas, like Lavradio, sought to obtain "two of the career objectives most commonly pursued" by their class.' What were these goals? The first was, in some sense, communal: to preserve and advance the interest of one's noble *casa* or house, and family. This desire was deeply ingrained in the Portuguese nobility of the day. The second objective was more individualistic: to advance one's own *fama* and *reputacao* by performing notable deeds in the service of the Crown. For a nobleman, the most acceptable means of adding to one's reputation related to *fama do valor* (reputation for military glory) and *fama do cabedal* (reputation for wealth). A Viceroy certainly found ample opportunities to achieve both kinds of *fama* during an appointment in Goa. Fighting against the armies of the king of Bijapur, the Mughal emperor, and Shivaji or the fleets of the Omani Arabs provided ample "fields" for glory and *fama do valor*. The plethora of entrepreneurial opportunities found in Goa offered plenty of opportunity for *fama do cabedal*. Viceroys traditionally exploited *casado* and indigenous third-party merchants to become involved in the myriad of private trade throughout the Indian Ocean basin with ties to Goa. Socially, the most acceptable of these trades were the horse trade with the Persian Gulf and the rice and grain trade from Kanara and the south. For the nobility, such commodities provided familiar links with their *quintas* in Portugal and no social *derogance*. Upon departing for the *Reino*, the proceeds from such entrepreneurialship were generally, and for obvious reasons, converted to diamonds and other precious stones for the voyage home.'

The provincial nobility of Portugal which had done much to place joao IV upon the throne was therefore more than happy to accept posts in the *imperio*, and especially the viceroyalty in Goa, in the decades that followed. From c. (660-1682 an examination of the background of the men who *held* that position (or that of governor) reveals a clear pattern of accession for the sons of the provincial nobles who had supported the Braganza revolution. As these noble families gradually became integrated into the reformed court or administrative nobility under joao IV, D. Luisa de Gusmao, Afonso VI and Pedro their sons would frequently rise to the ranks of the *titulares* following a similar pattern. They won their knightly

spurs of honor in combat against the Spanish in the Alentejo and then usually receive an appointment at court, an initial posting in the *imperio*, or a grant of income from the Crown as a reward. A *commandery* in the Order of Christ or one of the other religious orders would usually follow, as would the inheritance of the *casa* and its various titles; the most usual being the post of *alcaide-mor* (chief constable), and eventual appointment to the Councils of War or State of the king. At that point, given sufficient *reputacao*, ties to the Crown, and influence at court, the appointment to Viceroy would eventually follow bringing with it entrance into the ranks of the *titulares*. The break with Spain thereby facilitated the rise to power of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial families who, by their aggressive service to the Crown, came to dominate the administrative structure of the Branganzan state and in doing so helped to establish and solidify it."

While garnering the post of Viceroy of the *Estado da India* thus remained a cherished and potentially lucrative prize for the rising service nobility of late 16th century Portugal, the inherent difficulties in successfully carrying out the functions of that office had increased exponentially since the days of D. Sebastiao. Not only did the Viceroy have to contend with the continuing military threat of indigenous powers from Monomotapa to Macau, but the English, and especially the Dutch had demonstrated their bellicose intentions towards the *Estado* from the early part of the century onward. Economically, the necessity of competing in a complex of trading networks across the Indian Ocean and, to a degree, inland against well-entrenched, well-financed, and well-connected indigenous merchants had also been complicated with the arrival of the joint-stock companies of the Dutch, English, and French. The Portuguese were increasingly forced to compete with these rivals merely for a share of the European segment of the overall trade both on the Cape route to Europe and in the "country" or intra-Asiatic trade. Religiously, the monopoly of spreading the faith in Asia under the *Padroado* had also been challenged by the formation of the *Propaganda Fide* (1622) in Rome and the arrival of the Protestant Dutch and English who were generally more willing to forego religious considerations, as opposed to the work of the *religiosos* and Goa Inquisition (1560), in the quest for profit."

In early 1661, as D. Luisa and her advisors were completing negotiations for the marriage alliance with Charles II, the Queen wrote a series of letters to the arch governing *Conselho* of the *Estado* relating to affairs in Europe. Letters from her ambassadors in London and the Hague, the counts of Ponte and Miranda, had already warned of a large fleet of some "30 ships and 8000 soldiers" that the VOC was preparing to send to Asia in order to capture a port near Goa, or failing that Diu or Mozambique."

On April n, D. Luisa informed her new Governors that for some time she had hoped to write of peace with Holland, a pact that would "improve things there". Unfortunately, the States-General and **VAC** were proving obstinate in their dealings with Miranda. The Queen Regent nevertheless exhorted the Governors not to lose hope for peace with the United Provinces. She would send definitive word on these talks with the new Viceroy the following September along with material aid, although this could not be as much as she would have liked given "the necessities in which this State finds itself". Meanwhile, the Governors were ordered to continue the policy of "the defense and conservation of the *pracas* and liberty of commerce". On a more positive note, D. Luisa wrote that the war with Spain was going well, despite the separate peace that France had concluded, and that the kingdom would fight on until the last drop of blood!" Nine days later, the Queen Regent reaffirmed her intention to appoint a new Viceroy as soon as possible and one "of such quality" that one could justly expect that "his experience and valor would promptly procure the Remedy to the affliction" in which the *Estado* found itself. She concluded these letters by once again warning of the large Dutch fleet that would soon depart and ordered suitable defensive measures. Until major assistance could be dispatched, she was convinced that "with your work and industry, and above all your valor, and that of your subjects", the impending challenge could be met."

The members of this Governing Council were ideally to be D. Pedro de Lencastre, Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque and D. Manoel Mascarenhas." Lencastre, the fourth son of D. Lourenco de Lencastre and D. Ines de Noronha, had begun his service to joao IV "in the year of his happy acclamation in the province of the Alentejo". There, he had held the offices of Captain of the Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, *Commissario* and *Mestre de Campo*. Lencastre had served in the Restoration War until 1657. In that year he first traveled to India as *captiao-mor* of the *Naus* that conducted his uncle, the Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar, to Goa as the aorh Viceroy of the *Estado*. Vila Pouca had died on the outward voyage and never assumed his office. Continuing Dutch blockades of the mouth of the Mandavi had also prevented Lencastre from returning to the *Reino* until the spring of 1661, when the Queen Regent's letters had named him as one of the Governors on the Council. D. Manoel Mascarenhas was then *Captiao* of Mozambique, usually deemed a more lucrative post than serving as one Governor of what was expected to be a short-lived Council. He had accordingly declined the honor.'

The most experienced member of the Council was Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque. His father, Pedro de Mendonca, had been *alcaide-mor* of Mourao, *commendador* of Santiago de Cassem and Vila

Franca, *senhor* of Seregeira, one of the principal acclaimers of D. joao IV in December 1640, and later *guarda-mor* for the king. Luis was the eldest child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonio de Mendonca, a *dama* of D. Luisa de Cusmao. He had begun his career in the late 1640s fighting in the war in the Alenrejo, where he performed with "reputation" and "distinction". Luis had first traveled to the *Estado* in 1651, as *capitao-mor* of the ships *San Thame*, *S. Antonio de Maragão*, and *Nassa Senhora do Socorro*. This *Carreira* fleet made a swift voyage to and from Goa. In 1653, he had repeated this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disasters for the *Estado* by departing from Lisbon on 26 March with the ships *Sacramenta da Trindade* and *S. Joze* and reaching Goa on the end of October of that year. In 1657, Mendonca Furtado had returned to the *Estado* aboard the fleet carrying the *conde* of Vila Pouca and Lencastre, with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between January and March 1658, he had commanded the Portuguese fleet that unsuccessfully tried to break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi and relieve Jaffna, the remaining *Estado* outpost on Ceylon. These failures were not the fault of Mendonca Furtado, who acted with great courage and leadership. Rather, they resulted from crucial lapses on the part of other *fidalgos* commanders who had hesitated in the heat of battle. As the Jesuit Queiroz tells us, Mendonca Furtado had the most impressive physique of all the Portuguese in India at that time. Throughout these naval encounters with the Dutch fleet under Adriaen Roothaen: "Great was the valour and wisdom [with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted ... infusing courage into all by his presence."

On land, Mendonca Furtado's *ama do valor* had also grown during his imperial service to the Crown in the 1650s. In late 1658, the king of Bijapur in league with the **VAC** had invaded Salsette with some 400 cavalry and 4000 infantry troops under the general Abdula Aquimo. This force had advanced as far as Margao, while a Dutch fleet cruised off Murmugao awaiting word of a convenient time to disembark. The only Portuguese force then in Salsette was some 250 men in Rachol under the command of Gaspar Carneiro Girao. In Goa, this news prompted the dispatching of Mendonca Furtado as general along with some troops to meet the challenge. In a pitched battle of sorts fought near the village of Arli, the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula Aquimo's army and obliged this force to retreat from Salsette and back across the Ghats. According to Queiroz, the most notable feat of *valor* performed on that day was accomplished by Mendonca Furtado. As the armies deployed for battle, "one of his [Abdula Aquimo's] higher officers who was considered the most *valiant* among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him [Mendonca Furtado]". The Portuguese general had "sallied out of the

ranks to meet him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and a round target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because the buckles were not large enough for his arms". Thus armed on foot, Mendonca Furrado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer, "and when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind quarters of the horse and with his left he made the Moor's horse stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength and daring":'

Unfortunately, Mendonca Furtado's initial foray into governing the *Estado* with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662 was an anemic reflection of his military feats of glory. The origin of many of these problems related to a blood feud that developed between Mendonca Purtado and Barrolemeu de Vasconcelos in Goa after the former's return from the 1658 campaign in Salsette. Vasconcelos had thereupon charged Mendonca Purtado with various excesses during the course of that campaign. These allegations included harsh criticism for needlessly attacking local strongholds and segments of the indigenous populace of Salsetre for allegedly being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the more inflammatory charge of summarily executing 11 men in Coculim.' To avoid an open breach in the capital, Mendonca Furtado had been sent to the strategic fortress of Mormugao with the title of general. Upon his return to Goa in June 1661 as Governor, however, his rather vengeful nature was given free reign and the simmering feud between he and Vasconcelos had erupted into street fights between their partisans. Meanwhile, the pressing plethora of problems confronting the Crown and its Viceroyalty, most notably the continuing aggressions of the **VAC** and the fleet of Van Goens on the west coast of India, were largely ignored. Instead the Governors, the leading *fidalgos* resident in the capital and their retainers all concentrated on settling petty personal grudges with each other. As F. Ferreria Martins aptly noted on this Council and the government of Lencastre and Mendonca Furtado: it was "always in discord, being sterile in [its] administrative action when precisely the opposite was indispensable". The streets of Goa were "turned into a theater with scenes of anarchy, that brought about its complete ruin. Nobles and Clerics hired thugs to harass their enemies and the Governors did nothing to stop them." During the governmental chaos of this eighteen-month period, Van Goens captured Cranganor on the Malabar coast and then turned his attention to expelling the Portuguese from the rich coastal city of Cochin in the fall of 1662:°

It was at this critical juncture in the history of the *Estado da India* that the long awaited Viceroy promised by D. Luisa Gusmao at last reached India. Anronio de Mello de Castro, the *fidalgo* selected for this post, at least had the pedigree necessary for this daunting imperial assignment, as

his family had an impressive and long-standing record of service to the Crown in the Asian empire. His paternal grandfather, whose namesake he was, had been *Capitao* of the *Naus* of India. Two of his uncles, Diogo and Joao de Mello de Castro had also served with distinction in the *Estado*, while his brother Femao de Mendonca Furtado would serve as general of Ceylon. Antonio and his brother were the sons of Francisco de Mello de Castro, who had himself held the posts of *capitao-mor* of the seas of India and Admiral of the Royal Fleet, and his second wife, D. Angela de Mendonca, whose own father had died serving in the *Estado*. Antonio had begun his service to the Crown by fighting "with valour" in the war against Philip IV's armies in the Alentejo. He had been awarded with the *commander*' of Ponnello and the post of *alcaide-mor* of Colares. Eventually appointed to the Council of State, Mello de Castro was initially given the title of Governor of the *Estado* by D. Luisa in Letters-Patent of March 1662, with permission to assume the title of Viceroy a year later after successfully reaching Goa." The generally dismal state of the *Carreira da India* at this time and the desire to exploit the terms of the secret article of the 1661 treaty ensured that Mello de Castro sailed to take up his office aboard the five ship English fleet under James Ley that Charles II and Clarendon dispatched to claim their new Asian prize. This fleet departed from Lisbon in April 1662, and reached Bombay in late September. Mello de Castro would remain in Bombay for a little over two months. By the 10th of December 1662, he would reach Goa and officially assume the office of Governor two days later."

Upon reaching India, Mello de Castro confronted the dizzying array of difficulties that Mendonca Furtado and Lencastre had failed to address in their brief interlude of internecine conflicts in Goa. After the long dearth of serious Crown interest in the plight of the eastern possessions and the loss of regular contact with the Viceroyalty in Goa, Mello de Castro's term of office represented a prolonged reconnaissance mission. The new Governor was expected to observe and report on the wreckage of the previous decades of neglect, to isolate the most glaring problems, to suggest possible remedies and, if possible, to begin to address as many of these difficulties as possible. Viewed in this context, his Viceroyalty must be judged a success. As the ample extant correspondence attests, Mello de Castro performed his mission admirably, especially given the continuing lack of substantial support from a Crown that was still obsessed with the fighting the war with Spain and internal political matters relating to the succession. D. Luisa de Gusmao's Viceroy would prove himself to be an objective observer of the plethora of problems then afflicting the *Estado*. His long careful letters to Lisbon reveal a meticulous eye for detail which elaborated on many of the crucial issues confronting the Crown in its

quest to rehabilitate the *Estado*. Relations with the *Reis Vizinhos* and nominal European allies and enemies would have to be reevaluated; the antiquated and easily corruptible administration would have to be reformed; the traditional financial structures of the *Estado*, including monarchical monopolism and the entire *contracto* system would have to be reconsidered; effective centralized control would have to be reestablished in the outlying fortresses; and the long-standing privileges of the Roman Catholic Church and the cost of spreading the faith in Asia would have to be reexamined! While treatments of Antonio de Mello de Castro's tenure have usually been restricted to his notable three year refusal to turn over Bombay to the English, in fact his administration embodied a good deal more. It witnessed a comprehensive survey of the straining structures of the *Estado* and insightful suggestions and initiatives on how to recuperate a semblance of its erstwhile power and wealth."

The palace coup of the late spring in 1662 that installed Afonso VI and Casrelo-Melhor to power ensured that Mello de Castro's successor would be selected by the good count, and reflect his priorities for the *Estado*. On March n, 1666, Letters-Patent named joao Nunes da Cunha the joth Vice-roy of the State of India. Created the tst Count of Sac Vicente by Afonso on April 2, of that same year as an additional incentive to accept the position, Nunes da Cunha may have had close ties with the king and Castelo-Melhor, but he would ultimately demonstrate a rigidity of policy in Asia that was decidedly out of step with the rather practical Machiavellian nature of the king's private scribe. Nunes da Cunha possessed an impressive familial heritage with respect to imperial service to the Crown. Son of Nuno da Cunha and D. Francisca de Lima, his father was one of the principal "restorers" in the quest to regain Bahia from the Dutch in the 1620S and had died fighting in one of the galleons of the armada of D. Anronio de Menezes two decades later. Nunes da Cunha could also trace a direct family line to both Tristao da Cunha, ambassador to Rome for D. Manoel I who had sailed for the Indies in 1506, "discovered" the islands that bear his name and conquered Socotra; and Nunc da Cunha, *Vedor* of the *Pazenda* of D. joao III and Governor of India. joao Nunes da Cunha had been born in Lisbon in 1619. He possessed a keen mind, was extremely literate, and would publish two books in the 1650s and 1660s: *Peregrinacao de D. [joao IV* and *Vida de D. Pedro o Cruel Rei de Castela*. Nunes da Cunha, like Castelo-Melhor, had risen in court circles as much by his wits as by any *[ama de valor* he had achieved on the battlefields of the Alentejo. By the early 1660s, he was a member of the Council of War and *da chave dourada* and Deputy of the *Junta* of the Three Estates. He had been a gentleman of the *Camara* of the Prince D. Teodosio and later Afonso VI, and had also obtained grants of the commanderies of

Castelejo, Sac Romao do Erdal, and Santa Maria de Vouzela from the Order of Christ. On April 11, 1666 he sailed from the Tagus aboard a four-ship fleet that included the *nao Santa Tereza de Jesus*, the *galeão S. Bento*, and the *navetas N.S. de Penha de Franca* and *Nossa Senhora da Nazereth e S. Antonio?*'

Even though Castelo-Melhor was overwhelmingly concerned with continental affairs in general and arranging the French alliance in particular, he must have assumed that an intellectual like Nunes da Cunha would have continued the careful and relatively frugal policies of his predecessor in Goa. In this case, it appears that the *escrivão* may have misjudged his man, as he would later do with more fateful results regarding Pedro. The *S. Teresa de Jesus* reached the Mandavi in late September of 1666, and S. Vicente took over the powers of his office from Mello de Castro in a formal ceremony on the 11th of October, pledging to restore the former greatness of the *Estado* by "ferro e fogo (iron and fire)". Thereafter, however, the main focus of S. Vicente's energies to this end, both intellectually and as Viceroy, came to revolve around a rather misguided religious campaign aimed both at the rising power of the Omani Arabs and at critics in Goa who had long complained against the abuses and overweening power of the Roman Catholic Church, the Goa Inquisition, and the multitude of religious orders established in the Asian empire. Despite the admirable work by Mello de Castro toward regularizing and stabilizing the financial condition of the *Estado*, Nunes da Cunha managed to squander most of these savings in outfitting a huge armada of 18 ships for the Straits of Hormuz to humble the Sultan of Oman and, if possible, to reconquer Maskat.²⁶ As the Surat Presidency of the EIC reported to their Directors in London in a letter of 5 April 1667: "There arrived from Portugal! in Setember last a new Viceroy to Goa, who hath busied himselfe ever since his coming in proxiding & setting forth a considerable fleet ... but the designe is not completely knowne; Some say for Muscat ... others believe to Cong a Port a little above Gombrone belonging to the King of Persia."²⁷

Nunes da Cunha's religiosity, moreover, transcended any mere desire to continue the *reconquista* against the infidel in the Straits. Antonio de Mello de Castro had decried the power and abuses of the *religiosos* in harsh terms: "Among the greatest miseries that has existed for many year in this State of India none is of less weight than the multitude of *religiosos* that there are in it."²⁸ Sac Vicente, on the other hand, did everything he could to assist them and further entrench their social, political, and economic power. In two letters of January 25, 1667 to Afonso, the Viceroy maintained that the surest means to improve administrative efficiency and cut down on corruption was to involve the *religiosos* in government,

since "in all the parts where they do not have them" administrative thefts were great. Sac Vicenre's exceedingly low opinion of civilian administrators also led him to lament that the existing system ensured that "men without God" dominated the empire." That same month, in opposition to the advice of the *Procurador* of the Crown and the Treasury Council, the Viceroy wrote that he opposed any attempt to tax the assets of the Company of Jesus in Goa: "One should not take from *religiosos* who set such an example and show such zeal to the service of God and His Majesty in conserving this *Estado*."³⁹ In February 1667, in the midst of attempting to reassess the *Colecta* to finance more regular fleets, S. Vicente won approval from the *Camara*, nobles, and *povo* of Goa. Nevertheless, the *religiosos* of the Company of Jesus, the Dominicans, the Augustinians and the Carmelites had all opposed it. And in light of their "importance", the Viceroy had decided to wait for advice from the Crown before proceeding further! In the midst of this religious revival of sorts, Sac Vicente died in Goa on the 7 November 1668, at the age of 49 after governing a mere 2 years and 21 days. Fittingly, his support of the *religiosos* was not forgotten. He would eventually be buried at the feet of the Alter of S. Francisco Xavier, the apostle of the East, in the Jesuit Church of Bom Jesus in Velha Goa."

According to long-standing tradition, following São Vicenre's death, the *primeira via* of succession kept in a locked j-key chest in the church of S. Francisco, was brought to the *Casa Profeca* of the Jesuits and opened on the 7th of November before the members of the Council of State of the *Estado* and other civic and ecclesiastical dignitaries." The 5th Governing Council was thereby established to rule until the arrival of a new Viceroy from Lisbon. Of course, the unfolding uncertainties engendered by the drama of Pedro's overthrow of his brother, the internal demands of the kingdom in the years, the European machinations inherent in the initial steps in Louis XIV's quest for a part of Charles II of Spain's territorial holdings in Flanders, and the natural delays resulting from time and distance from the *Reino* all conspired to delay the arrival of a new Viceroy for more than two years. The 5th Council would therefore direct the *Estado's* activities from November 1668 until May 1671. The three members of this Council were Luis de Miranda Henriques, Manoel de Corte-Real de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro.

All three of the new Governors had substantial experience in the *Estado*. Corte-Real de Sampaio had served on the Council of State in Goa under Sac Vicenre, while Miranda Henriques was then the Captain of Diu." Antonio de Mello de Castro, according to some a distant relative to the former Viceroy of the same name, had perhaps the most impressive record of service to the Crown. Son of Jeronimo de Mello de Castro, gover-

nor of the Castle of S. Filipe in Serubal, *alcaide-mor* of Villa Vicoza, and *capitao-mor* of the Armada to the Indies of 1588, his paternal grandfather and uncle had also served in the *Estado*. By the late 1660's, Antonio had served and lived in Asia for more than twenty years, had married three times, had three sons there, and was considered a true *casado*. Of the Council of His Majesty, Mello de Castro had occupied the posts of *capitao-mor* of the *campo* of Ceylon (where he had distinguished himself in the defense of Colombo in 1655-56), of the Armada of the North, General of the Armadas of the *Reino*, Captain of the fortress of Bassein, and, from 1664 to 1667, Captain of Mozambique and Sofala." The tenure of the Council of Mello de Castro, Carte-Real de Sampaio, and Miranda Henriques was much less acrimonious than the previous Council of Mendonca Furtado and Lencastre. Of course this was not a difficult goal to achieve. As the Minutes of the Coa Council of State reveal, Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio in essence made the major decisions affecting the *Estado* from the *Salla Real* of the *Palacio da Fortaleza*, as the Viceroy's palace was known. Miranda Henriques never reached Goa to share in the duties of government, as the devastating attack of the Omani Arabs on Diu in December 1668 demanded all of his energies in the years that followed in an attempt to resuscitate the trade of that vital port city on the Gulf of Cambay."

The two and a half year governorship of this Council witnessed few significant changes from the policies of the preceding years. From the extant documentation, it appears that Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio were, with a few notable exceptions, willing to allow the entrenched machinery of the *Estado* to function much as before. The fact that only 8 major *Assentos* of the Council of State were taken during these years certainly suggests such a management style." Nevertheless, both these men were anxious to advance the long-term interest and cause of what might be defined as the *casado* lobby in Goa at the expense of what they perceived as the more transitory priorities of the *reinadoe*, that class of the upper service nobility from the *Reino* who customarily held the post of Viceroy for the specified term and then returned as rich men to Portugal. One of the principal problems with the *Estado*, declared the pair in a letter of January 8, 1669, was that such Viceroys and Governors placed "little authority" in the wise opinions of the *casados* and others with long years of service in Asia and instead did "what seemed] best to [them]". This tendency "was not converuenr to the service of Your Majesty", since the *reinados* "proceeded for themselves only little advised of the matters of this State". Mello de Castro and Corte Real de Sampaio also argued that in the future a *reinado* Viceroy should only make war with the advice of the Council of State, preferably stacked with *casados*.

After all, they pointed out, Sac Vicente had been in Goa less than a year and was ill-informed on relations with the *Reis Vizinhos* when he had decided to make war on Kanara against the advice of everyone else on the Council. This was a costly enterprise that the Governors complained they were now obliged to continue!"

The correspondence of Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio was also dominated by beseeching letters to the new Prince Regent describing the lamentable financial condition of the *Estado* and, above all, the acute need for vast material and monetary support if the *Estado* was to survive against the host of indigenous and European enemies gathering against it." The harsh lesson of Diu and perhaps Mello de Castro's experiences on the East Africa coast did, however, convince the generally cautious pair to mimic Sac Vicente's policy of sending a large fleet to engage the Omani Arabs. As they were quick to point out in a letter in January 1670 to Pedro, this fleet had been a "great credit to the reputation of Your Arms": bombarding Muscat, and defeating the Sultan's fleet off Congo, sinking 5 of his best ships and killing nearly 2000 of his men. News of this great victory had "frightened the nations of the East" and helped to recuperate our reputation as "*Senhores do mar*"; friends had sent congratulations, enemies had sent envoys to treat with us, reported the Governors."

While Pedro and Cadaval were no doubt cheered to receive these glad martial tidings, they were nevertheless anxious to appoint a new Viceroy, one of their own, who would once and for all alter the decades of decline in the eastern possessions. The Prince Regent and his key advisors had already resolved upon a fundamental shift in Crown policy regarding the tri-partiate empire, and were committed to initiating a series of reforms in the *Estado* which would allow it to regain a semblance of its former glory and economic benefit to the Crown and *Reino*. Just as importantly, unlike his parents and brother, Pedro was willing to allocate significant levels of monetary and material support for this daunting project. Although Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio had written to inform the Crown of S. Vicente's death in early January of 1669, this news probably did not reach Lisbon until early November of that year, when the *nao Nossa Senhora dos Remedies* anchored in the Tagus after a 10 month voyage from Coa.' The search for a suitable replacement took place during the remainder of 1669 and into early 1670, in the midst of a flurry of activity regarding the approaching Dutch War and Colbert's attempt to lure Pedro into this conflict, especially in Asia against the Vac. In early 1670, the Prince Regent made two exceedingly important decisions regarding his quest to rehabilitate the *Estado*: (1) he definitively rejected the often repeated offers of an Asian alliance against the Dutch proffered to him by Louis XIV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Romain; and (2) in Let-

ters-Patent of March 9, 1670, he selected Luis de Mendonca Furrado c Albuquerque as the jrst Viceroy. Together these choices would have a profound impact on the subsequent history of *Estado da India*.

Mendonca Furtado had returned to Portugal from Chaul aboard the *caraucella Nossa Senbora de Nazareth* in January 1663. Not much is known of his activities for the next few years, except that he gradually became integrated into that claue of young nobles in Lisbon that increasingly came to favor the removal of Afonso and Castelo-Melhor and the acession of Pedro to power. Mendonca Furtado not only urged the coup against Afonso that was played out in the fall of 1667, he was one of the strongest supporters of Pedro during these months. The fact that he had already garnered an impressive cache of wealth from his years of service in Asia, as well as his willingness to offer contrary advice to the new Prince Regent when necessary, was clearly reflected by his offer in the aftermath of the coup to repay D. Maria Francoise's dowry within the space of three days, provided Pedro would forego marrying her. It was much to the Prince Regent's credit that he did not hold this emotional difference of oppruon against Mendonca Furtado, who subsequently served on both the Council of State and of War. In those forums, Pedro continued to seek out his views until appointing him as Viceroy in March 1670." Following what was becoming a common practice, the Prince Regent also bestowed the title of ist count of Lavradio upon Mendonca Furrado by Letters-Patent of March 10, thus completing the rise of another of the provincial noble families that had supported the Revolution of 1640 to the ranks of the *titulares*. Throughout the spring of 1670, the sizable royal fleet that would carry Lavradio to the Indies, and signal the Crown's renewed interest in the *Estado*, gathered in the Tagus. On April 10, Mendonca Furtado and his five-ship *frota* departed. This late departure forced the new VICeroy and his entourage to "invcemar" in Mozambique, and the fleet did not reach Goa until the May 20, 1671. Two days later, he took possession of the office.⁴⁴

The two triennial terms that Mendonca Furtado served as Viceroy marked one of the most crucial periods in the history of the *Estado*. Pedro's first Viceroy had the experience, strength, force of will, as well as the *[ama do cabedal* and *valor* to confront the challenges and entrenched interests that typically frustrate any campaign to reform an inefficient bureaucratic system. Mendonca Furtado, like most *remados*, had always returned to the *Reino* after his various offices in the empire with his loot, and had extensive and useful connections at court. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, he had also spent considerable time living in Goa and could certainly appreciate the inherent weaknesses of the imperial edifice as well as any *casado*, although he himself had not yet married. Be-

fore his departure from Lisbon, Mendonca Purrado had been approached by Louis XIV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Remain, regarding the possibility of joint actions in the Asian trade against the much depised Dutch East India Company. Despite his willingness to discuss the soundest strategy for the French to pursue in their impending campaign against the **VAC**, Lavradio predictably demurred on the question of Portuguese support for any overt actions against Batavia's interests." Pedro and his new Viceroy, after all, had already decided to reject these overtures as "diplomatically" as possible and to instead enact a series of reforms while their European rivals were busy warring against one another in Louis XIV's War of 1672 that pitted the English and French against the Dutch in both Europe, and if Colberr had his way, the Indian Ocean trade as well.

During his six years of power in Goa, Lavradio's policies focused around four main priorities: to reestablish an adequate military presence in the *Estado* that could withstand any onslaught from the *Reis Vizinhos* and European rivals; to recussitare the flagging economic fortunes of the eastern empire; to reestablish effective Crown control over the outlying areas of the *Estado* that had largely fended for themselves during the preceding decades of warfare; and to address the plethora of administrative and religious abuses that had done much to undermine the reputation and position of the Portuguese throughout Asia. Among other things, Mendonca Furtado's tenure would witness the foundation of the permanent *Terce* of 500 men and officers in Goa; the relatively prompt despatchings of the yearly fleets to the Straits and the South in search of contraband shipping; a notable regularization of the sailings of the once moribund *Carreira da India*, the economic and communcation lifeblood of the empire; the reestablishment of regular trading voyages to Macau and Timor, once a source of valued income to the *Pazenda Real*; and a spirited attempt to take on the overbearing social and economic power of the *religiosos*.' By 1677, great strides would be made towards placing the *Estado* on a solid footing once again."

The work of consolidating these gains however fell to Mendonca Furtado's immediate successors: the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida and the Governor Antonio Paes de Sande. D. Pedro de Almeida's family background and record of service to the Crown in preparation for appointment to this lofty position largely mirrored that of Mello de Castro, Nunes da Cunha and Mendonca Furtado. Born in March 1630, he was the son of D. joao de Almeida and D. Violate Henriques. His father was of the *Casas* of joao IV and Afonso VI, gentleman of the *Câmara Real*, and *alcaide-mor* of Alcobaca. His mother was the daughter of the jrd count of Arcos. Pedro de Almeida's family also had long connections of service in the Asian empire: his great-great grandfather, D. Lopo de Almeida had

been Captain of Sofala, while his great grandfather and namesake had served with "great distinction" in India, especially during the notable defense of Diu by D. joao Mascarenhas. D. Pedro de Almeida had begun his service to the Crown in the Restoration War in the Alentejo, where he held the posts of captain of Horse and *mestre do campo* in a *Terce* of Infantry. He eventually received the *comrnanderies* of Loures and Sal Salvador de Souto in the Order of Christ for his services, D. Pedro had then moved on the rigors of court life in Lisbon. By the early 1670S he had become a Senator of the *Cdmara Municipal* of the capital city, a deputy in the *Junta* of the Three Estates, *Vedor* of the *Casa Real*, and a member of the Council of State. In Letters-Patent of April 1677, the Prince Regent named him the 32nd Viceroy of the *Estado* and, as had increasingly become practice, also bestowed the title of 1st Count of Assumar upon him.⁴⁸

One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the rehabilitation project of Pedro in the years after 1668 was the belief that the development of the rich *Rios de Cuama* basin in Mozambique, roughly corresponding to the Zambezi River basin, could compensate for the earlier losses suffered in Melaka, Ceylon, and the Malabar coast and could indeed serve as the basis for a renascent and profitable *Estado*." Antonio Alvarcs Percira in a well-known 1661 letter to the Crown had lauded the potential mineral wealth of this region and beseeched D. Luisa to exploit this area for the benefit of the Crown and its subjects." Mineral samples from the Rios had reached both Goa and Lisbon during the 1670S, further fueling interest in the region both at the Braganza court and in Paris, based on Saint-Roman's letters; especially since both Crowns were operating under the spell of mercantilism at this time, a theory of political economy which held bullionism as one of its major tenets." In a letter of January 1677, Mendonca Furtado had reiterated the need to subdue the area and to colonize it with sizable numbers of gente from the *Reino* and elsewhere. In his words, this area "could make Portugal opulent". Even before receiving this letter, Pedro and his advisors were convinced that the time was at hand to exploit the *Rios de Cuama* in a significant fashion, and D. Pedro de Almeida's brief Viceroyalty would be dominated by this quest and very little else. Following the Prince Regent's orders, the new Viceroy sailed from Lisbon in late April aboard the *nao São Pedro de Ribeira* and took power in Goa on the jorh of October 1677. The following January, he sailed for Mozambique to rendezvous with a fleet of four ships that Pedro had outfitted to carry out the so-called enterprise of Pate: the mission to establish colonists in the region, while subduing any indigenous opposition encountered in the process. Despite some initial successes, the expedition of Pate ended in failure. D. Pedro de Almeida died in March of 1679 in the midst of its execution."

Following explicit instructions from the Crown, the *primeira via* of succession had been opened in the *Palacio da Portaleza* on the 24th of January 1678, four days before the departure of Assumar for Mozambique, in order to appoint a 6th Governing Council to rule in his absence." It nominated D. Frei Antonio Brandao, the Archbishop of Goa; Antonio Paes de Sande, then *Vedor-Geral da Fazenda*, and Francisco Cabral de Almeida. Cabral de Almeida was already dead, and Brandao would die in July 1678. Antonio Paes de Sande, therefore, acted as sole Governor of the *Estado* for most of the period down to September 1681 when Francisco de Tavora, the count of Alvor would assume power. Paes de Sande was ideally suited for this position and did much to consolidate the gains of the late 1660s and 1670s. Born in Extremoz in 1622, he had held various posts in both Europe and the *Estado*. Paes de Sande's familial background was also solidly provincial noble. His father, Jeronimo da Gama de Sande, was a *fidalgo* of the *Casa Real*, *caualeiro professa* in the Order of Christ, *Procurador* to the Restoration *Cartes* and generally "*uma das principaes pessoas da villa, e uiuia [sic] das suas [azendas a lei da Nobreza]*". At the order and expense of his father, Antonio had been sent to fight in the Restoration struggle in search of *[ama do valor]* and social advancement in September of 1643. He evidently distinguished himself during the next two years in actions near Badajoz with the Company of Andre de Melo de Albuquerque and at Valverde under the command of Joao de Mesquita Pimental. After marrying D. Catarina de Castro Pereira Soutto-Mayor in 1645, and with the permission of the Crown, he spent several years in Spain serving Philip IV as *provedar* and *corregedor* of Moncaa. In 1666 he returned to Lisbon, received a *commandery* in the Order of Christ for his services and was named Secretary of the *Estado da India*."

Sailing aboard the Viceregal fleet of the count of Sac Vicente, Paes de Sande reached Goa for this first time in September 1666, whereupon Nuncs da Cunha had asked him to assume the office of *Vedor-geral da Fazenda* during his tenure in addition to his original duties. Paes de Sande continued in these offices as the behest of Antonio de Mello de Castro and Manoel Carte-Real de Sampaio for the first year of their Governorship. Returning to Lisbon in March 1671, the Prince Regent had rewarded him for his services in the *Estado* by nominating him *Guarda-mor* of the *Ribeira de Goa*, *supraanumerario de Conselheiro de Capa e Espada*, *no Conselho Ultramarine*, and the *commandery* of Sac Mamede de Mogadouro in the Order of Christ. His insightful opinions to Pedro on the *consultas* of the Overseas Council during the crucial Viceroyalty of Mendonca Furtado no doubt helped to convince the Prince Regent to embrace many of the long overdue reforms that characterized those years. In the spring of 1677, in recognition of these services and his previous ex-

pericneces in Asia, Paes de Sande was nominated as the *Vedor da Fazenda Geral of the Estado*, arguably the second most important position in the imperial edifice in the east, "*a mayor que tern aquelle Estado, e so a de V Rey the excede*", Departing from Lisbon with D. Pedro de Almeida aboard the *Sao Pedro da Ribeira*, Paes de Sande took office on November 4, of that year and remained as *Vedor* until his appointment to the Governing Council in January 1678.⁶

As Paes de Sande's letters to Lisbon admirably reflect, he possessed a keen, orderly, and penetrating mind." His administrative skills, honed over years of experience in Portugal, Spain, and the *Estado*, as well as his years as *Vedor* of the *Fazenda-Geral* dealing with the financial intricacies of the "State of India" proved of great use to him during the next three years. What the *Estado* needed above all at this juncture was an astute administrator who could consolidate the long-overdue reforms of the preceding decade. Pedro and Mendonça Purtado, exploiting their own dynamism and the preoccupations of their rivals, had laudably initiated this series of radical reforms. Nevertheless, these reforms may not have survived had it not been for the subsequent policies of Paes de Sande, especially given the Assumar's generally disastrous expedition to Pate, a setback which might have easily plunged the *Estado* back into temporary chaos under a less competent Governor. Paes de Sande, however, had served on the *Conselho Ultramarino* in the midst of this notable campaign during the 1670s: he understood the logic and intent of the policies and was ideally suited to entrench them "on the ground" in the *Estado* during his own tenure. Just as importantly, he knew from personal experience and conversations that Pedro was firmly committed to a rejuvenated *Estado da India*, and would not falter in this quest, whatever the news of a single expedition to East Africa! This conviction, one that would have been impossible serving under João IV, D. Luisa, or Castelo-Melhor, no doubt sustained Paes de Sande and allowed him to carry on with confidence in the wake of the disturbing reports from Mozambique in the spring of 1679.

The major priorities of Antonio Paes de Sande during his three year tenure as Governor were relatively straightforward: to pursue a measured but aggressive foreign policy with the *Reis Yizmbos* that would continue the process of regaining respect for Portuguese arms in Asia; to overcome the debacle of Pate; and above all to consolidate the administrative and financial reforms of Lavradio. To these ends, Paes de Sande would continue the ongoing war with the king of Kanara, in an effort to force this indigenous ruler to live up to the 1671 treaty signed with Mello de Castro and Cone-Real de Sampaio and to force him to stop giving aid to the Ormani Arabs." Paes de Sande would do everything possible to overcome

the legacy of Assumar's setback and death in the Pate expedition: regular sailings would be despatched with some troops and other forms of assistance, the Governor also took an active interest in the workings of the *Junta do Comercio* that had been earlier set up for that lucrative trade under Mendonca Furtado." As an administrator *par excellence*, Paes de Sande did would also do much to entrench the bureaucratic and financial reforms of the 1670s. Administrative controls over the Royal *Ribeira* (Shipyard) and *Casa de Polvara* (Gunpowder Factory) in Goa were tightened even further during his tenure." Paes de Sande would also attempt to implement a controversial ruling of a 1678 *Junta* in Goa which sought to halt longstanding abuses of the *religiosos*, the forced baptism and confiscation of property of "*gentio*" orphans in the territories of the *Eetado*. These abuses had had a very detrimental economic impact and Mendonca Furtado, in particular, had done much to see that they were ended.'

The overall impact of Paes de Sande's capable stewardship over the fortunes of the *Estado*, and the impact of the reform policies that began with Pedro's accession to power in 1668, is well reflected in the *Orçamento* of State Budget for 1680, which revealed a positive *saldo* of 171,164 *xerafins* for the *Estado* as a whole and a surplus of 148,094 for Goa and her dependencies. These figures compare very favorably with the huge deficits that characterized the 1630s onward." Moreover, in his document of transfer to Francisco de Tavora in September 1681, Paes de Sande was able to bequeath to his successor, more than 101,000 *xerafins* in the Royal Treasury, 12 ships "*de alto bordo*," another 20 "*de remo*," in Goa and Bassein, and a regular *Terco* with salaries paid!" This was indeed a far cry from the lamentable financial, geo-political and military condition of the *Estado* upon the arrival of Antonio de Mello de Castro aboard an English fleet some two decades earlier. It was also a fitting testimony to the actions of the succession of Viceroys and Governors who served the Crown in Asia during those years, men whose social background reveals a consistent pattern of provincial noble families anxious to rise in the hierarchy of the new Braganza state. Nevertheless, as the actions of Mello de Castro, Mendonca Furtado, Paes de Sande *et al.* reveal, this was a service nobility that was willing and able to provide real *service* to the pressing needs of the Crown in order to rise into the ranks of the *titulares* and the most lucrative positions the court could provide. All in all, it was a *quid pro quo* in the truest sense of the word, an arrangement which benefited both sides; and in the process served the needs of an Asian empire badly in need of assistance after long decades of neglect.

Christians: Saints and Sinners, c. 1640-1683

When Vasco da Gama and his crew reached the tropical shores of the Malabar coast of India on their epic voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, they were almost immediately confronted by two Spanish speaking Muslims from Tunis who demanded to know why they had come. The answer to this rather predictable question was: "*uirnos buscar cbristaos e especiaria*:" "We come in search of Christians and spices." From that time on, the twin motivation of economic gain and the desire to spread Christianity to the "infidels" and "*gentios*" of Asia had been at the very heart of the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean basin and beyond. As Diogo do Couro noted in his sixth *Decade* of 1612 on the symbiotic relationship between these two factors: "The Kings of Portugal always aimed in this conquest of the East at so uniting the two powers, spiritual and temporal, that one should never be exercised without the other." The Jesuit Antonio Vieira writing nearly half a century later added: "If there were not merchants who go to seek for earthy treasures in the East and West Indies, who would transport thither the preachers who take heavenly treasures? The preachers take the Gospel and the merchants take the preachers." This merging of geo-political, economic, and religious motivation was exemplified best in the *Padroado Real* or "royal patronage" over the missionary activities of the Roman Catholic Church in Asia, Africa, and Brazil that had been bestowed on the kings of Portugal by a grateful Rome in a series of bulls from the *Inter caetera* (1456) through the *Praecelsae devotionis* (1514). This combination of rights, privileges, and duties which in essence established the Portuguese Crown as the "standard bearer of the Faith," to quote Gil Vicente, was one of the most highly prized, "jealously guarded and tenaciously maintained prerogatives" of the Lusitanian kings over the centuries that followed.'

Nevertheless, in the initial decades after 1500 the quest for "spices" dominated over the quest for souls in Asia. The House of Aviz had been lethargic in establishing an ecclesiastical hierarchy in Asia to fulfil the religious obligations of the *Padroado*: Goa became the first bishopric in Asia only in 1534 followed by Cochin, Malacca, and Macau from 1556-1557. Not until 1560 did the Portuguese Asian capital become the site of an archbishopric. The first missionary priests had come out as early as the first decade of the 16th century in the ships of Afonso de Albuquerque and his

contemporaries. These Franciscans, Dominicans and others, numbered perhaps 100 or so in Goa by 1540. Many of these priests, however, were often ignorant of native languages "and most interested in their trade and their concubines" and thus hardly effective as agents for the introduction of a "new" religion to a largely hostile continent of Hindus and Muslims.¹ This laxity had been matched by flexibility in dealing with the religious practices of the Hindus Da Gama and his successors encountered. In seeking allies against Islam, it was logical that these early Portuguese adventurers would give the inhabitants of this newly reached land every opportunity to demonstrate that they were indeed practicing the religion of some strange or lapsed Christian sect. Da Gama, after viewing the temples and icons of Malabar for three months was still willing to consider the inhabitants Christian. The great travelers Pires, Barbosa, and Castanheda all found elements in Hinduism that either paralleled Christianity or suggested that it had once been a Christian sect lapsed under the pressure of Islam.¹

This laxity in establishing a formal administrative system for the *Padroado* and flexibility in dogma regarding Hindu religious practices came to an abrupt end in the 1540s with the arrival of the zealotry of the Counter-Reformation Church and its talented shock troops; the Jesuits. The siren call for this new policy came in 1540 when, in order to encourage conversions, all Hindu temples in Goa were destroyed. This act was soon thereafter repeated in the remaining "old possessions" in the Asian capital of Bardes (1573) and Salsetre (1584-87). In 1542, the great Jesuit Francisco Xavier reached India and gave a notable impetus to the missionary efforts then underway in the Portuguese Asian holdings. During the next decade, Xavier, who was called "apostle of the Indies", succeeded in making mass conversions in India, Ceylon, Japan, Melaka, and Indonesia before dying on an island off the China coast. To facilitate this work, Xavier had written to João III in May 1545 from the Moluccas calling for the establishment of the Inquisition in Goa. "The second necessity for the Christians is that your majesty establish the Holy Inquisition, because there are many who live according to the Jewish law, and according to the Mahomedan sect, without any fear of God or shame of the world."² In 1560, the Regent Cardinal Henrique had dispatched Aleixo Diaz Falcao to Goa with express orders to establish the Holy Office in the Asian empire. The final step in entrenching this Counter-Reformation *mentalité* in the *Estado* had come in 1567 with the work of the first Ecclesiastical Council celebrated at Goa. This Council's deliberations were motivated by three, somewhat contradictory, objectives; to declare that all religions other than the orthodox Catholic faith as defined by the Council of Trent were "intrinsically wrong and harmful in themselves," to acknowledge

that the Portuguese Crown had the "inescapable duty of spreading the faith and should use the secular power of the church to do so; and lastly that conversions "must not be made by force, nor threats of force," since no one came to Christ by faith "unless he is drawn by the Heavenly Father with voluntary love and prevenient grace".

After 1570, the position of the *religiosos* in the *Estado* was characterized by three long-standing trends: the rapid proliferation of the number of religious orders, a notable increase in their economic, social, and intellectual power, and the enactment of a series of anti-Hindu religious laws that sought to fulfil the intent if not the exact letter of the 1567 Ecclesiastical Council. By the early 17th century, the Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians were all well-entrenched both ecclesiastically and financially. Goa had at least 7 parish churches, with another 60 or so scattered throughout the tropical countryside of the old possessions. The first major Christian convent, that of Santa Monica (1606-27) on the 'Holy Mount' looking down on the rest of the city had over 100 nuns and a plethora of other applicants. The College of St. Paul's was the largest Jesuit educational institution in Asia with "70 religious and in theory 2000 students". The most impressive shrine to Christendom in Goa was the Sé or Cathedral of St. Catherine, begun in 1562 and only completed in 1652 with a length of nearly 250 feet. Built on a plinth of laterite, a local building stone, this Portuguese-Gothic style masterwork has 8 chapels, 6 altars in the transept, as well as a main altar dedicated to St. Catherine.'

According to figures found in Antonio Bocarro's *Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas* (1635), the Crown was responsible for salaries and other *mantimentos* for nearly 900 *religiosos* in Goa alone by the early 17th century, amounting to at least 59,000 *xerafins* a year.' The late 16th and early 17th century also witnessed the enactment and attempted enforcement of strict anti-Hindu laws in the Counter-Reformation campaign toward achieving religious conformity in the *Estado*. These laws can be broadly defined in two functional groups: those that sought to make continued adherence to Hindu religious practices impossible within the confines of the State of India, and those that offered implicit incentives to convert to the Catholic faith. In the wake of the gradual destruction of Hindu temples in the old possessions, the viceroys D. Constantino de Braganza and D. Francisco Courinho issued orders in 1560 and 1563 banishing large numbers of Brahmins in the interest of spreading the faith. In February 1575, the Governor Antonio Moniz Barreto mandated that if any of these Brahmins made an "unauthorized entry" into the *Estado*, their estates would be confiscated and utilized to provide clothing for the New Christians. On 13 March 1613, the Viceroy D. Hieronimo de Azevedo had issued an order that no "infidel" would be able to marry during times of

the year prohibited by the Church. At other times they would be able to do so only outside of their native villages and according to the laws of the *Concilio Provincial* under the pain of a 1000 *xerafins* fine, one-third paid to the accuser and two-thirds to cover the expenses of the High Court. In January 1620 this policy to discourage Hindu marriages was made even more strident: "As from the date of publication of this order, no Hindu, of whatever nationality or status he may be, can or shall perform marriages in this city of Goa, nor the islands or adjacent territories of His Majesty, under pain of a fine of 1000 *xerafins*.'"

Throughout this long campaign against Hinduism, the Portuguese hierarchy demonstrated a predictable effort to decapitate the rival indigenous religions by banning Hindu priests from Goa. One of the key provisions of a December 1567 law by D. Sebastiao stated that in his dominions "there should not exist any Muslim *leaiie* or Hindu preachers, *joshis*, *joguis*, Sorcerers, *Gurous*, of temples or any other person who held a religious office among the Hindus or were the heads or supporters of the religions of the Hindus". Those who failed to depart were held as captives for service at the *Ribeira*, the royal dockyards of Goa along the Mandavi. This 1567 law *inter alia* also mandated that Hindus who were resident in Goa and certain other cities of the *Estada* were to be forced to attend the preaching of Catholicism." As early as 1585, the third *Coneilio Provincial* had recommended to the Crown that Hindus should be forbidden to wear the sacred thread or to initiate their sons into this practice. Not surprisingly, other laws toward discouraging the practice of Hinduism were economic in nature. A June 1557 law by the Governor Francisco Barreto declared: "No officials of mine, controllers of revenues, commissioners of customs, treasurers, receivers of customs, accountants, lessees of my customs or other revenues, judges, scriveners, and notaries and other officials of revenue and justice should utilize the services in any way whatsoever of any Brahmin or other infidel." Orders of 1573 and 1634 also sought to deprive the Hindus of Salserte and Bardez of political dominance over the traditional *gauncares* or "village communities" in those areas and to prevent those who migrated to neighboring territories to escape religious persecution from receiving their annual share of the income of the *gauncares*- the *jono*."

Spearheading this assault on the indigenous religion was the *Pai dos Cbristaos* (Father of Chnstians). This appointed cleric, usually a Jesuit, was charged with the overall welfare of the converts in Goa and elsewhere. According to Pyrard: "There is another house ... called *Cathecurnenos* and is for catechizing and teaching the new Christians; they are fed and supplied with clothing there, until such time as they are instructed and baptized: over these the Father of the Christians has

charge, as over the whole house.'"" The *Pai dos Cbristaos* also monitored infractions of the anti-Hindu laws on the books: he kept records on the times and dates of the main indigenous festivals and noted and punished those who attended; he sought to prevent pilgrimages to neighboring temples; and he prevented the celebration of Hindu marriages. His most controversial and acrimonious duty was to enforce D. Sebastiao's, March 1559, decree on the forcible conversion of Hindu orphans. According to the provisions of this decree: children of Hindus in Coa, who were left "without father, mother, grandfather, grandmother or other ascendant lineals and are not of an age at which they can have understanding and judgment, as soon as the last of such relatives is dead," were put in the care of the Judge of Orphans and handed over to the Jesuit College of St. Paul, "for being baptized, educated and indoctrinated," in the Catholic faith. The *Pai dos Christiiios* was charged with "ferreting out Hindu orphans if necessary by force," and then turning them over to the Judge of *Orfãos* and eventually the College of St. Paul. As time went on, interpretation of this 1559 law became increasingly flexible, causing much controversy in the *Estado*. Besides the religious affront inherent in this law, there were various cases where Hindu children were taken and forcibly converted after the death of their father *alone* with the parent's property being confiscated in the process! Accordingly, increasing numbers of Hindu merchants decided to vote with their feet, seeking asylum in the lands of the *Reis Vizinhos* instead of risking the harsh religious and financial penalties inflicted with enforcement of this law."

In addition to this wide-range of punitive measures aimed at the Hindus in the years after 1560, there were other laws promulgated by the Crown designed to encourage conversion to Catholicism. In September '570, the Crown decided to exempt all Hindus who converted to Christianity from the *dizimos* land tax for fifteen years. In November 1592, the Viceroy Marhias de Albuquerque declared that slaves of "infidels" who converted would be freed. During the last half of the reth century, a series of laws relating to the inheritance of property in the *Estado* were also enacted to this end. According to traditional Hindu law, a man who died without leaving male offspring could not bequeath his inheritance to his wife and daughters. The Crown and Governor Francisco de Barreto sought to exploit this fact in a law of June 1557, which stated that wives and daughters could indeed inherit, *provided* they became Christians; and if they did not, the nearest Christian relatives would receive the estate. D. Sebasnao reinforced this measure in a decree of March 1559. In 1562, the Crown provided that a Hindu wife who became Christian and left her husband on the grounds that he retained his old religion might claim half of his estate during his lifetime. In 1557, a similar decree had stipulated that

a son or daughter who converted might claim one-third of their father's estate, *provided* they had no other brother, and might still additionally claim their part of the estate on the parent's death. Official posts in the Crown bureaucracy were also reserved for Christian converts wherever and whenever possible."

The successes of this concerted conversion campaign on the *status quo ante helium* in Goa and elsewhere in the *Estado* were limited. By 1600, it is estimated that there were perhaps 175,000 Christians in all of India out of a total population of some 140 million. Of this number, perhaps 100,000 "were the low-caste fishers and pearl divers of the Manar coast," where Xavier and the later Jesuits had been so successful. In Coa itself, there were perhaps 50,000 Christians; or 25% of a population of c. 200,000 in 1600. Nevertheless, the harsh measures outlined above did ensure that nearly two-thirds of the population in the city of Goa itself was Christian.⁴⁵ The resiliency of the indigenous religion in the face of this onslaught can be attributed to several factors: the strong opposition of the Hindus to this foreign faith; the ease with which indigenous religious temples and icons could be relocated to the lands of the neighboring *Reis Vizinhos* like the king of Bijapur. The local business acumen and capital of Hindu merchants in Goa and elsewhere also tempered the *de jure* zealotry of the campaign. It was also inevitable that a *de facto* tolerance and intermingling occurred from the outset between the two religions. Many Viceroys and other secular officials, as well as Archbishops and clerics, for example, utilized Hindu doctors. Nevertheless, this religious campaign and the supposed glories of the *Padroado* ensured that the *Religiosos* continued to play a vital role in the social, economic, cultural, and political life in the *Estado* far out of proportion to their actual numbers, which themselves were impressive. Moreover, it is clear that the zealotry of some of this legislation continued especially regarding the forcible conversion of Hindu orphans."

By the 1660s, the Braganza dynasty therefore confronted a "law of diminishing returns" with respect to the *religiosos*. Conversions continued to lag while Crown expenditures on supporting the state of religious orders in the capital and elsewhere remained high. There is ample evidence to suggest that the Archbishop, the Inquisitor-General and their minions also exerted significant political power, at times frustrating Crown initiatives at reform due largely to the realities inherent in the Goan jingle: *Vice-reo va, vice-rei vem, Padre Paulista sempre tem* {Viceroys come and go, but the Jesuit fathers are always with us}." More damaging to the Crown's interest was the fact that the continuing zealotry of the Inquisition, the *Pai dos Cristaos*, the religious orders, as well as open abuses of existing laws all served to alienate many indigenous families, who fre-

quently sought relief from such practices by leaving Portuguese held territories. Perhaps the most fundamental shift in the traditional Crown policy, from the days of Da Gama onward, to balance sound financial and religious policy in the empire took place in the rvth century with the entrance of significant European competition not only in economic matters, but implicitly in the religious field as well. During the reth century, the Crown had had the luxury of knowing that Hindu and Jain merchants who abandoned residence in the *Estado* could only take their [*azendas* to the lands of the *Reis Vizinhos*. After 1600 and the arrival of the Dutch, English, and French into the Indian Ocean trade in force, this luxury vanished. Such merchants henceforth would and did take their capital, business acumen, and networks to coastal enclaves controlled by Portugal's European competitors, decidedly another matter in the quest to dominate the rich trade of Asia. As time went on, and especially after 1663, the Crown was increasingly forced to consider a reformation of traditional religious excesses which had cost the *Estado* indigenous population and capital."

A perusal of relevant documents for the years after 1663 reveals that such excesses were commonplace. In the eminently quotable words of Antonio de Mello de Castro written in January 1666: "Among the great miseries that have existed for many years in this State of India, none is of less weigh than the multitude of *Religiosos* that there are in it, because they are rich, they are making themselves Masters of everything, and those that are poor, sustain themselves with the alms of those that are even poorer than themselves."¹⁹ Complaints made against the *religiosos* during this period were wide-ranging. First, that they were failing in their primary mission of spreading the Catholic faith due to an ignorance of indigenous languages. Although a royal decree of May 1656 had ordered that all parish priests be examined for competence before their appointment, this policy had not been strictly enforced. As a result, the Crown received many complaints regarding the inability of clerics to instruct the indigenous population of Goa in the local language of Konkoni, a shortcoming that was described by Afonso VI as "an affront to God and the souls of new converts".

A second category of complaints related to the hesitancy of the religious orders to contribute a "fair" share towards financing a rehabilitation of the *Estado* in the posH663 period. The daunting fiscal crisis that confronted the early Braganzas in their Asian empire forced them to consider various financial expedients, including cutting subsidies to the religious orders and seeking significant contributions from the leading clerical houses, that were predictably interpreted as an assault on the traditionally favored position of the *Padroado* in the *Estado*. The Jesuits as

well as the other main orders would in one fashion or another seek to delay and frustrate such efforts throughout these years. In the late 1660s, the Company of Jesus would oppose the extension of the *Coleaa*, a special food tax originally passed by a General Council of 1623 as well as the *donatio* for the peace with the United Provinces. Complaints were also common regarding the skill with which the religious houses had been able to absorb landed property throughout the confines of the *Estado* without express permission of the Crown or the misuse of the *fazendas* of territories legitimately granted to them. Other letters reaching the *Terreiro do Pace* lamented the poor job priests of various orders were demonstrating in other charitable functions including the running of the *Hospital Real* in Goa. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Lisbon received complaints that the Inquisition and religious orders were abusing various decrees of the Crown with extremely adverse effects on the financial stability of the *Estado*. The most glaring example of such abuses related to the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu orphans."

All of these specific problems were exacerbated by the continuing rift between Lisbon and the Holy See, dating from the Revolution of 1640, which had undermined the ability of the Crown to fill bishopric vacancies not only at home but also in the *imperio*. The actions of the missionaries of the *Propaganda Fide* (1622) who, with authorization from Rome, had begun to infiltrate the borders of the *Estado*, constituted yet another worrying hemorrhage for the once proud *hody-religioso* embodied in the *Padroado*." In April 1662, D. Luisa de Ousmao had complained of the dearth of information reaching Lisbon regarding the activities of the *religiosos* and given the Governors Luis de Mendonca Furtado and D. Pedro de Lencastre the power to nominate qualified individuals to fill vital ecclesiastical positions." The Queen-Regent, whose sincere piety and support for the *Padroado* can hardly be questioned, was no doubt anxious for her new Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Castro to resolve this plethora of religious problems as well as the host of secular ills afflicting the near moribund *Estado* in the early 1660s. In letters of March and April 1662, D. Luisa demonstrated her support for the *religiosos* by reconfirming a decree from the Viceroy Count of Tavora granting the Dominicans of Mozambique the right to send a yearly embarkation to Sena, by ordering Mello de Castro to promptly pay the salaries of the Franciscan priests of San Thome and underwrite the construction of new churches in Bardes, and by requiring that careful reports be assembled on any wayward priest before returning him to the *Reino* for discipline." At the same time, extreme financial pressures in both the *Reino* and *imperio* had evidently forced the Queen-Regent to consider the possibility of instituting some type of levy on the widely reported wealth of the religious orders in

the *Eetado*, a terse letter of April 4, 1662 instructed the new Viceroy to prepare a careful accounting of all the "*bens* and *propriedades*" of all the religious houses in Asia, and especially Coa.'

Antonio de Mello de Castro, however, would prove to be no great friend of the *religiosos*. After reaching Goa, he quickly came to the conclusion that the overweening economic, social, and intellectual power of the religious orders was one of the primary obstacles the Crown and its representatives faced in their quest to rehabilitate the remains of the *Eetadc*. His immediate problem was dealing with the fallout from the Luis de Mendonca Furtado-Barrolemeu de Vasconcelos imbroglio in which some of the leading clerics in the capital had *involved* themselves. The promise of swift punishment for any future infractions against the peace, and Mendonca Furrado's departure for the *Reino* promptly solved this dilemma. In February 1663, the Viceroy replied to D. Luisa's initial missives. He noted that it was proper for him to sanction voyages by the Domimcans from Mozambique to Sena only inasmuch as such voyages did not interfere with the terms of the lucrative *contraao* negotiated with the Captain of Mozambique. Mello de Castro was also quick to point out that the *religiosos* entrenched in the *Rios de Cuama* had also been particularly adept at avoiding the Crown's levy on gold and silver exported from that region "and by this vice have diverted a very considerable sum of capital"." As to the matter of preparing a formal accounting of all assets possessed by the religious orders, Mello de Castro predictably pleaded for additional time to complete this daunting task, while noting that "it is certain that the *religiosos* possess many *fazendas*, most of them only with the bill of sale," and not necessarily with Crown permission."

Given the severe financial constraints affecting both Lisbon and the viceroyalty during the early 1660s, it is hardly surprising that Antonio de Mello's main struggle with the *religiosos* related to convincing them to pay their share toward the defense and upkeep of the State. The Viceroy sought to obtain such contributions in difficult negotiations from 1662-1666 that focused on either cutting the level of Crown subsidies that each order received or alternatively in paying a *decima* or other percentage of their total revenues. These talks took on added urgency in the wake of the loss of Cochin and the other Malabar coast possessions to Rijckloff Van Goens in late 1662, early 1663. In a letter dated February 24, 1663, the Jesuit Francisco Barreto, *Visitador* of the Company of Jesus, summarized the initial response of perhaps the most powerful ecclesiastical order to this initiative. He began by noting that while all loyal subjects of the Crown were no doubt feeling the pain of the *Estado's* losses, the *religiosos* had more reason to do so since although "we are planting in this Orient the Faith with such zealousness, we are going to lose with such brevity what

we have acquired with such hard work over so many years". Barreto promised that all the Jesuit Colleges would arrange special prayers and penance to assist in this troublesome time, but he strenuously argued against either cutting the royal subsidy or imposing a new regular levy in favor of allowing the traditional system of a *don gratuit* of sorts operate. As the *Yizitador* pointed out, the Company had been more than willing to assist in times of need in the past: they alone had contributed toward dispatching galleons for the defense of Ceylon, lending the *Estado* some 20,000 *xeratins*, while during the recent siege of Cochin, the Company had provided far more cash and silver plate for its defense from the outset than any other order. These sentiments were no doubt repeated at the meeting of the Three Estates called by Mello de Castro on the 5th of March 1663."

The Viceroy's hand in this test of power was strengthened following the ascension to power of Afonso VI and Casrelo-Melhor. In a letter of March 14, 1663, the king and his *escruiuo* instructed Mello de Castro to strictly follow existing *regimentos* on the question of mandating ecclesiastical contributions to the *Estado* in time of need." To bolster his case, Castelo-Mefhor cited the recent example of these same orders contributing up to a tenth of their revenues in the *Reino* to pursue the war with Spain. The *escruiuo* noted that "these *Religiosos* being rich in money and lands, and collecting moreover many bequeaths from living and dead laymen," could easily afford to pay their fair share of defense expenses. Mello de Castro utilized such leverage as well as an implicit threat to resurrect the history of past scandals involving the religious orders to press his case for more regular and significant contributions. By early 1664, the Viceroy was able to inform Lisbon that in principal at least the *Religiosos* had agreed to pay one-eighth of their secular and ecclesiastical rents and one-fourth of their *crdinarios* each year to assist with the defense of the *Estado*. Mello de Castro, however, was quick to point out that these lofty ideals had not in fact been met. The Dominicans had contributed 1500 *xerafins* and the Company had promised 10,000 *xeraiins* to help with new fortifications at Mormugao. A fire that damaged the College of St. Paul in Rachol had prevented the jesuits from sending along the final 6000 *xerafins* of their pledge, even though the Viceroy doubted whether this was a legitimate excuse. These rather meager figures, moreover, had done nothing to defray the enormous cost of the contribution to the peace with the United Provinces, to which the *Estado* had ideally committed 100,000 *xerafine* a year!"

Throughout the remainder of 1664, Mello de Castro strove to ensure that the religious orders would not only pay their fair share toward defense expenditures, but also toward the *donativo* for Holland. A special

Junta called by the Viceroy to apportion the weight of the *donativo* at which representatives of all three estates were present met in August. As Mello de Castro informed Afonso in a letter of the 18th of that month, this body had agreed to marginal special taxes on salt and cotton cloth to help meet this obligation. Nevertheless, in order to raise the figure of 100,000 *xeraei*s a year for the 16 years of the levy, it was vital that the *religiosos* contribute a significant sum as well, a degree of altruism which had been decidedly absent in the opinions expressed at the *Junta* by the representatives of the ecclesiastical order." Between 20-23 August a series of letters was exchanged on this matter between the Viceroy, Barreto, and the Provincial of the Company of Jesus. In a letter to Mello de Castro, the Provincial went to great lengths to praise the traditional willingness of the Society to contribute in time of need: "we offer all that this poverty we possess allows." On a more salient and practical note, he was also quick to point out that the *religiosos* in this and similar *Juntas* could only be obliged to pay "those tributes that are in conformity with the law"." Mello de Castro responded by emphasizing that as they both knew the most crucial factor in assuring both the secular and ecclesiastical future of the *Estado* "was peace". Since it was impossible for the Crown to pay the contribution to the United Provinces without the assistance of the empire, the *Estado* was obliged to pay its share punctually. To accomplish this task meant that all three estates had to pay their fair share, including the *religiosos* and particularly the Jesuits. After all, this "same Company of Jesus in Portugal paid the *decimas* for the war with Spain," something that "could and should be done in India for the conservation of this *Estado* and in obedience to the King our Senhor in order to secure the Faith in these parts, and to halt the calamities, and miseries, so many times manifesting themselves first in the possessions and later in loss of so many *Pracas*".

In a letter in August 1664, Barreto sought to hold the line on the amount of exactions that would be paid by arguing that there was a notable distinction between what the Society had agreed to contribute in the *Reino* and what it should be obliged to pay in the *imperio*. The *Vizitador* noted that his order had agreed to such substantial levels at home, and especially the *decimas* on *rendimentos*, only because the kingdom itself was in peril." The following day, the Viceroy responded by rather effectively maintaining that it was in fact *more* important for the Society to pay *decimas* in the *Estado* than at home. After all, in Portugal since Spain was the enemy, "only" the Crown was at risk not the faith, while in Asia both were in fact threatened with extinction! All three estates had agreed to a new tax on olive oil to facilitate the payment of the *donativo* and in doing so had demonstrated a desire to share the burden. The Jesuits alone

among the religious orders had consistently sought to "impede" the cause "so important to God, to the King, and of such utility for this State". These selfish actions "were not just". Mello de Castro concluded: "Speaking to you as your friend and not as the Viceroy of India, I believe that this method of proceeding is very strange," and one that could ultimately result in problems for the Society in the *Estado*. The Viceroy made it clear that even though he was a personal friend and held Barrero "and all the holy fathers" in high regard, he would ultimately be forced to exact the monies demanded by the Crown and agreed to by the *Junta*.¹⁴ This hard line evidently had the desired effect not only on the Society of Jesus but on the other religious orders as well since they all nominally agreed to the provisions of the *Junta*. In the years that followed, however, all of these Orders consistently maintained that they were acceding to these demands under duress and complaints against the exactions were common. Moreover, as delineated in a letter of late August 1664 from the *Cabildo* of the *Sé* of Goa to Afonso, it was clear that the *religiosos* would have preferred, as in the past, to determine for themselves the levels and methods of the donations made to fund secular projects and priorities."

Nonetheless, once the question of the *donativo* had been technically resolved, the remainder of Mello de Castro's viceroyalty was relatively uneventful with respect to the *religiosos*. In a letter in January 1663, the *Camara* of the city of Chaul had complained to the Crown over the activities of the Society there, specifically charging that the Jesuits were involving themselves in the secular "jurisdiction" of the city and violating its privileges by investing in the two voyages from Goa to Mozambique that the Crown had conceded it to assist in maintaining the fortifications of that valued *praca*. In March 1665, Afonso ordered Mello de Castro to take all necessary actions to ensure the exclusion of the *religiosos* from the "administration of the said city" and with regard to their involvement in the specified voyages from Goa to Mozambique to provide the Crown with more particulars and evidence before a final decision could be made." The following month, Afonso responded to a letter from Barrero, written during the height of the *donativo* debate. In his missive, the *Yizitador* had harangued the king with the many examples of sizable financial assistance the Society had rendered in times of need, including the 20,000 *xerafins* pledged for the reinforcement of Ceylon in the 1650s. Moreover, it pleaded poverty with respect to the *donativo* due largely to the fire at the College of Rachol which had caused extensive damage to this Jesuit bastion in Salserre. In no doubt welcomed terms, the king ordered Mello de Castro to act in this matter according to the needs of the *Estado* and what he perceived as just in the circumstances.'

In letters to Afonso VI in January 1666, Mello de Castro proffered some final opinions on the status of the *religiosos* in the *Estado*, giving his rivals little quarter. His term as Viceroy had convinced him that the *Estado* itself was in jeopardy, should the economic, political, and social power of the religious orders remain unchecked. Simply put, he was no friend to the manner in which the "true faith" was being spread in Asia. In the Viceroy's view, the number of *religiosos* was far in excess of what was needed to propagate Catholicism. "One does not find in Goa and its environs more than 320 or so permanent Portuguese residents, while the priests exceed 700; in Chaul there are perhaps 21 and for them there are five convents." Mello de Castro noted that the only function that 20 fathers performed was to assist the dying with their wills in order to ensure that their *fazendas* reverted to the religious houses upon their demise, while others conspired to spend this windfall "scandalously". Such practices had not only added substantial sums to the coffers of the religious orders during his term, but in so doing had robbed the Crown of a source of income. More damaging to the interests of the State was a long-standing policy of luring recently arrived *soldados* into their houses, a practice which deprived the *armadas* and *fortalezas* of badly needed manpower at a time when the *Estado* confronted a host of enemies. In seeking to outfit the ships for the 1666 monsoon, the Viceroy had discovered that more than two dozen had deserted and fled to convents in Goa. In 1665, Mello de Castro had written letters complaining against such actions to the Augustinians, Franciscans, Jesuits and Carmelites, to little effect."

In his harsh denunciation of the *religiosos*, Mello de Castro not only sought to expose practices that either infringed upon or undermined the best interests of the Crown, he also sought to critique their performance in their legitimate function of spreading the Roman Catholic faith. Despite frequent and long-standing complaints on the slipshod manner in which the faith was propagated in the *Estado*, the religious orders continued to resist royal efforts to address the most fundamental reason for these shortcomings: a simple ignorance of the indigenous languages, especially Konkani, on the part of the vast majority of the *religiosos* who were charged with missionary activities. Mello de Castro argued that this state of affairs was crippling missionary activities throughout the *Estado* and particularly the "old conquests" of the island of Goa, Bardes, and Salsette. The usually astute Jesuits had evidently demonstrated relatively little interest in mastering local tongues. "Few or none of the *Vigarios* of Salsetre, know the language." They were assisted by "native" assistants "in the administration of the Sacraments. "I ask you to consider how one would be able to hear a confession on a winter's night, a league from the nearest road?" Although the Franciscans had some "masters of the lan-

guage" who could adequately fulfill their duties, most of these were elderly with few able students to continue their work. The Dominicans and Augustinians conducted themselves "in the same fashion". To combat this nearly general ignorance of local languages, the Viceroy endorsed the adoption of a plan advanced by some of his predecessors, calling for the establishment of a testing system for all priests involved in missionary work in the *Estado* to be administered by the *Cabido* of Goa or some other church official."

Mello de Casarro concluded his diatribe by informing the Crown that many of the religious orders were also doing their utmost to avoid paying their share to the *donativo*. It had been a "miracle" to win the initial agreement on the contribution, given the many interests against it and the open opposition of the Jesuits. Subsequent efforts to actually collect on the promises of 1664 had been anything but facile. Many of his officers had all but suspended their activities in Goa itself, since some of the leading lay and ecclesiastical residents there were arguing that a clause of the *Junta* agreement seemingly gave the parties involved the right to declare the *oitava* obligation null and void should one of their number fail to pay up! Thanks to his efforts, that part of the *oitava* due for the island of Goa, Bardes, and Salsette had been promised by all the religious orders save the Company of Jesus, which had insisted that all the others pay first. "I must confess to your Majesty that they are terrible men." In order to suffer them "it is necessary to be a Viceroy of bronze". In his opinion, nevertheless, it was vital to push this issue through to a successful conclusion since it was a model for defining the limits of ecclesiastical power in the *Estado*, and for establishing the clear primacy of Crown authority and the deference that the *religiosos* "owed to the service of Your Majesty".

The charges contained in Mello de Casarro's letters in January 1666, even though they may have been somewhat exaggerated, certainly demonstrate the fact that daunting problems remained with respect to defining the exact role the *religiosos* should play within a reformed *Estado da India*. The task of addressing these difficult challenges fell to Mello de Castro's successor as Viceroy, Joao Nunes da Cunha, the greatest friend the *religiosos* would find in the office during the late 17th century. After reaching Goa in late September 1666, Sac Vicenre, as noted above, devoted most of his energies for the next two years to waging a religious crusade against the Omani Arabs near the Straits of Hurmuz and seeking to further entrench the power of the *religiosos* into the fabric of the Asian empire. Nunes da Cunha, however, received instructions from the Crown that complicated his sacred quest. In January 1666, even before his departure from Lisbon, Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor had ordered him to address the festering and bothersome problem of a lack of knowledge of

indigenous languages on the part of the *religiosos* by adopting stringent measures. The king reiterated orders originally mandated in 1656 regarding the examination and appointment of parish priests throughout the *Estado*. Henceforth, all such clerics in advance of their formal appointments would be expected to pass a language exam administered under the auspices of the *Inquizidor Apostolico* and could not be confirmed in their posts "if they did not know the language of their parishes well". Afonso and Castelo-Melhor also ordered (hat the College of Reis Magos should have a teacher in such languages with at least 20 students, and teachers would also be appointed in other *[crtalezas*. The goal of such measures was to avoid the "great complaints of carelessness that the said *religiosos* have had in this important business and great damn to (he service of God and the souls of the new converts". In an attempt to ensure compliance, Afonso ordered that no parish priests could be paid until they had passed an exam and spoke the language."

In January 1666, Sac Vicenre also received orders to do his utmost to collect the *oitava* part of the *rendas* in the *Estado* that had been pledged to meet the *donativo*. As Afonso pointed out, Luis de Mendonca Furtado had done his best on the return voyage from Chaul to convince the Portuguese residents of Mozambique and the *Rios de Cuama* to make similar concessions. Nevertheless, based on Mello de Castro's warnings, the king expected the Jesuits and Dominicans to oppose this exaction in a variety of fashions. The Crown informed its new Viceroy: "I strongly order you (as I affirm with this letter) that as soon, with the grace of God you will have arrived in India, to generally execute this contribution in all parts of the *Estado*, in the form in which it has been adjusted.":' The following month, Sac Vicente was instructed to intercept "a Franciscan priest with a Patent or *Breve* naming him *commissario geral* of the said order in the *Eetado*", Since this cleric merely possessed authorization to assume this post from Rome and the Crown had long considered it "very prejudicial not only to the rights of this Court, but also to the service of God," to allow such appointments without first approving them, the Viceroy should prevent his assumption of power and send him to Portugal on the first available sailing." In March of that year, Nunes da Cunha was additionally charged with resolving a dispute between his predecessor and the Jesuits, relating to a share of the *rendas* of the island of Goa and adjacent islands in the old conquests that joao III had granted to S. Francisco Xavier to found the College of St. Paul and which Mello de Castro had evidently been withholding at least in part. The king and Castelo-Melhor ordered Sac Vicenre to examine all of the relevant *provisoes* on the matter and implement the policies specified in the most recent order passed by the Crown."

While Sac Vicente concentrated a good deal of his logistical energies toward organizing his grand Straits fleet, he also implemented policies that favored increasing the power of the *religiosos* in the political, economic, and social life of the empire. This attitude was admirably reflected in his first set of letters to the Crown in January 1667. In Sac Vicente's view, Chaul should continue to enjoy the two voyages to Mozambique it had been granted in order to assist the fortifications there that "are in a very ruinous state". As for complaints against the Jesuits involving themselves in the administration of that city, the new Viceroy was much less inclined than Mello de Castro to completely expel the *religiosos* from any political role. In his view, it was always "convenient" to have these talented Padres involved in some administrative capacity, since in all places where they were not, administrative thefts were notable. He advised Afonso not to listen to such complaints in the future made against the Society by "interested parties" who were only seeking to criticize the Jesuits in order to facilitate their own ability to rob the Crown and the people." The Viceroy also complained about the great corruption of the Governors of Mozambique, who despite the constant complaints of the Jesuits, had enriched themselves at the expense of the *povo* in those parts. For their trouble, the clerics had been "martyred" and "men without God, and without Faith, and with money [are] those who triumph!" Nunes da Cunha also notified the king that the new *commissano geral* of the Franciscans was very ill and could not at present be sent back to the *Reino*. He noted that he had also done his best to ensure that some 2000 *xerafins* had been sent to the Jesuit College at Macau to assist their activities in China.'

Sac Vicente's firm support for the *religiosos* was also evidenced in a dispute between the *Procurador da Coroa* and the Society of Jesus involving the payment of certain monies that this Crown official claimed was owed to the Royal Treasury by that order. The Viceroy's views in this matter reveal much about his general attitude toward the importance of the religious orders to the well-being of the *Estado*: "I beseeching ask that your Majesty using your royal grandeur not take them [the monies] from these *Religiosos*, who with such example and zeal to the service of God and your Majesty have conserved themselves in this *Estado*." Sac Vicente further argued that should any monies be taken they be directly applied only to the missionary work of the Society and not used for secular projects." In some cases, however, even Nunes da Cunha revealed some degree of frustration by the policies of his *religiose* friends. This feeling was evident, for example, in a letter in February 1667 regarding the extension of the *Colecta*, the only sure means in Sao Vicente's view to raise adequate monies to underwrite a rehabilitation of the *Estado* to its old splendor. In this dispatch, the Viceroy described his successful negotiations on this

matter with the three estates in Goa. Although the nobility and *povo* had agreed to an extension of this tax, monies that Sao Vicenre desperately needed to fund the formation of his grand armada for the Straits, it was being strongly opposed by the Jesuits, Dominicans, Augustinians and Carmelites. Even in this case, however, his high regard for the *religiosos* and their "importance" had convinced him to delay imposing this tax until the Crown could issue firm orders on the matter."

In the midst of his twin military and administrative campaign on behalf of the religious orders, Sac Vicenre died in Goa in early November 1668, after serving a little over 2 years of his term as Viceroy." Events, meanwhile, were transpiring in Lisbon that would also help alter the nature of church-state relations in the empire. The palace coup of late 1667 that had deposed Afonso and Castelo-Melhor and installed Pedro in power would ultimately have far reaching consequences in defining the exact role of the *religiosos* in the imperial structure of absolutist Portugal. The first stage of this transformation would come under the sth Governing Council of Luis Miranda Hennques, Manoel Carte-Real de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro. This process would accelerate with the arrival of Luis de Mendonca Furtado, and culminate with the work of D. Pedro de Almeida and Anconio Paes de Sande.

Pedro's reign coincided with that of Louis XIV's in France and there is little doubt that he strove to implement policies along the lines of his royal "cousin" to the north. The Prince Regent and his *grandee* advisors sought to establish a more centralized administration, a state-influenced mercantilist economy, a more efficient military and foreign policy, and increased power over religious policy in his kingdom, policies that have come to be defined as the hallmarks of the so-called absolutist State. With regard to religion, Pedro would confront a difficult task within the very traditional confines of the kingdom itself. The powerful clerical estate in Portugal, numbering c. 55,000 members, had long enjoyed a favored intellectual and economic position in the kingdom. It was in fact "a state within a state," that owned between one-fourth and one-third of the land in the kingdom, held rights to the *decima de Deus* or a tenth share of the royal revenues, and also received a plethora of other donations through mortmain and other devices from "pious believers". The Inquisition itself constituted yet another bastion of clerical influence and power within the kingdom."

As in most of Europe, the Crown's campaign to increase its effective control over this institution was long and gradual. Even during Pedro's reign, some royal initiatives would be undermined by vestigial clerical power, including his scheme to fund a new East India Company with monies from the New Christians." Nevertheless, the general pattern towards absolutism with regard to religious matters in the empire had al-

ready been established. The papal bulls initially authorizing the *Padroado* had given the Crown widespread power over all religious activities in Asia. Even in the midst of the mid-seventeenth century imbroglio with the Holy See following 1640, which centered around the issues of appointing bishops and the increasingly active *Propaganda Fide*, the Crown continued to maintain a hard line in its rights and privileges. These struggles over the restored Crown's prerogatives over religious matters in Asia no doubt exacerbated strained relations with Innocent X (1644-55), Alexander VII (1655-67), Clement IX (1667-69), and Clement X (1670-1676).

Afonso and Castelo-Melhor had not only striven to maintain the traditional powers of the *Padroado*, they had also sought to increase royal power by taking a more active role in the more mundane matters of spreading the faith in Asia. The 1666 decree on examining all parish priests and withholding payment for those who did not pass a language test indicated that the Crown henceforth expected a much more efficient return on the substantial amount of badly needed capital it was expending on the *Padroado*. Similarly, orders of that same year to recall the newly arrived *commisario-geral* of the Franciscans revealed that the Crown was determined to maintain its near monopoly in spreading the faith in Asia, even if such a policy meant further antagonizing the Holy See. Moreover, as the 1660s and 1670s wore on, the activities of the Dutch, English, and French Companies in the quest for Asian trade would ultimately force the Crown to reexamine the economic impact of its religious policies in the *Estado*? How much longer, in an increasingly competitive economic climate, could the Crown allow religious zealotry and at times incompetence to flourish and still expect to survive in the trade? This was the seminal question confronting Pedro. As the Prince Regent, Mendonça Furrado and others came to realize, the halcyon days of the mid-seventeenth century when the Portuguese had nearly monopolized the European share of the trade were clearly over, as were the times when the Inquisition and religious orders could ride roughshod over the indigenous peoples of the *Estado* without concern for the economic impact of such actions. It would fall to Pedro and his viceroys to temper the long-standing zealotry of the *religiosos* and their abuses in an effort to save what remained of the *Estado*. Their efforts would seek to construct a model for religious activities and proselytization in a Catholic empire that would spread the faith, while avoiding actions that would undermine the economic and political activities of the state.

During the tenure of the sixth Governing Council, Pedro was concerned with various issues relating to the *religiosos*. As early as April 1668, the Prince Regent invoked Crown prerogatives in a case involving some 12,000 *cruzados* that the Neapolitan Duchess of Gravina was seeking to

bestow on the Society of Jesus to assist them in their plight on the Malabar coast following the loss of Cochin in 1663.⁵⁶ In December 1668, the Prince Regent sought to crack down on priests from the *Propaganda* going to *Estado* without license from the Portuguese Crown." In March 1669, he resolved that 100,000 *cruzados* granted by *Cortes* would be used to facilitate negotiations with Clement IX towards settling the dispute over naming bishops in the kingdom and the empire. The Prince Regent was also no doubt anxious to arrange a rapprochement with the Holy See in order to gain recognition of the divorce of Afonso and Marie Françoise, and his subsequent marriage to the erstwhile Queen.⁵⁷

In March 1669, Pedro wrote to Sac Vicente concerning the complaints of the Inquisition on the conduct of the English in Bombay. "The *Conselho geral* of the Holy Office has informed me that the English on the island of Bombay are permitting freedom for every individual to live as they see fit, they are not permitting the Holy Office to undertake its necessary safeguards." Pedro pointed out that such actions violated the terms of the 1661 treaty that had permitted their entrance into this *praca*, and were allowing "delinquents against the Catholic Faith" to go without their just punishment. In the Prince Regent's opinion, since the treaty with England had allowed the Holy Office to continue its activities in Bombay, a protest should be lodged forthwith with the appropriate authorities in the English enclave to ensure that in the future "the orders of the Holy Office were carried out without exception" and that the clauses of the treaty honored.'

That same month, Pedro sought to follow up on Mello de Castro's complaints against the large amount of real estate the *religiosos* possessed in the *Estado* and the Viceroy's promise to provide a list of such properties, a list that had not yet reached Lisbon but which could ultimately be used to "limit this excess". The Prince Regent also issued instructions to follow up on Mello de Casro's complaints against the financial irregularities of the Jesuit Concalo Martins, while ordering the Viceroy to honor the pledge he had made to the Provincial of the Society of Jesus to provide funds from the Royal Treasury to assist the Jesuit colleges in Cochin, Coulim and Cranganor, *pracas* lost to the Dutch in 1662-1663.⁵⁸ An important *consulta* of the Overseas Council of December 1669 sought to reinforce Crown prerogatives on the matter of exclusive Portuguese power to nominate bishops for the lands nominally under the dominion of the *Estado*. A bull from Clement IX had pronounced that "all Christians were subjects of the bishops that the *Propaganda* had dispatched to all parts of the world". And soon thereafter two such foreign bishops had evidently been sent to India, including a French prelate."

The members of the Overseas Council, including Ruy Telles de Menezes, urged that Pedro take three steps to combat this act which had violated "Bulls conceded to the kings preceding Your Majesty in lands under the jurisdiction of this Crown". Pedro should first complain strenuously through his ambassador in Rome; he should then order that these prelates not be recognized in any form by the subjects of the *Estado*, and finally he should seek to preempt any further incursions by the *Propaganda Fide* by quickly filling all vacant bishoprics in the *Estado*. The marginal notation of the Prince Regent on this *consulta* indicates that he strongly supported these recommendations." While Pedro no doubt favored such actions as a means of entrenching Crown power in religious matters in ASia, it is interesting that in the accompanying documentation to this *consulta*, some of the primary reasons cited for embracing such a policy related not so much to the religious impact that the activities of the priests or bishops of the *Propaganda* would have in the *Estado* but the geo-political damage that would be done, should the Portuguese Crown be exposed as being so weak that it could not prevent such actions in its territories. The Dutch, English and French, it was noted, would all seek to exploit this perceived weakness at every turn." While Pedro and his Councilors may have used European diplomacy to address the *Propaganda Fide* challenge, the Governors of India informed the Lisbon in January 1670 that it was nearly an impossible task in Asia to prevent the passage of such interloping clerics on voyages to and from Rome. Despite largely shunning the Cape route, they were able to embark in a variety of Persian ports for "their journeys, without us being able to impede them, since the ships in which they travel are Dutch, English, and Moslem".

As *casados*, both Anronio de Mello de Castro and Manoel Carte-Real de Sarnpaio recognized the vast intellectual, social, political, and economic power of the *religiosos*. Unlike the Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Casarro, they were not willing to challenge that power during their administration, especially the vast influence of the Jesuits. After all, they and their families would have to live with the fallout of any decisions made regarding the religious orders long after their temporary terms as caretaker Governors had ended. On the issue of the large amounts of unauthorized lands the *religiosos* had amassed, they maintained: "We have not conceded license to any priests to buy property, the biggest complaint in this matter is the great amount that the priests of the Company [of Jesus] possess." Yet, the Governors sought to implicitly justify any such transactions that may have already taken place by arguing that "many times Your Majesties have been informed of this, and have confirmed them with all conditions even rather extraordinary ones". On the issue of the English impeding the work of the Inquisition in Bombay, the Governors

wrote that it was not yet clear if the EIC was directly undermining the work of the Holy Office, except in offering "freedom of conscience" in the enclave. Nevertheless, in a veiled effort to defend the religious policies of the Inquisition and the *religiosos*, Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio maintained that it was not this religious policy as much as the desire of criminals and debtors in the Province of the North to escape punishment that had already attracted large numbers of "indigenous subjects of Your Majesty" to Bombay. The Governor of the Province of the North had complained to his English counterpart about accepting these erstwhile Portuguese subjects, but to very little avail."

While Pedro and his Overseas Council may have had a desire to initiate religious reforms in the *Estado* from the outset of the regime, nothing significant was accomplished until the tenure of Luis de Mendonca Furtado as Viceroy. Mendonca Furtado's arrival in Coa in May 1671 signaled a notable escalation in the campaign to extend royal authority over the *religiosos*, to curb the most glaring abuses of the Inquisition and the religious orders, and to resolve the inherent trade-off of economic advancement vis-a-vis religious zealotry in favor of the former. In March 1670, on the eve of his departure from Lisbon, he received a packet of letters from the Prince Regent. Pedro instructed his appointee to finally complete the task requested by Antonio de Mello de Castro nearly five years earlier; that is to compile a comprehensive list of the land holdings of the *religiosos* and the Jesuits in particular. In a more specific case, Mendonca Furtado was ordered to place an ongoing dispute between the Dominicans and the *Procurador* of the Crown concerning lands which the order had allegedly appropriated without license from the Crown to the Royal Court for resolution. At the same time, there is little doubt that the Crown saw the efficient expansion of Catholicism under the legitimate auspices of the *Padroado* as a means of spreading the *gloire* of the Portuguese monarchy. Accordingly, Pedro also instructed Mendonca Furtado to continue the work of Sac Vicenre in encouraging conversions in Bardes and the Province of the North by, in part, building more churches to facilitate this process."

The increasing sensitivity of the Prince Regent and his main advisors like the duke of Cadaval to the economic consequences of spreading the faith in Asia, was well reflected in a May 1670 *consulta* of the *Conselho Ultramarine*" This document resurrected the question of dealing with the challenge to Crown's *Padroado* embodied in the continuing actions of the *Propaganda Fide* that "had made, and continues to make the determination to continue [to appoint] foreign subjects as bishops of Asian lands with the title of missionaries, against the law and practice immemorial, that Your Majesty enjoys thanks to the Senhores Kings, his predeces-

sors". The Council went a step beyond their deliberations of the preceding year by advising Pedro to order Mendonca Purrado to detain and dispatch all such clerics to the *Remo* for Portuguese approval: "Under no circumstances admit into the said *Estado* foreign clerics of any religion that have not traveled via this kingdom with the permission of Your Majesty." Pedro accepted this advice. It is significant that in addition to voicing the traditional complaint of such actions by the *Propaganda* violating the rights, power, and *gloire* of the kings of Portugal, the Overseas Council also voiced strong concerns over the economic impact of such actions. "Even though the motive of the *Junta* may be to propagate the Faith, and to assist Christianity ... it has succeeded in accomplishing something very different ... [these foreign priests] have applied themselves toward giving advice and news to the Princes of which they are vassals, in order to introduce the commerce of these states to the ruin of that of Your Majesty."⁶⁹ In March of 1671, Pedro informed Mendonca Purrado that the recent election of Clement X as Pope had helped to ease the rift over the appointment of bishops in the *Estado*, including the archbishop of Goa, but noted that the actions of the *Propaganda Fide* were still irksome."

Soon after taking power, Mendonca Furtado was forced to confront perhaps the most damaging and troubling problem relating to the *religiosos*: the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu "orphans". In a letter dated June '9, the new Viceroy received greetings from 35 of the leading *gentio* merchants of Bassein. After expressing the obligatory welcome, these merchants began to list problems with the *rendas* and *alfandegas* in the rich Province of the North due to the "oppression that we are presently enduring". Foremost among these abuses was the taking of Hindu orphans in violation of "ancient laws of the Kings of Portugal", which had permitted such actions only when both parents and grandparents were dead. Instead, the *religiosos* in the North and elsewhere had over time come to define "orphan" in an extremely loose fashion: when merely the father had died, but the child still had a mother, grandparents, and great-grandparents alive. Because of this abuse and the accompanying oppression, many indigenous merchants had fled to the lands of the neighboring kings. As the petitioners pointed out, many of these Hindus and Jains had also gone to the burgeoning English enclave of Bombay, attracted by the beacon of de facto "freedom of religion". This exodus to Bombay was of "such rigor" that this port, "whose tobacco *renda* in other times was 3000 *pardaos* per year, today yields to the English more than 13,000, and it may soon reach 24,000, after yielding in our time less than 3000, and that port is improving itself every day for merchants, since they are safe from the assaults we suffer". This letter predictably concluded by asking that Mendonca Purrado do his utmost to remedy such

abuses by ensuring that the original decrees on this matter were henceforth observed by the *religiosos*."

Before Mendonca Furtado advised the Crown of these worrying problems, Pedro and his advisors had already begun to debate such issues and the general question of the proper role of the *religiosos* in a rehabilitated *Estado*. As early as March 1671, the Prince Regent had begun to have second thoughts on the rigorous campaign that Sac Vicente had authorized in Bardes and the North in search of new converts. The decrees in favor of Christianity and the extension of the territory under the jurisdiction of the *Pai dos Christdos* that were part and parcel of this campaign had already resulted in some complaints to Lisbon about the taking and forced conversions of Hindu orphans. The Prince Regent instructed Mendonca Furtado to "execute the orders of the Viceroy, your predecessors", in matters of spreading Christianity but, unlike Sac Vicente, to do so using "the most suave methods possible", to avoid alienating the indigenous subjects of the *Estado*. Should problems arise, the Prince was to be informed immediately. Moreover, under no circumstances should the new Viceroy seek to make "converts by force, if they are not voluntarily, and above all do not take children from Hindu parents by force in order to baptize them, only orphaned children in the form that had traditionally been observed in this State, conforming to the extant orders".⁷²

A landmark *consulta* of the Overseas Council dated September 1671 had also tempered some of the zealotry of the Sac Vicente years. The *conselho* had been asked to advise Pedro on four main points raised in the letters of Mello de Castro and Sac Vicente between 1662-1668. Should the number of convents be reduced in light of the disproportionate number of *religiosos* in the *Estado*, as compared with the number of Portuguese citizens there? Should the clergy in the old conquests and the Province of the North be required to know the indigenous languages well to assist them in their missionary functions? Should the spiritual government of Mozambique, from Mombassa to Cape Correntes continue to be entrusted to a prelate with the title of 'administrator'? And what were the surest means to combat the infringement of the *Padroado* embodied in the activities of the *Propaganda Fide*? It is interesting that the Overseas Council in general deferred to the opinions of Antonio Paes de Sande on these weighty matters, the councilor with the longest "experience in the *Estado da India*".

In a document of August 1671, endorsed by the Council on September 3, and the Prince Regent the following spring, Paes de Sande proffered the following advice. On the issue of reducing the number of convents and religious houses, the councilor recommended that while the number should eventually be reduced given the ratios provided by Mello de Castro, for reasons of "religious piety" it was sufficient at present to simply avoid

any new constructions and to refuse to pay *ordinarios* to any convents with fewer than seven priests. On the matter of competency with indigenous languages, Paes de Sande noted that the Archbishop of Goa should continue to oversee this matter and should make every effort to ensure compliance with previous Crown orders on this matter, especially in the North where problems were greatest. On the matter of the *Administrador* in Mozambique, Paes de Sande recommended that the position he maintained for this "great and most useful conquest," since this region contained more territory and subjects than all the bishoprics of India combined. Finally, Paes de Sande argued that the surest means to combat the infringement of the *Propaganda* was to encourage the clergy of the *Padroado* to adhere to "the orders of Your Majesty passed in favor of Christianity," and spread the Faith in Asia in an efficient and sincere manner, while seeking to intercept the offending priests of the *Propaganda* and demand that they obtain proper authorization from the Crown before undertaking any missionary activities in that region."

In October 1671, Mendonça Furtado further championed the calls to curb the abuses of the *religiosos* for economic reasons in his first packet of dispatches as Viceroy. More time was needed to investigate the property holdings of the Company of Jesus before any attempt could be made to repossess any illegally gained *azendas*.² Mendonça Furtado asked for advice on the matter of permitting the Hindu subjects of Diu to maintain religious shrines in their houses without incurring penalties from the clerical and secular authorities of the *Estado*." The Viceroy also informed Pedro that despite the opposition of the *religiosos*, he had been able to extend to *Colecta* for another 6 years, monies that would facilitate the dispatching of the traditional armadas from Goa twice a year." The petition from Bassein had made an immediate and significant impact on the Viceroy. "I am obliged by the position I hold to tell Your Majesty the truth, and this is that the order of the Count of São Vicente relating to the land holders in the countryside presenting certification to the *Pai dos Cristãos* has been extremely damaging to the Service of Your Majesty." São Vicente's decrees in favor of the faith and the extension of the powers of the *Pai dos Cristãos* had caused great damage to the royal *rendas*, especially harmful to the interest of the State was the increased number of "orphans" that had been taken "in violation of the ancient laws of your royal predecessors". Echoing the language of the petition from Bassein, the new Viceroy pointed out that this practice had forced the indigenous merchants of the *Estado* to "live under oppression without Reason," and forced many of them to emigrate to the lands of the *Reis Vizinhos* and especially to Bombay dramatically increasing the trade of that port and the level of the tobacco *renda* there."

In August 1672, Mendonca Furtado elaborated on the great damage being done to the economic interests of the *Estado* by this practice in another letter. After complaining of the "insolent" and vexing behavior of the English officials in Bombay, Mendonca Furtado was forced to admit that a good deal of the credit "for making that island a great and opulent city," resided in the practice of allowing a freedom of conscience in the enclave. Such a policy, when juxtaposed with the abuses of the *religiosos* in the Province of the North, and especially the taking of Hindu orphans in a manner that violated the traditional decrees on the matter, had largely resulted in this boon to English interests in the region. The Viceroy warned that unless drastic measures were soon taken to correct such abuses the *rendas* generated in the English settlement would soon outstrip those produced in the Province of the North. "If Your Majesty does not order a prompt and appropriate remedy to this great evil, all the *rendas* that Your Majesty possesses there will soon be extinguished, and the trade [and prosperity] of the said *pracas* will be reduced to great poverty." ⁷⁹

In March 1672, before Mendonca Furtado's strident dispatches had reached Lisbon, Pedro addressed a series of letters relating to religious matters in the *Estado* to his Viceroy. In them, the Prince Regent reconfirmed his commitment to spreading the faith but once again ordered his servants to do so in the "subtlest fashion," one that would avoid the more glaring problems engendered in the methods of São Vicente. He did support one of Nunes da Cunha's initiatives: the attempt to open up trade with the kingdom of Achem by encouraging the *religiosos* to build a church there." In light of the recent bull obtained from Clement X, the Prince Regent notified Mendonca Furtado that he intended to send out a new Archbishop as soon as possible to fill that long vacant seat in the *Padroado* hierarchy, and that this prelate would advise him on the request of D. Carlos Ferrarini to formally establish a house for the Theatinos in Goa." The Prince Regent also reiterated his desire to see a complete list of Jesuit properties as quickly as possible in order to resolve long-standing complaints regarding unlawful obtainment of lands by that order. Pedro also instructed his Viceroy to compile similar lists on the remaining religious orders in India. These documents would contain the exact number of priests in each one, financial information on their convents and houses, as well as the *rendas* received from the [*azenda real*]"

Over the next five years, the Prince Regent and his Viceroy exchanged correspondence on various matters relating to the *religiosos*. Mendonca Furtado complained about the lamentable performance of the Franciscans as missionaries in Bardes due to ignorance of the indigenous languages, and other abuses. He also complained of the "scandalous"

behavior of the Dominicans on the islands of *Solar* and Timor, actions that were undermining not only the goals of the *Padroado* but also the secular and economic interests of the Crown. In both cases, the Viceroy lamented that he could not intervene in ecclesiastical matters directly and resolve these problems. He also pointed out that even when an Archbishop was installed in Goa, that cleric frequently found it difficult to punish offending priests." On another issue troubling the Crown, he informed the Prince Regent that since the clerics of the *Propaganda Fide* usually traveled through the kingdoms of the *Reis Yizinbos*, it was nearly impossible to follow the Crown's instructions on detaining them and preventing them from undertaking missionary activities." Mendonca Furtado also railed against the unsanctioned purchase of the lucrative property in Bardes by the Jesuits and his attempt to force the order to sell it to a lay person. The Jesuits were also criticized for their inept handling of the *Hospital Real* in Goa and the 1000 *xerafins* per annum that the royal treasury provided for that institution. Mendonca Furtado advised that the brothers of the order of S. joao de Deus truly knew how to deal with the infirmed and should he given control of the *Hospital*" The assault on the overweening power of the *religiosos* had increased by 1676, when Mendonca Furrado informed the Crown that: "the Augustinians and the other religious orders possess much more capital than the Royal Treasury and the subjects of Your Majesty." The Viceroy "dared" to suggest to Pedro that the least amount of [*azendas* they possessed, the better. This wealth had diverted the *religiosos* in Goa from living a truly monastic life. It had shifted their attention from their true purpose in Asia of spreading the faith, and instead needlessly encouraged them to meddle in affairs that did not concern them."

Throughout the mid-1670S, Mendonca Furtado continually complained about potentially the most damaging abuse of the *religiosos*: the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu orphans. In January 1673, he reiterated that this practice had to be reformed. This matter was of "such importance," since when rich Hindus lived within the confines of the *Estado*, "commerce flourishes". The capital that was exiting the North with these indigenous merchants was not only harming the economic well-being of the *Estado*, it was bestowing huge amounts of *cabedal* upon the undeserving English and Dutch, who were using this windfall "to enrich themselves" at Portuguese expense. Mendonca Purtado, writing with nearly twenty years of experience in Asia, stated: "All the merchants combined of Europe do not have as much capital as anyone of those Hindus that are called rich." These merchants, wielding the economic power of "lakhs of pagodas," at two and a half million *xerafins* per lakh, dominated "the commerce of all the ports of India". In comparison, the Euro-

peans possessed a small portion of the trade. In Surat alone, such merchants dispatched 50-60 great ships a year. These merchants and their *[azendas*, however, would enrich the royal customs houses, only if they could be assured of *living* within the confines of the *Estado* without the molestation of the *religiosos*, most notably the taking and forced conversion of Hindu orphans. The time to act was at hand, since Portugal's competitors in the trade, and particularly the English, were doing their utmost to exploit such abuses to exacerbate the economic problems of the *Estado*"

Nonetheless, as the Viceroy pointed out in January 1674 any attempt to reform this long-standing abuse was bound to be complicated. He had initially broached the issue with the Council of State of Goa in December 1673. This body had determined that the issue should be resolved by the *letrados* in the *Reino* in consultation with the *religiosos* in Goa. The preceding month, Mendonca Furtado had already attempted to gauge the response of the ecclesiastical community to reform by calling the leading Franciscans and Augustinians to the *Casa Professa* and asking their views on a number of issues including whether a Hindu child who had simply lost his father could in fact be considered an "orphan". Much to his chagrin, both Francisco de Barcelor, the *commissario-geral* of the Franciscans and Augusto da Piedade, the *Provincial* of the Augustinians, had indicated that legal precedents in Portugal and ecclesiastical precedents in the *Estado* indeed supported such a stance. Since Pedro's initial nominee as Archbishop had died soon after reaching the Mandavi and that office was still vacant, the Viceroy had also sought to poll the *Inquisitor-geral*, to very little result."

Francisco Delgado e Matos, the cleric who headed the Inquisition, evidently had little interest in responding to such requests from the secular authorities in Goa. "This minister is so absolute in his replies that even the Viceroys of Your Majesty are not treated with the respect that is due to them."⁹⁰ The disturbing fact that very little had changed in this matter was reflected in letter in December of 1674 when Mendonca Furtado, quoting from a report from the captain of Bassein, outlined the continuing exodus of Hindu and Jain merchants from the North "selling their properties and goods," much to the detriment of the royal *rendas*. In the opinion of this official, this exodus was due largely to the zealous practices of the officers of the Inquisition and others regarding the forcible conversions of orphans. This drain on the *Estado* was not only financial in terms of lost *rendas*, *foras*, and *alfandega* receipts. Money from these merchants had also traditionally been utilized either in the form of levies or loans to assist the *Estado* in times of war. Although something clearly had to be done to end these excesses, Delgado e Matos maintained that his officers and

other *religiosos* were merely operating according to the long-standing orders of the Crown."

Although Pedro continued to warn against the more glaring abuses of the *religiosos* including the forced conversions of Hindu orphans, he took no firm actions to correct this dangerous practice in the mid-re-os. He did, however, order Mendonca Furtado to deal with the ill-conceived actions of the Dominicans in Indonesia." A *consulta* of the *Conselho Ultramarine* of August 1673 had reiterated taking a hard line on the issue of foreign bishops and other clerics of the *Propaganda* in the Estado." The Prince Regent also ordered Mendonca Furtado to investigate the actions of the Franciscans on the island of Manapassar in the North. The Crown had granted this island and its *rendas* to them ideally to spread the faith in that region and to help the poor. Unfortunately, the order had apparently not lived up to its obligations: most of the money from the *rendas* had evidently found its way to Rome, while the spiritual and temporal needs of the islanders were being ignored. The Viceroy was to investigate such complaints and determine whether the grant should be revoked.'

In late 1676, Pedro received a document from the *povo gentio* of Goa that finally convinced him to address the crucial issue of the Hindu orphans. This packet of letters contained a formal petition from the "officials, nobles, and others of the Brahmanic Nation assisting in that City and its environs..., complaining against the *Paidos Christiãos* taking from the possession of their mothers, children orphaned by their father together with the property that his death bestows upon them, in order to oblige them by force to receive the baptism water against formal laws and provisions that defends them", In the Prince Regent's own words, this matter was of "such importance" and demanded such complete and total consideration on the part of the Crown that he ordered a formal *Junta* be held to resolve the matter. This grand meeting would include the opinions of the newly arrived Archbishop Primaz, D. Antonio Brandao, the Inquisitor Francisco Delgado de Matos, the Chancellor Francisco Cabral d'Almeida, Antonio Paes de Sande (recently appointed *Vedor da Fazenda*) with "three or four" other leading citizens, along with the *Paidos Cbristaos*, the *Procurador* of the Crown, and significantly the *procurador* of the *povo gentilico* of Goa. This assemblage would examine all the relevant documentation on the matter and seek to resolve the conflict, "by the means that seem most convenient to pacify and quiet the indigenous Hindu population", informing Pedro at the earliest possible moment of the decisions taken. Reflecting the importance the Crown had come to place on such matters, the Prince Regent noted that he would immediately endorse these resolutions, even if one or two dissenting votes were cast."

This *Junta* met initially in the *salla real* of the Viceroy's palace on December 17, 1677, two months after D. Pedro de Almeida had assumed the highest office of the *Estado*. After a long discussion of the issues and an examination of the relevant documentation there was nearly unanimous support among those present for reaffirming the stance initially delineated in D. Sebastiao's decree on the matter of March 23, 1559.⁹⁶ This order had specified that Hindu children "left without father, mother, grandfather, grandmother or other ascendant lineals and are not of an age at which they can have understanding and judgment, as soon as the last of such relatives is dead", should be taken by the *Pai dos Christaos* and handed over to the Jesuit College of St. Paul, "for being baptized, educated and indoctrinated by the Fathers of the said College," and eventually "placed in positions according to their respective aptitudes and abilities". This decree had been endorsed by the Viceroy D. Antao de Noronha in 1564, the Governor Antonio Moniz Barrete in 1571 and in other *alvaras* of 1582 and 1621. Nevertheless, what had been intended as a socio-religious policy in part designed to assist children in need and perhaps to cut down on vagrancy and needless suffering had in fact been transformed over time into an instrument of religious zealotry and economic oppression by the ecclesiastical community in Goa and the North. Much to their credit, and reflecting the shifting priorities of religious vis-à-vis economic considerations among the hierarchy in both Lisbon and Goa, the men present in the Viceroy's palace on that day sought to reaffirm the initial intent of D. Sebastiao's decree and end the damaging exodus of Hindu merchants and their capital from the *Estado*.

The Jesuit Gaspar Affonco, Matheus Gomes Ferreira, *Vigario-geral* of the Archbishopric, Dr. Manoel Martins Madeira, Chancellor of the *Estado*, Diego de Madre de Deus, *mestre* of the Franciscans, Antonio Paes de Sande, *Vedor-geral* of the *Pazenda*, the Archbishop D. Antonio Brandao, and the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida all voted in favor of passing a new law reaffirming the original conditions relating to defining "orphans" in the *Estado* delineated in the 1559 decree. The sole dissenting vote on this issue was not surprisingly cast by the Inquisitor D. Francisco Dalgado e Matos, who argued that D. Sebastiao's decree was excessive in its criteria and should be amended to conform to legal precedents in the *Reino*. Dalgado e Matos pointed out that Portuguese law defined orphan as "everyone that does not have a father," and this definition was utilized in the *Reino* to ensure "the education of minors, and the security of their temporal possessions". In his written opinion, the head of the powerful Inquisition noted: "I do not find any justification why one would not adopt these same practices to Hindu orphans, in order to secure their salvation, by means of the sacrament of baptism, especially since this matter

is of such importance." It is significant that in addressing such apparent logic those in the majority cited primarily *economic* reasons for justifying and reaffirming the criteria in the 1559 decree and recognizing the practical differences ¹⁰ adapting Portuguese law to the *imperio*."

According to the Chancellor Martins Madeira, the conservation of the *Estado* demanded that the ecclesiastical authorities adhere to the "said law of the king D. Sebastiao, regarding the taking of only those orphans who do not have a father, mother, and grandparents, because the State of India finds itself so exhausted, due to lack of capital and commerce, and greatly assisting its total diminution and ruin, is the lack of Hindu merchants that are leaving our domains, and going with their capital for Bombay, that today belongs to the English, and for Baroche, Surrare, and Gaga, because there they do not take their children against their will". In the Chancellor's view, experience had shown that only these rich Hindu merchants could substantially assist the royal *rendas* since "the Christians have neither the capital nor the industry to augment them, and all manner of commerce and trade, as well as spices, foodstuffs and even diamonds move through their hands". As *Vedor* of the *Fazenda*, Antonio Paes de Sande predictably echoed many of these same sentiments. The 1559 law should be supported since experience had shown that violating its provisions had "caused the diminution of commerce, the depopulation of the lands of His Majesty, and augmenting those of heretics and Muslims". Paes de Sande continued by pointing out that during his initial stay in the *Estado* from 1668-1671 he had witnessed the debilitating economic effects of the abuse of this law while visiting the Province of the North. Rich Hindus and jains living in Bassein, Diu, Daman and elsewhere were increasingly depositing their wealth, business acumen, and ultimately their families in the neighboring kingdoms of Bijapur, the lands of Aurangzeb, or in Bombay to avoid having "their 'orphan' children taken from them, in order to make them Christians". ⁴⁰⁰

Perhaps most significantly, it was D. Antonio Brandao, the new Archbishop, who sought to justify the seeming disparity between the legal interpretation of orphan in Portugal and the *Estado*. Brandao began by arguing for a strict adherence to the original conditions of the 1559 law. This law was "just" theologically in that the children of Hindu parents were only politically subjects of the Crown and could not be obliged to embrace Christianity against their will until such time as all their immediate relatives had died. While this definition of orphan may not have agreed with "civil law and the ordinances of the Kingdom", there could be no doubt that the Kings of Portugal by virtue of their conquests of foreign lands had the right to enact "different laws conforming to the natural differences of the subjects and vassals that live in them". D. Sebastiao's

1559 decree had constituted, in the Archbishop's view, a contract of sorts with the Hindus on this legal definition and the frequent violation of this understanding had led to mass migrations, "leaving these islands and conquered lands without people to cultivate them". In another concession of sorts to the economic power of the indigenous merchants in the *Estado* and their religious sensibilities, the *Junta* of December 1677 also resolved to allow Hindu marriages to take place behind closed doors provided armed guards were posted outside to prevent Hindu priests or *Bottos* from presiding and performing sacrifices or other customary rites. The fact that such prohibitions on *Bottos* effectively made any such marriages null and void would eventually prompt the Council of State in Goa and Pedro to modify this original decree and allow customary Hindu marriages on barges in the rivers separating the *Estado* from Bijapur and other Muslim kingdoms, provided no Christians were present."

The religious zealotry exemplified best, or perhaps worst, by the Inquisition and others did not, however, rest after the initial vote of late 1677. Long-standing religious and financial vested interests were at stake, and those opposed to reform predictably sought to undermine it by any possible means. The Jesuit Manoel Themudo who was then serving as the *Pai dos Christiios* wrote a scathing critique on January 2, 1678 indicting the entire reform movement, especially those who were seeking to limit what had become his de facto powers in dealing with *gentio* orphans. "As the Hindus are the declared enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith, and as such seek to undermine, and diminish it by every available means that they can," Themudo warned the Crown to give little credence to what was contained in the petition of 1676 and the other letters of complaint that had reached Lisbon over the past decade. Spending huge amounts of capital, presumably to influence the secular authorities, and "defaming the ministers of Christianity," were among the favored methods that these rich *gentios* in unholy their quest to undermine the sacred work of spreading the faith. Themudo did not "deny" that the 1559 decree specified that orphans should be defined as those Hindu children who had lost their father, mother, and grandparents. The *Pai dos Christaos* nonetheless argued that this criteria had proven wholly inadequate to meet the daunting challenge of converting these "enemies" of Christianity and a more rigorous definition, and implicitly a more potent weapon, had been justified."

After allowing sufficient time for all interested parties to review both the decisions of December 1677 as well as the complaints of Themudo, D. Pedro de Almeida reconvened the *Junta* on 12 January 1678 in order to reach a final resolution on the matter. At this meeting, the Jesuit Pedro Teixeira, sitting in place of his colleague Gaspar Affonco, essentially reinforced the argument originally expressed by Brandao at initial meeting.

The Jesuit representative argued that the secular Prince "has the power to promulgar laws that appear to him convenient to the greater good of his vassals, and the augmentation of his temporal states, as long as the said laws are not contrary to divine or natural law". In Teixeira's view, the Hindus of the *Fstado* were "still the vassals of the Christian Princes," and not therefore "subjects of the Church". Moreover, D. Sebastiao's original law defining orphans as those children who had lost their mothers, fathers, and grandparents was "not against divine law, nor natural law," and therefore legitimate. D. Pedro de Almeida, Brandao, Paes de Sande, and all the others present reconfirmed their initial votes, including the Inquisitor Delgado de Matos who once again cast the lone dissenting vote. The *assento* taken at this final meeting of the *Junta* denounced the recent abuses relating to the liberal interpretation of the term orphan, abuses which had had a demonstrable economic as well as social impact on the fortunes of the *Estado* during the most crucial period in its history. The panel also resolved to pass a new law reiterating the strict provisions of the 1559 decree which would serve as the basis for all future religious activities involving the *Pai dos Christãos* and Hindu orphans. The secretary Luis Concalves Cotra drafted this legislation which, as the Viceroy informed Pedro in a letter of January 23, had been swiftly registered and published."

The work and legislation of the *Junta* of 1678 embodies the most visible manifestation of the desire during Pedro's reign to reorder the priorities of the Crown in the seminal trade-off of economic vis-a-vis religious concerns operating within the *Estado da India*. The forceful recommendations of Luis de Mendonca Furtado, the support of the Prince Regent and his Overseas Council, the diligent work of D. Pedro de Almeida and Antonio Paes de Sande in Goa, and perhaps above all the tacit approval of Archbishop Brandao and the Jesuits allowed this significant initiative to wind its way successfully through the labyrinth of early modern bureaucracy that governed Portugal's Asian empire. Among other things, this reformation campaign attests to the belated albeit critical realization on the part of the Lisbon and Goa hierarchies that Hindu and Jain merchants constituted a vital component in the economic life of the empire, one that could no longer be ignored or alienated. Implicit in this fundamental shift was also the recognition that the days when the Crown and the *Padroado* could arrogantly operate in Asia without concern for the economic impact of their policies, as it had largely done during the glory days of the mid-16th century, was dearly over. The arrival of the English in Bombay touring "freedom of conscience," the continuing vexations of the Dutch, and the free-spending habits of the newly arrived French exerted tremendous pressure on the Portuguese to reform the

more unsavory practices of spreading the faith in an increasingly competitive Asian market. The road to such reform was strewn with pitfalls, dangers, and problems. It is wise to remember, for example, that challenging the power of the Church for men like Mendonça Furtado not only meant criticizing an institution renowned and feared for its religious and social power in Portugal and the *Estado*, but which also frequently provided lucrative positions for members of one's own family. One of Mendonça Furtado's own brothers, for example, was then *cônego* of Évora. Nevertheless, this Viceroy, his Prince, and others were willing to attempt such reforms out of the belief that economic concerns had to take precedence over religious zealotry if the *Estado* was to survive; and survive it did.

IV

Spices: The *Carreira da India*, c. 1640-1683

The economic history of Portugal's Asian empire has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention over the past century. The works of Godinho, Boxer, Sreensgaard, De Souza, Pearson, Disney, and Boyajian have all done much to advance our knowledge of the economic structures of the Portuguese *Estado da India* during the early modern period.¹ As with the general historiography on *India Portuguesa*, however, much of this work has concentrated on two periods in the long history of that imperial edifice. First, the glorious years of the early reth century, when Portugal constructed a geo-political and commercial empire in Asia which sought to dominate the lucrative and long-standing trading network of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea basins. And second, the generally disastrous years of the mid-i-rh century when that edifice was all but destroyed by the combination of internal political strains in the metropole and the much vaunted threat of the proto-capitalist joint stock companies of the Dutch and English in Asia. The general acceptance of the dictum of "stagnation and decline" for the years after 1663, and relatively sparse and widely scattered archival material for that period, have ensured very little work on the economic history of the late ryrh century *Estado*. This dearth of scholarly work is unfortunate, since the 1660s and 1670s witnessed a notable rehabilitation campaign regarding Portugal's commercial standing in the Indian Ocean trade. This campaign to restore the economic fortunes of the eastern empire formed a vital component of the general attempt to stabilize the *Estado* which followed Pedro's accession to power in late 1667. As in other matters involving the *Estado*, these efforts at reform would, in many ways, culminate during the Viceroyalty of Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque.²

A crucial aspect of this srabilizauon process is the revival that took place during these years of the once virtually moribund *Carreira da India*, the term used by the Portuguese for the voyage made by their Indiamen between Lisbon and Goa. From the outset of the *Estado*, the empire of Portuguese Monsoon Asia had been primarily a seaborne one. The *Carreira da India* therefore constituted an integral part of Lisbon's Asian empire, and especially its economic structures. For more than three centuries, "from the time of Vasco da Gama until the substitution of sail by steam," the *Naos* or Great Ships of the *Carreira* served as an economic,

religious and administrative lifeline between Portugal and her possessions in the East. Highly prized spices from India, Ceylon, and Indonesia, precious metals and stones, saltpeter, cotton cloth from the villages of Cujarar, European armaments much in demand in Asia, Chinese porcelains, high-ranking grandees anxious to take up lucrative Imperial postings, female orphans with Crown dowries in the quest for husbands in Golden Goa, the plethora of Jesuit, Franciscan, Augustinian, and Dominican priests detailed in the previous chapter, ambitious younger sons of noble houses of Portugal, as well as the dregs of Lisbon's prisons sent out as cannon-fodder all had at least one thing in common: the necessity of making the Cape passage. The *Carreira da Índia* was thus a quintessential fact of economic and geopolitical life—regular sailings and successful voyages usually portended stability if not prosperity, while intermittent departures and shipwreck almost always signaled hard times for the *Estado*.

Harsh lessons on the stormy Cape route quickly taught Portuguese pilots that successful sailings were largely dependent on the alternating monsoons of the Indian Ocean. The southwest monsoon virtually dosed all of the ports on the western coast of India from early June until September. Ideally, outward-bound ships from Lisbon therefore left between the end of February and late March in order to round the Cape of Good Hope in July and reach Goa in late September or October. Ships returning to Europe were obliged to leave in late December or January in order to profit from the favorable winds of the northeast monsoon and to avoid the "stormy May and June 'winter' season in the latitude of the Cape".¹ Over time, a series of meticulous sailing instructions or *roteiros* were compiled. Among the most notable of these rutters was the 1666 *Roteiro da Índia Oriental com as emendas que novamente se [izerio a elle, compiled by the Royal Cosmographer Anronio de Mariz Cameiro. The valued knowledge contained in such roteiros was supplemented by official orders or regimentos given to the captain-general of each fleet which prescribed conduct for every aspect of the voyage.⁴ The size of the ships utilized in the Carreira changed markedly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the first half of the eighteenth century carracks or galleons, both called Naos in the extant documentation, of approximately 400 tons burden were the general rule. By 1550, Indiamen of 600 to 1,000 tons were common. In the 1590s, despite attempts by the Crown to curb this alarming trend, unwieldy monsters of up to 2,000 tons were being constructed in the shipyards of Lisbon and Goa. As will be noted below, the eighteenth century witnessed a return to smaller, more seaworthy, frigate-type vessels along English and Dutch lines.*

Since the archives of the *Casa da Índia* were tragically lost in the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, it is extremely difficult to arrive at precise figures for

the sailings of the *Carreira* before that year. Based on the extensive work of V. M. Godinho with the remaining sources, it appears that from 1500-1635, some 912 ships (c. 6.78 per year) sailed for Goa with 763 or 84% completing the voyage. Of the 550 ships (c. 4.2 per year) that left India for the return voyage 470 or 85% reached Portugal. These figures dropped dramatically from 1635-1663.⁶ As Boxer notes, the size of the annual outward bound fleets also fluctuated over the history of the *Carreira*. The average from 1500-1530 was from 7-14 ships, by 1550 this figure had dropped to 5, and by 1640 the average was closer to 2-3 ships a year. Meanwhile, the size of the return fleets from Goa was probably half that of the ships leaving Lisbon.⁷ Moreover, sailing instructions and the departure dates specified in the *roteiros* and *regimentos* were only intermittently attained with dire consequences. As James Duffy and others have shown, shipwrecks were common during the late 15th and early 16th centuries, while mortality rates approaching 50% were far from unusual.⁸ One reason for these problems was that outward-bound ships were usually overcrowded, and departed late from Lisbon. This delay made many fleets miss the season for sailing on to India and forced the captain-major to "winter" in the unhealthy climate of Mozambique where disease took a heavy toll on crews already weakened by months of living aboard unsanitary ships with far from adequate diets. On the return voyage, a late departure meant that the *naos* would encounter adverse weather conditions off the coast of South East Africa, in the notoriously dangerous "roaring forties". Many a Portuguese Indiaman was lost during these years on the "Wild Coast" of Natal.⁹

Exacerbating these problems for the swift and successful completion of *Carreira* voyages was the increasing allure of stopping at ports on the Brazilian coast like Bahia, either on the outward or homeward-bound voyage. Such stops lengthened voyages, thus delaying the arrival of Crown spice cargoes that in many cases had already been utilized as collateral for loans. They also facilitated illegal trading of products like cinnamon that were ideally a Crown monopoly and the exchange of Asian goods for Brazilian gold. This private entrepreneurship was inevitable given the fact that, despite several attempts, a satisfactory system of wages was never established. Instead, the crews (from the captain-major to cabin-boy) were compensated with the right to carry home *caixas de liberdade* (liberty chests) loaded with spices and other products to be imported into Portugal wholly or partially duty free.¹⁰ Various Crown decrees were promulgated in an attempt to stop these destructive stopovers. On both November 14, 1660 and March 30, 1662, the Queen Regent D. Luisa Gusmao issued firm orders forbidding homeward bound ships from calling at either Angola or Brazil, except in dire emergencies.¹¹ Following

complaints from the Viceroy Anronio de Mello de Castro, this stance was modified in January 1666 to allow smaller vessels like pinnaces or *pataxos* to make such stops, but reiterated the ban on *Naos*." Although these restrictions were sometimes disregarded on the pretense of weather or the lack of provisions, the Crown was serious in its commitment to check such abuses, and a level of success was achieved beginning in 1668."

The nadir for the 17th century *Carreira* undoubtedly occurred from 1640-1663, in the midst of the protracted struggle on the continent against Habsburg Spain and the generally disastrous campaign in Brazil, Africa and Asia against the United Provinces. The years 1647-1649 alone witnessed the loss of the *Ataia e Sacramento* off southeast Africa, a fierce storm in April 1648 that sank scores of vessels anchored in the Mandavi river killing more than 1200 men, the loss of two *naos* destined for India in 1647, and the loss of the richly laden *Sao Lourenco* off Mozambique in September 1649. Of the five ships that left Lisbon in April 1650 in the *{rota* of the Viceroy Count of Aveiras, none reached India that year. The *São Francisco Xavier* was forced to return to Lisbon where she was intercepted by the English Commonwealth fleet under Blake then blockading the Tagus. Aveiras perished "wintering" in Mozambique, while the *Santa Andre* was captured by the Spanish on the return voyage to Portugal in 1652. After a brief and relative revival orchestrated by Luis de Mendonca Furrado from 1651-1653, such setbacks continued." Between 1658 and 1663 an average of one ship a year arrived in Goa, while not even that number made the return voyage successfully. In only slightly exaggerated terms, the Queen-Regent Dona Luisa told the French ambassador in 1659 that no news had been received from India in three years. In 1660, the *Sacramento da Esperanca*, the *Nossa Senhora da Estreffa*, and the *Conceicao* left Lisbon. Of these, the first made it to Goa in such a state that it was beached and stripped, while the last two were lost off Madagascar. The final debacle took place in 1662, when Antonio de Mello de Castro sailed to Goa in an English fleet."

Several problems complicate the process of documenting the recovery and stabilization of the *Carreira da India* that began in 1668 with the assumption to power of Prince Regent Pedro. The extant manuscript sources are sparse and widely scattered throughout Portugal, the rest of Europe, and India. It is therefore difficult to obtain sufficient data to construct a complete record for the post-reej period. Not surprisingly, conflicting evidence on sailing dates, stopovers, arrival dates, type of vessel, and cargoes is commonplace in the available sources. The Portuguese also had the rather disconcerting habit of giving long and sometimes virtually identical names to the *Naos* of the *Carreira*. Reflecting the continuing power of the Catholic church in Portuguese society, most of these names

had religious connotations or connections. Thus, we have the *Nossa Senhora de Ajuda* and *Nossa Senhora de Ajuda e Santo Antonio* or *Bom Jesus de Trindade* and *Born Jesus de Trindade e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria*. In the documents, of course, these would be shortened to merely *Nossa Senhora de Aiuda* or *Bom Jesus de Trindade* complicating the process of sorting out the seaborne traffic between Lisbon and Goa.

Fortunately, at least three major sources for the posr-reej period exist which allow for the compilation of relatively complete statistics on the *Carreira*. The *Cartas das Cabedais das Naus de S.A. q' uierao desde o anno 667 the' de 681* of II folios and *versos* was put together in late 1681 by joao Cabral de Mello *Contador* of the *Estado*. It contains a list of receipts compiled by the *feitores* (Crown factors) in Goa, listing the composition and value of the outward and homeward bound cargoes from 1667-1681.¹⁷ Valuable for its information on products and prices, this document also yields data on arrivals, stopovers, and departure dates. The *Registro das Cartas gerais que vão para a India, 1666-1784* of 15 folios and *versos* for the period 1666-1677, contains the letters from the *feitores* (although not bills of lading) of the *Casa da India* in Lisbon and their counter-parts in Goa, listing the *Carreira* cargoes. Arrival dates are sometimes provided, and the dating of these letters offers clues to departure dates from Lisbon. Unfortunately, there is an incomplete run of letters. From Lisbon, the yearly letters from 1666-1670 survive, while the letters from Goa are from 1666-1669, 1673-1677, with a dearth until 1708." Finally, Francisco Luis Ameno's *Noticia Chronologica dos descobrimentos que fizeriio os Portugueses até a India Oriental, e das Armadas que os Reis de Portugal tern mandado aquella Estado até o presente anno de 1762* gives a yearly breakdown of the Captains and ships of the *Carreira*, as well as relatively complete and accurate arrival and departure dates.¹⁸

As Table 1 reflects, there were 31 sailings from Lisbon to Goa for the years 1668-1681, or an average of 2.2 per year. Of that number, 30 made the voyage successfully, an impressive 96.8%. Only the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* of Luis de Mendonca Furtado's 1670 fleet was lost on the passage, constituting a meager 3.2% of the total. Rather surprisingly, there were no abortive voyages or *arribadas*. Ten ships, or 32%, either made stopovers at Brazil, or "wintered" at Mozambique or Socotra. Five of these ten were part of Mendonca Furtado's fleet. The breakdown on the duration of voyages is the following: 20 ships or 64% made the passage in 6 months, 1 ship (3.2%) took 7 months, 1 ship (3.2%) took 11 months, 7 ships or 22.4% completed the voyage in 13 months, and 1 ship (3.2%), the *Born Jesus de Trindade* (1670-71), took 17 months to reach Goa. The average voyage for the 30 successful sailings was therefore a relatively swift 8.2

TABLE 1: *Sailings from Lisbon re Coa, 1668-1682*

Ship	Type[1]	Captain or Master	Departs	Arrives	Other[2]	Duration
1. Sao Goncalo	[GI]	Antonin Carvalho de Ohveira	22/IV/68	30/III/169	-	11 mos.
2. Nossa Senhora da Ajuda	[N]	C. Ferrao de Castelbranco	511V/69	IX/169		6 mos.
j. Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes	[NI]	D. Antonio Mascarenhas	10/IV/70	20Nf71	Moss.e	13 mos.
4. Santa Carannn	[NI]	Ver.mo Rea Corrcia	10/IV/70	20N171	Moss.e	13 mos.
5. Nossa Senhora de Guia	[GI]	Ruy Horta Casrelbranco	10nV/70	20N/71	Moss.e	13 mos.
6. Nossa Senhora dos Rcmadius	[P]	Simao da Costa de Tavora	10/IV/70	Lost13]	Moss.e	
7. Bom Jesus de Trindade	[P]	Thomas Comes da Costa	1111V/70	20/IX/71	Moss.e	17 mos.
8. B. Jesus de Sao Dornigos	[G]	C. Ferrao de Casrelbranco	2f1V/71	25/IX/71		6 mos.
9. BJTIN Senhora de Nazererh	[PI]	Manoel Pereira	211V/71	25/IX/71		6 mos.
[4]						
10. Nossa Senhora da Ajnda	[N]	Joao Correa de Sa	12f1H/72	15f1X/72		6 mos.
11. NS de Nazercth e S. Anronio [5]	[PI]	jozeph Roiz da Silva	12/11/72	V/73	Bahia	13 mos.
12. Sao Pedro de Rates	[N]	jeronymo de Curvalhc	12f111/72	V/73	Bahia	13 mos.
13. NS da Ajuda e S. Amonio	[P]	Pedro Lourenco	3/III/72	V/73	Bahia	13 mos.
14. B. Jesus de S. Domingos	[IN]	D. Rodrigo da Costa	151111U/73	IX/73		6 mos.
15. Nossa Senhora dos Cardacs	[IN]	Bamabe de Ban-os	15/111173	IX/73		6 mos.
16. BJT/N Senhora de Nazereth	[P]	Pedro Lamego Palha	IV/73	IX/73?		6 mos.
17. Nossa Senhora do Rozario	[NI]	Siman de Sousa de Tavora	21IV/74	V/75	Bahia	13 mos.
18. BJT/NS de Boa Memoria	[PI]	Manocl Carvalho	2f1V/74	1f1X/74		6 mos.
19. Sao Pedro de Rates	[NI]	joao da Silva Guia	6f1V/75	IX/75		6 mos.
20. Nossa Senhora dos Remedies	[NI]	Andre de Sa	111Vf76	IX/76		6 mos.
21. BJNINS de Boa Memoria	[P]	Francisco Roiz Lishoa	111V/76	IX/76		6 mos.
22. San Pedro da Ribeira	[NI]	Francisco da Sa da Silva	1911V/77	27/X/77		7 mos.
23. Nossa Senhora do Pillar	[P]	Anronio Vaz Salgado	611V/78	IX/78		6 mos.
24. Nossa Senhora dos Millagres	[PI]		6/IV/78	IX/78		6 mos.
25. NS do Rozario e S. Antonio	[P]	D. joao Lourenco da Cunha	1/IV/79	IX/79		6 mos.
26. S. Maria Izabel de Saboya	[NI]	Manoel Pinto da Costa	1/IV/79	IX/79?		6 mos.
27. Santo Antonio	[F]	Vet. de Carvalho	3/IV/80	IX/80		6 mos.
28. Nossa Senhora da Vizitacao	[P]	M.cI Goncalves de Amorim	IV/80	IX/80		6 mos.
29. S. Maria Izabel de Saboya	[IN]	D. Joao L.o Alvarez da Cunha	25/III/81	IX/81		6 mos.
30. Nossa Senhora dos Millagres	[IN]	Manoel dos Santos Pinto	IV/81	IX/81		6 mos.
31. S. Antonio e S. F. Xavier	[NI]	D. Hennque Manoel	IV/81	IX/81		6 mos.

[1] N=Nao or Great Ship, Carrack; G=Galeao or Galleon; P=Patacao or Pinnace; F=Frigata or Frigate

[2] Location of Stopover on Voyage

[3] Ran aground and lost off Mozambique 26/IV/1671

[4] Bom Jesus de Trindade e Nossa Senhora de Nazareth

[5] Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e Santa Antonio

months. As for the average month of departure; 7 ships departed in March (22.6%) and the remaining 24 ships {77.4%} in April. Of these, 21 arrived in Goa in September (67.7%), 7 in May (22.6%), 1 in March {3.2%}, and 1 in October {3.2%}.

TABLE 2: Sailings From Goa to Lisbon, 1668-1682

Ship	Type	Captain or Master	Departs	Arrives	Other	Duration
1. Santa Teresa de Jesus	[N]	Francisco Rangcl Pinto	101H/68	Lost[1]		
2. NS dos Remedies	IN]	Manoel Pere.ra Countinho	15fV69	4/X1169	Bahia	10 mos.
3. NS da Ajuda	IN]		301V70	2511X/70		9 mos.
4. Sao Joao da Ribeira	IF]	[cao da Costa	15/X171	7NIII/72	Bahia	10 mos.
5. BJ de Sao Domingos	IN]	C. Ferrao de Castelbranco	25/1172[A]	7NIII72		6 mos.
6. NS dos Cardaes	IN]	Ruy Horta de Castelbranco	25/1172[B]	7NIII72		6 mos.
7. BJ de Nazereth	IP]	Sirnao de Souse Tavora	22/IX172[C]	22NIII73?	Bahia	11 mos.
S. NS da Ajuda	IN]	joao Ferreria	24/[73[A]	LoscjZ]		
9. NS da Ajuda e S An-rnnio	IP]	Manoel de Souze	IIIX/73[BI	IS/IX174	Bahia	1 Lrnos.
10. BJ de Trindade	IG]	Diego Delgado	11X173[C]	24NII1174	Bahia	10 rues.
11. Sao Pedro de Rates	IN]	D. Rodrigo da Costa	211V74IA]	19/VII/74		6 mos.
12. BJ de Sao Domingos	IN]	Antonio Machado	261V74[B]	Abortive	Goa	
13. Sao Miguel	IG]	Ver.mo de Carvalho	101X1V74[C]	7f1X/75		9 mos.
14. BJN/NSB Memoria	IP]	Jeronymo da Maya Diniz	10/XI11741DJ	1011X/75		9 mos.
15. NS de Oliveira	IF]	Anronio de Banhos	25/1175	14f1X/75		8 rnos.
16. Sac Pedro de Rates	IN]	Simao de Souza	28A/76	18/XI1176	Bahia	11 mos.
17. B1 de Sac Domingos	IN]	Andre da Silva	30/1177[MB]	Losrjj]	Bahia	
18. BJNINSB Memoria	IP]	Manoel Borges	15/X1V77[C]	IX/78		9 rnos.
19. NS dos Millagres	[N]	Francisco Martins	201V79	5NIV79		6 mos.
20. NS da Vizitacao	[PI	Manoe! Roiz	20/JJ79	14NIV79		6 mus.
21. NS da Conceicao	IN]	joseph Dalgadc	JJ80[NBj	6/X/80		9 mos.
22. NS do Pillar	[PI		I/80	15NIV80		6 mos.
23. SMaria Izabel de Saboya	[N]	D. Lourenco Alz. da Cunha	U80	211X180	Sofala	8 mos.
24. Santa Antonio	IF]		IX/80	26/IX/81	Bahia	[2 mos.
25. SA de Lisboa	[N)	Venssimo Carvalho da Costa	U81	26/IX/81	Sofala	8 rnos.
26. NS da Viziracao	[PI	Manoel Roiz	I/81	26/IX/81	Sofala	8 mos.
27. NS dos Millagres	[N]		IX/81	Lost[4]		
28. Sap Pedro da Ribeira	IN]		1/82	27f1X/S2		8 mos.

[1] No information

[2] Lost off Mozambique

[3] Beached and stripped at Bahia

[4] No information

Table 2 shows that there were 28 sailings from Goa to Lisbon from 1668-1682, or an average of 1.87 per year. 23 ships completed the return passage

successfully, or 82.8% of the total. Four ships, the *Santa Teresa de Jesus* (1668), the *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda* (1673), the *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos* (1677) and the *Nossa Senhora dos Milagres* (1681) were lost. This constituted 14.3% of the total. The ill-fared *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos* also noted the sole abortive voyage (3.6%) during this period. Although the data is incomplete, it appears that at least 8 vessels or 28.8% made stopovers in Brazil. Only 2 of these, the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* and *Sao Pedro de Rates* were *Naos* and thus ideally prevented from doing so. At least another 4 ships (14.3%) made short stopovers in Sofala. The voyage duration breakdown is as follows: 6 ships (21.6%) took 6 months to reach Lisbon, another 6 (21.6%) vessels made the passage in 8 months, 4 ships (14.3%) took 9 months, 3 ships (10.7%) took 10 months, and another 3 ships (10.7%) took 11 months to reach the Portuguese capital. The average voyage was therefore 8.2 months. Three of the returning ships (10.7%) departed from Goa in late December, 18, a majority (64.3%), left in January, 1 sailed in February (3.6%), while 3 ships (10.7%) departed in September and another 3 (10.7%) in October. Of these, 4 (14.3%) reached Lisbon in July, 5 (17.9%) in August and 11 (39.33%) in September. One ship (3.6%) reached the Tagus in October, another (3.6%) in November, and yet another (3.6%) in December.

What do these statistics tell us? First and foremost they reveal that as opposed to the dismal period from 1640-1663, when the *Carreira* was virtually moribund and contact between Lisbon and Goa was interrupted for years at a time, a regular seaborne trade between the metropolis and India was definitively re-established. Swift successful passages from Lisbon to Goa became the rule after 1674, with 14 consecutive vessels making the passage in approximately 6 months. This is a record that even the more "advanced" proto-capitalist companies of the Dutch and English and Colbert's *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* were no doubt hard-pressed to equal." On the more problematic return passage relatively swift voyages were also the rule, with only 2 of 15 vessels taking more than 9 months between 1674-1682. The reasons for this startling turnaround are not hard to find. In general, this transformation was the result of a fundamental shift in priorities on the part of the Portuguese Crown with respect to the "tri-dimensional empire" of Brazil, Africa, and Asia. There are clear indications that Prince Regent Pedro had abandoned the primacy that his father John IV had shown to Brazil and instead decided to shift Crown patronage and resources in an attempt to salvage and resuscitate the *Estado da India*: "the most important and glorious of all of the [Crown's] conquests."¹⁰

On a more practical level, these impressive numbers resulted from increased royal supervision over the voyages and stricter controls and punishment for captains who neglected their sailing orders. As CR. Boxer pointed out long ago, the key for successful sailings on the Cape route was prompt departures from Lisbon and Goa." This meant that vessels had to leave the Tagus sometime between late February and early April to reach Goa by September or October, and to depart from the Mandovi in January in order to reach Lisbon by the following summer. We have a plethora of royal decrees from 1668 on exhorting prompt departures and forbidding harmful stopovers in Brazil and Africa. While this was nothing new, it appears that Pedro and his Viceroy, unlike their immediate predecessors, strove to enforce such orders. Offending captains were punished and the number of late departures and *invernos* dropped. The Crown and Viceroyalty were also diligent about ensuring prompt departures." All 31 of the *Carreira* ships from 1668-1682 left Lisbon in either March or April; the earliest departed on March 3, (the *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda e Santa Antonio* in 1672), while only 2 ships sailed after the nth of April. Of these, only Luis de Mendonca Purtado's large 1670 fleet, the three ships that sailed in March 1672 and the *Nossa Senhora do Rozario* in 1674 did not make the passage in 6 month's time. On the return passage, 21 ships (75%) left Goa in either December or January; 18 made it to Lisbon the following summer or fall. Six of the remaining seven departures were small packet ships that were dispatched in either September or October. Only the *Santa Teresa de Jesus* failed to make a prompt departure from Goa, sailing on February 10, 1668, and this galleon never reached Lisbon.

These impressive figures for the sailings of the *Carreira* suggest that the Portuguese had quite simply learned from past mistakes and were bent on fundamental reforms in their Asian empire. Niels Steensgaard has advanced the rather strict dichotomy of proto-capitalist *vis-à-vis* monarchical monopolism as the most fruitful model for analyzing the commercial struggle between the Atlantic economies (and Asian Companies) of the Dutch and English and the Portuguese *Estado da India* during the 17th century. This interpretation has proven to be both persuasive and attractive for Indo-Portuguese historians." One problem with this schema, however, is that it assumes largely static and unchanging structures and priorities for these combatants over the course of the 17th century. This was far from the case. The VOC quickly lost its pristine "entrepreneurial" values, and by the 1660s was squandering huge amounts of cash to defend clearly unprofitable holdings like Ceylon." At the same time, the Portuguese learned to adapt to changing technologies and business practices. In much the same way as absolutism in Eastern Europe developed in part as a response to the threat of the more "advanced" absolutist states of West,

the Portuguese responded to the military, technological, and commercial threat of the merchant capitalist economies of the Dutch and English and initiated their own reforms." The Asian trade revolution of the eighteenth century undoubtedly affected all the powers in that trade.

As early as mid-century, the Portuguese Crown had begun to integrate the shipbuilding advances of the Dutch and English into the construction of their own *naos*. This promising trend had been continued by Pedro after 1668. As a result, the unwieldy 1200 ton carracks of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the monsters which had fueled the stories of the *Historico Tragico-Ultramarino*, were abandoned. In their place sleeker, more seaworthy galleons were built in the royal dockyards of Lisbon, Porto, and Goa.⁵⁶ Such galleons helped to resuscitate the *Carreira* and allowed it to achieve the impressive 98% and 82% success rate on voyages attained between 1668-1682. The Portuguese therefore made serious efforts to revive and stabilize their seaborne trade between Lisbon and Goa during the late eighteenth century. A fundamental precondition for any such revival was certainly the re-establishment of regular seaborne interchange between the metropole and Goa. As these figures from the extant manuscript documentation, as opposed perhaps to overwrought and exaggerated contemporary travel accounts, demonstrates the black legend of rapid and inevitable maritime decline regarding the eighteenth century *Estado* and the *Carreira* has been vastly overstated.

An analysis of the cargoes carried at Royal expense aboard the ships of the *Carreira* during this period also reveals much about the priorities of the Crown, about questions of change and continuity in absolutist Portugal, as well as about the nature of the commercial stabilization achieved in the *Estado* by 1683. There are several key extant documents for detailing the composition of the *Carreira* cargoes of this period. Amcno's work, while very useful for analyzing the rehabilitation of the voyages of the *Carreira*, contains no information on the cargoes of these vessels. The *Registro das Cartas gerais que uao para a India*, 1666-1784, while valuable for containing the letters of the Crown factors of the *Casa da India* in Lisbon and their counterparts in Goa, unfortunately provides an incomplete run of letters from these *feitores*. The *Contas das Cabedais das Naus* is therefore a superior source for information on the Crown cargoes aboard the *Carreira* during these years. Compiled under the direction of the *Contador* of the Royal Treasury, Joao Cabral de Mello, this source was completed in January 1682. As its title suggests, the *Contas das Cabedais* contains a list of receipts for revenues and expenditures relating to the *Carreira* as recorded by the five Crown *feitores* in Goa from 1667-1682: Miguel d'almeida da Silva, Urbano Areja Lisboa, Joao Esteves, Francisco Games de Mello, and Agostinho Coelho de Sousa. The document lists the

composition and value of the royal outward and homeward bound cargoes on all the *Carreira* ships for this period. The *Contas das Cabedais*, moreover, summarizes all of the Crown cargoes from 1668-1682, with frequent references to the prices paid for these commodities. It is therefore the most complete source available for documenting the late 17th century *Carreira da Índia*.

From the arrival of Vasco da Gama onward, the Europeans trading in Asia had discovered, much to their economic detriment, that their manufactured goods held very little attraction in Eastern markets. The demand for heavy woollens in Monsoon Asia proved to be indeed limited. Over time, the Portuguese and their European competitors, would increasingly attempt to compensate for this unwelcome reality by developing a large "country" or inter-Asiatic trade as a means of financing the purchase and shipments of spices and other goods to Europe. Above all, this trade helped to avoid the "harmful" export of spices to Asia in opposition to the bullionist tenets of mercantilism. The traditional composition of outward-bound cargoes at Crown expense had thus been armaments, munitions, and other products with military uses, including sulphur for use at the *Casa de Polvara* or Royal Gunpowder Factory in Goa. These military goods could either be utilized by the *Estado* for its own rather formidable defensive purposes or at times sold to finance the purchase of return goods for Europe. Nevertheless, it was invariably necessary to dispatch silver to Goa to finance the purchase of return cargoes augmented by other products like coral that were also in demand in Asia."

As noted above, 31 ships sailed from Lisbon to Goa between 1668-1682, with all but one, the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios*, making the voyage successfully. The table below summarizes the royal cargoes aboard those vessels."

As these figures demonstrate, the composition of Crown cargoes dispatched to the *Estado* remained fairly traditional throughout the formative years of Pedro II's "reign". Military armaments and munitions remained staples of the outward bound cargoes. Between 1668 and 1681, the Crown dispatched 3676 *quintals* (over 235 tons) of lead, 187 *quintals* (nearly 12 tons) of sulphur to be used in the Royal Gunpowder Factory in Goa, 42 *quintals* (2.6 tons) of lead-shot, 853 *quintals* (54.6 tons) of metal chain, and 1483 *quintales* (nearly 95 tons) of iron. To assist the Viceroyalty in the struggle with a host of European and Asiatic rivals and enemies, Pedro also embarked some 143 cannon of various sizes, nearly 48,000 cannonball, 1200 chainshot to assist the work of the yearly armadas that left Goa to enforce the long-standing monopolistic pretensions of the *cartaz* system, nearly 700 muskets, over 200 swords, 1383 pikes, and 1000 lances.

TABLE 3: Royal Cargoes on Outward Bound Ships of the Carrreira da India, 1668-1681

	Artillery	C ^b alls	Lead	Var	Sulphur	Lances	Chainshot	Leadshot	Copper	Flasks	Chain	Muskets	Pikes	Swords	10"
1. SG	18	1000	50Q	100B	24Q										
2. NSA	12	6000	100Q	100B	20Q	1000	runo								
NSC	11	5950	150Q	50B	30Q			10Q		410	211Q	25	50		
4. SC	10	800	151Q	50B	20Q			8Q		200	80Q	217	433	29	
s. NSG	10	700	350Q	50B	33Q		100	15Q		200	80Q	200	350	90	
6. NSRC*	re	700	ZZSO	50B	40Q		100	9Q		400	80Q	150	350	100?	
7. BJT					20Q						140Q	100	200		
8. BJSO	40	70001	903Q	186B							453Q				470Q
9. BJT/NSN			1Q												
10. NSA	ro	9836	164Q	100B											
11. NSN/SA															
11. SPR			200Q	97B											
13. NSA/SA			97Q												
14. BJSO	m	5009	489Q	100B											
15. NSC			203Q	10011											
16. IJT/NSN															
17. NSRISC	12	750	1SSO												96Q
18. BJT/NSBM															
19. SPR			99Q	111011					8Q						
20. NSR/SFB			19Q	80											122Q
21. BJT/NSBM				20B											42Q
22. SPR			47Q	150B											435Q
23. NSP															
24. NSM															
25. NSR/SA			80Q	80											318
26. SMIS															
27. SA'		8150?	152Q	150B											
28. NSV*															
29. SMIS		2000		25B											
30. NSM				50B											
31. SA/SFX				25B											
TOTAL	143	47,895	3676Q	1663B	187Q	10111	1200	42Q	8Q	12111	853Q	692	1383	219	1483Q

Q= Quintal=128lbs.

B=Barrel@6 almudes

It was certainly no coincidence that by far the most impressive concentration of such products sailed aboard the 1670 fleet of the *Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes*, the *Santa Catarina*, the *Nossa Senhora de Guia*, the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios*, and the *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos*. These ships carried 41 artillery pieces, 8150 cannonballs, 1000 lances, 692 muskets, 1382 pikes, as well as large quantities of lead, sulphur, and powder flasks."

This fleet was dispatched at a crucial moment in the history of the *Estado*. Pedro and his Council of State may have resolved to rehabilitate the Asian empire after long years of neglect, but their plans were significantly complicated by the approaching storm of the Dutch War of 1672 and Colbert's spirited attempt to lure Lisbon into an anti-Dutch alliance in Asia that would facilitate grandiose plans that Louis XIV's great minister harbored for his own *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales*. Rejecting this tempting offer, Pedro had instead appointed Luis de Mendonca Furtado and determined to provide his friend with everything deemed necessary to effect a rehabilitation of the *Estado*, a fact that was well reflected in the cargoes carried aboard the 1670 fleet. Mendonca Furtado would make the most of this promising start in the years that followed in the midst of the Third Dutch War in Asia, when all of his European competitors were preoccupied with warring against one another."

Although the return cargoes of the *Carreira* have been much more extensively studied than those carried aboard outward bound vessels, there has also been a tendency to focus on the glory years of the early to mid-reth century when the annual traffic in spices via the Cape route probably averaged c. 40,000 *quintals* a year, huge profits were made for the Crown, and fleets of 5-14 ships made the voyage annually. After the nadir of 1640-166}, a rehabilitation also took place on the return voyage of the *Carreira*. As Table 2 noted, between 1668-1682 there were 28 sailings from Goa to Lisbon or an average of 1.87 per year. Of that number, 23 ships or 82.8% made the passage successfully.

Chart 1 provides a yearly breakdown of the Crown pepper cargoes carried aboard these ships."

Even a cursory examination of this evidence clearly reveals that the quantity of Crown spice imports had dropped precipitously from the reth or even early rrrh centuries: Instead of tens of thousands of quintals, we find hundreds and at times a thousand or two quintals had become the rule. Nevertheless, we should temper this assessment with two vital considerations. First, the fact that the size of the *Carreira* fleets carrying these goods had modified significantly over time. On the outward bound voyage the average from 1500-1530 had been from 7-14 ships. By 1550, this had

been reduced to 5, by 1640 the average was 2-3 ships per fleet, and in the 1660s the average had fallen to 1-2 per year. Return fleets throughout these years had generally averaged half that of the number leaving Lisbon. Another important consideration is that the welcomed and needed reformation in shipbuilding techniques which began in the mid-17th century, a campaign which ultimately yield more seaworthy vessels for the *Carreira* along the lines of the English and Dutch Indiamen, had also ensured a drop in possible cargo space aboard these vessels. The unwieldy 1500-2000 ton monsters of the 1590s were gradually reduced to sleeker, more seaworthy frigate-type vessels of perhaps 500-600 tons by the 1670s.¹²

Therefore, it is perhaps more fruitful to judge these figures not in comparison with the glory days of the empire that had long since disappeared, but in comparison to the dismal period immediately preceding Pedro's reforms. Judged in this light, these royal cargoes tell us several things. First, they demonstrate that the stabilization of the sailings of the *Carreira* after 1668 also ensured a regular supply of pepper at royal expense after the lean years of the 1650s and early 1660s. Compared to the generally dismal sailings and cargoes of the Regency years of Dona Luisa and Afonso VI's reign, Crown shipments of pepper remained relatively stable throughout the first decades of Pedro II's reign, with at least 250 quintals being dispatched each year with the exception of 1671 and 1678. It should be noted, however, that the departure of the [*frigata Bom Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria*] in December 1677 with 50 quintals of Kanara pepper slightly distorts the figures for the latter year. The annual totals at Crown expense (excluding 1671 and 1678) ranged from a low of 201 quintals in 1668, to a high of 1903 in 1674. An almost steady rise is also detectable from 1668-1674, with by far the largest amounts of 1625, 786, and 1903

being dispatched from 1672-1674. These 4}14 *quintals* constituted some 48.3% of the total Crown pepper shipments for the entire period.

There can be little doubt that the timing of these "large" shipments related to both geo-political and economic factors. It is likely that Luis de Mendonca Furtado, following the lead of Pedro and the Overseas Council in avoiding involvement in the Dutch War of 1672, exploited the fact that his European rivals were indeed busing warring with one another at home and in Asia, to oversee the purchase and dispatching of significant amounts of pepper during these three crucial years. This policy not only confirmed the wisdom of Pedro decision on the war, but reflected a fundamental shift in the priorities inherent in the monarchical monopolism that had forged the empire in the early 16th century and had largely guided its major strategic decisions throughout the Aviz, Habsburg, and early Braganza periods. Instead of embracing the traditional allure of military action and conquest that had traditionally guided Lisbon's policy in struggling against both Asiatic and European competitors from the outset, Pedro and Mendonca Furtado instead opted for peace, reformation, and a practical economic strategy that in many respects surpassed the anachronistic reversion to warfare and conquest totally unsuited to the stated goals of the proto-capitalist companies of England and Holland that Colbert was in the midst of challenging. As Chart 2 demonstrates, Mendonca Furtado was also prompted to dispatch such cargoes during the years 1672-1674 according to the simple laws of supply and demand and the prices resulting from these economic realities."

As Chart 2 demonstrates, there was a close correlation throughout this period between the price paid by the Crown for its pepper in Kanara, Tanor, and elsewhere on the Malabar coast of India and the amount that

was purchased and dispatched to Lisbon. The average prices paid varied from 17.4-32.8 *xerafins* per *quinral* for these years, certainly a significant variation. The two periods when the price was lowest, that is from late 1668 through late 1671 for the four cargoes dispatched from January 1669 through January 1672 at an average price of 21.8, and from late 1673 to late 1674 at an average of 17.4 *xerafins* per *quintal* for four cargoes dispatched through December 1674 resulted in by far the largest shipments of pepper to Lisbon. These cargoes were carried by the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* (428 *quintals*), the *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda* (712 *quintals*), the *Born Jesus de Sao Domingos* (902 *quintals*), and the *Nossa dos Cardaes* (623 *quintals*) in the initial period; and the *Sao Pedro de Rates* (rooo *quintals*), the *Born Jesus de Sao Domingos* (903 *quintals*), the *Siio Miguel* (596 *quintals*), and the packet *Born Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria* (292 *quintals*) in the latter. The 5456 *quintals* carried aboard these 8 ships alone constituted 61% of the 8921 *quintals* dispatched during this period.

Although the nature of the extant sources make it difficult to trace the precise reasons for these two troughs in prices, it is likely that the tension and uncertainties engendered by the warfare between the English, French, and Dutch along the western coast of India during these years may have played a role. It is also interesting to note that Colberr's grand Asian fleet of 1670 under jacob Blanquet de La Haye, the single greatest threat to Dutch predominance in the trade, had been decisively defeated by the fall of 1674, and that England had also made a separate peace, effectively ending the Third Dutch War in Asia." The resumption of regular trade on the Malabar coast was characterized by a significant jump in prices between 1675-1679, from 27.5-32.8 *xerafins* per *quintal*, nearly doubling from 1674 levels for the cargoes dispatched throughout 1677 and in January 1679. These figures suggest that the indigenous merchants who dominated the pepper trade in Kanara, Tanor, and elsewhere were indeed sensitive to the vagaries of the market, at least as they affected the European demand for such products and may have exploited the realities of the diplomatic situation in Europe and by extension Asia to increase their own profits in the trade. At the same time, these figures reveal that the Portuguese, in the face of such inflated prices, either severely restricted their purchases, as in the period from late 1672 to late 1673, and again in late 1677, or abandoned the purchase of pepper altogether in favor of commodities with higher potential profit margins at home as from late 1680 onward, when the Viceroyalty purchased *bizalhos* of diamonds instead of pepper at Royal expense for the return cargoes."

The composition of Royal cargoes aboard the *Carreira*, even during this period of reform, remained exceedingly traditional. In terms of value, pepper remained by far the most important commodity. Of the 246,III *xeratins* in direct Crown expenditures on return cargoes, 188,549 *xerafins* or 77% were made on pepper. The 29,799 *xerafins* spent on the *bizalhos* of diamonds dispatched in 1681 and 1682 aboard the *Santo Antonio de Lisboa*, the *Nossa Senhora da vizitacao*, and the *Sao Pedro da Ribeira* represented 12% of overall expenditures, while the 20,216 *xerafins* used to purchase saltpeter equaled 8% of the total. The remaining 7547 *xerafins* or 3% was used to purchase teak and angelim planks, and naval riggings. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the composition of the return cargoes as reflected in Charts 1-2 is the fact that the Crown, even in peak years, was only dispatching from 900-1000 *quintals* per ship. The rated hold capacity of the 500-600 *tonelada* ships utilized on the *Carreira* during the late 17th century was probably between 7500 to 8500 *quintals*. Above deck areas and living quarters that were also jammed with products probably constituted an additional loading space of 20-25% or some 1900-2200 *quinta/s* to the total capacity of these ships." The obvious question is what use was made of the remaining c. 85°0-95°0 *quintals* of space aboard these vessels?

The answer to this important question is twofold: First, a reasonable amount of this space was taken up by the *caixas de liberdade* or liberty chests that had traditionally been granted to officers, crews, and noblemen traveling aboard the *Carreira* in lieu of regular wages. These *caixas* could be loaded with spices or other products that could be imported into Lisbon either wholly or partially duty free. King Manuel's decree of 1515 provided that captains of voyages and fortresses in India received four chests each, gentlemen of the royal household two or three, soldiers one chest, pilots and other officers of the ship one chest each, one chest for each two sailors, and one chest for each three cabin boys. Boyajian estimates that with a typical crew on returning Indiamen at 120 officers and sailors, and an additional 200 soldiers and *fidalgos*, these liberties amounted to c. 300 chests or 450 bales during the first half of the 17th century. At 2 *quintals* per bale, these goods would have occupied some 900-1000 *quintals* of storage space, or nearly all that available above the hold. By the late 17th century, the *liberdade* system, after a short-lived attempt to abolish the system altogether and instead substitute an adequate pay scale, was redefined in a *regimento* of March 11, 1652. Under this decree, the captain-major of any voyage was entitled to 15 liberty chests, 12 slaves, 300 *quintals* of blackwood, 100 *quintals* of lac-dye, and thirty of camphor. In addition, he might designate 12 servants as men-at-arms who were al-

lowed one chest and two *fardels* of cinnamon, with each *fardel* fixed at the maximum weight of 1 *quintal*. At the bottom of the scale, each sailor was allowed one liberty chest and 12 *fardels* of cinnamon and each grummet or apprentice-sailor was allowed one [*ardel*] of liberty goods and ten fardels of cinnamon. In 1664, well after being expelled from Ceylon, the Crown provided that under certain conditions pepper and other spices might be substituted for cinnamon.¹⁷

Based on evidence on the "Cartas Gerais" collection, it appears that the size of the crews was not significantly diminished on the return voyages. Although the invoices for the *liberdades* have not survived, letters from Manoel de Saldanha dated Goa, January 26, 1674 and from Pedro Ferreira dated January 26, 1676 inform us that the carrack *Sao Pedro de Rates* carried the following crews in those years: 16 [and 18] officers, 53 sailors, 25 apprentice sailors, 24 gunners, and 5 cabin boys, for a total of 123 and 125 crew members." It is not unreasonable to assume that the numbers of returning soldiers and other passengers must have also remained relatively close to c. 200 per carrack. At the same time, the 1652 *regimento* had increased *liberdade* allotments by approximately 60%: the captain-major's limit had risen from 4 to 15 chests, the common sailor's limit had risen from half a chest to a full chest plus 12 *fardels* of cinnamon or other spices. Using these figures, it is likely that the amount of cargo space devoted to *liberdade* goods, whether carried at the direct charge of those entitled to them or, as Saldanha's letter implies, leased out to private merchants, was probably close to some 700 chests or 1050 bales at 2 *quintals* each or c. 2100 *quintals* overall. Is it, however, possible to come to a more precise estimate on the makeup of *Carreira* cargoes during the late 17th century? Well yes and no.

Although the dearth of construction data on the *Sao Pedro de Rates* and other ships plying the Cape route during these years and the destruction of the *Casa da India* records in the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 prevent a definitive analysis of its overall cargo, we can utilize available information to make the following estimates. The *Sao Pedro* like most *naos* during this period was probably close to 600 *toneladas* in burden with an available cargo space (including both the hold and elsewhere) of c. 10,000 *quintals*. Based on the Saldanha's letter and the *Contas das Cabedeis* listing of receipts and expenditures on the *Carreira* for these years, we know that this ship carried 1000 *quintals* of Tanor pepper at Crown expense, c. 10% of the total.¹⁸ We should assume that D. Rodrigo da Costa, the captain-major, as well as the remaining members of his crew, all utilized their *liberdade* allotments to the utmost. As Table 4 demonstrates, the cargo space devoted to *liberdade* products on this *nao* must have been over 3000 *quintals*, or c. 30% of the available cargo space. Overall, then Crown pep-

per and *liberdade* allowances must have constituted some 4000 *quintals* or so, leaving some 6000 *quintals* or 60% available for strictly private trade.⁴⁰

TABLE 4: Estimated *Liberdade* Cargo Aboard *Sao Pedro de Rates*, 1674

	Chests	Fardels	Other
D. Rodrigo da Costa	15		12 Slaves, 130Q of dye etc., 300Q of bwood
12 Men-at-Arms	12	24	
16 Officers	32		4 Slaves
53 Sailors	53	636	
25 Grummets	25	250	
24 Gunners	24	288	
5 Cabin boys	5	50	
Total=3176 Quimals	166=498Q	2248Q	430Q
Fardele1 Quinal			
ChesreS Quintals			

These estimates on the composition of the cargo of the *Sao Pedro de Rates* suggest that various trends regarding the *Carreira* characteristic of the Habsburg period continued during the initial stages of the Braganza dynasty in Portugal. Above all, these estimates suggest a continuing decline in the percentage of overall cargo weight absorbed by Royal pepper and other products, and the increasingly vital role that private trade played in the *Carreira* traffic around the Cape, a trade that in some cases reached 5 million *cruzados* per year. Boyajian argues that from 1620-1640 the breakdown of royal vis-a-vis private trade was 54% versus 46% by total weight, and for the entire Habsburg period (1580-1640) this ratio was 62% versus 38%.⁴¹ The figures for the *Sac Pedro de Rates*, as rough as they are, seem to demonstrate that the percentage of cargoes absorbed by Crown trade continued to shrink during the Braganza period. The king's pepper shipments which had once absorbed virtually all of the cargo space on such vessels, c. 95% in the 1540s had now been reduced to a mere 10% of the total. This figure and the 30% privileged *liberdade* cargo still constituted less than half of the total by weight. Moreover, since a good portion of the *liberdade* allowance was no doubt leased to private traders, perhaps half of the total, the actual cargo space absorbed by the Royal trade and crew *liberdades* was probably less than 25% by weight. It should be noted that the *Sao Pedro de Rates* carried largest Crown pepper shipment of the entire period. Thus, on the other carracks of these years, which carried c. 500 or 600 *quintals* at Crown expense, the percentage of private trade was even higher and at times probably approached the 90% range that

Boyajian has proffered for the percentage by value for such cargoes for the Habsburg period!"

Nevertheless, the increasingly important role of the private trade on the *Carreira* route, which these figures suggest should not be taken *a priori* as a definitive sign of increasing infirmity on the part of the Portuguese Crown. In fact, such evidence may be interpreted as one sign of the logical maturation of the Braganza dynasty and the rising centralized state in Portugal that Pedro strove to construct for the remainder of the eighteenth century. One of Lisbon's primary goals during this formative period of Braganzan "absolutism" was to reestablish, once and for all, the seaborne interchange between the metropole and Asia, a link that had been all but severed by the years of warfare from 1640-1668. As the evidence indicates, Pedro and his Overseas Council most assuredly succeeded in this quest in the years after 1668.⁴ As this fundamental task was accomplished, Pedro and his advisors looked to the example of the Dutch, English, and French joint stock companies for lessons that would resuscitate the economic fortunes of the *Estado*.

Perhaps the most innovative and radical reform that Pedro and his clique considered during the late 1660s and early 1670s was the plan to reestablish a privately funded East India Company along the lines of his European competitors bankrolled by contributions from the powerful New Christians. This plan to rejuvenate the *Estado* by attracting a large infusion of money from the rich New Christian community in Portugal, a community with long-standing ties to the private trade carried on aboard the ships of the *Carreira da India*, reveals the firm commitment of the Crown toward the fortunes of the *Estado da India*. The Prince Regent initially embraced this plan as early as 1669, despite the staunch opposition of the Roman Catholic church and especially the Inquisition. In essence, Pedro sought to utilize this font of private capital for the benefit of the Crown's economic and geo-political interests in the Asian empire. The scheme revolved around a *quid pro quo* arrangement in which the Prince Regent would endorse a general pardon for past "judaizing" and promised future protection from the abuses of the Inquisition in the form of a bull to be promulgated by Pope Clement X in return for funding a new Asian Company along the lines of the Dutch and English model. To obtain such royal and papal largesse, the New Christians were also expected to underwrite sizable military reinforcements for the *Estado*: sending from 3000-5000 men to India during the first year of the plan, and 1200-1500 per annum thereafter, along with a stipend of 20,000 *cruaados* for the maintenance of this force.

As Francis Parry, the English ambassador, informed London in August 1673: "The New Christians would send to the East Indies & maintain

there 3000 souldiers & every yeare after 1500 as long as shall be needfull."" These men would complement the 500-600 man permanent *Terço* that was already in the process of being reestablished by the Crown with monies taken from the *Estado's donativo* for the peace with Holland, nominally 130,000 *cruzados* a year.⁴ But in the end, as Parry and other foreign diplomats in Lisbon noted, the entrenched opposition of what might be defined as a "medieval" coalition between the Holy Office and clergy, a good part of the nobility, and a populace still wedded to the prejudice, hatreds, and superstitions of the past, undermined this plan. All three estates of the *Cortes* of 1674 decried the scheme and Pedro, his resolve already shaken by the popular fury against the New Christians following what was called the "desecration of Odivelas" of 1671, as well as an assassination plot of 1673, backed down.⁴ A last ditch effort in 1675 to salvage the plan, substituting Florentine capital under the auspices of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo III, was also "quite laid aside, being look'd on as the offers of the Jews of Leghorne, authorized onely by y.e Duke".

Nevertheless, the scheme for a revamped East India Company funded by New Christian capital and the willingness of the Crown to question the economic feasibility of erstwhile royal monopolies like the *contracto* for Mozambique, which Pedro sought to open up to private investment in 1672, demonstrate that the post 1668 Lisbon hierarchy was willing to break with centuries-old practices, traditions, and supporters in an effort to salvage what remained of the *Estado*. In this quest for economic stabilization, New Christian monies, a free trade of sorts, joint-stock companies, and above all private capital were all judged to be legitimate weapons to fight an increasingly competitive commercial struggle with the Dutch, English, and French." The extant figures on the *Carreira* cargoes and the nature of the royal seaborne interchange with the Asian empire during the late 17th century suggest that the percentage of private trade (and profits) on the Cape route continued to increase throughout the years 1668-1683. It is reasonable to assume that the well-connected New Christian families in Lisbon and elsewhere, that Boyajian has convincingly detailed for the Spanish period, along with enterprising Viceroyes like Luis de Mendonça Furrado, continued to extract an exceedingly reasonable return on their investments in this trade. In short, while the direct Crown share of the *Carreira* trade may have stabilized in the 1670s at levels far below what it had once been, Pedro was willing to accept this reality as long as the lucrative private trade on the Cape route was reestablished after the dismal years of the 1650s and 1660s, and private profits (and at times those of royal administrators) in the inter-Asiatic trade expanded as well.

Pedro and Cadaval no doubt recognized, as the lesson of the Aviz dynasty in Asia and the Habsburgs in the New World demonstrated, that

Crown monopoly did not necessarily ensure huge Crown profit nor an expanding internal economy. The time was clearly at hand for innovation in the administration and exploitation of the rump empire in Asia. Throughout the 1670S, therefore, the Crown had considered a series of radical reforms, most of which included the wealth of the New Christian community in Lisbon, a community which had played a vital role in the private sector of the Cape trade for a generation or more." Yet, before such innovations could be attempted, the *Carreira* itself, that traditional economic, political, and social lifeline of the Asian empire had to be secured once again. By the early 1670S, this crucial task had been accomplished; a reasonable level of pepper was once again assured at Crown expense, and regular sailings between Lisbon and Goa once again became the rule. These successes, in turn, had restored an acceptable level of confidence, economic and otherwise, regarding the *Estado* on the quays of Lisbon, at the *Casa da India*, in the merchant houses of the New Christians, and in the *solars* of the nobility, a laudable state of affairs that had not existed in many years.

V

Administration: European Hierarchies and the Resiliency of Indigenons Structures, 1640-1683

In September 1652, when D. Vasco Mascarenhas, count of Obidos, assumed the Viceregal post in Goa, the *regimento* confirming his position still listed 20 major fortresses that the Crown possessed in Asia. In addition, Obidos found that some eighty ships were at his disposal in the *Estado* to help implement royal policy.' In December 1662, when Antonio de Mello de Casarro took office at the chapel of Reis Magos, his *regimento* could list only 10 such fortresses that the Crown possessed.' The disastrous intervening decade, in the midst of the continuing war at home and in the empire, had witnessed the loss of crucial posts to the enemies of the *Estado*, both European and indigenous. As noted above, the **VAC** had already stripped the Portuguese Crown of all of its holdings on Ceylon and others on the Coromandel coast, and would soon conquer the remaining posts of Cochin, Cranganor, and Cannanore on the pepper-rich Malabar coast. Sivappa Nayaka had expelled the Portuguese from posts on the Kanara coast like Mangalor and Barcelor in the mid-1650s. Moreover, the Moslem king of Golconda had conquered the long-standing settlement at San Thome in 1662.' Nevertheless, while the empire that Mello de Castro governed in the early 1660s had been severely pruned in its *number* of fortresses, the administrative structures and system that he inherited to undertake reform remained largely what it had been in Linhares time or even in the days of the house of Aviz, and administrative reform was a fundamental precondition to rehabilitating the truncated empire of the 1660s.

The problems confronting the new Governor and his successors in this quest were indeed daunting. In part, they related to issues of time, distance, technology, and money. To begin with, the geographic extent of the *Estado*, despite its recent losses, remained truly immense. The administrative jurisdiction that extended from the viceregal seat at Goa, "the head of this State," still stretched thousands of miles covering six modern time zones from Mozambique to Macau. The difficult round-trip voyage from Lisbon to Goa "took one and a half years, and the distance traveled equaled the earth's diameter": Communications were also rudimentary and fickle. The written word, when it could be put to paper and understood, remained the primary means of communication within the empire. The Crown dispatched such messages to Goa either with seaborne traffic

via the Cape of Good Hope or utilized the old caravan routes through the Levant. Both, however, were fraught with danger and far from reliable. These problems were exacerbated by the Crown's desire to restrict bureaucratic expenses in administering its overseas possessions, a desire rooted both in the structural limitations of the early modern European state and the quest to maximize profits. In turn, these realities ensured a good deal of local autonomy for the fortress Governors in this vast expanse, who frequently paid high prices for their offices and expected a sizable return in trade in return. Since months and sometimes years at a time went by with no definite orders from either Lisbon or Goa for these *de facto* fief holders, abuses and corruption were common. In organizing the trade with Asia, such imperatives had also helped result in a system where the Crown farmed out lucrative trading routes to private individuals, who sometimes paid a notable price for such privileges and usually reaped huge profits in return.'

The administrative system for the *imperio* as a whole from Africa to Brazil to the *Estado*, had naturally been determined largely by the shifting structures of the centralizing European state of the late medieval period, the "new monarchies," as well as the governmental changes inherent in the absolutist period of the 16th century. The Portuguese state, like those throughout Europe, had experienced these shifting patterns during the Aviz, Habsburg, and early Braganza periods. For the governance of the *Estado*, these changes resulted in the formation of an administrative system that was highly centralized and hierarchical in nature. From the outset, this imperial system sought to promote the economic and political interests of the Crown above all else. To bind the most powerful segments of Portuguese society to this system, royal largesse and a plethora of lucrative offices were provided for the nobility; Crown patronage and money flowed freely to the Church, while the New Christian community enjoyed the *de facto* ability to invest and profit from the rich trade with Asia. At the outset and during the glory years of the 16th century, the lower classes had also been enticed with the lure of Golden Goa, while the king could even fulfill his "charitable" obligations to the "Crown orphans" by providing offices in the *Estado* as dowries for these young women."

As in Europe, such offices were viewed as a form of personal property by the holder for the length of his term, usually three years and generally non-renewable. Since salaries were also rather meager, given the fiscal priorities of the Crown, it was expected that officeholders would supplement their income with monies gained through their posts. Moreover, "any distinction between public and private funds was blurred". Each office generally provided a series of official privileges and perquisites listed

in the royal letter of appointment, including the right to collect cernam taxes or to undertake trade on certain routes within the *Estado*. Neatly two centuries of administrative tradition in Asia had also conferred *de facto* customary privileges, such as demanding a gratuity before granting a *cartaz*, that the officeholder had the right to expect. While certain offices nominally conferred greater prestige, years of experience with the value of these combined privileges had resulted in a hierarchy of desirability for offices which was reflected in the prices paid for them. As Pearson notes, in 1618 more than twice as much was paid for the office of judge of the Goa customs house (given its wide array of perquisites) as was for the more prestigious post of captain for the entire city. In the mid-17th century, the captaincies of perhaps the two most potentially profitable fortresses of Diu and Hurmuz yielded five and fourteen times the price paid for the equivalent post in Goa. There was, therefore, a *de facto* entrepreneurial market of sorts for such offices operating within the official royal system of technical monarchical monopolism.'

During the 17th century, it was fashionable to ascribe gross corruption to this system and, by extension, to cite such corruption as one of the main reasons for the decline of the *Estado*.¹ Pearson and others have rightly demonstrated that this view was vastly overstated, a view that in true Whiggish style judged an early modern system through the prism of rigid Victorian conceptions on the nature of officeholding and abuse.² Nevertheless, there is no doubt that abuses did occur, and at times rather frequently. Extortion of forced loans at favorable interest rates was one common problem, as was illegal trade in products that were officially deemed Crown monopolies like spices. It has recently been argued that as the *Estado* experienced grave difficulties in the mid-17th century, and the potential for legal and customary supplements to one's salary narrowed, abuses became even more common and blatant. While it is logical to assume that increased competition from the Dutch and English and declining profits may have had such an effect, it is also likely that more complete record series may be partly or even largely responsible for the numbers of extant complaints on such matters. Above all, it is clear that the Crown with varying degrees of success sought to combat the more serious abuses, and that its royal servants in Asia, also had a clear idea of what practices transcended the line of proper behavior within the *de facto* system of supplementing one's salary. The practice of fortress captains utilizing royal artillery from their fortresses aboard their own ships, or plundering indigenous craft with valid passes, or even accepting bribes to avoid custom duties were all considered "beyond the pale". Why? The sources suggest that while it was *fine* to exploit any gray areas within the official system, such acts could not threaten the defense or integrity of the basic pillars of

the empire. Leaving strategic fortresses undefended, undermining the *quid pro quo* agreement with indigenous merchants implicit in the *cartaz* system, and depriving the Crown of crucial *alfandega* receipts, when such receipts furnished a sizable portion of the *Estado's* receipts, all violated this dictum and were not tolerated."

Obtaining an office in the imperial bureaucracy of the *Estado* may have been relatively easy to either purchase or receive in the form of royal favor. Actually taking up the position was quite another matter. An effort to curry favor with as many notable subjects as possible, while obliging them to Crown patronage, and the almost constant desire for specie had prompted the creation of a logjam for such offices. The more lucrative positions in Asia were sometimes promised for generations in advance. Diego do Couto related the story of a noble who had been appointed to the captaincy of Mombassa only to discover that there were some 30 other grantees in line for the position before him!¹⁴ In the interim, a candidate of noble blood could often obtain a certificate from the Crown citing past service to the king (usually as a soldier for 12 years) that could land him an entry level position in the bureaucracy. Non-nobles had a much more difficult time and any post that could be arranged for them was usually in a remote fortress, at paltry pay. This class-driven reality did much to encourage such individuals to seek better employment in the service of an influential noble, a group that generally maintained a retinue of lackeys in Goa, in the armies of the *Reis Vizinhos*, or in the houses of the religious orders.¹⁵ Fortunately, for many office-seekers, exceedingly high mortality rates linked to climate and disease frequently shortened the wait before they could take up their positions. Between 1604-35, it is estimated that some 25,000 soldiers had died at the Royal Hospital in Goa. According to Pedro Barrero de Rezende, of the 5,228 men leaving Lisbon from 1629-34, only 2495 made it alive to Goa. These high death rates were largely blind to class, of the 50 governors and viceroys up to 1656, 22 died during their term of office or on the return voyage to Portugal.¹⁶ As a result of this reality, frequent openings occurred for most of the main positions in the bureaucracy, as the *Livro das Homenagens* records reflect. From 1668-1677, some 115 individuals were named to major posts. Of this number, 58 or just over 50% were identified as nobles."

A noted Victorian scholar and a contemporary Indian one have both criticized the administrative structures of the *Estado* as being exceedingly simple in nature, a somewhat damning reflection of the backward social and political system of early modern Portugal.¹⁷ This long-standing view, however, is misleading. It may be true that the Imperial bureaucracy was relatively straightforward, and a model of simplicity in comparison with the complex Crown machinery created by Madrid in the New World.

Nevertheless, this fact had much less to do with any shortcomings in the governmental and societal structures in reth and rrth century Portugal, which in fact closely resembled those of her European neighbors, than with the relatively small number of Portuguese subjects resident in the *Estado* at anyone time. According to Boxer, there were probably never more than c. 14,000-17,000 Portuguese subjects resident in the *imperio* from Mozambique to Macau, even during the glory years of the reth century. This figure would include perhaps 7000-8,000 men in the administration and military service, and a similar number contained in the religious orders, European dependents, servants, and *mestizos* who lived according to European law.⁷ By the 1660s, this figure had declined markedly. As joao Nunes da Cunha maintained: "There are fewer Portuguese in the whole of this State than there are in Alhos Vedros," a small Ribatejo town containing some 200 households." While this description was certainly exaggerated, it is nonetheless likely that the number of Portuguese residents in the *Estado* had been reduced by two thirds from the previous century to c. 5000-6000. These numbers meant that the administrative structures that the Crown could afford to support, both financially and demographically, were relatively simple in nature."

The pinnacle of this hierarchical system was nominally the king in Lisbon working with the assistance of his councils. joao IV had significantly revamped the council system he had wrested from the Habsburgs in late 1640. He had first organized a new *Conselho do Estado* to replace the *Conselho de Portugal* which had decided affairs relating to the kingdom during the Habsburg period. The Council of State was headed by the king himself. It was usually made up of a handful of *grandees* and was charged with deciding the most important matters affecting the. Next, in December 1640, joao IV had created the *Conselho da Guerra*, which dealt with military affairs and for the first three decades of its existence focused primarily on the Restoration. Next, the king revamped the existing *Conselho da Pazenda* or Treasury Council set up by Philip II in 1591 to decide all matters relating to finance. Finally in 1643, the first Braganza King formally established a new Council, the *Conselho Ultramarine* or Overseas Council, to succeed the defunct Habsburg *Conselho da India* (1604-1614) and deliberate matters relating to the overseas empire; in South America, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the Overseas Council did not have exclusive domain over imperial matters. The Treasury Council continued to be involved, for example, in the financing of royal fleets for the *imperio* and in the receipt of their cargoes. Moreover, although the *Conselho Ultramarine* did advise the king on all matters regarding the day to day, or perhaps better year to year, operation of the empire, periodic decisions involving the overall delegation of resources to the various

components of the empire were usually reserved for the more powerful Council of State.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the loss of nearly all the Council of State records in the Lisbon earthquake have made it exceedingly difficult for historians to examine the critical decisions affecting the *Estado* during these years. However, the extant records of the *Conselho Ultramarine* and the official correspondence between the Crown in Lisbon and the Viceroyalty in Goa in the Monsoon Books collection frequently allow us to compensate for this tragic loss. According to the decree which originally created it, the Overseas Council would be presided over by the comptroller of the revenue of the India house or *vedor da [azenda da repartido da India]*, and included two other members from the military nobility, one lawyer, and a non-voting secretary. It met daily except for Sundays and holidays at 7:00 in the morning in summer, an hour later in the winter, and divided the workload according to geographic regions. Three councilors constituted a quorum. Matters relating to the *Estado* were discussed on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. Ideally, all its members were supposed to be men who had had previous experience in the *imperio*. Moreover, it appears that when an issue was discussed relating to the *Estado*, the Council largely deferred to the expertise of members with past experience there. Issues for discussion could be raised by the king, the Viceroy, or the Council itself based on its correspondence with the Asian empire. When a unanimous decision was taken, all of the members merely signed the *consulta* or recommendation to the king; when dissenting votes were cast, all the votes and views were recorded separately. The president of the Council then forwarded the *consulta* to the king for his decision. To implement policy, the Crown maintained a formal correspondence with the Viceroyalty, letters dispatched aboard the ships of the *Carreira* which left Lisbon in the early spring and ideally reached Goa by the end of the fall."

The Viceroy, in turn, would read these orders from home, implement them whenever possible, and then summarize his actions in replies that were sent back to Lisbon on the returning *Carreira* ships, which departed from the Mandovi in January "monsoon," and ideally reached Portugal by the late summer. To assist the Viceroy in the process of making his decisions and implementing Crown policy, a somewhat parallel hierarchical bureaucracy had developed in the *Estado*. The Viceroy, whose office and functions have already been detailed, stood at the top of this secondary hierarchy. His main councilor support came in the form of his own *Conselho do Estado*. From a very early date in the empire, such a body seems to have existed on a *de facto* basis to help legitimize the decisions of the Viceroy or Governor. In 1563, this institution gained formal and royal recognition. By 1604, the membership of the Council had evolved to regu-

lady include the Viceroy as president, along with the archbishop of Goa, the chief Inquisitor, two or three leading *fidalgos* resident in Goa who were usually *reinados* but upon occasion could be *casados*, the head of the High Court, the captain of the city of Goa, the *vedor da fazenda*, and a non-voting secretary. As the extant records of this body demonstrate, the Council was charged with discussing the most weighty issues confronting the *Estado*, especially those of war and peace. Its advice was contained in formal recommendations voted upon by the members and recorded by the secretary with individual opinions noted. Although these *assentos* were strictly advisory, the Viceroy usually followed the majority view for both practical and political reasons."

Table 5: Administrative Structure of the Estado da India, c. 1670

Lisbon	Crown	
	Conselho do Esrado	
	Conselho da Fazenda	Desembargo do Paco (Royal Board of Justice)
	Conselho Ultramarino	
Goa	Viceroy or Governor	
	Conselho do Estado	Procurador da Coroa
	Finance	Justice
Casa da Polvora [Gunpowder Factory]	Caza dos Contos	Mesa da Relacan
Ribeira Real [Royal Dock- yard]	Conselho da Fazenda	1 Ouvidor Ceral
General of High Seas Fleet [Alto Bordo]	Vedor-geral da Fazenda	50uvidors
General of Galley Fleet (do Remo]	Provedor-mor dos Conros	
Mesne do Campo of Goa Terco	Provedor-mor dos Defunros e Ausentes	
	Escrivao da Fazenda (Secretary of Treasury)	
	<i>Aifandega</i>	
	luiz or Alrnoxarife	
	<i>Arrematacao das Rendas Reais</i>	
Fortresses	Captain	
	Finance	Justice
Captain Garrison	Feitoria	Ouvidor
	Feitor	
	<i>Alfandega</i>	
	<i>Renda Holders</i>	

Beneath the Viceroy and his Council were *de facto* departments of justice and finance. The pinnacle of the entire Portuguese judicial system was the *Desembargo do Paço* or Royal Board of Justice in Lisbon. This board, the highest court in the kingdom, controlled the appointment of all magistrates and judges and oversaw the *Casa de Supplicacac* or Court of Appeals in Lisbon as well as the high courts in the empire. In Goa, this high court was called the *Mesa da Relacao* or Supreme Court and dated from c. 1545 and the administration of [oa]o de Castro. Before this a maverick network of royal judges, *desembargadores* and *iuiques* had assisted the Viceroy. The creation of the *Mesa* established a supreme court for the *Estado*. By the early 17th century, this body had been fixed at 6 judges: 1 senior Crown Judge or *ouvidor-geral da India* and 5 associate judges or *ouvidores*, with descriptive titles, who also served as the chief of a judicial department in the State. The *chanceler* served as head judge of the chancery; the *provedor-mor dos defuntos da India* served as chief probate judge and so on. The *Relacao* constituted the sole regularly sitting judicial board in the *Estado* and as such it acted as a high court of appeals for the decisions of all other Crown officials and judges. These might include the decisions reached by captains or circuit judges (*ouvidores*) in the various fortresses, district judges (*ouvidores da Comarca*) or even municipal bodies like the *Senado da Camara* in Goa. The important deliberations of the *Relacao* also commanded a respectable salary from the Crown, some 1500 *xerafins* a year. The *Procurador da Coroa* or Royal Attorney, also functioned within the royal bureaucracy of the *Estado*, and was charged with overseeing the operation of the system and protecting the Crown's interests.²¹

The financial structure of the *Estado* had also evolved gradually since the days of Albuquerque. Administratively, the commercial and fiscal interests of the empire were under the control of a House of Accounts or *Caza dos Cantos*, headed by the Comptroller General of Finance or *Vedor-geral da Fazenda*. As the empire grew, changes had logically followed. In the Spanish period, a 1589 royal *regimento* had set up a Board and Court of Accounts (*Meza e Tribunal dos Contos*) to facilitate trade and ideally to check corruption. This board was headed by the Viceroy and included the Comptroller of Accounts (*Vedor dos Cantos*) and 2 of the most senior accountants in the *Caza*. In 1615, the *Meza* was transformed into a body called the Public Revenue Council or *Conselho da Fazenda*. This new council included the Viceroy, the chancellor of the High Court, the *Vedor-geral da Fazenda*, the chief superintendent of accounts (*Provedor-mor dos Cantos*), the Crown attorney (*Procurador da Coroa*), the custodian of the property of the dead and absent (*Provedor-*

mor dos defuntos e ausentes), and a secretary *tescriuao da Fazenda*). This Council met regularly on Wednesday evenings and discussed all matters relating to the financial workings of the *Estado*. Ourfirting the ships of the *Carreira*, procuring spices, minting money from tribute and other sources, regulating salaries, administering all sources of revenues, sending gifts to local princes, and even paying for pilots to conduct ships from Mormugao to the *Ribeira* were all matters that received attention. The Treasury Council voted on such issues; a formal *assento* was recorded by the *escriwao* and signed by its members.²⁴

The *raison d'itre* of the other major fiscal institutions of the *Estado*, like that of the Treasury Council, was derived largely from the overseas trade with Europe and the lucrative intra-Asiatic or country trade. The *Alfdndega* or royal customs house, could easily trace its roots to examples in medieval Europe, the Levant, as well as indigenous Asian kingdoms. The most important of the *alfdndegas* established in the *Estado* was at Goa. The customs house there paid most of its receipts Into the *Caza dos Contos*, reserving a percentage of its tolls to pay the salaries of its various employees. Its head held the title of *juiz* or *almoxarife* and served under the *Vedor geral da [azenda*. At Coa, incoming and outgoing products were taxed at the rate of 6% *ad valorem* until 1569 and 7.125% thereafter. At Chaul, 8% was charged on imports and 6% on exports; at Diu 3.5% and eventually 4% were charged, while at Melaka an attempt had been made to reap 7% on the traffic through the straits." Customs revenues played a crucial role in the economic and administrative life of the *Estado*. In the sixteenth century, it has been estimated that customs revenues Yielded c. 60% of total revenues from Goa, and that the percentage for the *Estado* as a whole may have been as much as 65%. By the 1630S, these figures were 66% for Goa and 47% for the *Estado*:" The *feitoria* was another key facet in rhe financial edifice of the State of India. As early as the fourteenth century, the Portuguese Crown had dispatched a royal feitor to Bruges to act as its official business agent, to buy and sell on the account of the king, as well as originally to oversee the kingdom's merchant community there. As the empire had expanded along littoral Africa and throughout the Indian Ocean basin, the *[eitoria* system had been exported as well. As time went on, the factor abandoned one of his initial functions: that of chief of the Portuguese private trading community. His "factory" usually induded warehouse space, a staff and other accoutrements to facilitate his charge of profitably pursuing the Crown's trade. *Feitorias* predictably existed at the major fortresses the Crown possessed and all the factors operated under the supervision of the *vedor-geral da [azenda*:"

Although no *Conselho da Guerra* existed in Goa to assist the Viceroy, a third major *de facto* department of administration existed relating to

armed commercial policy and warfare. As noted above, the Portuguese had sought from the outset of their empire in Asia to create a system which would allow them to either monopolize or tax the most profitable sectors of the Indian Ocean trade. Albuquerque's strategy of capturing major strategic enrrcpots like Goa, Hurmuz, and Melaka had been supplemented by a declared Crown monopoly in key spices on the Cape route ro Europe utilizing the *Carreira da India*. At the same time, the intra-Asian trade in other commodities was to be regulated by the *cartaz* or pass system. Indigenous merchants were compelled to purchase these passes from authorized Crown agents. These documents provided information on the name of the captain, his crew, the size of the ship, and its cargo. The amount of arms and munitions that could be legally carried was also limited. At the outset of any voyages such ships were obliged to proceed to a Portuguese *fortaleza* and pay customs duties on the cargo, a cash deposit was also demanded which insured that the vessels would also stop to pay duties on the return voyage. Any ship that did not purchase such a pass was liable to confiscation as a legitimate prize, and her crew could be killed or enslaved. Since the cost of the *cartaz* was relatively low, it is clear that the main objective of this policy was to furnish the *Estado* with the vital stream of custom revenues that it so badly needed." In part to attract more indigenous merchants to this system, the Portuguese also promised armed convoys or *cafilas* on the more lucrative trade routes to provide protection against pirates and other threats. The most successful of these *cafilas* were established on the Goa to Gujarat route (largely in textiles) and the Goa to Kanara route (largely in rice)."

The foundation of this exaction system from the outset was the superior naval power and technology, especially in shipborne artillery, that the Portuguese possessed. To enforce it as the decades wore on meant that the Portuguese had to continually send out their regular fleets to search for and punish interlopers. During the "glory" years of the 16th century, fleets had been sent out from the main strategic fortresses throughout the Indian Ocean basin. By the mid-17th century, Goa was forced to bear the overwhelming brunt of this task. This meant that the Viceroy was expected to outfit and send out 3 main armed fleets each year: a squadron to the Straits of Hurmuz that would intercept ships in that region and collect the custom revenues that the Crown had been granted in the Persian port of Gombroon or Bandar Kung; the 'fleet of the North' that would patrol the waters around the lucrative trade in the Gulf of Cambay region near the Province of the North; and the 'fleet of the South' that performed a similar duty along the pepper rich Malabar coast towards Cape Comorin and Ceylon. These deep-water squadrons were normally made up of reasonably well-armed *naos*, and referred to as *armadas de alto bordo*. To

assist and protect the coastal trade *armadas do reno* made up of oared galleys were generally utilized. To provide the vital materials for this military work, the Viceroy could call upon the *Casa da Polvara* (Gunpowder Factory) and the royal *Ribeira* (Dockyards). The former established on the Mandovi river approximately halfway between Panjim and Velha Goa utilized indigenous saltpeter to produce perhaps the most crucial commodity for shipborne artillery, while the latter could ideally provide the ships and weapons to pursue royal policy."

This hierarchical bureaucracy, of course, had furnished a more or less workable governmental model for a century and a half. By the early 1660s, however, years of relative neglect from Lisbon and the ravages of warfare made the need for reform imperative. With his usual precision, Antonio de Mello de Castro outlined many of the more glaring problems to D. Luisa Gusmao in letters of 1662 and 1663. He lamented; "Everything one writes from India has this same uncertainty, since our friends are diminishing while our enemies are increasing." The Viceroy maintained that he had "only 500 soldiers with which to defend India". The Dutch had 7000. Clearly he could not defend "anything without men," and this lack of manpower was forcing him "to lose grand opportunities". "A great reformation" was needed in which leaders "demonstrate that they are capable of providing an example that their subjects might follow". When Lencastre and Mendonça Furtado had assumed power there had been 170,000 *xerafins* in the Treasury. These Governors had not only "spent everything, but they had even taken the money on deposit from the tax-farming accounts". As a result, there was not "a single penny" to assist reform." Administrative problems abounded in the *Fazenda*: officials looked more to their own interests than those of the Crown and "in such a vital thing" regular receipts and expense accounts were not even kept. Loans were almost impossible to obtain since old debts had not been honored." At the *Casa da Polvara*, exorbitant prices were paid with Crown funds for saltpeter, which was then diluted with salt and sand, and yields artificially maintained while the remaining saltpeter was stolen and sold privately. Poor record keeping facilitated this process." The tax-farming machinery had so many abuses "that it is not believable". Mendonça Furtado had been charged with relating these problems to the Crown on his return to the *Remo*. In the meantime, Mello de Castro prayed that "God would assist me in such a manner in which I might conserve what Your Majesty still possesses, and that things might recuperate".

Mello de Castro's call for reform had been echoed by of Sac Vicente in January 1667. Utilizing a medical metaphor, he argued that the *Estado* was indeed sick, suffering from a wide variety of ailments including the sale of fortress captaincies, corruption in the administration and, on a

more moralistic note, a system that favored the priorities and Interests of men "without Faith, and with money". The *Estado*, in his view, was surrounded by Hindus taking advantage of it, the insolent English, deceiving Moslems, the strong Dutch, and perhaps undermined "above all [by] insolent vassals". Nunes da Cunha maintained that the "benefit of time," would teach the Portuguese how to improve the *Estado*, and he would do all he could to begin the process. Sac Vicente's preferred strategy was to allow the patient to convalesce a bit before the really "strong medicine" was administered. Nevertheless, he evidently recognized that time was running short and the patient's wounds "were becoming cancerous". Therefore, he called for a restoration by "fire and iron". There is ample evidence to suggest that the Crown heeded the sage advice of these two Viceroy's and that meaningful administrative and military reforms took place in the *Estado* beginning in the late 1660s following the assumption to power of Pedro.

First, a serious effort was made to rehabilitate the Portuguese force of arms in India. Nunes da Cunha's call for "fire and iron," the fact that naval and military power remained at the base of the system of commercial compulsion, and the belief it was the commodity that the *Reie Vizinhos* "respected" most, all helped to prompt action on this issue. After receiving a plethora of complaints on the lack of manpower to garrison the fortresses and serve in the fleets, the *Conselho Ultramarine* considered the matter in a session of December 1669. Based on figures from Goa, the Council estimated that the major garrisons at places like Diu and Mozambique were pitifully undermanned with fewer than 50 men each at these forts that should have had 300 and more. The fleets were also virtually devoid of Portuguese soldiers. In the past, as many as 5000 Portuguese men had served in these functions, now that number had been reduced to perhaps 500. In the councilor's view, the principal cause of this evil was not that the Crown had failed to send out sufficient numbers of men but that certain factors which confronted them upon their arrival in Goa had resulted in this diminution. What were corrupting influences? For a start, a sufficient number of officers was not present to form them into companies, instill order, and provide some form of monetary support given the dearth of a reliable pay system. The quality of the men sent over as soldiers had also contributed to the problem of desertion: it was common to Impress relatively young boys and to send convicts or *degradados* as fodder for the forts and fleets. The *Reis Vizinhos* and the Religious orders had demonstrated great facility in attracting such men to their service; the former through the lure of reasonably lucrative pay, the later with promises of a relatively comfortable lifestyle. Many of these desertions were encouraged in the streets of *Velha Goa*, the huge metropolis of Portuguese

Asia with a population of as many 200,000 in the mid-17th century, before these men ever reached their garrisons."

The Council made several important recommendations to Pedro. First, the *Príncipe* should send as many men and ships as possible in the Viceroyal fleet of Mendonça Furtado in the spring of 1670. Second, the Crown should encourage all officers with experience in the recently ended Restoration war up to the rank of *mestre de campo* and all qualified soldiers to enlist for service in the *Estado* by offering royal *merces* at home and a level of fixed salaries in Asia. Third, the Prince Regent should form a permanent royal *Terço* of some 800 men and officers to form the new basis of military power in the State of India, a force that could be utilized to meet extraordinary threats confronting the Viceroy throughout his domains. The Council made it clear that this *Terce* should be comprised only of well-qualified and experienced officers and soldiers. Neither *rapazes* (young men) nor *degradados* would be allowed to serve in this unit, "since these two types are not of any real use," and had traditionally deserted in droves upon arrival in Goa. The Council admitted that the normal revenues of the *Estado* were not sufficient to bear the economic cost of this new *Terce*, destined as they were for existing and fixed ecclesiastical, military, bureaucratic, as well as extraordinary expenses. It is significant, and indicative of the renascent interest of Lisbon in reviving the fortunes of the Asian empire, that the *Conselho* recommended that these new expenditures should be met with the share of the money the *Estado* had been assessed for the peace with the United Provinces. In his marginal notations to this *consulta*, and in a series of letters from 1670-1672, Pedro made it clear that his firm conviction "*de acudir a India*" had prompted him to accept this plan." Despite problems relating to shortfalls in the actual yield of the *donativo*, this new royal *Terço* was in fact formed by Mendonça Furtado after his arrival in Goa with the experienced officer corps from the *Reino* and the rest of the empire that the *Conselho* had envisioned."

At the same time, the Crown continued to send out additional manpower in the ships of the *Carreira* to supplement this new fighting force. Despite royal recognition of past problems, these *soldados* continued to be drawn from traditional sources: forcible recruitment of young peasant boys, "sturdy beggars" from the cities and villages, and convicts. The harsh justice of Old Regime Portugal ensured a steady supply of criminal-soldiers, many of whom received long sentences overseas in the various parts of the empire for a variety of minor and capital offenses. Orders generally went out to district judges or *corregidores da Comarca* in the weeks before the departure of the Indiamen, reminding them to round up and arrest likely victims for such service "not only ... such persons as live

to the prejudice and scandal of the common weal by committing crimes, but also those who live in idleness".⁴ While most of the manifests listing these *degradados* have not survived, it is likely that nearly every *Carreira* ship carried its quota of such recruits. An extant document from the ship *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda* under Chrisrovaio Ferrao de Casrelbranco, which left Lisbon in April 1669 and reached Goa in September of that year, provides a reasonable sample on the numbers of men, their crimes and royal sentences involved for this period. This *nao* carried 79 convicts to serve out their sentences as soldiers in the *Estado*. Table 6 provides details for all those with information on their crimes and sentences."

Table 6: Some Details on Degradados Aboard the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda, 1669

Name	Crime	Sentence	Other
1. Lranc. joao	Theft	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
2. Manoel Goncalves	Theft	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	Same Crime as #1
3. Joao Afonso Tello	Involvement in a death	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
4. Antonio Madureira	Street Theft	4 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
5. Manoel Dias	Adultery with Married Woman	10 years in India for Life in Brazil	
6. Luis Concalves	Involvement in a death	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
7. Manoel Furtado[?]	Fleeing with Woman	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	Woman from Brother's House
8. Lourenco Agosrinho	Theft	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
9. Francisco Fernandes	Various Street Thefts	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
10. Joao Rodrigues	Murder?	Life in India for Life in S. Tome	
11. Manoel Marcello	Murder?	Life in India for Life in S. Tome	Same Crime as #10
12. Marcos da Costa	Theft	6 years in India	
13. Antonio de Meduros	Theft	6 years in India	Same Crime as #12
14. Antonio da Silva	Murder	8 years in India	
15. Vliguel de Abreu	Involvement in a death	2 years in India for 5 in Brazil	
16. Domingos Antunes	Theft	8 years in India	
17. Antao Varciro	Murder	8 years in India	
18. Diogo Diaz	Murder	Life in India	
19. Roque da Costa	Adultery?	10 years in India	
20. Francisco Comes	Killing Father, other Crimes	Life in India	
21. Joao Tincao?	Many Crimes	Six Years	
22. Pedro Nogueira	Involvement in Murder	10 years in India	
23. Francisco Lourenco	Pirating Tobacco	2 years in India	
24. Manoel Machado	Pirating Tobacco	2 years in India	Same Crime as #23
25. Caspar Rodrigues	Pirating Tobacco	2 years in India	Same Crime as #23-24
26. Luis de Olincidade?	Murder, other Crimes	Life in India	
27. Miguel Fonseca	2 Murders	Life in India	
28. Domingos Alvarcs	Rape	10 years in India	
29. Domingos Francisco	Illegally Possessing Pistol	2 year in India	
30. Antonio Francisco	Many Crimes	10 years in India	
31. Francisco Nunes	Involvement in a death	2 years in India	
32. Joao Dias	General Lawlessness	3 years in India	

Table 6: Some Details on Degradados Aboard the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda, 1669 (continued)

Name	Crime	Sentence	Other
33. Francisco jorge	General Lawlessness	Life in India	
34. M. de Souza Salvado	Murder	Life in India	
35. Estevo Rodrigues	Many Crimes	2 years in India	
36. Father Luis da Silva	Many thefts from churches	Life in India	
37. Father joao da Motta	Various Crimes, Fleeing	Life in India	
38. Father M. Magalhaes	Various Crimes, fleeing	Life in India	
39. joao Frig. Semedo?	Sex with Sister-in-law, other	8 years in India	
40. jofio de Feiras	Theft	3 years in India	
41. Martin Troda..	Theft, other Crimes	Life in India	

Of these 79 convicts, crimes were listed for 41 or about half. Of the overall total, there were only four men sentenced from the privileged orders of Portuguese society: 1 noble, Manoel da Cunha; whose crime was not listed, and the 3 priests sentenced for theft, flight from authorities and other crimes. In an effort to bolster manpower for the *Estado*, 10 men had had longer sentences in Brazil commuted to service in Asia; another two had had life sentences in Sac Tome commuted to a similar term in the *Estado*. Theft, murder, and involvement in a wrongful death were the most common crimes. The harsh sentences for rape, fleeing with a woman, and adultery, are interesting for what they say about the moral tone of the times and societal views on women. The lack of more complete documentation makes it difficult to determine the number of such convict-soldiers that were sent out between 1668-1682. Nevertheless, at an average of even 60 *degradados* per royal *nao*, the number would approach more than 1000 for those years on *naos* alone. Whatever the precise number, there can be little doubt that this source of manpower continued to provide problems. As Boxer has noted, the regular importation of these criminals "aggravated an already difficult social situation." Pedro and his councilors at least tried to deal with the main military problem relating to the *degradados*. As early as April 1669, the Prince Regent had issued firm orders that all infantryman, as soon as they arrived in Goa, were to be put into the nearby forts of Panjim, Mormugao, Aguada, and Gaspar Dias where they were to be formed into companies. Special orders were also required before these recruits could visit the *Velha Cidade*, where most had traditionally deserted. This regular flow of *soldados*, and especially the formation of the new royal Terce, provided the Viceroyalty with a level of available manpower that had been badly lacking in the early and mid-recos."

The final years of the Dutch struggle had not only witnessed the grave disruption of the *Carreira* trade with Europe, with no ships reaching Lisbon or Goa for years at a time, it had also rendered the *fleer-cafalia* system largely ineffective. The costly peace with the United Provinces, the marginally pacific years that followed, and the ability to maintain relatively stable levels of revenue in the *Estado* allowed Sao Vicente and his successors to rejuvenate the armada system dispatched from Goa. Receipts from the *aliandega*, rents, tax-farms and other regular sources of income remained stable for most of the 17th century. In 1630, revenues for Goa and her dependencies had been 321,923 *xerafins*: in 1634, 3^o4,346 *xeratinis*: by 1680 that figure would rise to 359,579 *xeratinis*; and in 1687, 356, 310 *xerafins* would be collected." Whenever the huge extraordinary expenses associated with open warfare could be avoided, a healthy *saldo* or balance resulted since regular payments in salaries to the bureaucracy and clergy generally totaled c. 230,000 *xerafins*. Although extant *Orçamentos* or State Budgets evidently exist only for the years noted above, it nevertheless appears likely that favorable balances were the general rule from the late 1660s until at least the mid-1680s." In these circumstances, it was feasible to dispatch formidable fleets once again to the Straits as well as to Cambay and Kanara financed either with Treasury funds or alternatively through loans that could again be obtained from the leading merchants in Goa. As the *Monções* and Treasury Council records demonstrate, after a long lapse Straits fleets were sent out under D. Jeronimo Manoel, Antonio de Mello de Castro, and D. Hieronimo Manoel nearly every year between 1667-1680. Moreover, fleets to Cambay and Kanara were also sent out with regularity. After the dismal decade of 1652-1662, a respectable Portuguese force of arms had been re-established. As the Dutch Governor-General Johan Maetsuycker noted: "It seems the Portuguese are making serious efforts to regain their former reputation on the coast of India."⁴⁹

Another initiative undertaken, especially after 1668, was to restore a semblance of control over the outlying areas of the *Estado* that had largely fended for themselves during the final years of the Dutch struggle. The *contracto* system of auctioning off captaincies like Mozambique may have assured the Crown of a regular source of money and absolved it from burdensome bureaucratic expenses, but it had also resulted in the creation of petty fiefdoms for the contract holders, who frequently pursued policies at odds with the interests of the Crown. The great distances involved, poor communication, and lack of policing prowess on the part of the Viceroy allowed such actions to be undertaken with impunity by captains who believed that they could not or would not be held accountable for such actions. Perhaps the most infamous example of such abuses was the case of D. Francisco de Lima during his tenure as governor-cap-

tain of Mozambique from 1654-57. De Lima excelled in extorting huge bribes, protection monies, forced loans *et al.* from the merchant community in south east Africa, amassing a huge fortune in the process. Although he avoided any punishment for these crimes while in office, de Lima eventually died as a fugitive from justice in San Lucar in 1678, charged in the murder of the Marquis de Sande (1667). The reassertion of effective royal control over the dependent *fortalezas* was a necessary precondition to stabilizing the *Estado*, both economically and politically."

As an April 1662 letter made clear, Macau, located at the other geographic extreme of the empire, "so distant from this kingdom, and also from this State of India...and so surrounded by enemies," was indeed in dire straits." The loss of Melaka had exacerbated traditional communication problems between Goa and the remaining Crown holdings in China and the Lesser Sunda Islands. The loss of trade with Japan in 1640 had also forced Portuguese merchants in Macau to increasingly reorient their commerce toward Indochina, Macassar, Bantam, Solor, and Timor in the decades that followed, with the sandalwood trade between the islands and Macau yielding regular profits for many of the leading merchants there.² The struggle between Ming and Manchu and increasing monetary demands by the Chinese rendered the Portuguese foothold in Macau increasingly tenuous, especially during what Boxer has aptly described as the years of crisis from 1662-1666, when Ch'ing authorities at Canton seized 7 Portuguese country trader's vessels in 1663-64, and another 6 in 1666.³ The costs of the continental struggle with Spain and the overseas war with the Dutch at this same time meant that Macau was forced to fend for itself against this host of geo-political, economic, and military rivals with virtually no support from Lisbon or Goa. In fact: "The city only managed to save itself with a great loan from the king of Siam [at this time] that permitted it to pay the exorbitant sums demanded by the Mandarin Chinese.'" Although the extant records are scattered, it appears that not a single royal ship reached the Mandovi from Macau, nor departed for that fortresses between 1660-1666. The captaincy of the fort of Sac Paulo in the City of the Name of God of China, as Macau was called, remained vacant for a brief time, royal power was virtually non-existent, and the *casade* population had fallen to perhaps 1000 or so by 1669, half of what it had been in 1635.\

As early as April 1662, the Queen Regent had written to Antonio de Mello de Casarro, ordering him to keep communication open with Macau by "whatever means" possible and to keep the Crown informed of events there. Since priorities in Europe were draining the Crown's resources, the new Governor was instructed to meet any demands for assistance that were forthcoming." In a reply of December 1662, Mello de Casarro in-

formed D. Luisa of the recent attempt of the Dutch to sack the city; a plan that was only frustrated through a timely storm which had scattered the attacking fleet. The dearth of recent royal aid had forced private citizens in the city and others with a vested interest in the Far Eastern trade to shoulder the burden of defense. Likewise, the resourceful merchant-adventurer Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, based in the kingdom of Macassar, had provided money to hire infantry and the like for the defense of the Portuguese trade there; and partly as a result the VAC had broken with that king and had sought to have Crown's subjects expelled from Macassar. In the ensuing campaign, two Portuguese ships had been captured: one recently arrived from Macau on the way to Goa, and the other of private traders. Vieira de Figueiredo had also had a significant amount of capital and goods confiscated by the Dutch. Given his own problems in India and elsewhere, the Governor could only hope that word of a peace with the United Provinces at home would relieve the military situation in Macau and Indonesia and that until such a time, he ordered the Portuguese subjects in those areas "to continue with the same resolution in its defense".⁶

Other priorities in the *Estado*, however, ensured that the situation largely languished until January 1666, when Mello de Castro was at last able to dispatch the galleon *Sao Francisco* to Macau. The Viceroy ordered this ship to stop enroute at Timor, "which finds itself in great danger due to the revolts that the monks of Sao Domingos have made" against the *Capitdo-mor* there." In the first packet of dispatches sent out after the palace coup of late 1667, Pedro included a letter from Afonso to Sac Vicente that informed the Viceroy of the peace that had been reached with Spain as well as the fact that the Queen had left him and wanted to marry the Prince Regent. A significant point in this rather bizarre document is that both Afonso and Pedro, who ultimately signed the letter, were keen to dwell upon the positive advantages the peace would have for Macau since the agreement permitted official Portuguese trade from there to Manila.") In their reply of January 1669, Manuel Carte-Real de Sampaio and Antonio de Mello de Casto informed Pedro that Sac Vicente had been particularly keen to assist Macau. The late Viceroy had compiled a long *memoire* on the issue of the conservation of that *fortaleza* and had indeed sent the *Penha da Franca* to China and the Lesser Sunda Islands in April 1668 to provide assistance. This ship carried textiles, rice, tobacco and other supplies for Macau as well as some specie to assist the economic activities of the Crown in the Lesser Sundas.⁶⁰ The loss of hope for a Ming revival in China also prompted Sao Vicente to sanction the embassy of Manoel Saldanha to the Manchu or Ch'ing court of Emperor K'hang-hsi to Beijing (1667-1670):⁶¹ In 1669, two ships were sent to Macau on similar mis-

sions: the frigate *Nossa Senhora de Nazereth e Santo Antonio* under Captain-mar D. Antonio Misq.ta Pimental (January) and the frigate *Nossa Senhora do Sacramento do Carmo* (April). A new *capitao-geral* of Macau, D. Alvaro da Silva, had also been sent out to improve Crown authority there."

In February 1670, the Prince Regent lamented "the miserable state and great problems that one finds in the City of Machao by the lack of assistance in men, munitions, and foodstuffs", from Goa. While acknowledging the efforts of Mello de Castro and Nunes da Cunha, especially with Saldanha's embassy, to address these problems, Pedro ordered Mendonca Furtado to continue with and escalate such efforts given the great importance of this possession." In his March 1671 packet, the Prince Regent issued similar orders regarding Timor. A letter from Father Manoel Trindade had reached the Overseas Council regarding missionary activities in Indonesia, with special emphasis on the attempt to forward the interests of the Crown by converting local rajahs to Christianity. The Overseas Council had considered this and other relevant materials relating to Timor and Solar. Based on these discussions, Manoel Barreto de Sampayo, secretary of the *Conselho*, had compiled a letter on the "importance of the conservation" of forts in the Lesser Sunda Islands both "with respect to the propagation of the Faith, as from the [financial] benefits that will result for the vassals of this State and the conservation of the city of Macau". The new Viceroy was instructed to give "particular application and assistance to the conservation of these islands, encouraging the vassals who serve me there with all types of honors and favors". Good relations should also be sought with the *Reis Vizinhos*. Above all, Mendonca Furtado should strive to "give shape to the civil, military, and ecclesiastical government that is totally lacking" in those possessions."

In October 1671, Mendonca Furtado responded to these orders. The Viceroy promised to do everything he could in this matter, despite the extreme shortage of men and money that confronted him. In May of that year, two frigates under Manoel Cardozo and Hieronimo Correa de Mendonca had sailed for China loaded with muskets, gunpowder, other munitions, and a new Captain-general for Macau, Jorges Borges da Silva.' Moreover, Mendonca Furtado agreed that it was vital to conserve Timor for its commercial benefits, especially its traditional trading ties with Macau: "There is no doubt Senhor that it will be of great importance to conserve these islands as much for the benefit that Your Majesty's vassals can gain commercially, principally the city of Machao." The Viceroy's long experience, however, tempered his enthusiasm for this task. "There are so many problems with the officials and subjects in those parts, as much by the captains and representative of Your Majesty, as by

the Dominicans... the distance is great, and manpower small." While Mendonca Furtado agreed to do everything he could, past experience had shown that the Captains who served there had "their own interests" at heart and not the "reputation of the Crown". The "bad example and indignity provided by the clerics of the Dominican order," who had forsaken their duty to propagate the Faith in favor of private business activities and scandalous living habits only exacerbated these problems."

In early 1672, the Viceroy consulted with his council of State as well as the Treasury Council, and by early spring had formulated a policy to ideally rehabilitate the influence of the Crown in China and the Lesser Sundras. The Coa hierarchy had decided that it was vital to reestablish the traditional voyages from China to Manila and Indonesia undertaken at Crown expense, "that have been extinct for many years" (A new Captain of the voyages to Timor had been named: Joao Anrundes Portugal, a *idalgo da caza*, and he had sailed to Macau aboard the *Nossa Senhora da Guia* in May 1672. Portugal's ship earned munitions, naval riggings, and other supplies for the outpost. The *caraoella Bom Jesus da Trmdade* was also outfitted for the voyage to China at this same time.' The new Capram was ordered to stop at Macau and disembark these supplies before heading to Timor to oversee the traditional trade in sandalwood between the two *pracas*. To exploit the provisions of the recent treaty with Spain and further bolster Crown trade in the region, Mendonca Furtado appointed Antonio Misquira Pimental, another *idalgo da caza*, as Captain-general of the royal voyages between Macau and Manila. For the initial voyage, Pimental was expected to lease a ship in China. The Viceroy promised to provide a *nao* for ensuing voyages the following year. To ensure "good administration" over these voyages, Mendonca Furtado had appointed a smart *Junta* to oversee them. This *Junta* would monitor the outfitting of ships, be they royal or leased; set salaries for sailors and officers; establish liberty chest rules; either borrow money or invest profits as necessary; and report all information to the Treasury Council and *Vedor-geral* to allow *alimdegas* rights to be collected. To facilitate regular Crown voyages to Timor, a "person of trust and satisfaction would be nominated to serve as Treasurer of this trade route, who would likewise report to the *Conselho*"

Mendonca Furtado's flexibility in this quest for stability in the Far East was revealed in [1673, in the wake of the return of the *Born Jesus da Trmdade* from Macau and Timor." The situation in the Lesser Sunda Islands, like that in Macau, during the crisis years of c. 1650-1666, had witnessed the firm entrenchment of a local power elite made up of Portuguese *casadoes* and a mixed Eurasian clan system, known as *larantuqueiros* on Timor and Flores, especially in the principal towns of

Lifao and Larantuka.' The Viceroy had thought of sending out the *mestre de campo* of the new Goa *Terce*, Manoe! de Mello, as the new Captain-General of Timor. But news aboard the *Bom Jesus* convinced him to instead embrace the *de facto* Captain-general in Timor, Mattheus da Costa a "natural of those parts who occupies the post of Captain-major of those islands, is accepted by all, and proceeds well in the service of Your Majesty, seeking always to act in obedience to [you]". Da Costa clearly seemed to be someone that the Goa hierarchy might work with. Sending another rival Captain might "ruin everything and cause a great uprising in those parts, and lead to total ruin of the said populace". In these circumstances, Mendonca Furtado had chosen to confirm da Costa as *Capitdo-mor*. Antunes Portugal would remain as Captain-major of the voyages to Timor, and might fully expect the largesse of Da Costa, while Pimental would remain as Captain-major of the Manila voyages. As for Manoel de Mello, he would instead be appointed Admiral of the Straits Fleet.⁷²

Yet, the situation on Timor was a good deal more complex than Mendonca Furtado allowed in his letters of 1673. At that moment Da Costa, who died that same year, was still in the midst of a long civil war against a rival Eurasian clan headed by Antonio de Homay." While Mendonca Furtado certainly described the situation, and particularly Da Costa's virtues, in highly exaggerated and favorable terms to the Crown, it appears that the *quid pro quo* the Viceroyalty entered into with him, and thereafter with Homay, at least yielded tangible economic results. Despite persistent problems, regular voyages were indeed reestablished between Goa, Macau, and the Lesser Sundras during the 1670s. Ships including the *Santo Antonio e Almas Benditas*, *Nossa Senhora do Mar e Almas Benditas*, and *Santa Clara, Madre de Deus* all made the voyage." Misquira Pimental, meanwhile, strove to forge a regular legal trade between Macau and Manila as allowed by the treaty with the Habsburgs. Ironically, this enterprise was hindered by the lucrative profits that had been generated for private merchants and Crown officials alike in these ports by the flourishing illegal trade that had characterized the war years from 1640-1668. These men had little reason to cooperate in the establishment of a royal trade in which the Crown would derive the majority of the benefits, and therefore Misquira Pimental's task was far from facile." Nevertheless, the notable strides that were made with respect to reestablishing a regular commercial intercourse and permanent Crown authority in key outlying fortresses like Macau and Timor says much about the seriousness of the Lisbon hierarchy toward rehabilitating its interest in Asia and remedying the abuses of the preceding decades of crisis in the *Estado*.

Another key area of administrative reform during these years related to the resumption of regular royal fleets to enforce the *cartaz* system and, by extension, to ensure a continuous flow of *alfdndega* receipts, monies that furnished a majority of revenues for operating the *Estado*. During the late 1650s and early 1660s, the Straits fleet had very rarely sailed from the Mandavi. According to the Treasury Council records, it appears that the fleet to the North (Cambay) had been more regular, sailing in 166r, r663, and 1664.⁷⁶ The fleet to the South (Mala bar and Ceylon) had similarly managed to sail in r660, r662, and r664.⁷⁷ The financial and military demands on the *Pozenda*, however, guaranteed that all three had never been dispatched in the same year during this period. This state of affairs began to change in r667 with the arrival of Sac Vicente. Utilizing the funds accumulated by the wise fiscal management of the Mello de Castro years and borrowing some 102,000 *xerafine* from leading Christian merchants in Goa like Diogo Fonseca da Silva and joao de Prado, Nunes da Cunha outfitted and sent out all three." In late January of that year, an *armada do sui* of three ships under joao Sousa de Preire had sailed for Malabar carrying some 20,000 *xerafins* in textiles to be traded for pepper, cinnamon, and rice. That same month, the *armada do norte* under D. Ruy Gomes da Silva departed for Bassein. Finally in April 1667, a much desired renascent Straits fleet under D. jeroniruo Manoel and Joseph de Melto de Castro left for Hunnuz."

This powerful armada ushered in a period when the regular dispatching of the Straits fleet once again became the rule. As Sac Vicente and his successors in the Viceroyalty well recognized this fleet was not only important to enforce the *cartaz* system, it was also needed to offset the rising maritime power of the Omani Arabs in the Persian Gulf region and the Swahili coast of Africa, a shift in affairs that had been particularly worrisome to the Portuguese since the r650 loss of Maskat to the Sultan bin Saif al-Ya'rubi of Oman." The Straits fleet was also crucial, as the Treasury Council records admirably reflect, since this force usually carried the customs revenues from Bandar Kung to Goa. Since this post was one of the few possessions that consistently produced a sizable surplus of revenue for the Crown, the importance of such voyages can hardly be overestimated. In an average year c. 20,000-40,000 *xerofins* would be dispatched to Goa.⁸¹ As will be detailed below, Nunes da Cunha viewed the Straits fleet as not only a way to rejuvenate the waning military reputation of the *Estado* but also as a weapon for the Faith against the heathens and infidels of the Middle East and Asia. He therefore spared little expense in outfitting the initial five-ship armada of r667. It appears that the flagship of this fleet was the recently arrived *Santa Tbereza de Jesus*, with 56 guns, 86 sailors and 400 soldiers aboard. Five frigates: the *Nossa Senhora dos*

Millagres, the *Sac Joao Baptista*, the *Sao Pedro*, and *Nossa Senhora dos Remedies de Cassabe*, and the *Sac Salvador* completed the fleet."

The great preparations in the Mandovi in 1667 predictably attracted the attention of Portugal's European rivals in the trade. As the Surat Presidency informed the English Directors in March of that year: "There is arrived from Portugall in September past a new Viceroy to Goa, who hath busied himselfe ever since his coming in proxiding & setting forth a considerable fleet of Eight shippes & 40 [to] 60 small frigatts, with which he hath declared to goo himselfe in Person, but the Designe not certainly knowne."" Meanwhile, the Governor-General reported to Amsterdam: "It seems that the Portuguese are making serious efforts to regain their former reputation on the coast of India."" The **VAC** was sufficiently alarmed that their Director at nearby Vingurla kept a watchful eye on these preparations and secretly purchased purloined documents that were forwarded to Batavia in order to divine the likely destination that was mistakenly believed to be either Ceylon, Cochin or even Baravia! Although the Dutch combined the ships of the three fleets into one super-*armada*, their statistics provide valuable information on the firepower that Sao Vicente assembled in the first year of his tenure. According to these documents, between January and March 1667 some 20 ships were outfitted at Goa. These vessels, both *alto bordo* and *remo*, carried some 325 cannon, over 500 sailors, and more than 3200 soldiers."

The campaign to outfit regular fleets to the Straits, *norte*, and *sui* proved successful for at least the remainder of the 1670s. D. Jeronimo Manoel commanded a string of naval forces to Hurmuz during that time: a s-ship fleet in 1668, a o-ship fleet in 1669, a 7-ship fleet in 1670, as-ship fleet in 1673, and a c-ship fleet in 1674.⁸⁶ Antonio de Mello de Castro took an rr-ship fleet to the Straits in 1672.⁸⁷ As the Treasury Council *assentos* reflect, these fleets not only returned with badly needed specie from Persia, but many prizes that were judged to have violated the *cartaz* system were seized as well. The 1667 Straits fleet, for example, returned to Goa at the end of that year with 2 prize ships loaded with horses that were sold at public auction as well as gold and silver." The 1669 fleet also succeeded in inflicting a damaging defeat on the Sultan of Oman's navy, further rejuvenating the maritime reputation of the Portuguese." The 'fleet of the North' and *cailla* system also functioned well during these years. D. Ruy Gomes da Silva, Domingos Barreto, Andre Coutinho, and D. Manoel Lobo da Silva all commanded this fleet that departed nearly every year from Goa. Munitions of all types were usually carried on the outward voyage in search of interlopers, while textiles, specie, and prize ships were usually in evidence on the return leg to the Mandovi." The *sul* fleet also sailed most of the time during this period under commanders like joao

Sousa de Freire. This force was generally charged with arranging pepper and other spices for eventual transshipment to Lisbon via the *Carreira*, as well as rice for Coa." Much has traditionally been made of the inability of Goa to produce sufficient quantities of rice and the resulting dependence of the capital on imports." Nevertheless, it should be noted that shipments of rice were regularly made from the capital to outlying factories during these years, as the *Pazenda* records clearly indicate."

Perhaps the most difficult reforms to implement and enforce were those within the Crown bureaucracy itself. A myriad of crippling administrative problems existed relating to the *Fazenda*, the *Ribeira*, the *Casa da Polvora* and the *Rendas* at this time. A few days after Christmas 1664, Antonio de Mello de Castro wrote a long letter to Afonso VI outlining many of these problems. According to the Viceroy, "the origin of all the problems relating to the *Fazenda*" was that the traditional orders on this institution were not being followed. During the years of crisis immediately preceding his arrival, his predecessors had been very "careless" in this regard, harmful practices had become entrenched, and arranging a "solution" had thus become increasingly difficult. Among other things, the *regimento* governing the Treasury had evidently been hidden or destroyed, accounting had been lax at best with no books being kept on receipts and expenditures, and funds had been improperly allocated to places like China, Bengal, and Mozambique. As a result, sufficient funds had not been found in the *coire* to assist other key *pracas*, prepare the fleets, or defend the *Estado*. In an attempt to regularize receipts and expenditures, Mello de Castro had ordered that henceforth the *cofre* would be located in the *Collegio* of the Jesuits with three keys held: one by the *vedor-geral*, one by the *feitor* of Goa, and the third by the Viceroy, so that no one could spend Crown funds without proper authorization."

In April 1665, Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor responded to such complaints by endorsing Mello de Castro's actions, by ordering that regular account books once again be kept in the *Pazenda*, and by sanctioning severe punishments for any Crown ministers involved in crimes related to their offices." In response to a January 1664 letter from the *provedor-mor* of the *Caza dos Cantos*, complaining of a lack of experience and skill on the part of the *contadores* in the House, the Crown ordered that new regulations and examinations be implemented, a step that was in fact undertaken by Joao Nunes da Cunha in January 1667.⁹⁶ Another legacy of the crisis years relating to the *Pazenda* was addressed in 1670 when Pedro ordered that all outstanding Crown debts should be authenticated and registered by the *escritorio da [azenda]* and 3000 xeratsins per year allocated toward their repayment." finally, the 1670 death of Simao Falcao Sotto Mayor, longtime *provedor-mor* of the House of Accounts, allowed

Mendonca Furtado to appoint Dr. Lourenco de Azevedo Mora to this post in late 1671. The Viceroy had complete confidence "in the talent of this subject." He was educated, intelligent, experienced in business, and capable of righting the plethora of abuses in the *Fazenda* that had characterized much of the 1650s and early 1660s. This talent had been admirably demonstrated in Mora's initial months in office, when he had been able to quickly accumulate more than 40,000 *xerafins* in the Treasury, which Mendonca Furtado had devoted to founding the Royal Terce! The *provedor-mor's* subsequent acts in conjunction with those of the Viceroy and his Councils would no doubt result in the financial stability reflected in the *Crcamento* of 1680."

As Mello de Castro noted, great abuses had also developed in the royal *Ribeira* (Dockyards) at Goa, a huge complex along the Mandovi that included a carpentry house, a rope factory, a smithery, a coopers house, a gun foundry with three kilns and all the tools needed to cast cannon and mint currency. These problems ensured that the *Bibeira* had come to consume a great part of the *Fazenda* of the *Estado*. Above all, the *almoxerife* and other officials had avoided keeping receipt and expense books for the vast storehouses located along the Mandovi. As a result, receipts of as much as 20,000-30,000 *xeratins* had sometimes gone unrecorded and then disappeared. Another common abuse resulting from lax record keeping had been for the *almoxerife* and his assistants to both overcharge for and underdeliver the goods paid for, keeping the balance for themselves. The *mestre* and constable-major of the *Ribeira* had also skimmed materials and profits from Crown contractors, especially those supplying wood. Since these same officials had not been required to sign receipts for the materials they took from the storehouses, theft was rampant. The arms storehouses were also in a lamentable state: the roofs leaked badly during the monsoon, causing significant losses, and the cannonballs were not stored efficiently according to caliber, causing long outfitting delays. Moreover, an accurate list of the number and caliber of artillery pieces in the forts of Coa did not exist. Mello de Casrro also complained of the long-standing practice of covering the decks of the ships at anchor during the monsoon with palm fronds. Water still leaked in, which in conjunction with the great humidity of that season caused the wood to rot quickly, damage that had to be repaired each fall. The hot tropical sun also dried these fronds out quickly, even during the monsoon, and fires frequently resulted."

Mello de Castro undertook reforms to remedy these abuses in the *Ribeira*, measures that were supported by the Lisbon hierarchy. Among other things, this Viceroy ordered that precise ledgers on receipts and expenditures would henceforth be kept and rhar formal, signed receipts

would be provided for all materials taken from the storehouses and armouries. To reduce repairs on "wintering" ships in the Mandavi, the custom of using palm fronds for coverings would ideally be abandoned in favor of cloth that had been water-proofed with tar and pitch. The Viceroy also cracked down on the harmful practice of allowing royal artillery to be used on private merchant ships.: "Mello de Castro also went to great lengths to prevent the very capable *mestre da Ribeira*, Francisco Goncalves, from returning to the *Reino* in 1666. In the Viceroy's view, there was "not another man in India that will be able to fill his shoes, and that we would lose totally the ability to build ships in this State, if [he] is removed from it".³⁰¹ Another vexing issue relating to the *Ribeira* focused on the question of what to do with royal ships serving in the *armadas* once they were no longer seaworthy. Although a decree of March 16, 1613 had ordered that unserviceable *navios de remo* should be burned in the Mandavi, larger ships were not covered by this law. As the Treasury Council records reflect, Mello de Castro and his successors, with Pedro's approval, continued what had become the *de facto* policy in Goa: stripping and selling such ships at public auction with the profits being used to finance the trade in rice with Kanara, textiles with Cambay, and other state projects."

The situation at the *Casa da Polvora*, the gunpowder factory near Ribandar whose grinders sometimes produced 800 lbs. of this commodity a-day in the mid-1640s, was hardly more commendable than at the *Ribeira* at the outset of the 1660s. As Mello de Castro lamented, "Your Majesty has great abuses... because the people by whose hands one receives and expends are accustomed to dealing more in their own interest than in the Service of Your Majesty". Bookkeeping at the royal factory along the banks of the Mandavi was indeed a rarity. Saltpeter was also purchased at greatly inflated prices by the officials of the gunpowder factory. This vital commodity was frequently mixed with salt and sand, both before and after it reached the *Casa*. At times, this diluted saltpeter contained perhaps a third of the pure product that had originally been contracted and paid for, while the rest was stolen. The Viceroy sought to improve the situation there by cracking down on corruption and by introducing new production methods to the factory." As a letter from Manoe! Salgado, the *provedor* of the *Caza* and Francisco da Silva, the *mestre da caza* reveals, Mello de Castro, despite his unpleasant voyage to India aboard English ships, had been sufficiently impressed to bring in new engineers for the *Caza*, including an Englishman to introduce more efficient techniques in manufacturing the gunpowder."

A January 1666 letter from Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor sanctioned this work and instructed Sao Vicente to continue it both by eradicating

any remaining "thefts and abuses" and by embracing the more efficient production methods of their European rivals at the old factory and perhaps even by building a new factory." As Nunes da Cunha was forced to admit, however, while the former charge was possible, the later had been complicated by the defection of the new English engineer to the "land of the Moors", where his skills had no doubt yielded more lucrative rewards! Nevertheless, this Viceroy had committed himself toward producing quality gunpowder in the old factory by traditional methods in as efficient manner as possible in order to assist the vital work of the *armadas*. A new factory would have to await new engineers and, more importantly, fuller state coffers." In March 1671, Pedro further solidified matters in the *Caza* by finally sending out a highly qualified *polvarista* aboard the fleet of Christovao Ferrao de Castelbranco. This engineer first examined the extant stocks of gunpowder in Mozambique and then assumed the position of *mestre polvarista* of the Goa factory, where his expertise evidently yielded favorable results for the remainder of the decade."

Dealing with abuses in the royal tax-farms or *rendas* should remind us that the administrative reforms heretofore discussed affected overwhelmingly *only* the Portuguese hierarchy itself, Portuguese subjects in the Asian possessions, and those indigenous Christians living under European law. Although population figures are sparse and inexact, these groups probably did not total more than c. 50,000 or so in the late seventeenth century. Moreover, this number constituted perhaps only 20% of those living within Portuguese domains. Therefore, the vast majority of the king's "subjects" in the *Estado* were allowed to live according to their customary laws." Beginning with Albuquerque, the Portuguese had wisely sought to utilize and exploit extant indigenous structures to their advantage, for both logistical and financial reasons. In Goa, for example, local village community organizations had been allowed to flourish. Village councils or *ganvkari* made up of representative headmen or *ganvkars* of the various clans or *vangads*, along with the district headmen (*thanadars*), exercised a wide variety of powers, especially in local matters." It was only in matters of revenue collection and "certain judicial cases, or law and order problems which the village administration was unable to cope with," that a branch of the Crown machinery of a "link organization" existed." While the *Yedor-geral da [azenda*, the *procurador da Coroa* and military captains of Bardez, Salsette, and Tisvaldi ultimately protected the Crown's fiscal, proprietary, and military interests, the actions of these officers rarely impacted on the daily life of the peasants, fishermen, and others in the villages once the basis *quid pro quo* between conqueror and conquered had been established in the early reth century. The resiliency of

indigenous structures, therefore, demonstrated itself throughout the years of Portuguese dominion in Asia."

The Portuguese also discovered that indigenous capital and expertise could not only be utilized to ensure the regular flow of revenue from local villages into royal coffers, but that Hindu merchants and businessmen could also play a vital role in the commercial and tax-farming sectors of the imperial economy. In recent decades, much has been made of the vital economic role of such merchants in the economy of the *Estado*. Scammell, De Souza, and Pearson have all argued in one fashion or another for indigenous *dominance* over the Goan and imperial economy with "by far the best evidence," found in the *Renda* records." As in early modern Europe, the Portuguese Crown embraced a tax-farming system in its Asian empire. These *rendas* were farmed out to the highest bidder (with a guarantor and deposit of surety) for a usual term of three years on everything from custom duties to taxes on the sale of official paper, spices, cloths, betel-nut, and tobacco. According to Pearson's estimates, between 1600-1670 *rendas* averaging 344,400 *xerafins* (=300 reis) a year were let out, with 80% of the people holding these *rendas* Hindu (62.7% of these held by Saraswar Brahmins according to names), and the other 20% were farmed out to Christians. In terms of overall value, Hindus held 65.2% (Saraswars 69% of Hindu total and 44.9% of overall total) and Christians 34.8%." The significance of these figures for the historiography is apparently definitive: Hindus and especially Saraswat Brahmins dominated the economic life of the *rendas*, ergo Hindu merchants must have played a dominant role in the economy of Portuguese Asia. But is it as simple as this?

The extant documentation for the 17th century tells us two things about the *rendas*: (1) that the issue of indigenous dominance may not be as clear cut as has recently been suggested; and (2) that grave problems in fact existed within the entire system that were only addressed in the late 1660 and 1670s. The recent historiography is no doubt correct in maintaining that indigenous merchants played an *important* role in the economy of the *Estado*. As noted above, the Portuguese logically sought to exploit local expertise, wealth, and connections and were frequently willing to forego official legislation and royal decrees on all such matters in the quest for material wealth. Hindu and Jain merchants living both inside and outside the territorial confines of the *Estado* also possessed great wealth and were capable of exerting a profound influence on the coastal trade, especially along the western coast of India between Goa and the Province of the North. On this point, we need only consider the contemporary evidence of no less an authority than Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque: "All the merchants of Europe combined do not have the capital of

any of these Hindus that are called Rich... [who] dominate the trade of all the ports of India."⁴ Nevertheless, any assertion for indigenous *dominance* is based on very shaky documentary evidence. There are, for example, virtually no *al(lindegas)* records for Goa for the 17th century. Data on cargoes for the official Crown trade is also sparse and widely scattered. Only recently has it been possible to compile reasonable figures on the *Carreira da Índia* for the period 1668-1680 based on scattered and rather sparse documents from Goa, Lisbon, and Évora." As for the yearly Budgets or *Orçamentos* of the *Estado*, there is a gap from 1634 until 1680, and not more than a half-dozen extant for the entire 17th century. More disturbing is the fact that virtually no documentation exists for the private trade between Goa, Europe, and the rest of the Asian empire during the 17th century. This trade, in terms of volume and value, was probably far more important than the official Crown trade.

Moreover, the very nature of the *rendas*, that is to say the tedious process of collecting these *local* taxes, lent itself to the utilization of indigenous merchants more commonly than virtually any other sector of the colonial economy. These records, therefore, provide data on a segment of the colonial economy that would almost invariably reflect a larger degree of indigenous involvement than almost any other sector. Pearson's figures showing that 80% of the *renda* holders were Hindus, controlling 65.2% of these taxes by value, therefore may suggest a far larger degree of indigenous involvement in the colonial economy than in fact may have been the case. We should also note that such a system also facilitated the process whereby the Crown could increasingly integrate local indigenous merchants into the colonial system, providing them with a relatively lucrative vested interest in the continuance of that system. At this same time, Pedro was in the midst of utilizing a similar methodology in the *Reino* to attach the nobility to such a State by providing lucrative offices at home and in the *imperio*:"

An examination of the relevant codices also reveals that the Crown usually reserved what could be considered the most important *rendas* for itself or Christian bidders; that is to say the custom revenues of Goa, Cochin (until 1663), and the ports of the Province of the North. This suggests that even within the rather narrow limits of the *rendas*, the Crown attempted to maintain a degree of control over the key links in the colonial economy. The Crown also made sure that the most lucrative *rendas* that were actually farmed out were almost always granted to Portuguese or, less frequently, local converts, evidence that seems to bolster the argument for effective centralized control. Thus we find that the increasingly lucrative and important tobacco *renda* for Goa was farmed out from 1663 until 1692 to either Portuguese *casados* like Francisco Lopes (1663-1667, at

between 25,500-26,700 *xerafins* a year) and Thomas Vaz (1667-1668, at 26,700 *xerafins* a year) or converts like Joseph de Miranda (1668-1671?, at 22,200 *xerafins* a year) and Antonio de Miranda (1689-1695?, at between 33,000 *xerafins* and 33,650 *xerafins* a year}." According to Pearson's estimates, this *renda* alone would have constituted nearly 10% of the average yearly tax-farming *rorals*."

Whatever the priorities of contemporary historians regarding the exact role of indigenous merchants in the imperial Portuguese economy, it is clear that in the 1670s the Crown not only strove to ensure that Portuguese or Christian converts held the most important *rendas*, but also undertook badly needed reforms for a system that had been undermined by abuse in the 1650s and early 1660s. Antonio de Mello de Castro first complained of serious abuses in the system in late 1664. In order to raise the bond of surety, sometimes 25% of the total, *rendeiros* would frequently "sell" property to associates at inflated prices with the understanding that it would later be "resold" with monies raised from the *renda*. The Crown had also been very lax in examining the *bens* of these guarantors for many of the *rendas*, "accepting any dreg", for this vital function, a practice that placed the interests of the *fazenda* at risk. *Renda* holders, moreover, had frequently collected taxes far in excess of their bids and had reaped notable profits on this practice." In June 1664, these abuses, the lost revenues that resulted to the Crown, and the need for the *Estada* to contribute c. 120,000 *cruzados* each year for the *donatio* for the peace with Holland had prompted Antonio de Mello de Castro to suspend the increasingly important tobacco *renda* and substitute a fixed per diem tax *far* each couple in its place." Although Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor had accepted this experiment, a plan that would ideally yield some 100,000 *cruzadoes* per year to the Treasury, it was abandoned by Sac Viceroy in 1667 as unworkable."

Afonso also accepted Mello de Castro's recommendations on cleaning up other abuses in the system. In February 1666, he ordered that a new office be created where all property deeds had to be registered within three days of any transaction in order to be valid." In a January 1667 letter, Nunes da Cunha pointed out that such an office would be redundant since the existing financial structure could implement such a policy, provided it was well administered, a goal he promised to achieve. At the same time, Sac Viceroy began to levy controversial *propinas* or fees on the *rendas* that benefited himself as well as ministers of the *fazenda*." In March 1669, Pedro responded to many of these same problems by echoing the sentiments of his brother: henceforth the *regimento* on the *rendas* would be scrupulously enforced, all guarantors would be examined, all deeds would not only be registered and notarized but approved by the

Procurador da Coroa:" The following January, Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampayo informed the Prince that to achieve the desired results, the *Procurador's* powers over the entire system should be increased. The Governors also pointed out that the 9% *propinas* introduced by Nunes da Cunha, fees that were to be shared by the Viceroy, the *Vedor-geral* and the ministers of the Treasury Council, would proportionally reduce *renda* yields. Although this prediction had been challenged by the officials involved, since it would ideally affect only those *rendas* which were farmed out at an increased rate, there can be little doubt that this sizable charge had a somewhat chilling effect on the *renda* market."

The issue of the *propinas* had been addressed by Pedro, his councils, and Mendonça Furtado in 1671. In April of that year, Pedro had found these fees to be "in opposition to my orders, and as such prejudicial to my *fazenda*". In a strongly worded letter to the Viceroy, he had therefore ordered that "neither you, nor any minister of my *fazenda*," would either levy or accept them. In fact, Mendonça Furtado was ordered to compile a list of those *propinas* that had been collected since 1667 so that they might be registered in the *livros* of the Treasury." Before he had even received these instructions from Lisbon, the astute Lavradio had gauged the negative impact of the *propinas* on Crown receipts. He had provisionally ordered his ministers to refuse to accept these monies, which totaled some 15,500 *xerafins* for the period involved, and informed all *rendeiros* that this fee would instead be applied to the *rendas* involved. In October 1671, the Viceroy informed Lisbon that this action had "resulted in a considerable increase in the *rendas* that in this short time had been farmed out". He reiterated that the 15,500 *xerafins* collected from January 1668 on had adversely affected the tax-farming market. "It is certain that Your Majesty has in your Treasury less money since the *rendeiros* bid in this time as merchants in the tax-farms with attention to the expense of the *propinas*, which when halted increased as I have informed Your Majesty." In the future, such practices would not be allowed, since "one finds Senhor, this empire in a state in which it cannot suffer these abuses in the royal treasury". It was vital that not only for the Viceroy, but all of his ministers and officials to have "the greatest care," in their behavior in order for the *Estado* to survive."

Overall, the late 1660s and 1670s witnessed a notable effort by the Crown and its representatives in Asia to effect badly needed reforms in an imperial system that had been largely allowed to atrophy in the crisis years after 1640. As Diogo do Couto had noted a century earlier, the *Estado* could always run profitably if it were administered properly. In addition to seeking meaningful reforms with this seminal goal in mind, there is evidence to suggest that efforts were made to appoint truly quali-

fied people to key offices in the eastern empire, a practice that had not always been adopted over the years. The best evidence that this criteria was utilized in these years was the appointment of the extremely capable and experienced Luis de Mendonca Furtado to the Viceregal post at a crucial period in the *Estado*'s history, and convincing him to remain in that capacity for two terms. Lavradio in turn demonstrated a fierce desire to advance the interests of the Crown by appointing men of similar backgrounds to other key positions in Asia. For example, in October 1673 he resisted the appointment of Manoel Mendes Henriques, "an entirely ordinary man", who had made his money in a shady fashion in Maskar and Bandan Kung, to a position in either the fazenda or the judiciary." About that same time, he complained bitterly to Lisbon about the appointment of Joao Correa de Sa, "who has no service in India", as general of the Straits fleet, and sought to mitigate this by selecting well qualified captains for the 5 ships." In December 1674, Mendonca Furtado also complained about the appointment of "various subjects, who are not capable of serving in the most minor infantry company," to captaincies of fortresses and the harm that resulted. Lavradio asked that in the future the Viceroys might have to discretion to examine all candidates and make a final decision in such cases."

A brief examination of some of the information provided in the extant *orcamentos* or state budgets from the 17th century as contained in Table 6 tells us much about the success of these reform efforts of the late 1660s and 1670s and the continued viability of the *Estado*:"

Table 6: (R)ceipts, (E)xpenditures, and (B)alances for the Estado (in xerafins)

Estado	Receipts	Expenditures	Balance
1630	801,992	960,172	-158,180
1634	1,185,164	1,115,455	+69,809
1680	731,818	454,663	+171,164
Goa/Depend.			
1630	321,923	409,232	-87,309
1634	304,346	339,414	-35,078
1680	359,579	111,485	+148,094

These figures, and especially the totals for 1680, demonstrate that whenever wise administrative policies were undertaken and overweening extraordinary military expenses were avoided, as was indeed the case from c. 1665-1682, the *Estado* remained both viable and profitable. The Viceroy could be assured of relatively stable revenues from Goa and her dependencies, usually c. 340,000 *xerafins* a year, for the entire 17th century. The revenues for the *Estado* as a whole also remained generally stable: 801,992 *xerafins* in 1630, 731,828 *xerafins* in 1680, a figure that is even more impres-

sive when one considers that a *Junta* run Mozambique was not included in the totals for this *orcamenta*. This stability in receipts shows that the sources of regular revenue the Portuguese had established in the empire: customs duties, taxes, rents, tribute *et at.* remained relatively secure despite the military, dynastic, and administrative chaos that characterized these years in Europe and ASia. When the Crown and its representatives devoted sufficient attention to governing and exploiting the eastern possessions, as was indeed the case during the late 1660s and 1670S, and ill-advised warfare was avoided, the *Estado da India* therefore remained a viable and significant force in the Indian Ocean basin.

VI

Foreign Policy: Diplomatic Relations with the *Reis* *Vizinhos* and European Rivals, 1640-1683

By the year 1662, the Portuguese Crown and its servants had maintained diplomatic relations with various indigenous kingdoms in Asia for more than 150 years. During that time, the nature of these relationships had varied widely depending on time and place: open and aggressive bellicism, mutual peaceful respect, and diplomatic fawning in the quest for favorable trading concessions. Relations with European rivals in the Indian Ocean dated in earnest only to the initial decade of the 17th century when the agents of the **Ele** and **vac** had arrived in search of their own share of the spices and riches of the Asian maritime trade. It is interesting to note that Portugal's experiences with her European competitors had been every bit as contentious as with the Asian states they had encountered in the initial decades of the 17th century. The Protestant Reformation had even guaranteed that the zealotry of the religious crusade against Islam could, to a degree, be continued against these heretic merchant adventurers of northern Europe. Overall, however, open warfare had characterized a good deal of the history of the *Estado*. The Portuguese Crown, as a legacy of the *reconquista* against Islam and the cultural norms of the late medieval and early modern state had predictably embraced armed force as a crucial aspect of its foreign policy and economic system since the days of Albuquerque.'

It was perhaps fitting then, that as Antonio de Mello de Castro anchored near Bombay in the fall of 1662 aboard Marlborough's fleet he would be confronted with the final chapter of the long story of Dutch aggression against the *Estado* which had characterized much of the 17th century. In the wake of successfully expelling the Portuguese from Melaka, Ceylon and elsewhere, the **vac** extended its campaign to the pepper rich Malabar coast of India and the remaining *Estado* fortresses on that coast: Cannanore, Cranganor, and Cochin. Rijckloff Van Goens, the capable and bellicose Governor of Ceylon had taken a powerful fleet to Malabar in late 1661. This force quickly captured Quilon and Cranganor and soon thereafter appeared before Cochin and Cannanore, intent on reducing these remaining Portuguese strongholds on this pepper rich coast.' In the years that followed, the Crown and Viceroyalty would be confronted with daunting diplomatic challenges on how to meet such military as well

as geopolitical and economic attacks. In the late 1660s and early 1670s, the Portuguese once again had to face the eternal question of their Asian experience: to fight or not to fight in order to protect and advance their interests? This complex issue confronted them not only with respect to their European rivals but also a host of indigenous kingdoms throughout maritime Asia known as the *Reis Vizinhos* or neighboring kings. Before examining the specific decisions embraced by the Crown and its servants in Asia during this crucial period, it is useful to provide historical background on some of these powers and their relations with the *Estado* during the 17th century.

The most formidable indigenous military power that the Portuguese at least potentially confronted for much of the 16th and 17th centuries was the Mughal empire, the powerful Muslim state that dominated much of north central India and which under the emperor Aurangzeb was poised to extend that power to the Deccan and the south. These areas had indeed witnessed much warfare since the decline of the once flourishing Hindu empire of Vijayanagar in the mid-15th century, with relatively large and powerful Muslim sultanates like Bijapur and Golconda as well as a host of petty Hindu principalities vying for power in that region. Moreover, while the Maratha revolt of Shivaji was still in its initial stages in the mid-17th century, this movement would eventually come to pose a threat to the entire subcontinent.¹ Portuguese relations with the Mughals dated from c. 1573 when Akbar annexed Gujarat to the empire. Relations between this emperor and the *Estado* were generally cordial. Akbar allowed the Portuguese to remain at Daman in his Gujarat *subah*, he promised not to harbor the Malabar pirates, he also agreed to merely one *cartaz* free pilgrimage voyage to the Red Sea a year, and invited the Jesuits to reside at his court and encouraged their proselytization. For their part, the Portuguese recognized both the formidable military might of the Mughal as well as the pivotal economic importance of the province of the North and fortresses like Diu, Daman, and Bassein to the *Estado*. Not surprisingly, therefore, they sought to cultivate pacific relations with him.²

Akbar's death in 1605, coinciding with the formation of the rival Dutch and English East India Companies and their arrival in Asia, had ushered in a period of more strained relations between the two powers. Jahangir (1605-1627) and Shah Jahan (1627-1658) both sought to utilize these European rivals as a counter-weight to the erstwhile power of the *Estado*. Despite fierce opposition from Portuguese agents at Agra, favorable *farmans* had been granted for factories and commercial activities in places like Surat that threatened to undermine the hitherto unassailable position of the Portuguese in the rich trade in textiles and indigo of Gujarat. At times, the Viceroyalty had resorted to force to oppose such actions, including

the seizure of Mughal shipping, and open warfare had resulted. In 1613, for example, Daman had been besieged by land. The threat of English or Dutch seapower being exploited to complement such actions thereafter convinced the Crown to pursue more measured policies with respect to the Mughals, and the emperor's ships were frequently allowed to sail from Gujarat without *cartazes*, provided custom duties were paid at Daman. Nevertheless, Shah jahan's reign had also witnessed rocky relations between the two powers. The strategic post at Hughly in Bengal had been overrun and captured in 1633, nominally to punish the assistance the *Estado* had provided to Bijapur in its own struggle with the Mughals.'

Moreover, in 1636, Shah jahan conquered the sultanate of Ahmadnagar. This victory ended the rule of the Nizam Shahi line and absorbed a traditional buffer state that had demonstrated a long-standing tendency to favor the interests of the Portuguese in the search for allies against the Mughals. This act and the defeat of the ruler of Ramnagar at about this same time not only placed Daman at permanent risk, but it had also forced the Portuguese there to pay a contribution or *chauth* to Agra, hitherto owed to Ramnagar. In 1658, the zealous Aurangzeb had captured the Peacock throne after a bloody succession war that had witnessed the imprisonment of his father, Shah jahan, and the defeat of his brother Dara Shukoh. The mercurial Aurangzeb was committed to the long-held desire of his predecessors to extend their power throughout the Deccan and the south. Aurangzeb also wanted to spread a "pure" form of Islam in the process. Both these goals obviously posed a very real threat to the continued viability of the *Estado*, especially in its crisis years of the late 1650s and early 1660s. The Viceroyalty was therefore forced to tread a very dangerous line in their relations with Agra when Mello de Casro reached India. Fortunately, this Viceroy and his successors would receive unexpected assistance in the form of the Maratha threat under Sivaji during these same years. This revolt served to distract the full weight of Aurangzeb's might from the Crown's possessions, especially in the province of the North. Unfortunately, the Marathas would prove to be a formidable danger in their own right:

As an examination of the Monsoon Books reveals, it was common practice for the Viceroys and Governors to devote at least one letter in each packet sent to the *Reino* to matters relating to the *Reis Vizinhos*.' These letters, when combined with the extant correspondence with the neighboring kings, provide a relatively complete picture of the foreign policy pursued by Goa with respect to the *Reis Vizinhos*.' Given the extreme demands placed upon Mello de Castro from the day of his arrival, most particularly news of Van Gocns's marauding fleet on the Malabar coast, it is not surprising that the new Governor could not immediately

devote much time to matters regarding the *Reis Vizinhos*, including the Mughal empire. In January 1664, Mello de Casarro compiled his first major letter to the Crown on this issue. Among other things, he outlined the huge extent of the empire, "beginning at the frontier with Persia and extending until Bassein," and what he perceived as a growing threat to the *Estado*, Aurangzeb's victory in the succession struggle boded ill for the Portuguese in the Governor's eyes since this prince was "our great enemy, and he has the special desire to conquer our fortresses in the North". As evidence of this antipathy, Mello de Castro noted that a Mughal army had entered the lands near Bassein the previous September "and caused damage in our villages". He sent Luis de Miranda Henriques with 10 ships and 300 troops to assist that fortress. These reinforcements had convinced the Mughals to stop their hostilities and ask for peace, a course the Governor favored since "it is incredibly difficult to carry on warfare in those parts where his [Aurangzeb's] power makes it impossible to defend". Mello de Castro noted that rumors of Aurangzeb's death had reached Goa, but proffered that such reports had neither certainty or even probability."

For the remainder of the 1660s and throughout the 1670s, the Viceroyalty was nevertheless able to maintain the relatively shaky peace that Mello de Castro arranged with Aurangzeb's envoys at Bassein in 1664. In letters of 1665 and 1666, the Viceroy noted that although no further moves had been made on the province of the North, the fact remained that the Grand Mughal still desired "our lands". The primary reasons that Aurangzeb did not act on such impulses were the emperor's preoccupation with Shivaji and the Maratha uprising, which had enjoyed a notable success in the 1664 sacking of Surar, as well as his escalating campaign against Bijapur that would eventually culminate in the capture of that sultanate in 1686. In addition to these growing distractions, the emperor also recognized that the Portuguese posed no threat to him on land and could thus not significantly complicate his escalating problems in Gujarat and the Deccan. Moreover, as past diplomacy had demonstrated, the more European powers vying for his largesse the better. All the same, Aurangzeb respected the continuing reputation of the Portuguese high seas fleet, especially off the coasts of Gujarat, and he continued the practice of purchasing *cartazes* from them throughout this period. As for Goa, while periodic incursions into the neighborhood of the province of the North were disquieting, they were far preferable to open warfare on land against the huge Mughal army."

The extant *Reis Vizinhos* correspondence focuses largely on these themes and issues. In January 1666, for example, Mello de Castro noted that Aurangzeb continued to be preoccupied with revolt of Shivaji as well

as problems with Bijapur. These military endeavors had continued to distract the Mughal emperor from any advances against the *Estado*. However, the chaos engendered by these struggles exposed fortresses from Diu to San Theme to eventual attack, certainly a tenuous state of affairs in some of these outlying posts given the fact that "nothing more is necessary to destroy us [there] than deny us provisions." Letters from Sac Vicente and Manoel Carte Real de Sampayo and Antonio de Mello de Castro in 1668 and 1670 reiterated this same state of affairs. In the course of the warfare with Shivaji, Aurangzeb's armies had briefly entered the neighborhood of Bassein. Nonetheless, the emperor continued to seek a *cartaz* for one ship a year to sail to Mecca, paying 1200 *xerafins* for this ship as well as much more for the ships of his vassals to make the same voyage.¹² In his letters from 1671-1674, Luis de Mendonca Furtado noted that Aurangzeb had committed to maintaining the peace through envoys to Bassein, and additionally purchased *cartazes* for passages to Surat.¹³ For the remainder of the 1670s and into the 1680s, the fragile peace with Aurangzeb endured. On one hand, this arrangement continued thanks to the Muslim emperor's continuing problems in Gujarat and the Deccan; at the same time escalating foreign policy problems for the *Estado* also contributed to this state of affairs. In short, neither power could afford additional enemies. The recognition of this indisputable fact in Agra and Goa ensured pacific relations between the two states.

As T.R. de Souza has noted, long-standing cultural, linguistic, and religious ties linked the indigenous community of Goa with the Marathas far in advance of their eighteenth century revolt against the Mughals.¹⁴ In 1636, Shivaji's father, Shahji Bhosle, had requested assistance from the Portuguese in his struggle with Shah Jahan and Adil Shah of Bijapur. The Viceroyalty may have refused military assistance, but it at least offered refuge for his family. In the years that followed, the Portuguese had initially looked with great favor upon the rise of Maratha power as a counterweight to the Mughal threat. As long as their activities were confined to the Deccan and away from the fortresses of the *Estado* great praise could be heaped upon Shivaji's successes and heroic exploits in defying the Mughals. By the late 1650s, however, these victories brought the Maratha leader much closer to the holdings of the *Estado*. Between 1657-1659 Shivaji added much of the north Konkan to his possessions. His rivalry with the Siddi of Danda and his plans to express his power by also constructing a navy were more than sufficient to engender a careful reevaluation of the merits of the Maratha revolt in Coa.¹⁵ Given the sparse resources of the *Estado* during these years, and its host of other military commitments, the Viceroyalty could do little more than adopt a policy of superficial friendliness and *sub rosa* obstructionism with regard to the

Marathas. In point of fact, their best diplomatic hope in the years immediately preceding Mello de Castro's arrival was that Aurangzeb and Shivaji would remain so obsessed with their campaign against one another that they would both ignore the extremely vulnerable possessions of the *Estado* on the west coast of India."

For most of the 1660s and 1670s, the *Estado* was able to maintain relatively peaceful relations with Shivaji, despite vastly different opinions among the Goa hierarchy on the best policy to pursue with respect to this threat. Fortunately, the Maratha leader frequently had more pressing problems than dealing with the Portuguese. In the view of Antonio de Mello de Casro, Shivaji was a practical leader who would listen to reason. In January 1664, the Viceroy believed an agreement was possible that would safeguard the possessions in the North, especially since Shivaji had recently "not shown us bad intentions". After sacking Surar in that year, the great Maratha leader may have entered the province of the North, but he had left without causing great harm and passed instead to the territories of Aurangzeb." During this period, however, the Portuguese also sought to retard Shivaji's advances toward their territories by supplying the Siddi of Danda, the *desais* of Kudal, Pernem and Bicholim, and Aurangzeb's general Mirza Raja jai Singh with weapons and other succor." While Sac Vicenre focused his foreign policy energies on issues regarding the straits of Hurmuz and the Omanis, Shivaji exacted revenge for this assistance to his enemies by invading Bardes in November 1667, raking some booty, men, and oxen before being expelled."! Carte-Real de Sarnpayo and Mello de Castro had subsequently taken a more jaded view of the Maratha leader's exploits. Shivaji may have conquered most of the Konkau, but in doing so he had usurped "the rights that belong to others, by which the inhabitants received the greatest vexation". Moreover, by these conquests, he had become an incredibly bad neighbor to the *Estado* who could not be trusted. "He is inconsistent in whatever he promises, and when he shows friendship, even then it is necessary to have the greatest caution!" As a result, the Council had done its utmost to reinforce the fortresses along the northern border of Bardes, especially after the Marathas again threatened Bardes and Salsette in 1668."

Luis de Mendonca Purrado was also wary of the growing power of the Maratha leader on the Konkani coast south of Chau. His rising maritime ambitions posed a direct threat to the naval pretensions of the *Estado* as well as to those of the Dutch, English, and French, who were all established in factories at Surar and elsewhere along the Bay of Carnbay. As the Viceroy noted: "When I reached this *Estado*, I found Sivaji, rebel vassal of the king Idalxa [Bijapur] so arrogant, and mighty as any of the *Reis Vizillhos*, by reason of having sacked Surrate and other ports of the

Mogor king, and having taken from there much treasure.": In early 1672, the Maratha menace had become more immediate on land, as Shivaji made threatening gestures toward the environs of Goa. As Lavradio reported in a letter in August of that year, Shivaji. "This past winter sought to cause an uprising in the lands of Bardez and Salsette, but my fine prevention caused him to desist in this intention.," By early 1673, the Viceroy, by his intelligence, care, and desire, had reconfirmed a shaky peace with the Maratha leader. Nevertheless, as Lavradio reiterated in January 1676, Shivaji: "is very inconsistent in his actions ... if he shows himself as a friend, he has already decided on some betrayal and thus one proceeds always with much vigilance and caution" with him." During the last years of Shivaji's career, tensions escalated between the powers. Portuguese support for the Siddi of Janjira, their refusal to pay any *chauth* to him, and the pleas of Hindu merchants in the *Estado* feeling the exactions of the Inquisition all played a role in this escalation. Although Shivaji's death in 1680 forestalled an attack, the fortification of Anjidiv island in the early 1680s prompted Shivaji's son, Sambhaji to launch a concerted offensive on Goa and Chaul in 1683. This substantial threat was only averted thanks to Mughal pressure on Sambhaji's flanks. Nevertheless, the huge cost of meeting this offensive temporarily threw the surplus budgets of the 1670s and early 1680s into the red. Thereafter, peace was restored for the remainder of Sambhaji's rule until 1680.²⁴

Among all the *Reie Vizinhos*, diplomatic relations were perhaps most immediate with the sultanate of Bijapur, the Muslim kingdom from which Albuquerque had wrested Goa in 1510. The other "old conquests" of Bardez and Salsette had also been taken from Bijapur in 1543. For the remainder of the 16th century, relations between the *Estado* and the Adil Shahi rulers of the sultanate were predictably stormy, with frequent attempts made to regain these lost territories. For much of the 17th century, however, relations had shifted somewhat and become generally more cordial. On Goa's part, this shift was mainly due to the importance of Bijapur as a supply center for various products in great demand in the empire: cloth, precious stones from Golconda, saltpeter for the *Casa da Polvora*, as well as sailors for the coastal fleets were all provided by or transshipped through Bijapur. A 1571 treaty recognized the importance of the kingdom by agreeing to allow the Adil Shah six free *cartazes* and the free importation of 25 horses each year; other duty free annual goods to the value of 6,000 gold *pardaus*, as well as a half share of all booty taken from ships without *cartazes* captured in the ports of the sultanate. On the part of the Adil Shah, such inducements and the very real fear of Mughal and Maratha invasions compelled a more pacific policy." This is not to say, however, that relations between the two powers were entirely with-

out friction. In the 1650S, for example, the Adil Shah invaded the Bardes and Salcere on two occasions. Tensions had risen at about this time due to the concessions the Adil Shah had made to the Dutch and English on the Konkan coast, allowing factories to be established at Karwar, Rajapur, and Vingurla. In 1654, Dutch pressure to attack by land and the desire to exploit the administrative chaos engendered by the overthrow of the count of Obidos by D. Braz de Castro resulted in a large but ill-fated invasion." In 1659, similar motives along with Portuguese harboring and encouraging of renegade Bijapuri provincial officials called *desais* resulted in a more modest military incursion in which Luis de Mendonca Furtado played a notable role.³⁷

By the early 1660s, the twin threat of Aurangzeb and Shivaji upon the sultanate substantially eased Bijapuri pressure on Goa and the *Estado*. Nevertheless, religious, geo-political, and historical factors all rendered the peace between the powers tenuous. As Antonio de Mello de Castro reported to Afonso VI in early 1664: "Today, the Idalxa has a good correspondence with us, but it is not secure, because every time that he has a [suitable] occasion he tries to take advantage of it by using it against us."³⁸ The 1664 decision to provide some munitions to Kanara had also invoked the wrath of the sultanate. For a time, it appeared that renewed war would result. The Adil Shah had dispatched some 2000 cavalry and infantry to the border of Salsette, but ultimately used these troops in an ill-fated campaign against Shivaji." In 1665-1666, Bijapur's continuing frustration in the war with the Mararhas continued to save the *Estado* from the glare of martial attention from the sultanate. As Mello de Castro wrote: "The Idalxa with whom the *Estado* shares a border from the Rio do Sal, which is the last port in Salsette, until Chapora, that similarly is the frontier of Bardes, finds himself today in great difficulty because one of his Hindu vassals called Shivaji has for many years men against him."³⁹

Aurangzeb's escalating campaign against Bijapur also complicated matters for the Adil Shahis and forced them to seek assistance from powers like Golconda, which according to Sao Vicente provided some 30,000 cavalry to resist the Mughal threat in the late 1660s." According to Corte-Real de Sampayo and Mello de Castro, a seminal problem in these struggles was that the dynasty was having difficulty effectively administering its own domains. "The king Aly Idalxa is the nearest neighbor to this State, but he is not capable of governing a limited [Provinces], Ict alone the kingdom of Vizapor, his captains are absolute and the do whatever they wish, and for this reason the Mogor has taken several of his cities."⁴⁰ Although these provincial officials or *desais* frequently sought aid and refuge in the *Estado*, open warfare was avoided during the 1670S and into the early 1680s thanks largely to the defeats Bijapur suffered at the hands of

the Marathas and Mughals. In the initial stages of this campaign, these reverses robbed Bijapur of many of its possessions on the Konkan coast. Ultimately, the struggle against both Shivaji and Aurangzeb would cost the Adil Shah dynasty its entire sultanate. These critical problems ensured that the *Estado* enjoyed a degree of stability with respect to Bijapur that would have seemed unthinkable in the time of Albuquerque.

Along the lush coast immediately south of Goa, the Portuguese had increasingly been forced to deal with the Nayaks of Ikkeri as the 17th century wore on. For most of the previous century, the Kanara coast had been made up of a series of petty principalities that had enjoyed a good deal of autonomy from both Vijayanagar and Bijapur. The region held great importance for the *Estado* since it supplied rice, pepper, and teak to the Portuguese, all vital commodities. Before 1600, the relative weakness of these principalities had allowed the Portuguese to dictate very favorable treaties that usually included bales of rice as tribute and *quintals* of pepper sold at very reasonable rates. To protect these interests, fortresses had been established at Basrur [Barcelor], Honavar [Onor], and Mangalore. The rapid rise to power of the Nayaks of the Keladi ruling family under Venkatappa Nayaka {1592-1629}, and the extension of that power under Virabhadra Nayaka (1629-1645) and Shivappa Nayaka (1645-1660) had greatly complicated relations with Kanara. These rulers not only created a significant domain between the Mirjan and Chandragiri rivers, they also exploited the weakness of the *Estado* during the crisis years of the mid-17th century and the Dutch onslaught to fundamentally alter the relationship between Kanara and the *Estado*. Initially, this shift was embodied in a marked revision of previous treaties. By the 1630s, it was the Portuguese who were agreeing to purchase pepper at fair market rates each year while allowing two *cartaz* free voyages and 12 duty-free horses annually! By the 1650s, Shivappa Nayaka had managed to expel the Portuguese from all their fortresses on the coast. The political machinations ushered in with Shivappa's son, Somashkar Nayaka, in 1660, however, would afford Goa the opportunity to reverse the legacy of defeat that had characterized its experience on the Kanara coast for most of the 17th century."

Somashkar Nayak's reign began with the dispatching of an embassy to Goa charged with negotiating the issue of having the Portuguese reestablish their factories in Kanara. Initially, these talks went well. Mello de Castro and others, however, were anxious over Dutch influence at court and the fact that the Omani Arabs had been substantially increasing their presence on that coast, buying up various commodities including rice. Nevertheless, the Viceroy eventually came to an agreement that promised the restitution of the erstwhile factories, Cambolim, and 10 ships with

their artillery that had been lost during the tenure of D. Francisco de Mello de Casro." D. Manoel Lobo de Silveira, *capitao-mor* of the *mar do sul*, was sent in the fall of 1664 with 11 *naos*, 2 galleys, and 1 storeship with artillery and other stores to explore the possibility of reoccupying these fortresses. Nonetheless, after taking over Cambolim, a fleet under Rijckloff Van Goens had appeared off Mangalore and Basrur and forced the Portuguese to abandon their plans. Despite the fact that Mello de Castro had also provided assistance to Somashker Nayak in his dispute with Bijapur, the dominant group at court quickly shifted its favor to the Dutch." By December 1666, Sao Vicenre had decided that Somashker Nayak's renewed promises of restitution were disingenuous. At a Council of State meeting late that month, he argued that "doubting the entrance to the ports of Canara on the part of the said king, it would be convenienc to first seck the island of Cambolim, either by an amicable deal, or by means of hostilities to possess it". Nunes da Cunha also suggested that all shipping belonging to Somashker Nayak and Arab merchants found along that coast might also be seized as part of such an offensive. Despite opposition to this course of acuou on the part of the Council, a large fleet under joao de Sousa Freire departed from the Mandovi in January 1667 and hostilities soon thereafter commenced.].

This warfare with Kanara did not go particularly well for the Portuguese. In January 1669, Carte-Real de Sampayo and Mello de Castro complained bitterly of Sac Vicente's decision to resume hostilities in a letter to Pedro. "One year after arriving the Count Viceroy resolved to make war on Canara, against the advice of everyone, which has resulted in State expense and a lack of foodstuffs for the city without providing any benefit." Reflecting the *casado* view in Goa, the Governing Council in 'lam asked that in the future any decision to wage war be made only with the advice of the Council of State." Even during these hostilities, however, both the Goa hierarchy and the indigenous ruler allowed an illegal trade in foodstuffs to continue carried on by Hindu merchants, as a lertor of January 1670 makes clear.¹⁸ The Governing Council had also reestablished negotiations with Somashker Nayak for peace and restitution of the erstwhile fortresses through Jesuit intermediaries. In February 1671, Somashkar Nayak sent a letter to Goa agam offering restitution of Mangalore, Basrur, and Honavar with some trading privileges, provided certain stipulations were met. Somashkar's conditions included rhe demand that only single walls with no bastions should be built around these factories, that no forcible conversions should be made among the indigenous Hindus, and that no Brahmins or cows were to be harmed.'

In Aprn 1671, Carte-Real de Sampaio, Antonio de Mello de Castro, and rhe Council of State discussed this offer conveyed to Goa by Vitula Malo,

Somashker Nayak's ambassador. By the time Mendonca Furtado arrived, these negotiations were nearly completed. While the new Viceroy was not adverse to continuing the military struggle, "a lack of manpower and money" compelled him to conclude these negotiations. At his insistence, the final agreement included the right to position artillery within the factory walls and for Somashkar to encourage all Christians in his domains to obey Portuguese clerics in ecclesiastical matters." Reestablishing factories at Mangalore, Basrur, and Honavar, however, was far more difficult than might have been imagined during the spring of 1671. First, Somashkar Nayak died in December of that year and his infant grandson, Basava Nayak, assumed the throne. Succession feuds threatened for most of the 1670s, and this political instability certainly complicated the implementation of the treaty. In the end, power remained with a group led by the queen mother and her favorite, Timmaya Nayak. The VAC, at the height of its anxiety over the entrance of the French into the trade in force at about this same time, was also determined to prevent nascent Portuguese ambitions on the Kanara coast and did its best at court and with periodic squadrons off the coast to frustrate the reoccupation of Mangalore, Basrur, and Honavar. Finally, the Omani Arabs continued to increase their presence on this coast. The Omanis had evidently received permission to establish a factory in the kingdom and their rice purchases had driven the price up on this vital foodstuff from 8 to 14 *pagodas* for a score of rice bales.⁴

Although temporary arrangements were made to reestablish the factories in question, the issue of an Omani settlement in Kanara evidently caused a further rupture in relations between the two powers and renewed warfare resulted in the mid-1670s. High-seas fleets under Domingos Barreto da Silva and Manoel Tavares da Gama had carried on the campaign against Kanara.' But as Luis de Mendonca Furtado noted in January 1675, this warfare had badly affected available foodstuffs to Goa and its environs, a serious state of affairs given the endemic warfare in the region between Aurangzeb, Bijapur, and Shivaji. Nevertheless, the succession struggle in Kanara improved the bargaining position of the Portuguese since both sides coveted European artillery and the Viceroy also recognized that arranging another peace settlement with provisions similar to the 1671 pact was desirable for the economic and geopolitical needs of the *Eetado*." For the next three years, warfare and negotiations continued. By late 1678, another treaty of "peace, alliance, and commerce" was concluded with Kanara. Antonio Paes de Sande and the Council of State discussed the offer brought to Goa by Chrisna Naique in a meeting of 10 December 1678. The final treaty, signed five days later was perhaps even more favorable to the Portuguese than the 1671 agreement.

Among other things, Basava agreed to pay the *Estado* some 30,000 *xerafins* to compensate for Portuguese expenses in the war, while renouncing any claims toward compensation for the ships Da Silva and Da Gama's fleets had captured. He also agreed to provide stone and wood for the factory at Mangalore, to pay an annual tribute for Mangalore and Basrur, to provide 1,500 sacks of clean rice annually, and raze the factory of the Omanis and cut off trade with them, and to allow Catholic churches to be built at Mizeo, Chandor, Bharkal, and Kalyan.' Although Omani trade continued on this coast, the 1678 treaty with Kanara certainly signaled a notable rehabilitation of Portuguese power on this valuable coast, a renascent presence that would have been unthinkable during the crisis years of the 1650s.

A final major Indian power with whom the Portuguese had relations was the sultanate of Golconda on the Coromandel coast. A rich textiles trade and the legend that the apostle St. Thomas was buried at Mylapore had first attracted the Portuguese to this region in the early 16th century, settling at San Thome de Mylapore in 1517. By 1600, San Thome was a town of "riches, pride, and luxury... second to none in India".⁴⁵ For most of the 16th century, the Portuguese had lived, traded, and prospered at San Thome under the aegis of Vijayanagar and then under the petty principalities which had succeeded it. The sultanate of Golconda originated in the early 16th century, "a conquest state ruled by a Turco-Persian dynasty," dominated by a Muslim political and military elite through a military fief system, and supported by the labor of indigenous Telugu speaking Hindus. By the mid-17th century, the sultanate had expanded to include most of the territory contained in the modern state of Andhra Pradesh. Golconda was a wealthy kingdom: traditional revenues from landed property had been supplemented by the development of the most important mines and market for large diamonds in the world, as well as a trade in textiles, indigo, foodstuffs, saltpeper, and iron." In 1646, Mir jumla had claimed suzerainty over San Thome for Abdullah Qurb Shah. The arrival of the Dutch and English on that coast with factories established at Pulicar and Madras significantly complicated the diplomatic situation for the Portuguese. By the early 1660s, the heavy diplomatic and financial pressure at the Qurb Shahi court at Hyderabad and general apprehension over the place falling into the hands of yet another European power, had convinced Abdullah to support a Dutch naval blockade with a besieging army under Neknam Khan. This combined force succeeded in expelling the Portuguese in May 1662, a defeat that Mello de Castro and his successors were determined to redress in the years that followed."

The next two decades witnessed various diplomatic machinations to convince Abdullah Qutb Shah and his successor, Ahul Hasan, to restore

San Thome to the *Estado*. In the wake of Neknam Khan's victory, the sizable Portuguese merchant community of San Thome had settled in nearby Madras under the auspices of the English fort-factory at Fort St. George. Led by men like Joao Coelho and Joao Pereira de Faria, this vocal group consistently pressured the Goa hierarchy to facilitate a settlement that would restore them to their erstwhile property and trade.' In February 1663, Antonio de Mello de Castro wrote to Abdullah, complaining of the unjust occupation of San Thome, an act prompted by the nefarious urging of the *Vac*. This move had violated the strong desire of the Portuguese to conserve peace and good friendship with Golconda, a policy expressly reconfirmed in his orders from Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor. The Viceroy noted that he would soon send an envoy to discuss the matter, and evidently chose Fr. Diogo de Madre de Deus and Manoel Antunes de Carvalho, formerly *sergeant-mar* of San Thome, to undertake this mission to Hyderabad." By January 1666, it was clear that Abdullah was in no mood to consider a restitution. His first reply to Mello de Castro's envoys was evasive, suggesting that he had taken the town due to some transgressions on the part of the Portuguese and a desire to keep the Dutch from capturing it. The English presence at Madras had also complicated matters since the Abdullah evidently wanted to restrict the European presence in his domains. A second diplomatic missive had been rudely received and thereafter ignored by the Qutb Shahi court. Neknam Khan had, moreover, already ordered substantial improvements in the town's fortifications." Meanwhile, Mello de Castro sought to improve the position of the expelled Portuguese residing in Madras through a series of appeals to the English Governor, calling upon him to honor the terms of the 1661 alliance between the powers and affording them protection from any further misfortunes at the hands of Abdullah's armies. He also sought to quiet the incessant complaints from his own subjects living there by promising them a relatively swift recuperation of San Thome.'

In January 1665, the Viceroy informed Afonso VI that no such restitution had indeed taken place. Mello de Castro also admitted that he had not yet resolved to use the only significant weapon he possessed in this dispute: a high-seas fleet that could "strangle" Abdullah's seaborne trade. His recalcitrance to utilize this strategy resulted from concern over the reaction of the *VAC*, which had still not demonstrated any long-standing desire to honor their peace with the Crown." By mid-1666, however, the continued intransigence of the Qutb Shahi court had already convinced the Viceroy to embrace more forceful measures. As Mello de Castro informed Afonso: "The king of Golconda pays no heed to us, nor has he even responded to a letter I wrote him asking for the restitution of San Thome. I have determined to send several ships that will impede the com-

mercc of his kingdom; because the losses that he will receive from this [act] will oblige him to restore the city, and have a better correspondence with us.?" While the reaction of the **VAC** remained uncertain, the Viceroy could at least count on Angle-Dutch rivalry and rumors of the impending arrival of Colbert's company into the trade to temper the Hollander's response. The most significant Portuguese victory in the enslaving war was the capture by the carrack *São Pedro de Alcantara* under *capitão-mor* D. Nourel de Castro of a very rich prize ship belonging to Abdullah near the Straits of Hurmuz departed from Masulipatnam and was bound for Persia. Predictably, it carried no *cartaz* and was loaded with textiles, precious stones, and other goods. The revenue from this vessel, that was certified as a legitimate prize in a Council of State meeting of May 1666, was substantial. After the Crown and Mello de Castro had received their shares, some 40,000 *xerafins* was paid to the sailors and infantry aboard the *São Pedro de Alcantara*. The remainder of the cargo was eventually sold at public auction in Bassem, with the proceeds funding other State projects."

At the very least, this maritime victory generated some attention from Abdullah, who soon sent ambassadors to Goa to discuss the matter. Mello de Castro had then discussed in a straightforward *quid pro quo* with the king's envoys: restore the Portuguese to San Thome in return for the prize ship. For the next few years, negotiations continued over these matters. Abdullah's representatives challenged the claim that the ship had been a legitimate prize and demanded the restitution of both the vessel and its cargo; while Mello de Castro and then Sac Vicente continued to demand the return of San Thome and were apparently willing to return the ship but not the cargo." As Carte-Real de Sarmpaio, Mello de Castro, and Luis de Mendonca Furtado lamented from 1670-1672, a state of war between the two powers continued while no definitive settlement could be reached." Somewhat ironically, after these years of political and military machinations on the part of the *Estado* designed to win back San Thome, a large royal French fleet under Viceroy Jacob Blanquet De La Haye managed to capture the town from the Qurb Shahis on a single day in July 1672." Mendonca Furtado and his Council of State still considered San Thome to be rightfully part of the *Estado* and evidently hoped that the French would restore the town to them. The Viceroy also advised Pedro to seek a diplomatic solution to this end in Europe.⁸⁸

Lavrado's most immediate problem was to ensure that the long suffering Portuguese community in Madras did not rush back to San Thome lured by an offer of personal restitution of property that La Haye had made, an admittedly attractive ploy designed to gain de facto recognition of French sovereignty over the place. João Pereira de Paria had warned of

such an exodus in a letter of late July 1672, and the Viceroy had thereafter written to joao Coelho to hopefully forestall a mass acceptance of the French offer and to vigorously discourage any armed support for La Haye's fleet. "The city of San Theme belongs to His Majesty...the vassals of His Majesty [should] not alter the state they are in.?" There was, of course, virtually no chance that the French would restore this town to the Portuguese. Colbert and La Haye had made efforts in both Lisbon and Goa to arrange an anti-Dutch alliance in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Third Dutch War.⁶⁰ As will be noted below, the rather wise rejection of this tempting diplomatic offer by Pedro and his Viceroy carried the price of negating even the remote possibility that the French would consider turning over the town. For the next two years, the Goa hierarchy kept a careful watch on the large-scale siege that developed at San Theme between La Haye's forces and the armies of the new king of Golconda, Abul Hasan. By September 1674, a concerted land siege by the Qurb Shahis and a Dutch naval blockade finally succeeded in expelling the remnants of La Haye's once powerful fleet. Unfortunately, this experience reinforced the view in Hyderabad that no European power should be allowed to take over the town again, and Abul Hasan's armies razed most of its fortifications and the Portuguese were never able to reestablish themselves in any significant fashion on the Coromandel coast:'

In addition to these major Indian powers, the *Estado* also maintained regular diplomatic relations with a plethora of other indigenous kingdoms throughout maritime Asia: the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty in China; Indonesian powers like the sultan of Bantam, the sultanate of Aceh, the ruler of Makassar; the Safavid dynasty in Persia, as well as a host of African rulers along the Swahili coast and inland that will be detailed in chapter 7. Nevertheless, perhaps the most daunting foreign policy questions confronting the Viceroyalty during these years related to the rising political and military power of the Omani Arabs. As Boxer has noted, the Omani had been a seafaring people for centuries before the arrival of the Portuguese in force in the Arabian Sea during the early 16th century and the capture of Ormuz and Maskat. Initially, however, their maritime technology was inadequate to challenge the shipborne artillery of the Europeans." This state of affairs had begun to change with the accession of the Ya'rubi line of Imams in Oman, beginning with Nasir ibn Murshid (1624-1649). This sultan succeeded in unifying much of Oman and at the end of his reign besieged Maskar, the most important Portuguese fortress in that region. Although Nasir ibn Murshid died before reducing this city, his objective was soon obtained by his successor Sultan ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi (1649-1679). After the capture of Maskat, ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi succeeded in building up and maintaining a formidable fleet of warships, based largely

on the European mode!, that engaged the Portuguese in a running war in the Gulf of Oman, in the Arabian Sea, along the Swahili coast of Africa, and on the west coast of India that lasted well into the eighteenth century. This challenge would command the attention of the succession of Viceroys appointed by the Braganzas beginning in the early 1660s.⁶³

Following the loss of Maskar, the fortress at Mombassa was judged to be at particular risk and ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi's forces unsuccessfully besieged the city in 1660-1661. Mendonça Purtado and D. Pedro de Lencastre had tried to assist Mombassa by sending the *São João e São Jacinto* there in December 1661, captained by Gabriel Neto de Souza and loaded with gunpowder, arms, rice, and 2000 *xerafins*? In April 1662, D. Luisa Gusmao ordered Mello de Castro to do everything he could to further reinforce the place so that no additional "disgrace" would befall the *Estado*. In January 1664, Mello de Castro sent the caravel *N.S. de Nazareth e S. Antonio* and two storeships to that city "with the provisions necessary to sustain and defend it". A new captain, Joseph Homen da Costa, sailed with this small fleet with orders to punish the ruler of Pate who had supported the Omanis in their most recent attack." As noted above, the campaign against ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi took on renewed vigor with the arrival of the zealous João Nunes da Cunha as Viceroy in the fall of 1666. Sac Vicente took the campaign against Islam very seriously. In fact he spent his first five months in office, and most of his energies during that time, assembling a large *armada* to carry on the campaign against the Omanis. Exploiting a treasury surplus accumulated by Mello de Castro and borrowing an additional 102,000 *xerafins* from leading Christian merchants in Goa, the Viceroy formed a powerful fleet under D. Francisco Manoel that was ready to depart by the early spring of 1667. At the same time, Sac Vicente sent a four-frigate fleet under D. Jerônimo Manoel to protect the fortresses of the *Norte* from Omani attack.'

Contemporary sources attest to the formidable power embodied in D. Francisco's fleet. Most of its commanders were seasoned veterans of Asian warfare; a notable portion of the c. 1800 soldiers aboard were European; while the gunners were the best available in Goa." Unfortunately, extant reports on the actions of the 1667 fleet after it departed from the Mandovi in early April are very sketchy. Nevertheless, it appears that the squadron bombarded Maskat and other positions on that coast controlled by ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi to some effect. A freak storm, however, thereupon scattered the Portuguese armada, forcing D. Francisco to regroup at Congo or Bandar Kung before returning to Goa in late August with at least two prizes." One indication of the relative success of D. Francisco Manoel's fleet is the extremely dynamic military response it engendered from the Sultan of Oman. At the same time, this perceived 1667

Table 7: The 1667 Straits of Hurmuz Fleet

Ship	Type	Captain	Guns	Sailors	Soldiers	Other
Sr.a Thereza de Jesus	Nao	[os. de MeJlo de Castro	56	86	400	Admiral
St. Jean St. Jacinth	Nao	Fran. de Lucas Cabreica	38	62	200	Vice
NS dR de Cassabe	Frigate	Pran. Range! Pinto	22	36	180	
Penha da Franca	Frigate	Fran. Comes de Lago	32	40	200	
NS de Nazareth de SA	Caravel	Manoel Carvalho	20	30	170	
	Frigate	D. F. M. de Albuquerque	24	30	180	
	Frigate	D. Garcia	18	30	150	
	Frigate	D. Pereira Sorto?	18	30	150	
	Frigate	Vesco Lour. da Gama	18	30	150	
Total:			246	374	1780	

victory may have resulted in comparatively lax preparations in Goa for the continuation of the campaign in 1668. In any event, the outgrowth of this conjunction of affairs was the sacking of the town of Diu by ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi's high-seas fleet and troops in November 1668, where a sizable amount of damage was done and a notable amount of booty carried off. As Carte-Real and Mello de Castro pointed out nearly a year later, the devastation caused to Diu continued even then: a regular trade had still not been reestablished, *alfandega* receipts were virtually non-existent, and the apparent ease with which the Omanis had sacked the place had given encouragement to other enemies of the *Estado*. In the words of the Governors, a prompt "*remedio*" was needed given the fact that Diu was "the principal *fortaleza* in India".⁷⁰

Significantly, the response of the Goa hierarchy to this stinging defeat was both prompt and effective. The very able Antonio Paes de Sande, who then held the key posts of *Vedor-geral da [azenda* and *secretario do Estado*, was sent north to assess the damage and propose a course of action to rehabilitate the area.⁷¹ The Treasury Council, meanwhile, handed down a series of decisions which facilitated the economic recovery of Diu, including a March 1669 *assento* which cut the usual custom duty rate at the *alfandega* in that city by half for the next six years.⁷² To exact revenge for the Omani attack, Corte-Real de Sampaio and Mello de Castro also dispatched a Straits fleet in March 1669 under D. Jeronimo Manoel. As the Governors informed the Crown: "Having given an account to Your Majesty of the entrance of the Arabs into Diu, and for this reason, we have ordered an armada to Mascare." This fleet consisted of four ships of *alto*

bordo, and five *de remo*. The galleon *São Bento* (*capitania*) had a crew of 30 as well as 80 soldiers; the *nao Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* sailed with a crew of 20 and 55 soldiers; the frigate *Sac Joao da Riheira* had a crew of 18 and 50 soldiers; and the caravel *Nossa Senhora de Nazareth* had a crew of 14 and 47 soldiers. The five galleys carried another 90 soldiers including indigenous lascarins. Among the Portuguese notables aboard this fleet were Joseph de Mello de Castro, *almirante* of the fleet and son of the former Viceroy; Antonio de Castro de Sande and Francisco Paes de Sande, both sons of the *Secretario do Estado*; and Joao Antunes Portugal."

Manoel's squadron reached Maskar on April 18, and bombarded that city for several days to some effect. A rumor that 5 Omani ships were headed for the Portuguese factory at Bandar Kung prompted Manoel to break off this action. The Captain-general then headed for Persia both to protect this factory and to take on water and supplies. Ibn Sad al-Ya'rubi evidently sent a 25 ship fleet, mostly *pataxoes* but with 5 large warships, under the same admiral who had directed the sacking of Diu the previous year in search of the Portuguese. On the June 18, 1669 the two fleets met off the island of Queixome or Qishm near Hurmuz. This naval engagement lasted until late on June 19, with the Portuguese more than holding their own. According to the extant Portuguese sources, this setback further incensed the Sultan who finally sent out an even more powerful fleet of 10 large warships, 4 frigates, 2 caravels, and some 7000 men under the command of Ali de Rostaya [sic] from Mecca, who in the past had besieged Mombassa. On the 29-30th of August, this fleet met Manoel's squadron in a fierce battle off the Cape of Macaodao (Ras Mussendom) near Hurmuz. Although badly outnumbered, Manoel's squadron fought gallantly and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Omanis: sinking 5 of their ships, forcing others to withdraw for repairs, and killing and wounding more than 2000 of the Arabs. As Carte-Real and Mello de Castro graphically informed Lisbon: "The natives [on that coast] did not eat fresh fish for many days because of the dead corpses that fouled the seas and beaches [rhere]."

This naval warfare with the Omanis continued with varying degrees of intensity throughout the 1670s and into the 1680s, with neither side winning a definitive victory. Initially, the Portuguese held the upper hand thanks to the victory of Manoel. As Carte-Real de Sampaio and Meilo de Castro informed Pedro, this stunning success over ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi's forces had prompted the friends of the *Estado* to promptly send ambassadors to Goa with congratulations and the enemies of the Portuguese to send envoys to treat with them." In January 1670, the Governors had sought to exploit this victory by sending D. Jeronirno Manoel back to the Straits with an even stronger fleet of seven ships *de alto bordo*, armed with nearly 150 cannons, over 500 soldiers, and 428 sailors. Manoel's fleet

returned in November with at least one prize ship from its successful sojourn at Bandar Kung and Hurmuz that had evidently witnessed another Portuguese victory off the island of Qishm." In a letter of October 1671, Mello de Castro and Carte Real de Sampaio boasted: "The Omanis remain so broken by the encounter they had with our fleet near the island of Queixome, that they gathered the little that remained to them at Maskat, not even sailing this past summer, a great occasion, by which we continued the Straits voyage that promises, not only credit, but also great advantages."" Nevertheless, Ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi had sent a fleet to attack Mozambique in 1670, an action that was only deterred by the effective actions of Gaspar de Sousa Lacerda and the timely arrival of Mendonca Furtado's Viceregal fleet in the summer of that year."

After Luis de Mendonca Furtado reached Goa, the foreign policy emphasis shifted somewhat more to diplomatic questions involving the European powers on the eve of the Third Dutch War. Nevertheless, Lavradio did not neglect the Omani campaign. In January 1672, he informed Pedro that he was sending a ten-ship fleet to the Straits under Antonio de Mello de Castro: six *do alto bordo* and four more *de remo* under the *capitiao-mor* Antonio de Castro de Sande." This fleet departed in March 1672 and by May of that year, Mello de Castro had evidently negotiated a treaty with Sayeide Hasan, governor of Mecca. Among other things, this treaty allowed the Portuguese to bring goods to Mecca without fear of attack, with ships from Diu, Daman, and Chaul paying only a 3% custom duty, and Mello de Castro's fleet exempt from any taxes. The Captain-general was also paid a lump sum of 10,000 silver *patacas* [1=C. 320 *reis*], that as Mendonca Furtado later pointed out was the principal advantage of this agreement." In 1673, joao Correa de Sá took a fleet to the Straits of 3 ships of *alto bordo* and 6 *de remo* that succeeded in obtaining a new *farman* from the Shah of Persia which reconfirmed the long-standing claim of the *Estado* to half the custom revenues collected in the port of Bandar Kung.'

By early 1676, the Omanis had recovered sufficiently from their earlier mauling to send another fleet of 12 ships against Diu. This time, however, the Portuguese were better prepared than some eight years previously. Despite a plethora of demands on the Viceroyalty, Lavradio had seen to the defense of the *Norte* in general and Diu in particular by sending the capable Manoel de Mello as *capitao-mor* of an 11-ship squadron. This force in conjunction with the squadron of the north then cruising the Gujarati coast had proven equal to the task of repelling the Omanis.' While the Portuguese were thus able to hold their own against Ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi in this warfare of the 1660s and 1670s, the cost of this campaign was high as several *fidalgos* pointed out to the Crown as time went by.

Nevertheless, revenues from Bandar Kung flowed into the *fazenda real* during this period and the renascent demonstration of naval power orchestrated by São Vicente and his successors at least succeeded in keeping the key Indian fortresses of the *Estado* safe during this volatile period.'

While the Portuguese had therefore been willing to pursue a bellicose foreign policy at times in relation to some of the *Reis Vizinhos*, the adoption of a more pacific policy with respect to European rivals in the trade would, in contrast, facilitate the rehabilitation of the *Estado*. In the early 1660s, the Dutch and English remained the only major European competitors for the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean trade. As noted above, the powerful VOC had been viewed as the "Antichrist" in Lisbon for most of the 17th century, and with some justification. After all, these Protestant "heretics" had expelled the Portuguese from major fortresses in Indonesia, from Melaka, Ceylon, and elsewhere between c. 1630-1660. As D. Luisa de Gusmao's ambassadors in northern Europe informed her, despite their efforts to arrange a formal peace with the States-General, there was little prospect of a respite in this campaign as the new decade began. The Dutch were making stringent demands: the granting of the same commercial privileges as those ceded to England in 1654, or, failing that, adequate monetary compensation, supplemented by a sum for the loss of erstwhile possessions in Brazil. The diplomatic task in the United Provinces was also complicated by attempts to arrange a peace with England which might be jeopardized by exorbitant commercial concessions made to the Dutch." As the count of Miranda informed the Queen Regent in letters of February 1661, the VOC was also making preparations to dispatch a large fleet to continue the campaign with the *Estado*."

In April 1661, D. Luisa informed Mendonça Furtado and Lencastre that she was hoping for a peace with the Dutch; "in order to improve things there," and that definitive word might be sent along with the new Viceroy the following September. Nevertheless, she also forwarded letters from Miranda indicating that a Dutch fleet of some 30 warships and 8000 men might soon be sent against Goa. While the Queen promised to send out this new Viceroy "with the greatest help that the possibilities of the kingdom permit, in the meantime, I am certain that with your work and industry and above all your valor and that of your vassals," this challenge could be met." In the end, of course, the continuing drain of the continental campaign against the Habsburgs and the imperial warfare with the United Provinces prevented D. Luisa and her advisors from sending out any meaningful support to Goa in the final stages of the Dutch onslaught. Instead, the Portuguese hierarchy sought to find an alternative source of reinforcements and succor for the tottering edifice of the *Estado*: the 1661 marriage treaty with Charles II and England. As detailed above, the idea

of arranging a formidable alliance with England cemented by a royal marriage to solve the Crown's problems was a long-standing priority of the Braganzas. Francisco de Mello e Torre's offer to Charles of marriage to Catherine of Braganza with a 2 million *cruzado* dowry, the cession of Tangier and Bombay, and the continuation of the commercial privileges set forth in the treaty of 1654 had finally been accepted in June 1661 and ratified in late August of that year. Articles XV, XVI as well as a secret article pledged the English king to defend Portuguese commercial interests against the Dutch in both Europe and Asia."

Diplomatic relations with the Dutch and English for the next two decades, and especially regarding Asian matters, were largely determined by actions relating to the new Portuguese Viceroy's arrival in India in September 1662. Miranda's negotiations in The Hague had finally resulted in an agreement between the two powers in the summer of 1661; Dutch merchants would henceforth receive the same commercial privileges as granted to the English in 1654, while to compensate for the loss of territory in Brazil, the Queen Regent agreed to pay the sum of 4 million *cruzados*, a hefty commitment that the Crown expected to meet largely from the rich salt trade of Setubal. Significantly, although this treaty was signed in August 1661, it was not ratified by D. Luisa and her Council until May 1662, nor by the States-General in December 1662. Moreover, the publication of the treaty did not occur until the following March." This delay, of course, greatly facilitated the work of Maetsuycker and Van Goens, in the final stages of their attack on the *Estado*, then focused on the remaining Portuguese possession on the Malabar coast. In January 1662, Van Goens had captured Cranganore. He next besieged Cochin in February 1662, an unsuccessful action that he resumed in the fall of that year. This aggressive campaign embodied a less than welcomed reception for the new Portuguese Viceroy, Antonio de Mello de Castro, when he reached Bombay in September 1662. At least initially, however, Mello de Castro assumed that he possessed a sufficient weapon to combat this threat; the English fleet which had carried him to India."

Soon after reaching Bombay and learning of the continuing Dutch campaign of aggression to the south, the Viceroy asked Marlborough for prompt military assistance. Charles, after all, in the secret article to the treaty had promised that Marlborough's fleet would "go well furnished of all the necessities as well as of instructions, to defend, aid, and assist all the possessions of the Portuguese in the East Indies," should they come under Dutch attack." Ley, however, refused to commit his fleet to such a dubious enterprise. The earl of Marlborough, moreover, had clearly had enough of the new Viceroy and his retinue of *fidalgos* on the voyage from Lisbon and was anxious to return to Europe once the transfer of the is-

land had been arranged. Further complications, including the tardy arrival of the ship *Mary Rose* with Sir Abraham Shipman aboard, alone commissioned to demand the transfer of Bombay, and the failure to produce acceptable credentials as specified in Mello de Casarro's instructions furnished the Viceroy with a convenient pretext for refusing to hand over the island.⁶¹ This bold act set the stage for Angle-Portuguese relations both in Europe and Asia for the next two decades. In turn, Ley's refusal to intervene against Van Goens's marauding on the Malabar coast, as well as the continuing infirmity of Goa's response to the military offensive of the **VAC**, allowed the Dutch to successfully complete their campaign. The renewed siege of Cochin was finally completed by early January 1663 when the Portuguese captain Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho surrendered the town to Van Goens. In early February, the town of Cannanore also fell to the **VAC**, thus expelling the Portuguese from the Malabar coast for the first time since the initial years of the 17th century.⁶² The attempt to recoup these towns from the Dutch, both captured after the peace had been ratified between the two powers would similarly set the stage for the Luso-Dutch relations during the 1660's.

In a letter of May 1661, D. Luisa de Cusmao had initially informed Mendonca Furtado and Lencastré of the pact with England that conceded Bombay to Charles II in return for the "utility that from the union and friendship with the English nation can result to this *Estado*".⁶³ The following October, the Queen Regent had reiterated her belief in the benefits of becoming "brothers in arms" with the English in Asia in another letter to the Governors.⁶⁴ In March 1662, Charles II had also written to Mello de Castro in terms designed to facilitate the transfer of Bombay, promising "on land, as at sea, we will defend as our own lands, all the possessions and territories of Portugal".⁶⁵ There is every indication that D. Luisa expected the English to be good allies who would help stabilize the rocky status of the *Estado*. Nevertheless, to help ensure compliance with the terms of the treaty, the Queen Regent had also written to Charles II to remind the English king that he had to send arms for the defense of the *Estado*.⁶⁶ Mello de Castro had also received rather precise instructions on turning over "the river and land of Bombay," upon his arrival, as Mello de Castro lived up to his obligations in the *quid pro quo*.⁶⁷ In October 1662, however, the Viceroy informed D. Luisa de Ousruao and the Council of State in Goa that despite his orders of April 1662 ordering him to turn over the island, he had refused to do so, since Shipman had not presented the necessary instrument for the transfer.⁶⁸ Mello de Castro elaborated his position on this issue in letters of December 1662 and early 1663 after he had reached Goa. These documents make it clear that the principal reasons for his refusal to turn over the island were: (1) Marlborough's failure to

provide any military assistance for the *Estado*, (2) the great economic and strategic potential of Bombay, especially as it related to the Province of the North; (3) the threat to Catholicism embodied by the English; and (4) the fickle nature of any alliance with Charles II." To ensure their prompt arrival in Lisbon, the Viceroy sent the Jesuit Manoel Godinho via the overland route with copies as well as dispatching others aboard the gal-
leon *S. Francisco*:"

From late 1662 until early 1665, the imbroglio engendered by Mello de Castro's act played out in Europe and Asia. Charles II and Clarendon, of course, were not amused with the news of events at Bombay and took an extremely hard line in subsequent talks with Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor. From the very beginning of negotiations with D. Luisa de Ousmao, the prime objective of any alliance with Portugal from the English perspective had been clear. As Charles succinctly wrote in his August 1661 instructions to his representative in Lisbon, Richard Fanshawe: "One of the principal advantages we propose to ourself by this entire conjunction with Portugal is the advancement of the trade of this nation and the enlargement of our own territories and dominions." Fanshawe had also been instructed to press for the cession of Bassein, and to use the weakness of the Portuguese in the face of the Dutch onslaught to his greatest possible advantage." In May 1663, after word had reached Whitehall of Mello de Castro's rebuff, Clarendon notified Fanshawe: "This act is so foul that less than the head of the man cannot satisfy for the indignity." Moreover, if Bombay was not handed over promptly: "Farewell to the friendship with Portugal and they are not to wonder if they hear that we and the Dutch are united in the East Indies and that we do all else to their prejudice." In February 1664, Afonso wrote in a rather stern tone to Mello de Castro. While they had read the Viceroy's dispatches sent with Godinho, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor could not understand why Bombay had not been turned over. In this letter, the Crown reiterated its earlier orders to carry out the transfer as quickly as possible, allaying any doubts on the part of the Portuguese residents on the island by assuring them that their *fazendas* and religion had been safeguarded in the treaty."

In a November 1664 letter, Mello de Castro acknowledged receipt of his second set of instructions to turn over the island. Leading *fidalgos* in Goa at that time, including Ignacio Sarmenro de Carvalho had pressured him to respect these orders. Carvalho had also advised the Viceroy not to allow the death of Shipman on nearby Anjdiv island, where the English force had landed in early 1663 after their less than cordial reception in Bombay, to delay this course of action. Mello de Castro, however, remained adamant in his refusal to honor the *quid pro quo* embodied in the treaty, when the English had, in his opinion, not fulfilled their part of the

agreement. As the Viceroy informed Afonso, there were still two "great difficulties" in honoring the king's orders: first, the failure of the English to provide "their promised assistance to Portugal," and in turn the risk of altering the peace between the two Crowns; and second, ~~the~~ faulty instrument that the English had presented him." By early January 1665, however, Mello de Castro had received additional letters via England that finally convinced him to relent and facilitate the long awaited transfer of Bombay. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that he did so with very little enthusiasm. As the Viceroy lamented; "Only the obedience that I owe as a vassal can prompt me to this action, because ... India [*Portuguesa*] will end on the very day upon which the English nation takes power in Bombay." Shipman's successor, Humphrey Cooke, finally travelled to Bombay with Mello de Castro's envoys, Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos and Sebasnao Alvares Nigos, and took possession of the island in mid-February 1665.¹⁰⁶

The formal transference of the town, however, did little to improve the strained relationship between the "allies" that had originated with the events of September 1662. The genesis of most of these problems related to the conditions that the English had been forced to agree to in 1665 in order to finally assume possession. This astute list of conditions drafted by Mello de Castro was highly favorable to the Portuguese cause. Among other things, they restricted the English to the island and port of Bombay alone, retaining Portuguese control over other nearby dependencies of Bassein including Mahim, Thana, and Salserre island. Catholicism would be protected as would the property rights of the current landowners, who would also not be liable to more *lores* than they were currently paying. Tolls would not be levied on Portuguese goods passing by Bombay, while English goods coming from the mainland would be subject to custom charges and other tolls at Thana and elsewhere. The English also promised not to receive deserters from the *Estado* and to immediately return any "Kunbis, Bhandaris, and the rest of the people Abunhados," subject to Portuguese landowners in the Province of the North. Given his dwindling forces on Anjdiv, the approaching war with the Dutch, and Mello de Castro's amply demonstrated attitude on the matter, Cooke had very little choice but to accept these conditions in early 1665.¹⁰⁷

Not surprisingly, both the royal governors of the island down to 1668, Cooke and Henry Gary, as well as the Company Presidents Oxenden and Ccrald Aungier, following the leasing of the place to the EIC by Charles II in 1668, chafed under these constraints and sought to circumvent them by any means possible. Complaints and counter-complaints on these issues littered the diplomatic correspondence between Goa, Bombay, Surat, Lisbon, and London during the ensuing years. In particular, the English com-

plained mightily against the collections of tolls at Thana and elsewhere that added 10-12% to the cost of importing commodities from the nearby mainland. Cooke and Gary did their best to avoid these charges, at times sending troops in English craft to defy demands for rolls." The [IC adopted a somewhat more **subtle** approach. In December 1672, Aungier forwarded a set of proposals to Mendonca Furrado designed to arrange a more specific alliance between the two powers in Asia. Foremost among his demands was: "That no duties be charged on imports excepting at the port of arrival and landing, and that they be free of all tolls over rivers, bridges etc., and that punishment be meted out to the *Mandovis* of Tanna and Caranja for their unbearable insolence, and the exorbitant duties and taxes which they arbitrarily impose on the subjects of His Majesty the King of England."¹⁰⁹ Throughout these years, of course, the Portuguese continued to collect these monies whenever possible. The English, after all, had agreed to the conditions of the transfer, and legally the position of the *Estado* appeared strong. English complaints were therefore largely ignored, especially by Mello de Castro, who in January 1666 had decried Cooke's initial excesses including the illegal occupation of Mahim, and branded Henry Gary "a terrible heretic," and "a great enemy of the Portuguese nation"." As late as March 1677, Charles II was still writing with very little effect, to Mendonca Furtado on the issue hoping to arrange relief from these tolls."

In turn, Portuguese landowners on Bombay decried the unjust usurpation of their estates. The most vocal of these complaints came from the two largest landowners under the old Portuguese regime: D. Inez de Miranda, the widow of D. Rodrigo de Moncauto, whose manor house had served as the locus for the transfer ceremony with Cooke, and the Jesuit order which, as elsewhere in the *Estado*, had amassed significant property on the island. Statistics on these losses can be found in two documents: a *Lista das Fazendas, que os Inglezes repetidas vezes confiscariio aos vassallos de Portugal, em Bombaym e Mahim*, and *O que tomado os Inglezes uzurpado sem causa ... na ilha de Bombaim e seu districto dos moradores nella*:" Based on these sources, it appears that by 1668, nearly 160,000 *xerafins* in *rendas* alone had been lost. In 1667, for example, D. Inez had been stripped of *fazendas* that returned 9,000 *xerafins* per year. That same year, the Company of Jesus had been deprived of various *fazendas* that returned 25,100 *xerafins* per year." Cooke, Gary, and Aungier were thus successful in their attempt to expropriate the erstwhile expropriators on the island. Pedro attempted to use these losses to his advantage in negotiations with the English regarding future payments on Catherine of Braganza's dowry, ordering Mendonca Furtado to prepare a comprehensive list of these losses for this task." While this task eventually

resulted in the documentation noted above, the Portuguese in fact received very little satisfaction in attempting to redress these violations of the 1661 treaty. During the 1670s, Aungmyer would exacerbate continuing tensions between the powers by turning Bombay into a thriving, well-defended base for the operations of the EIC. Above all, his policy of religious freedom in the enclave did much to lure indigenous capital from the Province of the North and in doing so, threaten the economic stability of Chaul and Bassein, as Mendonça Furtado pointed out in letters of 1671 and 1672. Only on the eve of the Second and Third Dutch Wars did the English briefly adopt a more conciliatory tone."

For the Portuguese, therefore, the promise and potential that D. Luisa had hoped for when she made the treaty with Charles in 1661 had been rapidly supplanted by a jaded resignation that the English would never prove to be saviors to the *Estado*. As Mello de Castro and Sá Vicente recognized early on, in addition to being recalcitrant military allies, the English simply did not have the power required for the role. As Mello de Castro proffered to Afonso in January 1662: "The English have so little power in this Orient ... that it is necessary for them to live in our shadow."¹⁶ In January 1667, Nunes da Cunha informed the Crown that not only were the English not living up to the commitments of the 1661 treaty, but: "The English do not possess in the said Orient neither the force, nor money, nor government [to do so], living in the shadow of the arms of Your Majesty."¹⁷ In fact, the English had been and never would be more than ruthless geopolitical and commercial competitors to the *Estado*, whose policies in Bombay exacerbated the drain of indigenous merchants and capital from the Province of the North. Mello de Castro and other *fidalgos* clearly wanted the Crown to purchase Bombay back from Charles II and there is solid evidence that Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor seriously considered this option beginning in 1665. The problem, of course, as the king pointed out in a letter to the Viceroy was that the Crown, due in part to the continuing war with Spain, already had sufficient difficulties in meeting the dowry obligations to England and the *donativo* promised in the treaty with the United Provinces. Quite frankly, the king did not have the cash required for the purchase and the *Cartes* was hardly likely to provide such a sum. Unless Mello de Castro could raise "most of the asking price", nothing could be expected." In the end, therefore, the English alliance proved to be a great disappointment with regard to Portugal's Asian empire. The fundamental foreign policy question as the 1660s wore on thus became how to rehabilitate the *Estado* in light of this dearth of assistance from London. The resolution to this seminal question related to relations with the United Provinces and increas-

ingly the rather mercurial entrance of France into the Indian Ocean trade as part of Jean-Baptiste Colbert's grand design for world trade.

In the years immediately following the peace with the United Provinces, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor concentrated their diplomatic efforts toward effecting the return of Cochin and Cannanore." These efforts were predictably rebuffed. De Win and the *Heeren XVII* based this stance on Clause VI of the 1662-1663 treaty. This article stated that an hostilities would cease between Portugal and the United Netherlands "in Europe within two months from the date that this treaty shall be signed by both parties, and in the other parts of the world from the date of the publication of this document".¹⁰ While it is quite possible that the Dutch delayed publication until March 1663 in order to facilitate the work of Maetsuycker and Van Goens, this did not abrogate the legal force of the treaty. Legally as well as diplomatically, therefore, Afonso and his envoys did not possess much of a case to press in The Hague and Amsterdam. Down to 1668, the Portuguese hierarchy in both Goa and Lisbon recognized that very little could be done to either exact revenge or to force a restitution of their erstwhile possessions in Asia. As Mendonca Furtado and D. Pedro de Lencastre had made clear to the *conselho ultramarino* as early as 1662, the Dutch were "absolute masters" of Asian waters." Exacerbating matters were additional Dutch vexations during these years. As Antonio de Mello de Castro noted in a letter of January 1666, the Dutch had done much more than merely refuse to restore Cochin and Cannanore. They had also captured a Portuguese ship sailing from Brazil to Angola, done much to prevent the *Estado* from retaking its fortresses on the Kanara coast, to upset Portuguese trade in Macassar and elsewhere in Indonesia, and even to have them expelled from Bandar Kung."

Following the accession of Pedro to power, an exceedingly tempting offer for revenge in Asia surfaced in the form of Colbert's Asian strategy. Colbert had begun his bold challenge to Dutch preeminence in the Asian trade, in much the same fashion as he began his internal economic reforms of the 1660s: with the hope that it might be possible to undermine the much vaunted position of the *VAC* by means of "peaceful" economic competition. Operating within the theoretical constraints of mercantilism and its tenets of finite global wealth, he judged the Indian Ocean trade to be the most lucrative in the world, the "only considerable one", which yielded the Dutch over 12,000,000 *liures* annually. This enormous font of merchant capital was not only the cornerstone of the Dutch global commercial edifice, it was also the root of many of France's economic ills. To address this festering inequity in overseas trade, Colbert had formed his own Asian *Compagnie* in September 1664, replete with a mirror image of the corporate structure of the *VAC*, a nominal capital pool of 15,000,000

liures, and monopoly privileges for 50 years. Fleets totaling 14 ships had been sent in 1665-1666 at a cost of over 2,700,000 *livres*. Francois Caron, an experienced Director-General, had begun the daunting task of attempting to enrich the French in the trade. Nevertheless, very little headway had been made in Asia. In a March 1669 *Memoire sur l'etat present de la Compagnie Orientale de France dans l'isle Dauphine et dans les Indes*, Louis's minister sought to address these early problems. By the early spring of 1669, Colbert had in fact decided to fundamentally alter his erstwhile strategy of peaceful trading competition and to instead dispatch a well-armed royal fleet that would once and for all establish French economic power in Asia. This campaign, moreover, was timed to take advantage of and complement Louis's approaching campaign in the Low Countries. A vital component of this strategy was to forge an anti-Dutch triple alliance in Asia with the English and Portuguese. Pedro's response to this alluring missive would largely set the stage for the projected rehabilitation of the *Estado* during the decade and a half which followed."

In March 1669, Colbert had sent off his formal instructions on these negotiations to his ambassador in Lisbon, the marquis de Sainr-Romain. He began this important document by reminding Sainr-Romain that of the four European nations then trading in Asia, the Portuguese had the longest experience and for many years had dominated the commerce of "all the islands of Asia, and established diverse places and considerable posts on the coasts of Africa, Persia, the Indies, China and Japan," noting "that this great power had been notably diminished after the Dutch had introduced their commerce in these same countries, and at present find themselves reduced only to the places of Goa, Diu, and several other less considerable ones of the Coromandel coast". In terms that anticipated the thrust of Sainr-Romain's arguments to the Portuguese Crown, Colbert contrasted the great wealth of the Dutch, whose annual fleets "transported] merchandise to the value of 10-12 million *livres*," and their military power, with "more than 150 ships in the Indies ... land armies of 10,000 to 12,000 men, and at sea 40 to 50 warships," with the poverty and weakness of the *Estado*, "which had neither warships nor ships". According to Colbert, this "prodigious difference" between the powers and the insatiable desire on the part of the Dutch to augment their position and entirely exclude the Portuguese from the trade, necessitated a "powerful and effective remedy", namely, to form a commercial and military "*société*" with a nation of similar interests, not only to combat the nefarious designs of the *VAC*, but also "to take back from them a part of the places that they have usurped by force". In Colbert's view, "only the French," were capable of procuring this great advantage for the Portuguese. Sainr-Romain was therefore ordered to turn the 1667 treaty into a

full-fledged commercial union in Asia, based on reciprocal trading rights and the granting of at least one fortified settlement of the *Estado* to the French."

Saint-Remain presented the French case to Pedro in April 1669 and continued talks well into the new year. In the course of his negotiations, he logically attempted to exploit the influence of the French faction at court; most visibly in the form of the able Marie Françoise, Afonso's erstwhile Queen and Pedro's Princess Regent, as well as the religious affinity between the two Crowns. Following Colbert's advice, he also sought to utilize the thirst for revenge against the heretic Dutch that was virtually endemic in Lisbon at that time, and to stress the admittedly poor performance of the English as allies and saviors for the tottering *Estado* in the years after 1661. This French offer was made at a crucial stage in the history of Portuguese Asia. As noted above, one of the most pressing questions confronting Pedro and his supporters following the ouster of Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor was how to arrest and, if possible, reverse the alarming 17th century decline of the *Estado*. Should the Crown, as with D. Luisa de Cusmao in 1661, embrace a foreign alliance as the basis for such a turnaround, or should peaceful internal reforms be adopted? As Saint-Romain pursued his talks, Pedro was in the midst of resolving this Asian dilemma, a resolution that was no doubt accelerated by the aggressive demands in Colbert's instructions. In 1669, the decision had been made to appoint the capable and experienced Mendonça Furtado as Viceroy, and the royal fleet to carry him to Goa had begun to assemble in the Tagus early the following year. While Saint-Romain was evidently convinced that a grand design was afoot in Lisbon regarding the *Estado*, it was not entirely clear whether this *restorador de Ceilão*, as the new Viceroy was styled, would achieve this notable goal by violent or peaceful means. Beginning in January 1670, the French ambassador, therefore, held a series of meetings with Mendonça Furtado in an attempt to discover the answer to this vital question, while hopefully generating support for the proposed alliance."

In his talks with Lavradio, Saint-Remain received mixed signals. As he informed Colbert and Louis XIV in letters of January and February 1670, the Viceroy had evidenced a "great desire to take some action against the Dutch there", especially one aimed at the reduction of Batavia, which was "the only good place that they had there and is the basis of their power". Moreover, Mendonça Furtado did "not believe that one can diminish the commerce of the Dutch in the Indies without waging war on them there". Drawing on his decades of fighting the Hollanders in Asia, Mendonça Furtado was also willing to furnish Saint-Romain with various stratagem for waging such a war with the *VAC*, including plans to exploit indige-

nous assistance, to undertake "*une simple guerre de pirates*," as well as basing such a struggle from a fortified French base near the straits of Melaka and the center of Dutch power. Nevertheless, he refrained from revealing the exact nature of his instructions from Pedro and continually stopped short of embracing the proposed league with France as the soundest means for restoring the *Estado* to its former glory. As the French ambassador discussed the matter with members of the Council of State like the duke of Cadaval, the marquis of Fronteira, and the marquis of Tavora, and members of the Overseas Council like Salvador Correia de Sá e Benavides, the divisions among Pedro's advisors on the issue became clear."

Nearly all members of the ruling hierarchy in Lisbon believed that a Franco-Dutch rupture in Europe was inevitable. On this point there was very little debate." Rather, the dispute acted out in the *Terreiro do Paço* raged around the question of how best to exploit this impending struggle for the benefit of the realm in general and the *Estado* in particular. Fortunately, the opinions of some of Pedro's most important councilors on this matter have been preserved in a document titled: *Instrucao da Secretaria de Estado e pareceres sobre a liga de Franca e Inglaterra*. The pro-French faction at court, championed by Marie-Francoise and Fronteira, argued that such an opportunity could be exploited "to regain a part of the places they had lost in the Indies".¹² In Fronteira's words, Colbert's proposal offered "the most opportune and desired opportunity that the kingdom could have to restore itself to the most glorious of all the conquests, which is the *Estado da India*". In terms that reflected the mixture of dynastic glory, mercantile benefits, and religious zeal that had long characterized the Portuguese presence of Asia, the marquis concluded: "Without conquests one cannot have capital, [and] it is without doubt true that in order to have a kingdom one has to have conquests, and in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to the honor of God, the glory of the nation, [and] the interest and remedy of your vassals."") The opposing faction, led by Cadaval, was not convinced that the proposed league was the best means to rehabilitate the *Estado*, since external dependence had failed 10 1661 with the English and any league with France would very likely result in renewed warfare with Spain 11 Europe and the Dutch in Asia. In arguing against an external alliance, Cadaval adroitly maintained there was "great doubt of the recovery of India according to the treaty celebrated between Your Majesty and the king of England, [and] if Your Majesty recovers India with the arms of France, that king will want the profit of his expense".¹³

The first official word that Sainr-Romain received on the proposed alliance came in August 1669, in a *consulta* of the Overseas Council. After

summarizing Colbert's offer, this document merely called for a strict adherence to the provisions of the 1667 treaty but very little else. Thus, while Portuguese commanders throughout the *Estado* were instructed to assist French ships in need, it recommended to Pedro that Colbert's *Compagnie* not be allowed to establish trading factories in the port cities of the *Estado*, nor should Lisbon grant one of her fortresses to the French, as Caron and others had suggested and Saint-Rornain had requested in his talks." This news could not have been totally unexpected for the French ambassador, since his dispatches to Colbert throughout the spring and summer of that year indicate that Pedro was being gradually won over by the Cadaval faction with respect to the alliance." Colbert was irked by this initial rebuff from the Portuguese capital. Perhaps he had taken the advice of the Jesuit Damiao Vieira to heart on the willingness of the Portuguese Crown to embrace such an offer, "given its current and pressing need". In any event, his impatience at what he believed was an ill-conceived response emerges from his letters to Saint-Romain, in which he constantly chastised Pedro and his advisors for being "blind" to the grim reality of their situation in Asia. "The Portuguese cannot see clearly what to me appears perfectly obvious, [that] it is impossible for them to exist in the Indies, and resist the power of the Dutch, if they do not align themselves with another European power." Despite his disappointment, Colbert ordered Saint-Romain to press for the league, or failing that, the incorporation of pro-French clauses into the official orders or *regimento* of Mendonca Furtado, as well as permission to build a French naval magazine on the banks of the Tagus."

For the remainder of 1669 and 1670, Saint-Romain indeed continued his talks with the Portuguese hierarchy to little avail. In December 1669, he discussed the matter with Marie-Francoise, who informed him that Schomberg had also raised the issue of granting one of the remaining *fortalezas* to France, a concession that she believed her husband was unlikely to make." Although the ambassador tried to hold out hope of an eventual agreement, it became increasingly obvious that Pedro had been definitively won over by Cadaval's views on the issue. Nevertheless, Saint-Romain informed Paris that he believed his efforts could help contribute to the naming of Tavora as the next viceroy, when Mendonca Furtado's term expired in 1674, an appointment that would bode well for France's ambitions in that region. In the meantime, he argued that the hatred towards the Dutch was such in many areas of the *Estado* that most Portuguese there would offer to assist the French royal fleet then forming, "even without orders from this court". This, of course, would prove to be wishful thinking. Overall, the Portuguese made few concessions beyond the recommendations of the August 1669 *consulta* of the Overseas

Council. Pedro rejected Saint-Remain's call to include pro-French clauses in Mendonça Paredes's formal *regimento*. He did, however, write letters to Portuguese commanders in Brazil and the *Estado* instructing them to favorably receive French ships in their ports. The Prince Regent also acceded to Colbert's demand that a French naval magazine be established along the Tagus, something which might prove to be of benefit to the French navy in the coming European struggle with the Dutch. In turn, Pedro's request that Mendonça Paredes's fleet be allowed to sail to India in the company of Colbert's grand Asian fleet of 1670 was rejected in November 1669, as soon as it became clear that the Portuguese would in all likelihood reject the comprehensive league in Asia that the French were seeking."

Throughout the course of these discussions, English and Dutch diplomats resident in Lisbon were extremely apprehensive about Saint-Romain's efforts. Francis Parry, the English envoy, informed Lord Arlington in August 1669 that he had broached the topic of the French ambassador's orders regarding the Asian trade with the Dutch resident and had been told that the "Srarcj-Gneral] had now Sent him expresse Command to be vigilant in this business, and by all Arts imaginable to hinder its taking effect". "France's rivals were especially wary of the close relationship that seemingly existed between Saint-Romain and Marie-Françoise. A good deal, for example, was made in the diplomatic correspondence with London and The Hague over the prominent role the French ambassador played at the baptism of the royal couple's first child, Dona Isabel Luisa Josefa, in 1669. As Parry advised Arlington in letters of November 1670, these early fears were unfounded. As he wrote: "There has been a Rumour some time about Towne of a League that is making between the French king and this Crowne ... to make a joint warre on the Hollander in the Indies. But there is a Person living in the french Ambassador's house, and very well acquainted with all his actions, who assures me that nothing yet is concluded." A week later, he was able to inform the English secretary of state: "I] now have it from a good hand that the French Ambassador, notwithstanding all his persuasions cannot prevail with these people to engage in any Acts of hostility against the Hollander. ...," Cadaval's arguments on the dubious nature of recovering any Asian territory based on the arms of either England or France, the sincere desire of the populace for the continued peace with Spain, and the simple judgment on the part of the Council of State that the French were still no match for the **VAC** in an open struggle in Asia evidently decided the issue.¹⁰⁹

For the remainder of the period before the outbreak of the Dutch War in the spring of 1672, and for the ensuing seven years of this important

conflict, Pedro never wavered from the wise judgment for peace that he had embraced by early 1670. After his arrival in Goa, Mendonca Furtado would also reject the similar entreaties for an anti-Dutch alliance made by Colbert's Admiral and Viceroy, Jacob Blanquer de La Haye as his grand fleet cruised the west coast of India in the early winter of 1672.⁴⁹ In fact, only one time during this entire period from 1668-1679 does it appear that the Prince Regent and Cadaval may have toyed with the idea of abandoning this policy and breaking with the Dutch. A letter of August 1672, written in the wake of the staggering early losses of the Hollanders at the hands of Louis XIV's massive army in the initial months of the land campaign in Europe, suggests that the pair may have considered joining in the fray to share in the considerable spoils that it then appeared the French king might be ready to win in both Europe and Asia." Even this brief flirtation, however, quickly ended as William of Orange began his notable rehabilitation of the Dutch position in the continental campaign. In the end, therefore, instead of embracing the admittedly timely and attractive French offer for quick revenge against the Dutch for decades of setbacks, Pedro and his closest advisors instead decided to remain as neutral as possible in the conflict, and to utilize the warfare that soon resulted among their European rivals in the Asian trade to initiate badly needed reforms in the *Estado*. This crucial decision, perhaps as much as anything else, argues for the effectiveness of Portuguese diplomacy, both with respect to the European powers established in Asia and the *Reis Yizinbos* in the years after 1668 which facilitated the stabilization process in Portuguese Asia.

VII

An African Eldorado: The Quest for Wealth in Mozambique and the *RiDs de Cuama*, c. 1640-1683

For the Portuguese Crown, the strategic Zambezi River basin or *Rios de Cuama* region as it was known, had long served as the focus of wishful speculation regarding the rich mineral deposits located there. During the early years of the empire, such beliefs had allowed Lisbon to hope for quantities of gold and silver which might equal the riches that the Spanish had found in Mexico and Peru with an accompanying economic boon. In later years, especially in the period under consideration here, these supposed riches were viewed as a mechanism which might help reestablish the golden years of the *Estado da India*. The Portuguese presence in south-east Africa dated from the early 15th century, with main *fortalezas* established on that coast at Mozambique island (1507) and Sofala (1505). In addition, the Crown maintained minor coastal posts at Quelimane (at the mouth of the Zambezi) and Luabo island; along with the interior settlements upriver at Sena and Tete.¹ Relations with the African kingdom of the Monomotapa, the paramount chief of the Makalanga confederacy, had varied widely over the years. Dominican missionaries had traditionally attempted to extend Portuguese power through their proselytizing activities. They had, for example, convinced Monomotapa Mavura (baptized D. Filipe) to allow churches and fairs in Zimbabwe during the 1640s, and also baptized his successor Siti Kazurukumusapa (thereafter D. Domingos) in 1652.² Meanwhile, there had been periodic Portuguese forays inland in search of gold and other lucrative trading goods. Perhaps the best example of such attempts was the Barreto-Homem expedition of 1569-1575, sanctioned by the mercurial boy-king D. Sebastiao, led by the vainglorious Francisco Barreto, and charged with conquering the rich mines of Monomotapa. The inglorious defeat of this expedition and the years of the Spanish captivity which began soon thereafter for a time retarded the formulation and execution of such schemes on the part of the Crown, a 1635 expedition being perhaps the lone exception.³ Nevertheless, resourceful Portuguese adventurers like Manoel Pais de Pinho successfully carved out huge private holdings or *prazos* where they exercised near total authority, intermarried with the indigenous population, and reaped the material benefits of the rich commerce of the region:

The Crown, meanwhile, was content to restrict its presence in that area largely to the fickle authority exercised by the captaincy of Mozambique and Sofala, a lucrative and much desired administrative post that was generally farmed out to the highest bidder, who paid the Crown a fixed sum and in return enjoyed effect control *over* Portuguese interests in the area and a plethora of commercial advantages as well. Not surprisingly this system not only encouraged the type of abuses and corruption typified by the careers of captains like D. Francisco de Lima, but also ensured that private individuals and not the state received the primary commercial and financial benefits that were generated by the region.⁴ As Axelsson has argued, while gold production in south-east Africa may have increased greatly from c. 1580-1600 to perhaps 100,000 *crúzados* a year, "this wealth, however, was of benefit to the lessee of the captaincy, not the state". Another major trade, that in ivory, may have yielded considerable revenue to the state, but provided "still greater profits to the individual". Exacerbating such problems was the unwelcome reality that the captaincy system ensured that the state "was put to great and disproportionate expenses to maintain the Portuguese presence ... in money, in resources, and in lives". The lucrative privileges formally granted to the Captain, and the bevy of ill-gotten gains readily available to an unscrupulous holder of that office, had also created a widening rift between Captaincy and the Portuguese residents of the region. As these *moradores* pointed out in a 1663 petition to the Crown, trade was the basis for their livelihood and the Captaincy system was increasingly depriving them of it. Although various *regimentos* over the years had allowed them to trade between Mozambique and the coast north of Cape Delgado, eastward from the Comoros and Madagascar, and even allowed them 200 *bares* of cloth as a liberty on the annual ship from Goa, the Captains had increasingly confiscated their cargoes and put them in his own warehouse. This practice and other abuses caused the *moradores* to call for the contract being given to private residents of Mozambique and Goa. While the Crown subsequently ordered the Captains to respect such privileges no significant reforms were immediately forthcoming.⁵

In 1656 and again in 1661, Antonio Alvares Pereira sought to rekindle increased Crown interest in the *Rios de Cuama* in long letters extolling the riches of the region. In Pereira's words: "The *Rios* are very extensive lands, and abundant in minerals, as much in gold as in copper, iron, and silver." Cotton, wood for building boats, fertile land for growing wheat, rice, and corn all existed there and could benefit the Crown. A link across the continent to Angola could also be forged. According to Pereira, the major problem in exploiting all these potentialities was "the lack of Portuguese inhabitants" living there. He estimated that perhaps as few as 80

cazados currently resided in the region. He concluded, however, that an investment of 30,000 *xerafins* in the coming year could fund the settling of a nucleus of new families there, a start that should be supplemented each monsoon with additional arrivals.' In April 1662, D. Luisa de Cusmao ordered Antonio de Mello de Castro to thank Antonio Alvares Pereira for his second letter on the *Rios de Cuama* and to investigate all the possibilities raised in this document. The Viceroy was also expected to discuss the matter with the Goa Council of State and come up with formal recommendations for the Crown.' In December of that year, Mello de Castro reported his findings in a letter to the Queen Regent. The Viceroy concurred with the glowing report of Pereira: "There is no doubt that the land of the *Rios* is a great thing and of considerable importance." Yet, any plans to increase the Portuguese presence in south-east Africa had to be severely tempered by three unwelcome realities: (1) the plethora of other demands on Lisbon and Goa; (2) the depleted state of the *Fazenda Real*; and (3) the rather daunting specter of the **VAC** in the general region of the Cape of Good Hope and beyond. All the same, the Viceroy promised to do everything he could to assist the region, provided it did not interfere with the *contracto* rights of the Captain of Mozambique and Sofala." For the remainder of the 1660'S, however, neither Lisbon nor Goa was in a position to act on the recommendations of Pereira nor anyone else. Serious efforts to exploit the potential of the *Rios de Cuama* region would have, like many aspects of the rehabilitation campaign of the *Estado*, have to await the accession to power of Pedro.

Interestingly enough, it was at least in part the work of Colbert's new *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* on nearby Madagascar that prompted the Prince Regent and his advisors to take a more active interest in developing Mozambique and the *Rios de Cuama*. French efforts to colonize Madagascar had been underway for some time. Richelieu's *Compagnie d'Criern* and even earlier private entities had all sought to establish a French presence on this strategic island as a precursor to entering the Indian Ocean trade proper. In 1654, for example, a French ship had put into Mozambique from Fort Dauphin in search of supplies, convincing D. Francisco de Lima and others of even more competition in the years to come." Colbert's well funded *Compagnie* had also centered its early activities on Madagascar. French fleets of 1665 and 1666 destined for the island comprised some 18 ships; and carried officers, crews, infantry companies, and colonists totaling more than 2500 people. The cost of these initial forays came to c. 2,760,000 *livres*.' As early as March 1666, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor had ordered Sac Vicente to take extraordinary care in reinforcing Mozambique given the increasing threat that the French Company posed." Colbert was clearly serious about his desire to break into the

Indian Ocean trade. Just as importantly, he then enjoyed the firm support of Louis XIV in this quest. Unfortunately for Lisbon, the original target of these commercial affections was dangerously close to Mozambique and the *Rios*, the very area that Pedro, Cadaval and others would increasingly coming to view as a locus for Crown activities which could compensate for earlier losses to the Dutch and ^{III} doing so serve as something of a cornerstone for a rehabilitated *Estado da India*."

Beginning in 1669, Pedro and his advisors began a concerted effort to address the lingering problems with Mozambique and the *Rios*. As noted above, the decision of the Prince Regent at about this same time to reject Colbert's tempting offer of an alliance against the Dutch certainly facilitated the ability of the Crown to undertake badly needed reforms in this region. Pedro, Cadaval, and members of the Council of State and Overseas Council considered available documentation on the issue including letters from Pereira, Manoel Barreto (1667), D. Antonio Lobo da Sylveira (c.1668), and D. Francisco de Lima. A *consulta* of the Overseas Council dated May 1669 summarized the general consensus of these reports: namely that major reforms were needed in order to rehabilitate the region and by extension the *Estado*. According to the Council, the problems in Mozambique and the *Rios* along with "new conquest that the French are making on the Island of Sdo Lourenco, together constitute a very important matter, and embody prejudicial consequences to the conservation of the *Estado da India*". Nearly all of these reports called for the abolition of the *coruracto* as a precondition for reform, with the trade to the *Rios* opened to all subjects provided custom duties were paid. Lima argued that the fortress at Sofala should be dismantled since the trade there had dwindled badly. He also proffered that corruption could be cut down by instituting a *cofre* with 3 keys in the future for all transactions involving the Royal Treasury. Sylveira called for increased fortifications in Quelimane, Linde, Luabo and Sofala. Barreto also offered a most grandiose plan for the systematic conquest of the region by a conquering *capitao-mor*. This African conquistador would begin at Sena, wielding a force of some 12,000 warriors, slaves, and 300 mulattos with firearms along with 100 Portuguese musketeers. In his view, this force would be capable of reducing Murrumbala, Tonga lands, Karangaland, and Butua. Large estates could be carved out of these conquests and at that point the other universal recommendations of these reports could follow: the introduction of significant numbers of Portuguese settlers from the mainland and empire.;

Many of these suggested reforms echoed recommendations made by Antonio de Mello de Castro and Sac Vicente from 1664-1667. Mello de Castro had urged that the *contracto* system be reformed, that financial

abuses be curbed in part by adopting 3 key chests and that the attempt of the new Captain D. Manoe! de Mascarenhas to restore and extend the fortifications of fort S. Sebastiao at Mozambique be assisted by the Crown, since "upon the security of it depends the conservation of this *Estado*".¹⁶ Sac Vicente had also railed against the frequent abuses of the Captains, whose ill-gotten fortunes had allowed them to buy anything they desired and ignore the just complaints of the clerics and *casados* of the region: "I will only say to Your Majesty that India will not be won by the Dutch, but lost by [such] unpunished injustices and tyrannies."" There can be very little doubt that the cumulative effect of all of these documents not only motivated the reforms of the ,670S but also set the guidelines for them as well. The exact timing of Pedro's actions, however, may have also been tied to continuing French activities off south-east Africa. In addition to undertaking diplomatic negotiations with Pedro regarding an anti-Dutch alliance, Saint-Remain had also kept busy informing Paris of the supposed riches of the *Rios* region. In a letter of February 1670, he advised Colbert: "The Portuguese have always believed they have rich and abundant gold mines ... where the Cuama river flows." In the French ambassador's view, since the Portuguese did not "have a settlement within 60 leagues of the mouth of this river," Colbert's *Compagnie* might easily accomplish something. With an eye towards a future reconnaissance of the area by the formidable royal fleet under La Haye then departing from Rochefort, he provided the following information: "The mouth of the Cuama river is on the coast of Africa opposite from the isle Dauphine [Madagascar] between 22 degrees of latitude and the Tropic of Capricorn."" The increasing interest of the French in the *Rios* and the impending arrival of Colbert's grand Asian fleet in the waters off south-east Africa apparently convinced Pedro and his supporters that forceful actions were necessary in order to safeguard this crucial area to the *Estado da India*.¹⁹

After extensive discussions, Pedro first informed Mendonca Furtado of an impending shift in Crown policy regarding Mozambique and the *Rios* in a letter of March 1671. The Prince Regent informed his Viceroy that he had decided to send an infantry company of 100 men, munitions, and arms to assist the fortress of Mozambique in the coming monsoon. Orders had been given to improve the fortifications there, and a new *polvarista* would stop there on his way to the *Caza da Polvara* in Ooa. New accounting procedures would also be instituted to cut down on financial irregularities. Perhaps more importantly, the Prince Regent informed Mendonca Furtado that beginning with the next appointment of a Captain, the contract of a trading monopoly would perhaps be taken away from that position, and instead the commerce of Mozambique and

the *Rios* would be free to all Portuguese subjects on payment of custom duties. These duties, it was assumed, would compensate for the loss of monies yielded from farming out the captaincy. The Viceroy and Treasury Council would be charged with establishing the *alfandega* in Mozambique and selecting its officers. Pedro, however, indicated that he would await Mendonca Furtado's advice before taking a final resolution on the issue.¹⁰

In October 1671, the Viceroy responded to this letter. Mendonca Furtado had been forced to "winter" at Mozambique and appreciated its importance as perhaps the most important fortress in the *Estado*. Nevertheless, his long experience in Asia convinced him that the Crown was considering an ill-advised course of action. Mendonca Furtado argued that while the monopoly contract with the Captain may not have been good for the vassals of the Crown, experience demonstrated that opening the *Rios* to free trade would be even less useful to the Treasury and Pedro's subjects. In language that embraced certain tenets of mercantilism, the Viceroy maintained that such a radical shift in policy would unleash potentially dangerous economic forces, with consequences not easily remedied from Lisbon or Goa. Moreover, the influx of textiles and other goods into the *Rios* would deflate prices and reduce the yields of any *alfândega*, whose receipts could thus not be expected to cover the revenue lost by abandoning the contract."

After consultations with the Treasury Council, Mendonca Furtado offered a somewhat less sweeping scheme to the Crown. An *estaque* or Crown authorized monopoly run for the benefit of the *Fazenda Real* could be established which could carry on the trade for Mozambique and the *Rios*. This entity would control the level of goods imported and exported from the region, thus ensuring stable prices and returns; some products might even be opened to private traders with customs duties paid at an *alfândega* at Mozambique. Mendonca Furtado proffered that since the economic potential of the region was so great, with 100,000-200,000 *cruzados* being made by men without much capital, the Crown might expect to make a handsome return from such a system. As a final critique of Pedro's idea, the Viceroy also offered that the main beneficiaries of such an action would most likely be indigenous Canarim and Hindu merchants. On related issues, Mendonca Furtado reported that he would send along a plan for the new fortifications of the fortress of S. Sebastian. Engineers accompanying his fleet had begun exterior work during his stay there, fixing the parapets on the ramparts and making them more useful for protecting artillery. A lack of manpower had delayed work on building new bastions. Nevertheless, the Viceroy proffered that it was not necessary to worry about a prolonged siege of the place

since within two months all of the besiegers would probably perish from disease. Nearly 250 men aboard his Viceregal fleet had died while wintering there and this harsh attrition rate could similarly be expected to affect any enemy troops.²¹

In early March 1672, before receiving these letters, Pedro resolved to abolish the monopoly contract system for the Captain of Mozambique and Sofala. In letters of March 7-8, the Viceroy was informed that based on the advice of his Overseas and Treasury Councils, the Prince Regent had decided to suspend the *contracto* and instead substitute *comercio livre* for Mozambique and the *RiDS de Cuama*? The following day a formal *alvara* was issued by Pedro that henceforth established free trade for all of his vassals resident in Portugal, the Atlantic islands, Brazil, and other conquests; the right to send vessels to trade on the African coast between the Cape of Good Hope and Guardafui in all goods, including pepper, cloves, cinnamon, and slaves without impediment, provided customs duties were paid. This new system would ideally commence in March 1673 and one of the prime reasons for undertaking this radical shift in policy was to facilitate the settling of the *Rios* with Portuguese subjects. The *alvara* would be posted in all the main public places of the *imperio*, and precise orders given to the Viceroy and all other officials not to intercept nor interfere with the commerce that would result. That same day, the Overseas Council approved a list of 24 skilled stonemasons, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and carpenters that were to be sent to Mozambique aboard the *Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e Santo Antonio* to assist with the work of improving the fortifications there."

By September 1672, Mendonca Purtado's letters criticizing this bold free trade plan had reached Lisbon and been debated by the Overseas Council. In a *consulta* of the fifth day of that month, this body recommended a compromise position. While the Crown had taken its original decision in order to save the *Rios* by populating them, the Viceroy evidently believed that his *estanque* plan would also achieve this end. Nevertheless, the Council recommended that this scheme only be applied to the erstwhile area of the *contracto* in Mozambique and the *Rios*. The rest of the African coast should indeed be subject to the provisions of the free trade *aloara* of the previous March. Mendonca Furtado should be apprised of this decision without delay and he should immediately order it into effect since: "This business is of the utmost importance for the conservation of the *Estado da India*." These prompt actions would also allow the Viceroy to select an experienced group of private citizens to form a *Junta* to oversee the activities of the *eetanque*." On September 22, Pedro forwarded the advice of his Council while informing Mendonca Furrado that he had decided to defer to his Viceroy's vast experience on such mat-

ters, allowing him to do what was best for the interests of the Crown, the *Estado*, royal and private profit, the conservation of Mozambique and the settlement of the *Rios*."

In Goa, Mendonça Furtado had continued to lobby against the implementation of the free trade system. In January 1672, he probably encouraged Antonio Colaco da Silva to compile a long report, ultimately destined for Pedro's eyes, on the state of Mozambique and the *Rios*, arguing against the implementation of *comercio livre*." In September 1672, at the same time as the Overseas Council was recommending a compromise solution, the Viceroy embarked a second series of letters on the issue aboard the *Bom [ezus de Nazareth]*. There was no disputing the fact that Mozambique and the *Rios* badly needed attention: additional settlers, a stronger military presence, and better administration. Yet, while this *banda* was of the utmost importance, "it would be so prejudicial to have the *Rios* open [to free trade]". The Captains may have paid c. 30,000 *cruzados* per year but under an *estaque* system, an efficient *Junta* could easily generate 60,000 *cruzados* a year. This sum could be used to offset the expenses of the *praca*. Moreover, the restoration of Mozambique would also help the economic vitality of the Province of the North, whose traditional trade to south-east Africa had sometimes yielded some 50,000 *xerafins* a year in *alfândega* receipts before the abuses of the Captains and the ravages of the Omanis had begun. The idea of allowing merchants from Brazil and the rest of the empire to profit from this trade was also an anathema to Mendonça Furtado since "great harm" would be done to vassals in Goa, Chaul, Bassin, Daman, and Diu who, given recent losses to the VOC, did not have many other trading options."

In January 1673, this pressing matter was finally resolved. After consultations with the State and Treasury Councils of Goa, the Viceroy established a *Tribunal da Junta do Comercio de Moçambique e Rios*. According to the *regimento* of the 23 January that set up this body, six officials would henceforth direct the trade of Mozambique and the *Rios*: a superintendent, a *castelão*, and *ouvidor*, the *Restor* of the College of S. Paul, and the Prior of the Convent of S. Domingos, and finally an "*bomem de negocio e trato de Mossambique*", nominated by the Viceroy. According to this *regimento*, the principal role of the *Junta* was to manage this commerce for the benefit of the *Fazenda Real*: overseeing the procurement, financing and shipping of products in a timely fashion, determining "just" prices, establishing a distribution network throughout the *Rios*, and enforcing the Crown's monopoly privileges over the trade. *Fazendas de lei* including Ivory, gold, gunpowder, and firearms constituted a Crown monopoly, while *fazendas livres* could be imported and exported by private subjects, provided that customs duties of 5% were paid at the

alfandega established at Mozambique. Mozambique would thus effectively act as the focal point of the *Junta's* administrative and commercial network. The superintendent was expected to utilize royal functionaries at Cape Correnres, Sena, Quelimane, and Sofala and their hinterlands to obtain trading goods that would eventually be shipped via "cafilas", along with appropriate *fazendas livres* to Mozambique for eventual shipment to Goa and the major ports of the Province of the North. Conversely, textiles and other goods from India would arrive at Mozambique and thereafter be distributed to the subordinate settlements."

In the same packet of letters in which Mendonca Furtado informed the Prince Regent that the *Junta* had been constituted, he also notified Lisbon of recent reports indicating that rich silver deposits had been found in the *Rios*. The Viceroy lamented that he lacked sufficient men to exploit these possibilities and predictably called for additional manpower and fortifications. "I think that if it is as these men say that there will not be in India more riches than the *Rios* promises." Men of quality were needed to mine these riches, men that should first be sent to Goa to acclimatize to a tropical climate before heading for the more difficult environment of Mozambique where so many Portuguese soldiers and sailors had died over the years from disease. Fortifications for places like Sofala would be expensive, but Mendonca Furtado hoped that these expenses could be offset either from profits from the *estaque* in the *Rios* or by a direct barter arrangement through the Crown's officers." Even before receiving this news, Pedro had been encouraged to undertake more aggressive military measures in the region. The Overseas Council in an *advizo* of September 1673 had highlighted the relatively troubled economic state of the *imperio*, including Africa and Brazil, and recommended among other things that the Crown undertake an expedition to the *Rios*, so "abundant in gold, ivory, and amber," from which "many neighboring kingdoms have taken many millions". In the view of his councilors, who invoked the examples of D. Manoel I and the Spanish conquests in the New World, only bold, prompt, actions would suffice: "Your Majesty should order everything attempted, and everything discovered, because nothing is more evident than these foundations, in order to obtain great riches."³¹

In the meantime, Mendonca Furtado was attempting the difficult work of establishing the *Junta* and its trade. Manoel Serrao Alfaya had originally been selected to serve as the *Provedor mor da Fazenda dos Cantos* and superintendent and he had sailed for Mozambique in January 1673." Unfortunately, as Joao de Sousa Freire informed the Viceroy in September of that year, Alfaya had died "a few days after his arrival". He had been replaced by Antonio Correa de Sá.³² Other notables on the *Junta* included Ignacio Sarmiento de Carvalho, former Captain of Cochin; the

reitor of the College of S. Paul, Sebastiao d'Almeida; and the Chancellor of the *Estado*, Francisco Cabral Almada. joao do Valle Lemos was appointed to serve as Secretary and *contador da [azenda dos Cantos]*. Initial problems with the new system were daunting." Antonio Lobo da Silva, a very rich landowner in the region had been spreading news that the whole African coast was open to free trade, as Pedro had initially intended, thus complicating the task of the *Junta*. The actions of other Portuguese subjects had also resulted in warfare with the Tongas and Manica, relations with the Monomorapa were hardly better given continuing usurping of the emperor's lands by Portuguese adventurers. The naval power of the Omanis also posed a threat to the *cafila* system that *junta* proposed to undertake along the east Africa coast. The garrison and fortifications at Mozambique remained in an inadequate state to meet these challenges. Finally, the example of the voyage of the *Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e Santa Antonio*, which had carried Serrao Alfaya to Mozambique showed that the *liberdades* carried would probably be far in excess in what should have been allowed.¹⁵ The only good news initially was that Sousa Freire had sent silver samples to Goa which promised great future wealth; wealth which might even allow the Portuguese to have a "great treasury in India", redeem all their past debts and purchase goods to a degree which would threatened the position of the V.Oc.¹⁶ In January 1674, Mendonca Furtado informed Pedro that the Jesuit Andre Furtado was returning to Lisbon and would inform the Crown of everything that was being done and should be done to exploit the potential of the *Rios*.¹⁷

That same month, the Deputies of the *junta* furnished a detailed account of their early activities to the Overseas Council and Crown. In September 1673, they managed to send *roupas* to the same value as the Captain of Mozambique to the *Rios*. Unfortunately, the untimely death of Serrao Alfaya had caused the trade to be a bit *atrasado* at the outset. Correa de Sá had demonstrated great skills at the *Fazenda Real* but a dearth of initial capital for the *Junta* had undermined their actions and undermined their credit. Sales of this original shipment of textiles had also been slower than anticipated because joao de Sousa Freire had also flooded the market with *roupas* during the final captaincy of the old system. The Deputies believed that future years would be more lucrative and that once some profits had been generated the trade and the *junta's* credit would be substantially improved. Moreover, in their view, Pedro could not conserve anything more important in Europe or Asia than the *Rios*. The lack of a sizable Portuguese community along the course of the Zambezi remained a fundamental problem for the success of the *Junta*. One way to remedy this "depopulation" was to send ships each year loaded with orphan girls from the *Reino* who, in a time honored practice, might

be provided with estates in the *Rios* as dowries in order to attract husbands and thus populate the region. On a related issue, the *Deputies* argued that the Crown should do everything it could to improve the economic state of Diu, which had traditionally maintained strong trading ties with Mozambique and the *Rios*, but which had recently suffered some exceedingly difficult years."

The Viceroy spent the next two years dealing with such problems and considering these and additional recommendations of the *Deputies*. The *Junta*, for example, had also asked that six small frigates with a crew of 40 be stationed at Mozambique to protect the trade on that coast. To reduce the traditionally high attrition rate among Crown troops at that fortress, the Superintendent and his colleagues had also recommended that a proper hospital be established that could be staffed by the Order of Sac jofio de Deus, which was noted for performing such work. More settlers and more fortifications were also needed in order to solidify the Portuguese presence in that region and to guarantee the success of the *Junta*. Individual members of the *Junta* had also made more specific suggestions. The Superintendent Correa de Sá urged the appointment of a person of authority by the Crown in order to reduce Portugal's wayward subjects and enemies in south-east Africa to obedience. Such actions could not be delayed, since the salvation of the *Estado* and the *Reino* rested on the successful exploitation of the wealth of the *Rios*!" The Chancellor of the *Estado*, Francisco Cabral Almeida, in a long letter of November 1674 asked that a fortifications be undertaken at Quelimane, both to preempr the intrusion of any European rivals into the area, and to make the new monopoly and *alfandega* system more effective." Although Mendonca Furtado was able to inform Pedro in December of that same year that the first fruits of the *Junta* had been harvested, 70 *oncas* of amber that had reached Goa in September 1674, daunting problems certainly remained.'

In January 1675, Lavradio addressed many of these initial problems with the *Junta*. The very capable former captain of Mozambique and 50-fala, joao de Sousa Freire, was sent back to the *Rios* as Captain-general with 40 Portuguese soldiers. He was charged with quieting problems with the Karanga and Manica and with negotiating the matter of opening the recently discovered silver mines. The abuses of the *reiigiosos* emboldened by the belief that they were "absolute masters" there and beyond, were also to be addressed by the new Captain-general.' The following January, Mendonca Furtado informed Pedro that constraints imposed upon him by the relatively depleted state of the royal treasury would not allow him to provide the 6 frigates requested by the *Junta*; two however were eventually provided. The activities of the *Junta* had also been undermined by the arrival of a ship directly from Brazil that had conducted a brisk busi-

ness and thus deprived the *estaque* of badly needed capital. Moreover, a ship coming from Cape Correntes had gone down with 150 bars of ivory. He favored a hospital run by the order of S. [oa]o de Deus, but once again money remained a problem. The Viceroy certainly agreed with the need for sending Portuguese couples to the *Rios*, but argued that Goa as the capital of the *Estado* also needed such subjects and thus could not spare any for Africa. Instead, Mendonça Furtado suggested that Pedro could attract such settlers in the islands where many were poor and orphaned and could be convinced by the lure of wealth and property."

In Lisbon, the Overseas Council also devoted much energy from 1675-1677 seeking to solidify the Portuguese presence in Mozambique and economic activities of the new *Junta* in the *Rios*. In *consultas* of January 1675, this body had been largely content to recommend the adoption of the initial demands of the *Junta's* Deputies, while doubting that sufficient funds existed to fundamentally reform the government of the *Rios*. Salvador Correa de Sá had also urged that a person "of total authority" be appointed immediately to the area in order to reduce Portugal's enemies and subjects to obedience. Correa de Sá called for such strong actions since upon the conservation of that conquest rested "the salvation of India, and also of this kingdom". He also argued that a ship should be sent to the *Rios* during the next monsoon, carrying 100 couples that could help populate the region and solidify the Portuguese presence there. This suggestion had been subsequently seized upon by the Council as a whole, which recommended that both couples and Crown orphans should be sent out, the latter provided with dowries in the form of either access to royal offices or perhaps even Crown lands to facilitate suitable marriages." In March 1675, Pedro confirmed the Letters-Patent creating the *Junta*. The Prince Regent also ordered that Mendonça Furtado do everything possible to help populate the region and to use all of his powers to staff treasury, war, and judicial positions with the best candidates available in the *Estado*."

By mid-1676, further deliberations of the Council, a process that included reviewing Manoel Barreto's 1667 memorandum and other key papers, had yielded a much more aggressive strategy for exploiting the potential of Mozambique and the *Rios*. In a *consulta* of June of that year, the Council recommended that a large expedition be dispatched from Lisbon under the command of a *capitão-geral* of "talent, experience, and reputation". This royal officer would be independent of the Goa Viceroy, and would be charged with establishing a separate government, towns and in fact a new colony for the Crown. The cost of this expedition was rather modestly judged to be in the vicinity of 250,000 *cruzados*, a sum that could easily be recouped from increased custom revenues generated by trade in the region. As the council argued, not only would the Crown

and its subjects profit from such an arrangement, but a notable increase in Christianity would also result in those pagan parts." While Pedro may have been impressed by this plan, it appears that the estimated cost of the expedition as well as the financial and administrative complexities of establishing a new government hierarchy in Mozambique convinced him to delay implementing the project. For the next six months or so, nothing more seems to have come of this radical proposal. It was only at the end of that year and in the early months of 1677 that the Prince Regent would come to embrace a modified version of the June 1676 plan for entrenching Portuguese power in the region.

In December 1676, the *Conselho Ultramarine* reiterated several of the crucial points made in its June *consulta*: settlers should be sent out forthwith with estates granted to them, efforts should also be made to extract the gold that had been found in the region, additional fortifications should also be constructed to defend the *Rios* against incursions from rival European powers, and finally some steps should be taken to facilitate the eventual separation of the government of Mozambique from that of the rest of the *Estado*. In its December *consulta*, the Council offered several specific recommendations on these issues. Twenty married couples should be dispatched in the coming sailing season. In order to defend the area from any real or imagined threats from the Dutch at the Cape or the French on the island of Bourbon, Quelimaine, at the mouth of the Zambezi, should be suitably fortified." Sometime between the discussions that resulted in this *consulta* and the annual packets dispatched aboard the 1677 Viceregal fleet that would carry D. Pedro de Alrneida to Goa, both Pedro and the Council came to embrace an even more forceful strategy for safeguarding Portuguese interests in south-east Africa. On April 4, 1677, the Prince Regent informed Ameida of these new plans. As Pedro related, the great economic and geopolitical importance of the *Rios* and Mozambique to the *Estado* and *Reino*, when combined with continuing "disorders" in that region with indigenous powers and threats from other European nations had convinced him to send a powerful royal fleet to once and for all entrench Portuguese power in that region. This fleet would depart from Lisbon the following September and consist of five ships carrying 600 infantry troops and their officers as well as 50 married couples to populate the region. These settlers would disembark at Quelimane."

The new Viceroy would proceed as usual to Goa with his fleet. After disembarking, he was ordered to do his utmost to gain all relevant information about conditions in the *Rios*. He was then to hand over the reins of government to a governing council and then sail for Mozambique in order to join up with the squadron then on its way from Lisbon. Once he

had reached south-east Africa, Almeida was authorized to assume the title of Viceroy from the Cape of Good Hope to that of Delgado, technically including the nearby adjacent islands. One of his first acts was to utilize this formidable military force to punish the actions of Muslim rulers along that coast including most notably the sultan of Pate. After a two or three year term, he was then ordered to hand over control of this new administrative unit to the capable joao de Sousa Freire. To prepare for this great expedition and settlement scheme, a pinnacle would be sent out directly to Mozambique with news of the plan. The Superintendent of the *Junta* and other officials would be instructed to gather as many provisions as possible from the mainland, the islands offshore as well as Madagascar and concentrate such stores at Quelimane in preparation for the arrival of the expedition in early 1678." Sousa Freire was also ordered to do his utmost to facilitate the scheme, and remain in power until the arrival of D. Pedro de Almeida." In April 1677, the new Viceroy sailed from Lisbon aboard the galleon *S. Pedro da Ribeira*"

Throughout the spring and summer of 1677, Pedro and Cadaval sought to utilize the royal bureaucracy to help raise the 600 infantrymen and 50 married couples foreseen in their plan. District governors throughout the kingdom received letters from the Prince Regent ordering them to call for suitable volunteers "of robust age" from the soldiers under their command. These men might even be married, provided their wives and children were willing to accompany them for the six years of service that had been deemed necessary. All such volunteers were ordered to be in Lisbon by the end of July. To attract suitable settlers, young couples with children who were still able to "propagate" were to be recruited. Decrees were also issued which heralded the mineral wealth of the region. Each couple would receive some 20 *milreis* with a supplement for children, along with provisions for the voyage and a short time thereafter. To offset the traditional image of Mozambique as a graveyard for generations of Portuguese soldiers and sailors on the *Carreira* voyage, settlement, it was said, would only be undertaken in a very healthy place, where the climate would be as mild as that in Portugal! Each settler would not only receive land to farm, but also would be able to pass this property on to his heirs. Any skilled artisan that embarked would also receive the tools and materials of his particular trade. Blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, and farmers were especially encouraged to apply for the scheme at the *Casa da India* in Lisbon by the middle of August. The specifics of this joint military-settlement scheme largely followed the outlines established for it in a memorandum entitled: *Relacao do que seia necessaria para a povoacao dos rios de Cuama, a dispender dos officios*, evidently compiled sometime in late 1676, early 1677."

According to the extant documentation, it appears that a substantial number of applications resulted from this campaign. These documents were reviewed by the *Conselha Ultramarino* and thereafter submitted to the Prince Regent for final approval. Among those accepted were 8 "reclaimed women". Settlers might also come from the ranks of foreigners and several indeed applied, including at least one Irishman. Initially, 20 missionaries were to accompany the expedition, in the end only 5 embarked. To facilitate the work of the order of Sac joao de Deus at the new hospital in Mozambique, a physician-in-chief, a surgeon-in-chief, two barbers, and a pharmacist were recruited. Pedro and Cadaval also appointed a series of Crown officials for the region including an *ouvidor-geral*, a *vedor*, a *contador-geral* and a *mestre de campo*" As Eric Axelson aptly declared: the "*Conselho Ultramarine* was indefatigable in organizing the expedition and providing against every eventuality"." Perhaps more importantly, the RIDS expedition reflected the great strides in the Indian Ocean that had been made by the Crown; the degree of interest that Pedro placed on rehabilitating the *Estado*; the pivotal role the *Rios* would ideally play in that process; and the wisdom of avoiding involvement in the Third Dutch War, a decision which greatly facilitated the ability to form and dispatch such a substantial fleet.

This expedition ultimately consisted of four royal ships and one frigate outfitted at the expense of the *Junta*. The *capitania*, the *nao São Bernardo* carried c. 415 persons (295 of them soldiers); the *nao Conceição* and the *Junta* frigate were to carry some 246 persons each (167 of them soldiers); the pinnacle *S. Joao de Deus* carried some 130 persons (including c. 65 soldiers); and the *charrua Nossa Senhora da visitacao* sailed with 120 persons (36 of them soldiers), excluding the settlers that also embarked on this ship." The expedition sailed in October 1677 with, in the slightly exaggerated terms of the English envoy in Madrid: "At least 2,000 persons, men, women, and children to inhabit that place whence is expected great store of Gold."⁶ It is unfortunate that the extant documentation tells us very little indeed about the subsequent history of this fleet and the settlement component of Pedro's grand plan for the *Rios*. It is probable that the expedition reached Mozambique in early 1678, and the settlers thereafter began there dispersal throughout the region. Axelson has argued that since joao Sousa de Freire had made the voyage to India in the period immediately preceding their arrival not much had been done to prepare for their settlement." Nevertheless, even if this was the case, it is possible that other royal officials or servants of the *Junta* might have facilitated the settlement plan. In any event, the Crown remained committed to the scheme. In October 1678, 25 settlers reached the *Rios*, while in 1679 another 52 arrived aboard the *Nossa Senhora de Guia*. The ultimate impact of this

plan on the Portuguese presence in the region is difficult to gauge. There can be little doubt, however, that the harsh climate and other factors certainly continued to undermine this serious Crown attempt to implant significant number of Crown subjects in the *Rios*.

Fortunately, a good deal more evidence has survived relating to the military component of the great *Rios* expedition of 1677. D. Pedro de Almeida reached Goa in October 1677.⁵⁹ For the next month, Almeida dealt with administrative and religious issues while preparing for his voyage to Mozambique. On December 6, the Viceroy held a formal session with the Council of State on the expedition to the *Rios*, in particular he sought advice on where the expected colonists should be settled and how to best exploit the military might of the five ships and 600 troops from Lisbon. These issues were discussed among the council members including the Archbishop of Goa, D. Frei Antonio Brandao; the *Vedor Cera! da [azenda]*, Antonio Paes de Sande; the *capitao-mor das naos da India*, D. Rodrigo da Costa; and the Inquisitor-general Francisco d'Algado Mates. By the end of this session, it appears that no definite decision had been made on any exact settlement location within the *Rios*.⁶⁰

As for the military priorities, Almeida and the Council decided to use most of the force Pedro was providing to settle old scores with Arab rulers along the African coast, especially the sultan of Pate. By the late 17th century, the Ba Barayk dynasty had created perhaps the most significant power in the Swahili region of Africa. This dynasty had Arabian roots, Shihr in the Hadramaut, and its rulers constructed the great center of Islamic culture in the region. Not surprisingly, the successive sultans of Pate had sought to expel the Portuguese from their remaining settlements on that coast, had overthrown indigenous rulers who had traditionally favored the interests of the Iberians including the prince of Paza (or Ampasa), and had welcomed the trade of the Omanis from their possessions.⁶¹ By the end of 1677, Almeida had decided to reassert Portuguese power on the Swahili coast. As the Council of State *assento* stated: the Prince of Paza would be restored to his kingdom "punishing the king of Pate who has revealed himself against this State, negating the obedience and vassalage that he should have for His Majesty ... [and] out of hatred for us admitting the trade of the Arab enemies of this State and prohibiting ours to the great prejudice of our *altandega* rights".⁶² Of course, Almeida and Pedro expected at least two immediate benefits from these actions: favorable trading concessions from the restored potentate, and the alleviation of the significant expenses that the prince of Paza had been occurring during his exile in Goa.

On the 14th of January, in preparation for D. Pedro de Almeida's departure, the letters of succession were opened in the *Salla Real* of the Vice-

roy's palace in Goa. These letters named the Archbishop of Goa, D. Frei Antonio Brandao; the *Vedor-geral* Antonio Paes de Sande; and the Chancellor Francisco Cabral da Almeida to the Governing Council that would rule following Almeida's departure. Since Cabral da Almeida was already dead, the other two men assumed control of government." The Viceroy then sailed for Mozambique on the 27th of that month with a three ship flotilla: the *Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes*, the *Nossa Senhora dos Millagres*, and the *São Paulo*, the last outfitted at the expense of the *Junta*." D. Pedro de Almeida's arrival in south-east Africa was not ideally timed at least with respect to the *Rios* settlement scheme. Embassies exchanged with the Monomotapa, as well as letters from the captain of Zimbabwe, during the spring of 1678 confirmed that a smallpox epidemic was then ravaging, exacerbated by other maladies as well. Huge mortality rates had resulted: few men were left to work the paramount chief's mines, a force sent out to attack the Tongas had been decimated by disease, and the traditional trading fairs of Ongo and Dambarare had also been ravaged by outbreaks. The economic power of Canarins, as well as the mercantile activities of the Dominicans in the region also complicated life for the *Junta*. The Viceroy, however, had determined to pursue his military strategy against the Muslim powers along the coast, and he would not delay this campaign in order to assist either the settlement plan of Pedro or the fledgling actions of the *Junta da Comercio*, initiatives that were largely left to fend for themselves in the years that followed.'

As the Viceroy sailed north toward the island of Pate, he possessed a formidable military force. His three-ship flotilla from Goa had been joined with the five-ship fleet that Pedro had sent out in October 1677. The Portuguese anchored off Pate on August 9, 1678 and three days later the troops disembarked. The sultan's forces were driven back from the beaches. A number of fortified positions were established around the main town on the island and a siege begun. For the next four months, Almeida and his officers conducted this siege in the face of mounting problems. The heat of course was oppressive, sorties from the town were common, supplies of meat, dried fish, and biscuits were soon depleted, and pinnaces sent to the nearby Querimba islands did not return." Fortunately, Almeida did receive assistance from Goa. The very capable Anronio Paes de Sande had promised in his discussion with the Viceroy to aide the expedition in every possible way, and this he did. Soon after beginning the siege, Almeida had sent the frigate *Nossa Senhora de Pilar* back to Goa with news and the request for munitions and provisions. As Paes de Sande informed Pedro in January 1679, he had done his utmost to provide such supplies including six artillery pieces to facilitate the siege, using monies from the increasingly lucrative *estanque de tabaco*. "Because I

have always believed that it is best not to separate the advantages and interests of India, from those of Mozambique, holding as truth that one can not operate in this fashion," improving conditions in south-east Africa would not result in losing India. The *Pilar* and two other ships were evidently sent back to Pate, perhaps with the long suffering Prince of Faza, who ultimately raised some 1200 supporters for the siege including Bajunes and Maracates.'

Thus reinforced, Almeida and his allies were able to press the siege to their advantage in early December 1678. A general assault was ordered, the Portuguese troops gained part of the town's wall and inflicted a good deal of damage within. At that point, local dignitaries favored negotiations: the Viceroy demanded that the offending sultan be surrendered as a hostage and that 30,000 *cruzados* be paid. This sum was intended as a sort of fine for past transgressions toward the Estado, as a contribution to offset Almeida's expenses, and as an inducement to prevent the further sacking of the town. On the 17th of December, everything seemed to favor the Portuguese cause. The sultan of Pate, as well as those of Siyu, Manda, and Lamu had been rounded up and imprisoned aboard the fleet anchored offshore. Almeida had taken up residence at the town's major mosque, an action that did little to endear him with the Muslims, and waited as contributions flowed in. Still, by the end of December, no more than 25,000 *cruzados* in gold, silver, ivory, tortoise-shell and other valuables were forthcoming. In a rather rash and perhaps ill-advised move, the Viceroy used this shortfall as a pretext to declare that original terms of capitulation had not been met. After a sham trial, the four sultans were executed and the town sacked until another 5,000 *cruzados* worth of booty had been extracted. At that point, events took a decided turn for the worse for the Portuguese; four Arab vessels, most probably belonging to the sultan of Oman appeared offshore in early January to assist their ally. Troops were landed and this contingent in conjunction with erstwhile supporters of the dead sultan gradually expelled the Portuguese and pro-Faza troops in house to house combat that lasted nearly a week. In the end, Almeida was forced to take to a sickbed aboard ship with a fever, while his troops executed a messy retreat, leaving behind as much as 20,000 *cruzados* in booty.'

D. Pedro de Almeida and his officers had long discussions on the voyage south, touching on the ill turn the Pate campaign had taken and on the question of how many troops should head for the Zambezi to assist the Crown's settlement plan for the *Rios*. While some of his officers suggested as many as 200 men, Almeida finally decided that only 30-40 troops would remain as his personal bodyguard, the rest would head for India and additional duties. Unfortunately, the Pate fleet overshot Mozambique on its

return voyage and a difficult month of beating against contrary winds was needed in order to regain this port. Less than a month after anchoring at Mozambique, Almeida again fell victim to a high fever and the Viceroy died in early March 1679. The large royal fleet thereafter sailed for Goa. The military component of the great *Rios* expedition therefore ended on a decidedly mixed note." Nevertheless, in comparison with the truly lamentable state of affairs in 1662 when Antonio de Mello de Castro was forced to take up his post aboard the Marlborough's fleet, the mere ability of the Crown to put together such a formidable expedition reflects the effectiveness of Pedro's reform program to resuscitate the *Estado*. The ease with which the sultan of Pate was dispatched also reveals that Portuguese military might was once again to be feared especially among the indigenous powers along the Indian Ocean basin. There can, however, be little doubt that the decision to attack Pate may not have been the most prudent strategy for Almeida to adopt. One negative result of his decision was that it helped to unite the Islamic powers on the Swahili coast and further thrust them into the arms of the Omani Arabs. Yet, to suggest that the 1678 campaign had any effect on the eventual loss of Mombassa is both overblown and Whiggish in nature.⁷⁰ Thus, while Almeida's military policies were misguided, the forces put at his disposal attest to the great strides the *Estado* had made since 1660.

Almeida's untimely death did not, however, put an end to either the *Rios* settlement plan or the economic functions of the *Junta*. What were the results of these bold initiatives on the Crown's part? The scattered nature of the extant sources make it difficult to render a definitive judgment on the success or failure of these initiatives. On one hand, the influx of settlers aboard the grand 1677 fleet as well as ships arriving from the *Reino* in 1678 and 1679 more than doubled the Portuguese population of the *Rios*. On the other, the overall number involved was not particularly impressive. Of the c. 200 settlers that probably landed at Mozambique from 1677-1679, only 78 reached the *Rios*: 28 married men, 29 women, and 21 children. Of this number, perhaps 20 soon died from the climate and disease. By June 1680, the total Portuguese population in the *Rios* could not have been more than fifty or so with another 200 mulattos. This number included 5 at Quelimane, 11 at Sena, 16 at Tete, 10 at Chicoca, 3 at the Monomorapa's Zimbabwe, 1 at Ongo, 2 others in the lands of the Karanga, and 2 in Manica. Yet, these settlers and those that followed them into the Zambezi river basin operating in conjunction with the reinforced Crown presence at Mozambique and Sofala undoubtedly helped to provide the nucleus that ensured a Portuguese imperial presence in south-east Africa well into the present century." In the mid-reeos, it had appeared likely that the continuing ravages of the VOC, the rising power

of the Omanis, and the worrisome pretensions of the French on Madagascar might foreshadow grave difficulties if not the very extinction of the Crown's political, economic, social, and religious presence in that region. By 1680, the prudent policies of Pedro and his advisors had overcome these concerns and established the basis for future colonial operations in south-east Africa.

The extant evidence on the activities of the *Junta* is no less scattered and perplexing. Several factors are dear. First, the undeniable reality that very significant obstacles existed in attempting to establish the trade of the *Junta*. A harsh climate, the huge distances involved, opposition from local interests, including Portuguese, Canarian, and indigenous magnates, who all favored the *status quo ante*, as well as problems with the *Reis Vizinhos*; all complicated matters. As Oliveira Boleo has noted, the attempt to control contraband and smuggling was a near impossibility." Yet, some minor successes did result for the *Junta*. Upon his return to the *Rios* from Goa, Joao de Sousa Freire had ordered Theodosio Garcia to continue the long-standing search for silver. After an expedition up the Zambezi that lasted nearly two years, Garcia in fact found rich mines for this precious metal in the land of the Caronga. Unfortunately, Sousa Freire died just two days after receiving this welcomed news. His successor as governor of the *Rios*, the *mestre de campo*, Antonio Ribeiro de Araujo also died soon thereafter and no decisive actions were taken to exploit Garcia's discovery." While it has been fashionable in the thin historiography on the topic to criticize the effectiveness of the *Junta* and its trade, the financial records of the *Junta* reveal a slightly different picture. At least two of these types of documents are extant. First, a *Conselho Ultramarino consulta* of February 1680 which summarized the financial transactions of the *Junta* from January 1676 until January 1677. Second, a balance sheet for the year 1679.

According to the figures from 1676-77, revenues for the *Junta do Comercio* totaled 167,721 *cruzados*, 206 *reis*, generated overwhelmingly by trade in the *fazendas da Id* of gold and ivory. Of this sum, 122,355 *cruzados*, 199 *rs.* had been obtained by the trade at Sena; another 7,568 *cruzados*, 361 *rs.* at Inhame; 11,518 *cruzados* and 518 *rs.* from Cape Correnres, 959 *cruzados* 3 *rs.* from the voyage to Sangaicm; 2,622 *cruzados*, 225 *rs.* from Angoxa; 10,195 *cruzados* 150 *rs.* from Sofala in 1675; and 12,501 *cruzados* 350 *rs.* from Sofala in 1676. Expenses for that same period had come to 165,636 *cruzados*, 256 *rs.* These payments included 110,377 *cruzados*, 112 *rs.* to the captains of Diu and Chaul for textiles and other *fazendas*: 30,600 *cruzados* had paid back the annual subsidy of 30,000 *xerafins* advanced by the Crown; 1,128 *cruzados* to cover leasing private ships; 12,850 *cruzados*, 72 *rs.* repaying a loan to D. or Manoel Serrao

Alfaya; 9,628 *cruzados*, 37 rs. to the Captain for Mozambique for troop payments; and a loss of 1,053 *cruzados* 35 rs. resulting from bad ivory tusks. A positive *saldo* of some 2,084 *cruzados*, 350 rs. had therefore resulted for this period."

The balance sheet for 1679 reveals 113,486 *cruzados* in revenue, and 113,488 *cruzados*, 301 rs. in expenses. On the revenue side of the ledger, two cargoes of gold from Sena, some 18,000 *matacaes* in weight had yielded c. 50,000 *cruzados*; 190 bars, 12 *faracolas*, and 10 *mainas* of ivory from Sena and Quilimene had yielded 54,451 *cruzados*, 99 rs; 8 bars, 1 *faracola* of ivory from Inhabame had resulted in revenues of 1893 *cruzados*, 189 rs.; 73 oz. of amber from Inhabame had yielded 1460 *cruzados*; and 3791 *cruzados*, 84 rs. had been generated by 12 bars, 7.5 *faracolas* of ivory from the island of Angoxa. The majority of expenses for this year, some 75,000 *cruzados*, had been utilized to repay a portion of monies advanced to the *junta* by the Royal Treasury (some 11,000 *cruzados*), or by private individuals (some 44,000 *cruzados*). Of the remaining 17,500 *cruzados*, some 5,500 *cruzados* had covered the operating expenses and *mantimentos* for the officers and other personnel of the *junta*; 11,692 *cruzados* had been contributed to the grand armada of D. Pedro de Almeida, and some 20,349 *cruzados* had been given to the *feitor* Pedro Rebello de Aguiar to cover other expenses."

These figures suggest that despite the problems inherent to establishing the *junta*, a relatively stable trading network was indeed established in the *Rios* during the 1670s. Given the traditional tenets of monarchical monopolism that had long determined Portuguese actions in the *Estado*, the Crown campaign to more efficiently exploit Mozambique and the Zambezi basin embodied a truly innovative strategy. The measures adopted by Pedro and his councils in Lisbon, along with the efforts of Mendonça Furtado, D. Pedro de Almeida, and Amónio Paes de Sande in Asia all combined to more firmly entrench a Portuguese presence in south-east Africa. While the *eldorado* that the Prince Regent and his servants were seeking in the *Rios* did not materialize, a good deal of success accompanied the nascent interest of the Crown in this region. The colonization scheme of the 1670s resulted in a larger population of Portuguese settlers along the Zambezi with whom to conduct trade. The *junta de comerao* created by Lavradio carried on a relatively respectable business at Crown expense. This solution also cut down on the notable corruption and concentration of power inherent in the old contract system. Private merchants were also allowed to reap the benefits of the trade under the auspices of the *junta*. Finally, while D. Pedro de Almeida's attack on Pate may have been somewhat misguided, it did at least herald a rejuvenated military presence in the region that was a badly needed buffer against the

encroachments of the Omani Arabs and other European powers. When all of these factors are considered, there can be very little doubt that the Portuguese position in south-east Africa in c. 1680 was far preferable to what it had been some twenty years earlier. The renewed interest and reforms of Pedro not only allowed the *Estado* to survive in that region, but also set the tone for an imperial presence that would expand as the years unfolded.

Conclusion

Portuguese Asia, c. 1683

As this study has attempted to demonstrate, the twenty or so years beginning in 1660 were crucial in the long history of the Portuguese *Estado da India*. The mixed legacy of the Habsburg era, almost endemic warfare with both indigenous powers and European rivals, and the very real constraints of limited demographic and financial resources at home, had confronted the Portuguese Crown with the very real possibility of losing their erstwhile Asian empire *in toto* during the early Braganza period. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the historiography on Portuguese Asia has largely ignored this critical period. The very scant literature that does exist on these years has tended to embrace the doomsday lamentations of the Jesuit accounts of the mid-seventeenth century on the post-1640 *Estado*, or to accept the nefarious and corrupt administrative practices described in Diogo do Couto's *Dialogo do Soldado Pratico* as both accurate and unchanging. Above all else, the dictum of "stagnation and decline" has held sway in the scholarly literature.¹ By almost universally embracing the loss of Cochin and the other Malabar coast possession in late 1662, early 1663 as the death knell of the *Estado*, historians have thus failed to accord the importance that is due to the years following in the wake of those events. As opposed to the traditional orthodoxy, it *in fact* appears that the years from c. 1663-1683 represented an era of reawakened Crown interest in the Asian empire, of periodic policy innovation, sustained reform, and the creation of a degree of stability that permitted Portugal to remain a power in the Asian trade and an imperial power in the Indian Ocean basin well into the present century.

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the setbacks of the late Habsburg and early Braganza years constituted a fundamental threat to the continued existence of the *Estado da India*. By the time of Antonio de Mello de Castro's arrival off Bombay in late 1662, the situation, as his initial letters to Lisbon admirably reflect, was critical. A nadir had been reached in virtually all areas affecting the eastern empire. The *Carreira da India*, the very lifeblood of the imperial edifice, was in a shambles with only an average of a single ship a year reaching Goa from the metropole and less than that making the return trip to Europe from 1658-1663. Long-standing warfare with the VOC, which had already cost the *Estado*

Melaka and Ceylon, was poised to culminate with the ravages of Rijckloff Van Goens fleet on the Malabar coast. The Omani Arabs had already stripped the strategic base of Maskat from the *Estado*, thus beginning a naval war that would only escalate as the years passed. The Nayak of Ikkarri had expelled the Portuguese from their positions on the Kanara coast. The annual fleets to the Straits of Hurmuz and along the coasts of India and Ceylon, once a cornerstone of the *cartaz* system and perhaps the most visible display of Portuguese naval might in the Indian Ocean, had been all but abandoned. The dispersed nature of the empire, an administrative system that tended to embrace money and connections instead of talent, and tendency of joao IV, D. Luisa de Cusmao, and Afonso VI to neglect Asia in favor of Europe, Brazil, and Africa had facilitated the erection of virtual fiefdoms among outlying governors and captains. Finally, the simple arithmetic embodied in the deeds of transfer for the Viceroyalty showed that the possession of 20 major fortresses in 1652 had been reduced to half that number in 1662. To adopt the metaphor of Fr. Manuel de Godinho, the *Estado*, "if it had been a tree, it was now a trunk".'

Yet, it is illuminating to extend this metaphor beyond the traditional limits of the historiography, which have equated Godinho's lamentations with irretrievable, irrational decline and ruin for Portuguese Asia during the late 17th century. A careful examination of the extant manuscript sources suggests that the great "tree" of the 16th century had indeed been reduced, but a more accurate description of the losses of the mid-17th century might be the radical pruning of an overextended "tree" that had been allowed to flourish beyond any reasonable and sustainable limits during the glory years of the 1500s. As much of the traditional literature suggests, Portugal's financial, demographic, and military resources were probably not sufficient to maintain such an empire in the face of sustained challenges from its European competitors in the 17th century. Nevertheless, it is clearly erroneous to suggest that Portugal was not capable of sustaining a relatively lucrative Asian empire during the early modern period. The "pruning" process of the mid-17th century which had cost the *Estado* more than half of its fortresses had been indeed radical. However, in this process, a more manageable edifice had resulted. A detailed examination of the *Orcamentos* or State Budgets of 1630, 1634, and 1680 reveals that most of the fortresses which were lost in this process had been a serious drain on Crown revenues during the middle years of the 17th century.'

State Budget Revenues(r), Expenditures(e), and Balances (b), (in xerafins)

Fort	(r) 1630	(e) 1630	(b) 1630	(r) 1634	(e) 1634	(b) 1634	{r} 1680	(e) 1680	(b) 1680
Muscat	53,903	78,724	-24,821	67,125	120,952	-53,827			
Jaffna	28,363	29,112	-749	23,190	21,797	+1393			
Colombo				40,774	74,241	-33,467			
Melaka	38,037	54,387	-16,350	37,561	70,092	-32,531			
Cochin	2332	36,017	-33,685		15,487	-15,487			
Moz.	42,188	39,104	+3084	42,500	35,291	+7209			
Diu	101,028	94,416	+6612	45,094	81,527	-36,433	30,773	54,130	-23,357
Daman	49,103	47,129	+1974	53,519	35,537	+17,982	89,240	49,168	+40,072
Bassein	115,097	107,512	+7585	122,469	58,895	+63,574	161,274	75,853	+85,421
Chaul	23,575	19,300	+4275	53,687	17,271	+36,416	19,579	25,515	-5936
Mombassa	17,397	18,763	-1366	7717	16,097	-8380	21,110	25,124	-4014
Others	9137	25,178	-16,441	21,256	25,578	-4322			
Goa	321,923	409,232	-87,309	304,346	339,424	-35,078	359,579	211,845	+147,734
Total	801,992	960,172	-158,180	1,185,264	1,111,455	+69,809	731,828	454,663	+271,164

As these figures show, Maskat had registered a loss of 78,648 *xerafins* for the years 1630 and 1634; Melaka a loss of 48,881 *xerafins* for those same years; and Colombo a loss of 33,467 *xerafins* for the year 1634 alone. This of course is *not* to suggest that the Crown desired to be rid of Melaka, Ceylon and Muscat, strategic fortresses that had been closely associated with the fame and power of the *Estado* since the days of Albuquerque and Manoel I. However, whatever glory had accrued to the Crown from the possession of these long held fortresses had been seriously tempered by the serious financial drain on the *Estado's* resources that they had become in light of the protracted war with the VOC and indigenous powers. Their loss, while tragic for the *g/oire* of Portuguese Asia, did not embody the end of the *Estado*, its financial or geopolitical viability, or, to continue with our adopted metaphor, the actual felling of Godinho's tree. Moreover, a bare trunk was not all that remained in 1663; instead a viable tree did survive that with proper care could live and perhaps even flourish again. Credit for recognizing this seminal fact must go to Prince Regent Pedro, the duke of Cadaval, members of the Overseas Council like Correa de Sá, and Luis de Mendonca Purtado. These able men realized that despite the earlier losses of the rzth century, what remained of the *Estado da India* could serve as the basis for a continuing and profitable Asian empire. As the September *consulta* of the Overseas Council declared, the remaining fortresses the Crown possessed, if properly exploited and administered, along with the further exploration of Mozambique and the Rios could serve as the foundation for a renascent *Estado*:'

During the years from 1640 through 1668, the Crown had demonstrated little interest in such a campaign. All of the early Braganzas had been confronted with the omnipresent and pressing challenge of winning the resto-

ration war with Habsburg Spain, and this life and death struggle certainly absorbed a good deal of the kingdom's energies and attention. However, the huge overseas empire carved out by the Aviz dynasty was a key component and consideration for any ruler who coveted the throne of Portugal. Moreover, the Braganzas could not neglect imperial concerns even in the midst of the Iberian struggle. In matters regarding the tri-dimensional empire, to employ the terminology of Oliveira Marques, the *Estado* received scant attention under João IV, D. Luisa de Gusmão, as well as Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor. The erstwhile duke of Braganza regarded Brazil as his "milk-cow" and the locus for further colonial greatness and largely neglected the *Estado* in favor of combating the Dutch in South America and Africa. His wife had at least made an ill-advised attempt to salvage what remained of *Ásia Portuguesa* in the midst of the VOC onslaught by seeking the rather dubious assistance of the English Crown. Castelo-Melhor and Afonso had made a half-hearted attempt to continue this interest in the *Estado*, while devoting most of their energies to continental affairs. It had therefore been left to Pedro and his clique of supporters to address the festering situation in Asia in the wake of the palace coup of late 1667. This dynastic *coup d'état* had profound consequences for Imperial policy in general and the fate of the *Estado da Índia* in particular.

It is not entirely clear why the new Prince Regent, unlike his immediate predecessors, sought to vastly elevate the relative importance of the *Estado* over what it had been in the years since 1640, and one might argue the late Habsburg years as well. Perhaps Pedro's interest was a logical dialectical reaction to the priorities and preferences of his father and older brother. Perhaps his decision to reform the *Estado* in systematic fashion emanated from the newfound interest in the Asian trade that France under Louis XIV and Colbert were convincingly demonstrating at this same time. After all, Bourbon France was in the midst of becoming the most powerful European state under the Sun King and his chief minister, while the long-standing pretensions of Habsburg Spain were on the wane. Louis and Colbert were spending huge amounts of capital seeking to establish the position of their new *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* and in doing so, spreading the *gloire* of the king and the mercantilist financial calculations of his minister.' As Car! Hanson has shown, the French absolutist example, as interpreted and advanced at court, by Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo and the count of Ericeira, had a significant impact on Portuguese society under Pedro.' It is thus reasonable to assume that the pivotal importance Colbert placed on the Asian trade in his economic schema may also have had a direct impact on Portuguese Crown imperial and economic policy as well. Finally, it is possible that Pedro's interest in reha-

bilitating the *Estado* may have simply resulted from his emotional and intellectual acceptance of the view expounded by the marquis de Pronreira when he noted that "without conquests one cannot have capital, [and] it is without doubt true that in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to the honor of God, the glory of the nation, [and] the interest and remedy of your vassals". For Fronreira, of all the Crown's conquests, the "most Important and glorious" was the *Estado da India*.'

The foundation for the rehabilitation that took place under Pedro and in particular Mendonça Furtado was the pivotal decision in Lisbon in late 1669 and 1670 to reject the very tempting offer of an anti-Dutch alliance proposed by Colbert through the French ambassador the marquis of Saint-Remain. At first glance, this projected Asian triple alliance directed at the **VAC** seemed to have every advantage working for it in the Portuguese capital. Decades of bitter setbacks at the hands of Maersuycker, Van Goens, and their cohorts that cried for revenge; a sizable and influential pro-French group at court headed by the shrewd Princess Regent Marie-Françoise of Savoy and supported by Schomberg and Fronreira; the religious affinity of the two Crowns that might serve the true faith in Asia together; the very large shadow of Louis XIV's anti-Dutch diplomatic and military preparations in Europe unfolding in majestic fashion at this time; and the traditional penchant of the Portuguese Crown for conducting its business relating to the *Estado* based primarily on the militaristic precepts at the core of the monarchical monopolism that had established that empire. Despite these seemingly overwhelming factors in favor of the French alliance and the continuation of long-standing warfare with the **VAC** in Asia, Pedro and Cadaval instead chose the path of neutrality and peace in the Third Dutch War of 1672.' This single groundbreaking decision in turn permitted the Portuguese to implement badly needed reforms in Asia while their European rivals were busy warring against one another. By the time the Dutch War ended in 1679, Pedro and the Viceroyalty in Goa had already achieved a good deal of what needed to be accomplished.

Militarily, these reforms embraced advice advanced by Francisco Rodrigues de Silveira in his *Reiormaoio da Milicia e Governo do Estado da India Oriental* (c. 1600-1619), an important work calling for fundamental reforms that has been largely ignored in the extant historiography on the 17th century *Estado*. Silveira argued that the eastern empire rested in large part on effective military power; with the State of India's wealth created primarily by the Portuguese naval force in the Indian Ocean. In his view, the once formidable military might of the *Estado* had been undermined by a combination of factors: the insatiable greed of the viceroys and ruling classes in Goa; an inadequate pay system; and the lax discipline endemic in the outlying fortresses.' Whether Pedro and his advisors were

familiar with Silveira's *Reiormacao* is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, many of the reforms of the late 1660s and 1670s directly addressed these long-standing problems. The prompt assignment of soldiers to their respective garrisons upon their arrival in the Mandovi and the prohibition of travel to Old Goa during their early months of service were initial steps in reasserting order. Above all else, the formation of a permanent *terço* in Goa staffed by an experienced officer corps and soldiers was a crucial step in attempting to reassert the military power of the *Estado*. The fact that the Prince Regent and his Council were willing to allow the Viceroyalty to utilize the badly needed monies for the *donativo* for the peace with the United Provinces to achieve this end merely reinforces the laudable *Crown* commitment to this project. The generally favorable *sa/dos* that resulted during the peaceful years of the Dutch War also facilitated the process of dispatching the annual fleets to the Straits of Hurmuz, the Malabar coast, and elsewhere, traditionally the most visible manifestation of Portuguese naval power.

Religiously, the reforms of these years also reflect the fact that Pedro and his advisors were willing to depart from long-established policy priorities regarding the Asian empire. Serious attempts were made to temper the more glaring abuses of the plethora of *reiiigiosos* in the *Estado*. These steps included decrees designed to prevent the unlawful obtainment of lands and rents by the religious orders, to improve the qualifications of clerics spreading the faith, and ordering a special *junta*, with indigenous representation, to reform the abuses relating to D. Sebastiao's decree on Hindu orphans. Such steps were prompted primarily by economic considerations, and reveal that the capitalist priorities of the Protestant rivals of the *Fstado* had affected the policy calculations of the Lisbon and Goa hierarchies. Men like Mcdonca Furtado, with long years of experience in the Asian trade and long years of struggling against the V&C and EIC, had come to realize that economic priorities had to triumph over religious zealotry if the *Estado* were to survive. There were, however, limits on the extent of religious reform possible as the ill-fated attempt of Pedro to arrange substantial New Christian investment to assist the *Estado* in return for protection against the ravages of the Inquisition in the early 1670s demonstrates. This setback admirably attests to the resilient vestigial power of the more traditional elements in Baroque Portugal and the difficulties that the Prince Regent would continue to have in instituting truly radical internal reforms in the kingdom. Goa, however, was relatively far removed from the metropole and the buffer of time and distance perhaps gave Pedro more latitude in implementing religious changes.

Economically, the situation, given the nature of the extant sources, is more complex to analyze. The best documentation perhaps exists for the

official Crown trade from Lisbon to Goa carried on by the *Carreira da India*, and even here the sources are relatively sparse. This qualification notwithstanding, the years from roughly 1668-1682 witnessed the stabilization of the *Carreira da India* after a truly dismal period. Reforms regarding the *Carreira* reinforce the argument for the willingness of the Crown to break with long-standing priorities of the past. In this case, Portuguese naval technology adapted and integrated many of the changes previously adopted by the Dutch and English to such great effect in the trade. Building relatively smaller, more seaworthy ships for utilization on the Cape route along with the reiteration of the need to strictly enforce traditional sailing *roteiros* on the passage around Africa yielded impressive results for the re-establishment of regular interchange between Iberia and India. Crown trade in traditional products like pepper via the Cape, although badly reduced from the glory years of the 16th century, also stabilized. The documents also suggest that the Crown and Viceroyalty were sensitive to market forces regarding supply, demand, and price structure, and also willing to branch out into other products including textiles and diamonds when conditions demanded it. Private trade is more difficult to gauge, given the paucity of sources. Yet the important work by James C. Boyajian for the Habsburg period and some documentation for the early Braganza years suggests that the percentage of private cargoes carried aboard the *Carreira*, both by weight and value, continued to expand during the 17th century. Despite increased European competition and other problems in the years after 1640, *casado* investors in Goa and elsewhere, including Old and New Christians, also continued a relatively lucrative intra-Asian trade in products ultimately destined for the *Carreira* or the plethora of other commercial centers throughout the Indian Ocean basin.¹⁹

As noted above, an examination of the *Circumstances* for the 17th century demonstrates that when properly administered, and above all when at peace, the State of India was not only self-sufficient but could also consistently yield a very positive *saldo* for the Crown. Moreover, during the construction of the absolutist state in Portugal, one must also remember that the nature and function of the empire itself may have been slightly modified from what it had been in the Aviz and Habsburg periods. In a kingdom where previously the military orders and church had come to monopolize large tracts of lands, capital, and social prestige at home, the *Estado* had traditionally served as a proving ground and source of reward for a loyal noble class. This process continued and perhaps even accelerated during the years after 1640. As the example of men like Mello de Castro, Nunes da Cunha, Mendonça Paredão, and D. Pedro de Almeida demonstrate, the provincial nobility that had followed João of Braganza

to Lisbon increasingly demanded titles, offices, and other honors as the price for supporting a king that like his royal cousins throughout Europe was seeking to entrench a more centralized state at the expense of at least some of the traditional prerogatives of the nobility. In the *Estado da India* and the rest of the empire, the Crown found such badly needed forms of largesse. On the level of European and Asian diplomacy, a rehabilitated *Estado*, and the accompanying *gloire* that accrued to the Prince Regent, also served the interest of the Portuguese Crown during these years.

Yet, it was not only the Crown and nobility that benefited from a rehabilitated *Estado da India*, the New Christians continued to generate profits on trade via the Cape and on the more amorphous intra-Asian trade. Even the peasantry could periodically utilize the empire to evade the rigid class or estate system of early modern Portugal. The settlers in the 1677 scheme for Mozambique had a chance for land and a better life serving the Crown instead of groveling in the mud for the nobility at home, even fallen women from the streets of Lisbon and Porto were accepted. As for the Church, while the Crown indeed attempted to end the more glaring abuses of the first estate, ¹¹¹ itself a logical outgrowth of rising absolutist tendencies in Portugal, the regular clergy and religious orders continued to hold a sizable bevy of social, intellectual, economic as well as spiritual advantages both in the *reino* and the *imperio*. Although Pedro may have alienated some segments of the first estate with his religious reforms in the *Estado*, he could also pose as the champion the Counter-Reformation Church in the guise of the Goa Inquisition, an institution that also periodically served to placate the nobility anxious of the economic advances of the New Christians. To win favor with the popular classes, who were more insular and nationalist in their perspective, the Prince Regent could highlight his struggle for traditional Portuguese prerogatives in seeking to adhere to the monopoly embodied in the *Padroado Real* and opposing the interlopers of the *Propaganda Fide* based in Rome.

All of these varied benefits made the sustained attempt to rehabilitate the *Estado da India* well worth the effort for both Pedro and his subjects. Perhaps the most compelling contemporary evidence for the success of this campaign was the grudging admiration that the reforms of Pedro and Mendonça Furtado engendered among Portugal's rivals in the trade. Ger-aid Aungier, the English President at Bombay and the man largely responsible for the increasing prosperity of the EIC on that coast, provided such evidence. In a letter to London of January 1674, Aungier outlined the traditional problems of the *Estado*, including administrative corruption and the overweening power of the *Padres* and *fidalgos*, but concluded that "the Prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much, both in the one and in the other". Two months later, Aungier was forced to admit: "The Por-

tuguese follow their trade as well in India as Europe vigorously." Such successes in fact had made them too "insolent" for Aungier's taste and he advised the Directors that means should be found to remedy this state of affairs." William Langhorn, the Governor of Madras voiced similar opinions in his letters to London at about the same time." Although there were many successes in this reformation campaign, perhaps the single most important success was the ability of Pedro and his advisors to restore a level of confidence regarding the *Estado da India* on the quays of Lisbon, at the *Casa da India*, in the *solars* of the nobility, and perhaps even in the merchant houses of the New Christians. This was a seminal precondition for a rehabilitated *Estado* since, in the final analysis, the Portuguese State of India "for its survival" depended "not so much upon the quantity of spices and drugs annually transported to Europe as upon the strength and loyalty of the soldiers and gentlemen" who administered it, fought for it, and above all, as time went on, invested in it." The attention of all segments of Portuguese society had in fact been reawakened to the potential of the Asian empire by c. 1683, thanks to the efforts of Pedro, Lavradio and others. Given the circumstances which had confronted the Crown some twenty years earlier, this indeed was no mean achievement.

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Notes

Introduction

Essential surveys of the foundation and structures of the *Estado da Índia* include: F.e. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* (2 vols., London, 1894); R.S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550* (London, 1899); Bailey Diffie and G.D. Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580* (Minneapolis, 1977); CR. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (New York, 1969); M.N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* (Cambridge, 1987); and Sanjay Suhrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700*.

- 2 For example, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 46.61, 114-27; and Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 40-48, 67-68.
- 3 Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 41. Cf. also, K.S. Mathew, *Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century* (New Delhi, 1983) pp. 197-98; and V.M. Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial* (4 vols., Lisbon, 1981-83) III:10-22.
- 4 For the various estimates on the level of spice imports for this period, cf. F.C. Lane "The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Its Revival in the Sixteenth Century," in *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore, 1966); V.M. Godinho, *L'Economie de l'empire portugais aux XVe et XVIe siècles* (Paris, 1969) pp. 674-704; CH.H. Wake, "The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700," *The Journal of European Economic History* 8 (1979); and Bal Krishna, *Commercial Relations between India and England, 1601-1757* (London, 1924) pp. 45. H. For a critical evaluation of these estimates, cf. Sreensgaard, "The Return Cargoes of the *Carreira* in the 16th and Early 17th Century" in T.R. de Souza ed., *Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions* (New Delhi, 1985) pp. 13-31.
- 5 HAG MRh8A fo. 157, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 29/XII/1662.
- 6 James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650* (New Brunswick NJ, 1983) p. 7.
- 7 Godinho, *L'Economie de l'empire portugais* pp. 100-07, cited in Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers* p. 7.
- 8 For details on this tendency, cf. Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 107-08; and Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* pp. 132-33.
- 9 For details, cf. Alfredo Botelho de Sousa, *Subsidios para a historia mi/itar maritima da India, 1585-1650* (4 vols., Lisbon, 1930-56) and N. MacLeod, *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als zeemongenhed in Azie, 1602-1652*, both based on the relevant manuscript collections; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 106-27.
- 10 Cf. the deeds of transfer from the Goa Council of State, found in published form in P.S.S. Pissurlencar, ed., *Assentos do Come/ha do Estado, 1618-1750* (5 vols., Basrora, 1953-57) III:200-04, and IV:87-89.
- 11 For a discussion of this tendency in the literature, cf. Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 107-08; and Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* pp. 132-33.
- 12 Cf. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* Lxxxix; Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India* pp. 174, 324-25; W.W. Hunter, *A History of British India* (2 vols., London, 1899-1900) I:176-85; and Vicent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford,

- 1919) p. 335. For the "Whiggish" tendencies reflected in these works, cf. M.N Pearson, *Coastal Western India* (New Delhi, 1981) pp. 17-20.
- 13 Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* p. 114.
- 14 *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago, 1974); originally published as *Caravans, Cavaans, and Companies: the Structural Crisis in the European-Asian trade in the Early 17th Century* (Copenhagen, 1973).
- 15 Quoted in Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 128-29. Codmbe's manuscript was originally published as *Relação do novo caminho que fez por terra e mar, vindo da India para Portugal no anno de 1663* (Lisbon, 1665). This work has been reprinted twice, first with an introduction and notes by Augusto Reis Machado (Lisbon, 1944), and most recently with editorial notes by A. Machado Guerreiro (Lisbon, 1974).
- 16 CL Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 128-49; and Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* pp. 131-43. Pearson, however, notes 10-11 that 'huge gaps' exist in our knowledge for the post-1600 period.
- 17 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24, consulta of the Overseas Council, 91XJr673.
- 18 Cf. *L'Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes* (4 vols., Amsterdam, 1770) Adam Smith quoted this passage to support his own estimation of these developments, cf. *All Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (2 vols., Chicago, 1976) 11:141 and 141 n. 1.
- 19 On these developments, cf. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1987), especially pp. 18-24, for his somewhat revisionist view that absolutism represented at base a redeployed form of feudalism designed to protect a threatened aristocracy from the twin threats of a rising bourgeoisie and a peasantry freed from the most onerous burdens of feudalism. For Marx and Engels, this period not surprisingly embodied a transitional one from feudalism to capitalism when the power of the "warring classes" of noble and bourgeois was so nearly equal that "State power, as the ostensible mediator" acquired for the moment "a certain degree of independence of both". Cf. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and State* in Marx-Engels *Selected Works* (London, 1968) p. 588. On Marx's view that the absolutist state was a harbinger of both the inevitable decline of the feudal nobility and the rise of the bureaucratic bourgeois state, cf. *The Civil War in France*, in *Selected Works* p. 289. For details on Marx's view of the peasantry, cf. *Capital* (3 vols., Moscow, 1961) 1:713-16. Recent general treatments of absolutism that summarize much of the relevant literature include: J. Miller, *Absolutism in Seventeenth Century Europe* (London, 1990); and Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism* (London, 1992). On the power of the New Christian community in Portugal at this time, cf. Carl A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal, 1668-1703* (Minneapolis, 1981) pp. 70-107; and James E. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640* (Baltimore, 1993) pp. 37H.
- w India Office Library, London, Original Correspondence [OC13939, Aungier to Directors, 30/III/1674, fo. 1 v.

Chapter 1

On the revolution of 1640, cf. A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* (2 vols., New York, 1972) I:324-29; H.V. Livcnore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge, 1976) pp. 170-74; F.E. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India 11:270-72*; and C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686* (London, 1952) pp. 141-42.

- 2 CL Fremont d'Albaucourt, *Memoirs of the Sieur d'Ablancourt, containing a general history of the Court and Kingdom of Portugal, from the Pvenian Treaty to the year 1668. Translated from the French copy printed at Paris, 1701* (London, 1703) p. 15.
- 3 Cf. Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* I:328-29.
- 4 For estimates on overall population and the size of the various estates, cf. joel Serrao, ed., *Dicionario de Historia de Portugal* (4 vols., Lisbon, 1971) I:797; joaquim Verissimo Serrac, "Uma estimativa da populacao portuguesa em 1640," *Memorias da Academia das Ciencias* XVI (1975) p. 217 ff.; V.M. Godinho, *Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa* (Lisbon, and ed., 1975) pp. 86-100; Oliveira Marques, *History* I:379-81; and Carl A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal* pp. 17-19. Albert Silberrhas estimated that even in the late 17th century, perhaps 80% of Portugal's population was still involved in agricultural pursuits. Cf. *Le Portugal Mediteranean a la fin de l'ancien regime* (2 vols., Paris, 1966) I:11.
- 5 An argument advanced most forcefully by Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 10-11.
- 6 Cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 21-23 and the sources cited therein.
- 7 For details on the military orders of Portugal and their ties to the Crown and nobility, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* p. 23; Vieira Guimaraes, *A Ordem de Cristo* (Lisbon, 1936); Francis Durra, "Membership in the Order of Christ in the Seventeenth Century: Its Rights, Privileges, Obligations," *The Americas* 27 (1970) pp. 3-25; "The Order of Santiago and the *Estado da India*, 1498-1750," in Durra and jodo Camilo dos Sanros, eds., *The Portuguese in the Pacific* (Santa Barbara, 1996) pp. 287-304; and Livermore, *New History* p. 132.
- 8 On the economic condition of the nobility at this time, and the attempt to supplement their landed incomes with money made from imperial service, as well as their increasing dependence on the Crown, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 24-27; and Virginia Rau, "Fortunas uhramarinas e a nobreza portugeza no seculo XVII," *Revista Portuguesa de Historia* 8 (1959) pp. 1-25. For a comparative view of the Spanish nobility at this time, cf. Charles jago, "The Influence of Debt on the Relations between the Crown and Aristocracy in Seventeenth Century Castile," *Economic History Review*, ser. 26 (1973) pp. 218-36; and "The 'Crisis of the Aristocracy' in Seventeenth Century Castile," *Past and Present* 84 (1979) pp. 60-90; and Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict* (London, 1983) pp. 240-56.
- 9 Serrgo, ed. *DHP* III:154-55.
- 10 Serrdo ed., *DHP* III:155. Hanson. *Baroque Portugal* pp. 23-25, 131-32, 164 also makes this argument and provides family background for Cadaval, Ericeira, and Fronteira. Cf. also Felgueiras Gayo, *Nobilario de Familias de Portugal tImpressao diplomatica do original manuscrito, existente na Santa Casa da Misericordia de Barcelos* XX (Braga, 1939) pp. 53-56 for details on Mendonca Furtado, X (Braga, 1938) pp. 147-48 on Nuncs da Cunha and II (Braga, 1938) pp. 74-76 on D. Pedro de Almeida.
- 11 On the preeminent role played by the Council of State and the loss of its records, cf. George D. Winus, *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon: Transition to Dutch Rule* (Cambridge MA, 1971) pp. xiii-xiv.
- 12 For a concise analysis of the administrative system of the Braganzas, cf. V.M. Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire," in *The New Cambridge Modern History V: The Ascendancy of France* (Cambridge, 1961) pp. 384-97.
- 13 On the role and meetings of the Corres during the period 1640-1700, cf. Godinho "Portugal and her Empire," p. 389; Olivares Marques *History* I: 327-30; Livermore *New History* pp. 198-99; and on the *real d'aqua*. Hanson *Baroque Portugal* pp. 144-47.
- 14 On the economic priorities of joao IV, cf. Olivares Marques, *History* I:330; and Livermore, *New History* pp. 173-74. For a discussion of the king's attempt to exploit New Christian capital in his quest for financial stability, the *atuaara* of 1649 and the en-

sumg struggle with the Inquisition over such steps, Cf. L.M.E. Shaw, *Trade, Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal, 1650-1690* (London, 1989) pp. 35-37.

- 15 For details on the military campaign with Philip IV from 1640-1656, cf. Olivares Marques, *History I*:331; Livermore, *New History* pp. 173-79; and Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 334-35.
- 16 João IV's foreign policy has been examined in, among others, Edgar Prestage, *The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland 1640-1668* (Watford, 1925) pp. 1-98; Visconde de Samarem et al., eds., *Quadro Elementar das relacoes politicas de Portugal com as diversas potencias do mundo* (18 vols., Paris/Lisbon, 1842-76; Eduardo Brazdo, *A restauracao: relacoes diplomaticas de Portugal de 1640 a 1668* (Lisbon, 1939); Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 333-35; Livermore, *New History* pp. 179-85; and Oliveira Marques, *History I*:328-30.
- 17 On the reverses suffered in the *imperio* during joao IV's reign, cf. Oliveira Marques, *History I*: 337-38, 345, 358-63, 377-78; Boxer, "The Global Struggle with the Dutch," in *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 106-27; F.e. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* 169-318; and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700* pp. 172-78.
- 18 Cf. Boxer, *A India Portuguesa em meados do seculo XVII* (Lisbon, 1980) p. 18.
- 19 Cf., for example, Oliveira Marques, *History I*:338, who notes 'the Lisbon government was forced to make a choice by the 1640'S and 1650'S in order to save some important shares of the empire."Wisely they chose the most promising part, the one where white settlement had spread definitely and permanently, and where profits from trade could compete with dedining revenues from the Orient.'
- 20 On this revolt, among others, cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India* 11'304-10.
- 21 On D. Luisa's character and priorities, cf. Livermore, *New History* pp. 185; Dnnvers, *Portuguese in Asia II*:270-71; and Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 335-43.
- 22 Cf. Livermore, *New History* p. 185.
- 23 On Afonso's personality, among many others, Cf. Livermore, *Ibid.*, and Robert Southwell, *The History of the Revolutions of Portugal from the foundation of that Kingdom to the Year 1667, with Letters of Sir Robert Southwell During his Embassy there.* (London, 1740) especially pp. 199-210 for a letter of 5/15 November 1667 cited in Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* p. 341.
- 24 On the priorities of D. Luisa during her Regency, cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. H5-40; Olivcira Marques, *History I*:331; and Livermore, *New History* pp. 185-86. The main faCTIONS were led by the counts of Cantanhede and Odemeira.
- 25 For details on the military campaign against Spain during the Regency years, Cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 336-37 and Livermore, *New History* pp. 186-88.
- 26 Cf. Liverruorc, *New History* pp. 186-88; Presrage, *Relations* pp. '18ff.; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 336 ff.
- 27 On the 1661 Luso-Dutch treaty, among others, d. Shaw, *Trade Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal* pp. 93-95.
- 28 On the continuing setbacks in Asia, Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India II*:317-29; Boxer, *Partuouese Seaborne Empire* pp. 106-27; M.N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* pp. 137-38; and Subrahmanvam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 177-80.
- 29 Among others Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India II*:327-31.
- 30 Cf. Glenn.J. Ames, "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire," *The Journal of European Economic History* 20 (1991) pp. 17-18; and Boxer, *A India Portuguesa* pp. 39-49.
- 31 On the treaty of 1654 and the negotiations leading to the 1661 treaty, Cf. Shaw, *Trade, Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal* pp. 52-65, 82-97; Pres-age, *Diplomatic Relations* pp. 142-52 and *Chapters on Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (Watford, 1935); Keith Feiling, *British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672* (London, 1930) pp. 44-52; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp.117-40; Brazfio, *A Restauracao* pp. 202-62; and Virginia Rau, D.

- Catarina de Braganca, Rainha de Inglaterra (Lisbon, 1941) pp. 25-60. An English version of the treaty can be found, among others, in George W. Forresr, ed., *Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat: Home Series* Volume II (Bombay, 1887) pp. 367-74.
- 32 Cf. Forresr ed., *Letters* pp. 368-73.
- 33 On Afonso's actions during his mother's Regency and the Queen response in the summer of 1662, cf. among others, Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 341-43; Fernando Correa de Lacerda, *Catastrophe de Portugal no deeposiceo d'el Rei D. Affonso sexto e subrogacao do principe D. Pedro o unico* (Lisbon, 1669) pp. 20-50; *A anti-catastrophe: Historia del rei D. Affonso VI de Portugal* [MS. of c. 1700] edited by C.A. da Silva e Souza (Porro, 1845) pp. 260-80; and Livermore, *New History* pp. 188-89.
- 34 On the 1662 coup against D. Luisa, cf. Correa de Lacerda, *Catastrophe passim*; *A Anti-Catastrophe passim*; Antonio Alvaro Doria, *A Rainha D. Maria Francisca de Saboia, 1646-1683* (Porro, 1944) pp. 36-4; and Gastão de Melo de Maros "O senrido da crise politica de 1667," *Anais da Academia Portuguesa de Historia* 8 pp. 337-440.
- 35 In a marginal notation made by Sir Henry Bennet (later Lord Arlingron) on one of Richard Panshaw's letters from Lisbon, cited by Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* p. 344 n. 15.
- 36 According to Ann Lady Fanshaw, the Queen Regent 'was a very honourable wise woman ... magnificent in discourse and nature ... ambitious but not vain. She loved government, and I do believe the quitting of it did shorten her life.' Cf. *The Memoires of Ann Lady Fanshaw, wife of the Right Hon.ble Sir Richard Fanshaus; Bart., 1600-1672* (London, 1907) p. 108.
- 37 Cf. Sourhwell, *Letters* pp. 199-210.
- 38 At least this is the view of Boxer in *Salvador de Sá* p. 344.
- 39 On Castelo-Melhor's consolidation of power, cf. among others, Live-more, *New History* pp. 190-91; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 344-46; and Olivares Marques, *History* I:332-33;
- 40 Cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* p. 344.
- 41 On Sousa e Macedo, who had served joao IV as Resident in both London (1642-46) and The Hague (1650-21), Cf. Edgar Presrage, *O Dr. Antonio de Sousa de Macedo: Residente de Portugal em Londres, 1642-46* (Lisbon, 1916); and John Colbatch, *An Account of the Court of Portugal, under the Reign of the present King Dom Pedro II* (2 pts. in 1, London, 1700) I:87-88.
- 42 On Schomberg, the Anglo-German count, and other foreign mercenaries in Portugal during the Restoration struggle, cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 336-47, and "Marshal! Schomberg in Portugal, 1660-1668," *History Today* (October, 1976) pp. 653-63; Chrisrovgo Ayres, *Um capitula da guerra da Reuauracac, 1660 a 1668: O Conde de Schonberg em Portugal* (Lisbon, 1897); Shaw, *Trade, Inquisition, and the English Nation in Portugal* pp. 135-40; and J. Childs, "The English Brigade in Portugal, 1662-68" *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* III (1970) pp. 135-47.
- 43 For details on the final stages of the war, Boxer *Salvador de Sá* pp. 354-55; Livermore, *New History* pp. 192-93; Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714* pp. 257 ff.; j.H. El'iot, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716* (New York, 1963, 1977) pp. 352-53.
- 44 For details on the negotiations resulting in this dynastic marriage, Presrage, *Diplomatic Relations* pp. 84-88, 166-69; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 352-59; and Livermore, *New History* pp. 192-94.
- 45 In the view of Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* p. 352.
- 46 Livermore, *New History* p. 193.
- 47 On these machinations in Lisbon and the 1667 treaty, cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 352 ff.; and Livermore, *New History* pp. 193-94. The 1667 treaty can be found in „F. Borges de Casro, *Collecção de Tratados, convencoes, contratos. e actes publicos cefebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal desde 1040 ate o presente* (8 vois., Lisbon, 1856-

- 58) I:338-53. For Sourhwcll's summary of the articles of this treaty, cf. PRO SP 89/8 fos. 132-37, Southwell to Arlington, 1611Vh667.
- 48 On the loss of San Theme, cf. William Foster, *The English Factories in India, 1661-64* (Oxford, 1923) p. 146n.r; H.D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras, 1640-1800* (3 vols., London, 1913) I:302-10; and *Livro dos Reis vnnhos* [LRVI No.2 fo. 10, Antonio de Mello de Castro to King of Golconda, 15(?)/II/1663.
- 49 The best account of Antonio de Mello de Casro's voyage to India remains Foster, cd., *The English Factories in India, 1661-64* pp. 123-43.
- 50 CL Francisco Luis Ameno, "Noticia Chronologica dos descobrimentos que hzeram os Portugueses ate a India Oriental, e das Armadas que os Reis de Portugal tem mandado aquelle Estado ate o presente anno de 1762," *Biblioteca Publica de Evora* [BrEI Codex CXV/1-21 fos. 91-94, summarized in Ames, "The Carreira da India," pp. 17-18. The only exception to this pattern was the four ship Viceregal fleet of [odo Nunes da Cunha.
- 51 Cf. *Lnrm das Mon(oes do Reino* [MRI Volumes 29-33 covering the years 1662-1667.
- 52 On this conjuncture of forces combining against Castelo-Melhor, cf. Livermore, *New History* p. 194; Oliveira Marques, *History* I:332-33; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 352 H.; Colbarch, *Account* I:43-48, 58-89; and PRO SP 89/8 fos. 24-34v., Sourbwell to Arlington, 4/II/1667.
- 53 Details on the coup of late 1667 and its aftermath can be found in PRO SI' 89/8 fos. 200-98 which contain the letters from Sourhwcll to Arlington describing these events as well as copies of relevant supporting documents. Cf. also his *Narrative of the proceedings in the court of Portugal, concerning the discharge of the Crmde de Caste! Melhor, the Secretary of State, and others, from their offices, in August, September, October, November, 1667* forwarded with his dispatch of 15/XU/1667 all given in Sourhwcll *Letters* pp. 218-319. Perhaps more interesting is a letter from Pedro to Charles II of 24/XI/1667 found in PRO SI' 89/8 fo. 246 ff. in which he stated that Afonso's trust in unworthy individuals had created such chaos in the kingdom that the "Camara, the nobility, and the povo of this city had obliged me almost with violence to take possession of this kingdom."
- 54 Quoted in Livermore, *New History* p. 195.
- 55 For details on the proceedings to annul the royal marriage, cf. PRO SI' 89/8 fos. 273-79, Documents relating to the hearing forwarded to Arlington by Southwell; A. Baiao, *Causa de nulidade de matrimonio entre a rainha D. Maria Francisco Isabel de Saboya* (o rei D. Afonso VI (Coimbra, 1925); and Doria D. *Maria Francisca* pp. 242-54.
- 56 Cf. Colbarch, *Account* I:3-5. As Hanson notes, however, the Prince Regent's "sallies into the night" would also result in him probably contracting "venereal disease sometime during the early 1670s." Pedro's mood swings were also quite severe, ranging "from deep and persistent despression to bawdy euphoria," behavior which suggests that "he may have been manic-depressive". Cf. *Baroque Portugal* p. 15.
- 57 CL Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 10-38.
- 58 CL Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 108-4°, 160-84. The letters of Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo from Paris during the late 1660's and early 1670's can be found in *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo* [ANTTJ MNE LPI 1 and 2. This correspondence has been examined by Virginia Rau in her *Politica Economica e Mercantilismo na Correspondencia de Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo* (1668-1676) in *Do Tempo e da Historia* (Lisbon, 1968), and "Cenas de vida parisiense na correspondencia de Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo (1668-1676) *Bulletin des Études Portugaises* 30 (1969) pp. 95-117. The best work all Colbert remains C.W. Colc, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism* (2 vols., New York, 1919).
- 59 On the power of the New Christians over the private sector of the Carreira trade, cf. James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Hahshurys* pp. 29-42.

- 60 On these reforms, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 143-84.
- 61 According to Boxer in *Salvador de Sá* pp. 371-73.
- 62 On Pedro's rebuff to the pro-French faction at court and the conclusion of the 1668 treaty, cf. Livermore, *New History* pp. 196-97; Boxer *Salvador de Sá* pp. 366-67; and Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 13-15.
- 63 On this belief, cf. *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino* (AHU) Codex i – fos. [22V-24, *Resolution of the Overseas Council*, 9/IX/1673.
- 64 On the monetary drain of Ceylon for the VOC, cf. *India Office Library* [IOL], London, *Original Correspondence* (E/3/33) 3749 "Extract of Letter from Governor-General and Council in Batavia to the Heeren XVII," fos. 1 ff. As Johan Maetsuycker wrote: "What a fearfull charge dorh Ceylon ... draw after it, and how many years harh this continued in hopes of a profitiable issue ... yet I think the Company will never accomplish there [sic] proposed profit ... God in mercy put an end to these bad times."

Chapter 2

- On the office of Viceroy, cf. Bailey Diffie and George B. Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580* pp. 247 n. 3 and 323; Pearson *Portuguese in India* pp. 34-35. It should be noted, however, that the author of the *Roteiro* of Vasco da Gama's voyage also used the term "visorrey" in his narrative. Cf. *Roteiro da Viagem de Vasco da Gama em MCCCCXCXVII* (Lisbon, and ed., 1861) p. 26.
- 2 Cf. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* 11:1-9; Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* p. 247 n. 3. Cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 323-25; and Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* n:487-88 for a list of the Viceroys and Governors and their length of service.
 - 4 Based on Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* II:487-88.
 - 5 Cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* p. 324; and Boxer, *A India Portuguesa* pp. 24-25.
 - 6 Cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* p. 325; and for the salary of 30,000 *xerafins* during this period HAG Codex 2316 fos. 3-5.
 - 7 Cf. Anthony R. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur: The Count of Linhares at Goa in the 1630's" in R. Prak and D. Rctbermund (eds.), *Emporia, Commodities, and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750* (Stuggart, 1991) pp. 427-44; and Virginia Rau, *Fortunas ultramatinas e a ncbreza portuguesa no seculo XVII* (Coimbra, 1961).
 - 8 According to Disney in "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur" p. 428.
 - 9 For details, cf. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur" pp. 429-44.
 - 10 For details on the family and personal background on the Governors and Viceroys of this period, cf. ANIT *Chancelarias Reais* for joao IV, Afonso VI and Pedro Ih jose F. Ferreira Martins, *Os Vice-Reis da India, 1505-1917* (Lisbon 1935); Felgueiras Gayo, *Nobilario de Familias de Portugal* (28 vols. Braga, 1939-41); D. Antonio Caetano de Sousa, *Histone Genealogica da Casa Real Portuguesa*; Afonso Eduardo Martins Zuquere, *Nobreza de Portugal* (Lisbon, 3 vols., 1960-61); Anselmo Braamcamp Freire, *Brasoes da Sala de Sintra* (Coimbra, 3 vols., 1921-30); and HAG Codex 650 "Catalogo dos Vice-Reis e Governadores da India, 1604-1837".
 - 11 The most comprehensive evidence for examining the policies of the Viceroy and Governors is the *Livros das moncoes do Reino* or Monsoon Books series at the HAG, containing the official correspondence and supporting documents between Lisbon and Goa. Volumes 28A-43 cover the years 1660-1679, cf. HAG Codices 37-50.
 - 12 Cf. HAG MR 28A, Count of Ponte to D. Luisa Cusmao, fo. 232, 7/II/1661; fo. 236, 14/II/1661 and MR 28A Count of Miranda to D. Luisa: fo. 238, IOIIIU1661; and fo. 234, 1/III/1661.
 - 13 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 212, D. Luisa Cusmao to Governors of India, 11/IV/1661.

- 14 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 215, D. Luisa Gusmão to Governors of India, 201IVh661; and also HAG MR 28A fo. 218, 26/IV/1661.
- 15 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9; Martins Os *Vice-Reis* pp. 149-50.
- 16 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9; Martin Os *Vice-Reis* pp. 149-50; and BPE Codex CXV/1-21 fo.91v.
- 17 For background on Mendonça Punado's family and early career, cf. Gayo, *Nobiliário de Famílias de Portugal* XX (Braga, 1939) pp. 53-56; Caetano de Sousa *Historia Genealogica* XI (Coimbra, 1953) pp. 260-61; Martins Zuquete *Nobreza de Portugal* II (Lisbon, 1960) p. 678; Braamcamp Freire *Brasões da Sala de Sintra* II (Coimbra, c. 1923) pp. 366-67; HAG Codex 650 fols. 9-10; Boxer *A Índia Portuguesa* pp. 43-44, 59-61; and Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, trans. by S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930) p. 990.
- 18 Cf. Pem. to de Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, pp. 1000-1002. For additional details on the 1658-59 campaign in Salsette, cf. Boxer, *A Índia Portuguesa* p. 60 and the sources cited therein.
- 19 Cf. Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* II:678.
- 20 Cf. Ferreira Martins, Os *Vice-Reis* pp. 149-50.
- 21 On Antonio de Mello de Casro's family and early career, cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v.; Ferreira Martins, Os *Vice-Reis* pp. 151-52; and Cayo, *Nobiliário de Famílias de Portugal* XI:44.
- 22 For the English account of this voyage, cf. EF 166(-1664) pp. 123-44. For Mello de Casro's side of the story, cf. J.R.J. Biker, *Coltecoo de tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da Índia Portuguesa fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teo reiações nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde a principio da conquista até o fim do secuto XVIII* (14 vols., Lisbon, 1881-87) III:3 H.; HAG MR 28A, Mello de Casro to D. Luisa Gusmão: fols. 243-44, 16/X/1662; fo. 36, 28/XII/1662; and 28B fa. 469, 18/X/1662.
- 23 For the relevant correspondence between Mello de Castro and the *Reino*, cf. HAG MR 28A-35; AHU DAI Boxes 25 (1661-1663) through 27 (1666-1668). Cf. especially, HAG MR 28A fa. 149, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Cusmao, 30/XI/1662; MR 30 fo. 117, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 14/I/1664; MR 30 fols. 141-41v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 29/III/1664; MR 31 fo. 160, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 20/IX/1664; MR 31 fols. j-6, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 28/IX/1664; and MR 35 fa. 165, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 29/IV/1666. For a traditional treatment of Mello de Castro's tenure, cf. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* II:327-56.
- 24 On João Nunes da Cunha's family background and early career, cf. Gayo, *Nobiliário de Famílias de Portugal* X:147-48; HAG Codex 650 fols. 9-10; Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* III:356; Ferreira Martins, Os *Vice-Reis* pp. 153-54; and BPE Codex CXVh-21 fols. 93-93v.
- 25 Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 92, São vicente to Afonso, 25/IV/1667.
- 26 CL AHU DAI Box 27, Document 99, São Vicente to Afonso, 21/IX/1667.
- 27 Cf. 101. OC 3213, President and Council in Surat to Directors, 5/IV/1667.
- 28 Cf. HAG MR 35 fols. 149-49v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/III/1666.
- 29 Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 21, 25/IV/1667; and MR 33 fa. 92, 25/IV/1667.
- 30 Cf. HAG MR 33 fa. 305, S. Vicente to Afonso, 29/IV/1667.
- 31 Cf. HAG MR 33 fa. 330 (?), S. Vicente to Afonso, 3/IV/1667.
- 32 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v.
- 33 The 'Auto da sucessão da Governança da Índia e Via q. p.a. ella se abriu na Capela maior da casa profeta da Companhia de Jesus desta Cidade p. falecimenro do Ex.mo Sot. João Nunes da Cunha de Sam. V.re V. Rey e cap.m g.l da Índia' from the Council of State records found in HAG Codex 9535 "Assentos do Concelho do Esrado, 1655-1676" (No. 6) is given in ACE IV:195-98.
- 34 Cf. ACE IV:190-200.

- 35 On the family background and previous experience of Antonio de Mello de Casro, cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 10; Martins, *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 155-56; and Gayo, *Nobiliario de Familiae de Portugal* XI:39-40, 71.
- 36 Cf. HAG MR 34 fo. 203, Governors to Pedro, 184-84V., 26ffh670.
- 37 CL ACE IV:203-17. It is interesting to note that in a letter of 8 January 1669, the Governors pointed out that S. Vicente had also been responsible for "only" 7 or 8 *consultas* during his tenure. CL HAG MR 35 fo. 23.
- 38 Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 17, Governors to Pedro, 81U1669.
- 39 CL for example, Governors to Pedro: HAG MR 35 fo. 3, 7/1/1669; MR 35 fo. 9, 8/1/1669; MR 35 fo. 1, 131U1669; and MR 34 fo. 158, 24/1/1670.
- 40 Cf. HAG MR 34 fos. 277-77v., Governors to Pedro, 281U1670; and MR 34 fos. 303-03v., Governors to Pedro, 28/1/1670.
- 41 CL Ames, "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682" pp. 25-27.
- 42 CL HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 81h669; and BPE Codex CXVh-21 fo. 93V. and Ames, "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682" pp. 19-22 and the manuscript sources cited therein.
- 43 On Mendonca Furrado's return to the *Reino* and activities there from 1664-1670, cf. Boxer, *Salvador da Sã* pp. 352 ff.
- 44 For details on Mendonca Furrado's assumption of his new titles and his voyage to Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXVh-21 fos. 93-93V.; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 157-58; *ANIT Registro de Mercês: Ordens Militares* Book 12 fo. 453 and Book 14 fo. 9v.; Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* II:678; *Assentos* IV:217-23; and HAG MR 36 fo. 405, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 14/X/1671.
- 45 Sainr-Romain's summaries of these conversations and other information relating to the proposed Franco-Portuguese alliance can be found in AAE CC fos. 97-100V., "Extrait des Lettres de M. Saint-Remain," 22/XII/1669-12/V/1670; fos. 103-05, Saint-Remain to Colbert, 30/XII/1669; fos. 10-13v., Saint-Remain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670; and fos. 119-20, Saint-Remain to Colbert [in cipher], 4/1/1670.
- 46 Cf. Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1661-1677" pp. 38-46 and the manuscript sources cited therein.
- 47 As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay wrote as early as 1674 on Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the abuses of the religious orders and nobles "the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much: both in one and in the other". Cf. 10L OC 3929, Aungier to Company Directors, 2/1/1674.
- 48 For details on the family background and early career of D. Pedro de Almeida, cf. Martins, *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 159-60; Braarncamp Preire, *Braeoes* II:366-67; HAG Codex 650 fo. 10; Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* II:328; and Gayo, *Nobilario de Familias de Portugal* II:74-75.
- 49 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24.
- 50 CL HAG MR 28A fos. 150-50v. This letter was dated Goa, 161IXh661.
- 51 Cf. AAE CC fos. 123-25, Saint-Rornain to Colbert, 19nV1670.
- 52 Cf. HAG MR 41 fos. 177-77v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/1/1677.
- 53 For details on the Pate expedition, cf. *Assentos* IV:304-15; BPE Codex CXVh-21 fo. 95v.; HAG MR 43 fos. 208-09, Pedro to D. Pedro de Almeida, 5/IV/1677; HAG MR 43 fo. 218, Pedro to Governors, 81IVh677; Eric Axelson, *The Portuguese in South East Africa, 1600-1700* pp. 151 ff.; and AHJ DAM Box 3, Document 16, *Consulta* of the Overseas Council on the Pate Expedition, 23/V/1677.
- 54 The "Entrega que faz o exm.mno S.or Dom P.o dalmeida V. Rey da India da governanca della aos Il.mos Sores Dom Fr. Antonio brundao, Arc.o de Goa, e Primas da India e Antonio Paez de Sande, ambos do Concelho de S.A." is given in ACE IV:3II-13.

- 55 For details on the family background and early career of Antonio Paes de Sande, cf. Antonio Paes de Sande e Casarro, *Antonio Paes de Sande: O Grande Gouernador* (Lisbon, 1951) pp. 9-26.
- 56 On Antonio Paes de Sande's career in Crown service from 1666-1677, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, *Antonio Paes de Sande* pp. 12-22; Martins, *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 159-61; HAG Codex 650 fa. II; HAG MR 33 fa. 242, "Cerndao de Antonio Paes de Sande," 211U1667; and *Assentos* IV;167-198.
- 57 Found *passim* in HAG MR 42-4S covering the years 1677-81.
- 58 On the war with Canara, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, *Antonio Paes de Sal/de* pp. n-aa; ACE IV:338-39; HAG MR 33 fo. 139 "Carte do rei da Canara" s.d. lè. 16661" MR 33 fa. 1S, S. Viceore to AfollSO, 25/I/1667; MR 33 fa. 138, S. Vicenre to Afonso, 261U1667; MR 35 fo. 17, Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio to Pedro, 81U1669; and MR 43 fa. 239, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 171U1679.
- 59 Cf. Paes de Sande e Casarro, *Antonio Paes de Sal/de* pp. zz-zj, 35-37; HAG MR 43 fos. 206-06v., Paes de Sande to Pedro, 20/I/1679.
- 60 Cf. ACE IV:350-52; HAG MR 43 fo. 239, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 171U1679.
- (1 On the religious policies of Paes de Sande, cf. Paes de Sande e Casarro, *Antonio Paes de Sande* pp. 24-18. For a discussion of abuses relating to the "gcnnò" orphans during this period and the adverse economic impact these practices were having on the trade of the Estado, cf. Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677" pp. 4i-41 and the manuscript sources cited therein.
- ta For the 1680 figures, cf. HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27. These *sal/dos* are contrasted with the 1630 figures in Ames "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677" p. 46.
- 61 This document is given in ACE IV:350-54.

Chapter 3

CL *Roteiro da Viagem de Vasw Da Gama* p. SL

- 2 On the *Padroado* and the merging of religious and economic interests, among others, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 116 ff.; Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 65-83, 228-48; Diffie and Winus, *Foundations* pp. 335-37; Antonio da Silva Rego, *Hetona das miseoes do padroado portugues do Oriente, 1500-1542* (Lisbon, 1949), and his collection *Documentação para a história das missal'S do Padroado Portugues do Oriente, India* (u. vols, Lisbon, 1947-in progress); Anur Basilic de Sã, *Documentacao para a historia das missal'S do Padroado Português do Oriente* (5 vols., Lisbon, 1954-58). The quotes from Diogo do Couto and Vicira are cited in Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 228 and 65.
- 3 Cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 116-17.
- 4 Ibid. and Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago, 1965-) I:387, 401.
- S On the arrival of the Jesuits and the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. n8-19; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 66-83. Xavier's letter calling for the Inquisition can be found in Silva Rego, *Doannentacao* III:351.
- 6 On the work of the Ecclesiastical Council in Goa, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 66-72. This marked shift in religious policy in the mid-rsrh century was well-reflected in the verse of the great Portuguese poet Luis Vaz de Can-oes. As opposed to the pristine curiosity and toleration found in Da Gama's *Roteiro* or Pires's account regarding Hinduism and its religious images, we find that by 1572, and the publication of the *Lusiads*, such images had been reinterpreted in the words of Carnoes and in the minds of his Portuguese COntemporaries. This revised view reduced the complex practices of Hinduism to "so many imaginings prompted by the devil. The statues were abominable ... Here the barbarous heathen performed his superstitious devotions." Cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 117.

- 7 On the status of the religious orders in Goa by the mid-17th century, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 118-19. For details on the Sé Cathedral in Goa, cf. S. Rajagopalan, *Old Goa* (New Delhi, 1982) pp. 14-19; and volume 2 of the *Colecção de Diálogo e Cultura* series issued by the Portuguese *Repartido Central de Estatística e Informação* titled *Velha Goa* (Lisbon, 1952) pp. II-46.
- 8 Bocarro's *Livro das plantas de todas as [citra]letas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental* manuscript found in the Biblioteca Pública de Évora (BPE) was published by A.B. de Bragança Pereira's in his *Arquivo Português Oriental* IV:21 and ii (Bastora, 1937-38).
- 9 For details on these anti-Hindu laws, cf. A.K. Priolkar, *The Goa Inquisition* (Bombay, 1961) pp. 114-49; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 66-79.
- 10 Cf. Priolkar, *Goa Inquisition* pp. 123-24.
- 11 On these measures, cf. Priolkar, *Goa Inquisition* pp. 124-27; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 66-67.
- 12 Cf. Pyrard, *Voyage* II:1 pp. 60-61, quoted in Priolkar, *Goa Inquisition* pp. 53-54.
- 13 On the powers of the *Pai dos Christãos*, especially as they related to D. Sebastião's decree on the taking of Hindu orphans, cf. Priolkar, *Goa Inquisition* pp. 127-40; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 75-78.
- 14 For details on these inducements, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 67-68; Priolkar, *Goa Inquisition* pp. 141-43.
- 15 For estimates on the number of converts, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 127-28; Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 78-83.
- 16 The resiliency of the indigenous religion to this onslaught is discussed in Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 127-28.
- 17 Quoted in Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* p. 74.
- 18 Discussed in Ames, "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677", pp. 41-42.
- 19 Cf. HAG MR/35 fo. 149-49V., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/II/1666.
- 20 Cf. HAG MR/In fo. 174, Afonso to S. Vicente, 7/II/1666.
- ai Discussed in Ames, "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677", pp. 33-34, 41-42.
- az. On the dispute with Rome over appointing bishops and the actions of the *Propaganda Fide*, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 230-39.
- 23 HAG MR/28A fo. 116, Queen Regent to Governors of India, 11/IV/1661.
- 24 Cf. HAG, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro: MR/28A fo. 54, 14/III/1662; fo. 169, 21/IV/1662; and fo. 77, 4/IV/1662.
- 25 HAG MR/28A fo. 71, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 4/IV/1662.
- 26 HAG MR/28A fo. 55, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 6/II/1663.
- 27 HAG MR 28A fo. 72, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 6/III/1663.
- 28 Cf. HAG MR/Jo fos. 13-13V., Barreto to Mello de Castro, 24/II/1663.
- 29 HAG MR/30 fo. 10, Afonso to Mello de Castro, 14/III/1663.
- 30 Cf. HAG MR/30 fo. 11, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 11/III/1664.
- 31 HAG MR/31 fo. 28, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 18/VIII/1664.
- 32 HAG MR/31 fo. 31, Provincial of Jesuits to Mello de Castro, 20/VIII/1664.
- 33 HAG MR/31 fo. 32, Mello de Castro to Provincial of Jesuits, 14/VIII/1664.
- 34 HAG MR/31 fo. 34, Barreto to Mello de Castro, 22/VIII/1664.
- 35 HAG MR/31 fo. 35, Mello de Castro to Barreto, 23/VIII/1664. Cf. also MR/31 fo. 33, Mello de Castro to Barreto, 20/VIII/1664.
- 36 Cf. HAG MR/31 fo. 265, *Cabido* of Sé Cathedral to Afonso, 27/VIII/1664.
- 37 HAG MR/32 fo. 15, Afonso to Mello de Castro, 22/III/1665.
- 38 HAG MR/32 fo. 29, Afonso to Mello de Castro, 14/IV/1665.
- 39 Cf. HAG MR/35 fos. 149-49V., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/II/1666.
- 40 HAG MR/35 fo. 125, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/II/1666.
- 41 Cf. Mello de Castro to Afonso, 29/II/1666, HAG MR/35 fo. 96 and 145.
- 42 Cf. HAG MR/35 fo. 174, Afonso to S. Vicente, 71/VJ/1666.

- 43 HAG MRIn fo. 54, Afonso to S. Vicente, 29/IIh666.
- 44 HAG MR/n Io. 205 Afonso to S. Vicente, 6/II/1666.
- 45 HAG MR/n fa. 80, Afonso to S. Vicenre, 26/IIIh666.
- 46 HAG MR/33 fa. 21, S. Vicenre to Afonso, 25/IV1667.
- 47 HAG MRIn fo. 92, S. Vicenre to Afonso, 25/II/1667.
- 48 Cf. S. Vicente to Afonso, 25/II/1667, HAG MR/' Io. 88 and fo. 206.
- 49 HAG MR/n fo. 305 S. Vicente to Afonso, 29/IV1667.
- 50 HAG MR/33 fa. 330 (?), S. Vicenre to Afonso, 3/II/1667.
- 51 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. SV.
- 52 On the power of the Church within the kingdom, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 27-38.
- 53 CL Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 89-100 and below pp.
- 54 Cf. Ames, "The Estado do india, 1663-1677," pp. 41-42.
- 55 HAG MR/H fo. 259, Pedro to S. Vicenre, IIIIVh668.
- 56 HAG MR/H fo. ic, Pedro to S. Vicenre, 15/XIU1668.
- 57 HAG MR/H fos. 213-13v., Pedro to S. Vicente, 29/IIII1669.
- 58 HAG MR/H fo. 252, Pedro to S. Vicente, 26/IIIh669.
- 59 HAG MR/34 fa. 54, Pedro to S. Vicenre, 28/IIII1669.
- 60 Cf. Pedro to S. Vicente: HAG MR/34 fo 60, 28/IIIV1669; and fo. 145, 29/IIIh669.
- 61 Cf. Arquivo Historico Ultramarino [AHU] *Documentos aoulscs relativos à India* [DAI] Box 28, Document 85.
- 62 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 85, marginal note of Pedro dated 1/II/1670 on the *consulta* of 7/XIU1669.
- 63 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 85, copy of unsigned opinion on this matter, s.d., attached to the *consulta* of 7/XIIh669.
- 64 HAG MR/H fo. 16, Governors to Pedro, 23/IIh670'
- 65 HAG MR/H fo. 55, Governors to Pedro, 24/II/1670.
- 66 HAG MR/H fa. 225, Governors to Pedro, 26/IIh670.
- 67 Cf. Pedro to Mendonca Furtado: HAG MR/36 fo. 82. 2u1III1670; fo. 16, 26fIIU1670; and AHU Codex 208 fo. 337Y., 27/IIIfh670.
- 68 CL AHU DAI Box 28, Document 150.
- 69 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 150, fo. 2 of the *considta* of 17Nh670.
- 70 HAG MR/36 fo. 415, Pedro to Mendnnca Furtado, 20fIIIh671.
- 71 Cf. HAG MRf36 fos. 259-59v., Hindu Merchants of Bacaim to Mendonca Furtado, 19N lh671.
- 72 CL HAG MR/36 fo. 2,7, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 21IIIU1671.
- 73 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 208.
- 74 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 208, 2 fos. addendum to the *ccmsulta* of 3/IX/1671 written by Paes de Sande and dated 26NIHh671.
- 75 Cf. HAG MR/;6 fo. 83, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 31Xh671.
- 76 HAC; MRI36 fo. 2,8, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 3fXh671.
- 77 HAG MR/36 fo. 403, Mendonca Furrado to Pedrn, 14/X/1671.
- 78 Cf. HAG MR/36 fo. 258.
- 79 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 137-37V., Mendonca Funado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.
- 80 Cf. HAG MRf37 fo. 7, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 3/III/1672.
- 81 HAG MRf37 fo. 50, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 11II11672.
- 82 Cf. HAG MRf37 fo. 78, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, JOIII1672.
- 83 HAG MRf37 f0. 85, Pedro to Mendonca Purrado, JO/IIIh672.
- 84 Cf., for example, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro: HAG MRf37 fa. 8, nJIXh672; MR/38A fos. 113-13v., IO/Xh673; and MR/41 fo. 59, 101V1677.
- 85 HAG MR/17 fa. 14, Mendonca Funado to Pedro, 12IIXh672.
- 86 CL Mendonca Purrado to Pedro: HAG MR/38B fa. 287, 11/X/1673; and MR/42 fa. 3, 12/IIh 677.

- 87 HAG MRJ40 to 125, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 22/II/1676.
- 88 Cf. HAG MRJ37 fos. 274-74V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/II/1673.
- 89 For details, cf. Mendonca Furtado to Pedro: HAG MRJ38B fos. 406-06v., 21XUI673; MRJ38B fos. 378-78v., 201V1674; and MRJ38B fos. 456-57, 20IU1674, which contains an *assento* of the Goa Council of State on the matter, dated 28IXUI673. Pissurlencae provides useful additional documentation on the discussions on this matter in ACE rV:229-31 n. 1, and rV:287-91 n. 1.
- 90 HAG MRJ38B fos. 378-78v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 20IU1674.
- 91 Cf. MRJ39 fo. 109, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 31XIV1674.
- 92 HAG MRJ38A fo. 128, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 27IXJ1672.
- 93 AHU DAI Box 29, Document 130, *Consulta* of the Overseas Council on Foreign Bishops in the *Estado*, 30/VIII/1673.
- 94 Cf. HAG MRJ41 fo. 58, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 3/II/1676.
- 95 Cf. HAG MRJ42 fo. 110, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 31/III/1677. The petition from the Hindu population of Goa to Pedro can be found in MRJ42 fos. 138-38v. A similar petition had been sent to Mendonca Furtado on 21/II/1676, cf. MRJ42 fos. 147-48.
- 96 The relevant documentation on this issue and the *Junta* can be found in HAG MRJ42 fos. 133-78; MRJ43 fos. 208-09.
- 97 Quoted in Priolkar, *Inquisition* p. 127.
- 98 For details on the Goa Council of State meeting of 17 December 1677, cf. ACE IV:280-88.
- 99 ACE IV:283-84.
- 100 ACE IV:281-85.
- 101 ACE IV:285-87.
- 102 Cf. ACE IV:280-88; and Priolkar, *Inquisition* pp. 118-20.
- 103 HAG MRJ42 fos. 177-78. Cf. also Themudo's letter of 4/XII/1677 found in MRJ42 fos. 144-45v.
- 104 For details on this second meeting of the *Junta*, cf. ACE IV:299-303. The law on this matter can be found in HAG MRJ42 fos. 198-200v.

Chapter 4

Cf. V.M. Godinho, *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial; L'Economie de l'empire portugaise aux XVe et XVIe siècles*; and *Les Finances de l'état portugais des Indes Orientales (1517-1635)* (Paris, 1982); C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*; and *From Lisbon to Goa, 1500-1750: Studies in Portuguese Maritime Enterprise* (London, 1984); Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*; M.N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1976); *The Portuguese in India*; A.R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century*; and James E. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain*; and *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs*.

- 2 Traditional surveys of the *Estado* include F.E. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*; R.S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India*; Bailey Diffey and George Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580*, and Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire*. A recent attempt to update this historiography can be found in S. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*. For details of the rehabilitation of the *Estado* during the late 17th century under Pedro and Mendonca Furtado, cf. Glenn J. Ames "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe and the East," pp. 31-46, and "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire", pp. 7-27. Cf. Boxer *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* p. 206.

- 4 For details on the *roteiros* of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Cf. Boxer "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1650-1750", *The Mariner's Mirror* XLVI (1960) pp. 35-54. Alvaras (royal decrees), *regimentos* and Crown letters governing the sailings for the *Carreira* for this period are found in Historical Archives of Goa [HAG] HAG MR/28A fos. 95, 193; MR/33 fos 113-14; MR/34 fa. 214; MRF36 fo. 309; MRF37 fos. 22-25; and MRF38B fos. 4(3,474; AHU DAI Box 27, Document 151; Box 28, Document 97; and British Museum [BM] Add. MSS. 20879 fos. 31, 53-54.
The stimulus for this significant *volte-face* was most probably João Pereira Corte-Real's *Discurtos sobre la Navegacion de las naos de la India de Portugal, Por Iuan Peveyra/Corte Real, Cavalera Portugues, para que V. Maggestadseia seroido de mandartuer* (Madrid, 1622?). Cone-Real's distinguished naval career (Captain and Captain-Major of at least four successful *Carreira* voyages, Admiral of the Portuguese Fleet, *Mestre do Campo* of the *Terco da Armada*) and his pivotal importance in design reforms for Portuguese Indiamen have been detailed by Boxer in his "Admiral Joao Pereira Cone-Real and the Construction of Portuguese East-Indiamen in the Early Seventeenth Century", *The Mariner's Mirror* XXVI (1940) pp. 388-406.
- 6 Cited in Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* p. 219.
Ibid. p. 207.
- 8 Cf. Bernardo Gornes de Briro, *Histonca tragico-maritima, em que se escrevem chronologicamente os naufragios que tiuemo as naos de Portugal, depots que se poz em exeracio a navegação da India* (2 vols., Lisbon, 1735-36 and later editions), and *Relacion de las grandes perdidas de naos y galeones, que han tenido los Portugueses en la India Oriental* (Madrid, 1651). Works like these traditionally set the tone for modern treatises on the subject like Duffy's *Shipwreck and Empire: Being an Account of Portuguese Maritime Disasters in a Century of Decline* (Cambridge MA, 1955). Cf. also Boxer's introductions to the Hakluyt Society's editions of *The Tragic History of the Sea, 1589-1622* (Cambridge, 1959) and *Further Selections from the Tragic History of the Sea, 1559-1565* (London, 1968); his "The Naval and Colonial Papers of Dom Antonio de Ataíde", *Harvard Library Bulletin* V (1951) pp. 24-50; "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1650-1750" pp. 36-41; and *The Portuguese Seahome Em/lire* p. 119 ff.
- 9 For examples, cf. Boxer, *The Tragic History of the Sea*, 1589-1622 pp. 25-26, 55, 114-17, and 191.
- 10 Boxer "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1650-1750," pp. 37-40.
- 11 Cf. HAG MRF18A fa. 193, Queen-Regent to Governors of India, 14/XI/1660, and fo. 94, Queen-Regent to Antonio de Mello de Casro, 30/III/1661. Cf. also BM Add. MSS. 20879 fos. 31, 53-54.
- 11 Cf. HAG MR/31 fo. 206, Antonio de Mello de Casro to Afonso, 20/XI/1664; MRF33 fa. 113, Afonso to S. Vicente, 8/II/1666; and BM Add. MSS. 20879 fo. 105.
- 13 Cf. AHU DAI Box 17, Document 151, *Consulta* of Overseas Council on Embarkations to *Reino*, 6/XI/1668, with *Regimento* from S. Vicente to Dinis de Mello de Casro, captain of the *nao S. Pedro de Alcantara* dated 29/II/1667 attached; Box 18, Document 97, *Consulta* of Overseas Council on Embarkations to *Reino*, 21/II/1670, with *Regimento* from S. Vicente to Francisco Range! Pinto, captain of the *nao S. Thereza*, dated 4/II/1668, attached; AHU Codex 208 fa. 339v., Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 1/V/1670; and MRF37 fos. 14-15, *Regimento* for Ships Returning to *Reino*, 2/III/1672.
- 14 For details on these generally dismal years, Cf. Boxer, *A Índia Portuguesa em meados do século XVII* pp. 39-49.
- 15 Ibid. pp. -u, 39-49.
- 16 Cf. HAG Codex 2316 *Livro de Registro dos aiuaras etc. de diferentes feitorias* fos. 28-39v.
- 17 AGA Codex 47. For the years 1668-1682, d. fos. IV-14V. for a printed version of this codex, cf. Silva Rego ed. *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa* IV:3ff.

- 18 Cf. BPE Codex CXV/1-21. All this data can be supplemented by information from the Monsoon Books and Treasury Council records from the HAG as well as details found in the State Papers, Foreign series of the PRO in London. HAG MR/33-44 (1668-1680) contain frequent references to the ships of the *Carreira*, including arrival and departure dates, details on delays and mishaps, and even some information on cargoes. The *Assentos do Conselho da Fazenda* vols. 11-14 (1666-86) at the HAG (Códices u68-72) are valuable for arrival and departure dates, since the Council approved expenditures for pilots to conduct arriving ships to the anchorage at Mormogao and homeward bound ships to take on water at Fort Agceda before departing. The *State Papers, Foreign*, series at the PRO for Portugal (SPF89) is also useful since it contains the correspondence between English diplomats resident in Lisbon and officials in London. Given the keen interest of the English in the Asian trade it is not surprising to find frequent references to the ships of the *Carreira*. For example, we have Francis Parry's letter of 20/30 August 1672 (SPF89/12 fos. 134-34v.) describing the great joy in Lisbon at the arrival of three "richly laden" ships from India, "which is soe good a fortune as harh not been knowne here since Porrugall harh been a kingdome of irselfe". He was referring to the S. *João da Ribeira*, the *Bom Jesus de S. Domingos*, and the *Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes*, which had arrived in the Tagus in August 8, 1672.
- 19 For example, 56 French ships (both royal and Company) made the passage from Europe to les Indes Orientales between 1665-1682. Of these only 26 or 37.4% made it back to France. Cf. Paul Kaepelin, *La Compagnie des Indes Orientales et Francois Martin* (Paris, 1908) pp. 653-55.
- 20 From an analysis by the marquis de Fronteira of Colberr's proposed anti-Dutch triple alliance in Asia with the English and Portuguese. Cf. BNL Codex 748 fos. 130-65 for the Instrucao da Secretaria de Estado e paraceres sobre a liga de Franca e Inglaterra. For Fronteira's views, Cf. fos. 153v.-56v.
- 21 Cf. Boxer, "The Carreira da India, 1650-1700", pp. 36-37; and *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 206-07.
- 22 For details on the Crown's attempt to enforce such orders and ensure prompt departures, cf. HAG MR/34 fos. 213-13v., Pedro to S. Vicenre, 29nWJ669; fo. 214, Governors to Pedro, 261U1670; MR/35 fa. 1, Governors to Pedro, 13/1/1669; MRJ36 fo. 309, Pedro to Mendonca Furrado, 1/IV/1671; MRJ37 fo. 22, Pedro to Mendonca Furrado, 2/III/1672; fo. 23, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, nJIXh672; fos. 24-25, Instructions for Ships Returning to Reino, 2/III/1672(?); fos. 236-36v., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 2/II/1673; fos. 239-39v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 14/II/1673; MRJ38A fo. 144, Pedro to Mendonca Funado, 281XIIh672; MR/38B fo. 463, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 26JII1674; fo. 474, Pedro to Mendonra Funado, 131IIIh673; MR/39 fo. 86, Pedro to Mendonca Purrado, 20/III/1674; MRJ40 fo. 141, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 261IIU1675; and MR/42 fa. 84, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 22/III/1677.
- 23 Cf. *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* and "The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation", in *Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism* ed. by Maurice Aymard (Cambridge, 1982).
- 24 On the monetary drain of Ceylon for the *vac*, cf. IOL OC (E/3/33) 3749 "Extract of Letter from Governor-General and Council in Barevia to the Heeren XVII", fos. 1 ff. As Johan Maetsuycker wrote: "What a fearfull charge dcrh Ceylon...draw after it, and how many years harh this continued in hopes of a profitable issue...yet I think the Company will never accomplish there [sic] proposed profit. ..God in mercy put an end to these bad times."
- 25 For details on this process in Europe, cf. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* pp. 195-235. The reforms implemented in the *Estado* after 1668 are outlined in Ames "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677", pp. 38-46.
- 26 Cf. Boxer "Admiral João Pereira Certe-Reai and the Construction of Portuguese East-Indiamen in the Early Seventeenth Century".

- 27 On the need to export silver to Goa and periodic problems with furnishing sufficient quantities, d. HAG MR/37 fos. 139-39v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672; and MR/39 fo. 60, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 19IIIIh674.
- 28 Based on figures from HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v. and AGA Codex 47 fos. 2V.-14v.
- 29 Cf. AGA Codex 47 fo. 4v.-5v, "Carra geral que vay para a India nesta moncao de 670 e por vice rey Luis de Mendonca Furtado, capitam mor D. Amonio Mascarenhas", Ruy Fernandes d'Almeida and Luis Alvarez Caroeiro to Miguel d'Almeida da Silva, Lisbon 311Vh670; and HAG Codex 2316 fos. 29v.-30v,
- 30 For details on Colbert's *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* and his attempt to lure Pedro into an anti-Dutch triple alliance at this time, d. Glenn J. Ames "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal", pp. 536-59. Pedro's reasoning in declining this tempting offer can perhaps best be gleaned from examining the opinions of his Council of State members on the proposed pact found in BNL Codex 748 fos. 130-65.
- 31 On the sailings from Goa to Lisbon d. Ames "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682" pp. 10-27. The figures for Chart I are based on data found in HAG Codex 1316 fos. 28-39v., and AGA Codex 47 fos. 2v-14v.
- 32 On the transformation of the ships and fleets of the *Carreira* over the years c. 1500-1680, d. CR. Boxer *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 205-27; "The *Carreira da India*, 1650-1750", pp. 35-54; "Admiral Joao Pereira Cone-Real" pp. n8-406; and his collected essays on the subject published as *From Lisbon to Goa, 1500-1750*.
- 33 Derived from data on quantities and prices found in HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v.
- 34 Cf. Boxer "The Third Dutch War in the East, 1672-4", *The Mariner's Mirror* XVI (1930) pp. 341-86; and Glenn J. Ames "Colbert's Grand Asian Fleet of 1670", in *The Mariner's Mirror* LXXVI (1990) pp. 227-40. For contemporary views on the impact of such events on prices and availability of pepper along the west coast of India at this time, cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 139-39v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672; MR/9 fo. 60, and Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 19IIII1674. On the impact of increased European competition, d. HAG MRJ41 fos. 177-77v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/V/1677 and MR/42 fo. 86, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 22IIIIh677.
- 35 Cf. HAG Codex 2316 fos. 39-39v. On the high profits made on diamonds and other precious stones or *pedraria* in Lisbon, cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia*, pp. 49-51.
- 36 Based on estimates of Magalhães-Codiho and others examined by C.H.H. Wake "The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700", *The Journal of European Economic History* pp. 378-81.
- 37 For details on the *liberdade* system and the regimento's of 1515 and 1652, d. among others, Boxer "The *Carreira da India*, 1650-1750", pp. 3-40; and Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia* pp. 38-40.
- 38 AGA Codex 47 fos. 7v.-8v. and 11v.-13.
- 39 CL AGA Codex 47 fos. 7-8v., and HAG Codex 2316 fos. 37v.-38.
- 40 On attempts to increase the efficiency of registering the contents of liberty chests, d. HAG MR/17 fo. 22, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 2/III/1672; MR/42 fo. 84, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 22IIII1677; and MR/42 fo. 84-84v., D. Pedro de Almeida to Pedro, II/XII/1677.
- 41 *Portuguese Trade in Asia* p. 42,
- 42 *Ibid.* It is likely that cotton cloth became an increasingly important component of return bound private cargoes as the 17th century progressed. On this trend, d. also HAG MR/35 fo. 165, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 29/I/1666; and MRJ4 fo. 214, Governors to Pedro, 261UI670.
- 43 Cf. Ames "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682", pp. 23-27.
- 44 PRO (SPF) 89h2 fos. 252-53, Parry to Williamson, 15/VIII/1673. This project is also discussed in Hansou, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 94-100. For details on the interest of this

- community in the Increasingly important private sector of the Carreira trade, cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia* pp. 36-42.
- 45 On the *Terco*, cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 87, Resolution of the Overseas Council, 91XIU1669; and Pedro to Mendonca Furtado. HAG MR/36 fa. 56, 61IIIh670; and MRJ37 fo. 75, IOIIIU1672.
- 46 On the factors undermining this plan, cf. PRO SPF 89tII fcs. 279-79V., Parry to Williamson, 5/XII/1673; and Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 94-100.
- 47 PRO SPF 89/13 fos. 131-31V., Parry to Coventry, 171XIU1675.
- 48 For details on Pedro's declaration of *Comercia Livre* on the East Coast of Africa in 1672 for all Portuguese subjects and the eventual foundation of a Junta to oversee this trade in the 1670'S, cf. Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677", pp. 43-45.
- 49 On the vital role of the New Christians in this trade, cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia*, especially pp. 14-17 and 31-33. For Pedro's plan to lure sizable New Christian capital into a scheme to resuscitate the *comercia!* and military prowess of the *Estado* in return for protection against the abuses of the Inquisition in the early 1670'S, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 94-100; and for a contemporary account, PRO SPF 8g/11 fos. 186-87, Parry to Arlington, 26JXU1672; Party to Williamson: fos. 248-49, 18/VII/1673, fos. 252-53, 15MIUI613; and fos. 279-79v., 5/XII/1673.

Chapter 5

- Cf. ACE 111:200-04 for this regimenro dated 6/IX/1652. The breakdown for these ships was the following: 16 in Bassein in the armada of the *Norte* under Tristao da Silveira; 10 in the armada of the south under Francisco Pereira da Cunha; 5 in Mormugdo under Manoel Roil; 14 in the armada of the *donativo*; 16 near Maskar and 22 in the *Ribeira* at Goa.
- 2 Cf. ACE IV:87-89.
For details, cf. among others, Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 106-27; Suhrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire*, 144-80; Winius, *The Fatal History*; and Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:268-338.
- 4 Cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 61 and ff.
- 5 On this system, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* 61-70; Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 311-23; Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 318-30; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* 60-79.
- 6 On the formation and functioning of the administrative system, cf. Diffie and Winuis, *Foundations* pp. 301-37; Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 62-106; Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 39-64; n8-48. 296-339; and Pearson, *Portuguese in India* 61-80. On the issue of New Christian emmigration to the *Estado* and their role in the trade with Asia, cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade* pp. 30-52 and *passim*.
- 7 Cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 65.
- 8 Ibid. pp. 61-67.
- 9 Cf., for example, Danvers, *Portuguese in India* I:xxxix; R.S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India* pp. 174, 324-25; W.W. Hunter, *A History of British India* I:176-85; and Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* p. 335. As Danvers noted: "A laxity in Government, and a general corruption amongst the servants of the State, in which each one, regardless of the public interests, sought hut his own benefit and the accumulation of wealth, only too certainly prepared the way for the downfall of Portuguese rule in India."
- 10 Cf. Pearson, "Corruption and Corsairs in Sixteenth Century Western India: A Functional Analysis", in *Coastal Western India*, pp. 18-4°.

- 11 For a discussion of the abuses in the official system and the issue of whether such problems increased in the 17th century as difficulties increased for the *Estado*, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 66-70. 138-41.
- 12 Cited in Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* p. 298.
- 13 For details, cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 327-29; Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 95-99; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 296-317.
- 14 These figures are quoted in Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 93.
- 15 Cf. HAG Codex [258, *Livro de Homenagens* (3) fos. 13-127.
- 16 Cf. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India* pp. 12-13; and D.R. Sar Desi, "The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511-1641", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, X, 3 (1969) p. 504.
- 17 Cf. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825* (Johannesburg, 1961) pp. 19-20.
- 18 According to Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* p. 129, who dates this quote as June 1669. I have not yet been able to locate this exact passage in the *Monções* correspondence or elsewhere. Nevertheless, since Nunes da Cunha died in November 1668, a revision in dating appears in order, most probably to his packets of January 1667 or 1668.
- 19 This argument is advanced by Diffie and Winius in *Foundations* p. 322.
- 20 João IV's reforms regarding the Council system are detailed in Winius, *The Fatal History* xii-xiv; Boxer, *Salvador da Sá* pp. 157-63; and Marcelo Caetano, *O Conselho Ultramarino: Esboço da Sua História* (Lisbon, 1967) pp. 19-55.
- 21 On the Overseas Council, cf. Caccano, *O Conselho* pp. 91-110; Winius, *The Fatal History* pp. xiii-xiv; and Boxer, *Salvador da Sá* pp. 160-62. The resolutions of this Council can be found for this period in AHU codices 16 (1661-1671) and 17 (1671-1684) *Crônicas Mixtas de Conselho Ultramarino*; codices 46 (1656-1669) and 47 (1669-1676) *Registro de Consultas das partes*; and Codices 211 (1644-1670) and 212 (1670-1711) *Registro de Consultas da Índia*.
- 22 On the formation of the *Conselho do Estado* in Goa, cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* p. 325; Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz, *O Conselho da Índia* (Lisbon, 1952); and Pearson, *The Portuguese in India*, pp. 35-36. The resolutions of the Goa Council of State for this period can be found in HAG Codex 9535 *Assentos do Conselho do Estado* (6) (1655-1676) and Codex 8001 *Assentos do Conselho do Estado* (7) (1676-1696), published in ACE IV (1659-1695).
- 23 On the formation of this judicial system, cf. Boxer, *Salvador da Sá* pp. 163-64; *Seaborne Empire* pp. 275-78; and Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 325-26.
- 24 On the structure of the financial system, cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa: A Socio-Economic History* (New Delhi, 1977) pp. 200-01. The *Assentos* of the Treasury Council for this period are found in HAG Codices 1168 *Assentos* (10) (1660-1666), 1169 *Assentos* (11) (1666-1669), 1170 *Assentos* (12) (1669-1674), 1171 *Assentos* (13) (1674-1679), and 1172 *Assentos* (14) (1679-1686).
- 25 CL Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 320-321.
- 26 CL Pearson, *Portuguese in India* p. 36; and A.R. Disney, "The Portuguese Empire in India", in *Indo-Portuguese History. Sources and Problems*, ed. by John Correia-Afonso (Bombay, 1981) pp. 159-60.
- 27 For background on the *feitoria*, cf. Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* 312-17; Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 46-47; and Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 25-31.
- 28 On the *cartae* system, among others, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 37-39; Boxer, *Seaborne Empire*, pp. 48, 137, 387; Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 77-78; and Diffie and Winius, *Foundations* pp. 320-22, 416, 420, 431.
- 29 For details on the *cafilas*, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 38-39.
- 30 On the armada system, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 47-58, 133-35.
- 31 HAG MRh8A fo. 101, Mello de Castro to Queen Regem, 611h663.

- 32 Cf. Mello de Castro to Queen Regent: HAG MRh8B fos. 331-31v., *1/II/1663*; and MRh8A fo. 216, *29/XII/1662*.
- 33 HAG MRh8A fo. 101, Mello de Casrro to Queen Regent, *6/IIIh663*.
- 34 HAG MRh8A fo. 157[-57v], Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 29IXIU1662 and 6/II/1673.
- 35 HAG MR/31 fos. 3-6, MeHo de Castro to Afonso, *28/XIU1664*.
- 36 HAG MR/30 fos. 121-22v, Mello de Castro to Afonso, *14/IIh664*.
- 37 HAG MRh8A fa. 90, Mello de Castro to Afonso, *6/IIU1663*.
- 38 HAG MRI30 fos. 2-2V., Mello de Casrro to Afonso, *12/IIh664*.
- 39 HAG MR/33 fo. 95, S. vicensre to Afonso, *25/IIh665*.
- 40 AHU DAI Box 28, Document 87, Consulta of Overseas Council, 91X1h669, fos. 1-3.
- 41 Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 87, and HAG/MR 36 fo 56, Pedro to Mendonca Purtado, 6/IIU1670; MR/37 fo. 75, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 10/IIU1672.
- 42 On the initial steps in the formation of the *Terco*, cf. Mendonca Furtadc to Pedro: MR/36 fo. 36, *3/X/1671*; MR/36 fo. 393, *6/IXh671*; 37 fo. 76, *13/IX/1672*; and Pedro to Mendonca Funado. MRI36 fo. 35, 20/IIU1670; and 38B fo. 310, *26/IXh672*.
- 43 Discussed in Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 31, 90, 2[8-20, 313-15, 387.
- 44 On this list, cf. HAG MR/34 fo. 205, Pedro to S. Vicente, *4/IV/1669*; MR/34 fo. 206, Governing Council to Pedro, 2/U1670; and for the list itself MR/34 fos. 207-09. There is also an extant list for the convicts sent out in 1670 aboard the ships of Mendonca Furtado's fleet, minus the flagship, found in HAG MR/36 fos. 183-83v.
- 45 *Seaborne Empire* p. 314.
- 46 HAG/MR 34 fo. 181, Pedro to S. Vicente, *2/IV/1669*.
- 47 Cf. Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677" p.46 and the sources cited therein for the revenue figures for 1630, 1634, and 1680. The numbers for 1687 can be found in BNL Codex 8538 fos. 51-65v., "Relacao do que Rend. a \$. Mag.de em cada anno as Pracas, e rerras q' tem na India, e dos pagamenros ordinarias e despezas assentadas nella."
- 48 Huge extraordinary military expenses, in part relating to Mararha invasion of Shambhaji in 1683 raised Goa expenditures for c. 1687 to 551,795 xerafins, although regular expenditures remained at 234,084 xerafins for that year. Cf. BNL Codex 8538 fos. 51-65v.
- 49 IOL HT 734 fos. 13-13V., Governor-General and Council in Baravia to *Heeren XVII*, *25/IIU1667*.
- 50 On the practice of selling captaincies, cf. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 6-68. On Francisco de Lima, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* p. 291.
- 51 HAG MR/28A fo. 140, Queen Regent to Mello de Casrro, *7/IV/1662*.
- 52 On patterns of trade in this region at this time, cf. Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 171-72, 176, 207-11, 216, 219-22; and G.B. Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754* (Cambridge, 1986) pp. 87-168.
- 53 Cf. Boxer, *A India Portuguesa em meados do secuto XVII* p. 68; *Fidalgos in the Far East* (Oxford, (968) pp. 139-99; *Seaborne Empire* pp. 143-44, 327; *Macao na Epoca de Restauracao* (Macau, 1942) pp. 69 H.; and Souza, *Survival* pp. 43, 201, 220.
- 54 Cf. Boxer, *A India Portuguesa* p. 68; and "Macao as a Religious and Commercial Enrepor in the reth and ryth centuries", *Acta Asiatica* XXVI (1974) pp. 64-90.
- 55 Cf. Sousa, *Survival* p. 32.
- 56 HAG MR/28A fo. 140, Queen Regent to Mello de Casrm, *7/IVh662*.
- 57 HAG MR/28A fo. 141, Mello de Casrro to Queen Regent, 29fXIU1662.
- 58 HAG MR/29 fo. 25, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 26/Ih666. On preparations for its departure cf. HAG ACFho fos. 239-39V., *11/IXIIh665*.
- 59 HAG MR/34 fos. 256, Afonso [and Pedro] to S. Vicente, 28/IIU1668.

- 60 Cf. HAG MR/35 fo. 43, Governing Council to Pedro, 12/II/1669; and MR/35 fos 44-5IV. for São Vicente's letter on Macao. On the despatching and cargo of the *Penha da França*; cf. HAG ACF/II fo. 168v., Assento of Treasury Council, 1.IIIv668.
- 61 On Saldanha's embassy, d. HAG MRJ35 fos. 44-5IV.; and Sousa, *Survival* pp. 43.201, 220.
- 62 Cf. HAG ACF/" fo. 112, Assento of Treasury Council, 1I[?]/XIU1668 and fo. 238v., Assento of Treasury Council, 13/IV/1669; Boxer, *Fidalgos*, p. 164; and MRJ39 fo. 1, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 4/XII/1674. In this letter, the Viceroy summarized Saldanha's mission to Beijing. K'hang-hsi had apparently asked for a lion from the Portuguese. Mendonca Furtado had ordered Joao de Sousa Freire, then Captain of Mozambique, to arrange one from the *Rios*. The lion reached Goa and had been sent out with Joseph de Mello de Castro, who was also ordered to explore possibilities of further exploiting trade with Canton.
- 63 HAG MRJ36 fo. 44, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 6/VI/1670.
- 64 HAG MRJ36 fo. 168, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 20.IIIh671.
- 65 HAG ACF/12 fo. 70, Assento of Treasury Council, 5/IV/1671; and HAG Codex 1258, *Liuro de Homenagens* (3) fa. 32.
- 66 HAG MRJ36 fos. 169-69V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 8/IXh671.
- 67 HAG MRJ37 fos. 123-23V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 10/VIII/1672.
- 68 HAG MR/37 fos. 123-23V., and the various assentos of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/II fo. 121 and 123, 5/IV/1672; fo. 123v., 1911Vh671; fo. usv., 27/IV/1672; fo. 129, 27/IV/1672; fo. 129v., 27.IVh672; and fo. 130, 27.IVh672.
- 69 Outlined in HAG MRJ37 fos. 123-23V.
- 70 On the arrival of this ship, cf. HAG ACF/12 fo. 199V., Assento of Treasury Council, 5/IV/1673.
- 71 On this process, cf. Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire*, pp. 207-11; and Boxer, *Fidalgos* pp. 174-98.
- 72 HAG MR/38A fos. 129-29V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 10/IXh673.
- 73 Cf. Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire*; pp. 207-10; Boxer, *Fidalgos* pp. 180-82.
- 74 Cf. HAG ACF/12 fo. 260, Assento of Treasury Council, 14/IV/1674; and ACFh3 fo. 179v. • Assento of Treasury Council, 25.Vh678.
- 75 On opposition to the reestablishment of royal power and trade, cf. Sousa, *Survival* pp. 63-85, 99-103; Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire*, pp. 207-11; and HAG MR/39 fo. 25, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 4/XII/1674. On the reluctance of the Manila authorities to honor the 1668 treaty, cf. HAG MRJ41 fos. 179-79V, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 23/II/1677.
- 76 Cf. HAG ACFho fos. 38v.-39, Assentos of Treasury Council, 23/VIII/1661; ACFho fo. 125v., Assento of Treasury Council, 25/XIIh662; ACFho fa. 150, Assento of Treasury Council, 27/XIII1663.
- 77 CL HAG ACFho fos. 21v.-22, Assento of Treasury Council, 24/XII/1660; ACFho fo. 10v., Assento of Treasury Council, 16/XIIIh662; ACFho fo. 18IV., Assento of Treasury Council, 21/XI/1664.
- 78 For details, cf. HAG MRJ33 fo. 242, "Cerridao de Antonio Paes de Sande", 2.IIIh667.
- 79 Cf. Assentos of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/u fo. 67V., 3/II/1667; ACF/II fo. 51, 13/XIU1666; and ACF/" fa. 165, 28.IIIU1668.
- 80 On the rise of Omani seapower, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* 133-35; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire*, pp. 191-94.
- 81 CL for example, HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27; and the Assentos of the Treasury Council found in HAG Ae/F/II fos. 100V.-10IV., 91Vh667; ACF/" fa. 159, 2/III/1668; and ACF/" fos. 224V.-26, 1/IJII1669.
- 82 For details, cf. Assentos of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/IT fo. 48, 151Xh666; ACF/" fo. 87V., 18.IIIU1667.
- 83 101. On: 3213 Surar Presidency to Company, 5/IV/1667 fa. 4.

- 84 IOL HT 734, Governor-General and Council to *tieeren* XVII, 251U1667 fo. 13.
- 85 IOL HT 737, Director at Vingurla to *Heeren* XVII, 20/III/1667; and HT 738, Series of Letters from Dutch Agent at Goa to Director at Vingurla, january-March J667.
- 86 Cf. the relevant *assentos* of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/u fa 165, 231IIIh668; fa. 216, 291Ih669; fa. 219V., 201IU1669; fos. 224v.-25, 1/III/1669; ACF/12 fa. 2, 20/XIU1669; fa. 178, 18/II/1673; and fo. 237v., 13/XIU1670 Cf. also HAG MR/34 fos. 275-77v., Governing Council to Pedro, 28/I/1670; MR/34 fos. 279-79v., Governing Council to Pedro, 28/I/1670.
- 87 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. uj-rjv., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672; HAG ACF/12 fo. 115V., 24/II/1672.
- 88 Cf. *assenios* of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/II fa. 143, 2/I/1668; fa. 159v., 3/III/1668; and fa. 168, 13/IV/1668.
- 89 Cf. HAG MR/34 fos. 275-77v., Governing Council to Pedro, 28IU1670
- 90 Cf. *assentos* of the Treasury Council, HAG ACF/II fo. 51, 13/XIIIh666; ACF/12 fa. 157, 71XU1672; ACF/12 fo. 270, 25/X/1674; and ACF/13 fa. 113, 20/IV/1677.
- 91 Cf. HAG ACF/II fo. 6IV., *Assento* of Treasury Council, 3/I/1667;
- 92 Cf. for example, Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 19, 56, 91-96, and "The Port City of Goa", in *Coastal Western India* pp. 72-73.
- 93 Cf., for example, *assentos* of Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/12 fos. 177V., 24/I/1673, on 500 fardos of rice to Mozambique; ACFh3 fa. 50, 3/I/1676, on 50 candis of rice to Mombassa; ACFh fa. 55, 20U, 676, on 95 candis of rice to Mombassa.
- 94 HAG MRI, fos. 3-6, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 28XIU1664.
- 95 HAG MR/32 fo. 35, Atonso to Mello de Castro, 3/IV/1665.
- 96 HAG MRIH fo. 17, Afonso to Sac Vicnre, 10IIIU1666; and MR1u fo. J8, Sac Vicnre to Afonso, 25/I/1667.
- 97 HAG MR/36 fo. 110, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 1/IV/1670.
- 98 HAG MRIJ6 fos. 390-9IV., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 2/X/1671.
- 99 HAG MRIJ1 fos. 3-6.
- 100 HAG MRIJ1 fos. 3-6.
- 101 HAG MRI35 fa. 163, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/I/1666.
- 102 On this matter cf. HAG MRI34 fo. 169, Pedro to Sac Vicente, 1/IV/1669; HAG MRI34 fa. 170, Governing Council to Pedro, 24/I/1670; and, for example, the Treasury Council *assentos* found in HAG ACFho fo. gv., 6ffVh660; ACFho fo. 46, 23/IX/1661; ACFho fo. IIIV., 3/X/1662; ACFho fos. 131-3IV., 81IIIh663; ACFho fa. 158, 271IIU1664.
- 103 HAG MRI30 fos. 121-12V., 14/I/1664; MRI3! fos. 215-16, 9IU1665.
- 104 HAG MR/33 fo. 124, Letter of Certification of Salgado and da Sdva, 31IIh667.
- 105 HAG MRIJ} fo. 122, 8IU1666.
- 106 HAG MRIJ} fo. 123, Sac vicenre to Afonso, 261Jh667; and MRJ33 fo. 124.
- 107 HAG MRI36 fo. 264, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 21/III/1671.
- 108 On these figures, d. Diffie and Winus, *Foundations*, 322-23, 331-32; Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 92-95.
- 109 Cf., for example, Diffie and Winus, *Foundations* pp. 332-35; Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 89, III, 154; and De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 56-106.
- 110 De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 69 ff
- 111 De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 69-104.
- 112 CL G.V. Scammell, "Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in Asia in the Sixteenth Century", *Modern Asian Studies* 14(1980) pp. 1-2. This article was originally presented at the I International Seminar on Indn-Portuguese History, Goa, 1978, with the title, "Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in the Indian Ocean". Cf. John Correia Afonso ed., *Indo-Portuguese History: Sources and Problems* (Bombay, 1981) pp. 163-173; De Souza; "Goa-based Seaborne Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century", *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* XII (1975) pp. 433-42; "Glimpses of Hindu Dominance of Goa Eco-

nomy in the 17th Century", *Indica* XII (1975); with many of these arguments appearing in Medieval Goa; and Pearson, "Wealth and Power: Indian Groups in the Portuguese Indian Economy", *South Asia* III (1973) pp. 36-44; and "Indigenous Dominance in a Colonial Economy: The Goa *Rendas*, 1600-1700", *Mare Luso-Indicum* II (1973) pp. 61-73.

- 113 Pearson, "The Goa *Rendas*", p. 65.
- 114 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 274-74v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/II/1673.
- 115 Cf. Clenn J. Ames, "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire", pp. 7-27.
- 116 On the rise of the absolutist state in Portugal under Pedro, cf. Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 10-38.
- 117 Cf. HAG Codex 656 fos. 126, 167v., 245v., and 248; Codex 2320 fos. 18 and 55v. As Pearson allows in "Goa *Rendas*", p. 66, the "most valuable" *rendas* were usually reserved for the Portuguese.
- 118 Based on the annual figure of 344,400 *xerafins* given by Pearson in "Goa *Rendas*", p. 63.
- 119 HAG MRI31 fo. 160, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 20/XII/1664.
- 120 HAG MR/33 fos. 47-47v., *Assento* of Treasury Council, 4/VI/1664.
- 121 Cf. HAG/MRI" fo. 44, Afonso to São Vicente, 27/II/1666; and HAG MR/33 fo. 45, São Vicente to Pedro, 25/II/1667.
- 122 HAG MRI n fo. 70, Afonso to São Vicente, 11/II/1666.
- 123 HAG MRI n fo. 71, São Vicente to Afonso, 25/II/1667.
- 124 HAG MRIH fo. 51, Pedro to São Vicente, 28/III/1669.
- 125 HAG MR/H fo. 52, Governing Council to Pedro, 29/X/1670.
- 126 HAG MR/36 fo. 364, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 1/IV/1671.
- 127 Cf. HAG MR/36 fo. 365, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 3/X/1671. A list of *tmrpinas* collected during this time can be found in HAG MRI36 fos. 367-69v., List of Fees Collected Oil Royal *Rendas* by Decree of Treasury Council of 20 January 1668, dated 31Xh 671.
- 128 HAG MR/38A fo. 43, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 11/X/1673.
- 129 HAG MRI38B fos. 442-43v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 20/II/1674.
- 130 HAG MRIW £0. 123, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 4/XII/1674.
- 131 The figures from the 1630 and 1614 *orcamentos* are found in Disney, *Pepper Empire* pp. 52-55. The 1680 *orcamento* is found in HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27.

Chapter 6

- On this tendency, among others, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 40-50; Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 29-35; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 55-79.
- Cf. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* II:325-29.
- For background on the internal situation in India, cf. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 40-42; Furber, *Rival Empires* pp. 9-12; and De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 27-28.
- 4 On the *Eetadc:e* relations with Akhar, cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 27-28; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 145-48.
 - 5 Cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 28-29 and the sources cited therein.
 - 6 On relations with the Mughals and Marathas during this period, cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 29-30, 38-41; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 181-91.
 - 7 Cf. AHU DAU26 Document 22, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 14/II/1664; HAG MRI1 fos. 20-20v, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 7/II/1665; MR/35 fos. 143-43v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/II/1666; MR/3 fcs. '01-01v., S. Vicente to Afonso, 27/II/1667; AHU DAU27 Document 99, S. Vicente to Afonso, 11/II:3h667; AHU DAU28 Document 80, S. Vicente to Pedro, 16/Jh668; HAG MR/H fos. 301-01v., Governing Council to Pedro, 28/Jh670;

- MR/36 fos. 382-83, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 3fXh671; MR/37 fo. J49, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672; MR/37 f05. 243-45, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 19/I/1673; MR/39 Io. 135, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 25/I/1675; and MR140 fo. 99, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 22/I/1676.
- 8 Cf. HAG Codices 970 and 971 *Livros das Reis Vizinhos* nos. 2 (1662-1668) and 3 (1677-1681). Printed summaries and transcriptions of these important codices can be found in *Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa* XI (Lisbon, 1959) pp. 165-296; XIII (Lisbon, 1959) pp. 528-605; and XXI (Lisbon, 1962) pp. 237-372.
 - 9 CL AHU DAU26 Document 22, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 14/I/1664.
 - 10 Cf. Mello de Castro to Afonso: HAG MR/31 fos. 20-20v., 7/I/1665; and MR/35 fos. 143-43v., 28/Ih666.
 - 11 HAG MR/35 fos. 143-43v., Mello de Casro to Afonso, 28IIr666.
 - 12 CL AHU DAU28 Document 80, S. Vicente to Pedro, 161V1668; and HAG MR/34 fos. 30I-OIV., Governing Council to Pedro, 281VI670.
 - 13 Cf. Mendonca Furtado to Pedro: HAG MR/36 fos. 382-83, 3fXh671; MR/37 fo. 149, 24/VIII/1672; and MR/37 fos. 243-45, 19/I/1673.
 - 14 Cf. *Medieval Goa* pp. 38-41.
 - 15 According to De Souza, *Medieval Goa* p. 39.
 - 16 Cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 4^o-41; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* p. 194.
 - 17 Cf. AHU DA1h6 Document 22, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 14/I/1664.
 - 18 Cf. Mello de Casro to Afonso: AHU DAU26 Document 22, and 14/I/1664; HAG MR/31 fos. 20-20v., 7Jlh66.; MR/35 fos. 143-43v., 281Ih666; HAG RV/2 fos. 8, Mello de Casro to Avaldar of Bicholim, 27Jlh663; and Mello de Casro's letters to Shivaji found in RV/2 fos. 14, 6JIVh663; fos. 15v.-16, 26fIVh663; fo. 36v., 16/IV/1665; and De Souza, *Medieval Goa* p. 40.
 - 19 Cf. HAG MR/35 fo. 13, Governing Council to Pedro, 71Ih669; and ACE IV:187-90, *Assentos* of Council of State, 8IIIU1668 and 20/IIU1668.
 - 20 Cf. HAG MR/34 fos. 30r-OIV., Governing Council to Pedro, 281Ih670.
 - 21 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 243-45, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 19/I/1673.
 - 22 HAG MR/37 fo. 149, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.
 - 23 HAG MR/40 fo. 99, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, nJlh676.
 - 24 Cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 40-43; and Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:367-70.
 - 25 For background on relations with Bijapur, cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 31-32.
 - 26 Cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* p. 33; and Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:308-10.
 - 27 Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:324-25; Boxer, *A India Portuguesa* pp. 59-60.
 - 28 AHU DA1/26 Document 22, Mello de Casro to Afonso, 14/I/1664.
 - 29 HAG MR/31 fos. 72-73, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 21/XIU1664; ACE IV:137-39, *Assentos* of Council of State, 3NU1664 and 19NU1664.
 - 30 HAG MR/35 fos. 143-43v., Mello de Casro to Afonso, 28IIr666.
 - 31 AHU DA1h8 Document 80, S. Vicente to Pedro, 16/I/1668.
 - 32 HAG MR/34 fos. 30I-OIV., Governing Council to Pedro, 281II1670.
 - 33 For background on relations with Kanara, cf. De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 34-37.
 - 34 Cf. HAG MR/31 fos. 72-73, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 21XIU1664.
 - 35 Cf. HAG MR/31 fos. 72-73; MR/31 fos. 20-20v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 7/I/1665.
 - 36 CL ACE IV:176, *Assento* of Council of State, 31/XII/1666.
 - 37 HAG MR/35 fo. 17, Governing Council to Pedro, 8IVr669.
 - 38 HAG MR/34 fos. 30I-OIV., Governing Council to Pedro, 281II1670
 - 39 Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:364-65; ACE IV:216-17, *Assento* of Council of State, 20JIVh671.
 - 40 Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:364-65; HAG MR/36 fos. 382-83, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 3fXh671; and ACE IV:226-27, *Assento* of Council of State, 29fXIJh671.

- 41 HAG MRJ39 fo. 135, Mendonca Purtado to Pedro, 25/1/1675; and De Souza, *Medieval Goa* pp. 38-39.
- 42 ACE IV:233-35, *Assento* of Council of State, 7JIVh674; ACE IV:338-39, *Assento* of Council of State, 10/XIU1678; and HAG MR/36 fos. 442-42V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 23/1/1672.
- 43 HAG MR/39 fo. 135, Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 25/1/1675.
- 44 Cf. ACE IV:338-39, *Assento* of Council of State, IOIXIV1678; Danvers, *Portuguese in India II*:365.
- 45 Cf. John Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia* (edited by William Croock, London, 3 vols., 1909-15) I:115.
- 46 Cf. J.F. Richarus, *Mughal Administration in Golconda* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 1, 14-15, 34-35.
- 47 For details on San Thome during the 17th century, cf. Lotika Varadarajan, "San Thome-Early European Activities and Aspirations" in Luis Albuquerque and luacio Guerreiro, *Aetas de II Seminario Internacional de Hist6ria Inda-Pcrrmguesa* (Lisbon, 1985) pp. 423-41; H.D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, I:286-310; H.K. Sherwani, *History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty* (Delhi, 1974) pp. 480-515; and "Reign of Abdu'l-lah Qutb Shah (1626-1672)" *Journal of Indian History* XLV (1967), pp. 15-60; and on the siege of 1662, William Foster, ed. *The English Factories in India, 1661-1664* p. 146.
- 48 Cf. for example, HAG RVh fos. 10 and 18, Mello de Castro to Fr. Diogo da Madre de Deus, 12JIIh663 and 20NUI663?; fo. 18 Mello de Casrro to Edward Winter, 17NIUI663?; fo. 41V. and 42, Mello de Casrro to English President in [Madras?], 29IIVh666 and 29VIUI666; fo. 42V., Mello de Castro to Portuguese Resident in Madras, 29/VII/1666; and fo. 43, Mello de Castro to English at Madras, 2IIVHUI666.
- 49 Cf. HAG RVh fo. 10, Mello de Casrre to King of Golconda and his son-in-law, 13/II/1663 and IIh663; and AHU DA1h6 Document 22, Mello de Casrre to Afonso, 14/II/1664.
- 50 HAG MR/35 fos. 143-43v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28IUI666.
- 51 HAG RVh fo. 18, Mello de Castro to Edward Winter, 17NIUh663?; fo. 41V. and 42, Mello de Castro to English President in [Madras?], 29/IV/1666 and 29NHh666; fo. 42V., Mello de Castro to Portuguese Resident in Madras, 29IUIUI666; and fo. 43, Mello de Castro to English at Madras, 21IUIU,666.
- 52 HAG MR/11 fos. 20-20V., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 7/II/1665.
- 53 Cf. HAG MR/35 fos. 143-43V., Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 28IUI666.
- 54 On the capture of this prize ship and the division of the booty from it, cf. HAG MR/33 fos. 301-01v., S. Vicenre to Afonso, 27/II/1667; ACE IV:18-61, *Assentos* of Council of State, 1/V/1666; and various *assentos* of the Treasury Council found in HAG ACF/II fo. 29V., 31VIUI666; fo. 43V., 3/XU1666; fo. 45, 3/XIh666; fo. 47, 15/XI/1666; fo. 70, 20/II/1667; and fo. 92V., 27IIVh667.
- 55 On these negotiations, cf. HAG RV/2 fo. 43?, Mello de Casrro to Ambassadors from Abullah Qutb Shah, 11/IXh666; fos. 55-55v. S. Vicente to Neknam Khan, 22JIIh667, and S. Vicenre to Abdullah, 23/IIIh667; ACE IV:163-67, *Assenros* of Council of State, 22/IX/1666 and 2/X/1666.
- 56 Cf. HAG MR/34 fos. 301-01V., Governing Council to Pedro, 28/II/1670; MR/36 fos. 182-83, Mendonca Funado to Pedro, 3/Xh671; and MR/37 fo. 149, Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.
- 57 Cf. Glen11.J. Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal", pp. 536-59; "Colbert's Grand Asian Fleet of 1670", *The Mariner's Mirror* 76 (1990) pp. 227-40; and MR/37 fo. 212, joao Pereira de Faria to Mendonca Furrado, 30/VII/1672.
- 58 Cf. HAG MR/37 fo. 203v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 13/IX/1672; AHU DAU29 Document 131, *Caneulta* of the Overseas Council on the French Capture of San Thorne, 2/IX/1673.

- 59 Cf. HAG MRJ8A *fa.* 243, Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 11/X/1673; and Archives Coloniale, Paris, C2-62 fo. 186, Mendonca Purtado to Coelho, 19/Xh672.
- 60 Cf. GlennJ. Ames, "An Elusive Partner: Portugal and Colben's Projected Asian Alliance, 1669-1672", *Revista Portuguesa de Historia* XXVIII (1993) pp. 33-57.
- 61 Cf. Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy," pp. 536-59; and "Colberr's Grand Asian Fleet", pp. 227-40.
- 62 CL Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 133-36, 146.
- 63 For background on the Omanis during this period, cf. Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire* pp. 177. 191-4.
- 64 HAG ACFho fos. 54-54v., 56v., 62-63, *Assentos* of Treasury Council, 21/X/1661 and 7/Xh661.
- 65 HAG MRJ28A fo. 103, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 511Vh662.
- 66 HAG MRJ30 fos. 2-2V., Mello de Castro to Monso, 11Jlh664; and ABU DAV26, Document 22, Mello de Ccsro to Afonso, 14/I/1664.
- 67 On these preparations, cf. HAG MR/33 fo. 242, *Certidao* of Antonio Paes de Sande on Loan of 102, 280xcrafins from Merchants of Goa to Royal Treasury, 21/I/1667; MRJn fo. 330 (?). S. Vicenre to Afonso, 3/II/1667; 10L HT 737, Dutch Director at Vingurla to Heeren XVII, 2011IV1667, [with copy of letter from S. Vicente to Afonso purchased at Goal; 738, Letters from Dutch Agent at Gaa to Director at Vingurla, I-11VI667; and *Assentos* of the Treasury Council found in ACF/II fos. 84v., 1011IV1667; fo. 87, 12111h667; and fo. 87v., 1811IV1667.
- 68 CL for example, 10L OC)213, Surat President and Council to Directors, 511Vh667.
- 69 For details. cf. AHU DAV27 Document 99, S. Vicente to Afonsc, 211IXh667; and ACF/II fos. 128V.-29, *Assento* of Treasury Council, 22/X/1667.
- 70 On the sacking of Diu, cf. HAG/MR 35 fo. 3, Governing Council to Pedro, 711h669; and MRJH fcs. 284-84V., Governing Council to Pedro, 2611h670.
- 71 Cf. HAG MRJH fos. 284-84V.
- 72 HAG ACF/II fos. 229-29V., 1811IV1669.
- 73 On the formation of this fleet, cf. HAG MR1H fos. 275-77V., Governing Council to Pedm, 281U1670; ACF/11 fos. 216, 119v., 224v.-25, *Assentos* of the Treasury Council, 291U1669, 2011IV1669, and J111h669.
- 74 For details, d. HAG MRJ34 fos. 275"77v.
- 75 HAG MRJH fos.)03-03V., Governing Council to Pedro, 28fU1670' The rulers sending embassies included the Zamorin of Calicut, the king of Bijapur, and Shivaii.
- 76 On [he 1670 fleet, cf. HAG MR1H fos. 278-79v., Governing Council to Pedro, 281U1670; ACFh2, *Assentos* of Treasury Council fos. 37 and)9V., 31/X/1670, and 31Xh670.
- 77 ABU DAV28, Document 212, Mello de Castro and Cone-Real de Sampayo to Pedrc, 6fXh671.
- 78 HAG MRJ37 fo. 1, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 711IV1672.
- 79 HAG MRJ36 fo. 451, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 23/I/1672.
- 80 On Mello de Cestro's fleet and the treaty signed in Mecca, d. HAG MR/36 fo. 451, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 21U1672, MR/37 fos. 11)-13v., 24/VIII/1672; HAG ACF/12 fos. 115V.-117V., *Assentos* of the Treasury Cound, 24/II/1672; AHU DAV/29 Document 129, *Consulta* of Overseas Council with Copy of Treaty, 25/VIII/1673. For Mendonca Furrado's views on the scant utility of this agreement, cf. his letters to Pedro found in HAG MR137 fos. 171-72V., 15/IX/1672; MRJ39 fo. 28, 4/XII/1674; and finally MR/41 fo. 66, 12Jh 677.
- 81 For details cf. AHU DAV29 Document 171, *Consulta* of Overseas Council, 281WI674 with letters from joao Correa de Sá from Bandae Kung, dated 29/V/1673 and 6/VII/1673.
- 82 For events surrounding the 1676 attack of Diu, cf. HAG MR140 fo. 237; and ACE IV:244-52, *Consulta* of Council of State, 2811VI676and supporting documents.

- 83 For a critique of the ongoing campaign against the Omanis cf. a letter from Francisco Cabral de Almada, Chancellor of the Goa *Relacao*, dated 20/1/1676 and included with a *consulta* of the Overseas Council of 19/11/1677 found in AHU DAU30 Document 146. On the regular revenues from Bandar Kung, cf. HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27, which for 1680 shows revenues of 44.000 *xerafins* and expenses of 6359 *xeratinis* for that factory.
- 84 These demands and the general diplomatic situation between Lisbon and The Hague can be found among others in Boxer, *Salvador de Sa* pp. 336-49; L.M.E. Shaw, *Trade Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal* pp. 93-94; and Prestage, *The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland from 1640-1668*.
- 85 Cf. HAG MRhsA fo. 28, 10/II/1661; and MR/28A fo. 234, I/III/1661.
- 86 Cf. Queen Regent to Governors: HAG MRhSA fo. 212, 11/IV/1661; Io. 116, III/Vh661; fo. 215, IOIIVh661; fo. 21S, 26IIVh661; and MRhsA fo. 23S, Miranda to Queen Regent, IOIII/1661; fo. 234, Miranda to Queen Regent, I/III/1661.
- 87 On the conclusion of this treaty, among others, cf. Shaw, *Trade, [Inquisition]* pp. 88-93; Boxer, *Salvador de Sa* pp. 37-43; and Ronald Hutton, *Charles II: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989) pp. 159-61. A copy of the treaty can be found in *Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat: Home Series II*, ed. by G.W. Forrest (Bombay, 1887) pp. 367-8.
- 88 On the Dutch treaty, cf. Shaw, *Trade, Inquisition* pp. 91-94.
- 89 For this English version of this rather contentious voyage cf. *The English Factories in India*, [1661-64 ed. by William Foster] pp. 128-31.
- 90 Cf. Forrest ed., *Selections* pp. 367-68.
- 91 Discussed in Foster ed., *The English Factories* pp. 131-43.
- 92 On the final stages of the Dutch campaign on this coast, cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India II*: 325-30; and Furber, *Rival Empires* pp. 83-84. Cf. also, HAG MRhSB fo. 543, Certidao of D. Pedro de Lencastre, 2S/XI/1662; MR/28A fo. 5, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 29IXIIh662; MRhsA fos. 41-41v., Sarmiento de Carvalho to Mello de Castro, 4/II/1663; and MRhsA fos. 9-40, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 29IXIIh662 and postscript of 6/II/1663.
- 93 HAG MRh8A fo. 227, 21Nh661.
- 94 HAG MRhsA to. 229, Queen Regent to Governors, 27/X/1661.
- 95 HAG MRh8B, Charles II to Mello de Castro, 2jIII/1662.
- 96 Cf. Queen Regent to Mello de Castro: HAG MRhsA fo. 169, 2/IV/1662 and MRh8A fo. 106, 5/IV/1662.
- 97 Cf. for example, HAG MRh8A fo. 227, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 21/V/1661.
- 98 HAG MRhsA fo. 243, and MRhsB tos. 500-ov., Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 16/Xh662; and HAG MRh8B fo. 469, Mello de Castro to Coa Council of State, 18/X/1662.
- 99 Cf. Mello de Castro to Queen Regent: HAG MRhsB fo. 14, 28/XIIh662; MRh8A fo. 176, 4/II/1663; and MRhSB fos. 331-31v., 1/II/1663.
- 100 For details on Godinho's journey that began in Bassein in December 1662 and ended in Lisbon in October 1663, cf. his *Relação do Novo Canunhc que fez par terra e mar, vindo da India para Portugal, no anno de 1663*, () Padre Mal/ael Godinho.
- 101 HMC Hearhcore Mss., *Fanshaioe Letters*; pp. 18-20, Charles II to Panshnw, 2jNIIh661 (0.5.).
- 102 HMC Hearhcore Mss., *Faneh.noie Letters*, pp. 89-90, Clareudon to fanshaw, 16/V/1663 (0.5.).
- 103 HAG MRI29 fo. 13, Afonso to Mello de Castro, 8/II/1664.
- 104 Cf. HAG MR/31 fo. 166, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 14/XI/1664; and MR/31 fo. 190, Ignacio Sarmiento de Carvalho to Mello de Castro, 13/XI/1664.
- 105 HAG MRI1 fo. 162, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 5/II/1665.

- 106 Detailed in Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:342 (f).
- 107 Cf. BNL Codex 10,703 fos. sv-nv. given also in Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:343-53.
- 108 Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:355-56.
- 109 Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:358-60.
- 110 Cf. HAG MR/35 fo. 51, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 5/IIh666.
- 111 Cf. HAG MR/42 fo. 122, D. Pedro de Almeida to Pedro, II/XU1677.
- 112 These documents are found in BNL Codex 10,703 fos. SV-29V. and HAG Codex 782 fos. 103-14. Cf. also supporting documents in BNL Codex 10,703 fos. szv H. "Apropriaõ se os Inglezes o dominio do Rio de Bandora contra todo o direito"; fos. 18 H. "Uzurpao os Inglezes a Ilha de Mahym e a sua Alfandega", and fos. 96 H. "Apendix necessaria na qual se responde Aos novas fundameneos da Companhia Anglicana representados pellos seus Directores ao Enviado do Serenissimo Rey de Portugal."
- 113 Cf. HAG Codex 782 fa.103v.-14; and BNL Codex 10,703 fos. 27-29v.
- 114 Cf. HAG MRJ36 fa. soo(?), Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 7/III/1671; and the Viceroy's reponse found in MR/37 fos. 137-37v., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.
- 115 Cf. HAG MRJ36 fos. 259-59v., Petition of Hindu Merchants of Bassein to Mendonca Furtado, 19NU1671; and AHU DAII29 Document 34, Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.
- 116 HAG MR/35 fa. 94, Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 291/IIh666; and also his earlier letter MRJ31 fos. 72-73.
- 117 AHU DA1h7 Document 87, Draft of *Ccnsulta* of the Overseas Council, n.d. [1668?].
- 118 On the issue of purchasing Bombay back from the English, Cf. HAG MR/32 fo. 67, Afonso to Mella de Casrro, 15/IV/1665 (?); MR/31 fo. 162, Mello de Castro to Afonso, s1U1665; and ACE IV:158-59, Consulra of Council of State, 1/V/1666.
- 119 Cf. HAG MRJ29 fo. 21, Afonso to Mello de Casrro, 131/IVh664.
- 120 Cf. Danvers, *Portuguese in India* II:329-31.
- 121 Cf. AHU Codex 211 fos. 340-40v., *Consulta* of Overseas Council, 291/IIIh662.
- 122 HAG MR/29 fo. 22, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 261U1666; and MR/35 fo. 94, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 291/IIh666.
- 123 For details on Colbert's Compagnie, cf. Glenn J. Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal", pp. 536-59; "Colbert's Grand Indian Ocean Fleet of 1670" and *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* (DeKalb, 1996) pp. 66-88 and the manuscript sources cited therein.
- 124 For these instructions, Cf. *Lenree, instructions, et memoires de Colbert*, ed. by Pierre Clement (7 vols., Paris, 1861-82) II:456-59.
- 125 For details on these negotiations, Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "An Elusive Partner: Portugal and Colbert's Projected Asian Alliance, 1669-1672", pp. 33-57.
- 126 Cf. AAE CC BI:644 fos. 119-20, Sainr-Romain to Colbert, 4/II/1670; to. 98v., Saint-Rornain to Louis XIV, 15/IVh670; and fo. III, Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/II/1670.
- 127 Cf. AAE CC BI:644 fos. 103-0jv., Sainr-Romain to Colbert, 301XIU1669.
- 128 AAE CC BI:644 fos. IOS-05v.
- 129 Cf. BNL *Fundo Cera!* Codex 748 fos. 130-65v. for the "Insruccao da Secretaria"; and for Fronreira's views, tos. 154-54v.
- 130 BNL FG Codex 748, fos. 137-18.
- 131 Cf. AHU DAU28 Document 71.
- 132 Saint-Romain's 1669 and 1670 letters to Colbert and Louis XIV can be found in AAE CC BI:644 fos. 97-217v.
- 133 For Colbert's letters to Saint-Rnmain on these negotiations Cf. BNP CCC 204 fos. 131-33, 10NIh669; fos. 133v.-34v., 11/VIh669; fos. 278v.-82, 27/Xh669; fos. 312-13V., 21IXU1669; and fcs. 330-31, 71XI1III669. Cf. also *Carreapondance administrative sous le regne de Louis XIV* ed. by G.B. Depping (4 vols., Paris, 1850-55) m:494-95, and Colbert, *Leures* III:494-95 for a letter of 27MIU1670.

- 134 AAE CC BI:644 fos. 103-05v, Sainr-Romain to Colbert, 30IXW1669.
 135 AAF. CC BJ:644 fo. 142v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV., 181IVh670.
 136 BNP CCC 204 fos. 312-13v., Colbert to Saint-Romain, 21IXlh669.
 137 PRO SPF 89/10 fos. 117-18, Parry to Arlington, 131VIII1669.
 138 PRO SPF 89/11, Parry to Arfingron: fos. 5-5v., 211XU1670; and fo. 14, 29JXU1670.
 139 As Mendonca Furtado later informed Pedro in a coded letter: "there is no doubt Majesty that the French do not have the power in India to oppose the Dutch, who are extremely powerful." Cf. AHU DAI29 Document 171. 18111116n
 140 For details Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal", pp. 536-59; "Colbert's Grand Indian Ocean Fleet of 1670" pp. 227-40; and *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* pp. B7-H.
 141 CL BA 51-V-49 fos. 10-11. Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 6NH111672.

Chapter 7

On the initial Portuguese scrddmcnrs, d. among others, Eric Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600* (Johannesburg, 1973) pp. 12-74; Alexandre Lobato, *A expansao portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530* (3 vols., Lisbon, 1954-60); and Amonio Baccaro, *Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas in Arquivo Português Oriental* IV:Vol.2: Part I:1-37; BNL Codex 29: *Relacao dos plantas, e descnsoes de todas as fortalezas, cidades e pouacoas que os portugueses têm no estado da India Oriental*; and BNL Codex 1987: *Continuacao da historia da India, fundação das [crtaletas da India]*, fos 54-55v.

- 2 On these religious activities, cf. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* pp. 134-36; and "Viagem que fez o Padre Ant.º Games, de Comp.a de Jesus, ao Imperio de de (sic) Manomorapa, e Assestencia que fez nas diras terras d.e Algus nnuos", *Studia* 3 (1999) pp. 152-242.
 For details, d. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600*, pp. 152-64; "The Barreto-Hornem expedition: a note", Congresso do Mundo Portugues, *Memorias III:1:1* Seccao, (Lisbon, 1940) pp. 311-37; and J.J. Teixeira Borelho, *Historia militar e politica dos Portugueses em Moçambique da descoberta a 1833* (Lisbon, 1934) 1:204-07.
- 4 On the *prazos* during the 17th century, d. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* pp. 137-38.
 On the contract system, d. Pearson, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 61-67. For details on the rather checked career of D. Francisco de Lima, d. Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* p. 291; and Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700*, p. 129-36, who argues that he "served well". The relevant manuscript sources on his abuses while serving in Mozambique can be found in AHU Codex 208 fo. 29IV., Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 711Vh662; HAG MR/30 fos. 141-4IV., Mello de Casrrn to Afonso, 291111664; Petition of Lima to Afonso, MR/31 fo. 219, 28/XIII1664; and especially AHU DAI/25 Document 28, 161IXh66J.
- 6 Cf. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600* pp. 239.
 Cf. HAG MR/30 fos. 128-28v., Petition of *Moradores* of Mozambique to Viceroy, 14IXh663?1; and response of Crown in MR/32 fo. 87, Afonso to Mello de Castro, 14/IV/1665.
- 8 Pereira's 1661 letter can be found in HAG MR/28A fos. 150-50v., dated 16 September of the 11th year.
- 9 Cf. HAG/MR 28A fa. 148, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 12/IV/1662.
- 10 Cf. HAG MRh8A fo. 149, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 30IX1111662.
- 11 Cf. HAG MR/24 fo. 338, Lima to Viceroy, 17NIIIh654; nJIIIsufta of Overseas Council at AHU Codex 211, fos. 326v.-27V., 29/II/1657; cited in Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600-1700*, p. 134.

- 12 Cf. Glenn]. Ames, *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* pp. 7, 12-35.
- 13 Cf. HAG MR/33 fo. 91, Afonso to S. Vicenre, 30/III/1666.
- 14 On this belief, cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122-24v., *consulta* of Overseas Council, 9/IX/1673.
- 15 Cl. AHU DAU28 Document 94, *consulta* of Overseas Council with supporting documents and reports from de Lima, Sylveira, and Barreto, dated 14/V/1669 and revised 17Xh669.
- 16 Cf. Mello de Casrro to Afonso, HAG MR/30 fo. 117, 14/I/1664; MR/30 fos. 141-4IV., 29/I/1664; MR/31 fo. 225, 7 or 17IIU1665; and MR/32 fa. 13, 22/III/1665.
- 17 Cf. S. Vicenre to Afonso: HAG MR/33 fo. 92, 2/Ih667; and MR/n fo. 152, 271Ih667.
- 18 Cf. Ames, *Colbert, Mercantilism and the French Quest for Asian Trade*, pp. 82-88. 95-96.
- 19 Cf. HAG MR/H fo. 73, Prince Regent to S. Vicente, 29JIIU1669; and especially AHU DAU28 Document 94, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 14/V/1669, revised 17Xh669 and MR/36 fa. 318, Prince Regent to Mendonca Furrado, 20nIIh671.
- 20 Cl. HAG MR/36 fo. 264, Prince Regent to Mendonca Furtado, wIIU1671.
- 21 Cf. HAG MR/36 fos. 265-66, Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, IIfXh671.
- 22 Cf. HAG MR/36 fos. 265-66; and MR/36 fo. 401, Mendonca Furtado to Prince Regent, 13/X/1671.
- 23 Cf. AHU Codex 208, fa. 349, Prince Regent to Mendonca Furtado, 7JIIh672; HAG MR/p fo. 192 Prince Regent to Mendonca Furtado, 8/IIIh672 [same as Codex 208 fo. 349]; and MR/37 fo. 10, Prince Regent to Mendonca Furrado, 8IIU1672.
- 24 Cf. AHU DAM/3 Document 6, decree on free trade for Mozambique and *Rios de Cuama*, 9IIIIh672; and AHU DA1h9 Document 29, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 9IIU1672.
- 25 Cf. AHU Codex 212 fos. 18-19, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 51IXh672. Cf. also AHU Codex 212 fos. 17v.-18, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 61IXh672.
- 26 Cf. HAG MR/38A fo. 64, Prince Regent to Mendonca Furrado, nJIXh672.
- 27 Cf. AHU DAU29 Document 5, Report of Colaco da Silva on Mozambique, 20Ih672. By March 1673, Pedro had evidently been sufficiently impressed by this document to suggest further duties for this merchant. Cl. HAG MRJ38A fo. 275, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 11/III/1673. Interestingly enough, by the time this letter reached Goa, Colaco da Silva had been sent back to Sofala *degradado* for falsifying gold. Cf. HAG MR/38A, fa. 276, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 18/X/1673.
- 28 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 193-93V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 12IIXh672.
- 29 On the formation of the Junta, cf. Mendonca Furrado to Pedro: HAG MR/37 fos. 250' 50v., 22/I/1673; MR/37 fos. 272-72V., 22/I/1673; MR/37 fos. 273-73v., 24/I/1673; the *regimento* can be found in MR/37 fos. 251-55 titled 'Regimento para o novo comercio de Mocambique', and has been discussed by Oliviera Boleo, "O 'Regimento para o novo comercio de Mocambique de 1673'". in *Studia* 3 (1959) pp. 90-109.
- 30 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 273-73v., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/I/1673.
- 31 Cl. AHU DAM/3 Document 9, *adoiso* of Overseas Council, 9/IX/1673.
- 32 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 250-50v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 22/I/1673.
- 33 Souse Freire to Mendonca Furtado, 15fVIII673, cited by Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa. 1600-1700* p. 146 n. 16.
- 34 HAG MR/37 fos. 250-50v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 22/I/1673.
- 35 On these early problems, cf. Mendonca Furtado to Pedro: HAG MR/37 fos. 272-72V., 22/I/1673; MR/37 fos. 273-73v., 24/I/1673; MR/38A fo. 26, 10/X/1673; MR/38A fo. 65, 10001673; MR/38A fo. 239. n/Xh673; MR/38A fo. 234, nOOI6n; and MR/38A fcs. 224-24v., 233-33v., n/Xh673.
- 36 Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 273-73v., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 24/I/1673.

- 37 Cf. HAG MRJ38B fo. 440, Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, *w/11674*; and also MRJ38B fa 449, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 1911h674.
- 38 Cf. AHU DA1h9 Document 155, Deputies of *Junta do Comercio* to Pedro, 231V1674, with reaction of the *Procurador da Coroa* of 10/X/1674, and the Overseas Council of 30/II/1675. The *consulta* of the Overseas Council can also be found in AHU Codex 212 fos. 37-38. Pedro's response to this document was summarized in HAG MRJ40 fo. 63, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 14/III/1675. This letter from Pedro is also found in AHU DAM/3 Document 11 with a reply from the Viceroy dated 2111h676.
- 39 A discussion of these issues by the Lisbon and Goa hierarchy can be found in the following: AHU Codex 212 fos. 34v.-35, *consulta* of the Overseas Council, 22/IX/1674; AHU DAU29 Document 203, *Junta* to Pedro, 23/XI/1674; AHU DA1h9A Document 206, Chancellor of *Estado* to Pedro, 291XU1674; HAG MRJ39 fo. 115, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 3/XII/1674; MRJ39 fo. 75, Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 31XIU1674; MRJ39 fos. 185-85v., Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 23/II/1675; AHU DAM/3 Document 10, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 26111675; AHU Codex 212 fos. 37-38, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 31/II/1675; AHU Codex 212 fo. 38v., *consulta* of Overseas Council, 7/II/1675; HAG MR140 fo. eo, Pedro to Mendonca Purrado, 14/III/1675; and MR140 fo. 63, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 14/III/1675.
- 40 Cabral Almeida's impressive letter can be found in AHU DAU29A Document 206, dated 291XU1674. Both the Goa Council of State and the Overseas Council in Lisbon were impressed with his earlier work in helping to establish the *Junta* and his eventual report to the Crown. Cf. AHU DAU29 Document 203, *assento* of Goa Council of State, 23/XI/1674; and AHU DAM/3 Document 12, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 29/X/1675.
- 41 Cf. HAG MR139 fo. 115, Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 3/XIU1674.
- 42 HAG MR1W fos. 185-85v., Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 23/II/1675.
- 43 Cf. Mendonca Furtado to Pedro. HAG MR140 fo. 74, 21/II/1676; MR140 fo. 61, 21/II/1676 also found in AHU DAM/3, Document JJ; and MR140 fos. 145-45v., 22/II/1676.
- 44 Cf. *consultas* of Overseas Council: AHU DAM/3 Document 10, 261U1675; AHU Codex 212, fos. 37-38, 31/II/1675; AHU Codex 212, fa. 39, 6/II/1675; AHU Codex 212 fo. 38v., 7/II/1675; and AHU Codex 212 fos. 39-40, 8/II/1675.
- 45 Cf. Pedro to Mendonca Purrado. HAG MR140 fo. 73, 611IU1675; MR140 fo. 75, 611IU1675; MRJ40 fo. 60, 14/III/1675; and MR140 fo. (3, 14/III/1675.
- 46 AHU Codex 212 fos. 55-56v., *consulta* of Overseas Council, 19NU1676. This *consulta* was titled: "Sobre se rratar da povoacao dos Rios de Cuama e suas conquistas."
- 47 AHU DAM/3 Document 13, *considta* of Overseas Council, 29/XIU1676.
- 48 HAG MRJ43 fos. 208-09, Pedro to Almeida, *j/IVh677*. CL also AHU DAU30 Document 136, *consulra* of Overseas Council, 11/III/1677; HAG MRJ43 fo. 210, Pedro to Governors of India, *5nVIr677*; and MR143 fo. 218, Pedro to Governors of India, *8/IV/1677*.
- 49 Cf. AHU DAM/3 Document 16, *consulta* of Overseas Council and supporting documents, 23/VI/1677.
- 50 Letter of Pedro to Sousa Freire of 27/III/1677 cited by Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700*, p. 149 n. 23.
- 51 Cf. BPE Codex CXVh-2J fo. 95V.
- 52 For details on this stage of the settlement scheme, d. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-900*, pp. 149-50 and the manuscript sources cited therein. The *relacao* n.d. is included with AHU DAM/3 Document 13, *consulta* of the Overseas Council, 29/XIU/1676.
- 53 The relevant documents regarding this process are found in the various *consultas* of the Overseas Council found in AHU DAM/3 Documents: 18, 8/VII/1677; 20, 17/VII/1677; 21, 23NIIU1677; and 24-31, all dard 6NIIUJ677.
- 54 Cf. *The Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* p. 150.

- 55 Based on figures found in the *relacao* given in AHU DAM/3 Document 13, *consuua* of the Overseas Council, 29/XI/1676; and BPE Codex CXX/1-21 fo. 9v.
- 56 Cf. AHU Codex fo. 63v., *consulta* of Overseas Council, nJIXh677; Codex H2 fo. 64, *ccnsulta* of Overseas Council, 22/X/1677; and PRO SP IOU92, Anon. to Williamson, 18/XIh677 cited by Axelson in *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1711* (p. 150 n. 37).
- 57 Cf. Axelson, *Ibid.*; pp. 150-51.
- 58 Cf. Axelson, *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- 59 Cf. ACE IV:164-70, "Enrrega que o ex.mo S.or Luis Mendoca furtado e Albuquerque, Conde de Lavradio dos Concelhos do estado e guerra de S.A. fza da Govemanca da India eo ex.mo Snor Dom Pedro de Almeida do Concelho dEstado de S.A."
- 60 Cf. ACE IV:275-78 for the relevant *assento* of the Goa Council of State.
- 61 For background on the Ba Barayk dynasty, d. Subranamynam, *The Portuguese Empire*, pp. 191-94; and Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* pp. 152 ff.; and his editorial notes to "Viagem que fez o Padre Ant.o Games, da Comp.a de Jesus, ao Imperio de de (sic) Manornorapa; e assistencia que fez nas ditas terras d.e Alg'us annos", *Studio 3* (1959) pp. 155-242. The island of Parra had three main cities each under a shiekh or sultan, including Pate and Ampaza or Faza.
- 62 Cf. ACE IV: 277. Cf. also HAG MR/42 Ios. IH-34V., D. Pedro Almeida to Pedro, 10IU1678.
- 63 Cf. ACE IV:304-14, "Auto da abertura da Primeira via da Sccessao da Covemanca da India e, q' vierdo nomeados, par gov.ores os R.mos S.ores Dom Fr. Antonio Brandao Area Primas, e Antonio Paes de Sande ambos do Cons.o de S.A. e o D.or fr.co Cabral de Almeida chr.el do esrado falecido", and supporting documents.
- 64 Cf. HAG MRJ42 fo. 129, D. Pedro de Almeida to Pedro, 15/Ih678; MR/43 fo. 339, Anronio Paes de Sande to Pedro, 16/U1679; and HAG ACFh3 fo. 147V. *assento* of Treasury Council, 18/II/678; fa. 152, *assento* of Treasury Council on loaning ten artillery pieces to Junta, 18/U1678; and fo. 152V., *assento* of Treasury Council on outfitting Almeida's fleet, Ih678.
- 65 On these conditions, cf. AHU Codex 212-12v., *consu/ta* of Overseas Council, 15/XI/1679, based on Almeida's letter to Pedro of 5IVI/1678 from Mozambique; and Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* p. 151.
- 66 Cf. AHU Codex 212 fo. sov., *consulta* of Overseas Council, 10fIIh680; Axelson, *Ibid.*, p.151.
- 67 On these reinforcements for the expedition, d. Pees de Sande to Pedro: HAG MRJ43 fo. 239, 17/II/1679; MRJ43 fo. 215, 20/II/1679; and MR/43 fos. aoe-cov., 20/II/1679. A letter from D. Pedro de Almeida to Pedro of 20/II/1678 suggests that the Viceroy intended to take the Prince of Faza with him aboard the main fleet.
- 68 On the sacking and eventual retreat from the town, cf. HAG MRJ44 fo. 65, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 3/XI/1679; PRO SPF 89h6 fos. 78-79, Parry to Sunderland, 27NU/1680; and Axelson, *Ibid.*, p. 152.
- 69 Cf. AHU Codex 212 fos. 89v.-92v., *consulta* of Overseas Council, 18/VII/1680; and HAG MR/45 fos. 131-38v., Paes de Sande to Pedro, 23/II/1681.
- 70 Cf. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* pp. 155ff.
- 71 Cf. HAG MR/45 fos. 131-38V., Paes de Sande to Pedro, 13/U1681, which gave an overview of the state of affairs in Mozambique in the wake of D. Pedro de Almeida's death and the end of the Pate expedition. Among the supporting documents sent with this letter were lists of the couples sent to the Rios in October 1679, of those aboard the *Nossa Senhora de Guia* in December 1679, of the Portuguese subjects in Sena, as well as an estimate of the number of mulattoes in the district. The principal lists were titled: "Lisra dos cazaes que S.A.... foy servido mandar para esres Rios na Monedo de Ourubro de 1678;" "Cazais que vierjio na Serhia em Ourubro de 679;" "Cazais que vierao na Cahora Nossa Senhora de Guia ern Dezembro de 679;" "Somao dos cazaes que vierao de Mosambique para Senna;" "Lisra dos moradores portuguezes que ha

em Senna Quilimane e mais povoações desta conquista;" and "Resumo dos homens brancos portugueses e filhos de Portuguezes....10 de Junho de 680".

- 72 Cf. "O 'Regimento para o novo comércio de Mocambique' de 1673", pp. 91-99.
- 73 On Garcia's expedition, d. AHU Codex 212 fos. 89v.-95, *consultas* of Overseas Council, of 18/VI/1680 and 29/IV/1680.
- 74 Cf. AHU DAM/3 Document 83, *omsuita* of Overseas Council, 23/VI/1680.
- 75 Cf. AHU DAM/3 Document 80, Coma corrente da entrada e saída do Resgate que se fez nos portos do contrato de S.A. que Deus g.de neste presente anno [1679].

Conclusion

Cf. the contemporary accounts of Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*; Godinho, *Relação do novo caminho*; and Diogo de Couto, *O Soldado Practice* ed. by Manuel Rodrigues Lapa, and ed., Lisbon, 1954. The modern accounts include most notably Boxer, *Seaborne Empire* pp. 128-49 who first employed the term "stagnation and decline" for the post-1663 period; Pearson, *Portuguese in India* pp. 131-43 who concedes [p. 3] that "huge gaps" exist in the literature exist for these years; Hanson, *Baroque Portugal* pp. 209-11 who largely adopts the traditional view; and Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire in Asia* pp. 181-215, who examines the "niches" and "networks" in which the *Estado* stayed on after the loss of the Malabar possessions.

- 2 Cf. *Reiado do novo caminho* (Lisbon, 1944) p. 13.
- 3 The figures for 1630 and 1634 are adapted from Disney, *Pepper Empire* pp. 52-55, the figures for 1680 are found in HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27.
- 4 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24.
- 5 For details on Colbert's campaign and its possible impact on calculations in Lisbon, cf. Ames, *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* especially pp. 78-97.
- 6 Macedo's letters from Paris can be found in ANTI: Foreign Ministry Documents ME/III documents 1 and 2. For Hansen's view on the impact of French mercantilist theory on the Portuguese Crown, cf. *Baroque Portugal* pp. 126-40. Cf. also Virginia Rau, *Política Económica e Mercantilismo na Correspondência de Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo (1668-1676)* (Lisbon, 1968).
- 7 Cf. BNL Codex 748 tos. 153v.-56.
- 8 On these negotiations, d. Ames "An Elusive Partner: Portugal and Colbert's Projected Asian Alliance", pp. 34-57; and *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest (or Asian Trade)* pp. 78-88.
- 9 For a discussion of this important work, d. G.D. Winus, *The Black Legend of Portuguese Asia: Diogo do Couto, His Contemporaries and the Soldado Prático* (New Delhi, 1986?) pp. 38-57.
- 10 Cf. *Portuguese Trade in Asia* pp. 29-85, 241-42.
- 11 Cf. 10L OE 3929 Aungier to Company 2/VI/1674; 10L OC: 3939, Aungier to Company, 30/III/1674.
- 12 eLIOL OC 4044, Langhom to Company, 30/XI/1674, "The Portuguese particularly, whose Vice Rny begins to be troublesome; pretending to take all ships whatsoever [from] Mores that Sayle with less than 25 Europeans; and to take out all Portuguese out of any other ships they meet with; which latter though strictly taken is not without Precedents; yet may hereby ruine of many voyages and ships also."
- 13 A slight revision of sentiments expressed by Steensgaard in "The Return Cargoes of the *Carrreira*" pp. 27-28.

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